CONTEMPT

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 129521, September 7, 1999

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE

COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN,
petitioners,
vs. MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P. MANALAYSAY, respondents.
Ponente: PARDO, J.:

Facts: On June 28, 1996, SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of Interport Resources
Corporation, directed respondent Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite time
and place for the validation of proxies and nominations for directors of the firm.
SEC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding
the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders.
Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over
by respondent Manalaysay.
On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport Resources Corporation held on July
9, 1996, null and void and directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in
contempt.

Issue: Whether or not respondents guilty of contempt of SEC order?

Held: No. the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt was
highly improper. The Court of Appeals issued on July 8, 1996, a temporary restraining order against the order
of the SEC of June 28, 1996 directing the Interport Resources Corporation to desist from holding the
stockholders' meeting on July 9, 1996. Contrary to the view of petitioners, the effect of the temporary
restraining order of the Court of Appeals directing the SEC to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow
such meeting to proceed as scheduled. More, the Court of Appeals in its final decision nullified the SEC's
order. Hence, there was no willful disobedience to a lawful order of the SEC. Respondents were not guilty of
contempt.

PS.
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the
dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment,
and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial."
While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for
contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise
the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
The SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. There was no charge filed by a private party aggrieved
by the acts of respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's temporary restraining
order. The Court of Appeals enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the
scheduled stock-holders' meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to an order of
the SEC. The disobedience which the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at
bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience.
The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. The chairman and commissioners of
the SEC must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint.
The SEC suspended respondent Manalaysay from the practice of law in the SEC, a power vested exclusively
in the Supreme Court.

EN BANC,[A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1771 : May 27, 2004]

SALVADOR SISON, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S.
ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch 253, Respondents.

PER CURIAM:

The Presiding Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, said authorized
driver, while on board the official car on an official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos
Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right
turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it
appeared that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily visible to the naked eye; he introduced himself
as the authorized driver, his son in fact, and showed the calling card with a notation in the dorsal portion
thereof introducing the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and begged that
he be allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to limb, life and property
occasioned by his alleged traffic violation; that such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the drivers
license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody who
introduced himself as a lawyer the day before.

The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate
disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its
representative but is one constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, specially considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court was
then on official errand.

the acts of respondents in arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge of indirect contempt is
heard constitute the gravest ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

ISSUE: Whether or not indirect contempt should be affirmed?

HLED: No. Respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by which to consider Sisons apprehension of his son as
indirect contempt. The act complained against must be any of those specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires that the person obstructed should be
performing a duty connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent Judge acted oppressively and
vindictively.

First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part of the
respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the time) because he knew, as a public official
himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving
into a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of the office or position of the violators father.
Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection expected of him as a judge to realize that
the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes IIIs attempt to bluff his way out of the apprehension because he
was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt
of court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the issuance of the traffic
violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and also
administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on
the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension.

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any
court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property,
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given
to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 150949, June 21, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
petitioner, vs.ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.

Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land
in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title issued in her name by
the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
The TCT in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, a new TCT was issued in the name of
Sharcons. However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were
prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua and the caretakers claimed that spouses
Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT was indeed
registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.
Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court , Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title,
In the course of the proceedings, Judge Dolores L. Español, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly
See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons have used a spurious certificate of title and tax
declaration when it filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared
respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents?

Held: No. They are guilty only of Indirect contempt.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice.

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it
constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper
conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
VI, we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not
apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the
accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be
punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be
heard by himself and counsel. Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but
a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.Thus, the modes of
procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those
adapted to criminal prosecutions. Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are
guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to
respondents.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-
UNJIENG LA'O, Respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: On January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in
the death of thirteen (13) men. This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno,
and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During
the press conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the
Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases
before the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan
submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending
directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

Issue: Whether the violated the sub judice rule liable for Indirect contempt?

Held: No.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule
may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere
with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty
of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice
rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence;
that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should
be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating
that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no
attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.

"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such
a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice." By no stretch of the
imagination could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the
comments of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases.The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature,
should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In the present case, such necessity is
wanting.

SECOND DIVISION, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.:

Issue:

Held: