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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 146731 January 13, 2004

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO BERNANTE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Resolution2 dated 31 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58875. The Court of Appeals dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
Agustina M. Enemecio against respondents Office of the Ombudsman and Servando Bernante. The present petition also assails
the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated 7 December 2000 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio ("Enemecio") is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College
of Fisheries Technology ("CSCST-CFT"), Carmen, Cebu. Private respondent Servando Bernante ("Bernante") is an Assistant
Professor IV of CSCST-CFT.

On 30 March 1998, Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of public documents,
malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante before the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT.3 Dr.
Severino R. Romano, CSCST-CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas
("Ombudsman").

Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public document.4 The
Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to submit her affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses. After Enemecio submitted the required
affidavits, the Ombudsman ordered Bernante to submit his counter-affidavit. The administrative complaint was docketed as OMB-
VIS-ADM-98-0201, while the criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. The Ombudsman jointly tried the two
cases.

Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and unprintable words against her on the walls of the
CSCST Carmen Campus. Enemecio claimed that Bernante also shouted defamatory words against her while she was inside the
school premises. Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on forced leave
from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-
day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries in Criminal
Case No. NR-1678-CR. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent
Andres T. Melencion approved Bernante’s application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to receive
salary for that period because of his "falsified leave applications."5

For his part, Bernante did not deny that he was in prison from 15 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. He maintained that he received his
salary for that period because of his duly approved leave applications. Bernante also alleged that Enemecio filed the criminal and
administrative complaints against him in retaliation for the case he filed against Enemecio’s friends, Dean Severino Romano and
Bernadette Mante. Bernante denied he was behind the spray-painting of obscenities against Enemecio on the walls of the school
campus.6
On 13 January 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing the administrative complaint against Bernante in OMB-
VIS-ADM-98-0201. The Ombudsman explained:

On the issue of the alleged falsification of respondent’s application for leave by making it appear that he was on vacation when in
truth and in fact he was serving a sentence for a criminal conviction, we have determined that there is no regulation restricting the
purpose or use of an employee’s earned leave credits. Considering that the application for leave filed by the respondent was duly
approved by the appropriate official concerned, it matters not how he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the specifics
or reasons for going on leave be spelled out in such application.

On the issue of the spray painting of obscenities on the walls of the school, the evidence is insufficient to prove that respondent
was the person responsible for such as there were no eye witnesses to such activity. The testimony of Bernadette Mante merely
identifies the respondent as allegedly having a drinking session with security guard Estanislao Lavaria at around 11:00 on the
night of March 29, 1998. Furthermore, witness Mante states that there are about ten (10) to twelve (12) families living inside the
dormitory facing the school walls where the grafitti appeared. Despite this number, not one single person appeared to have
witnessed respondent spray painting the questioned grafitti on the walls of the campus (TSN, April 19, 1999). While it may be
probable that the only person or persons who could have had the opportunity to spray paint the said grafitti on the night of March
29, 1998 or in the early morning hours of March 30, 1998 were the respondent and security guard Lavaria, this is not sufficient
justification to directly blame them for such event.

Regarding the complainant’s allegation that on March 10 and 25, 1998, the respondent defamed the former by uttering
slanderous words, it appears that only the incident occurring on March 10, 1998 was corroborated by the testimony of witness
Delfin Buot (TSN, April 7, 1998). Witness Buot testified that he was about (3) meters from the respondent when the latter shouted
the words ‘buricat’ (whore) ‘putang ina’ and ‘maot’ (snob) to the complainant. However, the circumstances of the utterance,
particularly the time and the relation of the protagonists involved, leads us to conclude that the same is removed from the official
functions of the respondent as a professor of the school. Stated otherwise, the act of the respondent was not in relation to his
official functions. In the case of Palma vs. Fortich, et al., 147 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court ruled that:

In administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v. Crisologo, et al. (17 SCRA
868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension under two categories, namely: (1) those related to the
discharge of the functions of the officer concerned (neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of
maladministration of office and (2) those not so connected with said functions. Under the second category, when
the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final
judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative action.

Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation charge is now pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in
Catmon, Cebu under Criminal Case No. 30006-CR, the matter of respondent’s administrative culpability is still
premature to be determined herein.7

On the same date, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint against Bernante in OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-02868 finding no
probable cause to indict Bernante for falsification of public document. The Ombudsman explained thus:

It is well established by documentary evidence that the applications for leave filed by the respondent for the
period from May 15 to 31, 1996 were duly approved by the head of office, which in this case is Mr. Andres T.
Melencion, Vocational School Superintendent. All these leaves were with pay indicating that the respondent
availed of his leave credits which are undeniably due to him by law. It matters not how the respondent utilizes the
days where he is on leave, be they enjoyed as a vacation or, in this case, incarceration for a crime. There
appears to be no regulation or law against the utilization of leave credits for purposes other than recreation. As
such, there could be no falsification where nothing is being misrepresented in the official leave forms which the
respondent prepared and submitted.9

The Ombudsman denied Enemecio’s motion to reconsider the dismissal of the criminal complaint in its Order of 28 February
2000. In denying the motion, the Ombudsman stated:

We find the complainant’s arguments untenable. There is no dispute that the leave forms are public documents.
What is in dispute is whether or not the failure of the respondent to indicate therein the reasons for his leave
amounts to a crime of falsification. It is submitted that it does not, for the simple reason that the form itself does
not require stating the reasons for going on leave. An employee simply indicates through check marks the nature
of the leave he is availing of, which in the case at bar, respondent chose to avail of his forced and vacation leave
credits. Nevertheless, the omission does not affect the validity of its approval. What is indicated in the leave forms
is only the need to specify the whereabouts of the employee who goes on leave. However, it is not a requirement
that specifics must be provided. In any case the omission to state the location of a vacationing employee is not a
condition sine-qua-non for its approval.

To sum it up, there is no falsification of leave forms where there is no requirement for the indication of reasons for
going on leave. Regardless of such a requirement, the need to indicate the whereabouts of a vacationing
employee is not a necessity for its approval.10

Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the resolutions which dismissed
the criminal complaint and denied the motion for reconsideration in OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. Applying the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto,11 the appellate court dismissed Enemecio’s petition for having been filed out of time. The appellate court also stated
that the proper remedy available to Enemecio was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.

In her motion for reconsideration, Enemecio argued that the appellate court should not have relied on Fabian. Enemecio
contended that Fabian declared void only Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA 6770") and Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 ("AO No. 07") insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO
No. 07, including the "final and unappealable character" of orders, resolutions or decisions exonerating a respondent from any
criminal liability, still stand. Enemecio stated that she filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
because she considered Bernante’s absolution from the administrative complaint in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201 as already final and
unappealable. As there was no adequate remedy of appeal, Enemecio claimed that her only recourse was a petition for certiorari
before the appellate court under Rule 65.12

The Court of Appeals denied Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration in its Order of 7 December 2000.

Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals stated that in Fabian, the Supreme Court held that appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals must be brought by petition for review under Rule 43. The
appellate court stated that a petition for review must be filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed final order or resolution.
Since Enemecio received on 22 March 2000 a copy of the Ombudsman’s Order denying her motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court ruled that Enemecio had only until 6 April 2000 to file a petition for review. Enemecio filed her petition only on 8
May 2000. The appellate court further stated that Enemecio’s allegation in the petition that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is false. The proper remedy available to Enemecio is a petition for
review.13

In denying Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals clarified that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s
petition assailing the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Bernante. The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared
void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in administrative disciplinary
cases to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the power to review decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.14

The Issues

Enemecio contends that:

1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction over the petition.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to appreciate that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the
appropriate course of action considering the circumstances obtaining.

3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner by
misinterpreting the ruling of the Supreme Court in Fabian vs. Desierto.15

The issues boil down to whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the Court of Appeals is the proper remedy to
question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the Ombudsman.

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to dismiss this petition.

Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 6516 questioning the Ombudsman’s Resolution
dated 13 January 2000 and Order dated 28 February 2000 dismissing the criminal case against Bernante.17 Thus, the Prefatory
statement of Enemecio’s Petition in the Court of Appeals states:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Resolution dated 13
January 2000 and the Order dated 28 February 2000 both issued by the Public Respondent in the Ombudsman
Case docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0201 and entitled, "Agustina Enemecio vs. Servando Bernante, Asst.
Professor IV, CSCST- College of Fisheries Technology, Carmen, Cebu", for being a manifest and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The Resolution dated 13 January 2000 dismissed the criminal
complaint for malversation and falsification of public documents filed against herein Private Respondent while
the Order dated 28 February 2000 denied herein Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Certified machine
 copies of the aforesaid Resolution and Order are hereto appended as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively.
(Emphasis supplied)

The appellate court dismissed Enemecio’s petition and denied her motion for reconsideration. Enemecio now comes to this Court
via this petition for review, claiming that "what was involved in the petition before the appellate court was the
administrative, not the criminal case."18 Enemecio thus stresses that "there is no reason for the Court of Appeals to say that
the petition concerned the criminal case."19

We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her counsel, Atty. Terence L. Fernandez. Atty.
Fernandez’s conduct has fallen far too short of the honesty required of every member of the Bar.

It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsman’s
Resolution and Order dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this reason, the appellate
court in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition as
the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary actions. Atty. Fernandez’s attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch
effort to secure a decision favorable to his client’s cause does not escape our attention. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Fernandez is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. He must always bear in mind that good faith and
honorable dealings with judicial tribunals are primary obligations of an attorney. He must always remember to deal with courts
with truthfulness and not to trifle with court proceedings.20 For this, Atty. Fernandez should be admonished not to commit similar
acts again.

Even if we consider Enemecio’s petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the dismissal of the administrative case
against Bernante, the action must also fail. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions
should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.21 The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of
the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA
6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of the Ombudsman, remain valid.22

In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal
cases is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.23 Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals,
instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright.

Even if we consider the substance of the case, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s determination of
whether there exists a prima facie case against Bernante.

Enemecio assails the dismissal of the criminal charges against Bernante for two reasons: (1) that she was able to prove before
the Ombudsman the charge for malversation against Bernante; and (2) that Bernante himself admitted that he signed and filed
the subject leave applications.

Enemecio asserts that she was able to present before the Ombudsman the payroll of the CSCST-CFT employees covering the
period from 16 May 1996 to 31 May 1996 signed by Bernante. Enemecio asserts that this document proved that Bernante
"actually received and was paid the amount of P3,185.08 as a result of his falsified letter-requests and leave applications."
According to Enemecio, these constituted acts of malversation.

Enemecio’s contentions do not deserve serious consideration.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.24

As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to
disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure
of the truth of the facts narrated.25 Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false
statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced
leave.

In PCGG v. Desierto,26 the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given the
facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in
form or substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds otherwise. If, in the Ombudsman’s view, the
complaint is sufficient in form and substance, he may proceed with the investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to
dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation.27

Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has carefully studied the merits of the criminal
complaint. Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the
private respondent to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Edgardo P. Cruz
concurring.

3 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

4 Ibid., p. 11.

5 Ibid., pp. 64, 12-15.

6 Ibid., p. 64.

7 Rollo, pp. 65-66.

8 CA Rollo, p. 26.

9 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

10 Ibid., p. 27.

11 356 Phil. 787 (1998).

12 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

13 CA Rollo, pp. 55-56.

14 Ibid., pp. 73-74.

15 Rollo, p. 19.

16 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

17 CA Rollo, pp. 5-20, 25-28.

18 Rollo, p. 11.

19 Ibid., pp. 11, 20-21, 64-66, 77-78.

20 PAMARAN, TRIAL PRACTICE IN PHILIPPINE COURT 6 (3rd Ed., 1986).

21 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Barata v. Abalos, Jr., 411 Phil. 204 (2001); Lapid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, 29 June 2000, 334
22

SCRA 738.

Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 142738, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 437; Nava v.
23

Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544 (2001); Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario, 376 Phil. 115 (1999).

Relucio v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 147182, 21 November 2002; Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364
24

Phil. 890 (1999).

25 REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK TWO 210 (15th Ed., Rev. 2001).
 G.R. No. 140358, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 561. See also Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
26

Behest Loans v. Desierto, 418 Phil. 715 (2001); Yu v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128466, 31 May 2001, 358
SCRA 353.

27Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 415 Phil. 135 (2001); Mamburao,
Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 139141-42, 15 November 2000, 344 SCRA 805; Knecht v. Desierto,
353 Phil. 494 (1998).

28 PCGG v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 767.

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 144026 June 15, 2006

FERNANDO S. DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, finding petitioner Fernando
S. Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art.
172, par. 2, in relation to Art. 171, pars. 2 and 4 thereof of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner was charged with falsification of a private document under the following information:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July, 1986, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Fernando S. Dizon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
commit falsification of a private document, to wit: Said accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction Corporation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and
making it appear in said document that the First United Construction Corporation has undertaken building construction, sewage,
water, and other civil works, for the following projects of Titan Construction Corporation:

Title Cost

1. Calapan Super Area Shop P 8,900,000.00

2. Masbate Super Area Shop 9,800,000.00

3. Catarman Super Area Shop 12,000,000.00

and that the same was executed and signed by the President of Titan Construction Corporation, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew that said certification was not issued nor authorized to be issued by Titan Construction Corporation and that it
is false because First United Construction Corporation never had any participation of the projects listed therein which were
undertaken by Titan Construction Corporation and that the signature appearing in said certification as being that of Titan
Construction Corporation’s President is false and a forgery since it was not signed by its President, to the damage and prejudice
of Titan Construction Corporation.3

Under arraignment on 17 May 1991, accused petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

This criminal case against petitioner originated from a civil action4 for prohibition, damages with petition for the issuance of
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction filed by Titan Construction Corporation and Fernando M. Sopot on 25 January
1991 against the members of the Pre-Post Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Public Estates Authority
(PEA). In said civil case, plaintiffs maintained that the members of the PBAC and the PEA erroneously awarded to First United
Construction Corporation, in a bidding held on 30 October 1990, the contract for the construction of the Bahay Pangarap Project
of the PEA.

A witness for the prosecution, Atty. Jaime Linsangan, counsel for Titan Construction Corporation, presented certain documents
submitted by First United Construction Corporation during the bidding conducted on the Bahay Pangarap Project. Among those
presented as evidence in court was the alleged "Certification" dated 10 July 1986 issued by Titan Construction Corporation which
reads as follows:

July 10, 1986

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION has undertaken building const’n, sewerage, water, and
other civil works for the following on-going projects of Titan Construction Corporation

Title Cost

1. Calapan Super Area P 8,900,000.00

2. Masbate Super Area 9,800,000.00

3. Catarman Super Area 12,000,000.00

Titan Construction Corporation

by: (Sgd.)
President5

According to Atty. Linsangan, he had presented a copy of said certification to the officers of Titan Construction Corporation, and
upon verification learned that the projects mentioned in said certification were never undertaken by First United Construction
Corporation. He was likewise informed by the same officers that the signature on the said certification was not the signature of
the former President of Titan Construction Corporation, Vicente Liwag.

Another witness, Jose Caneo, testified that he is the Vice President for Special Projects of Titan Construction Corporation since
1981 and that petitioner and his father, Felipe Dizon, were his former co-employees and had worked with them. He alleged that
petitioner, as the possessor of the questioned certification, which petitioner himself submitted to the PEA in support of their bid,
must be presumed to be the author and/or perpetrator of the falsification, and that he presumes it must be the petitioner who
delivered the certification to the PEA as the certification was among the records of the First United Construction Corporation
where the petitioner was one of its officers. He further claimed that he has no personal knowledge as to who affixed the forged
signature on the document.

For the defense, petitioner and his father testified. From their testimonies, it was discerned that petitioner is a civil engineer by
profession and had worked with the National Housing Authority from 1978 to 1981. He was likewise an employee of Titan
Construction Corporation as office engineer before he accepted overseas employment in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return in 1985,
he worked with some friends and organized their own construction company now known as First United Construction
Corporation. Petitioner had discussed with his father his plans to participate in government projects and thus, requested the latter
to secure a certification from the Titan Construction Corporation attesting that they had done some construction works for said
company. Thereafter, his father gave him the certification he requested.

The petitioner claimed that he had no part in the preparation of said document, and neither does he have knowledge as to who
signed said certification, as his father only informed him that the certification came from Jose Caneo. He also disclosed that he
does not know Mr. Vicente Liwag. Petitioner also admitted that the First United Construction Corporation had no part in the
completion of the three projects referred to in the certification, but nonetheless allowed his engineers, specifically, Myleen Hizon,
to include said certificate in the documents submitted for their pre-qualification bid thinking that the signature appearing therein
was genuine. According to petitioner, he only used the questioned certification due to the belief that the Titan Construction
Corporation had authorized its use, and only came to know of the alleged forgery of the signature appearing in said document
when the criminal case was filed against him. Furthermore, petitioner maintained that the reason the criminal case was filed
against him was due to his refusal to pay the ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) demanded of him by Jose Caneo and Benito
Yao, said amount representing the expected profit from the Bahay Pangarap Project.

Felipe Dizon, father of the petitioner, on his part, testified that he was employed by Titan Construction Corporation from 1981
until 1991, and was both vice president and project manager of said corporation in 1986. He stated that his son requested him to
secure a certification to the effect that he had done some construction work in order to help him take part in public biddings, and
explained that he found nothing wrong with this request as this was an ordinary practice of construction companies, the same
having been done by Titan Construction Corporation when it was starting. In order to secure said certification, he approached
Jose Caneo and conveyed his son’s request. Jose Caneo then told him to prepare the certification and he will have the same
signed by Vicente Liwag. Thereafter, he asked one of the employees of Titan Construction Corporation to type said certification,
choosing the projects to be mentioned therein as said projects were known to him as vice president and project manager. He
asserted that when Jose Caneo gave him the certification two weeks later, he was of the belief that the signature appearing
thereon was genuine; otherwise, he would not have given the same to his son. Also, Felipe Dizon claimed that the case was filed
as a result of the disqualification of Titan Construction Corporation from the public bidding for the Bahay Pangarap Project, and
that he was informed by Benito Yao that the case will be withdrawn if his son paid ten million pesos representing the expected
profit from said project.

On rebuttal, Jose Caneo countered that he was never approached by Felipe Dizon to have any certification signed by Vicente
Liwag and likewise denied demanding any amount from the petitioner for the withdrawal of the case.

After trial and a perusal of the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that petitioner, then the Executive Vice President of
First United Construction Corporation, in his desire to join public biddings, requested his father to secure a certification that would
show that he had participated in some of the projects of Titan Construction Corporation, knowing fully well that he in fact had not
participated in any of Titan Construction Corporation’s projects. His father, in turn gave the petitioner a certification allegedly from
Titan Construction Corporation declaring that First United Construction Corporation had participated in the construction of the
three projects mentioned therein. The said certification was material to enable First United Construction Corporation to qualify for
the pre-qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap Project of the PEA. As a result of the submission of said certification, First
United Construction Corporation pre-qualified and was thereafter awarded the project, causing the other bidders, including Titan
Construction Corporation, to lose and thus, sustain loss.

Consequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction on 22 April 1993. According to the court a quo:

From the foregoing evidences (sic) it would appear that the accused Fernando Dizon caused it to appear in the certification that
the President of Titan Construction Corporation, Mr. Vicente Liwag participated in the act of issuing the said document. His
admission to the effect that he caused the securing of the certification for the purpose of submitting the same to the Public
Estates Authority (PEA) as part of the pre-qualification requirements in the bidding. In the case of People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil
28; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil 1253, the possessor of the falsified document is presumed to be the author thereof, and the
one who stands to benefit therefrom is presumed to be the author thereof. He admitted requesting his father to secure the said
certification. He likewise admitted that he has no participation in anyone of the projects mentioned therein. That despite such
knowledge of falsity of the contents of the document he accepted and allowed the same to be used for the pre-qualification
bidding before the PEA.

His admission to the effect that said certification was necessary to pre-qualify his company to participate in the bidding for
government projects knowing fully well its falsity shows his intent to misrepresent facts and/or pervert the truth in the narration of
fact contained in the certification with a wrongful intent to injure and/or damage third person.

The Court hardly believe[s] the defense of the accused that one Benito Yao was extorting money from him in the amount
of P10,000,000.00 on the promise that the case would be withdrawn. The records of the Titan Construction Corporation duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission does not show on record that Benito Yao is a stockholder, director, or
officer of the said company.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused FERNANDO S. DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171, par. 2 and 4 thereof and
hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Two (2) YEARS, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine
of P5,000.00.6
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the conviction before the Court of Appeals. On 29 November 1999, the appellate court rendered
the assailed Decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification of the penalty, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, absent any aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, appellant FERNANDO S. DIZON is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of arresto mayor, minimum term, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional, as
maximum term. All other aspects of the appealed decision stay.7

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied; hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction because the prosecution failed to
adduce any proof to substantiate the allegation that petitioner was involved in the preparation of the falsified certification, and that
the sole basis of the conviction was the legal presumption that the possessor of the falsified document is presumed to be the
author thereof. Petitioner argues that for said presumption to take hold, it must first be shown that the questioned document is a
forgery or was indeed falsified. According to petitioner, the foregoing is not true in the instant case because the State failed to
introduce satisfactory evidence of the forgery or falsification of the certification, as well as to establish that the said certification
was unauthorized. Petitioner rationalizes that while it is true that, other than the signature of the president of Titan Construction
Corporation, the representations made in the certification are false, it does not necessarily follow that its execution was
unauthorized by Titan Construction Corporation. He further justifies that there is evidence in record that attests to a furtive
practice in the construction industry where certifications, of the kind involved in this case, are issued by established construction
corporations to assist new construction firms to pre-qualify in public biddings.

Petitioner also stresses that, based on his testimony and that of his father, it has been satisfactorily shown that he had no
participation in the drafting and issuance of the certification. Petitioner explains that the certification was prepared by his father,
Felipe Dizon, who was then still an officer of Titan Construction Corporation, and that through an intermediary, Felipe Dizon
arranged to have the certification signed by the president of Titan Construction Corporation, Vicente Liwag. Thereafter, Felipe
Dizon delivered the signed certification to his son. Petitioner maintains that with his father’s admission of complicity, it was
tenuous for both the trial court and the appellate court to hold that petitioner is the forger of the certification.

In order to properly address the issues presented by petitioner, it is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of
Falsification of Private Document under the Revised Penal Code which the petitioner has been accused of perpetrating. The
elements of Falsification under Paragraph 2 of Article 172 are as follows:

1. That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Art. 171;

2. That the falsification was committed in any private document;

3. That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to
cause such damage.

Under Article 171, par. 2, a person may commit falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document that a
person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or
proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 4 of Article 171 is perpetrated by a person who, having a legal obligation
to disclose the truth, makes in a document statements in a narration of facts which are absolutely false with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.

In order that petitioner may be convicted of falsification under par. 2 of Article 171, it is essential that it be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that he had caused it to appear that Mr. Vicente Liwag had authorized the issuance of said certification, when
in truth, Mr. Liwag did not partake in said issuance of the certificate. Stated differently, for petitioner to be convicted of falsification
under par. 2, the allegation in the Information that he "willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a
certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making it appear in said document x x x that the same was executed and signed
by the President of Titan Construction Corporation, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew that said certification
was not issued nor authorized to be issued by Titan Construction Corporation x x x and that the signature appearing in said
certification as being that of Titan Construction Corporation’s President, x x x" must be clearly established.

The threshold issue then is whether the signature of Mr. Vicente Liwag was forged. Contrary to the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the appellate court, this Court deems that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Atty. Jaime Linsangan and
Jose Caneo, failed to prove with moral certainty that Mr. Liwag did not authorize the issuance of the certification.

As a general rule, findings of fact by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are given great respect and even
regarded with finality by this Court; however, this rule accepts of certain exceptions, such as 1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; 6) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; 8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.8 Particularly in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose his liberty upon conviction, the Court must be content
that the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn by the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

The conviction of petitioner was anchored on the testimonies of Atty. Linsangan that he was informed by the officers of Titan
Construction Corporation that the signature appearing on the certification was not the signature of the corporation president
Vicente Liwag; and of Jose Caneo that he has no personal knowledge as to who actually affixed the signature on the certification
and that he presumes it to be the petitioner. He (Caneo) assumes that it must be petitioner who was in possession of the
document as he presumes that it must be petitioner who delivered the certification to the PEA as the certification was among the
records submitted by First United Construction Corporation, where the petitioner was one of the officers.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the prosecution fell short of sufficiently ascertaining that the signature appearing in the
certification was, in fact, not that of Mr. Vicente Liwag, much less, that petitioner is the author of the certification. Atty. Linsangan
was merely informed that the signature appearing in the certification was not that of Mr. Liwag. On the other hand, Jose Caneo
only presumed that petitioner was the possessor of the alleged falsified document as he assumed that it was petitioner who
delivered the certification to the PEA. Jose Caneo’s presumption was, however, directly demolished by the cross-examination of
Atty. Crescini:

Atty. Crescini: Mr. Caneo, I address your attention to paragraph 8 of your affidavit complaint which reads: "that being in
possession of the said certification which he himself submitted to the PEA in support of their bid, the said Fernando S. Dizon is
presumed to be the author/perpetrator of the said falsification." You remember this allegation of this affidavit-complaint?

