Reinhardt Chartbook

This version: March 3, 2010
This Time is Different Chartbook:

Country Histories on Debt, Default, and Financial Crises
Carmen M. Reinhart
University of Maryland, NBER and CEPR
Abstract
This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of public debt
and economic crises of various forms. It is a timeline of a country’s creditworthiness and
financial turmoil. The analysis, narrative, and illustrations in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), This
Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, were primarily organized around themes
(serial default, inflation, etc.), although detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific
information on the dating, frequency, incidence, etc. of specific crises episodes by country. The
Chartbook compliments the thematic analysis with individual country histories, and provides the
grounds for a systematic analysis of the temporal patterns of debt cycles, banking and sovereign
debt crises, hyperinflation, and, for the post World War II period, the reliance on IMF programs.
JEL E6, F3, and N0
*
The author is grateful to Vincent Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff for useful comments and suggestions,
National Science Foundation Grant No. 0849224 for financial support and to Maura Francese, Elín
Guðjónsdóttir, Fregert Gustaffson, Sophia Lazaretou, Ashok Mody, Diego Saravia, and Jan-Luiten Van
Zanden for providing invaluable references on individual countries and, in some cases, sharing their
historical data as well.
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Table of Contents
Section
I. Preamble
II. Key to Charts and Methodology Notes
III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes
IV. Highlights and Future Research
References
List of figures
Figure
1. Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
2. Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking
Crises, 1975-2009
3a. Argentina: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
3b. Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default, Devaluation
and Banking Crises, 1865-1895
3c. Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking
Crises, 1970-2008
4a. Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default, and
Banking Crises, 1852-2009
4b. Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
5a. Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
5b. Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises,
1865-1914
6. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1835-2009
7. Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,Default, Banking Crises,
and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009
8a. Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
8b. Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Default and Banking Crises, 1875-1914
9 Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1919-2009
10a. Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009
10b. Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
11. Central African Republic: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
12a. Chile: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
12b. Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom,
13a. China: Central Government (domestic plus external), Default and Banking Crisis,
1865-1924
13b. China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default,
13c. China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external), and Banking
Crises, 1981-2009
14a. Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
2
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure
14b Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
15. Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 1892-2009
16. Cote D’Ivoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
17. Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1880-2009
18 Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
19a. Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default and Banking
Crises, 1914-2009
19b. Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
20. Egypt: Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009
21a. El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external)Debt, Default and Banking
Crises, 1914-2009
21b. El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-
2009
22a. Finland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1914-2009
22b. Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
23. France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1880-
2009
24a. Germany: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
24b. Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
25. Ghana: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
26a. Greece: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
26b Greece: Government Domestic Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1884-1939
27. Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and
Devaluation, 1920-2009
28 Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and
Devaluation, 1914-2009
29. Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
30a. Iceland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1908-2009
30b. Iceland: External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009
30c. Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
31. India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default,
32a. Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1975-2009
32b. Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
33a. Ireland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1929-
2009
33b. Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
34 Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1861-2009
35a. Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
35. Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
3
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure
36. Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
37a. Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
37b. Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
38a. Malaysia: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
38b. Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
39. Mauritius: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-
2009
40a. Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910
40b. Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1872-2009
41. Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-
2009
42. Myanmar: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1980-2009
43. Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external) and Banking Crises,
1814-2009
44a. New Zealand: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1860-2009
44b. New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
45. Nicaragua: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
46. Nigeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
47a. Norway: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
47b. Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004
48. Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1914-2009
49. Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
50a. Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
50b. Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
51a. Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default,
51b. Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises,
1980-2008
52a. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
52b. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
53. Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
54. Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-
2009
55a. Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945
55b. Russia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation,
56. Singapore: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,and Banking Crises,
4
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
1969-2009
Figure
57a. South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
57b. South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
58a. Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679
58b. Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
58c. Spain: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
58d. Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises,
1970-2008
59. Sri Lanka Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1950-2009
60a. Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
60b. Sweden: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
61. Switzerland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
62a. Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts,
“Near-default”, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009
62b Thailand: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
63. Tunisia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
64a. Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009
64b. Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
65a. United Kingdom: Central Government Debt, Restructurings, and Banking Crises,
1692-2009
65b. United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
66a. United States: Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1790-2009
66b. United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
66c. United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009
66d. United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
67a. Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
67b Uruguay: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Default, and Banking
Crises, 1865-1914
68. Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1921-2009
69. Zambia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
70. Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
5
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
I. Preamble
This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of debt and
economic crises of various forms. The analysis, narrative, and illustrations in This Time is
Different, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although
detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency,
incidence, etc. of specific crises episodes by country. 1 The Chartbook compliments the thematic
analysis—indeed, it fills in as documentation to its underpinnings. What follows systematically
illustrates for 70 countries the individual timeline of public and private debts, banking, sovereign
domestic and external debt crises, and hyperinflation, starting from a country’s independence
(and even prior to that in numerous cases) to the present. The dating of the largest output
declines and a country’s history with International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs since World
War II to deal with an assortment of economic ills contribute to the chronologies.
The individual country histories are often fascinating in their own right, highlighting that
virtually no country has escaped unscathed from economic crises of one form or another. In
effect, in a number of countries, financial crises are more “a way of life” affecting all, if not most
generations. Black swans are not that rare.
The prologue to this Chartbook is minimalist by design and is organized as follows. The
next section offers an essential guide to the country charts and the accompanying tables, clarifies
methodological issues, and delineates the approach followed to document the vast number of
sources referenced in this analysis.
Section III summarizes some of the main (common or recurrent) themes and patterns that
(collectively) the country histories reveal. Some of these are documented in the literature while
others merit considerable further study. These “big picture” themes include: The repeated-game
nature of sovereign debt crises and the fact serial default is commonplace among today’s
1
Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009)
6
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
emerging markets just as it was among advanced economies in an earlier era needs little
commentary, as even a causal perusal of the charts display this historical pattern. The serial
nature of banking crises (particularly among the more developed economies prior to World War
II) is equally compelling. Nearly all of the 21 advanced economies in the sample record an
impressive crisis tally, especially from the 1880s to the 1930s. The episodes where there are
surges in private debt before the crisis and public debts after the crisis are not only numerous but
span across advanced and emerging economies in nearly all regions. And so on…
The last section discusses where there are gaps in the data and overall analysis of the
debt-crisis cycle. As such, it is a roadmap for future research,
II. Key to Charts and Methodology Notes
For working definitions of banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises, see the extensive
discussion in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and 2010). As to the crises highlighted in the country
profiles, our focus is on primarily external sovereign default (also its less common counterpart--
domestic sovereign default) and banking crises. Many countries have a rich history of recurring
(and often chronic) exchange rate crashes and inflation crises, particularly (but not exclusively) in
post World War II Latin America. We only provide limited information on these recurring follies
in monetary history.2 We do include, highlight and date all hyperinflation episodes, as these have
been associated with the complete or near complete liquidation (through de facto default) of
domestic currency debts.
Key to charts
Besides the events discussed above, in a few charts we highlight “near- default” episodes,
which involve some form of international assistance to avoid a default or a restructuring. Their
dates are also listed in the first column of the accompanying table. Some examples of sub-
2
In the tables that accompany each country profile, we do provide, as summary statistic on inflation crises,
the share of years with annual inflation above 20 per cent per annum. This inflation performance also gives
a reasonable indication of the incidence of currency crashes,
7
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
sovereign defaults (by states or provinces) are also flagged. In a few charts, historic currency
crashes (such as the collapse of an 80-year old peg) are highlighted as well. More mundane
episodes of inflation and currency crises are not shown. However, the full sample incidence
(share of years) in an inflation crisis, is reported in the table below the chart, so as to provide
information on chronic inflation problems. 3 The major output collapses shown in the tables that
accompany the charts and the numerous IMF progams since 1952 (listed as a memorandum item
at the bottom of the table) are not depicted in the figures, to avoid compromising clarity.
Table 1. Coloring and Shading to Highlight Events in Country Charts
Years in default or restructuring Pale

