Violent ethnic conflict in Germany during the Refugee Crisis

Maximiliano Díaz

Introduction to Conflict Studies and Management

Willy Brandt School of Public Policy

University of Erfurt

Winter Semester 2018-2019

March, 2019
I. INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the so-called refugee crisis in Europe, Germany received more than one million two
hundred thousand asylum seekers between 2015 and 2016. That number of people represented more
than 60% of all asylum seekers in throughout Europe in 2016 (European Parlament, 2017) and
involved a cost of more than 21.7 billion euros (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2017). In response to
this big migrant flow, there were numerous protests and violence acts, most of them linked to far-
right groups within the country. Refugees and their accommodations were attacked since 2014,
however the peak was in 2016 (HIIK, 2019).

The objective of this paper is to answer the question: what elements may be influencing the violent
ethnic conflicts in Germany since 2014. It will be implicitly assessed whether the current conflict in
Germany with refugees is related to the concept of ethnic conflict.

The paper will be structured as follows, first in the theoretical framework it will review different
concepts of ethnicity and the process in which an ethnic conflict become violent. Secondly, the
analysis section will be subdivided into three parts: 1. background, where relevant information of the
case will be presented, 2. ethnic conflict, where it will be analyzed how the theoretical models can
explain the conflict studied, and 3. violent conflict, where the research question will be answered.
Finally, the paper will conclude with the main points addressed.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to analyze the case study, first the definition of ethnicity will be provided. Then I will research
the main theoretical approaches about the origin of this phenomenon and ethnic conflicts. Second, I
will make a comparison between the concept of ethnicity and nationalism. Finally, some theories that
explain how violence between groups can emerge from an ethnic conflict will be presented.

1. Ethnicity and conflict

Max Weber introduced the concept of "ethnische Gemeinsamkeit" (ethnic membership) in his book
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economics and Society) published post mortem in 1922. In his own
definition, he emphasized the idea of an identity based on subjective beliefs, for instance believing
that they have common ancestors due to physical, cultural or historical similarities. At the end of '60s

2
and beginning of ‘70s, the theoretical study of ethnicity began to develop, several decades after of
Max Weber’s definition (Ausenda, 1997).

The theory related to ethnicity can be divided into three approaches1: primordialist, instrumentalist
and constructivist (Young, 1993; Lake & Rothchild, 1998). The primordialist approach, ethnicity is
understood as an inherent characteristic (biological or historical) of individuals and communities,
which cannot be modified or elected. This perspective considers that conflicts and tensions are
generated naturally between different ethnic groups due to their differences (Lake & Rothchild,
1998). Regarding the instrumentalist approach, ethnicity is seen as an identity instrumentalized by
individuals or groups to achieve an objective. This point of view considers that ethnicity is frequently
used as a political tool, therefore it can be studied as a type of conflict based on political differences
(Lake & Rothchild, 1998). Finally, the constructivist approach considers ethnicity as a social
phenomenon, originated naturally and as a result of human interaction. It is believed that identity is
beyond the control of individuals, since it is a social construction. In this approach conflicts are not
generated by individuals wills, but by the social system itself. According to this, ethnic conflicts can
be studied as a type of social conflict (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). These three approaches are opposite
to each other, since they are idealized models, but it is advisable to use them in a complementary way
to analyze real cases (Turton, 1997; Lake & Rothchild, 1998).

2. Ethnicity and nationalism

Some authors, such as Varshney (2003), use the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism as synonyms.
Others, like Lake & Rothchild (1998), distinguish conceptual differences, but they consider that these
may be unclear when it refers to ethnic, religious, regionalist or nationalist social conflicts. On the
other hand, authors like Eriksen (1991) recognize similarities and differences between both concepts.

Ethnicity and nationalism can be considered as ideologies that highlight cultural similarities within a
group of individuals, and in case of conflict, their differences (Eriksen, 1991). The biggest difference
between the two concepts is that nationalism is more linked to the role of State and nation. This
difference can be observed when minorities and majorities ethnic groups are within the same
nation. Regarding ethnic minorities, people are within a nation-state but that does not represent
them, in this case it is easier to distinguish nationalism and ethnicity. In the case of an ethnic

1
Other authors such as Varshney (2009) distinguish approach primordialism with the name of essentialism
and distinguish a fourth and fifth called institutionalism and realism. On the other hand, authors such as David
Turton (1997) propose a different theoretical division in two groups, individualist and structural.