Mr. Caneo: Yes, sir.

Q: I understand and take it therefore that your only conclusion in believing that the certification Annex A of your affidavit
complaint was falsified by the accused is because he was allegedly in possession of the same?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It actually therefore also goes [to say that] you did not actually see him prepare physically the certification Annex A, you did
not see it?

A: I did not see.

Q: You have no personal knowledge as to who affix(ed) the signature on Annex A purporting to be the signature of the President.
You did not see it also?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You have no personal knowledge of who affix(ed) the signature?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, when you claimed that Mr. Dizon was the one who himself submitted to the PEA this certification, Annex
A, you only presumed it was he who personally delivered it?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not see him in person actually in the act of delivering that certification to the PEA?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You only presumed he was the one who delivered it because the certification was among the records of the FUCC?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you further made the presumption because Mr. Dizon is an officer of FUCC?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That’s all you know, your presumptions?

A: Yes, sir.9

Thus, the presumption then of Jose Caneo is totally devoid of any basis.
From the foregoing it is clear that Atty. Linsangan and Jose Caneo had no personal knowledge as to the matter they testified to.
The testimony of Atty. Linsangan merely established that he was informed by certain officers of Titan Construction Corporation
that the signature of Vicente Liwag appearing on the certification was forged, however, the said officers where never presented
during trial to prove such claim of forgery. When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without
any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.10 On the other hand, the testimony of Jose Caneo was based on mere
presumptions and speculations, and bare assumptions and speculations cannot be bases for conviction.11 A conviction for a
criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere assumptions.12 Thus, the reliance by the lower
court on the hearsay and speculative testimonies of the abovecited witnesses, is misplaced.

By and large, there was no competent evidence to prove the allegation of the officers of Titan Construction Corporation that the
signature affixed on the certification was not that of Vicente Liwag, thus making the issuance of the certification unauthorized.
The prosecution did not present Mr. Vicente Liwag, or any other knowledgeable witness to testify whether the signature
appearing on said certification was indeed not by Mr. Liwag, thus establishing the fact that the certification was falsified by
making it appear that the issuance was actually consented to by the president of Titan Construction Corporation. Absent clear
proof that Vicente Liwag did not sanction the issuance of said certification, the Information that petitioner has committed
falsification of private document under Article 172, in relation to par. 2, Article 171, cannot be considerably proved.

With respect to par. 4 of Article 171, what is sought to be penalized is the act of making in a document of utterly false narration of
facts by a person who has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of said facts, thereby causing injury to a third party. And in the
case at bar, in order that petitioner may be penalized under par. 4, it is necessary that the allegations in the Information that "x x
x accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction Corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare
a document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making it appear in said document that the First United
Construction Corporation has undertaken building construction, sewage, water, and other civil works, for the following projects of
Titan Construction Corporation: 1.Calapan Super Area Shop – P8,900,000.00; 2.Masbate Super Area Shop – P9,800,000.00;
3.Catarman Super Area Shop – P12,000,000.00 x x x, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew x x x that it is false
because First United Construction Corporation never had any participation of the projects listed therein which were undertaken
by Titan Construction Corporation x x x, to the damage and prejudice of Titan Construction Corporation" be proved.

According to the court a quo, it has been substantially gathered from the evidence adduced in trial that:

. . . [A]ccused Fernando Dizon, then the Executive Vice-President of the First United Construction Corporation, in his desire to be
able to join public biddings, requested his father Felipe Dizon to secure a certification to the effect that he has participated in
certain projects of the Titan Construction Corporation, knowing fully well that he has no participation whatsoever on said projects.
That the father in turn gave the son a certification from the Titan Construction Corporation to the effect that he has participated in
the construction of the three (3) projects mentioned therein. That the said certification is material to enable him to qualify the pre-
qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap Project. That because of the certification submitted, he actually pre-qualified and was
awarded the project. That the same caused the other bidders to lose in the bid, hence damage is present.13

From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the elements of the crime of falsification under par. 4 of Article 171 necessary to
convict petitioner, particularly that a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; b) that he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; c) that the fact narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and d)
that the perversion of the truth in the narration of fact was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person are present in
the instant case.

The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the trial court, further stressed that petitioner admitted in court that he had requested his
father to secure a certification from the Titan Construction Corporation declaring that First United Construction Corporation had
done some construction work for the former; that said certification was necessary for First United Construction Corporation to
qualify in public biddings for government projects; and that petitioner knew fully well the falsity in said statements. Said acts of the
accused caused damage not only to Titan Construction Corporation which suffered when it lost in the bidding, but also to the
State which expected faithful compliance with the requirements of prequalification, bids, and awards on government
infrastructure contracts as provided under Presidential Decree No. 1594.

This Court is not convinced. In the case at bar, the circumstances relied upon by the trial court do not lead to an inference
exclusively consistent with the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove that it was indeed
petitioner who prepared the document nor that he was the one who provided the facts contained in the certification. Even from
the admissions of both petitioner and his father, what can only be established is that petitioner requested his father to secure a
certification that they had done some construction work for Titan Construction Corporation. Nothing in said testimony indicates
that petitioner had asked his father to commit any falsification. Petitioner did not provide nor even suggest what detailed
information will be included in said certification.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses merely inferred that by virtue of petitioner’s position as Executive Vice President of
First United Construction Corporation, he was in possession of said document and thus can be presumed to be the author of said
falsification. There is nothing in the evidence to support a positive conclusion that petitioner was actually in possession of the
falsified document.

Even the presumption that the person who is benefited by the falsified document is presumed to be the author, cannot be applied
in this case. Petitioner was not directly benefited by the certificate. It must be pointed out here that the said certification benefited
First United Construction Corporation which was granted the construction project, and petitioner was merely an officer of said
company and any benefit he may have received from said project would only have been incidental.

From the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect for the law, be held that there
is sufficiency of competent evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral
certainty. The Court finds the testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent
weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on petitioner. The principle has been dinned into
the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined
to hold that the evidence is conclusive that he is not guilty, neither is it convinced that he is so, based on the circumstances of
this case. The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein petitioner. So long as
the acts of the petitioner and the circumstances can be explained upon any other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with his
guilt, he must be acquitted.

To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the prosecution’s evidence
was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies
the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.14 It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind
the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal
based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be
doubted,D:\judiciary\supreme_court\jurisprudence\2005\jul2005\150439.htm - _ftn34#_ftn3415 for a criminal conviction rests on
the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.16 And, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction,17 and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be considered.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20143, dated 29 November 1999, affirming the Decision dated 22 April 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Branch
109, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Fernando S. Dizon of the
crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, on reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1CA-G.R. CR No. 20143, dated 29 November 1999, penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now
Presiding Justice) with Associate Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.

2 Crim. Case No. 91-0716 dated 22 April 1993.

3 Rollo, pp. 114-115.

 4 Civil Case No. 91-213 entitled, "Titan Construction Corporation and Fernando M. Sopot v. Atty. Luis B.
Pangilinan, Jr., as Chairman, Engineer Manuel Berina, Atty. Dan Amosin and Mr. Pelayo Laplap, as members of
the Pre-Post Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Public Estates Authority."

5 Rollo, p. 116.

6 RTC Decision, pp. 11-13; rollo, pp. 124-126.

7 CA Decision, p.18; rollo, p. 92.

8 Spouses Almendrala v. Spouses Wing On Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.

9 TSN, 31 July 1991, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 39-41.

10 People v. Sarabia, 376 Phil. 32, 43 (1999).

11 Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, 357 Phil. 762, 808 (1998).

12
Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20, 25.

13 Rollo, p. 123.

14 People v. Salguero, G.R. No. 89117, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 357, 377.

15 People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 743 (2000).

16 Id., pp. 743-744.

17 People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 93-94 (1986).

18 People v. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78, 80 (1948).

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Today is Saturday, January 18, 2020

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170453 October 30, 2006

NESTOR A. BERNARDINO and CELEDONIA N. TOMAS, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 170518 October 30, 2006

EUGELIO G. BARAWID, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review are the September 19, 2005 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan which found
petitioners guilty of falsification of public document in Criminal Case No. 27548 and its November 18, 2005 Resolution2 denying
petitioners' motion for new trial.

The facts show that petitioner Nestor A. Benardino (Bernardino) was the former Municipal Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and
Chairman of the PreQualification Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the construction of the extension of the public market of
Guimba; while petitioner Eugelio G. Barawid (Barawid), a Municipal Treasurer was a member of the PBAC.
Petitioner Celedonia N. Tomas (Tomas) was the PBAC's acting Secretary. The other members of the PBAC were Municipal
Councilors, Ernesto T. Mateo and Benito A. Rillo; Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator Efren N. Fronda; Municipal
Budget Officer Abraham P. Coloma; Municipal Engineer Jose F. Mateo; Municipal Accountant Renato L. Esquivel; and non-
government organization representatives Paulino G. Quindara and Luis F. Rendon, Jr.

The "Minutes of the opening of bids"3 show that on December 8, 1997, the PBAC members convened at the Municipal Library
of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The Acting Chairman, assisted by Commission on Audit (COA) representative Rolando E. Ronquillo
(Ronquillo), assessed the qualifications of the four bidders who participated and thereafter awarded the project to Mascom
Design and Engineering International (MASCOM) whose bid was determined to be the lowest and most advantageous to the
government of Guimba. The Minutes was signed by petitioner Tomas in her capacity as the acting Secretary of the PBAC.

On the same date, petitioners Bernardino and Barawid and the other PBAC members signed a "Prequalification Bid and
Award Committee"4 stating that "after due deli[b]eration, the committee resolved as it is hereby resolved, to recommend [the]
Award [of the] Contract [to MASCOM] for offering the lowest [bid]." Their signatures also appear in an "Abstract of
Bidding"5 and "Abstract of Proposal"6 both reflecting the names of the four bidders and their respective bids.

Meanwhile, prior to the construction of the public market extension, prosecution witness Jose Lucius Pocholo Dizon (Mayor
Dizon) was elected Municipal Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 1998 local elections. He thereafter conducted a public
bidding for the construction of the same extension of the public market and awarded the project to KYRO Builder as the lowest
bidder. Consequently, MASCOM filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal compliant against Mayor Dizon and
petitioner Barawid for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

In his Rejoinder-Affidavit,7 Mayor Dizon contended that the award to KYRO is proper because the project could not be validly
given to MASCOM as there was in fact no competitive public bidding held on December 8, 1997. In support thereof, he attached
the similarly dated June 27, 2000 affidavits8 of former PBAC members, namely, Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara, Renato
L. Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr., stating that no public bidding was
held in connection with the construction of the Guimba public market extension nor was the local PBAC convened on December
8, 1997. Affiants also declared that the documents in connection with the alleged bidding were delivered to their residence/office;
and that they signed the same upon the representation of MASCOM's representative that the documents were necessary for the
Philippine National Bank loan application of the municipality in connection with the construction of the public market. 9

On the basis of the admission of the said affiants, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the case against Mayor Dizon and
petitioner Barawid and instead filed the instant case for falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code against all the members of the PBAC members including the herein petitioners.

The Information charged petitioners and the PBAC members of falsification by making it appear in the "Minutes of the opening of
bids," "Prequalification Bid and Award Committee," "Abstract of Proposal," and "Abstract of Bidding," that they and COA
representative conducted a public bidding on December 8, 1997, participated in by four bidders, when no such bidding was in
fact conducted, to wit:

That sometime on December 8, 1997, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Celedonia N. Tomas, Acting Secretary of
the Prequalification, Bids and Award Committee (PBAC) of the Municipal Government of Guimba, Nueva Ecija;
Nestor A. Bernardino, then Mayor and PBAC Chairman; and the PBAC members, namely: Benito A. Rillo and
Ernesto T. Mateo, both members of the Sangguniang Bayan; Eugelio G. Barawid, Municipal Treasurer; Efren N.
Fronda, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator; Abraham P. Coloma, Municipal Budget Officer; Jose
F. Mateo, Municipal Engineer; Renato L. Esquivel, Municipal Accountant; and Paulino G. Quindara and Luis [F.]
Rendon, Jr., NGO representative, while in the performance of and taking advantage of their official positions,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare
and make it appear in the 'ABSTRACT OF BIDDING', the 'ABSTRACT OF PROPOSAL', the MINUTES OF THE
OPENING OF BIDS' and the 'PBAC RECOMMENDATION', that a public bidding for the construction of the New
Guimba Public Market Extension (wet market) was concluded, that four (4) firms, to wit:

1. Bounty Builders

2. M.O.M Enterprise

3. F.L. Reguyal Construction

4. MASCOM Design and Engineering International

purportedly participated therein and submitted their bids, that a COA representative was supposedly present
during the opening of the bids, and that the PBAC supposedly convened and deliberated on the purported bids
when, in truth and in fact, the aforesaid firms and the COA representative did not so participate and the PBAC did
not actually convene and deliberate on the purported bids, as in fact, no such public bidding was conducted and
said documents were executed to justify the award of the contract to build the aforesaid public market extension
to MASCOM Design and Engineering International to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

Upon arraignment, petitioners and the other PBAC members, except for Benito A. Rillo who died on December 5, 2001, pleaded
not guilty.

At the trial, prosecution witness and COA representative Ronquillo declared that he did not attend any public bidding regarding
the construction of the Guimba public market on December 8, 1997.11 He admitted, however, that he has no personal knowledge
whether or not a bidding was truly conducted on said date.12 The same declaration was made by prosecution witness Mayor
Dizon who admitted that he does not know whether the PBAC conducted a public bidding.13

The prosecution also offered in evidence the affidavits of PBAC members, Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara, Renato L.
Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr., in support of its theory that no public
bidding was held by the PBAC on December 8, 1997. Counsel for the said affiants admitted the genuineness of the signature
appearing in the affidavits.14

Petitioners and the PBAC members filed their separate motions for leave to file demurrer to evidence but were denied. They
were, however, given a 10 day period within which to file their respective demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court,
subject to the legal consequences under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, petitioners and the PBAC
members filed separate demurrer to evidence.

On September 19, 2005, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed judgment of conviction holding that the Affidavits of Luis F.
Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara, Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P.
Coloma, Jr., as corroborated by the testimonies of COA representative Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon proved beyond reasonable
doubt that no public bidding was conducted by the PBAC on December 8, 1997. The dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Nestor A. Bernardino, Ernesto T. Mateo, Eugelio G.
Barawid, Efren [N.] Fronda, Abraham [P.] Coloma, Jr., Jose F. Mateo, Renato [L.] Esquivel, Paulino [G.]
Quindara, Luis [F.] Rendon, Jr. and Celedonia N. Tomas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
in the Amended Information and, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence law and without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) Years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE DAY of prision mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,000.00) with costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioners Bernardino and Tomas filed a motion for new trial16 on the basis of the alleged newly discovered evidence consisting
of the affidavits executed in 2003 to 2005 by Renato L. Esquivel, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda, Jose F. Mateo, Abraham P.
Coloma, Jr., Eugelio G. Barawid, 17 Luis F. Rendon, Jr.,18 and Paulino G. Quindara,19 in connection with a separate administrative
case filed against said affiants for dishonesty and grave misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman. Affiants stated in the
said affidavits that there was in fact a public bidding held on December 8, 1997; and that they executed their June 27, 2000
affidavit stating that no bidding occurred, because of the fear and intimidation employed by Mayor Dizon who needed said
affidavits to bolster his defense in the case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act filed against him. Petitioners
Bernardino and Tomas claimed they were not party to the said administrative case against the affiants and that it was only after
the promulgation of the decision in the falsification case that affiants apologized and informed them of the existence of said 2003
and 2005 affidavits.

Petitioner Barawid and the other PBAC members also filed their separate motion for new trial20 on the ground of alleged errors of
law and irregularities in the trial of their case.

On November 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate motions for new trial.21 Renato Esquivel, Jose Mateo, Efren
Fronda, Luis Rendon, Jr., and Paulino Quindara filed a petition before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 170499 but was denied in
a Resolution dated June 26, 2006. Their motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on September 18, 2006.

Petitioner Barawid filed a separate petition docketed as G.R. No. 170518 which was consolidated with the petition of Bernardino
and Tomas in G.R. No. 170453.22

The issue is whether the guilt of petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce the quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
the accused. Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused-appellants have not been proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of
long standing that their presumption of innocence must be favored and their exoneration be granted as a matter of right.23

In the instant case, petitioners were charged with falsification under paragraph 2, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Its elements
are: (1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3) that
he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate.24

The evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that no bidding was conducted on December 8, 1997 were the June 27,
2000 affidavits of Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara, Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N.
Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr. The testimonies of COA representative Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon could not be considered
for purposes of determining whether a public bidding was indeed held on that day because of their admission that they do not
have personal knowledge whether or not said bidding was indeed conducted.

Pertinent portions of the similarly worded affidavit of Luis F. Rendon, Jr., and Paulino G. Quindara, reads:

5) That the truth of the matter is that no public bidding for the contract to construct the new public market
[extension] x x x of the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija was actually held or conducted on 08 December
1997 nor was the Local PBAC convened in connection therewith, and that bidding documents relative thereto
purporting to show that a public bidding was conducted in accordance with the applicable laws, rules and
regulations on public bidding and award of contracts were hand delivered to me in my residence by a
representative of Mascom, a certain Caloy Santos for my signature.

6) That I have no knowledge of and/or participation in the preparation of the subject bidding documents, except
my signature thereon.25

Renato L. Esquivel deposed that:

3. That no actual public bidding was held and/or conducted on 08 December 1997 in connection with the contract
for the construction of the new public market [extension] x x x of the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija as
supported by the following:

a. The Office of the Municipal Accountant of the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, was not furnished
any communication/letters/notice stating that such public bidding will be conducted which is normally done
before any public bidding is held.

b. The covering public bidding documents were personally delivered to me in my residence by a

representative of Mascom Design & Engineering International for my signature.

c. I have no knowledge of and/or participation in the preparation of the covering public bidding documents
allegedly held on 08 December 1997, except for my signature thereon.
 d. The covering public bidding documents were not signed by the assigned Commission on Audit
representative.26

Jose F. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr., similarly averred that:

3. That no actual public bidding was held and/or conducted on 08 December 1997 in connection with the contract
for the construction of the new public market [extension] x x x of the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

4. That the covering bidding documents for the public bidding allegedly held on 08 December 1997 were hand
delivered to me by a representative of Mascom Design & Engineering International (Mascom for brevity) in my
office for signature.27

Likewise the Affidavit of Ernesto T. Mateo, reads:

3) That no actual public bidding was held/conducted on 08 December 1997 in connection with the contract for the
construction of the new public market [extension] x x x of the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

4) That the covering bidding documents for the alleged public bidding conducted on 08 December 1997 were
signed by me in my residence.28

As can be gathered from the foregoing, the affiants declared that no public bidding was held on December 8, 1997. However,
said declaration is merely an expression of an opinion and not a fact considering that like prosecution witnesses Ronquillo and
Mayor Dizon, they also have no personal knowledge as to whether or not a bidding was indeed conducted at the Municipal
Library of Guimba, Nueva Ecija on December 8, 1997. Pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the opinion of
witnesses, as in the instant case, is not admissible. Since affiants were not in the place where the alleged bidding was held, they
are not in the position to declare with moral certainty that no such bidding in fact occurred. Their statements that they signed the
documents showing that they participated in the determination of the lowest bidder with knowledge that they did not in fact so
participate therein, bind only them and not petitioners whose whereabouts on December 8, 1997 were not established to be
known to said affiants. And while the Information alleged conspiracy such that the acts of the affiants may be attributed as well to
petitioners Bernardino and Tomas, the same cannot be considered against said petitioners inasmuch as no evidence was
presented by the prosecution to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It
cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact.29

Under Section 36, Rule 130 of the same Rules, witnesses can testify only to those facts which they know of their personal
knowledge, that is, which is derived from their own perception, except as otherwise provided by the rules. They are not generally
allowed to testify on their opinions or conclusions but must state facts within their knowledge as it is the province of the court to
make deductions from pertinent facts placed in evidence and to decide matters directly in issue. Their testimony must be
confined to statements of concrete facts within their own observation, knowledge, and recollection – that is, facts perceived by
the use of their own senses – as distinguished from their opinions, inferences, impressions and conclusions drawn from such
facts, which are incompetent and inadmissible.30 While there are exceptions31 to the rule on inadmissibility of opinions, the subject
declarations in the instant case is not one of them.

Moreover, the evidence showing that seven members of the PBAC did not attend the public bidding does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner Tomas as acting Secretary and the other three members, that is, the deceased Benito A. Rillo,
and herein petitioners Bernardino and Barawid, did not convene on December 8, 1997. Otherwise, stated, the absence of the
seven PBAC members did not eliminate the possibility that the rest of the members convened and carried out the public bidding
with four participating bidders. Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof, which in this case is the prosecution, loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.32

In sum, the Court finds that petitioners Bernardino and Barawid must be acquitted considering that the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond moral certainty. The law, to guard against injustice, requires that the offense be established by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. It is a serious matter, not only to a party, but to the state as well, to take a person from the ordinary
avocations of life, brand him a felon, and deprive him of his liberty, appropriate his labor, and cast a cloud upon his future life,
and humiliate his relatives and friends. To authorize the state in doing this, there must be no reasonable doubt on the accused's
guilt.33

However, the same cannot be said with respect to petitioner Tomas. Even if we assume that all the PBAC members attended the
bidding, including those who executed an affidavit to the contrary, petitioner Tomas is still liable for falsification. Note that she
was the only one who signed the "Minutes of the opening of bids" which stated, among others, that COA representative Ronquillo
attended the public bidding on December 8, 1997. As acting Secretary of the PBAC she has the duty to prepare or intervene in
the preparation of the Minutes of the meetings of the PBAC which should be recorded pursuant to Section 3734 of the Local
Government Code. In making it appear that COA representative Ronquillo attended the bidding when the latter categorically
testified that he never attended a public bidding in the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija on December 8, 1997, petitioner
Tomas took advantage of her official position,35 rendering her liable for falsification under Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. Finding the testimony of COA representative Ronquillo to be convincing and there being no ill motive shown that
would impel him to perjure himself, the Court gives credence to his declaration and sustains the judgment of conviction against
petitioner Tomas.

In the same vein, petitioner Tomas' motion for new trial was correctly denied by the Sandiganbayan. The evidence presented in
support of said motion was that a public bidding was truly conducted and that the PBAC members attended the same. However,
this has no bearing on the culpability of petitioner Tomas which is predicated on her untruthful declaration that the COA
representative attended the bidding, regardless of the presence or absence of the PBAC members.

Under Article 171 of the of the Revised Penal Code, falsification is punishable with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P5,000.00. There being no modifying circumstance in the instant case, the penalty of petitioner Tomas shall be imposed in its
medium period, ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36 she is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which may be fixed anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to prision mayor, which is prision correccional with a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Petitioner Tomas is therefore
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the September 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27548 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE with respect to petitioners Nestor A. Bernardino and Eugelio G. Barawid who are ACQUITTED of the crime of falsification
under Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Insofar as petitioner Celedonia N. Tomas is concerned, the September 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 27548 finding her guilty of the crime of falsification under Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to the indeterminate penalty which is fixed at 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Rollo of G.R. No. 170518, pp. 9-47. Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and concurred in by
Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Jose R. Hernandez.

2 Id. at 67-84.

3 Id. at 197-198.

4 Id. at 199.

5 Id. at 200.

6 Id. at 201.

7 Id. at 207

8 Id. at 215-227.

9Except for Renato L. Esquivel and Ernesto T. Mateo, the other 5 members of the PBAC claimed the MASCOM
representative made such representation.

10 Rollo of G.R. No. 170518, p. 10.

11 Id. at 12-13.

12 Id. at 55.

13 Rollo of G.R. No. 170453, pp. 98-99.

14 Rollo of G.R. No. 170518, pp. 50-52.

15 Id. at 45 to 46.

16 Rollo of G.R. No. 170453, pp. 84-106.

17 Id. at 110-123

18 Id. at 137-140.

19 Id. at 141-142.

20 Rollo of G. R. No. 170518, pp. 48-66.

21 Id. at 67- 84.

22 Id. at 260.

23 People v. Lim, 435 Phil. 640, 664-665 (2002).

24 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, Fourteenth Edition, p. 215.

25 Rollo of G. R. No. 170518, pp. 215 and 217.

26
Id. at 219.

27 Id. at 221, 224 and 226.

28 Id. at 223.

29 People v. Berroya, 347 Phil. 410, 429-430 (1997).

30 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Evidence in the Philippines, Vol. II, Part I, 1997 Edition, p. 635.

31 Sections 49 and 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, read:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may
be received in evidence regarding –

a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impression of the emotion, behavior or appearance of a person.

32 Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521, 537 (2002).

33 Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 150439, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 190, 216.

34 Pertinent portion thereof, reads:

SECTION 37. Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (Local PBAC)–

xxxx

(c) All meetings of the committee shall be held in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall. The
minutes of such meetings of the committee and any decision made therein shall be duly recorded, posted
at a prominent place in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall, and delivered by the most
expedient means to the elective officials concerned.

