SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of

ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,
SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T.
BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners’ (a) Motion to Dismiss
the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an
application for a Writ of replevin..[2] Â h Y

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:

On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:

"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and
twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at
P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose
Vargas.

2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two
hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-
sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio
Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. …" .[3]

Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present
proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources)
Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept
the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer,
then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint
against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78),
Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code.[6] MisÓ sc

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and
Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to
file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The
complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..[7]

On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army
elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was
again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet,
valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio
Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for
violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..[8]

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy
of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary
criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for
violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who
chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it. .[9]

Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and
Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners
before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and
issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992. .[10] Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.[11]

Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction
and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent
RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and
enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and
forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed
the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are
kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia
legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court..[12]In a Resolution issued on
September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for
appropriate disposition..[13]

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that
the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78]
of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said
conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the
Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the
confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance
used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court
said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of
P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]

Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the
procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were
unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice
to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and
recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the
procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was
confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been
issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in
failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles
could not be considered in custodia legis..[15]

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners’ claim that private
respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners
could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought
to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of
the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It
reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of
his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer
might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of
another..[16]

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim
that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were
contradicted by its own findings..[17] Their petition was found without merit.[18] RtcÓ spped

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE

SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A]
OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES
NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO
 BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR
PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED
BY E.O. NO. 277; AND

(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A
SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:

(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is
in custodia legis.

(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles,
with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

We will now resolve both issues.

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the
commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest

Products without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code…slxä mis

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for
the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the
seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said
load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed
illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facieviolation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised
Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said
violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the
commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is
pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows: Scä

Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of
violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or

employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]

Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A
and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:

Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All

conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found
spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705,
shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his

duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural
resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to
seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent
thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies
apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances
shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest
products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case
where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance
shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the
case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent
documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a
warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section
78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxsä c

Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not
submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of
the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers
of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the
DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded
for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the
DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of
the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and
hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia
legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. .[20]

In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on
July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin
suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry
laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We
said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on
seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriff’s
Return, and wait for the judge’s instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.

Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a
replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:

". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous

plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the
court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in
their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and
forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of
a writ of replevin...".[21] ScslxÓ

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent..[22] And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit
against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. .[23] However, the
protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities
within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or
corruption.[24] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in
question are clearly official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A
and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing
their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without
the State’s consent.

Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor
General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative
remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time
possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by
a motion to dismiss..[26] If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could
be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. [27] Mesmä

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin
issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject
motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and
appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the
Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons
responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. CalrkyÓ

[1]
Rollo, pp. 22-27.
[2]
CA Records, p. 43.
[3]
Rollo, p. 23.
[4]
Id. at 23.
[5]
Id. at 74.

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. – Any person
[6]

who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied.)
[7]
Rollo, p. 70.
[8]
Id. at 23, 78.
[9]
Id. at 75, 85.
[10]
CA Records, p. 43.
[11]
Supra, note 4.
[12]
Id. at 18-19.
[13]
Id. at 21.
[14]
Id. at 26-A.
[15]
Id. at 25-27.
[16]
Id. at 27.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Id. at 6.
[20]
Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614, 621 (1991)
[21]
Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, July 28, 1999, citing Pacis v. Hon.
Averia,18 SCRA 907 (1966)
[22]
CONST., Art. XVI, sec. 3.
[23]
De Leon, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2nd ed., 1994, pp. 228-229.
[24]
Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et al., 109 Phil. 233, 241 (1960)
[25]
Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88, 96 (1988)

[26]
Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.

SECTION 1. Grounds. -- Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
[27]
Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 [1986). See also Section 1[j), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional
Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO
DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, Calbayog City, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others,
the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused

GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de [o]ficio.

The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.

The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is
taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No.
HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof. [3]

The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last
paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein
respondents.

The Facts

In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with]
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:

That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy
two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet
valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY
CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from
the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not
guilty.

Thereafter trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:

That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a

Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he
was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with
Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the
said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The
lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x
2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber
would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was
informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed
him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy
Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the
assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and
series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and
series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest
Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted
lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further
told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from
the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his
assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to
his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.

The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both
the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that
the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion.
The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series.
Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not
testify to identify [them].