3
majority, both concepts tend to merge into the same notion, especially if the State represents the
people of that ethnic group. Moreover, nationalism has a dual characteristic, due to its relationship
with the nation-state, on one hand it can be in favor of the equality of social and human rights, and
on the other, it can limit and deny rights to non-citizens or culturally deviant citizens as immigrants
or descendants of immigrants (Eriksen, 1991).

3. Ethnicity and violent conflicts

Considering instrumentalist and constructivist approaches, the origin of ethnic conflicts is typically
related to competition for some type of resources, such as work, social benefits, property rights,
among others (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). In multicultural societies where there is freedom of
expression, it is expected that conflicts of ethnic types occur, through political ways or non-violent
demonstrations (Varshney, 2009).

Ethnicity by itself is not a cause of violent conflict, but the collective fear of the future and one's own
security. This fear arises when the State is not capable (or is perceived as incapable) of mediating
between different groups and safeguarding their integrity (ethnic groups and groups will be spoken
of indistinctly). If this fear is not controlled, can trigger several strategic dilemmas that will lead to
the outbreak of violent conflicts. These dilemmas are: information failures, credibility commitment
and security dilemma (Lake & Rothchild, 1998).

The first dilemma, information failure, is that the information that is handled between groups is
crucial in case of conflicts, that is, to know the intentions, capacities, strengths and weaknesses of the
other. Considering that, when a State is not capable, or is not perceived as, to ensure fair mediation
and security between groups, uncertainty arise between them, causing fear about their own safety.
This can trigger violence in the conflict. Second, credible commitment refers to the fact when groups
(or one of them) perceive that they cannot trust in each other's commitments. So a feeling of insecurity
is generated, and therefore the relationship between the groups becomes unstable. This instability can
occur because the power balance between groups changes. Power relations are based on the number
of members, resources and capacity of each organization (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). Finally, the
security dilemma proposes that if a sovereignty force is not perceived, in other words there is not a
strong State able to ensure security between the groups, they will think that only rely on themselves.
This can lead to groups making preventive attacks, under the fear of being attacked first, which can
start a cycle of violence very difficult to control (Posen, 1993).

4
These dilemmas do not act independently, they enhance each other, increasing the chances of a violent
conflict. Additionally, the presence of ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs can enhance and
expedite this process. Moreover, in Lake & Rothchild’s words (1998, p.18): "political memories,
myths, and emotions also magnify the polarizing effects of activists and entrepreneurs, further
accelerating the vicious cycle of ethnic fear and violence".

III. ANALYSIS

The latest report of The Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict
Research (HIIK)2, has re-classified the conflict in Germany as "violent crisis", for the third
consecutive year since 20143. The report links the conflict with the asylum and immigration policies
of the German State. Within the conflict three generalized sides are identified, first the anti-asylum
and immigration groups, formed by right-wing and far-right groups, anti-Islamic groups and other
xenophobic groups, second and in contrast, pro-asylum and immigration groups, including the
government, and third, a group formed by immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In 2018 it
received this classification, because there was reported at least 1,118 violent acts related to this
conflict (HIIK, 2019).

1. Background

In this section backgrounds of the conflict case in Germany will be presented. I will introduce a brief
description of the arrival quantity of asylum seekers in the country and government’s expenditure that
this had implied. Subsequently, some figures related to the violent attacks generated by anti-refugee
groups will be provided. Finally, I will present the general position of far-right groups.

The famous phrase of the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, in 2015 "'Wir schaffen das" (we
can do it) was a clear message to the world about the country's commitment to the refugee crisis in

2
Every year HIIK produces this report, which reviews the situation of all national and international conflicts in
the world. Conflicts are categorized according to the level of violence (violent or non-violent) and intensity
(low, medium and high), establishing five categories: dispute, nonviolent crisis, violent crisis, limited war and
war.
3
In the 2016 report this conflict was retroactively included, and 2014 was assigned as the start year. On the
other hand, the report did not indicate why that year was defined as the initial of the conflict.

5
Europe. With a welcome policy, borders were opened for the arrival of thousands of immigrants
seeking asylum. This action overlooked the EU Dublin III Agreement4 (Funk, 2016).

According to the data presented by European Parliament (2017), Germany is the country that has
received the most asylum applications in the EU since 2012. Even in 2015 and 2016 (the most critical
years of the refugee crisis in Europe) where more than one million two hundred thousand asylum
seekers arrived to the country. In 2015, applications to Germany accounted for 36% of all applications
in the EU, while in 2016 that figure was almost 60%. Subsequently, in 2017 the application figures
for both, the EU and Germany, returned to a level relatively similar to those of 2014 (see Figure 1).

1.400.000 1.321.600
1.259.955
1.200.000

1.000.000

800.000
745.155
600.000 705.705
626.960
476.510
400.000

200.000 202.645 222.560

0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Asylum applications in the EU Asylum applications in Germany

Figure 1: Evolution of the number of asylum applications in the EU and Germany, between 2011 and 2017. Retrieved from
EU migrant crisis: facts and figures, European Parlament, 2017.

In 2017, the total number of immigrants in Germany was more than ten million, representing 12.8%
of the total population, almost 3 percentage points more than in 2014. In addition, the total number
of asylum seekers in the country was 1,680,000, being 2% of the country's population, and
representing almost 16% of the total migrant population. Table 1 shows the considerable increase of
asylum seekers in the country between 2015 and 2016. Beyond these figures, within the country's
multiculturalism it is also important to highlight that the percentage of the population with migration
background5 was around 23% of the population in 2016 (OECD, 2018).

4
The agreement establishes that an asylum seeker must present his application to the first country of the
European Union in which he has entered.
5
The individual or at least one of their parents was born without German citizenship

6
The large increase in asylum applications, integration programs, economic and social support for
refugees, involved a considerable expense for the German state. The Federal Ministry of Finance
estimated that 21.7 billion euros were spent in 2016, due to the flow of asylum seekers (Federal
Ministry of Finance, 2017). This figure represents approximately 0.7% of GDP in 2016, as the
Statistisches Bundesamt (2019b) reported.

Table 1:
Total population, foreign population and asylum seekers by year.

Foreign population Asylum seekers

Date Population % of % of % of
total total
population population foreign
2007 82.217.837 6.744.880 8,2% 457.430 0,6% 6,8%
2008 82.002.356 6.727.620 8,2% 456.050 0,6% 6,8%
2009 81.802.257 6.694.775 8,2% 477.595 0,6% 7,1%
2010 81.751.602 6.753.620 8,3% 503.407 0,6% 7,5%
2011 80.327.900 6.930.895 8,6% 505.925 0,6% 7,3%
2012 80.523.746 7.213.710 9,0% 549.825 0,7% 7,6%
2013 80.767.463 7.633.630 9,5% 613.925 0,8% 8,0%
2014 81.197.537 8.152.970 10,0% 746.320 0,9% 9,2%
2015 82.175.684 9.107.895 11,1% 1.036.235 1,3% 11,4%
2016 82.521.653 10.039.080 12,2% 1.597.570 1,9% 15,9%
2017 82.792.351 10.623.940 12,8% 1.680.700 2,0% 15,8%
Note: The field "date" corresponds to 31/12 of each year. Information retrieved from Persons seeking protection by
protection status and reference year, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019a.

The increase in levels of migration and refugees in the country also increased the number of
xenophobic and anti-refugee demonstrations, including violent acts against individuals and
institutions. Since 2014, there has been a significant increase of this kind of acts (Benček & Strasheim,
2016), but the largest increase was in the two following years, when attacks on refugees and their
accommodation increased fivefold (Jäckle & König, 2018). The most critical year was 2016, in the
number of asylum seekers (as I mentioned previously) and in the number of attacks against them and
their accommodations. From 2017 it can be seen an apparent gradual decrease in attacks. Summary
information regarding attacks on asylum seeker accommodations and assaults on asylum seekers can
be seen in Table 2.