35 Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154886, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 460, 478-479.

36Section 1 of Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
provides:

SECTION 1, Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
 maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Today is Saturday, January 18, 2020

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989

MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of
falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before
Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela,
taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign
a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975,
which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of
the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document that there was such a
position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no
such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there
any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor.

xxx

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela,
went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in
the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any
vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio
Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day
and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo
Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the
accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused.

xxx

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1,
1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975,
addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").

xxx

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly
salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975
(Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to
receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter
told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no money. because of this, she went to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She
was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment
papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to
Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual
budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel
for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget
was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item
or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk
in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled
up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2").
With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-
up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28,
1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K"
and "K-l").

xxx

[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs
against the accused- appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner
contends that the respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it
affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following

A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of criminal
intent on the part of the accused.

B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified
certification.

C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence
despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer,
employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
. . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following
requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in
connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the
exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the
Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the
certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil
Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v.
Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the
position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds
had been appropriated therefor.

Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not
meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:

Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of
facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161;
Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are available'
does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do
was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds
are allocated therefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in
the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are
available" [Rollo, p. 41).

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In
the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for
the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary,
the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the
Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of
absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is
declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the
first and third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the Guidelines in
the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the
position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign.
As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the
petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as
to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified
document is a public document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil.
913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third
person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for this principal distinction
between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the Idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing
People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage
becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].

Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part
must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the
petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the
municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the
municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual
Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel
for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these
facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance
No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith
in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July
1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he
appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false
certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an
untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will
to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act
with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should
likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse
his office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19
Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the
duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v.
Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the
duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the
absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful
and thorough review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the
absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its
case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity
to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid
down this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law:

. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the
orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has
 had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing
People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his
repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the
evidence presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present
during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v.
Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the
petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue,
he also failed to appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the
counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that
he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be
faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the
instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:, concurring.

I agree with the precedent rulings applied by the Court to the facts as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. I
believe, however, that a too literal application of the rules may blur the line between deliberate intent to commit a crime and the
unwitting commission, through negligence, of an act which would otherwise be criminal if intentionally committed.

It is a well-known fact that many top officials both national and local, usually rely on the initials of lower echelon employees on
such routine matters as prior compliance with regular procedures. When a government executive sees the required initials below
his typewritten name, he confidently affixes his signature to certifications, clearances, and approvals of permits or licenses. He is
technically guilty of falsification if what he signed turns out to be false but should we require him to personally go over every step
and procedure which he ordinarily leaves to subordinates? In this case, of course, there is evidence that the accused was aware
that the position to which Carreon was appointed is non-existent.

There is likewise an indication in this case that the petitioner could not present evidence in his defense because he was in the
United States hiding from political enemies. However, his counsel was here and his main plea was for change of venue. If the
venue had been changed, there would have been presentation of evidence. I agree with the ponente that the due process
argument has not been presented adequately, sufficient to reverse the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:, concurring.

I agree with the precedent rulings applied by the Court to the facts as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. I
believe, however, that a too literal application of the rules may blur the line between deliberate intent to commit a crime and the
unwitting commission, through negligence, of an act which would otherwise be criminal if intentionally committed.

It is a well-known fact that many top officials both national and local, usually rely on the initials of lower echelon employees on
such routine matters as prior compliance with regular procedures. When a government executive sees the required initials below
his typewritten name, he confidently affixes his signature to certifications, clearances, and approvals of permits or licenses. He is
technically guilty of falsification if what he signed turns out to be false but should we require him to personally go over every step
and procedure which he ordinarily leaves to subordinates? In this case, of course, there is evidence that the accused was aware
that the position to which Carreon was appointed is non-existent.

There is likewise an indication in this case that the petitioner could not present evidence in his defense because he was in the
United States hiding from political enemies. However, his counsel was here and his main plea was for change of venue. If the
venue had been changed, there would have been presentation of evidence. I agree with the ponente that the due process
argument has not been presented adequately, sufficient to reverse the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Today is Saturday, January 18, 2020

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009

NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No.
27483 promulgated on 7 August 2007 which found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and its Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.

On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents, defined and punished
under paragraph 1 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Cotabato City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional
Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance
of her official functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM,
for the purpose of claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000.4

On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be given the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit
during a preliminary investigation in order that her right to due process would not be violated.5 Petitioner further filed an Urgent
Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for preliminary investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that
petitioner was not deprived of the opportunity to be heard before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be
heard on preliminary investigation.7

On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial
conference was held and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order.9 The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of
facts, and agreed that the issues to be resolved were as follows:

1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, falsified her Employee Clearance, which she
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the
signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes of claiming her salary for the
months of August and September 2000;

2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in order to commit the crime charged.10

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K. Pangilan,11 former Human Resource Management Officer V of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism,
ARMM;12 and Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.

Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government employee and formerly a Human Resource
Management Officer V of the ARMM which position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As such, one of her duties was to
receive applications for clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance was a
requirement to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by retiring employees, employees leaving the country or those
applying for leave in excess of thirty days. The person applying for clearance shall get a copy of the employees clearance and
shall accomplish the same by having the different division heads sign it.

Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner – Norma Pacasum – to be the former Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000, petitioner submitted the original of an Employees
Clearance to her office in compliance with the memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all
officers and employees to clear themselves of property and money accountabilities before their salaries for August and
September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan
(Laura) contained in said document was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-law, and that the latter’s
signature was very familiar to her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the original Employees Clearance with the intention
of sending the same to her daughter-in-law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of her name in the
Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger available, she instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify
the signature. Laura, whose office was only a walking distance away, came and inspected the clearance, and denied signing the
same. After she denied that she signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer of the Employees Clearance
took said document and left.

Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the original of the Employee Clearance, but said that the
latter was a niece and staff member of the petitioner. She said that all the signatures16 appearing in the Employees Clearance
were all genuine except for Laura’s signature.

The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose signature was allegedly imitated. Laura testified
that presently she was holding the position of Human Resource Management Officer II of the Department of Tourism - ARMM.
Prior to said position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued
memorandum receipts (MR) to employees who were issued government property, and received surrendered office properties
from officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she was their Regional Secretary of the
DOT - ARMM.

Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris17 Batuampar, an officemate and niece of petitioner Pacasum, went to her
house with the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all property
accountabilities. She refused to sign the clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office properties
issued to her. A few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the latter’s office and inspect the Employees
Clearance submitted by the representative of petitioner. She went to her mother-in-law’s office and was shown the Employees
Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she denied the signature18 appearing on top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris
Batuampar, the representative of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.

Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the instant case. She issued a
certification20 with a memorandum receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by petitioner. The certification attested she did not
sign petitioner’s Employees Clearance because all the office properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned
to the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as Supply Officer, petitioner
had not returned anything.

The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City, testified that she
had been a telegraph operator for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit,
Quezon City. She received two telegrams23 for transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and the
other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said documents, she transmitted the documents through telegram. The telegram
addressed to petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms.
Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005.24

On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered25 its documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-
b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to which the accused filed her
objections.26 The trial court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August 2005.27

For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took the stand.

For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional
Secretary of the DOT of the ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by
Gov. Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31 August 2000
in view of the impending expiration of the Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the memorandum applied to her, she being
a cabinet secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash
advances were required to get an Employees Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She then instructed her staff to
work on her salary.

Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if the signature of
Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the Employee Clearance was in her name,
she did not cause Laura’s signature to be affixed thereto.

Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000 sometime in said month, because ARMM
Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance before she could get her salary because
she was re-appointed.28

Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees Clearance.29 When she first saw the photocopy
of the Employees Clearance, the signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance again after this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner
said it was not she who placed or caused Laura’s purported signature to be affixed there.

Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her, because she had no cash advances and she could
receive her salary even without clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier, Accountant and the Auditor checked her records
and found that she had no cash advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her salary.
However, she was informed by her staff that her salary could not be released because the Office of the Governor required a
clearance. Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose of which was for the release of her salary for the months of August
and September 2000. She was able to get all the needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With the refusal of Laura to
sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation.

Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering her to submit to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-
23 August 2000.

On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she believed that an Employees Clearance was
necessary, and for this reason she had this document prepared by her staff. She said her Employees Clearance was always in
the possession of Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the document twice.31

Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000
issued by Gov. Misuari because the same was the product of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive
Secretary Parcasio. He explained that this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added that an
Employees Clearance was not a requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in the memorandum,
because what was required for the purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from the Resident Auditors of the
Commission on Audit.

On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary exhibits32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5, with sub-markings.
The prosecution objected to the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court admitted all the defense exhibits.33

On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged in the
information. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A. Pacasum GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged in the Information and, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum
with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) with costs against the accused.34

The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the Employees Clearance
of petitioner to have been falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on petitioner’s defense denying she was the one who
actually falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the
alleged falsification, because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance and the one
who submitted the said clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The trial court found said denial
unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no direct evidence to show that petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the
signature of Laura Pangilan, there were circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or
who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added that
considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that
she was the material author of the falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to
show that it was another person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or
motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the same.

The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s contention that she did not stand to benefit from the falsification of her
Employees Clearance and from the submission thereof to the Office of the Regional Governor, because she allegedly had no
existing cash advances. She claimed that an Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the
months of August and September 2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the presumption that he
who benefits from the falsification is presumed to be the author thereof does not apply to her. The lower court explained that the
aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner, she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said
memorandum to petitioner was even admitted by her when she, in compliance therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary
to work for her Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said that the fact that
she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did not exempt her from the coverage of the memorandum, because she must
show she had no cash advances and the only way to do this was by obtaining a clearance.

Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative value in proving its contents and was
inadmissible because the original thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that
the presentation and admission of secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to prove the
contents thereof, because despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution to petitioner and her assistant
secretary to produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they ignored the notice and refused to present the original of said
document.

On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Sandiganbayan35 to which the prosecution
filed a Comment/Opposition.36 Subsequent thereto, petitioner filed a Supplement to Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration &
Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be granted in
order that the testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly discovered evidence. The prosecution
filed its Opposition.38

On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit;
and the motion for new trial, because the evidence sought to be presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.39

On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.

In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), was required to file its Comment on the petition.41 After two motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which
were granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment dated 18 February 2008.42 Petitioner was required43 to file a Reply to the
Comment, which she did on 5 June 2008.44

On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008 and
on 5 November 2008.45

Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in:

I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence must be deemed the author thereof, when
the evidence on record does not support, but even contradicts, such a conclusion.

II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was required under the Misuari Memorandum
to submit her Employee’s Clearance to clear herself of these, when there is no evidence to that effect and the
prosecution even admitted so.

III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the allegedly forged Employee’s Clearance, in
favor of the innocence of the Accused.

IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional evidence on her behalf, thus denying her due
process.46

Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not required to file an Employees
Clearance to draw her salary, since what was required under said memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She further
contends that since she was not required to file said Employees Clearance because she had no cash advances, the signature in
her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was required was a Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid memorandum, what was required before she could
draw her salaries was a Credit Notice from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The full text of the Memorandum47 form
the Regional Governor reads:

MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR

TO: ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AS STATED

DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000

1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of the undersigned, it is hereby directed that
all outstanding cash advances be liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.

2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all ARMM officials/employees with
unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld until they have settled their accounts and a corresponding
Credit Notice is issued to them by the Commission on Audit.

3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by the drastic cut of our budget,
memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for financial
assistance is hereby suspended effective immediately.

4. For strict compliance.

PROF. NUR MISUARI

It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from officers/employees who had unliquidated cash advances was the
corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had settled their accounts. There was indeed no mention of any
Employees Clearance therein. Up to this point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that the signature of Laura
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan
was imitated or not is the main issue in this case for falsification.

From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was effective only starting 1 September 2000 and not
before. In the case at bar, the information charges petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying
her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice
requirement was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September 2000.

The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioner’s Employees Clearance imitated? If yes,
(2) Who imitated or caused the imitation of said signature?

On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioner’s Employees Clearance
was not hers. The same was an imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his/her signature
therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome.48

Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She adds that Atty. Randolph C.
Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the ARMM, told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not need an
Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed.49

These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not only for compliance with the
Misuari memorandum but, more importantly, because her term of office was about to end, since her position was coterminous
with the term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her salary for August,
2000,51 an Employees Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her secretary that she did
not need an Employee Clearance to get her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re-appointment," when she
was working for her Employees Clearance at around August 2000, improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov.
Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of
the ARMM when she had her Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her statement that she did not
need an Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed does not inspire belief.

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had in his position a falsified document and he
made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the material author of the
falsification. He argues that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made use
of or uttered the Employees Clearance, because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused it to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim, she said there were no "receipt marks" in the
Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the Regional Governor received said documents.

It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the "falsification" of a public document.
The act of "using" falsified documents is not necessarily included in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified
documents is punished under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees
Clearance was consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a public document,
it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another
was counterfeited.54 It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus,
the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the offender profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no
longer material.

The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that the same was circulated to the
different division heads for their signatures is already considered use of falsified documents as contemplated in Article 172. The
lack of the stamp mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not received by the
Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of
the Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to
the Office of the Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the Regional
Governor.

Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that
she had no knowledge about the falsification because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her
Employees Clearance.

Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion.57

In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person whom she instructed to work
for her Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this person in order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact,
we find that the defense never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order,
because the defense never listed her as a witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help her cause after she has been
convicted is already too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar’s testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered
newly discovered evidence as to merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly discovered evidence.

The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance will not exonerate her. We have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not
always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on
circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which said:

While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged the signature of Laura Pangilan in the
Employees Clearance in question, the Court nevertheless finds the following circumstances, obtaining in the records, to
establish/indicate that she was the one who committed the forgery or who asked somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of
the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance, to wit –

1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her Employees Clearance in compliance
with the Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of Laura Pangilan
was affixed on her clearance are strong evidence that the accused herself either falsified the said signature or
caused the same to be falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance of the accused
is possession by the accused herself because the former was only acting upon the instructions and in behalf of
the latter;

2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her Employees Clearance to enable her to
collect her salary for the months of August and September 2000 is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her
to commit the falsification by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to forge it; and

3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the falsification as she admitted that she was
able to collect her salary for the month of August 2000 after her falsified Employees Clearance was submitted and
approved by the ORG-ARMM and therefore, she alone could have the motive for making such falsification.

On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man would say that the accused – a Regional
Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had no knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule, well-buttressed upon reason, that in
the absence of a satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his possession or control a falsified document and who makes
use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger or the one who caused the forgery and,
therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held that –

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or
uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to
have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v.
De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and profited in the use of the falsified
Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is inevitable that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full
opportunity, she was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged or falsified the
signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she alone, had the reason or motive to commit the forgery or
falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such falsification/forgery.60

The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner, convince us to apply the rule that in
the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger
and, therefore, guilty of falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail.62 A prima facie
case of falsification having been established, petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such
burden. This, she failed to do.

Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans when they failed to report the
alleged falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from
getting her salaries.

We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court,
as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart from such a rule.

Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of petitioner’s Employees Clearance was
supposed to have been obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted the authenticity and probative
value of the photocopy of the Employees Clearance.

The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree when it ruled:

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the
best evidence if the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents
inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse
party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence
can be had, the Court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence
of any clear showing that the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be
disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.

The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing may
be admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a
writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:

Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. – If the document is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he
fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party against whom it is offered does not warrant
the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document which may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or
made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of her assistant secretary, [Marie Cris]
Batuampar. So the prosecution in its effort to produce the original copy of the said Employees Clearance of the accused, thru
Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA
Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie Cris]
Batuampar ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before June 8, 2005, the original of the
Employees’ Clearance in the name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her August and September 2000
salary as DOT Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her
residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano, the original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to produce the same.

Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees Clearance as evidenced by the photocopy
thereof, and despite the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her assistant secretary to produce the
original of said employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the presentation and
admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof was justified.65

This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a
criminal case for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of said document via secondary
evidence or substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the best or primary evidence – the original of the document – is
not available for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3,66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time to present evidence,
allowing her only two hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure to present another important witness in the of person of Atty.
Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The
Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case as follows:

After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial hearing for the reception of defense evidence was
scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its
Order of September 16, 2005, cancelled the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a
5-day workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing on November 23 and
24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the
November 23, 2005 hearing despite due notice, the Court cancelled the November 23 and 24 hearings, and moved the same to
March 13 and 14, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the same time directed the said defense counsel to show cause in
writing within five (5) days from receipt of the Order why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to appear despite due
notice. In compliance with this Order, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively,
1aw phi 1

which were both Noted by the Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.

In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her continued failure to get a substitute
counsel considering that her counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the case since January 16, 2006,
the Court cancelled the March 13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning
and designated Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the accused upon receipt of
the order to immediately confer with said counsel for purposes of preparing for her defense in the case.

On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:

Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail on March 16, 2006) requesting extension of time
to engage the services of counsel is merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4,
2006 and said accused would have more than ample time to engage the services of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any
excuse from the accused on said settings that she failed to engage the services of counsel or that her counsel needs more time
to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its Order of March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio to represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter to confer with Atty. Rosario
and assist him in preparing for her defense.

On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the accused, that since he was appointed counsel
de oficio, the accused has not communicated with him and therefore he was not ready to present any evidence for the accused,
the Court cancelled the hearing in order to give the defense another opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4,
2006, the following day as previously scheduled.

On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –

"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the case on the ground that she just hired a new
counsel who thereafter arrived and entered his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202 Masonic
Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City. With the appearance of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby
discharged as counsel de oficio of the accused.

"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence on October 9 and 10, 2006, both at 8:30
o’clock in the morning. For repeated failure of the accused to acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her waiver of
appearance is hereby cancelled and she is ordered to personally appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.

SO ORDERED.

On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of Appearance, Motion For Postponement
of October 9 and 10 Hearings stating therein that since his service as new counsel was just engaged by the accused, and that
the accused herself cannot also attend the said hearing because she is undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance
of Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9, 2006, the Court issued
the following, which reads –

"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006 Hearing filed by accused Normallah L.
Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to be without merit, as this case has been set for hearing
several times and the accused has been given the last chance to present evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for
postponement.

"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in today’s hearing despite the Order of the Court dated
July 4, 2006, canceling her waiver of appearance, and ordering her to personally appear before this Court, as prayed for by the
prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her provisional liberty is
ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from notice to explain in writing why final
judgment shall not be rendered against the said bond.

With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to present its evidence today and tomorrow, the
last chance for it to present its evidence, the Court is constraint to consider the accused’s right to present evidence as waived.

The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order dated October 25, 2006, and
Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006.

At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –

"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest’ was called for hearing this
morning, only Attorneys Bantuas M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.

In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. It must
be stressed that the primordial reason for the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered in the presence of the accused in
the previous hearing in violation of the Court’s Order for her to personally appear in the hearings of this case and for her
indifference to the directives of the Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no alternative but to deny the
Motion.

Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought the assurance of the accused (and she promised)
to appear before this Court if the motion will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused the favor to appear before it. The
accused is reminded/advised that the issuance of the warrant of arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear before the
Court or be arrested and brought to the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the
Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence) of the accused dated November 21, 2006, and the prosecution’s
Opposition thereto, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –

"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s November 7, 2006
Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence)" dated November 21,
2006 and the plaintiff’s Opposition thereto dated November 28, 2006.

"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an additional bond of P10,000.00 despite the
aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in the interest of justice, the Court is inclined to reconsider and give favorable action to
the motion and grant the accused another and last opportunity to present here evidence.

"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the accused’s last chance to present and/or complete
the presentation of her evidence on February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the Sandiganbayan Centennial
Building in Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court gave her ample opportunity to present her
evidence.67

The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the trial court was lenient with the petitioner. The failure
of the defense to present Atty. Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of
this, we quote a portion of the hearing when petitioner was testifying:

ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this time?

A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got together with the other members of the cabinet of
Gov. Misuari, but he lives in Davao, sir.

Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this case?

A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.

CHAIRMAN

Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already gave you enough opportunity to present your
side, right? You should not be telling the Court that only after this hearing, you will start looking (for) people who will, definitely,
clear your name. You should be doing that months ago, correct?

WITNESS

Yes, your Honors.68

Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. For
one to be convicted of falsification under said paragraph, the followings elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public
officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by
counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.

All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that petitioner was a public officer, being then
the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused the preparation of her Employees
Clearance (a public document) for the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. Such being a
requirement, and she being a public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not
for her position and employment in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of
public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he had the duty to make or
prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody of the document which he
falsified.69 It being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her position when she falsified or
caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan. lawphil.net

Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
in the commission of the felony, the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the range of eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken
from the medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7 August 2007 and its
resolution dated 22 October 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Jose R.
Hernandez, concurring; records, Vol. 1, pp. 527-555.

2 Records, Vol. 2, pp. 41-50.

3 Should be "Employees Clearance." See Exh. A-2, Folder of Exhibits.

4 Records, Vol. 1, p. 1.

5 Id. at 23-24.

6 Id. at 48-51.

7 Id. at 114-115.

8 Id. at 129-130.

9 Id. at 180-183.

10 Id. at 182.

11 TSN, 6 April 2005.

12 Id.

13 TSN, 14 June 2005.

14 Exh. A-5, Folder of Exhibits.

15 Exh. A-2, Folder of Exhibits.

16 Exhs. A-2-b to A-2-g, Folder of Exhibits.

17 Spelled as "Maricris" by the Sandiganbayan.

18 Exh. A-2-a, Folder of Exhibits.

19 Exh. A-1, Folder of Exhibits.

20 Exh. A-3, Folder of Exhibits.

21 Exh. A-4, Folder of Exhibits.

22 Exh. A-4-a, Folder of Exhibits.

23 Exhs. A-6 and A-7, Folder of Exhibits.

24 Exhs. A-8 and A-9, Folder of Exhibits.

25 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 260-265.

26 Id. at 268-276.

27 Id. at 284.

28 TSN, 5 February 2007, p. 17.

29 Id. at 19.

30 Id. at 29.

31 Id. at 50.

32 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 451-453

33
Id., Exh. 1 is the same as Exh. A-5; Exh. 2 is the same as Exh. A-2, Folder of Exhibits.

34 Id. at 554.

35 Records, Vol. 2, pp. 5-11.

36 Id. at 18-24.

37 Id. at 25-31.

38 Id. at 35-39.

39 Id. at 41-50.

40 Rollo, p. 188.

41 Id.

42 Id. at 195-218.

43 Id. at 219.

44 Id. at 226-237.

45 Id. at 242-265, 266-279.

46 Id. at 14.

47 Exhibit A-5, Folder of Exhibits.

48Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code (1997 Edition), Vol. II, p. 233, citing US v. Viloria, 1 Phil. 682, 684-
685 (1903).

49 TSN, 5 February 2007, pp. 17-18, 52.

50 TSN, 6 February 2007, p. 20.

51 TSN, 5 February 2007, p. 17.

52 Id. at 42.

53 Id. at 44.

54 Caubang v. People, G.R. No. 62634, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 377, 392.

55 Lumancas v. Intas, 400 Phil. 785, 798 (2000), citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918 (1955).
 56 People v .Maglente, G.R. No. 179712, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 447, 468.

57 People v. Agsaoay, Jr., G.R. Nos. 132125-26, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 450, 466.

58 Pre-Trial Order, Records, Vol. 1, p. 181.

59 Caubang v. People, supra note 51 at 390.

60 Rollo, pp. 546-549.

61 Nierva v. People, G.R. No. 153133, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 114, 124-125.

Republic v. Vda. de Neri, 468 Phil. 842, 862-863 (2004), citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
62

Philippines (Vol. VII, Part II), p. 7.

63 Fullero v. People, G.R. No. 170583, 12 September 2007, 533 SCRA 97, 113.

64 Mangangey v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147773-74, 18 February 2008, 546 SCRA 51, 65.

65 Rollo, pp. 550-552.

66Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

67 Rollo, pp. 532-536.

68 TSN, 5 February 2007, pp. 21-22.

69 Fullero v. People, supra note 63 at 114.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

QUISUMBING, J.:

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I vote to grant the petition and reverse the decision of the Sandiganbayan
finding petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification under Article 171, paragraph
1, of the Revised Penal Code.

In my view, it is erroneous to convict petitioner because of the following grounds:

First, there is lack of sufficient evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Article 171, paragraph 11 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes "any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his/her official position shall
falsify a document by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric."

The elements of falsification of public document are as follows:

(a) the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public;

(b) s/he takes advantage of his/her official position;

(c) s/he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
such as counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.2

Elements (b) and (c) are absent in this case. Petitioner could not have taken advantage of her official position to have her
employee clearance falsified because she had no need for the clearance. Moreover, the mere act of an employee of having
his/her clearance signed is not taking advantage of one’s official position. It is erroneous to conclude that were it not for her
position and her employment in the ARMM, petitioner could not have accomplished her clearance.

There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing that petitioner imitated or caused to be imitated the alleged falsified
signature in the clearance. The witnesses merely testified that the signature in petitioner’s clearance was falsified. This fact alone
is not sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of falsification.