For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused
would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts
have been established:

That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed
him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the
service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s]
were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca
Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the
furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood
shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference
as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross
Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were
loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his
house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was]
also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The
subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood
shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped
him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and
he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy.
Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house
in Barangay Obrero, CalbayogCity. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if
somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the
papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San
Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead
impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and
returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what
happened. [4]

After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle to Lucenecio.
 Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized
lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to present
documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber
seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional
Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and
conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994,
concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from
private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus
L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region
VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said
vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been
administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED
approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9]He further claimed that the DENR had
exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the
Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence.

The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood
shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house
in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the
authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding
the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC
considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was
untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his
disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by
the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross
Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of
P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused
Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion
which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest
products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the
subject lumber. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has
long become final and executory.

Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by

the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the
lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this
fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an
accused in the present case.

Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is
himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other
persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of
his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence,
neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has
committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision
of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were
declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed. [10]

Hence, this Petition.[11]

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:

(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order

x x x the return of property already owned by the government.

(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions

of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of
mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.
[12]
 Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the
confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and
(3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from
confiscating the vehicle administratively.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle

Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the
return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government
property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR
secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by
land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the
provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction
of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of
forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
Section 68 reads:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. [14]

Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or
other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. [15]

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal
meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording
correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial
arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want,
especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that
are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A
define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether
motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode
of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and
control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws,
rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-
93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the
guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation
of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to
private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess
seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The Information
did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally
cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as
amended.

Confiscation Without Due Process

Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false,
falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record
only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only
after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according
to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum
on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-
charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum
recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32)
ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the
confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal
Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because
it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside
the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed
Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating
Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on
Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is
questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated
vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the
validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper
service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is
not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main
limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions
and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil
actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]

Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended

Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-
A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator
or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of
1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the
conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal
use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of
PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law
or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her
vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have
violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case
is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement
or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the
authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable
of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we
cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds
such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products
without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice. [28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private
respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry
laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve
the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future
generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws. [29] Strong
paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that
frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]

Third Issue:
Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners
third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold
that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval
does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Judge Clemente C. Rosales; rollo, pp. 39-47.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[3]
Rollo, p. 47.
[4]
RTC Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 39-42.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[6]
Rollo, p. 35.
[7]
Order of Forfeiture; rollo, p. 147.
[8]
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 48-51.
[9]
Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, Annex C, rollo, p. 38; Annex 11, rollo, p. 147; and Annex H, rollo,
p. 177.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[11]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for private
respondents on January 30, 2001. The resolution of this case was delayed by private respondents
failure/refusal to file their pleadings on time. The Court had to issue two separate Orders of Arrest
and Commitment against private respondents on April 20, 1998, for their failure to submit their
Comment on the Petition (rollo, pp. 71-72) and against Atty. Sisenando Fiel Jr. on November 20,
2000 for his failure to file the Memorandum for private respondents (rollo, pp. 258-259).
[12]
Rollo, p. 228. The Memorandum for Petitioner was signed by
Attys. Fiel I. Marmita and Chona S. Apostol-Octa.
[13]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 18, August 2, 1995; Department of
Health v. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700, 707, December 29, 1995.
[14]
111 VLD 74.
[15]
Ibid, p. 75.
[16]
Globe-Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 701, March 3,
1992.
[17]
Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictonary, 2nd ed., p. 371, citing Kolambugan Lumber &
Development Co. v. Yia, 56 Phil 201, 203, October 15, 1931.
[18]
Ibid, p. 211, citing Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 108 Phil. 566, 572, May 31,
1960.
[19]
Id., p. 290, citing Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. Coscolluela, 44 Phil. 527, 531, February 20, 1923.
[20]
1, DENR Administrative Order 54-93.
[21]
5 and 7 of PD 705 (25 YLD 6-7).
[22]
April 6, 1995 Order; rollo, p. 151.
[23]
Letter dated May 10, 1995; rollo, p. 152.
[24]
5 (m) and (n), Rule 131, Rules on Evidence.
[25]
San Miguel Foods, Inc. -Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68, 84, October 10, 1996.
[26]
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 389, 393, August 7, 1996; Taedo v. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 80, 86, January 22, 1996.
[27]
9, PD 705.
[28]
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995; Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404, 407, July 5, 1996.
[29]
111 VLD 73.
[30]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, 472, January 23, 1995.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),

Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO
LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action

for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private
respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao,
Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR,
for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the
owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should
not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of
DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation andordered the forfeiture of
the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989
of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied
in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the
petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their
letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied
then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. [3] Pending resolution
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the
private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan [4] with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,[5] which issued a writ ordering the return
of the truck to private respondents.[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. [7] Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order
ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.[8] Hence, this present
petition,[9] with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction,
seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27,
1993,[10] the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was
granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that
the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of
this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon
the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance
to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as
admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on
the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.[11] Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action.[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is
not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by
the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence,
it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,[13] (2) when the issue involved
is purely a legal question,[14] (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction,[15] (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned,[16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,[17] (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter,[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable,[19] (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim,[20] (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings,[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. [22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the
Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners
of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12,
1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,[23] private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did
avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. [24]

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary
for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the
grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within
the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [25] In Felipe
Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,[26] which was reiterated in the recent
case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,[27] this Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the
circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process
because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan.
This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.[28] One may be heard , not solely
by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable
than oral argument, through pleadings.[29] In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation
of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration,[31] as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed
a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order
of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, [32] we ruled
that :

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of
the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to
perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be
gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
The pertinent provision reads as follows:

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents
thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor
include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large
extent, due to the fact that private respondents interpretation of the subject provision
unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of
Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below:

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline
ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized
in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of
the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent
laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read
in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. [33] Statutes should
be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.[34] In this wise, the observation
of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present
situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources
of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of
EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the
country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through
the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical

difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more
responsive to present situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other
hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-
A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided
any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra. [35]

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the
crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private
respondents, reads in part , viz. :

xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission
of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and
in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx [36]

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order
and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the
petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime"
is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was
being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of
P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed
out:
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by
Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance
used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.
She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
liable. xxx
[37]

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and

punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted
in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as
provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily
private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section
68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment
by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned
Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without
license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705
before its amendment by E.O.277 )

SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby

amended to read as follows:

Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277
amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705,
the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the
language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. [38]
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained
against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action
by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing
the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative
forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to
be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim
that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to
recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.[39] To detain is
defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody,[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous
taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim
of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing
of the property is sufficient.[41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin
proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging
the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized
under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and
the actual value of the property.[42] Private respondents miserably failed to convince this
Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should
be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest
products with out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section
68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck
by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence ,
no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the
orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority
given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken
by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts
may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET
ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is
hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the
controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo p. 235.
[2]
Rollo pp. 241-242.
[3]
Rollo p. 239.
[4]
Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded in office by Petitioner
Leonardo Paat.
[5]
Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.
[6]
Rollo pp. 251-252.
[7]
Rollo pp. 274-275.
[8]
Rollo pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by Justices Luis A. Javellana and
Jorge S. Imperial.
[9]
Rollo pp. 14-35.
[10]
Rollo pp. 117-119.
[11]
National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas Consolidated Mining
Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L -15809, August 30, 1961; Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R.
No. L-29466, May 18,1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.
[12]
Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-18276, January 12,
1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L-4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v. District Engineer, L-22782, August 29,
1975.
[13]
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.
[14]
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.
[15]
Industrial Power Sales, Inc. V. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.
[16]
Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.
[17]
De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.
[18]
Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata v. Peralta, G.R. No.
23155, September 9, 1974.
[19]
Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.
[20]
Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.
[21]
Soto v. Jareno, supra.
[22]
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.
[23]
Rollo pp. 236-240.
[24]
Rollo p. 239.
[25]
Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.
[26]
G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.
[27]
G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.
[28]
Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995.
[29]
Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995.
[32]
G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.
[33]
Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.
[34]
De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.
[35]
Rollo pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.
[36]
Rollo p. 242.
[37]
Ibid.
[38]
Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.
[39]
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p.850, footnote 57; I. Tanenbaum Son and
Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85, 184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.
[40]
Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 Ill 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27 Okla 754, 116 P 428.
[41]
Id., footnote 60 ; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.
[42]
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.