External debt shading
Years in default or restructuring Dark
Domestic debt shading
Near default, as defined in text Bright
shading
First year of banking crises Black
line/bar
Hyperinflation Medium
(annual inflation > 500%) shading
Insets of smaller tables and charts into the figures
Insets are used throughout to provide complementary information to that shown in the
main figure. For example, for many advanced economies, an inset plots for household credit to
GDP from the mid-1990s to the present to highlight trends in private debts ahead of the 2007-
2008 crisis. In other cases, these insets provide information on the maturity composition of the
debt (public or private, as the case may be) on the eve of a banking crisis be it default or
hyperinflation. The distribution of public and private debt before and after a crisis also provide
documentation of the numerous crisis cases where the government assumed important quantities
of private debts.
3
For evidence on the correlation and overlap between currency crashes and inflation crises, see Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010).
8
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Descriptive statistics in the tables to each country
Descriptive statistics are mostly self-explanatory, but two particulars merit explanation.
The first year of banking crises are listed and those shown in italics indicate that the episode in
question was not deemed to be a systemic crisis. Near default episodes are also shown in italics
and not counted in the tally of default. The last column provides information on the largest annual
output declines, usually the top five, but more or less when relevant. Both the year and the
percent decline (in parentheses) are given. For full output collapse episodes, the interested reader
is referred to Barro and Ursua (2009).
The bottom portion of the table gives memorandum items on IMF programs with the
country over the period from 1952 to 2009. The first year of the program is listed as well as the
total number of programs. The relevant sources are discussed below.
Debt ratios
Debt is usually shown as a percent of GDP and in a few cases as a percent of exports. In a
handful of cases we have debt data for the earlier part of the 19th century but no GDP or trade
measure to scale the debt data by. In those few cases, we show changes in debt (often over three
years) to provide an indication of the debt cycle. The nominal GDP data comes from numerous
scholars as well as official statistical sources. For a number of developing countries we have
more data on exports than for GDP (in all cases we have post World War II nominal GDP data).
In these cases the charts show the actual debt/GDP ratio for the period during which GDP data is
available (say post 1920s) and use the debt/exports ratio times the average export to GDP ratio
(for the period during which both series overlap) to back-cast the series.
References and sources
Most charts list the main source as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), which has an extensive data
appendices listing sources series-by-series and country-by-country over different subperiods.
Additional sources listed below each graph usually indicate that we came across these sources
subsequent to the publication. Prominent examples of the recent discoveries include: detailed
9
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
recent historical studies of Italian, Greek, Dutch and Swedish public debts (Maura Francese and
Angelo Page for Italy, Sophia Lazaretou on Greek 19th century domestic debts, Frit Bos for the
Netherlands, and Klas Fregert and Roger Gustafsson for Sweden.) As the sample was extended
to include Bulgaria, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, and Switzerland, pertinent sources for these are also
listed in the relevant country page. Finally, the sources for the IMF programs are Bird, Hussain
and Joyce (2004), Mody and Saravia (2009), and the IMF’s Annual Reports for several years to
update these studies through 2009.
III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes
This section highlights some of the issues where the collective evidence from the country
histories are particularly illuminating. Throughout, I use country examples or specific crises
episodes to illustrate particular points.
(i) Serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and several
advanced economies. Figures 8a and 26 for Brazil and Greece, respectively (among many more
that are similar) call attention to this point by simply shading the years in default throughout the
sample; the summary table also lists the timing and duration of each default spell while the tally
entry (bottom of column 1) reports the default tally for 1800-2009. Countries such as France and
pain have a higher count if pre-1800 default episodes are counted.
(ii) Prior to World War II, serial banking crises in the advanced economies was the
norm; as the larger emerging markets developed a financial sector in the late 1800s—these
economies joined the “serial banking” crisis club. Country histories for Belgium (Figure 6),
Canada (Figure 10a) among others, illustrate this pattern. The world financial centers (the UK,
Figure 65a and the US Figure 66a) take the lead in serial banking crises. One can speculate that
the less-developed economies substitute foreign bankers for nonexistent domestic ones. As such,
when acute sovereign fiscal difficulties arise, these become manifest in serial external default
rather than serial domestic banking crises.
10
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
(iii) In light of serial debt and banking crises (not to mention chronic currency and price
instability), it is not surprising to see a similar serial pattern in the incidence of IMF programs.
Peru and the Philippines set the record with 24 and 23 programs, respectively. However, IMF
programs were not always in the exclusive domain of emerging markets. During the 1950s-
1970s, the IMF was more like the discount window of a central bank and did not carry the stigma
it of the default or near default cases. Among the advanced economies, the U.K. holds the record
with 11 programs.4
(iv) Private debts typically surge prior to a banking crises. This pattern is evident in
total external debt (a stock), capital inflow bonanzas (a flow), domestic banking sector credit (a
stock), or any combination of these. 5 Public debts may or may not surge ahead of banking
crises. Indeed, especially in financial repression cases the governments efforts to stuff its debts in
“captive “ bank balance sheets Procyclical fiscal policies, where the government amplifies the
boom-bust cycle in total debt (as documented in Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003), all too
often re-enforce the boom in private indebtedness ahead of the banking crisis.
For external debts, see Figures 30b and 62a for Iceland and Thailand, respectively.
Surges in capital inflows do not last forever. When they end, countries often display the Calvo-
type sudden stop syndrome, even in crises of an earlier century in advanced economies. 6 The
U.S. experience during 1865-1913, shown in Figure 68b, exemplifies this behavior. Domestic
credit climbs sharply prior to the banking crisis an unwinds afterward—the examples form
banking in Colombia (Figure 12b) and Norway (Figure 47b) demonstrate this time profile. By
contrast, the famous (or infamous) lost decade and bank debt overhang in post 1992 crisis Japan
is evident from Figure 34b. The coverage on domestic credit boom in this Chartbook is not
intended to be as comprehensive as public and external debt—the primary focus. However, the
4
Bird et.al. (2004) aptly title their paper on IMF programs “Many Happy Returns?..”
5
The term “capital flow bonanza” is introduced in Reinhart and Reinhart(2008) and refers to a surge in
capital inflows (over and beyond their historoic norm).
6
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo_Kung (2006), for example.
11
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
pattern alluded to here is strongly supported by the evidence from studies that have focused
primarily on the domestic credit cycle. The most comprehensive in terms of country coverage is
Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who find most booms are followed by currency crises, banking
crises or both. The smaller country set for the 1880-2008 period studied in Schularick and Taylor
(2010) presents similar findings.7
(v) Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises. To
be clear, we are referring to “domestic” banking crises, the issue of whether banking crises in the
financial centers precede domestic banking crises and or sovereign defaults or restructurings is
examined in some detail in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). The reasons for this temporal sequence
may be the contingent liability story emphasized by Diaz Alejandro (1985) and formalized in
Velasco (1986), in which the government takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus
undermining its solvency.8 Even absent large scale bailouts (and without counting the post-crisis
new government guarantees) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) establish that, largely owing to
collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise by about 86 percent in the three years
following a systemic financial crisis, this sets the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst
scenario, default.
The list of country examples of this sequencing is too long to enumerate, we would
highlight as illustrative, the Barings 1891 crisis in Argentina (Figure 3b), Austria’s banking crisis
in 1931 and subsequent default in 1932 (Figure 5a) and Indonesia’s 1997-1998 banking crisis and
1999-2000 default (Figure 32a).
(vi) Public debts follow a repeated boom-bust cycle; many (if not most) of the bust
phase involved a debt crisis in emerging markets. Public sector borrowing surges as the crisis
nears. Debts continue to rise after default, as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.9
7
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Gourinchas et.al. (2001) also document for different samples this
boom-crisis-bust pattern.
8
See Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) for a framework that is consistent with these dynamics.
9
See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on evidence on output behavior before during and after debt crises.
12
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
If there is an exchange rate crash associated with default, as shown in Reinhart (2002), the
valuation effect on external debts also contributes to further increase in debt/GDP ratios.
The boom-bust episodes are very numerous cutting across regions and time. The crisis
episode in Figure 69 for Zambia illustrates the pre-crisis surge in public debt—as well as its
continued climb in the early stage of default.
(vii) As suggested in the Diamond and Dybvig’s famous framework of banking crises, short-
term debts (public and private) escalate on the eve of banking crisis and sovereign defaults. 10
Most famously, Mexico ramped up its short-term debt issuance just in advance of its
“Tesobonos” crisis in 1994 as in Figure 40b. In the march toward hyperinflation, long-term debts
disappear altogether; the German hyperinflation of 1923-1924 (Figure 22a) demonstrates these
dynamics.
(viii) Private debts become public debts-after the crisis. Several examples from the debt
crisis that engulfed Latin America in the early 1980s and lasted a decade are documented in
various insets that document the rising share of private “hidden debts” carrying implicit
government guarantees (Figure 62a for Thailand, among others) (Figure 19a for Ecuador, for
example). 11
10
See Chang and Velasco (2000) for an open-economy treatment of Diamond and Dibvig (1983).
11
For a discussion of hidden public debt see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
13
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 1. Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and

(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
Banking crisis
(black line) 80
70
60
50
40
30
Default 20
(shaded)
10
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Algeria, 1962-2009
External Duration Domestic Banking Hyper- Share of Share of 5 worst
default (in years) default crisis dates inflation years in years in output
Dates dates (first year) dates external inflation collapses
default crisis year(decline)
1991-1996 6 n.a. 1990 n.a. 10.4 12.5 1961(12.1)
1962(21.1)
1966(4.8)
Number of episodes: 1971(8.5)
1 0 1 0 1980(5.4)
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs Total number
1989, 1991, 1994,1995 4
14
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 2. Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

700
Banking crisis
(black bar) 600
Domestic defaults
(dark shading) 500
400
1993-1996 Hyperinflation
Year Inflation
1993 1379.5 300
1994 949.8
1995 2672.2
200
1996 4146
Default (shaded) 100
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Notes: No data is available prior to 1985 right after independence from Portugal (1975) and during the
early year of the 27-year civil war (1975-2002).
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:

Angola, 1975-2009
dates dates (first year) dates external inflation collapses
1985-2003 19 1976 1991 1993-1996 54.3 60.0 1974 (5.0)
1992-2002 1975 (38.4)
1976 (10.2)
1 2 1 1 1993(24.0)
Dates of programs Total
None 0
15
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 3a. Argentina: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Public foreign bond issues and default

250
50
1827-1857 40
the first and longest
default 30
200
20 Hyperinflations
10
0
150
1824 1834 1844 1854 1864 1874
` 100
External defaults (shaded)
banking crises (black lines)
50
0
1867 1877 1887 1897 1907 1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown above. Domestic default episodes are that overlap with
external default are not shaded (see table below for dates)
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs:
Argentina, 1816-2009
1827-1857 31 1890-1893 1885 1984-1985 32.5 24.7 1914(10.4)
1890-1893 4 1982 1890 1989-1990 1917(8.1)
1951 1 1989-1990 1914 1931(6.9)
1956-1965 10 2001-2005 1931 1959)6.5)
1982-1993 12 2007-2009 1934 1985(7.0)
1989 -- 1980 1989(7.0)
2001-2005 9 1985 2002(10.9)
1989
1995
2001
Number of episodes:
7 5 10 2
1958-1962, 1967-1968, 1976-1977, 1983-1984, 1987, 1989, 20
1991-1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003(2)
16
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 3b. Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default,
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
160
1890 Barings banking
1885 and 1890 crises crisis and default
Year Private as a 140
% of total
1884 42.1 120
1885 96.6 1885, banking crisis and
1889 78.2 exit from Gold Standard
1890 100.0 100
80
60
40
Banking crises
(black lines)
20
0
1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
17
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 3c. Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation

(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
70
Hyperinflation
First year of
60
the banking crisis
(black line);
default (shaded)
50
40
30
Curency crash;
bank holiday 20
and an output
collapse of
over 30%
10
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method
is used. Only systemic banking crises are shown.
18
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure4a. Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,

Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1852-2009
200
Banking crises
(black lines); 180
there is a "near-
160
default"
Household debt as a percent of GDP in 1932
140
in New South
130 Wales.
120
110
90 100
70
50 80
1995 1999 2003 2007
60
40
20
0
1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: S.J. Butlin (1968), OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: An interesting anecdote on sub-sovereign debt from correspondence with Huw McKay (who also
refered us to Butlin’s work, which dates the earliest banking crises.. During the great depression, the left
wing government of the largest state in Australia, New South Wales, voted to default on its foreign debt,
only to be over-ruled by the Federal Government. Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Australia, 1800-2009
(calculations since independence—1901)
default (in default crisis dates inflation years in years in output
dates years) dates (first year) dates external inflation collapses
1932 n.a. n.a. 1828 n.a. n.a. 2.8 1882(5.6)
1843 1892(12.3)
1893 1893(5.5)
1931 1930(9.5)
1989 1931(6.7)
Number of episodes:
0 0 5 0
1961 1
Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total.
19
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 4b. Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
160
1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath
Banking crises
Year Private as a
(black lines) 140
% of total
1886 16.9
1887 34.8 120
1891 17.9
1892 12.8
100
80
60
40
20
0
1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893
20
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 5a. Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Banking crisis begins in

1931 (black lines) and default in 1932. 100
1938 was the last of 7 default episodes (shaded)
90
80
70
60
The 1921-1922 hyperinflation
Year Share of 50
short-term debt
40
1919 68.6
1920 87.9 30
1921 99.1
20
10
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Austria, 1800-2009
(Austria-Hungary pre-1918)
default crisis year(decline)1
1802-1815 14 1945 1873 1921-1922 17.1 13.3 1919(15.6)
1816 1 1924 1931(8.0)
1868-1870 3 1929 1932(10.3)
1914-1915 2 1931 2009(3.8)
1932-1933 2 2008
1938 1
1940-1952 13
Number of episodes:
7 1 5 1
None 0
Notes: There is an issue whether to treat (more or less) consecutive defaults in 1802, 1805, and 1811 as
separate episodes or as a single longer episode, as above.
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
21
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 5b. Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
450
World War I begins
400
350
Banking crisis 300

(black line)
250
200
150
100
50
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
22
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 6. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and

140
120
100
80
60
40
First year of banking crises

20
(black lines)
0
1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Belgium, 1800-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1838 n.a. n.a. 5.2 1932(4.5)
1842 1938(2.3)
1848 2009(3.2)
1870
1914
1925
1931
1934
1939
2008
Number of episodes:
0 0 10 0
1952 1
1
23
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 7. Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
1931 default
1000
Share of
Domestic default (dark shading)
Year short-term debt 900
1928 18.3
1929 46.2 800
1930 51.2
700
1984-1985 hyperinflation
600
500
The 1931
Banking crises (black lines) 400
default
episode
300
(shaded) lasted
18 years 200
100
0
1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics.
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs:
Bolivia, 1825-2009
1875-1879 5 1927 1987 1984-1985 21.6 14.6 1954(9.5)
1931-1948 18 1982-1985 1994 1956(5.9)
1980-1984 5 1999 1982(4.4)
1986-1993 8 1983(4.5)
1989-1997 9
Number of episodes:
5 2 3 1
1956-1957, 1959, 1961-1967, 1969, 1973, 1980, 20
1986 (2), 1988(2), 1994, 1998, 2001
24
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 8a. Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
900
Year Share of
Hyperinflation
short-term debt
1987 11.8 800
1988 44.1
1989 79.2 700
600
Defaults
(shaded) 500
400
300
First year of
banking crises 200
(black lines)
100
0
1824 1834 1844 1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Notes: For 1824-1945, public external debt; for 1946-2009 external debt is the aggregate of public and
private debts. Only the major banking crises are shown. There are a total of 9 default episodes but only 8
shaded regions, as two episodes occur in consecutive years (see table below). Only systemic banking crises
are shown.
Brazil, 1822-2009
1828-1834 7 1986-1987 1890 1988-1990 26.6 26.1 1893(12.8)
1898-1901 4 1990 1897 1992-1994 1896(7.2)
1902-1910 9 1900 or 1930(6.0)
1914-1919 6 1914 single 1981(4.4)
1931-1933 3 1923 episode 1990(4.2)
1937-1943 7 1926 1988-1994
1961 1 1929
1964 1 1963
1983-1990 8 1985
1990
1994
Number of episodes:
9 2 11 2(1)
1958, 1961, 1965-1972, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1998, 2001-2002 16
25
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 8b. Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
90
The Barings crisis of 1890
Banking crises
(black lines); 80
default (shaded)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
26
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 9. Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,

350
Three external defaults

(shaded) 300
250
200
150
Banking crises 100

(black lines)
1981-1990, only external public debt 50

data available (dashed line)
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Bulgaria
Dates years) dates (first year) dates external inflation collapses
1916-1920 5 n.a. 1931 n.a. n.a. 1934(8.5)
1932 1 1994 1990(9.1)
1990-1994 5 1991(10.8)
1993(11.6)
3 0 2 0 2009(6.5)
1991-1992, 1994, 1996-1998, 2002, 2004 8
27
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 10a. Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009

(debt as a percent of exports and GDP)
700
1935- Alberta defaults

600
First year of banking
crisis (black line)
500
Debt-to-exports (solid)
400
300
200
100
Debt-to-GDP (dotted)
0
1867 1877 1887 1897 1907 1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. The 1983 banking crisis (also shown) does
not meet the systemic criteria.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Canada, 1867-2009
1935 “near” 10 n.a. 1837 n.a. n.a. 0.7 1876(6.7)
1866 1919(7.6)
1873 1921(10.8)
1906 1931(15.4)
1908 1932and
1933(7.1)
1912
1923
1983
Number of episodes:
0 0 8 0
None 0
28
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 10b. Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
1890 50
Barings crisis
45
40
35
The Panic 30
of 1907
Banking crises 25
(black lines)
20
15
10
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
29
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 11. Central African Republic: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
120
Banking crises
(black lines)
100
80
60
1994, a rare 100 percent
devaluation across the
CFA franc zone 40
Second and 20
ongoing default
(shaded)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs:

Central African Republic, 1960-2009
1981 1 n.a. 1976 n.a. 56.0 4.0 1979(5.6)
1983-2009 27 1988 1983(6.0)
2 0 2 0 2003(7.1)
1980-1981, 1983-1985, 1987(2), 1989, 1994, 1998 10
30
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 12a. Chile: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
250
9 default/restructuring
episodes (shaded)
200
150
Banking crises 100

(black lines)
50
0
1826 1846 1866 1886 1906 1926 1946 1966 1986 2006
Sources: Diaz et. al (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Chile, 1818-2009
1826-1842 16 n.a. 1890 n.a. 27.1 20.3 1919(14.2)
1880-1883 4 1899 1921(13.3)
1931-1947 18 1907 1930(16.0)
1961 1 1915 1931(21.2)
1963 1 1926 1932(15.5)
1965 1 1976 1947(10.8)
1972 1 1981 1975(12.9)
1974-1975 2 1982(13.6)
1983-1990 8
Number of episodes:
9 0 7 0
1956, 1958-1959, 1961, 1963-1966, 1968-1969, 16
1974-1975, 1983, 1985, 1989 (2)
31
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 12b. Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom,
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
120
Banking crises
(black lines);
default (shaded) 100
The Barings crisis of 1890

80
The Panic
of 1907 60
40
20
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Sources:.Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
32
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 13a. China: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
1600
Banking crisis
(black line)
1400
defaults
(shaded)
1200
Domestic
default
(dark shading) 1000
800
600
400
200
0
1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935

China, 1850-2009
1921-1936 16 1921
1863 1946-1948 12.9 10.0 1934(8.7)
1939-1949 11 1932
1866 1960(3.4)
1873 1961(17.3)
1883
1898
1910
1923
1931
1934
Number of episodes: 1998
2 2 10 1
1981, 1986 2
1
No output data from 1939 to 1951.
33
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 13b. China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
70
Banking crises
(black lines)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
34
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 13c. China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external)
(three-year sum in issuance as a percent of GDP)
23
Total (Central government) Asian financial 21

Year Debt/GDP crisis
19
2006 16.5
2008 27.8 est. 17
2009 35.7 est.
15
First year banking 13

crisis
(black line) 11
US subprime and
9
global crisis; fiscal
stimulus plans in
7
China.
5
3
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, several issues, National Debt Association of China, Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Data on central government debt outstanding (domestic plus external) is no longer published.
Estimates for 2008 and 2009 are based on issuance data for those years.
35
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 14a. Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
90
The runup to default 80

Year Share of
Short-term debt 70
1929 15.1 Banking
1930 20.2 crises. 1982 60
1931 43.9 and 1998
(black lines)
50
40
1932, the last of 7 default 30

episodes (shaded)
20
10
0
1902 1907 1912 1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Sources: Junguito and Rincón (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Colombia, 1819-2009
1826-1845 20 n.a. 1982 n.a. 35.6 17.8 1914(3.4)
1850-1861 12 1998 1934(2.1)
1873 1 1999(4.2)
1880-1896 17
1900-1904 5
1932-1934 3
1935-1944 10
Number of episodes:
7 0 2 0
1957-1960, 1962-1964, 1966-1973, 1999, 2003, 18
2005
36
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 14b. Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
The 1998 banking cisis was 50

associated with the worst
recession recorded.
First year of 45
the banking
crises
(black lines) Coverage of
40
domestic credit
series expanded
35
30
25
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
is used.
37
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 15. Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
750
6 of a total of 9 defaults/restructurings are shaded