The Sandiganbayan, for lack of proof of petitioner’s direct participation in falsifying the document, relied on the disputable legal
presumption that the possessor of a falsified document who makes use of such to her advantage is presumed to be the author of
the falsification.3 At any rate, for the presumption of authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to profit or had
profited from the use of the falsified document.4 In this case, petitioner does not stand to profit nor profited from the use of the
alleged falsified document.

Second, the allegedly falsified document, petitioner’s employee clearance, was not needed by her to get her salaries for the
months of August and September 2000 and therefore, no criminal intent or ill motive could be attributed to petitioner to warrant
her conviction for falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

Criminal intent must be present in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification.5 In this case, there is no reasonable
ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present. Petitioner had no ill motive to falsify her own
employee’s clearance. She had no need to do so since the employee clearance was not needed by her in the procurement of her
salaries. Even if she had her employee clearance prepared, this act, by itself, is not felonious. There was nothing willful or
felonious in petitioner’s acts that would warrant her prosecution for falsification.

I therefore vote to set aside the Decision dated August 7, 2007 of the Sandiganbayan and acquit petitioner of the charges against
her.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

xxxxxx

2 Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337, 349.

3 Eugenio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 433, 447.

4 Id. at 449.

5 De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164166 & 164173-80, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 394, 405

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 185493 February 2, 2011

LtC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN (Ret.), Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the conviction of an accused for an offense other than that charged in the Information based on a claim that
the essential elements of the offense of which he was convicted are also elements of the offense charged in the Information.

The Facts and the Case

On June 20, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman indicted petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan (Guillergan) for estafa through
falsification of public documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 22904.1

The evidence shows that sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptroller’s Office, to cause the preparation of the
payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with supporting time record and book. The agents’ names were copied and,
based on their appointment papers, certified as correct by Guillergan and then approved by Brigadier General Domingo T. Rio
(Rio).2

Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the payees, Guillergan would direct Technical
Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the "Remarks/Sig"
column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.3

Also on Guillergan’s instruction, the CIAs’ payrolls in Region 6 for 1987, totaling ₱732,000.00, were covered by cash advances
payable to Captain Roland V. Maclang, Jr. (Maclang, Jr.), which advances were issued upon his request as disbursing officer for
that purpose. When ready, Guillergan received the corresponding cash or checks then turned them over to Rio.4

At the end of 1987, Rio further received ₱787,000.00 in "administrative funds" to be paid out to contractors for repairs in the
men’s barracks, the firing range, the guesthouse and others. But Rio requested that this "administrative funds" be re-aligned to
"intelligence funds" in order to facilitate clearing.5

On April 14, 1989 the AFP Anti-Graft Board filed a complaint6 against Rio, Butcon, Maclang, Jr., Seclon, and Guillergan for
violating Articles of War 94 in relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution7 dated May 24, 1991, recommending
the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. On April 21, 1992, however, the ombudsman investigator issued a memorandum,
recommending the filing of charges of illegal use of public funds against Rio and the exoneration of the other respondents. In a
memorandum8 dated February 11, 1993, the review panel in the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation.

On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the filing of charges against all the accused
before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, an Information was filed against them for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a),9 in
relation to Article 17110 of the RPC.

While the case was pending, Rio died, prompting the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case against him.11

On January 20, 2006, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts with motion for judgment12 based on such stipulations. On June
30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Second Division rendered judgment,13 finding Guillergan guilty of falsification penalized under
Article 17214 of the RPC and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months as minimum to 4
years, 9 months and 10 days as maximum. The court acquitted the other accused on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of violation of Article 172 of the RPC under an
Information that charged him with estafa in relation to Article 171 of the code; and

2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents.

The Court’s Rulings

The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by making it appear in several public documents that
₱1,519,000.00 in AFP funds intended for the CIAs’ payroll were paid for that purpose when in truth these were just given to Rio,
resulting in damage and prejudice to the government. Although the charge was estafa in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, the
facts alleged in the information sufficiently made out a case for violation of Article 172 of which Guillergan was convicted. What is
important is that the Information described the latter offense intelligibly and with reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to
understand the charge against him and suitably prepare his defense.15

What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
solemnly proclaimed in it.16 Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary
public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is
done.17

On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; 18 and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.19 All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.

First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in
Region 6. While the Information said that he took advantage of his position in committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found
that his work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official
custody of the pertinent documents.20 His official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources that the command
received from Camp Crame.21 Still, he took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the time record, book, and payrolls in
question.

Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the offense charged by "causing it to appear that persons participated
in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate."22 In People v. Yanson-Dumancas,23 the Court held that a
person may induce another to commit a crime in two ways: 1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise; and 2) by using
words of command. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered Butcon to sign the "receive" portion of the
payrolls as payee to make it appear that persons whose names appeared on the same had signed the document when they in
fact did not.24

Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was committed on the time record, book, and payrolls which were public
documents.

What is more, given that some of the essential elements of Article 171 constitute the lesser offense of falsification of public
documents under Article 172, then the allegations in the Information were sufficient to hold Guillergan liable under Article 172.

As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan unless these fall under certain
established exceptions.25 Since none of those exceptions can be identified in this case, the Court must accord respect and weight
to the Sandiganbayan's findings. It had the better opportunity to examine and evaluate the evidence presented before it.26 As
aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the payrolls did not receive their salaries. First, x x x Guillergan declared that
he personally turned over the entire amount of [₱1,519,000.00] to Gen. Rio. Second, Butcon’s narration that he was instructed by
Guillergan, to [affix his] initial at the receive portion of the payrolls. Lastly, according to the records of the case, the office of
Guillergan had no business in processing the payroll of these personnel. x x x

Additionally, the appointment papers from which these payrolls were based do not reveal any information about the acceptance
of the appointments by the agents. In a letter dated April 14, 1989 of the Anti-Graft Board of the Armed forces of the Philippines x
x x [to Ombudsman Vasquez], it was stated that the appointment papers of the agents "must" be accompanied by the acceptance
of the agents. These papers "should ordinarily" be attached to the payrolls for proper clearing purposes. Since there were no
acceptance papers presented, it only suggests that the lists on the payrolls are names of ghost agents. Even more, the board
made a comment that x x x Guillergan denies knowledge of the persons appointed even if he certified to the correctness of the
payrolls.
The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification of the payrolls; causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.27 1avvphi 1

The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Sandiganbayan’s decision dated June 30, 2008 and Resolution
dated January 7, 2004 which found petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan guilty of violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case 22904.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per raffle dated January 31,
2011.

1 Rollo, pp. 33-36.

2 Affidavit of Edna Seclon, id. at 175.

3 Affidavit of Nemesio H. Butcon, id. at 176.

4 Id. at 75.

5 Id. at 150.

6 Id. at 71-73.

7 Id. at 158-162.

8 Id. at 150-153.
9Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

10Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no

such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official
book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses
enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such
character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.

11 Records, Volume 2, p. 768.

12 Rollo, pp. 52-70.

13 Id. at 37-51.

14Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;
and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of
another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in
the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the
penalty next lower in degree.

15 Flores v. Layosa, 479 Phil. 1020, 1035 (2004).

Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324, 345, citing Lumancas v. Intas, 400
16

Phil. 785, 798 (2000), further citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918 (1955).
 17 Regidor, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244, 263.

18 Supra note 10.

19Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 233, 247, citing Reyes, Luis B.,
The Revised Penal Code (1981); see also Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, 502 Phil. 702 (2005).

20 Rollo, p. 72.

21 Affidavit of Guillergan, id. at 174.

22 Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Title Four, Art. 171, par. 2.

23 People v. Yanson-Dumancas, 378 Phil. 341, 359 (1999).

24 Bernardino v. People, G.R. Nos. 170453 and 170518, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 237, 247-248.

25The exceptions are: 1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; 2)
the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and
are contradicted by evidence on record; and 6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based. (Cadiao-Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 168544, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA
713, 724-725.)

26Regidor, Jr. v. People, supra note 17, at 269, citing Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No.
161455, May 20, 2008, 554 SCRA 136, 145-146.

27 Rollo, pp. 47-48.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 166086-92 February 13, 2009

ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR. and CAMILO B. ZAPATOS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondents.
 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the
Sandiganbayan Decision2 dated September 24, 2004, convicting petitioners Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. (Mayor Regidor), former City
Mayor, and Camilo B. Zapatos (Zapatos), former member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City (petitioners), of the
crime of falsification of public documents.

The Facts

Petitioners, along with Aniceto T. Siete, former Vice-Mayor, and one Marlene L. Mangao,3 then Acting Secretary of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City, were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents in the following
Informations:4

Criminal Case No. 13689 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1988, in the City of Tangub, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene Mangao, all public officers being then the
City Mayor, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, Temporary Presiding Officer, and Acting
Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, of said City, and as such are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution 50-A, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City, entitled: "A
RESOLUTION GRANTING A SALARY INCREASE OF ALL EMPLOYEES EXCEPT CHIEFS, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
OFFICERS (sic) AND CITY OFFICIALS OF TANGUB CITY AT ONE HUNDRED PESOS (₱100) A MONTH EFFECTIVE JULY 1,
1988," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by said body, to the damage
and prejudice of the Government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13690 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 30th day [of] June, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor,
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, of the
said City, and as such are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the
crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official/public
positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution
No. 56, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 2
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF TANGUB CITY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988," by then and there making it
appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in
truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13691 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 30th day of June, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, of said
City, and as such are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions,
conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 56-A
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub entitled: "RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE
INFRA FUND OF TANGUB CITY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid
Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused
well knew it was never taken up by said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13692 filed on May 11, 1989

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers, being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively of said
City, and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions,
conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 63 of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "A RESOLUTION EARNESTLY REQUESTING HONORABLE ALFREDO
BENGZON, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MANILA, THRU THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, CANDIDO TAN,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REGION X, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, TO APPOINT DR. SINFORIANA DEL CASTILLO AS CITY
HEALTH OFFICER IN TANGUB CITY HEALTH OFFICE," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was
deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was
never taken up by said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13693 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, of said City,
and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein
charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring
and confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 61 of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "A RESOLUTION REVERTING THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000) FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF SPORT CENTER TO COVER UP DEFICIENCIES OF
APPROPRIATION IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was
deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was
never taken up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13694 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 21st day of July, 1988, in the City of Tangub, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor, Temporary
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, and as such,
are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged on
relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and
confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 64, of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod entitled: "A RESOLUTION ADOPTING A POSITION PAPER REGARDING THE CONTINUED
EXISTENCE AND OPERATION OF TANGUB CITY AND REQUESTING HONORABLE LOURDES R. QUISUMBING FOR A
RECONSIDERATION OF HER MEMORANDA," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid resolution was deliberated
upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken
up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13695 filed on May 11, 1989

That on or about the 21st day of July, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene L. Mangao, all being public officers being City Mayor,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member and concurrently Temporary Presiding Officer and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Secretary,
respectively, of said City and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and
committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their
official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify Resolution No. 68, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, MALACANANG, MANILA FOR AUTHORITY
TO PURCHASE TEN (10) UNITS OF MOTORCAB, ONE (1) DOZEN MICROSCOPE COMPOUND, ONE (1) SET
ENCYCLOPEDIA TEXTBOOKS, ONE (1) SET BRITANICA DICTIONARY, SEVEN (7) UNITS ELECTRIC TYPEWRITER (20"
CARRIAGE), ONE (1) UNIT ELECTRIC FAN AND ONE (1) UNIT LOMBARDINI DIESEL ENGINE 4ID 820 FOR USE OF
VARIOUS OFFICES OF TANGUB CITY," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated
upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken
up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Upon their arraignment on July 8, 1991, petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. Marlene L. Mangao was not
arraigned as the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Hence, an order for her arrest was issued which
remains unserved up to the present. On the other hand, Aniceto T. Siete passed away on March 12, 1991 before he could be
arraigned.5 Upon agreement of the parties, no pre-trial conference was conducted. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the
course of trial, two varying versions arose and, as found by the Sandiganbayan, are culled as follows:

Evidence for the Prosecution

The accused are all public officers in the City Government of Tangub City. Accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. was then the incumbent
Mayor who assumed office on May 5, 1988, while accused Aniceto T. Siete as the incumbent Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Accused Camilo B. Zapatos was the Acting Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, while accused Marlene L. Mangao, who was a clerk in the Office of the Mayor, was designated as Acting Secretary
of the City Council during the period corresponding to the alleged commission of the crimes charged against the accused.

When accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. assumed the mayoral post on May 5, 1988, it has been the practice that the proposals for
resolutions and ordinances originated from him or his office. Often, when a proposal is put in the agenda of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, a prepared resolution is already available so that it will be easier for the City Council to just accept or adopt the
resolutions.
lawphil.net

During the session of the Sangguniang Panglungsod on July 27, 1988, the Council was presented with the Minutes for the
sessions held on June 23, 30, July 14 and 21, respectively. The minutes of said sessions reflected resolutions and ordinances
allegedly taken up, deliberated and passed upon by the Sangguniang Panglungsod namely: Resolution 50-A on June 23, 1988,
Resolution 56 and 56-A on June 30, Resolution No. 63 and 61 on July 14, Resolution 64 and 68 on July 21. The actual copies of
the Resolutions, Appropriations and Ordinances all contained the signatures of the four (4) accused and approving the same.

However, some of the Council Members questioned the validity of the said Resolutions and Ordinances. They alleged that the
Resolutions and Ordinances were neither taken up, deliberated nor passed upon during the above-mentioned dates. Roberto O.
[Taclob],6 [private complainant] a former council member, testified that the questioned Resolutions were not taken up and thus
could not have been deliberated nor passed upon. His testimony was corroborated by prosecution witnesses, Estrelita M.
Pastrano, Elizabeth L. Duroy Albarico and Agustin L. Opay, all former members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City
[private complainants]. Although the questioned resolutions were subsequently ratified by the Sanggunian through Resolution 94
by a vote of five (5) to four (4), with the four (4) complaining witnesses abstaining, dated October 15, 1988, the Council Members
still filed a complaint with the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) an administrative case against the four (4)
accused for misconduct in office and neglect of duty. The councilors claim that they were prevented from [attending] the sessions
of the Sanggunian for seven (7) months because the schedule of sessions was randomly changed without them being notified.
Accused Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., together with the other co-accused were preventively suspended from July to September
of 1989 but were subsequently not found guilty by the DILG. Despite signing an Affidavit of Desistance, thinking that the
Sandiganbayan is bound by the findings of the DILG, the complainants pursued the cases against the four (4) accused. Thus, the
criminal complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan were continued and trial ensued on January 8, 1992.

Evidence for the Defense

In his defense, Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. testified that before approving resolutions or ordinances, he consults his legal
counsel to check if there are any irregularities in the resolutions and whether or not the resolutions are beneficial to the City of
Tangub. He also stated that he did not attend or participate in the sessions of the City Council, asserting that, as Mayor, he did
not, in any way, influence the deliberations of the Sanggunian. He stressed that the Sangguniang Panglungsod is totally
independent of his office and as the approving officer of the Municipal Government, he relies on the certification of the Presiding
Officer that the resolutions and the ordinances are valid and lawful before affixing his signature. The accused, Eleno T. Regidor,
Jr. contends that he signed the questioned resolutions in good faith and with the belief that they were deliberated and passed
upon.

It is further contended by accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. that the questioned Resolutions were taken up and passed upon during
the sessions. The same accused further claimed that the minutes of the sessions of the Sanggunian were inaccurate since the
entire proceedings were not completely and accurately taken down by the stenographer or Council Secretary present during the
meetings, thus, the deliberations on the questioned resolutions were not entirely recorded. Lastly, the same accused claimed that
the complainants even admitted in their Affidavit of Desistance the inaccuracy of the minutes "x x x although the matters taken
during the sessions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod wherein we were present, were discussed and deliberated upon, we are
not sure whether or not said deliberations and discussions were recorded in the minutes x x x." The defense of the accused
Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. is corroborated by the testimony of Rogelio Taburada,7 [Taburada] who was then a Councilor of Tangub
City.

As for the other accused Sanggunian Member and Acting Presiding Officer Camilo B. Zapatos, he opted not to take the witness
stand and instead adopted the evidence of his co-accused Eleno T. Regidor Jr.

The Sandiganbayan's Decision

On September 24, 2004, the Sandiganbayan held that the petitioners' defenses of good faith and lack of intent failed to cast
doubt on the allegations of the prosecution. The pieces of evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses revealed
that Resolution Nos. 50-A,8 56,9 56-A,10 6311 61,12 6413 and 6814 (assailed Resolutions) established the moral certainty or degree
of proof which would produce conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Thus, it disposed of this case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the above cases as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 13689, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo B. Zapatos, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
 Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the
maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case No. 13690, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document was defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a
FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

3. In Criminal Case No. 13691, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a
FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

4. In Criminal Case No. 13692, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) years of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a
FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

5. In Criminal Case No. 13693, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a
FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

6. In Criminal Case No. 13694, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo B. Zapatos, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the
maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

7. In Criminal Case No. 13695, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo B. Zapatos, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the
maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).

In so far as Aniceto T. Siete is concerned, who died before arraignment could be held, the case against him is hereby considered
dismissed by reason of his death.

Let a Warrant of Arrest issue against Marlene L. Mangao for her immediate apprehension and in order to answer the charges
leveled against her.

SO ORDERED.

The Issues

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration15 which was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution16 dated
November 26, 2004. Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AMOUNTING TO EXCESS
OR LACK OF JURISDICTION AS NO CRIME OF FALSIFICATION WAS COMMITTED BY THEM;

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION WAS TOO WEAK TO WARRANT CONVICTION [BECAUSE] IT MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT/VALUE TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE OF THE
COMPLAINANTS AND THE EXONERATION BY THE DILG OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE AGAINST THEM;
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF REGIDOR THAT HE
HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE PREPARATION, BEING THE CITY MAYOR HIS RULE WAS ONLY TO APPROVE THE
RESOLUTIONS; [AND]

V. THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS INCREDIBLE THAT ACCUSED TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THEIR POSITION[.]
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.17

Moreover, petitioners asseverate that there is no falsification in this case under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code because they did not cause it to appear that other persons participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate. Petitioners submit that they did not feign such participation because the private complainants physically and actually
participated in passing the assailed resolutions. The participation of Mayor Regidor came only after the assailed resolutions were
submitted to him for approval. Likewise, there is no falsification under paragraph 7 of Article 171 because petitioners passed and
approved authentic, genuine and original documents. Petitioners submit that paragraph 7 involves falsification of a non-existent
document and the falsifier produces one purporting to be the original. Petitioners also opine that the DILG's dismissal18 of the
administrative complaint and the private complainants' act of executing affidavits of desistance19 should be given weight. Intent to
gain and/or bad faith were not shown by petitioners as some of the assailed resolutions do not involve money matters. Further,
petitioners argue that Taburada's testimony should have been accorded more weight and credence than the testimony of private
complainant Taclob. Petitioners claim that Taburada, as a former member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, clearly testified that
he was present at the time all the assailed resolutions were deliberated upon and approved,20 while Taclob's testimony was not
credible and trustworthy considering that he executed two (2) affidavits of desistance. Taburada's testimony was not at all
discussed by the Sandiganbayan; hence, its decision was not supported by evidence. Most importantly, petitioners reiterate their
contention that the minutes21 were defective and inaccurate. Thus, petitioners pray that they be acquitted in the name of due
process and based on the long-standing policy of the State to acquit the accused if the quantum of evidence is insufficient to
convict, as in the case at bench.22

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), claims that the
issues raised by the petitioners were purely questions of fact because the same would entail the review of all pieces of evidence
and evaluation of the weight and probative value thereof. The OSP also claims that petitioners questioned the sufficiency of
1avvphi1

evidence presented by the prosecution which were relied upon by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the OSP submits that the instant
Petition should be denied outright for it is not the function of this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to re-
examine the pieces of evidence duly submitted by the parties. On the merits, the OSP argues that petitioners by virtue of their
respective offices and functions, held positions directly connected with the proposal, deliberation, passage and approval of the
assailed resolutions as found by the Sandiganbayan and as duly supported by evidence. Intent to gain and/or bad faith is
inconsequential, as the law punishes the act of falsification as a violation of public faith. The OSP alleges that the petitioners
deliberately attempted to and, in fact, did conceal the falsity of the documents by making it appear that the assailed resolutions
were valid on their face, as the same were approved and signed by the petitioners. Moreover, the DILG ruling dismissing the
administrative complaint filed against the petitioners and the affidavits of desistance executed by the private complainants were
of no moment. Thus, the OSP posits that the prosecution's evidence was overwhelming and sufficient to prove the guilt of the
petitioners beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.23

The ultimate issue in this case is whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
documents.

Our Ruling

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

The law in point is Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
 7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no
such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the
preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the
civil status of persons.24

Thus, for falsification of a public document to be established, the following elements must concur: 1) that the offender is a public
officer, employee, or notary public; 2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by
committing any of the aforementioned acts. Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there
be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished
is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.25

In this case, the petitioners are charged under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners Regidor
and Zapatos, as Mayor, and Member and Temporary Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, respectively, made it
appear that private complainants, among others, participated in the Sangguniang Panglungsod sessions when they did not in fact
so participate,26 and issued, in authenticated forms, the assailed resolutions purporting to be copies of original documents when
no such originals exist.

We hold that all the elements of the offense punishable under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised Penal Code are
present in this case.

First. Petitioners were public officers at the time of the commission of the offenses charged. Mayor Regidor was
then Mayor of Tangub City, while Zapatos was a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and was a
Temporary Presiding Officer thereof.

Second. The petitioners took advantage of their respective official positions because they had the duty to make or
to prepare, or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document, or have the official custody of the
document which they falsified.27 Zapatos, as a member and, at the time, Temporary Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, had the duty to make or prepare or intervene in the preparation of the assailed
resolutions. In like manner, Mayor Regidor cannot claim that as mayor he had no participation in the making, or
preparation of, nor any intervention in the assailed resolutions.

Under Section 18028 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, or the Local Government Code of 1983, which was in effect at
the time the crimes imputed were committed, the city mayor had the power to veto the ordinances and resolutions
enacted or adopted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Contrary to Mayor Regidor's submission, the veto power
confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution as a requisite to its
enforceability. Thus, this Court held that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an
ordinance or resolution requires not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence as well.29

Third. While petitioners' witness, Taburada, testified that he was present during the Sangguniang’s deliberations
of the assailed resolutions,30 private complainant Taclob also testified that the resolutions were not discussed and
approved during the respective sessions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.31 The minutes of the sessions, as
well, do not reflect any deliberation and/or approval by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the assailed resolutions.
Initially, when Taburada was asked if the minutes faithfully recorded all the matters deliberated upon during the
sessions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod on June 23, June 30, July 14, and July 21, 1988, he readily affirmed it.
But after the Sandiganbayan called for a recess when the counsel for the parties had a heated discussion,
Taburada claimed that the minutes of the sessions on said dates did not contain all the matters taken up during
those sessions, particularly the deliberation and approval of the assailed resolutions.32 Yet, the resolutions were
questioned by private complainants precisely because the alleged deliberation and voting thereon were not at all
conducted as reflected in the minutes33 of the Sanggunian session of July 27, 1988. On said date, after taking up
other matters, the Sangguniang Panglungsod, upon motion of Taclob, went into a closed-door session. Then a
nominal voting was conducted in order to determine "whether said resolutions were brought before the session for
deliberation or [if] the nature of said resolutions [was] reflected in the minutes."34 Majority of the members voted
"no," while Taburada answered "no comment"35 because he did not actually read the minutes at the time, but he
nonetheless signed the same.36 To the same question, Zapatos also answered "no comment." These material
inconsistencies in Taburada's testimony, pitted against the testimonies of the private complainants and the
documentary evidence, proved fatal to petitioners' cause.

It must be borne in mind that weighing heavily against the petitioners' defense is the well-settled doctrine that
findings of fact of trial courts — in this case, the Sandiganbayan — particularly in the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.37

While the petitioners do not wish to impute much significance to the minutes, they are important in the resolution of this case.
In a similar case, De los Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, Third Division,38 this Court, citing a number of cases,39 highlighted the
importance of the minutes taken in the pertinent proceeding, relying thereon to ascertain the truth when confronted by conflicting
claims of parties. Hence, this Court held:

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding. It
has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason
to accord them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records.
In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter
difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.40

We see no reason to deviate from this ruling.

Added to this is the Memorandum of Agreement41 entered into by the Office of the Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod on
August 12, 1988, "recalling all SP resolutions not duly passed and/or approved by the majority of the members thereat." Further,
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, in its Resolution No. 9442 dated October 15, 1988, opted to re-approve the assailed resolutions
"which were alleged to [have been] implemented but not discussed," rather than move for the amendment of the minutes. These
acts belie petitioners' claims that the minutes were inaccurate for failing to include therein the deliberations and approval of the
assailed resolutions. Indeed, if the minutes merely omitted any mention of the discussion on, and approval of, the subject
resolutions, there would have been no need to resubmit them for the approval of the Sanggunian. It would have been more
convenient to simply effect the correction of the minutes.

