Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
-On behalf of Bond, Bristow, British International, CHC Scotia: Captain Steve
O’ Collard – Manager Flight Standards – CHC European Operations
- The context
- Conclusion
Agenda
- The context
- The safety issue
- Conclusion
The context (1/3)
- JAR-OPS 3 amendment 5 includes additional Flight Performance
requirements for helicopter operations from/to offshore helidecks located in a
hostile environment (such as the North Sea), and proposes to the NAAs an
implementation starting on 01.01.2010. These requirements are called ‘PC2
Enhanced’ (PC2E).
- These requirements are (NB: in the event of one engine failure during the
take-off or the landing phases): « The take-off mass takes into account: the
procedure; deck-edge miss; and drop down appropriate to the height of the
helideck » (JAR-OPS 3.520(a)(3)(ii)), and « The landing mass takes into
account: the procedure; and drop down appropriate to the height of the
helideck » (JAR-OPS 3.535(a)(3)(ii)).
-Several North Sea Countries have introduced the PC2E requirements in their
national law since 01.01.2010,
- This is the reason why Eurocopter, in its letter to EHOC (dated 30/11/09),
has recommended not to apply the PC2E procedures in an offshore helideck
environment and has recommended to continue to use the ‘PC2 Limited
exposure’ instead (NB: because of Eurocopter commitment to EHOC made in
2008, draft PC2E Flight Manual procedures and performance were
nevertheless provided for EC225LP and EC155),
- The UK North Sea operators have presented this position to the CAA UK in
2009, which has received a very positive feedback. An extra delay has been
granted to the operators until 01.07.2010 in order to allow the CAA UK to take
a final position.
The context (3/3)
- The Eurocopter Letter to EHOC has been officially transmitted to the UK
and NL CAAs at the end of February 2010,
- The context
- Conclusion
Background
• PC2 enhanced:
h TDP
= 15ft
PC2 enhanced (AEO)
• For example: in case of take off and landing with the « 90°
offset » procedure (almost one third of the cases according to
operators): PC2 limited exposure is the only realistic solution (or
OEI OGE performance!)
PC2 (AEO)
15ft
PC2 enhanced (OEI)
• PC2 enhanced take off: in case of engine failure before TDP, a safe forced
landing is theoretically possible before TDP but more difficult if the TDP is
higher because
• The risk of losing the visual reference of the helideck is higher
• The risk of obstacle strike is higher
• If the pilot moves forward before the TDP, the safe forced landing in case of
engine failure before TDP can be impossible: deck edge strike
The trend for the crew can be to move forward before the TDP,
because:
TDP Fear of the obstacle in the rear and fear of loss of
h TDP references greater than the fear of engine failure,
= 30ft Priority to leave the helideck and pass the deck edge.
1st segment
TDP VTOSS, 100ft/mn
OEI 2mn 1000ft
OEI 30s
Vy
30ft
200ft
VTOSS=45kTAS
15ft
HEIGHT LOSS
35ft
Safety in OEI
Comparison of the PC2 enhanced risk with the PC2 limited exposure risk
PC2 limited exposure risk: catastrophic event at 5 10E-8 per take off and landing
• In addition to that,
If 10% of additional flights due to the potential payload loss with PC2E,
10% of additional accidents at the end, more than 1 additional accident
per year! (134 accidents in 8 years)
In the helicopter world, many more accidents due to obstacle strike and
loss of visual reference than to engine failure.
Eurocopter safety conclusion
EC thinks that the global risk with ‘PC2 limited exposure’ is smaller than the
global risk with ‘PC2 enhanced’ due to the facts that:
• The daily risk is lower by performing a PC2 limited exposure than a PC2
enhanced procedure.
• The previous safety conclusions drawn for PC2 enhanced are mainly
also valid for PC1 in an offshore environment (TDP PC1 = 30ft, loss of
payload….)
Agenda
- The context
- Conclusion
Way forward proposed by EC
To give all the information to the operator to determine the optimized take off
weight for the mission taking into account the best safety compromise between :
• Risks induced by platform environment (AEO)
• Risks induced by exposure time (OEI)
• Risks induced by additional flights (AEO)
In any case, the crew knows the theoretical exposure time (X seconds):
In practice:
In case of engine failure occurring before the theoretical exposure time X , the
combination of parameters ( height, IAS,VS …) that could permit a fly away could
be defined in the flight manual
PC2 Defined Limited Exposure: 3 scenarii
a/ A safe force landing could be not possible (Æ deck edge strike risk):
• no effect of wind factorization ,
• sudden loss of power
• engine remaining without positive power margin
• .....
b/ Water impact avoidance could not be possible (Æ ditching risk)
c/ A Fly away is possible (the real time exposure is lower than the
theoretical exposure time due to: wind effect , power effect...