650
550
450
350
crises (black lines)
250
150
50
1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Soley Güell (1926), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources
cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Costa Rica, 1838-2009
1828-1840 13 n.a. 1987 n.a. 34.5 5.3 1923(7.6)
1874-1885 12 1994 1927(9.2)
1895-1897 3 1932(8.0)
1901-1911 11 1934(11.8)
1932-1952 21 1942(10.4)
1962 1 1944(9.4)
1981 1 1982(7.3)
1983-1990 8
1984-1985
Number of episodes:
9 0 2 0
1961-1962, 1965-1967, 1976, 1980-1982,1985, 16
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2009
38
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 16. Cote D’Ivoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
250
Almost uninterrupted ongoing

default for 26 years (shaded)
200
150
100
1994, a rare 100 percent

devaluation
Banking crisis across the CFA franc 50
(black line) zone countries
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Cote D’Ivoire, 1960-2009

1983-1998 16 n.a. 1988 n.a. 52.0 6.0 1965(2.2)
2000-2009 10 1983(3.9)
2 0 1 0 2000(4.6)
1981, 1984-1986, 1988-1989, 1991, 1994, 1998, 11
2002, 2009
39
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 17. Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
90
Accounting definition of debt
expanded 80
70
60
50
Banking crises
(black lines) 40
Household debt as a % of GDP 30

1995 79.6
2000 90.9 20
2005 115.9
2008 136.7 10
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Denmark, 1800-2009

n.a. n.a. 1813 1813 n.a. 0.0 1.9 1856(5.6)
1857 1877(2.7)
1877 1921(2.9)
1885 1932(2.6)
1902 2009(5.0)
1907
1921
1931
1987
2008
Number of episodes:
0 1 10 0
Dates of programs Total number of years
None 0
1
40
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 18. Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external)

Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
100
1975-2001, default on 90
domestic debt (dark shading)
First year of banking crises 80
(black lines).
3 external defaults 70
(lighter shading)
60
50
In 1985 the 1 peso to 1 US dollar peg
in place since 1905, is abandoned 40
30
20
Banking crises
10
(black lines)
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Dominican Republic, 1844-2009
1872-1888 17 1975-2001 1996 n.a. 28.3 6.6 1965(12.4)
1892-1893 2 2003 1985(2.5)
1897 1 1990(5.5)
1899-1907 9
1931-1934 4
1982-1994 13
2005 1
Number of episodes:
7 1 2 0
1959, 1964, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2001, 2003, 9
2005
41
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 19a Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external)

Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP )
140
120
Shown are five of a total of
ten external defaults
(lighter shading) 100
80
In 2000, in the midst of crisis, 60

Ecuador officially fully dollarized
in place since 1905, is abandoned
40
20
Banking crises
(black lines)
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

Notes: For the period 1973-1989 the data is for external public debt for general government, this
underestimates public indebtedness, as it does not include domestic (or internal) debts—at the same time
general government is more inclusive than our central government measure. These two effects are working
in opposite directions.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ecuador, 1830-2009
1826-1845 20 1999 1981 n.a. 57.8 13.9 1983(2.1)
1868-1890 4 1998 1987(6.0)
1894-1898 1 1999(6.3)
1900-1904 5
1906-1911 3
1914-1924 9
1929-1954
1982-1995
1999-2000
2008
Number of episodes:
10 1 2 0
1961-1966, 1969-1970, 1983, 1985-1986, 1988- 18
1989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2003
42
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 19b. Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

160
Private debts become public
1999 banking
debts--1982 default crisis and default 140
Year Share of Ecuador dollarizes
private debt
1972-1981 18.2 120
1982 21.1
1983-1992 2.2 100
80
60
40
20
Banking crises
(black bars)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
43
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 20. Egypt: Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009
350
300
1876, the first of 2 default

episodes (shaded) Banking crises 250
(black lines)
200
150
No external public 100

debts 1940-1960
50
0
1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002

Notes: By 1945, the outstanding balance on Ottoman debts were either fully paid off or forgiven; no
external debts are recorded through 1960.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Egypt 1800-2009

1876-1880 5 n.a. 1907 n.a. 2.9 5.2 1887(2.2)
1984 1 1981 1914(3.0)
1920(6.6)
Number of episodes: 1990 1942(3.6)
2 0 3 0 1991(3.2)
1962, 1964, 1977-1978, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1996 8
Sources: Pre-World War II GDP from Yousef (2002).
44
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 21a El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external)

Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
70
External default
episodes (light shading) 60
50
Domestic default (dark shading); 40

first year of banking crisis
(black line)
30
20
10
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics.
.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: El Salvador, 1838-2009
1828-1860 33 1981-1996 1989 n.a. 22.7 3.5 1927(12.1)
1898 1 1931(10.1)
1921-1922 3 1932(10.2)
1932-1935 11 1938(7.1)
1938-1946 21 1949(9.2)
5 1 1 0 1982(6.3)
1958-1963, 1965, 1967, 1969-1970, 1972, 1980, 20
1982, 1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2009
45
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 21b. El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

Private debts become public 60

debts--1981 domestic default In 2001, El Salvador
Year Share of dollarizes
private debt 50
1971-1980 40.7
1981-1990 5.8
2007 27 40
30
20
As an exception to the rule,
El Salvador defaulted on its
domestic debts (shaded) in 10
Banking crisis
1981 while servicing external debts.
(black bar)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
46
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 22a. Finland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
120
First year of banking crisis

(black lines) 100
80
60
40
20
0
1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Finland, 1800-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1900 n.a. n.a. 7.5 1862(5.4)
1921 1867(8.0)
1931 1931(2.4)
1939 1991(6.2)
1991 2009(6.4)
Number of episodes:
0 0 5 0
1952, 1967, 1975 3
1
47
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 22b. Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
In 1992, the markka 100

"crashed" during the
Exchange Rate Mechanism
Crisis 90
80
70
60
50
1991, the first

year of 40
the banking crisis
(black line)
30
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
is used.
48
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 23. France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
300
Year Debt/GDP
1815 17.2 250
1848 45.8
1870 53.4
1873 89.6 200
150
100
Banking crises
(black lines)
50
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: France, 1800-2009
1812. n.a. n.a. 1802 n.a. 0.5 5.7 1848(6.1)
1805 1859(6.5)
1848 1870(7.6)
1881 1876(8.2)
1889 1931(6.0)
1907 1932(6.5)
1914
1930
1994
Number of episodes:
0 10 0
1956, 1958, 1969 3
1
Excludes World Wars I and II. There are a couple of additional output declines comparable in magnitude
to those shown in the latter 19th century.
49
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 24a. Germany: Federal and Total Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
The march to hyperinflation
Year Share of 80
short-term debt
1916 24.1
Banking crises 70
1918 31.7
(black lines)
1920 51.7
60
1922 77.7
1923 99.6
50
Total debt (solid)

40
1923-1924
Hyperinflation
30
20
Depression-
wartime Federal debts 10
default (dash)
(shaded)
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.

Germany, 1800-2009
1807 1 1948 1857 1923-1924 12.9 9.5 1919(19.5)
1812 1 1880 1923(16.9)
1850 1 1891 1931(7.6)
1932-1953 22 1901 1932(7.5)
1925 1946(52.6)
1931 2009(4.9)
1977
2007
Number of episodes:
4 1 8 1
None 0
1
50
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 24b. Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
400
Banking crises
(black lines) 350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
51
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 25. Ghana: Total Public (domestic and external) Debt, Default,
1971-2003, frequent currency 150

crashes and high inflation
1957 130
Independence
110
90
70
50
First year of
Domestic default (dark shading) banking crisis 30
external default (light shading) (black line)
10
1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ghana, 1957-2009
1966 1 1979 1982 n.a. 9.4 45.3 1955(6.4)
1968 1 1982 1997 1975(12.5)
1970 1 1982(6.9)
1974 1 1983(4.6)
1987 1
Number of episodes:
5 2 2 0
1966-1969, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987(2), 1988, 14
1995, 1999, 2003
52
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 26a. Greece: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
450
Banking crisis
(black line) 400
defaults
(shaded) 350
1941-1944 Household debt as a % of GDP

300
Hyperinflation 1995 6
2000 12.9
250
2005 35.9
2008 49.7 200
150
2010, Near- 100

default
50
0
1848 1858 1868 1878 1888 1898 1908 1918 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Greece, 1829-2009
1826-1842 17 1932-1951 1931 1941-1944 48.1 12.7 1847(14.0)
1843-1859 17 1991 1852(14.7)
1860-1878 19 1856(11.7)
1894-1897 4 1891(11.5)
1932-1964 33 1919(17.7)
Number of episodes:
5 1 2 1
None 0
1
Excludes World Wars I and II. Source: Kostelenos et. al. (2007)
53
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 26b. Greece: Government Domestic Debt, Default,

(loans to the government as a percent of Central Bank loans)
60
Central Bank loans to the

government as a percent 50
of total loans
40
30
Rising domestic debt in
the eve of external default
20
Banking crisis
(black line) 10
defaults
(shaded)
0
1848 1858 1868 1878 1888 1898 1908 1918 1928 1938
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
54
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 27. Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Devaluation, 1920-2009
70
External default
episodes (shaded) 60
The 1-to-1 peg in place since 1900 ends in 1985