Likewise, petitioners' reliance on the affidavits of desistance executed by the private complainants fails to impress this Court. Our
ruling in Balderama v. People43 is instructive:

A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon
retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction
of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances
in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can
retractions be considered and upheld.

The affidavits of desistance cannot prevail over the categorical statements of the private complainants, the very same affiants
who executed the same. Moreover, based on the testimonies of the private complainants, they merely executed the affidavits of
desistance after the DILG dismissed the administrative complaint and after Mayor Regidor asked them to execute the same,
because they had the impression that the DILG ruling would, in one way or another, be binding on the Sandiganbayan, and they
simply wanted to avoid having to spend for their fare in going to the Sandiganbayan for the trial.

This impression was likewise noted by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Decision. The impression was so prevalent that even
the petitioners themselves relied on the DILG dismissal of the administrative charge, contending that it should have been given
greater weight by the Sandiganbayan, at least to create a serious and reasonable doubt to warrant their acquittal.

The petitioners' contention lacks merit.

It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal
liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is
known as the "threefold liability rule." Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and
vice-versa. In this criminal prosecution, the dismissal of the administrative cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result
in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them.

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, the Sandiganbayan's conviction of petitioners had ample factual mooring, after the
prosecution presented both documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence. Time and again, we held that we are not a trier of
facts; hence, we defer to the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan which had more opportunity and facilities to examine and
evaluate the evidence presented.44

To repeat, settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and conclusive in
the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave
abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; and 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of
evidence on record.45 We found none of these exceptions in the present case. Thus, we accord respect and weight to the
Sandiganbayan's findings, a portion of which aptly and judiciously states, to wit:

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds the contentions of the accused untenable. Their defense of good faith and lack of intent
has failed to cast doubt on the allegations of the prosecution. In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public
officials or by private persons, it is not that there be present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person. Verily, the pieces of
evidence reveal the specific acts of the four (4) accused in the commission of the crime of falsification. Firstly, the accused
caused it to appear in a document that members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod participated in the sessions, deliberations and
passed the questioned resolutions. The said resolutions reflect the attendance of all the members of the Sanggunian on the
dates thereon, including their unanimous approval of the resolutions. The pieces of evidence and the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, however, reveal otherwise. If, in truth and in fact, Resolutions 50-A, 56, 56-A, 63, 61, 64 and 68 were
indeed taken up and passed upon on their respective dates, it would be contrary to human reason why the members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod who approved it unanimously, to suddenly file a case against the accused and deny the existence of
a legislative act they authored. Secondly, the accused are found to have committed the act of issuing in authenticated form, a
document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such document exists. In issuing the subject Resolutions,
Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Vice-Mayor Aniceto T. Siete and SP Camilo B. Zapatos, consummated the crime of falsification by
purporting them to be original copies of valid, deliberated and approved resolutions when no such documents exist and no
proceedings regarding them ever took place as established by the prosecution. Their defense that the minutes of the sessions
were inaccurate and did not reflect the deliberations concerning the questioned resolutions, does not convince this Court. The
testimonies of complainants Roberto O. [Taclob], Estrelita M. Pastrano, Elizabeth L. Duroy and Agustin L. Opay, all former
members of the City Council during the terms of the accused, must be given great weight and credence. In falsification of a public
document, the falsification need not be made on an official form. It is sufficient that the document is given the appearance of, or
made to appear similar to the official form.

All told, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public documents.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the Sandiganbayan Decision dated September 24, 2004 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 13689, 13690, 13691, 13692, 13693, 13694 and 13695 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Special Raffle dated February 2, 2009.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2Particularly docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 13689-95, penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a
member of this Court), with Associate Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro (now a member of this Court) and
Roland B. Jurado, concurring; id. at 26-42.

3Marlene L. Mangao is still at-large. Thus, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan which, however,
remains to be unserved up to this day; records, p. 483.

4 Records, unpaged. (Emphasis supplied.)

5 Records, p. 200.

6 Also referred to as Roberto Taclub in other pleadings and documents.

7 Also referred to as Rogelio Taborada in other pleadings and documents.

8Entitled: A RESOLUTION GRANTING A SALARY INCREASE OF ALL EMPLOYEES EXCEPT THE CHIEFS,
ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF OFFICES AND CITY OFFICIALS OF TANGUB CITY AT ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P100.00) A MONTH EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1988; Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits.

9Entitled: A RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE GENERAL FUND OF

TANGUB CITY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988; Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits.

10Entitled: RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE INFRA FUND OF TANGUB
CITY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988; Exhibit "C," folder of exhibits.

Entitled: A RESOLUTION EARNESTLY REQUESTING HONORABLE ALFREDO BENGZON, SECRETARY,

11

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MANILA THRU THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO TAN, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, REGION X, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY TO APPOINT DR. SINFORIANA DEL CASTILLO AS CITY
HEALTH OFFICER IN TANGUB CITY HEALTH OFFICE; Exhibit "D," folder of exhibits.

12Entitled: A RESOLUTION REVERTING THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

(₱100,000.00) FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF SPORT CENTER TO COVER UP DEFICIENCIES OF
APPROPRIATION IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND; Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits.

13
Entitled: A RESOLUTION ADOPTING A POSITION PAPER REGARDING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE
AND OPERATION OF TANGUB CITY DIVISION IN TANGUB CITY AND REQUESTING HONORABLE
LOURDES R. QUISUMBING FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF HER ORDER/MEMORANDA; Exhibit "F," folder of
exhibits.

Entitled: RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND

14

MANAGEMENT, MALACAÑANG, MANILA FOR AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE TEN (10) UNITS MOTORCAB,
ONE (1) DOZEN MICROSCOPE COMPOUND, ONE (1) SET ENCYCLOPEDIA TEXTBOOKS, ONE (1) SET
BRITANNICA DICTIONARY, SEVEN (7) UNITS ELECTRIC TYPEWRITER (20" CARRIAGE) ONE (1) UNIT
ELECTRIC FAN AND ONE (1) UNIT LOMBARDINI DIESEL ENGINE 4ID 820 FOR USE IN THE VARIOUS
OFFICES OF TANGUB CITY; Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits.

15 Rollo, pp. 43-50.

16 Id. at 24-25.

17 Supra note 1, at 8-9.

18 Dated April 15, 1991; Exhibit "13," folder of exhibits.

19 Exhibits "16," "17," folder of exhibits.

20 TSN, January 9, 1992, pp. 17-18.

21 Exhibits "H," "I," "J," "K" and "L," folder of exhibits.

22 Supra note 1; petitioners' Memorandum dated November 25, 2006, rollo, pp. 176-183.

23 OSP's Memorandum dated November 15, 2006; id. at 193-223.

24 Emphasis supplied.
 Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324, 345, citing Lumancas v. Uriarte, 347
25

SCRA 22, 33-34 (2000), further citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918 (1955).

26 Bernardino v. People, G.R. Nos. 170453 and 170518, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 237, 247-248.

27 Giron, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 145357-59, August 23, 2006, 499 SCRA 594, 605.

28 Section 180 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides:

SECTION 180. Approval of Ordinances by the Mayor; Veto Power. — (1) All ordinances, and any
resolution or motion directing the payment of money or creating liability, enacted or adopted by
the sangguniang panlungsod shall be forwarded to the mayor. Within ten days after the receipt of the
ordinance, resolution or motion, the mayor shall return it with his approval or veto. If he does not return it
within that time, it shall be deemed approved. If he returns it with his veto, his reasons therefor in writing
shall accompany it. A vetoed ordinance, if repassed by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, shall take effect as provided in this Code.

(2) The mayor shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation ordinance, or
of an ordinance, resolution or motion directing the payment of money or creating liability, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object. The item or items objected to shall not take effect
except in the manner provided in the preceding section. Should an item or items in an appropriation
ordinance be disapproved by the mayor, the corresponding item or items in the appropriation ordinance of
the previous year shall be deemed reenacted.

29 De los Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, Third Division, G.R. No. 121215, November 13, 1997, 281 SCRA 631, 635.

30 TSN, January 9, 1992, pp. 17-18.

31 TSN, March 4, 1992, p. 5.

32 TSN, January 9, 1992, pp. 21-32.

33 Exhibit "L," folder of exhibits.

34
Id.

35 TSN, January 9, 1992, pp. 36-45.

36 TSN, January 10, 1992, pp. 9-11.

37 Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 331 Phil. 531, 580 (1996).

38 Supra note 29.

39Id. at 636-637, citing, Malinao v. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616 (1996); Velarma v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 406
(1996); Drilon, v. Lin, 235 SCRA 135 (1994); Pimentel v. Garchitorena, 208 SCRA 122 (1992); Dizon v. Tizon, 22
SCRA 1317 (1968); Subido v. City of Manila, 108 Phil. 462 (1960).

40 Id. at 638.

41 Exhibit "18," folder of exhibits.

42 Exhibit "14," folder of exhibits.

G.R. Nos. 147578-85 and G.R. Nos. 147598-605, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 423, 432-433. (Citations
43

omitted.)

44Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin v. The Honorable Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161455, May 20,
2008.

45Supra note 43, at 432, citing Gil v. People, 177 SCRA 229, 236 (1989), further citing Cesar v. Sandiganbayan,
134 SCRA 105 (1985).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Constitution
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AUSL Exclusive

Today is Saturday, January 18, 2020

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification
the April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625,
3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up
to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.4

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda
Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160,
Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing
that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received
the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the
loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.5

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-
cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the
name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was
granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan,
received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent
and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received
the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount,
and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the
said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature of
Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency,
when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the
amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that
the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount
of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the
signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same
and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused
 and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of
P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers9 testified that on certain dates
in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2,
1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No.
237A11 for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A13 was released to Ferlyn
Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No.
374A.14

Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona
fide members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that
she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to
the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and
made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein.18 As to the signature of
Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.19

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's
testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's
sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative
is not open to minors.20

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He
testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit
Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No.
237A is Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in Arroyo's name was
settled.22

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal
for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year,
she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only
Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because the Journal had
missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.23

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion
and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released
the money to them;24 that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that
the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries in the
vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the approval of
Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;25 that she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he
was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of
irregularity;26 that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are
children of regular members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has
to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after
the cases were filed in court.27 She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.29

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been registered since
1967.30

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all
the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year
 and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal
interest from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.31

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum,
AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine
of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen
thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus
costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the
prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of
an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an
element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these
loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.34

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document, appellant could be
convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines
the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and
important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a
crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name
of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which
those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.37

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing
it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by
signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the
amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received its
proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion
knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was
aware that while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it
appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible
testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of
Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures were
forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any
ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section
27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its
books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting
loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in
Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the
understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon.39

The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because
they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions41 nor are they
defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.42 Rather, they are private documents, which have
been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. 43

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the
said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden
completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important to ascertain whether the offender
is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a
means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of
falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the
time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in
reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for
21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of
falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear
that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in
excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan
Tiao,48 the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as
the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held
guilty of falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months.49 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within
the range of the allowed imposable penalty.

Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties
for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the
aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was
settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the
time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;
 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash
voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal
that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by:
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the
modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and
that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making
untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which
caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error
for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal
Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.50

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary
when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the
Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He
replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to
his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an
audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An
inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited
in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained
that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form
of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the
place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is,
comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the
offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x
x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or
administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as
such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the
custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter
the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted
on his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of
estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for
safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by
the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks
did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control
they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his
subordinate with instructions to retain them.

xxxx
 But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently misappropriate the
funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have
seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to
hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed
to extend this interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own
use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and
makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the
present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel
argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period
the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the
disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36
Phil., 821.)53

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for
PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise
disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as
she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as
part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been
loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights
caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying
circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of
falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to
indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum
shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the
sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment.
The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 25-40. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon
A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria.

2 CA rollo, pp. 34-41. Penned by Judge Abednego O. Adre.

3 Rollo, p. 41.

4 TSN, August 1, 1990, pp. 96-97.

5 CA rollo, pp. 16-17.

6 Id. at 18-19.
7 Id. at 14-15.

8 Id. at 20-21.

9 TSN, August 13, 1983, pp. 3-5.

10 Records, p. 230.

11 Id. at 238.

12 Also referred to as Godofreda in the Records.

13 Records, p. 239.

14 Id. at 240; TSN, March 4, 1986, pp. 5, 7-8.

15 Id. at 234-237.

16
TSN, March 4, 1986, pp. 24-25.

17 Id. at 12-14.

18 TSN, August 1, 1990, pp. 101-106.

19 Id. at 10.

20 TSN, October 22, 1986, pp. 5-19.

21 TSN, June 10, 1987, pp. 14-15.

22 Id. at 19.

23 TSN, February 16, 1988, pp. 2-15.

24 TSN, November 14, 1988, pp. 5-6; 8-10 and 14-16.

25 Id. at 13.

26 Id. at 19-23.

27 TSN, March 29, 1988, p. 38.

28 Id. at 30-31.

29 Id. at 34.

30 TSN, March 28, 1990, p. 69.

31 CA rollo, pp. 40-41.

32 Rollo, p. 39.

33 Id. at 6.

34 Id. at 13.

35 G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, citing U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

36Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. – The penalty of prisión correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: x x x

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

37 Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 144026, June 15, 2006.

 38Although Batulanon signed the names of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo, her act of falsification will not fall
under Paragraph 1 of Article 171, which requires that there must be an attempt or intent on the part of the
accused to imitate the signature of other persons. Such was not shown in this case because the genuine
signature of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo were never offered in evidence. See Reyes, The Revised Penal
Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), pp. 205-206.

39 TSN, August 13, 1986, pp. 10-13.

40 Citing People v. Francisco, C.A., No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G. 537, 541, cited in Luis B. Reyes,
The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco, the Court of Appeals ruled that
"the cash disbursement vouchers here in question are not negotiable instruments nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce. They are nothing more than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers of
the loans extended to them and as such are private documents only."

41Monteverde v. People, 435 Phil. 906, 921 (2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th
ed., 1998), p. 236, citing People v. Lizares, C.A., 65 O.G. 7174.

Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 235, citing People v. Co Beng, C.A., 40
42

O.G. 1913.

43 U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596, 597 (1907).

44 People v. Caingat, 426 Phil. 782, 792 (2002).

45 A. Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review (9th ed., 1997), p. 464, citing Cuello Calon, II, p. 261.

46 56 Phil. 286 (1931).

47 36 Phil. 146 (1917).

48 37 Phil. 78 (1917).

49 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128213, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 427, 435.

50While the Information alleged that petitioner Batulanon also falsified the "Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger"
of Dennis Batulanon, she cannot likewise be convicted of falsifying said document as it was not formally offered in
evidence.

51 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), p. 736.

52 43 Phil. 186 (1922), cited in Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), p. 750.

53 Id. at 189-191.

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 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 168486 June 27, 2006

NOE S. ANDAYA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari from the September 29, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
26556, affirming the January 29, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 92-
36145, convicting petitioner Noe S. Andaya of falsification of private document, and the April 26, 2005 Resolution3 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit association
authorized to engage in savings and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected as president and general
manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its
members. Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI passed and approved Resolution No. RS-88-006-
048 setting up a Finder’s Fee Program whereby any officer, member or employee, except investment counselors, of AFPSLAI
who could solicit an investment of not less than P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finder’s fee equivalent to one percent of the
amount solicited.

In a letter4 dated September 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, then Chairman of the Board of Trustees,
regarding the precarious financial position of AFPSLAI due to its alleged flawed management. As a result, Gen. Abadia
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of
AFPSLAI which led to the filing of several criminal cases against petitioner, one of which is the instant case based on the alleged
fraudulent implementation of the Finder’s Fee Program.

On October 5, 1992, an information for estafa through falsification of commercial document was filed against petitioner, to wit:

The undersigned accuses NOE S. ANDAYA of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 8th day of April, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, by means
of deceit, false pretenses and falsification of commercial document, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
the ARMED FORCES AND POLICE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman of the Board of
Director[s], Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, AFP, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned the said
accused being then the President and General Manager of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc.,
caused and approved the disbursement of the sum of P21,000.00, Philippine Currency, from the funds of the association, by then
and there making it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that said amount represented the 1% finder’s fee of one
DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas]; when in truth and in fact accused knew fully well that there was no such payment to be made
by the association as finder’s fee; that by virtue of said falsification, said accused was able to encashed (sic) and received (sic)
MBTC Check No. 583768 in the sum of P21,000.00, which amount once in his possession, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the aforesaid sum of
P21,000.00, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5 (Emphasis supplied)

The case was raffled to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-36145. On
May 30, 1994, petitioner was arraigned6 and pleaded not guilty to the charge, after which trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue.

Guilas, a general clerk of AFPSLAI’s Time Deposit Section, testified that on April 8, 1991, he was informed by Tini Gabriel and
Julie Alabansa of the Treasury Department that there was a finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 in his name. Subsequently,
Judy Balangue, an investment clerk of the Time Deposit Section, told him that the finder’s fee was for petitioner. When Guilas
went to petitioner’s office to inform him about the finder’s fee in his (Guilas’) name, petitioner instructed him to collect the
P21,000.00 and turn over the same to the latter. Guilas returned to the Treasury Department and signed Disbursement Voucher
No. 583807 afterwhich he was issued Metrobank Check No. 6837688 for P21,000.00. After encashing the check, he turned over
the proceeds to petitioner. On cross-examination, Guilas admitted that there was no prohibition in placing the finder’s fee under
the name of a person who did not actually solicit the investment.

Balangue also testified that on April 3, 1991, petitioner instructed him to prepare Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No.
521789 in the name of Rosario Mercader for an investment in AFPSLAI in the amount of P2,100,000.00 and to inform Guilas that
the finder’s fee for the aforesaid investment will be placed in the latter’s name. On cross-examination, Balangue confirmed that a
P2,100,000.00 worth of investment from Rosario Mercader was deposited in AFPSLAI. He further acknowledged that the
Finder’s Fee Program did not prohibit the placing of another person’s name as payee of the finder’s fee.

The defense presented three witnesses, namely, Emerita Arevalo, Ernesto Hernandez and petitioner.

Arevalo, secretary of petitioner in AFPSLAI, explained that the finder’s fee was for the P2,100,000.00 investment solicited by
Ernesto Hernandez from Rosario Mercader. The finder’s fee was placed in the name of Guilas upon request of Hernandez so
that the same would not be reflected in his (Hernandez’s) income tax return. She alleged that Guilas consented to the
arrangement of placing the finder’s fee in his (Guilas’) name. She also claimed that there was no prohibition in the Finder’s Fee
Program regarding the substitution of the name of the solicitor as long as there was no double claim for the finder’s fee over the
same investment.

Hernandez, an associate member of AFPSLAI and vice president of Philippine Educational Trust Plan, Inc. (PETP Plans),
testified that sometime in 1991, he was able to solicit from Rosario Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI. He
also asked petitioner to place the finder’s fee in the name of one of his employees so that he (Hernandez) would not have to
report a higher tax base in his income tax return. On April 8, 1991, petitioner handed to him the finder’s fee in the amount of
P21,000.00.

Petitioner denied all the charges against him. He claimed that the P21,000.00 finder’s fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI
because of the P2,100,000.00 investment of Rosario Mercader solicited by Ernesto Hernandez. He denied misappropriating the
P21,000.00 finder’s fee for his personal benefit as the same was turned over to Ernesto Hernandez who was the true solicitor of
the aforementioned investment. Since the finder’s fee was in fact owed by AFPSLAI, then no damage was done to the
association. The finder’s fee was placed in the name of Guilas as requested by Hernandez in order to reduce the tax obligation of
the latter. According to petitioner, Guilas consented to the whole setup.

Petitioner also claimed that Hernandez was an associate member of AFPSLAI because his application for membership was
approved by the membership committee and the Board of Trustees and was in fact issued an I.D. There was no prohibition under
the rules and regulation of the Finder’s Fee Program regarding the substitution of the name of the solicitor with the name of
another person. On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that he merely approved the substitution of the name of Hernandez
with that of Guilas in the disbursement voucher upon the request of Hernandez. He brushed aside the imputation of condoning
tax evasion by claiming that the issue in the instant proceedings was whether he defrauded AFPSLAI and not his alleged
complicity in tax evasion.

After the defense rested its case, the prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue and Ma. Fe
Moreno.

Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of AFPSLAI, testified that Hernandez was ineligible to become a member of
AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the association’s by-laws. However, she admitted that the application of
Hernandez as member was approved by the membership committee.

Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI at the time of her testimony on January 25, 2000, stated that there are eight criminal cases
pending against the petitioner in various branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In one case decided by Judge
Bacalla of Branch 216, petitioner was convicted of estafa through falsification involving similar facts as the instant case. She
further stated that Hernandez was not a member of AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the by-laws. On cross-
examination, she admitted that the case decided by Judge Bacalla convicting petitioner was on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

The defense dispensed with the presentation of Mercader in view of the stipulation of the prosecution on the fact that Mercader
was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that she was convinced to invest in the association by Ernesto Hernandez.10

On June 20, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision11 convicting petitioner of falsification of private document. On July 5, 2001,
petitioner filed a motion for new trial.12 In an Order13 dated December 20, 2001, the trial court ruled that the evidence submitted
by petitioner in support of his motion was inadequate to conduct a new trial, however, in the interest of substantial justice, the
case should still be reopened pursuant to Section 24,14 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioner proceeded to submit documentary evidence consisting of the financial statements of AFPSLAI from 1996 to 1999 to
show that AFPSLAI did not suffer any damage from the payment of the P21,000.00 finder’s fee. He likewise offered the testimony
of Paterno Madet, senior vice president of AFPSLAI, who testified that he was personally aware that Rosario Mercader invested
P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI; that Hernandez was a member of AFPSLAI and was the one who convinced Mercader to invest; that
the finder’s fee was placed in the name of Guilas; that petitioner called him to grant the request of Hernandez for the finder’s fee
to be placed in the name of one of the employees of AFPSLAI; that there was no policy which prohibits the placing of the name of
the solicitor of the investment in the name of another person; that the substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of Guilas
was approved by petitioner but he (Madet) was the one who approved the release of the disbursement voucher.

On January 29, 2002, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision convicting petitioner of falsification of private document
based on the following findings of fact: Hernandez solicited from Rosario Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 for AFPSLAI;
Hernandez requested petitioner to place the finder’s fee in the name of another person; petitioner caused it to appear in the
disbursement voucher that Guilas solicited the aforesaid investment; the voucher served as the basis for the issuance of the
check for P21,000.00 representing the finder’s fee for the investment of Mercader; and Guilas encashed the check and turned
over the money to petitioner who in turn gave it to Hernandez.

The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification of private document were present. First, petitioner caused it to appear in
the disbursement voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee.
Second, the falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause damage to the government because it was meant
to lower the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in an Order15 dated May 13, 2002. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; hence, the instant
petition challenging the validity of his conviction for the crime of falsification of private document.

Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals contradicted the ruling of the trial court. He claims that the Court of
Appeals stated in certain portions of its decision that petitioner was guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial document
whereas in the trial court’s decision petitioner was convicted of falsification of private document.

A close reading of the Court of Appeals’ decision shows that the alleged points of contradiction were the result of inadvertence in
the drafting of the same. Read in its entirety, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court
and, necessarily, it affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of falsification of private document and not of estafa through
falsification of commercial document.

In the main, petitioner implores this Court to review the pleadings he filed before the lower courts as well as the evidence on
record on the belief that a review of the same will prove his innocence. However, he failed to specify what aspects of the factual
and legal bases of his conviction should be reversed.

Time honored is the principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole action for review on any question including those
not raised by the parties.16 After a careful and thorough review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner should be
acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 217 in relation to Article 17118 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification under Article 171 which, in the case at bar, falls under
paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate; (2) the falsification was committed on a private document; and (3) the falsification caused damage or was
committed with intent to cause damage to a third party.

Although the public prosecutor designated the offense charged in the information as estafa through falsification of commercial
document, petitioner could be convicted of falsification of private document, had it been proper, under the well-settled rule that it
is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given by the public
prosecutor in the preamble of the information. We explained this principle in the case of U.S. v. Lim San19 in this wise:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed,
and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the
manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those
acts constitute.20

The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime of falsification of private document. Specifically, the
allegations in the information can be broken down into the three aforestated essential elements of this offense as follows: (1)
petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a finder’s fee from
AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finder’s fee was due to him; (2) the falsification was committed
on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00.

The first element of the offense charged in the information was proven by the prosecution. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well as the presentation of Disbursement Voucher No. 58380
established that petitioner caused the preparation of the voucher in the name of Guilas despite knowledge that Guilas was not
entitled to the finder’s fee. Significantly, petitioner admitted his participation in falsifying the voucher when he testified that he
authorized the release of the voucher in the name of Guilas upon the request of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not
personally prepare the voucher, he could be considered a principal by induction, had his conviction been proper, since he was
the president and general manager of AFPSLAI at the time so that his employees merely followed his instructions in preparing
the falsified voucher.