The attacks have been directly associated with far-right movements (Benček & Strasheim, 2016),
such as Gruppe Freital, the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA),
and supporters of National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and Alternative for Germany (AfD),

7
among others. These groups have organized several demonstrations each year, where there have been
violent confrontations with the police and against pro-asylum counter-demonstrators (HIIK, 2019).
Members of these far-right movements have criticized Germany's migration policies and the
government's handling of the crisis (Mader & Schoen, 2018). They have used several controversial
points to reject the presence of refugees in the country, among which, they argue that: i) the number
of refugees who have entered the country has increased the rates of crimes and violent crimes
(including rapes and murders), ii) arrival of people from different cultures and religions (especially
Muslims) threatens German cultural identity, and iii) the large public expenditure had affected
negatively to German population, especially the poorest, due to the prioritization of the use of public
resources in refugees (Karapin, 2002; Funk, 2016; Davis & Deole, 2017).

Table 2:
Number of attacks on asylum seeker accommodations and assaults on asylum seekers by year since
2014

Attacks on asylum seeker

Assaults on asylum seekers
Year accommodation
2014 289 65
2015 880 168
2016 1.550 382
2017 1.389 330
2018 1.118 120
Note: Information retrieved from Refugees welcome? A dataset on anti-refugee violence in Germany from Benček &
Strasheim, 2016; from Conflict Barometer 2016, from HIIK, 2017; from Conflict Barometer 2017, from HIIK, 2018; and
from Conflict Barometer 2018, HIIK, 2019.

In this context, an interesting case to analyze is the far-right AfD party. This party was founded in
2013 and had a moderate Euroscepticism speech. In its first federal elections, the same year of its
foundation, it could not participate in the German Bundestag because they only obtained 4.7% of the
votes, being 5% the minimum. In the beginning of the refugee crisis in Europe and Germany, AfD
began to take an increasingly radical anti-refugee speech, gaining popularity, attracting voters from
other right-wing parties and adding new ones. Consequently the party managed to benefit from the
refugee crisis and in the new federal elections in 2017, when they obtained 12.6% of the votes, the
third most voted party in the country, and got participation on the Bundestag (Der Bundeswahlleiter,
2017; Berning, 2017; Mader & Schoen, 2018).

8
2. Ethnic conflict

In the case of study, a social crisis with violent ramifications is presented. Concepts of ethnicity and
nationalism can be considered as similar from the aggressor’s point of view, since they see themselves
as the majority “ethnic group”. Regarding the anti-refugee groups, it is worth highlighting the
differences between them (native citizens of Germany) and non-local (refugees from third world
countries). These differences include cultural features, such as religion and customs (Sola, 2018). The
anti-refugee groups attribute characteristics to the refugees, as potential criminals and rapists, among
others (Backes, et al., 2018). Therefore they argue that want to "defend their country" and interests.
Following this argument they categorize others as unwanted, even when they can be German citizens,
but their ethnic characteristics are not "correct" (skin color, ancestors, culture, etc.) (Bartsch, et al.,
2018a).

Regarding the three approaches, mentioned above, about ethnicity and the possibility of an inherent
conflict, probably the one that best fits in the case is instrumentalist, although elements of the other
two can also be seen. As I mentioned previously, ethnicity itself is not a cause of violence, but a
conflict can be generate based on it. From an instrumentalist point of view, political entrepreneurs of
far-right parties (like AfD), take the opportunity of a regional and national crisis to elaborate speeches
and win voters. The results of this could be seen in the federal elections on 2017 (Der
Bundeswahlleiter, 2017).

On the other hand, beyond the role played by right-wing groups, it cannot be ignored that the refugee
crisis existed independently of these groups. The entry of a large number of people to a country in a
short time, demands an important work deployment (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2017). It is
necessary both, state and citizens, put effort in terms of integration. Inevitably there will be cultural
clashes and fears for refugees and local citizens. The constructivist approach shows that the social
complexity in a crisis of this magnitude could inevitably lead to conflicts (Varshney, 2009).