50
40
30
Banking crisis (black lines)

20
10
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Guatemala, 1838-2009
1828-1856 29 n.a. 1991 n.a. 31.4 3.5 1922(5.6)
1876-1888 13 2001 1931(6.7)
1894 1 2006 1932(12.5)
1899-1913 14 1943(33.3)
1933-1936 4 1982(3.5)
1986 1
1989 1
Number of episodes:
7 0 3 0
1960-1961, 1966-1970, 1972, 1981, 1983, 1988, 15
1992, 2002-2003, 2009
55
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 28. Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Devaluation, 1914-2009
250
External default
episodes (shaded)
200
150
Honduras has not had a systemic 100

banking crisis in this period
50
The 2-to-1 peg in place since 1919 ends in 1981
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Honduras, 1838-2009
1828-1867 40 n.a. 1999 n.a. 65.1 3.5 1924(6.6)
1873-1925 53 2001 1932(10.4)
1981-2009 29 1933(6.2)
3 0 2 0 1954(5.7)
1957, 1959-1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 1971-1972, 19
1979, 1982, 1990, 1992, 1999, 2004, 2008
56
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 29. Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
200
Wartime 1941 default lasts
nearly 3 decades. 180
(black lines) 160
140
120
1945-1946 100
Hyperinflation
80
60
40
20
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Hungary, 1918-2009
1932-1937 7 n.a. 1931 1945-1946 37.0 14.1 1931(4.8)
1941-1967 27 1991 1990(6.7)
2008 1991(11.9)
2 0 3 1
1982, 1984, 1988, 1990-1991, 1993, 1996, 2008 8
57
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 30a. Iceland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

80
70
Banking crisis, currency crash,
and near default, 2007-present
60
50
First year of
banking crisis 40
(black lines)
30
20
10
0
1908 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Iceland, 1918-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1985 n.a. n.a. 25.0 1916(11.7)
2007-2010 “near” 3 2007 1918(6.2)
1920(15.2)
0 0 2 0 2009(8.5)
1960, 2008 2
1
The reported declines for 1916, 1918, and 1920 are on a per capita basis (Historical Statistics of Iceland,
2010).
58
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 30b. Iceland: External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009
External Share of
Debt/GDP short-term debt
2005 276.4 16.5 150
2006 428.3 17.5
Banking crisis, currency crash, 2007 522.8 37.5 130
"near default", 2007-present 2008 870.1 39.0
2009:Q3 923.8 48.5 110
90
70
50
First year of
banking crisis 30
(black lines)
10
-10
1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
59
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure30c. Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
420
The exchange rate crashed
by about 95% against the
dollar in 2008 370
320
270
220
170
First year of
the banking crisis 120
(black line); near default (shaded)
70
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
60
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 31. India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default,
1400
First year of 1990-1991
banking crisis "Near default"
(black lines) 1200
1000
800
600
400
200
Debt restructuring
(shaded)
0
1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: India, 1835-2009
(calculations since independence—1947--reported)
1958 1 n.a. 1863 n.a. 11.1 3.2 1891(9.2)
1969 1 1908 1899(7.8)
1972-1976 5 1914 1918(12.8)
1989-1990 1921 1920(7.9)
1947
1993
3 0 7 0
1957, 1962-1963, 1965, 1981, 1991 (2) 7
61
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 32a. Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
3 default/restructuring "Hidden debts" on 100

episodes (shaded) Banking crises
the eve of Asian crisis
Years Share of (black bars) 90
private debt
80
1985-1994 14.2
1995 26.6 70
1997 34.8
60
50
1966, the 40
Year of Living
Dangerously 30
inflation
hits 940 % 20
10
1949, Independence
0
1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Sources: Creutzberg, P. (1976), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein

Indonesia, 1800-2009
1966-1970 5 n.a. 1992 1966 14.8 31.1 1931(7.1)
1998-2000 3 1997 1958(4.7)
2002 1 1963(4.2)
1967(4.4)
3 0 3 1
1961, 1963, 1968-1973, 1997-1998, 2000 11
62
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 32b. Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
90
During 1997-1998, the
exchange rate collapsed by 80
about 235% against the
dollar; inflation spikded to
70
60 percent
60
50
First year of 40
the banking crisis
(black line); default (shaded) The "twin crisis" was
30
followed by defaults
20
10
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
used.
63
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 33a. Ireland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

Household debt as a percent of GDP

120
100
80
100
60
40
80
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
60
40
First year of
banking crisis 20
(black line)
Wartime
0
1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Sources: National Treasury Management Agency, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ireland, 1919-2009
n.a. n.a. 1836 n.a. n.a. 1933(2.5)
1856 1937(3.8)
1958(2.1)
2007 2008(3.0)
0 0 4 0
None 0
64
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 33b. Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
200
First year of 180

the banking
crisis 160
(black line)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
used.
65
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 34. Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
180
First year of banking crisis
(black lines) 160
Wartime default (shaded)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Sources: Francese and Pace (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Italy, 1800-2009
1940-1946 7 n.a. 1866 1944 3.3 10.5 1867(8.3)
1887 1881(6.7)
1891 1892(5.6)
1893 1919(16.7)
1907 1920(8.7)
1914 1930(4.9)
1921 2009(4.8)
1930
1935
1990
2008
Number of episodes:
1 0 11 0
1974, 1977 2
66
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 35a. Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
200
Wartime 1942 default
(shaded) lasts a decade. 180
(black lines) 160
140
120
100
1945 Hyperinflation 80
1992 60
banking
crisis ushers 40
in lost
decade 20
0
1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Japan, 1800-2009
1942-1952 11 1946-1948 1872 1945 5.2 11.0 1896(5.5)
1882 1899(7.4)
1901 1920(6.2)
1907 1930(7.3)
1917 2009(5.0)
1923
1927
1992
Number of episodes:
1 1 8 1
1962,1964 2
67
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 35b. Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
330
310
Spring and fall 290

2000
burst of IT bubble 270
250
230
210
190
First year of 170

the banking
crisis 150
(black line)
130
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
68
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 36. Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
140
120
100
80
Banking crises
(black lines)
60
40
Defaults
(shaded)
20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Kenya, 1963-2009
1994-1998 5 n.a. 1985 n.a. 14.9 8.5 1952(11.1)
2000-2001 2 1996 1953(2.5)
1961(2.4)
Number of episodes:
2 0 2 0
1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985, 1988(2), 15
1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003
69
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 37. Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and
"Hidden debts" on
60
Years Share of 1998, near-default/bailout
private debt Banking crises
episode (shaded)
1985-1994 18 (black bars)
50
1995 19.9
1997 30.4
40
30
Private external debt
as a % of GDP
30 20
1997-1998 banking
crisis 20
10
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Korea, 1945-2009
1997-1998 2 1983 n.a. 0.0 15.4 1920(12.3)
1985 1922(7.1)
1997 1939(10.4)
1951(7.7)
0 0 3 0
1965-1975, 1977, 1980-1981, 1983, 1985, 1997 17
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
70
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 37b. Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
The Asian 1997-1998 120

banking cisis and "near"
default. 110
100
90
First year of 80
the banking
crises
70
(black lines)
60
50
40
30
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
71
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 38a. Malaysia: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and
"Hidden debts" on 80
Years Share of Banking crises 70
private debt (black bars)
1985-1994 15.9
60
1995 32
1997 32.8 Public external
debt (solid) 50
40
30
20
10
Private external debt (dash)
0
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Malaysia, 1963-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1985 n.a. 0.0 0.0 1912(7.2)
1997 1925(12.4)
1938(4.9)
0 0 2 0 1998(7.4)
None 0
72
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 38b. Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
First year of
the banking crises 160
(black lines)
140
120
100
80
Domestic credit
60
aggregate expanded
coverage
40
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
used.
73
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 39. Mauritius: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

1997 banking crisis

70
Years Share of
private debt
1982-1991 8 60
1992-1996 16.3
1997 13.5
50
1998-2002 6.4
40
30
1997 banking crisis

(black line) 20
10
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Mauritius, 1968-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1997 n.a. 0.0 11.9 1964(6.9)
1968(6.9)
0 0 1 0
1978-1981, 1983, 1985 6
74
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 40a. Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910
(Billions of US dollars, three-year sum)
1
180
The first 6 of 8 default
0 .9
0 .8
140
0 .7
120
0 .6
100
0 .5
Banking crises, 1883, 1907,

80
0 .4 and 1913 (black lines)
60
0 .3
0 .2
40
0 .1
20
0
1823 1833 1843 1853 1863 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913
75
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 40b. Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
500
1994-1995 "near-default"
Tesobono crisis 450
Year Share of
Banking crises Short-term debt 400
(black lines)
1992 43.7
1993 58.6 350
1994 72.8
300
250
200
150
1982, The last of 8 default 100

episodes (shaded)
50
0
1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Mexico, 1821-2009
1828-1830 3 1850 1883 n.a. 43.9 11.1 1902(7.1)
1833-1841 1 1928-1932 1907 1930(6.3)
1844-1850 7 1982 1913 1932(15.0)
1854-1864 11 1920 1983(4.3)
1866-1885 20 1929 1995(6.2)
1914-1922 9 1981 2009(6.7)
1928-1942 15 1994
1982-1990 9
Number of episodes:
8 3 7 0
1954, 1959, 1961, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995, 9
1999
76
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 41. Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
140
Morocco's first default was 1903-1904
120
1983 was a default and a

banking crisis 100
(black line)
80
60
40
Defaults
(shaded) 20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Morocco, 1956-2009
1903-1904 2 n.a. 1983 n.a. 11.1 0.0 1981(2.8)
1983 1 1992(4.0)
1986-1990 5 1995(6.6)
Number of episodes:
3 0 1 0
1959, 1965-1969, 1971, 1980-1983, 1985-1986, 16
1988, 1990, 1992
77
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 42. Myanmar: External (public plus private)

Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
250
Single default
episode (shaded)
200
150
100
Banking crisis 50
(black bar)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs : Myanmar, 1948-2009
1997-2009 13 1984 1996 n.a. 21.0 37.1 1954(6.2)
1987 1966(4.2)
1987(4.0)
1988(11.4)
Number of episodes:
1 2 4 0
1969, 1973-1974, 1977-1978, 1981 6
78
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 43. Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external)

Household debt as a percent of GDP
End of French rule 130

and wartime default (shaded) 110
300
90
70
50
250
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
200
150
100

crisis 50
(black lines)
0
1812 1822 1832 1842 1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Bos (2007), CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Netherlands, 1800-2009
1802-1814 13 1802-1814 1819 n.a. 6.2 0 1830(3.5)
1897 1896(3.8)
1914 1931(6.1)
1921 2009(4.0)
1939
2008
Number of episodes:
1 1 6 0
1957 1
1
79
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 44a. New Zealand Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1860-2009
Between 1914 and 1929 the share of domestic 250

debt rose from less than 20% to about 50%
Household Debt as a Percent of GDP First year of
banking
200
110 crises
90 (black lines)
70 Wartime
50 150
1995 1999 2003 2007
100
The 1892-1893 crisis was 50

common to Australia and New
Zealand
0
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: New Zealand, 1907-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1893 0.0 0.0 1876(11.6)
1987 1908(6.9)
1931(8.5)
1948(9.9)
0 0 2 0
1967 1
1
80
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 44b. New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
140
1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath
Banking crisis
Year Private as a
(black line) 120
% of total
1886 16.9
1887 34.8
1891 17.9 100
1892 12.8
80
60
40
20
0
1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
81
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 45. Nicaragua: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
4500
Runup to 1932 default
Share of
First year of 4000
Year short-term debt banking crisis
1925 8.8 1985-1990 Hyperinflation (black line) 3500
1927 60.6
1929 89.6 Year Inflation 3000
1931 93.3 1985 571.4
1986 885.2 2500
1987 13109.5
1988 4775.2 2000
1989 7428.7
1990 3004.1 1500
Peak debt-to-exports is 1000

There is no private domestic
524% in 1932
or external debt; the domestic public
debt market disappears 500
(no data 1950s-1960s)
0
1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Nicaragua, 1838-2009
1828-1874 47 1985-1990 1987 1985-1990 47.1 12.2 1930(19.2)
1894-1895 2 2000 1936 (20.4)
1978(7.9)
1911-1912 2 1979(26.6)
1915-1917 3 1988(12.4)
1932-1937 6
1979-2009 31
Number of episodes:
6 1 2 1
1956-1958, 1960, 1963-1964, 1968-1970, 1972, 1979, 1991, 15
1994, 1998, 2002
82
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 46. Nigeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

180
160
Banking crises
Fleeting default
(black bars)
on an oil 140
warrant
120
100
80
60
2004-2005 was the
last of 5 default 40
episodes.
20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Nigeria, 1960-2009
1982-1992 11 n.a. 1992 n.a. 28.0 24.0 1967(15.5)
1986-1988 3 1995 1978(5.9)
1992 1 1983(5.1)
2001 1 1986(8.8)
2004-2005 2 1987(10.8)
Number of episodes:
5 0 2 0
1987, 1989, 1991, 2000 4
83
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 47a. Norway: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

70
60
50
40
30
20

(black lines) 10
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Norway, 1800-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1898 n.a. n.a. 5.2 1831(7.0)
1921 1848(4.7)
1931 1921(9.7)
1936 1931(7.8)
1987
Number of episodes:
0 0 5 0
None 0
84
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 47b. Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004

(Amount outstanding at year-end as a percent of GDP)
180
160
140
120
100

crises 80
(black lines)
60
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Sources: Eitrheim, Ø., K. Gerdrup and J.T. Klovland (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited
therein.
85
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 48. Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

120
1988-1989-US trade
sanctions; freezing of assets
in US; bank runs and bank
100
holiday; defaults on demestic
debts (darker shading)
external default episodes
(shaded) 80
60
There were no 40
external
debts
20
Banking crisis
(black line)
0
1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003

Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1945, hence, we scale debt by exports and adjust it by the ratio of
exports to GDP to splice the pre-World War II series.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Panama, 1903-2009
1932-1946 15 1988-1989 1988 n.a. 27.1 0 1948(5.9)
1983-1996 14 1983(4.5)
1987-1994 1988(13.5)
Number of episodes:
3 1 1 0
1965, 1968-1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985, 20
1992, 1995, 1997, 2000
Notes: The 1987-1994 default is on bonds, while the 1983-1996 episode is on bank loans.
86
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 49. Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default,

2002 banking crisis; 2003 80

7th default episode
70
60
50
40
30
20
Banking crises
(black bars) 10
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Paraguay, 1811-2009
1874-1885 12 n.a. 1890 n.a. 22.6 11.1 1940(5.3)
1892-1895 4 1997 1947(13.1)
1920-1924 5 2002 1983(3.0)
1932-1944 13 2009(4.5)
1968-1969 2
1986-1992 7
2003-2004 2
Number of episodes:
7 0 3 0
1957-1961, 1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 2003 10
87
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 50a. Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
100
1988-1990
1983, The last of 8 default
hyperinflation
80
70
60
50
Banking crises (black lines)
40
30
20
10
0
1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Peru1821-2009

1826-1848 23 1931-1938 1872 1988-1990 40.2 13.2 1930(11.5)
1876-1889 14 1985-1987 1983 1931(8.1)
1931-1951 21 1999 1983(9.3)
1969-1969 2 1988(9.4)
1976 1 1989(13.4)
1978 1
1980 1
1984-1997 14
Number of episodes:
8 2 3 1
1954, 1958-1968, 1970, 1977-1979, 1982, 1984, 24
1993, 1996, 1999, 2001-2002, 2004
88
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 50b. Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
1400
1200
1000
800
Banking crises
(black lines); 600
default (shaded)
400
200
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
89
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 51a. Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default,
90
80
1983 is the single default
episode (shaded)
70
60
50
Baking crises
(black lines) 40
Domestic plus externa public 30

debt (solid)
20
Private external 10
debt (dash)
0
1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Philippines, 1946-2009
1983-1992 10 n.a. 1981 n.a. 18.8 6.3 1904(13.9)
1997 1923(6.1)
1935(6.8)
1984(7.5)
1 0 2 0
1962-1968, 1970-1976, 1979-1980, 1983-1984, 23
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998
90
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 51b. Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default

90
80
70
60
50
40
1991, the first year 30

of
the banking crises 20
(black lines)
10
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
used.
91
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 52a. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
700
Total Share of
debt short-term Depression and wartime
defaults (shaded) 600
1919 9,988 77.1
1920 70,741 87.5
1921 252,705 94.0
500
1922 744,836 97.3
1923 111,509,994 100.0
400
First year of 300

banking crisis
(black lines)
200
100
0
1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947

Poland, 1918-2009
1936-1937 2 n.a. 1931 1919-1923 31.5 18.5 1980(-6.0)
1940-1952 13 1934 1990 1981(10.0)
1981-1994 14 1991 1990(7.2)
1991(7.0)
Number of episodes:
3 0 3 1
1990-1991, 1993-1994 4
92
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 52b. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
90
Banking crisis
(black bars) Hidden debts? 80
Share of
Year private debt
70
1992 0.8
1996 3.7
1998 25 60
2007 46.8
50
1990
Hyperinflation
40
The last of 3 defaults 30

(shaded)
20
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
93
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 53. Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Household debt as a percent of GDP 90

1892, the last of 6 default
100 80
episodes (shaded)
80
60 70
40
20 60
1995 1999 2003 2007
50
40
30
1890, 1923, 1931
the first year of 20
banking crises
(black lines) 10
0
1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Sources: OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Portugal, 1800-2009
1828 1 n.a. 1828 n.a. 11.0 9.5 1918(5.1)
1837-1841 5 1846 1928(9.7)
1850-1856 7 1890 1935(5.3)
1892-1901 10 1920 1936(7.6)
1923 1940(6.5)
1931
Number of episodes:
4 0 6 0
1977, 1978, 1983 3
94
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 54. Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

180
Hidden debts? 160

Years Share of
private debt Banking crisis 140
1996-2000 23.6 (black bar)
2001-2005 38.2 120
2007 46.4
100
1981 is the second of 80

three defaults
(shaded)
60
40
20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Romania, 1878-2009
1933-1958 26 1933-1958 1931 n.a. 22.6 9.8 1989(5.8)
1981-1983 4 1990 1990(5.6)
1986 1 1991(12.9)
1997(6.1)
3 1 2 0
1975, 1977, 1981, 1991-1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 10
2001, 2004, 2009
95
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 55a. Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945
(as a percent of exports)
The first 3 of 5 300

defaults (shaded);
0.9
first year of banking

0.8
250
crises black lines 1918-1924
0.7
Hyperinflation
200
0.6
1917-1918, domestic debts

were also repudiated
0.5
150
0.4
0.3
100
0.2
50
0.1
0
1815 1825 1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945

Russia 1800-2009
1839 1 1917-1918 1862 1918-1924 38.8 13.8 1992(14.5)
1885 1 1947 1875 1993 1993(8.7)
1918-1986 69 1957 1896 1994(12.7)
1991-1997 7 1998-1999 1995 1998(5.3)
1998-2000 3 1998 2009(7.9)
2008
Number of episodes:
5 4 6 2
1992, 1995-1996, 1999 4
96
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 55b. Russia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation,
100
Banking crises 90
(black bars). 1998-banking
and renewed default 80
70
60
1993
Hyperinflation 50
40
30
20
The last two of 5 defaults
(shaded) 10
0
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
97
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 56. Singapore: Central Government (domestic and external) Debt, Default,
110
The Asian
1997-1998 crisis 100
(shaded)
90
80
70
60
50
First year of
banking crisis 40
(black line)
30
1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004

