Francisco vs. House of Representatives [G.R. No.
160261, Nov 10, 2003] Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention
verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
 framers and the people mean what they say
ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers
ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
 no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others,
to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as
to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes
is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract.
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than
non-self-executing
as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967]
for that purpose, but it cannot do both, at the same time.
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION MAY BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN
A GENERAL ELECTION.
Santiago vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997]
PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, NOT SELF-EXECUTORY.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND DOES NOT COVER
INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION.
The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They
can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Lambino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006]
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION MUST CONTAIN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and
can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people
INTIATIVE CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, AND NOT REVISION
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-
andbalances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of
the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
1
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when
the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971]
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE SUBMITTED
TO THE PEOPLE FOR RATIFICATION IN ONE ELECTION, PIECE-MEAL
RATIFICATION IS NOT ALLOWED.
The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. It says
distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention
called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution, "thus
placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention
may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments
proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
Occena vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981]
TO APPROVE PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ONLY NEEDS MAJORITY VOTE, SUBJECT
TO THE RATIFICATION BY THE PEOPLE. - The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed.
De Leon vs. Esguerra [G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987]
1987 CONSTITUTION; DATE OF RATIFICATION; RETROACTS ON THE DAY
OF THE
PLEBISCITE.
will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite
merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date
of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people
in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. CIR [G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975]
THE PROMOTION OF GENERAL WELFARE IS A GOVERNMENT FUNCTION,
REPUDIATION OF THE CONCEPT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE. - The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group
of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it
is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991]
But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character
and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant.
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
THE SUSPENSION OF POLITICAL LAWS DURING BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE ENEMIES IN ARMS.
Republic vs. Villasor [G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973]
FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT.
"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
it may limit claimant's action `only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
2
Sanders vs. Veridiano [G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988]
ACTS COMMITTED BY THE OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY ARE
COVERED BY STATE IMMUNITY
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY APPLIES TO FOREIGN STATES SUED
IN THIS JURISDICTION. -
In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
par in parem non habet imperium (meaning, an equal has no authority over an
equal)
United States vs. Guinto [G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
The Holy See vs. Rosario [G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994]
PROCEDURE IN INVOKING STATE IMMUNITY BY FOREIGN STATES. - In
Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office
of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity
Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands [G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]
"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor,
or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense."
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when
the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall
be applicable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla (G.R. No.
L29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes
important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended
to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with
the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number.
3
 (A) The objection of Congressman Pat Rio Tek is not valid. The UNCLOS has
nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multi-‘. läteral
treaty regulating sea use rights and maritime zones, contiguous .zones,
exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves. Whether referred to
as internal waters or archipelagic wafers, the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines.
(B) UNCLOS III does not define the internal and territorial waters of states but
merely “prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines
of archipelagic States like the Philippines.”
(B)
(a) The territorial Sea is 12 nautical miles from the baselines. An
archipelagic state may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outerrnost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago; but the drawing of the baselines should
not depart to any appréciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago šave for 3 percent of the total number of the baselines (Magallona v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2017, 655 SCRA 476).
(b) The contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea.
The maximum limit is 24 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea. It
confers functional jurisdiction to prevent infringements of customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitary regulations. (Crawford, Brownlie’s Principle of Public
International
Law, 8th ed., pp. 265-268).
(c). The economic zone extends no farther than 200 nautical miles from the
baselines of the territorial sea. The coastal state has sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the
waters superjacent to the sea-bed and its sub-soil, and economic exploitation and
exploration, such as the production of energy, (Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of
Public International Law, 8th ed., p. 276).
(d) The continental shelf gives the coastal state rights to explore and exploit the
resources of the shelf by operation of law. (Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of
Public International Law, 8th ed., p. 276).
[A] The “completeness test means” that the law sets forth the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate. (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita,
469 SCRA 1 [2005]).
The “sufficient standard test” means the law lays down adequate guidelines or
limitations to map out the boundaries of the authority of the delegate and prevent
the delegate from running riot. The standard must specify the limits of the authority
of the delegate, announce the legislative policy and identify the condition under
which it is to be implemented. (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
[2005]).
[B] The assailed portion of the Presidential Decree No. 910 does no satisfy the two
tests. The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” gives the President unbridled discretion to determine the purpose
for which the funds will be used. An infrastructure is any basic facility needed by
society. The power to determine what kind of infrastructure to prioritize and fund is
a power to determine the purpose of the appropriation and is an undue delegation