The second element of the offense charged in the information, i.e., the falsification was committed in Disbursement Voucher No.
58380, a private document, is likewise present. It appears that the public prosecutor erroneously characterized the disbursement
voucher as a commercial document so that he designated the offense as estafa through falsification of commercial document in
the preamble of the information. However, as correctly ruled by the trial court,21 the subject voucher is a private document only; it
is not a commercial document because it is not a document used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions22 nor is it defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.23 Rather, it is a private
document, which has been defined as a deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a public
notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth,24 because
it acted as the authorization for the release of the P21,000.00 finder’s fee to Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment of
this finder’s fee.

While the first and second elements of the offense charged in the information were satisfactorily established by the prosecution, it
is the third element which is decisive in the instant case. In the information, it was alleged that petitioner caused damage in the
amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Diosdado Guilas was
entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such sum to him. However, contrary to these
allegations in the information, petitioner was able to prove that AFPSLAI owed a finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00
although not to Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez.

It was positively shown that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario
Mercader which entitled him to a finder’s fee equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited (i.e., P21,000.00) under the
Finder’s Fee Program. The documentary evidence consisting of the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 5217825 which
was presented by the prosecution categorically stated that Rosario Mercader deposited P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in
AFPSLAI. In fact, Rosario Mercader was no longer presented as a defense witness in view of the stipulation by the prosecution
on the fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that Hernandez was the one who convinced her to make such
deposit.26 Moreover, the defense showed that the disbursement voucher was merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the
request of Hernandez so that he would have a lower tax base. Thus, after Guilas received the P21,000.00 from AFPSLAI, he
gave the money to petitioner who in turn surrendered the amount to Hernandez.

It was further established that Hernandez was an associate member of AFPSLAI and, thus, covered by the Finder’s Fee
Program. The prosecution tried to cast doubt on the validity of Hernandez’s membership in the association but it merely relied on
the unsubstantiated claims of its two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of
AFPSLAI and Ma. Fe Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI, who claimed that Hernandez was disqualified from being an associate
member under AFPSLAI’s by-laws. However, except for a recital of certain provisions of the by-laws, they failed to support their
claims with documentary evidence clearly showing that Hernandez was disqualified from being an associate member.
Significantly, Maigue admitted on cross-examination that Hernandez’s membership was approved by AFPSLAI’s membership
committee and was issued an AFPSLAI I.D. card.27 Documentary evidence consisting of Hernandez’s I.D. card as well as the oral
testimonies of petitioner, Arevalo and Hernandez, and the admission of Maigue on cross-examination, support the claim of the
defense that Hernandez was an associate member of AFPSLAI.

Considering that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 investment from Mercader, it follows that he was entitled to
receive the finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00. AFPSLAI suffered no damage because it really owed the P21,000.00
finder’s fee to Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid to Guilas and only later turned over to Hernandez. Clearly then, the
third essential element of the offense as alleged in the information, i.e., the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00, was not proven by the prosecution.

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.28 It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for
the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. However, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the
third essential element of the crime charged in the information. Thus, petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of
evidence.

The trial court convicted petitioner of falsification of private document, while conceding that AFPSLAI suffered no damage,
however, the court reasoned that the third essential element of falsification of private document was present because the
falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause damage to the government considering that its purpose was to
lower the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, allow him to evade payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.

We find ourselves unable to agree with this ratiocination of the trial court because it violates the constitutional right29 of petitioner
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As early as the 1904 case of U.S. v. Karelsen,30 the
rationale of this fundamental right of the accused was already explained in this wise:

The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute
the crime charged.31 (Emphasis supplied)

It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring
the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because
he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.32 The allegations of facts constituting
the offense charged are substantial matters and an accused’s right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the
information cannot be waived.33 No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein.34 To convict
him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded.35 The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal
to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.36

Thus, in Alonto v. People,37 Dico v. Court of Appeals38 and Ongson v. People,39 we acquitted the accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 ("The Bouncing Checks Law") because there was a variance between the identity and date of issuance of
the check alleged in the information and the check proved by the prosecution during trial:

This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the information alleged that petitioner issued a check dated May 14, 1992
whereas the documentary evidence presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the amount of
P25,000 dated April 5, 1992. Prosecution witness Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks
(Exhibits "G," "H," and "I"), but categorically stated that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated May 14, 1992, which
was contrary to that testified to by private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992. In view of
this variance, the conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this
ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI Check No.
831258 dated April 5, 1992 in the amount of P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the identity of the
check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws or
issues a check on account or for value, and the date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the time of issue the
maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the
conviction for the third count fatally defective.40 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan,41 we upheld the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
accusation against him in a case involving a variance between the means of committing the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
alleged in the information and the means found by the Sandiganbayan:

Common and foremost among the issues raised by petitioners is the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them
on a finding of fact that was not alleged in the information. They contend that the information charged them with having allowed
payment of P83,850 to Ricardo Castañeda despite being aware and knowing fully well that the surveying instruments were not
actually repaired and rendered functional/operational. However, their conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding
that the surveying instruments were not repaired in accordance with the specifications contained in the job orders.

xxxx

In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process requires that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation
of this constitutional right.

The important end to be accomplished is to describe the act with sufficient certainty in order that the accused may be appraised
of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused
would be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution.

xxxx

There is no question that the manner of commission alleged in the information and the act the Sandiganbayan found to have
been committed are both violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Nonetheless, they are and remain two different means of
execution and, even if reference to Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 has been made in the information, appellants’ conviction should
only be based on that which was charged, or included, in the information. Otherwise, there would be a violation of their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against them.

In Evangelista v. People, a judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan, for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, was reversed by the Court on the ground that accused was made liable for acts different from those
described in the information. The accused therein was convicted on the finding that she failed to identify with certainty in her
certification the kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay Distillery, Inc., although the information charged her with falsifying said certificate.
The Court said that, constitutionally, the accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her. To convict her of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional
right.
Contrary to the stand of the prosecution, the allegations contained in the information and the findings stated in the
Sandiganbayan decision are not synonymous. This is clearly apparent from the mere fact that the defenses applicable for each
one are different. To counter the allegations contained in the information, petitioners only had to prove that the instruments were
repaired and rendered functional/operational. Under the findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision, petitioners’ defense
would have been to show not only that the instruments were repaired, but were repaired in accordance with the job order.

xxxx

This is not to say that petitioners cannot be convicted under the information charged. The information in itself is valid. It is only
that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for an act that was not alleged therein. x x x.42 (Underscoring supplied)

As in the Burgos case, the information in the case at bar is valid, however, there is a variance between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced during trial with respect to the third essential element of falsification of private document, i.e., the
falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a third party. To reiterate, petitioner was charged
in the information with causing damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 because he caused it to appear in the
disbursement voucher that Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such
amount to Guilas. However, he was convicted by the trial court of falsifying the voucher with criminal intent to cause damage to
the government because the trial court found that petitioner’s acts were designed to lower the tax base of Hernandez and aid the
latter in evading payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.

We find this variance material and prejudicial to petitioner which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant case. By the
clear and unequivocal terms of the information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that the falsification of the voucher by
petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 and not that the falsification of the voucher was done with
intent to cause damage to the government. It is apparent that this variance not merely goes to the identity of the third party but,
more importantly, to the nature and extent of the damage done to the third party. Needless to state, the defense applicable for
each is different.

More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based precisely on the allegations in the information. A review of the records
shows that petitioner concentrated on disproving that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this was the charge in the information which
he had to refute to prove his innocence. As previously discussed, petitioner proved that AFPSLAI suffered no damage inasmuch
as it really owed the finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 to Hernandez but the same was placed in the name of Guilas upon
Hernandez’s request. If we were to convict petitioner now based on his intent to cause damage to the government, we would be
riding roughshod over his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation because he was not forewarned that he was being
prosecuted for intent to cause damage to the government. It would be simply unfair and underhanded to convict petitioner on this
ground not alleged while he was concentrating his defense against the ground alleged.

The surprise and injustice visited upon petitioner becomes more evident if we take into consideration that the prosecution never
sought to establish that petitioner’s acts were done with intent to cause damage to the government in that it purportedly aided
Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the finder’s fee. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was never made a party to this
case. The income tax return of Hernandez was, likewise, never presented to show the extent, if any, of the actual damage to the
government of the supposed under declaration of income by Hernandez. Actually, the prosecution never tried to establish actual
damage, much less intent to cause damage, to the government in the form of lost income taxes. There was here no opportunity
for petitioner to object to the evidence presented by the prosecution on the ground that the evidence did not conform to the
allegations in the information for the simple reason that no such evidence was presented by the prosecution to begin with.

Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to cause damage to the government from the testimony of petitioner and his
three other witnesses, namely, Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of the names in the voucher was intended to
lower the tax base of Hernandez to avoid payment of taxes on the finder’s fee. In other words, the trial court used part of the
defense of petitioner in establishing the third essential element of the offense which was entirely different from that alleged in the
information. Under these circumstances, petitioner obviously had no opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge that
he committed the acts with intent to cause damage to the government because this was part of his defense when he explained
the reason for the substitution of the names in the voucher with the end goal of establishing that no actual damage was done to
AFPSLAI. If we were to approve of the method employed by the trial court in convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning
the surprise and injustice that the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him precisely seeks to prevent. It would be plain denial of due process.

In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to convict petitioner for acts which purportedly constituted the third essential
element of the crime but which were entirely different from the acts alleged in the information because it violates in no uncertain
terms petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable act because it deprives the government of much needed funds in delivering basic services
to the people. However, the culpability of petitioner should have been established under the proper information and with an
opportunity for him to adequately prepare his defense. It is worth mentioning that the public prosecutor has been apprised of
petitioner’s defense in the counter-affidavit43 that he filed before the NBI. He claimed there that AFPSLAI really owed the
P21,000.00 finder’s fee not to Guilas but to Hernandez and that the finder’s fee was placed in the name of Guilas under a
purported financial arrangement between petitioner and Guilas. Yet in his Resolution44 dated September 14, 1992, the public
prosecutor disregarded petitioner’s defense and proceeded to file the information based on the alleged damage that petitioner
caused to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 representing unwarranted payment of finder’s fee.45 During the trial proper, the
prosecution was again alerted to the fact that AFPSLAI suffered no actual damage and that the substitution of the names in the
voucher was designed to aid Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the finder’s fee. This was shown by no less than the
prosecution’s own documentary evidence – the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178 in the amount of
P2,100,000.00 issued to Rosario Mercader which was prepared and identified by the prosecution witness, Judy Balangue. Later
on, the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Arevalo, Hernandez, Madet and petitioner, clearly set forth the reasons for the
substitution of the names in the disbursement voucher. However, the prosecution did not take steps to seek the dismissal of the
instant case and charge petitioner and his cohorts with the proper information before judgment by the trial court as expressly
allowed under Section 19,46 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.47 Instead, the prosecution proceeded to try petitioner under the
original information even though he had an adequate defense against the offense charged in the information. Regrettably, these
mistakes of the prosecution can only benefit petitioner.

In closing, it is an opportune time to remind public prosecutors of their important duty to carefully study the evidence on record
before filing the corresponding information in our courts of law and to be vigilant in identifying and rectifying errors made.
Mistakes in filing the proper information and in the ensuing prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the State’s interest in
enforcing its criminal laws and adversely affect the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2004 Decision and April 26, 2005 Resolution of the Court Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Bail
Bond is CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 82-100. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso.

2 Id. at 25-61. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.

3 Id. at 16-18.

4 Records, pp. 44-47.

5 Id. at 1-2.

6 Id. at 116.

7 Id. at 181.

8 Id. at 182.

9 Id. at 186.
10 Id. at 320.

11 Id. at 389-407. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.

12 Id. at 411-413.

13 Id. at 460-461.

14SEC. 24. Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or
upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The
proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.

15 Rollo, pp. 520-521.

16 People v. Yam-id, 368 Phil. 131, 137 (1999).

17Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prisión correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

xxxx

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

x x x x.

18Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.— The penalty of prisión
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no

such original exits, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official
book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses
enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this article, with respect to any record or document of such
character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.

19 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

20 Id. at 278-279.

21Citing People v. Francisco, C.A. No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G. 537, 541, cited in Luis B. Reyes,
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco, the Court of Appeals
ruled that "the cash disbursement vouchers here in question are not negotiable instruments nor are they defined
and regulated by the Code of Commerce. They are nothing more than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers
of the loans extended to them and as such are private documents only."
22Monteverde v. People, 435 Phil. 906, 921 (2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II
(14th ed., 1998), p. 236, citing People v. Lizares, C.A., 65 O.G. 7174.

23Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 235, citing People v. Co Beng, C.A.,
40 O.G. 1913.

24 U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596, 597 (1907).

25 Records, p. 186.

26 Id. at 320.

27 TSN, July 20, 1999, pp. 12-13, 16.

28 People v. Caiñgat, 426 Phil. 782, 792 (2002).

29 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14(2).

30
3 Phil. 223 (1904).

31 Id. at 226.

32 Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, 201 Phil. 311, 323 (1982).

33 Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 810 (2003).

34 U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368, 371 (1912).

35 People v. Pailano, G.R. No. 43602, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 649, 654.

36 41 Am Jur 2d § 259, pp. 863-864.

37 G.R. No. 140078, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 624.

38 G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 441, 454-456.

39 G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 656, 669-671.

40 Alonto v. People, supra at 640-641.

41 Supra note 34.

42 Id. at 804-810.

43 Records, pp. 19-20.

44 Id. at 3-7.

45The public prosecutor reasoned thus: "We cannot give credence to the protestation of witness for respondent[,]
Hernandez[,] that he was able to convince and solicit money from Mrs. Rosario Mercader. We may still believe
this if it were a transaction done singly or a couple of times, but the records show that this has become a plan, a
scheme through deceitful means to obtain money thus through the years caused a drain to AFPSLAI of its much
needed funding. Because of this, Central Bank of the AFPSLAI commenting adversely upon respondent’s
actuations in allowing the dissipation of the Association’s assets thus resulting in a few years of its total collapse.
Mrs. Mercader was not called upon to explain if she really was an investor. In cases where corroboration is
required, it must be done, otherwise the party will lose his cause where the testimony of a witness is contradicted
and the fact sought to be proved is important, corroboration is necessary x x x."

46SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense.— When it becomes manifest at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

47 See People v. Uba, 99 Phil. 134 (1956).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Today is Saturday, January 18, 2020

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 148682-85 November 30, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ANGEL A. ENFERMO, Appellant.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This case was certified to this Court, pursuant to Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, by the Court of Appeals after reviewing the case on appeal1 and affirming with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, which found appellant guilty of two counts of Malversation through Falsification of
Public Documents and two counts of Malversation.2

On October 25, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Metro Manila twelve
informations against appellant, Angel A. Enfermo, and Ferdinand C. Entienza, both former employees of the National Research
Council of the Philippines (NRCP).3 Several of the cases filed were dismissed for repeated failure of the prosecution to present
evidence.4 The motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied.5 The NRCP through the Government Corporate
Counsel filed a petition for certiorari6 with the Court of Appeals questioning the dismissal and the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, which petition was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated November 18, 1998.7 As a result of the
dismissal of those cases, the only ones that survived and were tried in the Regional Trial Court were Criminal Cases Nos.
111086 and 111087 for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and 111091 for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, in which only appellant, Angel A. Enfermo, was charged.

The prosecution, in support of its charges, presented evidence, as follows:

Alejandro Rodanilla, Administrative Officer of the NRCP, testified that appellant, Angel A. Enfermo, held the position of
Disbursing Officer II, Accounting Section, Finance and Administrative Division of the NRCP. His duties and responsibilities as a
disbursing officer are the following: "He assist[s] the cashier in the preparation and the release of the checks covering the
financial transaction of the NRCP. He also assist[s] the cashier in encashing the checks for salaries of the employees of NRCP."8

As testified to by Luz Acosta Aramil, Accountant III of NRCP, sometime in 1993, it was discovered that the debit and credit
records of the checks issued and paid by its depositary bank, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), did not balance. The bank
reconciliation showed overstatements of ₱80,000, ₱60,000 and ₱60,000 for the months of June, July and November,
respectively. An investigation disclosed that there were double issuances of checks, which were covered by only one
disbursement voucher each.

In Criminal Case No. 111086, the charge originated from the double issuance of checks intended for Aurora Dacanay, a
researcher who was doing a study on pine shoot moth and tip moth in the Benguet pine forest in the Cordillera. On February 26,
1993, the NRCP issued an LBP check with Check No. 0000163230-BB to Dacanay in the amount of ₱38,446.13.9 This check
was duly supported by Disbursement Voucher No. 93-02-95. The sum was the final release of an outright grant in connection
with an NRCP-assisted research project E-181, entitled "Population Dynamics of Pine Shoot Moth and Tip Moth in Benguet Pine
Forest in the Cordillera."10 The check was received and encashed by Dacanay in Baguio City.11 However, on May 19, 1993, a
second check with Check No. 0000026186-CC was issued to Aurora Dacanay for the same amount of ₱38,446.13 and
supported by the same voucher as the first check. This second check was encashed by appellant in the Parañaque branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines by supposedly forging the signature of the payee and signing his own name as an
acknowledgement of receipt of payment.12 Appellant received and misappropriated the proceeds of the check.

In Criminal Case No. 111087, again, the charge stemmed from a double issuance of a check intended for Jose M. Bernaldez, a
Mathematics professor based in Mindanao State University (MSU), Iligan City. Check No. 0000096515-CC in the amount of
₱30,000 was issued by the NRCP to Bernaldez, on August 13, 1993.13 The check was supported by Disbursement Voucher No.
93-5-591. The amount paid was for an outright grant in connection with the NRCP-assisted research project No. B-78, entitled
"On Regular Cyclically K-Complementary Graphs."14 The check was received and encashed by Bernaldez in Iligan City.15 Again,
as in the case of Aurora Dacanay, another check was issued in the name of Jose M. Bernaldez with Check No. 0000026624-CC,
which was not supported by a disbursement voucher.16 Like the case of Dacanay, appellant encashed the check at the
Parañaque branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines, by supposedly forging the signature of Bernaldez, and signing his own
name to acknowledge receipt of payment.17 Appellant received and misappropriated the proceeds of the check.

The resident auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the NRCP, Ma. Eugenia Rodil, testified to an audit report which she
prepared and submitted pursuant to the detection of the anomalous transactions at the NRCP. After her cash examination
revealed that there was a shortage, a fraud audit in the NRCP was performed. Rodil testified on the documentary evidence
gathered relating to the double issuance of checks to Dacanay and Bernaldez. In her investigation she discovered that the bank
statement did not tally with the Journal of Checks Issued, which was prepared by Accountant III Aramil and the Report of Checks
Issued (RCI), which was prepared by the cashier.18

With regard to Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and 111091, the prosecution presented Mary Christine Avanzado and Lanie P.
Manalo, employees of the NRCP, who both executed affidavits.19 Avanzado testified that when she was claiming her salary as
Clerk I for the period of January 1–15, 1994, she was informed by appellant that he had spent the money and would just pay her
back.20 In the case of Manalo, she did not receive her productivity incentive pay in the amount of ₱2,000. She then confronted
appellant regarding the amount, and the latter replied that he had used it to pay a debt.21 Both Avanzado and Manalo signed the
payroll upon the promise of appellant that he would return the money.22

Appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court on all four charges. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with modification, as follows:

Appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove that he falsified the signature of the payee in LBP [Checks] Nos.
0000026186 (Dacanay) and 0000026624 (Bernaldez) in Criminal Case[s] Nos. 111086 and 111087 as it did not present the
testimony of the NBI officer or handwriting expert who prepared the handwriting examination report. Moreover, argued the
appellant, if he really committed such forgery, then he should have at least imitated the signature of the payee; and since it was
his signature which appeared on the dorsal portion of the questioned checks, he could not have forged his own signature.
Appellant also pointed out that the prosecution presented mere photocopies of the questioned checks, the originals thereof were
not submitted in evidence. The trial court thus erred in convicting the accused in the absence of evidence that he
misappropriated the proceeds of the subject checks.

Such contentions are untenable.

The crime charged in Criminal Case[s] Nos. 111086 and 111087 is malversation committed by means of falsification of public
documents, the checks considered as public documents evidencing payment of obligation by the government out of public funds

The crime of malversation of public funds is defined and penalized as follows:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.—Presumption of malversation – Any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property….

...

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above penal provision are that:

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and

(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the
taking by another person of, such funds or property. (Rueda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129064, November 29, 2000.)

Anent the last element, our Supreme Court has ruled that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution
has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them
in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 125160, June 20, 2000, citing People v. Pepito, 267 SCRA 358,368, See also Felicilda v. Grospe, 211 SCRA 285.) An
accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only
evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. (Navallo v.
Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 185; Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan, 200 SCRA 722, 734.) Such conversion of public funds must
be affirmatively proved, whether by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows.
(Bugayong v. People, 202 SCRA 762.)

In the case at bar, We find that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved all the elements of the crime of malversation under Art.
217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant did not give any explanation as to the shortage in the funds which have been traced to the double issuance of checks,
the responsibility for which fell on the cashier (Entienza) and the disbursing officer (appellant). His defense consisted of a mere
denial that the signature appearing on the dorsal portion of the questioned checks was not his. In his testimony, however,
appellant did not categorically deny that said signature was his but that he could not remember whether it was his signature
because it was a long time ago. As to the authenticity of his signature appearing on said checks, upon the request of the NRCP,
the NBI conducted a handwriting examination of appellant’s signature appearing on the questioned checks together with
specimen signatures of appellant taken from daily time records, and submitted a report thereon confirming that indeed, the same
were written by (1) one and the same person. While it is true that the prosecution did not present the testimony of the NBI officer
or handwriting expert who conducted said examination, the signature of appellant appearing on the questioned checks was
sufficiently established by the testimony of Luz Aramil who has sufficient familiarity with appellant’s signature, having worked with
appellant who was under her supervision and had seen documents signed by him. Such opinion of a non-expert on handwriting
is authorized under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to prove genuineness of a handwriting. A person is deemed to be
acquainted with the handwriting of another where it is shown that, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be
written by that person have frequently come into his possession or under his scrutiny or have been habitually submitted to him.
(Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 ed., p. 279, citing 3 Jones, p. 311.) In Court Administrator v. Villanueva (223
SCRA 41), our Supreme Court has ruled that resort to handwriting experts, while probably useful, is not mandatory nor
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. This is so since under Sec. 22, Rule 132, the handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert who conducted
the examination and submitted the report questioned by the appellant, is not indispensable in proving the authenticity of
appellant’s signature on the questioned checks.

Appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to indubitably establish that it was he who actually falsified the signature of
Aurora Dacanay and Jose M. Bernaldez and referred to the testimony of Aramil on cross-examination where the latter could not
definitely point to him as the one who signed the name of said payees on the checks. Aramil’s testimony, however, only
emphasized the point that such act of falsification committed by appellant can be conclusively presumed from the undisputed fact
that he was the one who encashed the checks and received the proceeds thereof as evidenced by his signature acknowledging
receipt of payment of said checks. It has been held that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. (Maliwat v. CA, 256
SCRA 718.) Since it is obvious that the purported signatures of the payees in the questioned checks were not genuine
signatures on the basis of visual comparison alone, it goes without saying that the person who encashed the same and
received payment thereof is presumed to be the forger of said signatures. Taken together with the circumstances that
as disbursing officer, appellant was the one in charge of preparation, encashment and delivery of checks issued by the
NRCP, the conclusion is inevitable that no other person other than appellant could have falsified the payees’ signature,
encashed the questioned checks and misappropriated the proceeds thereof. Being a public officer who had taken
advantage of his official posisiton and falsified the signature of the payees of the questioned checks, appellant has
committed falsification of public document defined and penalized under Art. 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The totality of evidence indeed points to the appellant as the one responsible for the encashment of the questioned checks found
to be irregularly issued. His objection as to the documentary exhibits being mere photocopies is of no significance since during
the hearings below, appellant’s counsel, upon request by the prosecution, had admitted that these are faithful reproduction[s] of
the originals thereof, which original copies, however, have not been submitted to the trial court as they were being kept in
custody by the Commission on Audit which had conducted its own investigation on the matter. Besides, no such objection was
raised by appellant in his "Comments/Objections to Prosecution[’]s Formal Offer of Evidence."