Notes: Since the mid-1990s all public debts of the central government are domestic.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Singapore, 1965-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1982 n.a. 0.0 2.2 1964(3.5)
2001(2.4)
0 0 1 0
None 0
98
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 57a. South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
120
1985-1987, multilateral trade sanctions
and first two default episodes
(shaded) 100
1989, banking
crisis and 80
last default
60
40
Banking crises (black lines)

20
0
1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: South Africa, 1800-2009

1985-1987 3 n.a. 1865 n.a. 5.0 1.0 1983(1.8)
1989 1 1877 1992(2.1)
1993 1 1890 2009(1.8)
1977
3 0 4 0
1958, 1961, 1976(2), 1982-1983 6
99
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 57b.South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
1890 Barings crisis 300

Year Private as a
% of total
1888 70.2
1889 84.8 250
1890 80.3
1891 40.0
200
Banking crises
(black lines)
150
100
50
0
1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893
100
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58a. Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679
(Billions of ducats, three-year sum)
1
35
0 .9
30
0 .8
0 .7 25
3 of a total of 13
0 .6
defaults (shaded)
20
0 .5
0 .4
15
0 .3
10
0 .2
5
0 .1
0
1600 1610 1620 1630 1640 1650 1660 1670
Domestic and External Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation: Spain, 1550-1799
External Duration Domestic Banking Hyper- Share of Share of
default (in default crisis dates inflation years in years in
dates years) dates (first year) dates external inflation
default crisis
1557-1560 4 1557-1560 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1575-1577 3 1575-1577
1596-1597 2 1596-1597
1607 1
1627 1
1647 1
Number of episodes:
6 3 0 0
101
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58b. Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
1877, the last of 13 defaults
(shaded) since 1557 180
160
First year of
banking crises 140
(black lines)
1920, 1931,1977, and 2008
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Spain, 1800-2009
1809 1 1936-1939 1814 n.a. 23.8 3.8 1868(10.1)
1820 1 1829 1874(8.4)
1831-1834 4 1846 1896(8.0)
1837-1867 31 1920 1936(22.3)
1851 - 1931 1937(8.3)
1877-1882 7 1977
6 0 6 0
1959, 1960, 1978 3
102
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58c.Spain: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
9
The last of 13
sovereign 8
defaults that
began in 1557 7
(shaded)
6
From 1875 onwards all capital flows are private

4
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
103
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58d. Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default

210
First year of
the banking crises
190
(black lines)
170
150
130
110
90
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
used.
104
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 59. Sri Lanka: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
180
160
Two default episodes

140
(shaded)
120
100
80
60
40
First year of
banking crises
20
(black lines)
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Sri Lanka, 1948-2009
1979 1 1996 1989 n.a. 6.5 3.2 1918(-6.5)
1981-1983 3 1930(4.0)
1935(5.2)
2 1 1 0
1965-1966, 1968-1969, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1983, 1988, 14
1991, 2001, 2003(2)
105
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 60a. Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
90
1811, Sweden's only default 80

episode (shaded);
unclear whether it involved First year of
external debts banking crises 70
(black lines)
60
50
40
30
20
10
Three-year inflation reaches 258 %-
the highest this 300 year-period
0
1719 1739 1759 1779 1799 1819 1839 1859 1879 1899 1919 1939 1959 1979 1999
Sources: Fregert, K och R. Gustafsson, (2008), "Fiscal Statistics for Sweden 1719-2003", Research in
Economic History, volume 25, 137-191, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: Prices are far more volatile during pre-World War II. For this reason, and owing to the fact that
deflation is about as likely as inflation prior to the rise of fiat money, we also examine the evolution of
(smoother) three year changes in the price level.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Sweden, 1800-2009
1811 1 n.a. 1811 n.a. 0.5 1.9 1826(8.9)
1876 1838(5.7)
1897 1861(5.7)
1907 1921(3.7)
1922 2009(4.2)
1931
1991
Number of episodes:
1 0 6 0
None 0
1
106
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 60b. Sweden Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default

Domestic credit aggregate expanded

75
coverage, 2002-2009
135
125 70
115
105
65
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
60
55
50
First year of
(black line)
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
107
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 61. Switzerland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

90
First year of
banking crises 80
(black line)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Switzerland, 1800-2009
n.a. n.a. n.a.1870 n.a. n.a. 1854(11.1)
1910 1860(13.0)
1921 1867(12.1)
1931 1877(9.7)
0 0 5 0
None 0
1
108
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 62a. Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts,
“Near-default”, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009
350
1997-1998
"Near
default" 300
(shaded)
250
Public and private
external debts (dash)
200
150
100
50
Banking crises
Public (domestic and external debt) (black lines)
0
1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Thailand, 1800-2009
1997-1998 “near” 2 n.a. 1983 n.a. 0.0 9.0 1919(4.2)
1996 1942(9.0)
1945(6.8)
0 0 2 0 2009(2.3)
1978, 1981-1982, 1985, 1997 5
109
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 62b. Thailand Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
200
180
First year of
(black line)
140
120
100
80
60
Currency collapse, recession
and "near default" 40
20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
110
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 63. Tunisia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
Last of 5 80
defaults
(shaded)
70
60
50
1991was the first year of
a banking crisis
(black line) which lasted
40
5 years
30
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Tunisia, 1956-2009
1867-1870 4 n.a. 1991 n.a. 13.0 0.0 1955(5.1)
1956 1 1957(4.1)
1958 1 1959(4.2)
1963 1
1979-1982 4
Number of episodes:
5 0 1 0
1964-1967, 1969-1970, 1986, 1988 8
111
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 64a. Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009
1200
8 default/restructuring
2000-2001 banking crisis

800
and "Near" default
600
400
Banking crises 200

(black lines)
0
1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003
Sources: Pamuk (1995), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Turkey, 1800-2009
1876-1881 6 n.a. 1931 n.a. 19.5 35.6 1927(9.1)
1915-1928 14 1982 1932(6.0)
1931-1932 2 1991 1994(5.5)
1940-1943 4 2000 2001(5.7)
1959 1 2009(5.6)
1965 1
1978-1979 2
1982 1
2000-2001 2
“near”
Number of episodes:
8 0 4 0
1961-1970, 1978-1980, 1983-1984, 1994, 1999, 2002 18
1
112
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 64b. Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default,
70
2000-2001,"Near-
default"
Banking crises (shaded) 60
(black bars)
50
40
Publlic and 30
private (solid) 1982 was both a default
and banking crisis. The
last of 6 default episodes 20
Private external
10
debt (dash)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
113
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 65a. United Kingdom: Central Government Debt, Restructurings,

300
In 1932, World War I
debts are restructured.
250
First year of
banking crisis
(black lines)
200
150
100
50
Debt restructuring (shaded)
0
1706 1721 1736 1751 1766 1781 1796 1811 1826 1841 1856 1871 1886 1901 1916 1931 1946 1961 1976 1991 2006
Sources: UKpublicspending, (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:

United Kingdom, 1800-2009
n.a.. n.a. 1822 1810 n.a. n.a. 2.4 1919(10.9)
1834 1815 1920(6.0)
1888-1889 1825 1921(8.1)
1932 1837 1931(5.1)
1847 2009(4.9)
1857
1866
1878
1890
1974
1984
2007
Number of episodes:
0 4 12 0
1956-1958, 1961-1964, 1967, 1969, 1975, 1977 11
1
114
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 65b. United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
First year of
banking crises 190
(black lines)
170
150
130
110
90
Coverage of domestic
credit series 70
expanded
50
30
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
115
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66a. United States: Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1790-2009
1873-1884, 10 states in 1933, suspension of the Gold Clause
140
default (shaded)
First year of
banking crises 120
Debt
(black lines)
restructuring
100
80
9 states in default
60
40
20
0
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

United States 1790-2009
1790 1 1790 1814 n.a. n.a. 1.4 1908(10.8)
1841-1842 1818 1914(7.7)
1873-1884 1836 1930(8.6)
1933 1841 1932(13.1)
1857 1946(10.1)
1861
1864
1873
1884
1890
1907
1914
1929
1984
1 2 15 0
1963-1964 2
Notes: The default of US states are not counted in the tally as the total number of episodes refers to
sovereign credit events only.
1
116
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66b. United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
30
Banking crises
(black lines)
25
20
15
10
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
117
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66c. United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009

(end-of- period stock of debt as a percent of GDP)
300
1933, suspension of the Gold Clause
default (shaded) First year of
banking crises
(black lines) 250
200
150
100
50
0
1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006
Notes: Data for 2009 is end-of-June. The Flow of Funds is reported for 1945-2009; prior to that the
Historical Statistics of the United States series is scaled (down) to match the Flow of Funds data.
Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States, Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, OECD, World Bank, Global
Development Finance, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and sources cited therein.
118
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66d. United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit

250
First year of
banking crises Spring and fall 2000,
(black lines) burst of IT bubble 230
210
190
170
150
130
110
Savings and loan decade-long episode
90
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
119
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 67a. Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
"Hidden debts" on the 600

eve of default-2003
Year Share of
private debt 500
1991-2000 3.9
2001 6.9
2002 21.6 400
300
200
First year of
100
2003, The last of 9 banking crises
default (black lines)
episodes (shaded)
0
1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Notes: For the period 1871-1914 only external debt data is available. Domestic debts (only a few
observations are available) was negligible during this period.