of the power to appropriate. (Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 [2013])
The defenses raised by the U.S. Government are not valid.
[A] This defense relies on sovereign immunity from suit as advanced by the U.S.
Government.
But the suit file by the Officials of Palawan draws its strength from Article 30 and
31 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
However, the U.S. defense is defeated by the UNCLOS through the application of
Article 32 which provides:
“With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in Articles 30 and 31,
nothing in the Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. [emphasis added]”
4
In reality the supreme relevance of Article 32 quoted above is actualized by quoting
an existing U.S. government document sourced from Dispatch Supplement, Law
of the Sea Convention: Letters of Transmittal and Submittal and Commentary, as
follows:
“Article 32 provides, in effect that the only rules in the Convention derogating from
the immunities of warships and government ships operated for nongovernment
purposes are those found in Articles 17-26, 30 and 31 (February 1995, Vol. 6,
Supplement No. 1 p.12).
[B] The U.S. Government turns to the defense that it is not bound by the UNCLOS
for the reason that it is not a
Suggested answer to the 2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law State Party or a
signatory.
However, to be bound by the principle, it does not have to be a party to a treaty or
convention. If it has the normative status of a customary norm of international law,
it is binding on all states. This appears to be holding of the principle of immunity of
warship in question, as upheld by the U.S. Government in the document cited
above (Ibid., at p.17).
It states from the UNCLOS, thus:
The Convention protects and strengthens the key principle of sovereign immunity
for warships. Although not a new concept, sovereign immunity is a principle or of
vital importance to the United States. The Convention provides for a universally
recognized formulation of this principle.
Article 32 provides that, with such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and
in Articles 30 and 31 nothing in the Convention affects the immunities of warships.
[a] By the term “archipelagic doctrine of national territory” is meant that the islands
and waters of the Philippine archipelago are unified in sovereignty, together with
“all the territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
This archipelagic docrine, so described under Article I of the Constitution, draws
its rationale from the status of the whole archipelago in sovereignty by which under
Part IV of the UNCLOS the Philippines is defined as an Achipelagic State in Article
46, thus:
(a) “Archipelagic state” means a state constituted wholly nu one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands; (b) “Archipelago” means group of
islands including parts of islands interconnecting waters and other natural features
which are so closely interrelated that such islands waters and other natural
features form an intrinsic geographic, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such.
As an archipelagic state, the national territory is implemented by drawing its
“straight archepelgic baselines” pursuant to Article 47 of UNCLOS which
prescribes among its main elements, as follows:
1. By “joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago”, including the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area
of the water to the land including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 2. Mainly, the
length of such baselines “ shall not exceed 100 nautical miles…” 3. “The drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
Suggested answer to the 2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law configuration of
the archipelago.”
[b] The contention of Prof. Agaton is not correct at all.
“Regime of islands” is a concept provided in Article 121 of the UNCLOS. It is a
definition of the island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water
which is above water at high tide.”
On the other hand, this provision is differentiated from “rocks” which cannot sustain
human habitation of their own.
The importance of the difference between a natural island and rock is that an island
is provided with territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
This is the difference by which RA 9522 introduced into the KIG and separately
Panatag or Scarborough Shoal is an island.
“Regime of Islands”, has no relevance to acquisition or loss of sovereignty. RA
9522 has the effect of possibility dividing the area in question into island and rocks,
apparently to make clear for each the maritime zones involved in the definition of
island or of rocks.
The following are the methods of amending the Constitution:
(i) By Constitutional Convention, where Article XVII, Section 3 of the Constitution
states, "The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
5
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention." Both houses shall vote
separately, and the members includes all those within the jurisdiction of the
Congress.
(ii) By Constitutional Assembly, composed of all members of the bicameral
Philippine Congress (Senate and the House of Representatives). It is convened by
Congress to propose amendments to the 1987 constitution. Under Article XVII of
the Constitution of the Philippines, amendments pass upon a vote of three fourths
of all members of Congress, but it is not clear if the Congress should vote as a
single body or as separate houses.
(iii) Amendments to the Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
A. The consent to be sued is given by the State either expressly or impliedly.
There is express consent when there is a law enacted by the Congress expressly
granting to sue the State or any of its agencies.
There is implied consent when the State enters into a private contract, unless the
contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function; when
the State enters into an operation that is essentially a business operation, unless
the business operation is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental
function; or when the State sues a private party, unless the suit is entered into only
to resist a claim.
(B) Yes. Although the immunity from suit of the State can be extended to public
officials in the performance of their official functions and duties, the rule is not
absolute at all.
The suit against the government officer must be in a case in which the ultimate
liability will belong to the officer, not to the government. Public officials cannot hid
under the veil of state immunity for the acts performed in connection with official
duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith
or grave and patent negligence. In this case, the public official may be prevented
or ordered to undo the oppressive or illegal act or compelled to perform an act
which is legal. It is not the public official per se but his performance in line with his
duty which is being compelled or prevented thru petition for mandamus or
prohibition.
(C) Yes. Government-Owned or-Controlled Corporations enjoy immunity from suit
as they are regarded as instruments of the State.
However, the rule does accept exemptions such as when the law creating the
GOCC provides for its suability or when it enters into a commercial contract, acts
on its proprietary capacity, sues or files a counterclaim , confiscates property in
expropriation, acts thru an agent or gives it consent to be sued.
People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWER. - Any attempt to abdicate
the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest.
"on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another.
"It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be
managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authority; and
hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be
delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local self government has
never been held to trench upon that rule
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA [G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988]
6
TESTS IN DETERMINING VALIDITY OF DELEGATION. There are two accepted
tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce
it Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.

REASON FOR PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION. The reason is the increasing

complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary.

Ynot vs. IAC [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]

The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption.

Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose
the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.