Effect of 50 % wind factorisation With a wind 10kt greater than the wind factored:
ÆDLE is reduced by 2s compared to the theoretical
value
Example : With a 40kt real wind
Æ DLE is reduced by 4s compared to the theoretical
value
Effect of engine power 2% margin on Engine Power Check
Æ DLE is reduced by 0.5s compared to the theoretical
value
- The context
‘PC2 Enhanced’
‘PC2 Enhanced’: a non-prescriptive requirement – Why?
- soft wording (‘the take-off mass takes into account deck-edge miss’)
- no prescriptive wording (‘An operator shall be satisfied that …’ ). This is not the
same as « an operator shall ensure that… »
For a number of reasons (e.g. the deck size, and the helideck environment – including obstacles and
wind vectors), it was not anticipated that operations in PC 1 would be technically feasible or
economically justifiable by the projected JAA deadline of 2010 (OEI HOGE could have provided a
method of compliance but this would have resulted in a severe and unwarranted restriction on
payload/range).
However, due to the severe consequences of an engine failure to helicopters involved in take-off and
landings to helidecks located in hostile sea areas (such as the North Sea or the North Atlantic), a policy
of Risk Reduction is called for. As a result, enhanced Class 2 take-off and landing masses together with
techniques that provide a high confidence of safety due to: deck-edge avoidance; and, drop-down that
provides continued flight clear of the sea, are seen as practical measures.
For helicopters which have a Category A elevated helideck procedure, certification is satisfied by
demonstrating a procedure and adjusted masses (adjusted for wind as well as temperature and
pressure) which assure a 15ft deck edge clearance on take-off and landing. It is therefore
recommended that manufacturers, when providing enhanced PC2 procedures, use the provision
of this deck-edge clearance as their benchmark.
JAR-OPS 3 ACJ Subpart H, § 7.4.2 (ctnd)
As the height of the helideck above the sea is a variable, drop down has to be calculated; once clear of
the helideck, a helicopter operating in PC1 would be expected to meet the 35ft obstacle clearance.
Under circumstances other than open sea areas and with less complex environmental conditions, this
would not present difficulties. As the provision of drop down takes no account of operational
circumstances, standard drop down graphs for enhanced PC2 - similar to those in existence for
Category A procedures - are anticipated.
Under conditions of offshore operations, calculation of drop down is not a trivial matter - the following
examples indicate some of the problems which might be encountered in hostile environments:
-Occasions when tide is not taken into account and the sea is running irregularly - the level of the
obstacle (i.e. - the sea) is indefinable making a true calculation of drop down impossible.
-Occasions when it would not be possible - for operational reasons - for the approach and departure
paths to be clear of obstacles - the ‘standard’ calculation of drop-down could not be applied.
Under these circumstances, practicality indicates that drop-down should be based upon the height of the
deck AMSL and the 35ft clearance should be applied.
JAR-OPS 3 ACJ Subpart H, § 7.4.2 (end)
There are however, other and more complex issues which will also affect the deck-edge
clearance and drop down calculations:
As accident/incident history indicates that the main hazard is collision with obstacles on the
helideck due to human error, simple and reproducible take-off and landing procedures are
recommended.
In view of the reasons stated above, the future requirement for PC 1 is replaced by the new requirement
that the take-off mass takes into account: the procedure; deck-edge miss; and drop down appropriate to
the height of the helideck. This will require calculation of take-off mass from information produced by
manufacturers reflecting these elements. It is expected that such information will be produced by
performance modelling/simulation using a model validated through limited flight testing.
The ‘Enhanced PC2’: a target where practically possible
- ‘as accident/incident history indicates that the main hazard is collision with
obstacles on the helideck due to the human error, simple and reproductible
take-off and landing procedures are recommended’.
Conclusion of the JAR-OPS 3 intent for ‘PC2 Enhanced’
-Beyond the risk linked to one engine failure, JAR-OPS 3 states that the
‘Enhanced Class 2’ take-off and landing procedures have also to take into
account the following risks:
- collision with obstacles on the helideck due to human error (main
hazard according to in-service history),
- moving decks
- sea level (tide)
Conclusion: compliance of the « PC2 with time exposure »
Taking into account that the day to day risk (AEO conditions) of collison with
the obstacles on the helideck is much higher than the risk linked to one
engine failure, the risk induced by moving decks, Eurocopter consider that the
current ‘PC2 with time exposure’ characterized by:
- A low height vertical climbing
- A risk, in case of one engine failure, lower than one per 20 millions take-offs
or landings.
- The context
- Conclusion
Conclusion
1. Imposing the CAT A / PC1 take-off and landing profiles in the offshore
helideck environment is less safe than the current ‘PC2 with exposure’
way of operating,