Uruguay, 1811-2009
1876-1878 3 1932-1937 1893 n.a. 13.0 18.0 1905(10.1)
1891 1 1898 1914(16.7)
1915-1921 7 1971 1920(12.8)
1932-1938 7 1981 1931(17.3)
1965 1 2002 1933(12.5)
1983-1985 3 1982(9.3)
1987 1
1990-1991 2
2003 1
Number of episodes:
9 1 5 0
1961-1962, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1975-1977, 1979-1981, 21
1983, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999-2002
120
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 67b. Uruguay: Total (private and public) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Default, and Banking Crises, 1865-1914
500
450
400
350
300
Banking crises
250
(black lines)
Default
200
(shaded)
150
100
50
0
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
121
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 68. Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
90
2004 is the last of 10 default
70
60
Banking crises
(black lines)
50
40
30
By 1930 Venezuela had paid off all its external debts .

20
10
0
1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006

Venezuela, 1829-2009
1826-1840 15 1995-1997 1978 n.a. 35.9 11.0 1914(12.6)
1848-1859 12 1998 1993 1931(19.2)
1860-1862 3 1942(12.6)
1865-1881 17 1989(8.6)
1892 1 2002(8.9)
1898-1905 8
1983-1988 6
1990 1
1995-1997 3
2004-2005 2
Number of episodes:
10 2 2 0
1960, 1989, 1996 3
122
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 69. Zambia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

450
Defaults 400
(shaded)
350
300
250
200
150
100
Banking crisis 50
(black line)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Zambia, 1964-2009
1983-1994 12 n.a. 1995 n.a. 24.0 40.0 1966(5.5)
1977(4.9)
1 0 1 0
1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983-1984, 1986, 1995(2), 1999, 2004, 12
2008
123
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 70. Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
Highest Monthly Inflation Rates in History
Country Month with Highest monthly Equivalent Time required 140
highest rate inflation rate daily rate for prices to double
Hungary 16984.00 1.30 x 1016% 1.95 15.6 hours
Ongoing banking 120
Zimbabwe 39753.00 796000000.00 0.98 24.7 hours
crisis (black line)
Yugoslavia 34335.00 3130000.00 0.65 1.4 days since 1995
Germany 8675.00 295.00 0.21 3.7 days 100
Greece 16377.00 113.00 0.17 4.5 days
China 18019.00 42.10 0.13 5.6 days
80
60
40
Prior default, 1965-1974
Defaults 20
(shaded); latest is ongoing
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: Hanke (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, IMF Programs and Hyperinflation:

Zimbabwe, 1965-2009
1965-1974 10 2006 1995 2006-2009 40.0 40.0 1977(8.0)
2000-2009 10 1992(8.4)
2000(7.3)
2 1 1 1 2008(14.1)
1981, 1983, 1992 (3), 1998, 1999 7
124
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
References
Barro, Robert J. and José Ursúa (2008). “Macroeconomic Crises Since 1870,” NBER Working
Paper 13940, April.
Bassino, Jean-Pascal, and Pierre van del Eng, (2006) “New Benchmark of Wages and GDP,
1913-1970, mimeograph Montpellier University, France, 20
Bird, G. M. Hussain, J.P. Joyce (2004). “Many Happy Returns: Recidivism and the IMF,”
Journal of International Money and Finance Vol.23, Issue 2, March, 231-251.
Bos, F. (2007). “The Dutch fiscal framework; history, current practice and the role of the CPB,”
CPB Document 150.
Butlin, S. J. (1968) Foundations of the Australian monetary system, 1788-1851 (Sydney: Sydney
University Press).
Calvo, Guillermo A., Alejandro Izquierdo, and Rudy Loo-Kung (2006) “Relative Price Volatility
Under Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance Sheet Effects,” Journal of International
Economics 9(1): 231–254.
Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco, “A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2), 2001, 489-517.
Creutzberg, P. (1976) Changing Economy in Indonesia; in volume 2, Public Finance 1816-1939,

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Diamond, Douglas, and Philip Dybvig. (1983), “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity”,
Journal of Political Economy, June, vol. 91, no. 3,401–19.
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos (1985), “Goodby Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash,” Journal
of Development Economics 19.
Eitrheim, Ø., K. Gerdrup and J.T. Klovland (2004). "Credit, banking and monetary
developments in Norway 1819-2003", 377-408 Chapter 10 in Eitrheim, Ø., J.T.
Klovland and J.F. Qvigstad (eds.), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819-
2003, Norges Bank Occasional Papers no. 35, Oslo, 2004, 377-408.
Francese Maura and Angelo Pace (2008), “Il debito pubblico italiano dall’Unità a oggi. Una
ricostruzione della serie storica”, Banca d'Italia, Occasional paper no. 31, Roma
Fregert, K. och R. Gustafsson, (2008), "Fiscal Statistics for Sweden 1719-2003", Research in
Economic History, Volume 25, 137-191.
Gold, Joseph (1970) Stand-by arrangements of the International Monetary Fund, (Washington
D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, Rodrigo Valdes, and Oscar Landerretche (2001). “Lending Booms:
Latin America and the World.” Economia, Spring, pp. 47-99.
125
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Hanke, Steve H. (2008) “New Hyperinflation Index (HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at 89.7
Sextillion Percent.” Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. (November )
(http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe)
Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), http://www2.stjr.is/frr/thst/rit/sogulegt/english.htm#8
Junguito, Roberto and Hernán Rincón (2004). "La política fiscal en el siglo XX en Colombia",
Borradores de Economía, No. 318, Banco de la República.
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1999). “The Twin Crises: The Causes of
Banking and Balance of Payments Problems”, American Economic Review, Vol.89 No.4,
June, 473-500.
Kaminsky, Graciela, Carmen M. Reinhart and Carlos A.Végh( 2004) “When It Rains, It Pours:
Procyclical Capital Flows and Policies”, with. in Mark Gertler and Kenneth S. Rogoff,
eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 11-53
Kostelenos, G. S. Petmezas et. al. (2007), 'Gross Domestic Product 1830-1939", Sources of
Economic History of Modern Greece, Historical Archives of the National bank of Greece
Lazaretou, Sophia (2005) “Greek Monetary Economics in Retrospect: The Adventures of the
Drachma," Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Vol. 34, No. 3, 331–
370.
Levandis, John Alexander, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1944).
Mendoza, Enrique G. and Marco E. Terrones (2008). “An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence
from macro Aggregates and Micro Data, NBER Working Paper 14049, May.
Mody, Ashoka and Diego Saravia (2008). "From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program: Does
democracy impede the speed required by financial markets?," IMF Working Paper
08/276.
National Treasury Management Agency, Ireland (2010) “National Debt of Ireland: 1923-2009”
http://www.ntma.ie/NationalDebt/historicalData1.php.
Pamuk, Sevket (1995), Ottoman ForeignTrade in the 19th Century, Historical Statistics Series,
Volume 1 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics).
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Vincent R. Reinhart , “Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View
of the Past and Present,” in Jeffrey Frankel and Francesco Giavazzi (eds.) NBER
International Seminar in Macroeconomics 2008, (Chicago: Chicago University Press for
NBER,
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2008), “The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt”
NBER Working Paper 13946, April.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton Press).
126
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2010), “From Financial Crash toDebt Crisis,”
NBER Working Paper.
Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor, (2010), “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy,
Leverage Cyvles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008,”
Soley Güell, Tomas, Historia Monetaria de Costa Rica, (San Jose, Costa Rica: Imprenta
Nacional, 1926).
Stone, Irving (1999) The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865–1914 (New York:
St. Martin’s Press).
UKpublicspending, (2010), http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk
Velasco, Andres. "Financial and Balance-of-Payments Crises." Journal of Development

Economics, October 1987, 27(1/2), 263-83.
Yousef, Tarik M., “Egypt’s Growth Performance Under Economic Liberalism: A Reassesment
with New GDP Estimates, 1886-1945,” Review of Income and Wealth 48, December
2002, 561-579.
127

Reinhardt Chartbook

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Reinhardt Chartbook

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

This version: March 3, 2010

This Time is Different Chartbook:

This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of public debt

and economic crises of various forms. It is a timeline of a country’s creditworthiness and

JEL E6, F3, and N0

This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of debt and

analysis—indeed, it fills in as documentation to its underpinnings. What follows systematically

War II to deal with an assortment of economic ills contribute to the chronologies.

generations. Black swans are not that rare.

sources referenced in this analysis.

debt-crisis cycle. As such, it is a roadmap for future research,

II. Key to Charts and Methodology Notes

domestic currency debts.

Table 1. Coloring and Shading to Highlight Events in Country Charts

Years in default or restructuring Pale

Insets of smaller tables and charts into the figures

Descriptive statistics in the tables to each country

is referred to Barro and Ursua (2009).

total number of programs. The relevant sources are discussed below.

References and sources

appendices listing sources series-by-series and country-by-country over different subperiods.

update these studies through 2009.

III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes

episodes to illustrate particular points.

pain have a higher count if pre-1800 default episodes are counted.

rather than serial domestic banking crises.

(2010) presents similar findings.7

1999-2000 default (Figure 32a).

continued climb in the early stage of default.

Figure 1. Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Figure 2. Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,

Default (shaded) 100

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:

Public foreign bond issues and default

Figure 3c. Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation

Figure4a. Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,

Banking crisis begins in

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:

Banking crisis 300

Figure 6. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and

First year of banking crises

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Figure 7. Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt

Figure 9. Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,

Three external defaults

Banking crises 100

1981-1990, only external public debt 50

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Figure 10a. Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009

1935- Alberta defaults

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs:

Banking crises 100

The Barings crisis of 1890

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:

Total (Central government) Asian financial 21

First year banking 13

The runup to default 80