Finally, the primordialist approach gives us a look rooted in the sectors of the population with the
greatest tendency to xenophobia (Thayer, 2009) (perhaps the most susceptible group according to
instrumentalist approach). This sector of the population reacts with fear in the face of a conflict that
they believe is inevitable, due to cultural differences. They do not want their nation to lose its identity
and security due to the numerous arrival of strangers (Bartsch, et al., 2018a).

The three approaches can be applied to this case, in different magnitudes, but they cannot explain on
their own account the emergence of violence in the conflict. Therefore, three strategic dilemmas will
be reviewed below.

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3. Violent Conflict

In this last section, an attempt will be made to answer the initial question: What elements may be
influencing the violent ethnic conflict in Germany since 2014?

The evolution from a conflict to a violent conflict, can be explained using the three strategic dilemmas
previously reviewed.

The arrival of a large number of refugees from countries in critical situations, can generate fear and
worry in the citizens, especially if they do not know anything about those immigrants and fill their
uncertainty with prejudices. Sometimes people associate concepts such as war, terrorism and poverty
to refugees. These fears are reinforced when there are unclear crimes involving immigrants which
have a lot of exposure through the media and anti-refugee speeches (Bartsch, et al., 2018a).

All the aforementioned can generate an atmosphere of fear in the population and lead citizens to look
solutions in strong positions groups as far-right parties, even though their speeches promote more
fear. The relationship between people and these anti-refugee groups becomes a vicious circle of fear.
In other words, the fear that people feel increases when parties make harsh criticisms of the pro-
immigrant policies taken (Backes, et al., 2018). This can lead to losing credibility in the government
(in the eyes of its critics), and not see the State as a valid entity that watches over the interests and
protection of its citizens. In this way, it can be concluded that there is no control, that the State cannot
provide the necessary protection, and self-organized defense becomes necessary. If this "self-defense"
is meant to be preventive, massive attacks against refugees and their accommodations are generated
(Bartsch, et al., 2018b).

In this way, the three dilemmas can act together, enhancing each other. The fact of not knowing the
refugee background, or having ideas based on prejudices, generates concern and fear (information
failure). Additionally, the massive arrival of immigrants in a short time, generated a change in the
balance of power (or in perception), causing distrust in part of the population about this group of
foreigners (credibility commitment). Finally, the loss of confidence in the State, makes people feel
unprotected and fall into the circle of fear. In this context, the emergence of far-right political forces
that attracts those fearful people, groups them and makes them feel stronger, ends up triggering
violent reactions to protect themselves and their environment from immigrants (security dilemma).

Following this logic, the elements that more influence the violence in the conflict in Germany, are
probably related to misinformation (or false information), with the loss of confidence in the State, as
a guarantee of the order and security, and the participation of political with speeches that promote

10
fear. All these elements combined create a general feeling of insecurity and fear in one's own security,
which can eventually lead to a violent act.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The conflict related to the refugee crisis in Germany, has several elements that can be considered to
explain, in the first place, how the conflict was generated, and secondly, how it ended up being
violent.

First, considering three basic approaches to explain ethnic conflicts: primordialist, instrumentalist and
constructivist, it can be argued that instrumentalist approach is the one that best explains the conflict,
however the contribution of the other two approaches also help to explain the case. The social context
was complex, there was a crisis in the entire continent, there were many fears and internal concerns,
therefore social conflicts were to be expected. However, the instrumentalization of the refugee crisis
by groups of the far-right strengthened, and gave a strong voice, to a conflict that otherwise could
have been more tenuous.

Secondly, considering the three strategic dilemmas, explanation to why this social conflict became
violent, are: information failures, problems of credible commitment and security dilemma. All three
act in parallel influencing each other.

Finally, misinformation (or false information), distrust of refugees, loss of credibility in the State, and
discourses of political entrepreneurs, could generate a state of insecurity and fear. Part of the
population affected by this sought refuge in extreme groups, which gave them the security they do
not feel on the part of the State. These extreme groups, in a context where they fear for their own
security and interests, may end up acting violently, as during the refugee crisis.

11
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