Coming now to the charges against the appellant in Criminal Case[s] Nos. 111089 and 111091, the respective information reads
–

Criminal Case No. 111089

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman accuses Angel A. Enfermo of the Crime
of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Article
171 paragraph 1 and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

That on or about January 15, 1994, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused Angel A. Enfermo a public officer being
then a Disbursing Officer of National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP), Taguig, Metro Manila, taking advantage of his
official position, did

then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify NRCP Salary Payroll for the period January 1 to 15, 1994 by forging the
signature of Marie Christine T. Avanzado, NRCP Accounting Clerk; and thereafter, with grave abuse of confidence, embezzle,
misappropriate and convert to his personal use and benefit the salary in the amount of ₱978.24 pertaining to Ms. Avanzado, to
the damage and prejudice of public interest and Marie Christine T. Avanzado.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 111091

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman accuses Angel A. Enfermo of the Crime
of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Article
171 and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

That on or about January 17, 1994, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused Angel A. Enfermo a public officer being
then a Disbursing Officer of National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP), Taguig, Metro Manila, taking advantage of his
official position, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Productivity Incentive Payroll of NRCP for the year
1993 by forging the signature of Lanie P. Manalo, an employee of the NRCP; and thereafter, with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate and convert to his personal use and benefit the said Productivity Incentive of Ms. Manalo in the amount of
₱2,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of Lanie Manalo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

As shown above, the prosecuting officer designated the offense as Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document under Art.
315 paragraph 1(b) in relation to Art. 171, paragraph 1 and Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After evaluating the evidence
adduced during the trial however, the lower court convicted the appellant of the crime of malversation defined and penalized
under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, stating that there was no falsification of public document involved as the appellant did
not falsify the signatures of Avanzado and Manalo in the payroll since

the latter two (2) themselves signed the same after appellant promised to return the money. The lower court reasoned that said
funds remain as public funds prior to their release to and receipt by the personnel entitled thereto, and hence by admitting that he
had used the money representing the salary and productivity incentive bonus, respectively, of Avanzado and Manalo for his own
benefit, appellant clearly committed an act of malversation in both cases.

Appellant, on the other hand, argued that he could not be convicted of the crime charged in Criminal Case Nos. 111089 and
111091 since both Avanzado and Manalo testified that their signatures in the payroll were not falsified by the appellant. Their
signature on the payroll thus constitutes undeniable proof that there was transfer of ownership of said money from the
government to the said employees. Such money thereby became subject to the control of the said employees and it is perfectly
within their rights to lend it and allow somebody to use their money. In fact, appellant averred, it is a recognized practice among
government employees and even in the private sector to just sign the payroll without actually receiving their money because
others have borrowed it. No money or property was taken from the government and hence no element of damage to the
government was present.

Appellant’s arguments are without merit.

First, We shall pass upon the matter of the crime charged in the information and subsequent conviction of the appellant for a
crime other than that designated by the prosecuting officer in said information.

Although the caption or preamble of the information(s) charged the accused-appellant with estafa through falsification of public
document, the crime committed was malversation. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the
description thereof as alleged in the information. (Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 492, citing early cases People v.
Maravilla,165 SCRA 392; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773; People v. Sandoval, 254 SCRA 436, 452; People v.
Aczon, 225 SCRA 237.) The technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information does not determine the
character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information. (People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168, 175, citing Socrates v.
Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773, citing Reyes v. Camillon, et al., 192 SCRA 445.) The real nature of the criminal charge cannot
be determined from the caption or preamble of the information or from the mere reference to a particular provision of law alleged
to have been violated because they are conclusions of law. On the contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. (Ibid.; See also Pecho v. People, 262 SCRA 518, 528, citing Matilde v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456.) Thus,
an incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. (Ibid., citing U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273.) For the rule is settled that it is ultimately the
court which determines the nomenclature of the crime after the trial and following its own ascertainment of the facts needed to
constitute the elements of the crime attributed to the accused. (Cinco v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 726, 733, citing People v.
Eleuterio, 173 SCRA 243, 251.)

As described in the information, the offense imputed to appellant Enfermo contains all the essential elements of malversation, to
wit: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(3) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (4) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such
funds or property. So that even if appellant is correct in saying, and which was also the ruling of the trial court, that he had not
committed falsification of public document since he did not falsify the signature of Avanzado and Manalo in the payroll, still he
cannot escape criminal liability for the act of malversation committed by him in taking, appropriating or misappropriating the
payroll money intended for Avanzado and Manalo, for his own personal use and benefit. Contrary to appellant’s theory, such
funds remain as public funds prior to their release to and receipt by said Avanzado and Manalo, the persons entitled to receive
the same. His asseveration that it is a recognized practice among government employees and even in the private sector for
employees to just sign the payroll without actually receiving the money because others have borrowed it, has no basis and does
not justify his highly improper act. Besides, in no way can it be considered that appellant had "borrowed" the questioned funds
intended for Avanzado and Manalo when he had not first sought the permission of the two (2) before taking the money and using
it for his personal benefit, as said employees even had to confront him for their non-receipt of said payroll money. And even
granting that he had priorly (sic) secured permission from said employees, it will not change the character of the payroll funds as
public funds for as long as these have not yet been received by or released to the said employees.

Clearly then, upon the foregoing facts and circumstances, the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime of malversation in
Criminal Case Nos. 111089 and 111091 has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court, We believe that the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum to reclusion perpetua maximum in Criminal Case Nos. 111086
and 111087. Art. 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. In the light of Article 48 which provides that the penalty for a complex crime is the penalty for the
most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period, the proper penalty in this case is therefore reclusion perpetua,
which remains as an indivisible penalty having no minimum, medium and maximum periods. (People v. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360,
382, citing the Supreme Court’s Resolution of January 9, 1995 clarifying its decision in People v. Lucas, 310 Phil 77.)
Consequently, the Indeterminate Sentence Law ( Act No. 4103, as amended) does not apply in this case in view of Section 2
thereof. On the other hand, the penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 111089 and 111091 should also be modified from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years and four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, to an indeterminate penalty of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each in accordance with Article 217 paragraph 2, the amount involved (₱978.24 and
₱2,000.00) being more than ₱200.00 but does not exceed ₱6,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision in Criminal Case
Nos. 111086, 111087, 111089, and 111091 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 111086, accused Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory penalties and to indemnify the National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP) the
amount of ₱38,446.13;

2) In Criminal Case No. 111087, accused Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
together with the accessory penalties and to indemnify the National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP) the amount of

₱30,000.00;

3) In Criminal Case No. 111089, accused Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, together with its accessory penalties and to indemnify Christine Avanzado the amount of
P978.24; and

4) In Criminal Case No. 111091, accused Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum together with its accessory penalties and to indemnify Lanie P. Manalo the amount of ₱2,000.00.23

As mentioned above, the case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. In a Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, appellant raised the following Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CRIMINAL
CASE[S] NOS. 111086 AND 111087 AND IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.24

Appellant also adopted the arguments presented in Appellant’s Brief25 and the Supplemental Appellant’s Brief26 filed before the
Court of Appeals. The errors assigned in these briefs are as follows:

Appellant’s Brief
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION BUT DISREGARDED BASIC
FACTS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIT THE APPELLANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT
HE MISAPPROPRIATED THE PROCEEDS OF THE CHECKS.

Supplemental Appellant’s Brief

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
111086 AND 111087 HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 111089.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 111091.

IV

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION [TEMPORAL MINIMUM TO RECLUSION]
PERPETUA MAXIMUM IN CRIMINAL CASES NUMBERS 111086 AND 111087 ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO NINE (9) YEARS
AND FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR IN CRIMINAL CASES NUMBERS 111089 AND 111091 ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

For clarity, the issues as culled from the arguments of appellant in the briefs filed before this Court and the Court of Appeals may
be restated thus:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087, whether the checks were actually in the possession of appellant.

2. In criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether it was proven that the signatureS on the two checks Were those OF
APPELLANT.

3. In criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether appellant falsified the signatures of dacanay and bernaldez.

4. in criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether photocopies of the checks are admissible as evidence.

5. In criminal cases nos. 111089 and 111091, whether the funds taken by appellant were public funds.

6. In Criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
temporal minimum to reclusion perpetua maximum.

7. in criminal cases nos. 111089 and 111091, whether the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day to nine (9) years and four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.

The first, second, and third issues will be discussed together. Although it is true that the prosecution did not present any direct
evidence that appellant effected the falsification, such is a disputable presumption arising from the facts of the case. In Maliwat v.
CA, cited by the Court of Appeals, this Court said –

The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is
the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. (Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116 citing Alarcon v. CA, 125 Phil. 1110
[1967], People v. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil 906 [1935]; People v. Lotegro, 50 O.G. No. 2632; People v. Dala, 50 O.G. 612675; People
v. Manansala, L-13142, 30 June 1959; People v. Caragao, 30 SCRA 993; Caubong v. People, 210 SCRA 377).

If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. de Lara,
45 Phil. 754 ; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, cited in People v.
Sandaydiego, 81 SCRA 120 [1978].).27
By mere comparison with the signatures of Dacanay and Bernaldez in the checks that they had actually signed, Check No.
00000163230-BB28 and Check No. 0000096515-CC29, it was proven that the signatures in the other two checks, Check No.
0000026186-CC30 and Check No. 0000026624-CC31, were falsified. Furthermore, it is indisputable that said checks were in the
possession of appellant, as proven by the fact that he was the Disbursing Officer; and that possession of such checks was within
his functions. Also, the fact that his signatures appeared at the back of the checks further proves that he was in possession of
them, that he was the one who presented them for payment, and that he received their proceeds and therefore used and profited
by such checks. Since he could not adequately explain the foregoing facts, the presumption defined in Maliwat v. CA applies. He
is therefore presumed to be the forger of the signatures of Dacanay and Bernaldez.

Appellant’s contention that the NBI report on the signature of appellant is not admissible since the officer who prepared the report
was not presented to testify on the report’s authenticity or contents need not be resolved because the authenticity of appellant’s
signature on the two checks does not depend upon it since such was proven by the testimony of Luz Aramil, who was familiar
with the signature of appellant.32

As to the fourth issue, regarding the admissibility of the photocopies of the checks in Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087,
this Court finds that they are admissible because appellant did not raise this question in his Comments/Objections to
Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence.33 Appellant is therefore deemed to have accepted the photocopies as admissible.

With regard to the fifth issue, the funds taken by appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and 111091 are public in nature. He
claims that Avanzado and Manalo signed their names, which signified that they had already received the money and therefore
the money had already become private in character. From the testimony of Avanzado and Manalo, it is plain that appellant took
the money prior to their signing the payrolls. In Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, a case penned by Justice
Malcolm, this Court held:

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due
government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the
State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to
subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that money
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the
latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.

The United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of Buchanan vs. Alexander ([1846], 4 How., 19), in speaking of the right of
creditors of seamen, by process of attachment, to divert the public money from its legitimate and appropriate object, said:

"To state such a principle is to refute it. No government can sanction it. At all times it would be found embarrassing, and under
some circumstances it might be fatal to the public service. . . . So long as money remains in the hands of a disbursing
officer, it is as much the money of the United States, as if it had not been drawn from the treasury. Until paid over by the
agent of the government to the person entitled to it, the fund cannot, in any legal sense, be considered a part of his effects."
(See, further, 12 R. C. L., p. 841; Keene vs. Smith [1904], 44 Ore., 525; Wild vs. Ferguson [1871], 23 La. Ann., 752; Bank of
Tennessee vs. Dibrell [1855], 3 Sneed [Tenn.], 379.)34

Hence, the money was public in nature since it had not yet been received by Avanzado and Manalo when appellant took it.

As to the sixth issue, the penalty imposed by the RTC is wrong. Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua when the amount malversed is greater than ₱22,000.
Since appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period,
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In this case the penalty imposed should be reclusion perpetua. Since the
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to indivisible penalties,35 and reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty,36 the
Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be applied to the penalty in Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087.

For the seventh and last issue, Article 217, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code37 applies to the penalties in Criminal Cases
Nos. 111089 and 111091 since the amounts malversed were ₱978.24 and ₱2,000. Since there are no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the medium range of the penalty prescribed in Article 217, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (the penalty
prescribed is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods) is where the maximum of the indeterminate sentence can be
placed. The minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code.38 No error was
committed on this point. The court a quo placed the minimum and maximum of the indeterminate sentence well within the ranges
prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23001 is AFFIRMED in toto, as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No 111086, appellant Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP) in the
amount of ₱38,446.13;

2) In Criminal Case No. 111087, appellant Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
together with the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP) in the amount
of ₱30,000;
3) In Criminal Case No. 111089, appellant Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, together with its accessory penalties and to indemnify Christine Avanzado in the amount of
₱978.24; and

4) In Criminal Case No. 111091, accused Angel A. Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, together with its accessory penalties, and to indemnify Lanie P. Manalo in the amount of ₱2,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1CA-G.R. CR No. 23001, decided by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño.

2 Criminal Cases Nos. 111086, 111087, 111089 and 111091.

3 Records, pp. 1 – 37.

4 Records, p. 180.

5 Records, p. 233.

6 CA-G.R. SP 47923, Records, pp. 250-263.

7 Records, pp. 316-318.

8 TSN, August 20, 1997, pp. 2-4.

9 Exhibit "D-2-a,"Folder of Exhibits, p. 34.

10 Exhibits "D-2-e," "D-2-g," "D-2-h" and "D-2-I," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 36- 39.
11 Exhibit "D-2-b," Folder of Exhibits, p. 34.

12 Exhibits "A," "A-1" and "A-2," Folder of Exhibits , pp. 12 -13.

13 Exhibit "C" ("D-1-c"), Folder of Exhibits, p. 16 (19).

14 Exhibits "D-1-g," "D-1-h," "D-1-i" and "D-1-l," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 22-24 and 27.

15 Exhibit "D-1-d," Folder for Exhibits, p. 19.

16 Exhibit "B" ("D-1-a"), Folder of Exhibits, p. 14 (18).

17 Exhibit "B-1" ("D-1-b"), Folder of Exhibits, p. 15 (18).

18 TSNs, September 17, 1997, pp. 2-15; November 10, 1997, pp. 4-5.

19 Exhibits "A" and "B," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 50-51.

20
TSN, August 13, 1997, pp. 19 and 22.

21 Id. at 25-26.

22 Id. at 28-29.

23 CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 36-42. Emphasis supplied.

24 Rollo, p. 13.

25 CA Rollo, pp. 50-67.

26 CA Rollo, pp. 101-113.

27 G.R. Nos. 107041-42, 326 Phil. 732, 749-750 (1996).

28 Exhibits "A," "A-1" and "A-2," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 12-13.

29 Exhibit "D-1-c," Folder of Exhibits, p. 19.

30 Exhibits "A," "A-1" and "A-2," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 12-13.

31 Exhibits "D-1-a" and "D-1-b," Folder of Exhibits, p. 18.

32 ATTY. IBAY

Q- And you mentioned Mr. Enfermo signed the checks. Why do you know the signature of Mr. Enfermo? Are you
familiar with the signature of Mr. Enfermo?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Why are you familiar with the signature of Mr. Enfermo?

A- Because he was our disbursing officer, [S}ir. (Witness Luz Aramil, TSN, August 13, 1997, p. 12.)

33 Records, pp. 238-243.

34 43 Phil. 384, 386-387 (1922); emphasis supplied.

35 People v. Roque, G.R. No. 53470, 192 Phil. 398 (1981).

36 People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, 354 Phil. 372 (1998)

37 Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. --

…
 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than 200
pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

38Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1 (Act No 4103). In this case, prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, or from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, is the range where the minimum penalty can
be placed.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A.
No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9
May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on
a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato
through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany
trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting
that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request
to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before
proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask
for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he
could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the
visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to
the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the
Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by
writing the name "Oscar Perez."4

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same
office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was
actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court
filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry
was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of
his conviction.

The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He
was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of
P4,000.00 plus costs.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate
term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.

Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A.
No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according
to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never
been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar
Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085
has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name
in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was
charged under the wrong law.5

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should
be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.7

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the
surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related
statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085,
is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one
with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name
and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be
had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the
use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such
authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register . . . .

The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now
reads:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local
civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was
registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized
by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
 register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name
and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure
such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and
the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any
name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business
Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in
its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931
and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt
for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or
printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his
business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where
his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business
name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in
the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or
common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . .

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained
against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized
the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil
register.9

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of
an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real
name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of
the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner
admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which
he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain
difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two
names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and
sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a
petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of
his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further
using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in
ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after
he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he
can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young."

All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper
and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules
of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any
sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the
messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while
merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no
question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by
petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had
identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a
matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence
open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of
C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as
C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this
principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 24-37.

2 Id., p. 26.

3 Records, p. 7.

4 Rollo, p. 26.

5 Id., p. 12.

6 People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 542.

7 Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No. L-14129,
31 July 1962, 5 SCRA 684.

8 Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1008-1009.

9 Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954 Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, Guillermo B.,
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., p. 359.

10 106 Phil. 762 (1959).

11 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing Co., p. 139.

12 See Note 6.

13 People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957).

14 See Note 6.

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Today is Saturday, January 18, 2020

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162187 November 18, 2005

CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER VON SPRENGEISEN, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999
dismissing the petition for certiorari assailing the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable cause exists against private
respondent Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen for perjury.

The Antecedents

On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Special Committee on Anti-
Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory bricks
from Germany.2 The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I-98.

The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there
was a prima facie case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS
submitted its report to the Tariff Commission, declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued importation of
refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal
value of the imported goods.3

The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However, before it could respond, the chairman of the Tariff
Commission prodded the parties to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice President and
Assistant General Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and General Manager
Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other. During the conference, the parties agreed
that the refractory bricks were imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200, and that such importation
was likely to injure the local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses and protracted litigation. HTC
was required to reform its price policy/structure of its importation and sale of refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the
provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a compromise
agreement containing the terms agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia signed.4 Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP,
delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of Ramon Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by Von
Sprengeisen’s approval.5
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by inserting the phrase "based on the
findings of the BIS" in paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had the same delivered to the
office of HTC on April 22, 1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement and
delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales returned, with the agreement already signed by Von
Sprengeisen.6 Gonzales, who had also signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary Public Zenaida P. De Zuñiga
notarized the agreement.7 Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized Agreement to HTC.8

RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997 hearing before the Commission for
the approval of the agreement, a representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement. The Commission
submitted its report to the Special Committee which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, the
normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC received a copy of the decision on March 4,
1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.

In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and noted that the normal value of the said importation
under the decision of the Special Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC
filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such
decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:

1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF
THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT AGREED UPON WAS DELIBERATELY AND
SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.9

The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein that Villanueva violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code when he surreptitiously inserted the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in the agreement without the knowledge and
consent of Von Sprengeisen and despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS. Appended to the motion was
an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in which he alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came
out with its Report declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before
HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the best solution to the
pending case before the Commission; he and Gonzales attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a
compromise, that the parties will accept the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based
refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the draft of the compromise agreement prepared by Villanueva, he approved
the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a compromise agreement already signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his
review, approval and signature; believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the contents of the first compromise
agreement, he signed the second agreement without reading it; when he received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of
the Tariff Commission based on the compromise agreement of the parties wherein the committee adopted the findings and
recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value of the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric ton), he was shocked because he
never agreed to the use of such findings for the reformation of its price policies; there was, in fact, an agreement between him
and Villanueva to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him despite
several attempts; suspecting that something amiss happened, he had the draft of the first compromise agreement retrieved but
his secretary failed to locate the same; it was only sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file containing the draft and
was appalled to discover that Villanueva had substantially altered the first draft of the compromise agreement; this made him
conclude and confirm his suspicion that Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud, induced him to sign the compromise agreement to the
prejudice of the HTC.10

The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and Assistant General
Manager of RCP, filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Appended thereto was a complaint-affidavit executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von Sprengeisen made
the following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:

a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office, inviting him to a meeting for the purpose of finding the best and most
equitable solution to the case (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind them the findings and recommendations of the Bureau of Import Services
(BIS) with respect to the anti-dumping protest filed by RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

d. The phrase "based on the findings of the Bureau of Import Services" was inserted in paragraph 1 of the final Compromise
Agreement without his knowledge and consent (p. 3, Urgent Motion); and

e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously inserted the aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion).11

Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the following false statements in his Affidavit of Merit:

a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the best solution to the case;
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them] the findings and recommendation of the BIS submitted to the Secretary of
Finance;

c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany;

d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely a draft; and

e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced [respondent] to sign the final Compromise Agreement.12

In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called the other for a conference was not a material matter.
Since the first draft of the Compromise Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the complainant to send to him the
hard copy of the Agreement for his signature. He further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the compromise
agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed that it contained the same provisions in the faxed copy. He did not
suggest that the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" be inserted in the hard copy of the agreement because he and
Villanueva were at odds on the BIS finding the normal price of the goods was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it would
have been senseless of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make any willful and deliberate assertion of any
falsehood as to any material fact.13

Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no probable cause for perjury against the private respondent and
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed the resolution of
Prosecutor Supnet and found probable cause for perjury against the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit
that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and deceit. According to the Second Assistant City
Prosecutor, the allegation of the private respondent "thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise Agreement" was a
deliberate assertion of a falsehood, designed as it was merely to give the BIS the impression that private respondent was misled
into agreeing to the compromise agreement. She further opined that the allegation was perjurious, considering that the private
respondent had sufficient time to pass upon the Compromise Agreement and could have availed the services of legal minds who
could review the terms and conditions thereof before signing the same;14 hence, she recommended the reversal of Prosecutor
Supnet’s resolution and the filing of the information. The City Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the Second Assistant
City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an Information for perjury was filed against the private respondent with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila.

The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor on
September 20, 2002. According to the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish the materiality of the alleged false
assertions and that the said assertions were willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are not
altogether false since the intention of the parties in executing the compromise agreement was precisely to put behind the ruling of
the BIS, despite which the complainant inserted the condition that the parties would be bound by such findings and
recommendations.15 The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila is hereby REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is directed to
withdraw the information for perjury against respondent Horst-Kessler von Sprengeisen and to report the action taken within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.16

Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the resolution of the Justice Secretary, alleging therein that
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the said resolution.17 The private
respondent, for his part, sought the dismissal of the petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary, there was no
probable cause against him for perjury.18

On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Justice Secretary.19

The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment on the petition, the parties had agreed to
put behind them the findings and recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti-dumping protest. The appellate court
stated that its finding is buttressed by the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise agreement
and that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself "to reform
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being imported to and sold in the Philippines in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its implementing rules and requirements." The CA emphasized that it was inclined to believe
that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties when the petitioner inserted the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in
the revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not have been perjury when the private respondent executed the Affidavit
of Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment. The CA also agreed with the findings of the Secretary of
Justice that the insertion of the condition in the compromise agreement that the parties would be bound by the BIS findings and
recommendation gave the private respondent reason to believe that he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the
Agreement; as such, the private respondent’s allegation in his Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to signing the Compromise
Agreement through fraud and deceit, was not altogether false. Consequently, the CA ruled, the private respondent did not make
any willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.20 The appellate court conformed to the disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice
in the assailed resolution and concluded that the private respondent did not, in the Affidavit of Merit, make a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.21
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court against private respondent Von Sprengeisen and
the Secretary of Justice, insisting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed resolution.

The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary investigation, he adduced substantial evidence to prove probable cause for
perjury against the private respondent. He maintains that probable cause does not mean actual and positive causes; nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers that, contrary to the claim of the private respondent in his
Affidavit of Merit, the meeting between him and Jesus Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private respondent and HTC Sales
Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other, was arranged by the latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft and final copies of
the compromise agreement, the parties made express reference to the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export price
of HTC was below the fair market value. By agreeing that such findings of the BIS be included in the Compromise Agreement,
the said private respondent impliedly agreed to such findings as basis of the price for which HTC would sell the German-made
magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. The petitioner avers that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton
was not specifically mentioned in the compromise agreement was of no importance, considering the parties’ acceptance of such
findings is based on R.A. No. 7843. He points out that the private respondent could not have failed to notice the difference
between the first draft and the final copy of the agreement before signing it because, as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply
affidavit, it took the private respondent twenty minutes or so after receiving the agreement to review the final draft before signing
it. Moreover, the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment signed by the private respondent was filed more than 15
months from the execution of the compromise agreement and after four months from the Tariff Commission’s approval thereof.

The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the interregnum of 19 months, the private respondent failed to discover the
revisions/insertions in the final draft of the compromise agreement. Considering the premises, the petitioner submits, the private
respondent’s filing of the Urgent Motion for and in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to escape
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.

The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested phrase in the final draft of the compromise agreement was
necessary although it may not be in the best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods made by the private respondent in his
Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit were material to the proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission
because these were used to set aside the compromise agreement executed by the parties.

In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, hence, improper
in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of the existence of a probable cause is primarily an
administrative sanction of the Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice Secretary should be accorded great
respect, especially since the same were upheld by the CA. He asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this
Court that the Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in her
resolution.

The petition has no merit.

The pivotal issue in this case is factual – whether or not, based on the records, there was probable cause for the private
respondent’s indictment for perjury.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of
facts of a quasi-judicial agency, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless cogent facts and
circumstances of such a nature warranting the modification or reversal of the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in exceptional cases. The petitioner has failed to
establish that any such circumstance is present in the case at bar.22

The Court finds that the public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution, and that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision and
resolution. If at all the public respondent erred in issuing the assailed resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court especially so where, as in this case, the issues
before the CA were factual and not legal. The absence or existence of probable cause in a given case involves a calibration and
a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the parties before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative
weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the petition before it.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause;" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge."23

The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation
upon complaint of an offended party.24 The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the absence or existence of a
probable cause affirmed by the CA is accorded high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established.25

Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and
not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this
and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is
consummated when the false statement is made.26

The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that one consideration of policy overshadows all others – the
measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from lodging complaints or
testifying.27 As quoted by Dean Wigmore, a leading 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law, "throws every fence
round a person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting witnesses from oppression or annoyance, by charges, or
threats of charges, of having made false testimony is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts."28

Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material
matter.29 The elements of the felony are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.30

A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful.31 Perjury being
a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused.32 Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice,
with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of
what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts.33 It
must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.34

Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not
perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense.35 A false statement which is obviously the result of an
honest mistake is not perjury.

There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it
must be proven that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true.36

Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his admissions or by
circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a
motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he
claimed not to know.37

A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution
must prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the
contradicting statement.38 The rationale of this principle is thus:

… Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity
of testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not
appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply
neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be
furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused.39

The term "material matter" is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact
or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately
affects the credence of any witness who testified. In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency to
influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one way or the other. The effects of the statement are weighed in terms
of potentiality rather than probability.40 The prosecution need not prove that the false testimony actually influenced the
Commission.41
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the HTC and his affidavit, that it was the petitioner who invited
him to a
conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales who did so. Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a conference is
of de minimis importance because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after having been prodded by the Chairman of the
Commission to settle the case instead of going through the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation. No adverse
inference (related to the merits of their respective contention in this case) can be ascribed as to whoever called the conference.
After all, parties are even urged to settle cases amicably.

Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her resolution:

The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent to the meeting may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent may not
have known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able to talk to complainant, he presumed that it was complainant who
extended the invitation. Moreover, the identity of the one who initiated the meeting is not material considering that there was a
meeting of the minds of the Parties.42

The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that the copy of the first agreement transmitted to him was a
fax copy of the draft, and that, contrary to the allegations of the private respondent, such agreement was prepared by Borgonia
and not by the petitioner. As gleaned from page two of the agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates of the
petitioner and the private respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot as yet be notarized. As claimed by the private
respondent, a copy was transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he found it to be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia
would prepare and sign the agreement and give it back to him for review and signature, with the particulars of his community tax
certificate indicated in the final copy.

Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to prepare the compromise agreement subsequently signed by
the petitioner and the private respondent was of prime importance because only such person should be charged for perjury. The
private respondent erroneously stated in his Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who prepared the
agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was Borgonia who prepared the first and the second copies.
However, the private respondent cannot be held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who prepared the agreement and not the
petitioner. The Court agrees with the following contention of the private respondent in his counter-affidavit:

4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr. Borgonia who made the insertions, there is no doubt that, indeed, the
insertions were made into the document. Since complainant is the signatory to the Compromise Agreement, it is but natural for
one to presume that he had made the insertions. At the same time, I can not be expected to know that it was Mr. Borgonia, as
claimed by complainant, who made such insertions.43

Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management Information Group of RCP, whereas the petitioner was no less
than its Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Borgonia’s superior. Unless and until approved by the petitioner,
any agreement prepared by Borgonia was merely a piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the compromise
agreement prepared by Borgonia had the petitioner’s
imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the agreement. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner had the
compromise agreement prepared under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be concluded that the private respondent
made a deliberate falsehood when he alleged that the agreement was prepared by the petitioner.

The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim that, during the conference, he and the private respondent agreed that,
based on the BIS report, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks per metric ton was DM 1,200, and that such report
would be used as basis for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.

It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the private respondent had agreed on three aspects of the case:
(1) based on the prima facie findings of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per meter ton was DM 1,200 and that the actual
export price of HTC was below the fair market value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise its price policy
and structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A. No. 7843 and rules and regulations implementing the law; and (3)
if HTC fails or refuses to comply with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of execution without need of demand.
However, the petitioner and the private respondent could not have agreed on such base price; the petitioner insisted on the
amount recommended by the BIS (DM 1,200) while the private respondent insisted on DM 950. There was an impasse. By way
of a compromise, the parties agreed to do away with the BIS recommended base
value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation per metric ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued
implementing the law. This is gleaned from the affidavit of Borgonia:

13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that the value of DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price at which Hamburg
Trading would sell German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr. Villanueva did not agree to the
suggested value, as we considered it low. In the end, both parties decided to base the determination of the price on the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations. …44

Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated therein the agreement of the petitioner and the private
respondent arrived at during the conference, thus:
1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession in order to end litigation, the SECOND PARTY undertakes and
commits to reform its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being imported interest sold in the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations.45

If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he and the private respondent had agreed that HTC will use as basis for
its price policy and structural revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia would have incorporated the said agreement in the first
compromise agreement. He did not, and Borgonia has not offered any explanation for such failure. The petitioner signed the draft
of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It was only in the second compromise agreement that was later signed by the
petitioner and the private respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS." Borgonia and the petitioner made the insertion on their own, without the a priori consent of the
private respondent.

The Court is not convinced by the petitioner’s contention (and that of Borgonia in his Affidavit) that the petitioner and the private
respondent had agreed to leave the final determination of the base value or price of importation per metric ton to a third party
(BIS). The private respondent could not have agreed to the use of the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had strenuously
objected to its use as basis for the revision of its price policy and structure. For HTC to admit that the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per
metric ton was the normal value of the refractory bricks from Germany for the purpose of resolving the anti-dumping case is one
thing; but for HTC to agree to be bound by the BIS recommendation for the purpose of revising its price policy and structure is
completely a different matter.

With the petitioner and the private respondent’s admission of the prima facie findings of the BIS, the Commission can prepare its
recommendation to the Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the HTC importation subject of the case. Thereafter:

D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the report of the Commission, decide whether the article
in question is being imported in violation of this section and shall give due notice of such decision. In case the decision of
dumping is in the affirmative, the special committee shall direct the Commissioner of Customs to cause the dumping duty, to be
levied, collected and paid, as prescribed in this section, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on
such article, and on the articles of the same specific kind or class subsequently imported under similar circumstances coming
from the specific country.

In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within the period prescribed herein, the recommendation of the
Commission shall be deemed approved and shall be final and executory.46

On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy and structure of HTC, the parties had agreed to accomplish the
same in due time. It goes without saying that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to the price policy and structure
revision of HTC.

The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not to be bound by the base value in the BIS report for the revision of
its price policy and structure is not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are only prima facie, meaning to say, not
conclusive, and HTC was accorded a chance to base its price policy and structure on evidence and informations other than those
contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to time, hence, the
need for any importer to revise its price policy and structure from time to time; and (3) the base value to be used by HTC in
revising its price policy would be scrutinized and resolved initially by the Commission, by the Special Committee and by the Court
of Tax Appeals on appeal.

The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent was not only practical and fair, but in accord with law as
well.

In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared that
he and the
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations implementing the same
to determine the base price for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.

Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending phrase before and after signing the agreement and for a considerable
stretch period until HTC filed its motion. However, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that such failure of the
respondent to object to the offending phrase for such period of time amounted to an admission that, indeed, the private
respondent was aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and to his agreement thereto; and estopped the private
respondent from alleging that he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Compromise Agreement. In his appeal to the
DOJ, the private respondent declared that:

3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss and lacking in circumspect in failing to review the hard copy Compromise
Agreement and notice the insertion. Being in the trading business, respondent-appellant personally handles hundreds of
documents daily and is on the telephone for most of the day communicating with suppliers and customers. And he had no reason
to believe that either complainant-appellee or Mr. Borgonia would make such an insertion, especially after respondent-appellant
had accepted the fax Compromise Agreement wording and conveyed such acceptance to complainant-appellee’s office.
Respondent-appellant also had to reason to even think that such a surreptitious insertion would be made; after all, he had a very
warm and friendly meeting with complainant-appellee and Mr. Borgonia and came out of it with a feeling that he could trust
complainant-appellee (p. 4, Annex "C").
3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he was induced to sign the hard copy Compromise Agreement through
fraud and deceit, respondent-appellant honestly believes that he was misled into signing it. He was misled by the fact that he had
been sent the fax Compromise Agreement by complainant-appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to complainant-
appellee and now requested for the hard copy for execution, that he had been led to trust that the findings and recommendation
of the BIS were being put behind them and that complainant-appellee had agreed to such a compromise. The transmittal of the
hard copy Compromise Agreement, without any notice or mention by complainant-appellee or complainant-appellee’s office that
it contained
insertions or wording different from the fax Compromise Agreement, and on respondent-appellant’s understanding that the
wording of the hard copy Compromise Agreement would be exactly the same as the fax Compromise Agreement, constitutes the
fraud or deceit allegedly by respondent-appellant.47

In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:

2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I was unable to review the Compromise Agreement delivered by Mr.
Gutierrez on 22 April 1997 as I was busy with numerous calls and business at the time it was delivered. Also, I had been led to
believe in our meetings with Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Borgonia that I could trust them. So, after having seen the fax Compromise
Agreement and being amenable to it, I trusted that they would send a genuine hard copy. As it turned out, I was mistaken.48

Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit of Merit, the private respondent tried for several times to
contact the petitioner, but the latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the suspicion of the private respondent that the
insertion of the offending phrase was not, after all, inadvertent but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of HTC.
The private respondent may be blamed for putting too much trust and confidence on the petitioner, but he certainly cannot be
indicted for perjury for lack of probable cause.

The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the Commission that the private respondent appeared for HTC, on May
9, 1997, before the Commission for the hearing on the Compromise Agreement; and showing that the private respondent did not
object thereto.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; Rollo, pp. 28-A-44.

2 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7843 reads:

SEC. 3. Section 301, Part 2, Title II, Book I of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 301. Dumping Duty. –

"A. Whenever the Secretary of Finance or the Secretary of Trade and Industry (hereinafter called the ‘Secretary’)
receives an anti-dumping petition from the domestic industry or the Secretary has reason to believe, from any
invoice or other document or newspaper, magazine or information or translation thereof by any reputable
language translator made available by any government agency or interested party, that a specific kind or class of
foreign article, is being imported into, or sold or is likely to be sold in the Philippines at a price less than its normal
value, the importation or sale of which might injure, or retard the establishment of, or is likely to injure an industry
producing like articles in the Philippines, the Secretary shall, within twenty (20) days from receipt of such petition
or information, determine a prima facie case of dumping. Within five (5) days from such receipt, he shall notify the
protestee-importer and require him to submit within ten (10) days from such notice evidence from the producer of
the imported article duly authenticated by the Philippine consular or trade office to support the normal value of
such product. If no such evidence is submitted within the prescribed period, the Secretary shall base his decision
on the available pertinent data.

"Pending determination of a prima facie case of dumping, the petitioner may petition that the release from the
Bureau of Customs of the alleged dumped product be withheld. If the Secretary determines that on the face of the
petition and documents presented, there exists an imminent danger of injury to a particular industry as a result of
the alleged dumping, he shall direct the Commissioner of Customs to hold the release of the questioned
importation, upon filing by the petitioner of a bond equal to the alleged margin of dumping. The bond shall answer
for damages which the importer may suffer as a result of the holding of the release of the questioned importation,
in case the Secretary finds that there is no prima facie case. However, the petitioner’s liability for damages shall
not exceed the amount of his bond. This bond shall be cancelled once a prima facie case has been determined
by the Secretary. The Secretary may, motu proprio, hold the release of the questioned articles based on his
information that an imminent danger of injury exists to a particular industry as a result of the alleged dumping.

"The Secretary upon the determination of a prima facie case of dumping shall so advise the Tariff Commission
(hereinafter called the ‘Commission’) and shall instruct the Commissioner of Customs to hold the release of the
goods or articles in question, unless the protestee/importer shall have filed a cash bond not less than the
provisionally estimated dumping duty plus the applicable regular duty based on the documentary evidence
submitted with the dumping protest, to answer for the payment of such duties, fees and charges if a dumping
case is established. If the protest is dismissed, the cash deposit shall be returned to the importer within ten (10)
days from the finality of the order."

The law has been amended by Republic Act No. 8752, otherwise known as the Anti-Dumping Act of 1999.

3 Rollo, p. 113.

4 Rollo, pp. 45-46.

5 Id. at 80.

6 Id. at 78-79.

7 Id. at 47-48.

8 Id. at 64.
9 Rollo, p. 49.

10 Rollo, pp. 55-56.

11 Id. at 66-67.

12 Rollo, p. 67.

13 Id. at 71-77.

14 Rollo, pp. 87-88.

15 Rollo, p. 116.

16 Ibid.

17 Id. at 123-136.

18
Id. at 137-146.

19 Id. at 28-44.

20 Rollo, pp. 42-43.

21 Ibid.

22 (1) … the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
(Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110871, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 656)

23Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, 4 February 2003, 396 SCRA 703, citing Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA
192 (1994).

24 Advincula v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131144, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 583.

Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA 504; Lui v. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, 27
25

May 2004, 429 SCRA 449.

26 U.S. v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).

Bronston v. U.S., 409 U.S. 352 (1973) citing Study of Perjury, reprinted in Report of New York Revision
27

Commission, Legis, Doc. No. 60, p. 249 (1935).

28 Bronston v. U.S., supra.

29 U.S. v. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520 (1910).

30 Diaz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 65006, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 86.

31 Padua v. Paz, A.M. No. P-00-1445, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 21.

32 People v. Abaya, 74 Phil. 59 (1942).

33 Welch v. State, 157 S.W. 946; Ferguson v. State, 35 S.W. 369, cited in 70 C.J.S. Perjury §30, p. 473.

34 Butler v. McKey, 138 F.2d 373 (1943).

35 Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93173, 15 September 1993, 226 SCRA 438.

36 State v. Barkwell, 600 S.W.2d 497 (1979).

 37U.S. v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (1971); U.S. v. Jones, 374 F.2d 414 (1967); U.S. v. Bergman, 354 F.2d 931
(1966); U.S. v. Kelly, 540 F.2d 990 (1976).

38 U.S. v. Capistrano, 40 Phil. 902 (1920).

39 People v. McClintic, 160 N.W. 461 (1916).

40 U.S. v. Berardi, 629 F.2d 723 (1980).

41 U.S. v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196 (1971).

42 Rollo, p. 87.

43 Rollo, p. 76.

44 Rollo, p. 64.

45 Id. at 45.

46 Section 301 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7843.

47 Rollo, pp. 98-99.

48 Id. at 81.

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 135297 June 8, 2000

GAVINO CORPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform
laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid
because such action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of
said land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the property, validly awarded it to private
respondents.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the May 14, 1998 Decision 1 and the August 19, 1998 Resolution 2 in CA-
GR SP No. 47176, in which the Court of Appeals (CA) 3 dismissed the petitioner's appeal and denied reconsideration respectively.

The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads: 4

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby dismissed. The
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the Petitioner.

The Facts

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over
two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.

To pay for his wife's hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon.
When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of
four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract
denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan," 5 which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the
land during the duration of the mortgage.

Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner instituted
against the respondents an action for recovery of possession. 6 In his Complaint, he alleged that they had entered the disputed
land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land.

Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and petitioner allowed the former to take over the
possession and cultivation of the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed on
June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" 7 over the landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394.

Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and alleged that his and his children's signatures appearing
on the Waiver were forgeries.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the
landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27
recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries." 8

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), 9 in a Decision promulgated on October 8, 1997 in DARAB
Case No. 1251, affirmed the provincial adjudicator's Decision. 10 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the
Resolution dated February 26, 1998. 11 As earlier stated, petitioner's appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It rejected his
contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were unenforceable. Section 9 of Republic
Act (RA) 1199 and Section 28 of RA 6389 allow a tenant to voluntarily sever his tenancy status by voluntary surrender. The
waiver by petitioner of his rights and his conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions reallocating the landholding to the
respondents are immutable evidence of his abandonment and voluntary surrender of his rights as beneficiary under the land
reform laws.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence the alleged forgery of his and his sons' signatures.

Hence, this recourse. 12

 Issues

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner alleges in his Memorandum that the appellate court committed these reversible errors: 1

. . . [I]n relying on the findings of fact of the DARAB and PARAD as conclusive when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts and the inference taken is manifestly mistaken.

II

. . . [I]n disregarding and/or ignoring the claim of petitioner that the alleged waiver documents are all forgeries.

III

. . . [I]n ruling that petitioner had forfeited his right to become a beneficiary under PD No. 27.

IV

. . . [I]n failing to rule on the legality and/or validity of the waiver/transfer action.

In short, the focal issues are: (1) Was the appellate court correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and his sons on the
Waiver were not forged? (2) Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the Waiver were genuine, was it null and void for being
contrary to agrarian laws? (3) Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27? (4) Did he, by voluntary
surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Factual Findings

Alleging that an information for estafa through falsification was filed against the respondents, petitioner insists that his signature
on the Waiver was forged.

We are not persuaded. The filing of an information for estafa does not by itself prove that the respondents forged his signature. It
only means that the public prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents, but such finding does not constitute
binding evidence of forgery or fraud. 14 We agree with the well-reasoned CA ruling on this point: 15

. . . We are not swayed by Petitioner's incantations that his signature on the "Waiver of Rights" is a forgery. In the
first place, forgery is never presumed. The Petitioner is mandated to prove forgery with clear and convincing
evidence. The Petitioner failed to do so. Indeed, the "Waiver of Rights" executed by the Petitioner was even with
the written conformity of his four (4) sons (at page 11, Rollo). The Petitioner himself signed the Resolution of the
Board of Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, surrendering his possession of the
landholding to the Samahang Nayon, (idem, supra). Under Memorandum Circular No. 7, dated April 23, 1979 of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, transactions involving transfer of rights of possession and or cultivation of
agricultural lands are first investigated by a team leader of the DAR District who then submits the results of his
investigation to the District Officer who, in turn, submits his report to the Regional Director who, then, acts on said
report. In the present recourse, the requisite investigation was conducted and the report thereon was submitted to
and approved by the Regional Director. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Evidence, public officers
are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in accordance with law.

As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB — an administrative body which has
acquired expertise on the matter — such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. 16 The presence or
the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was convincingly settled by the agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner
utterly failed to convince us that the appellate court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were well-
supported by the evidence.

Second Issue: Validity of the "Waiver of Rights"

Petitioner insists that agreements purportedly relinquishing possession of landholdings are invalid for being violative of the
agrarian reform laws.

Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a farmer-beneficiary because of the series of
mortgages he had taken out over the land. They also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.

We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer is void except
when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a
reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating the government's
program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. 17 In Torres v. Ventura, 18 the Court clearly held:

. . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself.
Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his
continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer
except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.

. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular [No. 7, Series of 1979, April
23, 1979]:

Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of PD 27 have
transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered
the same to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null
and void.

Third Issue: Abandonment

Based on the invalidity of the Waiver, petitioner concludes that the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA erroneously ruled on the
basis of the said document that he had abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his landholding. Denying that he abandoned the
land, he contends that the transaction was a simple loan to enable him to pay the expenses incurred for his wife's hospitalization.

We agree. Abandonment 19 requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property;
and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. 20 The intention to abandon implies a departure,
with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. 21

The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy relationship; and (b) his
failure to work on the landholding for no valid reason. 22 The CA also deemed the following as formidable evidence of his intent to
sever the tenancy relationship: (a) the mortgage and (b) his express approval and conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolution
installing the private respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding. We disagree.

As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the private respondents were
1awphil

obligated to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear,
absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was an
obligation on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.

Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender

Contrary to the finding of the appellate court, the petitioner also denies that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding.

His contention is untenable. The nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear showing that he
voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the present circumstances, may qualify as a
surrender or transfer, to the government, of his rights under the agrarian laws.

PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable except through hereditary
succession or to the government, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of RA 3844 also
provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be extinguished by: . . . (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by
the agricultural lessee, . . . ."

In this case, petitioner's intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to the
Samahang Nayon Resolutions surrendering his possession of the landholding. The Samahan then recommended to the team
leader of the DAR District that the private respondent be designated farmer-beneficiary of said landholding.

To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private person. It was the government,
through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under
the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as long
as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. 2

Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such
action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to
become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan
shall, upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all rights
and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong
social and economic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.

The cooperatives work in close coordination with DAR officers (regional directors, district officers, team leaders and field
personnel) to attain the goals of agrarian reform (DAR Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 1977). The Department of Local
Government (now the Department of Interior and Local Government) regulates them through the Bureau of Cooperative
Development (Section 8, PD 175). They also have access to financial assistance through the Cooperative Development Fund,
which is administered by a management committee composed of the representatives from the DILG, the Central Bank, the
Philippine National Bank, the DAR and the DENR (Section 6, PD 175).

Petitioner insists that his act of allowing another to possess and cultivate his land did not amount to abandonment or voluntary
surrender, as the rights of an OLT beneficiary are preserved even in case of transfer of legal possession over the subject
property, as held in Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association (Cocoma) v. Court of Appeals. 24

We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the Cocoma ruling because what was prohibited was the perpetration of the tenancy or
leasehold relationship between the landlord and the farmer-beneficiary. The case did not rule out abandonment or voluntary
surrender by the agricultural tenant or lessee in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed
petitioner's appeal. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 31-36.

2
Ibid., p. 37.

3
Thirteenth Division composed of JJ Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (ponente); Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez (Division
chairman) and Mariano M. Umali (member), both concurring.

4
CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 36.

5
Ibid., p. 78.

KASUNDUAN SA PAGPAPAHIRAM NG LUPANG SAKAHAN

PARA SA KALAALAMAN NANG LAHAT:

Ako si GAVINO A. CORPUZ, may sapat na taong gulang, biyudo at sa kasalukuyan ay nakatira sa
Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija ay tumanggap ng halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpu't dalawang libo at
limang daang piso) perang Pilipino ngayong ika 5 ng Disyembre 1986 mula kay Gng. HELARIA F.
GROSPE. Dahil sa pagkatanggap ko ng halagang nabanggit ay binibigyan ko si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe,
may asawa at may bahay ni Ginoong GERONIMO R. GROSPE ng lubos na karapatan para sakahin ang
aking lupa na nagtutukoy ng mga sumusunod:

Lot Number : Not available

Location : Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija

Existing Title : Not available

Land Area : 22,000 sq. m.

Na sa kasunduang ito ay may karapatan si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe na gamitin o sakahin ang aking lupa
sa loob ng APAT NA TAON mula sa 5 Disyembre 1986 hanggang Disyembre 5, 1990 at ito ay
mapapawalang bisa lamang ayon sa bagong kasunduan namin. Pagkatapos ng apat na taon ay ibabalik
ko rin ang halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpo't dalawang libo at limang daang piso) na aking nahiram kay
Gng. Helaria F. Grospe.

Na sa kasunduang ito ay isasagawa ngayon sa [illegible] 1986 sa Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

(sgd.) GAVINO A. CORPUZ (sgd.) HELARIA F. GROSPE

(May-ari ng lupa) (Nagpahiram ng salapi)

SA KAPAHINTULUTAN NG MGA ANAK: SAKSI:

 (sgd.) ANACLETO CORPUZ [signature illegible]

(sgd.) RAYMUNDO CORPUZ (sgd.) LOVELITO C. ORA.

(sgd.) JIMMY CORPUZ.

6
The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1286-NE-91.

7
Rollo, p. 79.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

KAMI, mga nakalagda sa ibaba nito, pawang may mga sapat na gulang, Pilipino, at sa kasalukuyan ay
pawang naninirahan sa Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, matapos makapanumpa nang naaayon sa
batas ay nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:

Na, kami ang mga tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na dati ay nakatala sa pangalan ng aming
ina/ama/kapatid na si G/Gng. Gabino A. Corpuz na makikilala [na] Lote Blg. 3017 na may sukat
na 2.2830 ektarya humigit kumulang na dating pag-aari ni Florentino Chioco na matatagpuan sa
Malaya, Sto. Domingo, NE, na napapaloob sa Titulo Blg. 126638.

Na, bilang tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na nabanggit sa itaas aming inililipat ang lahat ng
karapatan at pamomosisyon kay GERONIMO R. GROSPE.

Na, ginawa namin ito upang maisaayos sa Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) ang paglilipat
ng mga karapatan sa nasabing Lote sa pangala[n] ni GERONIMO A. GROSPE.

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito ngayong ika 02 ng Enero 1990,
dito sa bayan ng Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

PANGALAN AT LAGDA SEDULA BLG. KINUHA SA NOONG

(sgd.) Raymundo S. Corpuz 10152182 Sto. Domingo, N.E. 11/06/89
(sgd.) Jimmy S. Corpuz 10152183 Sto. Domingo, N.E. 11/06/89
(sgd.) Anacleto S. Corpuz 00976119 Sto. Domingo, N.E. 03/20/89

CONFORME:

(sgd.) GABINO A. CORPUZ

Sedula Blg. — 10113264
Kinuha sa — Sto. Domingo, N.E.
noong — June 22, 1989

xxx xxx xxx

8
Rollo, p. 41.

9
The Board was composed of Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, chairman; with Undersecretaries Hector D. Soliman
and Artemio A. Adasa Jr.; Assistant Secretaries Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano, Sergio B. Serrano and
Clifford C. Burkley, members.

10
Rollo, p. 52.

11
Ibid, p. 59.

This case was deemed submitted for decision upon this Court's receipt of the Memorandum for the Petitioner on
12

June 14, 1999. Respondents' Memorandum was received earlier, on May 28, 1999.

The Petitioner's Memorandum was signed by Atty. Nicolas P. Lapeña Jr. and the Respondents' Memorandum,
13

by Atty. Jaime P. Batalla.

14
Villanueva v. United Coconut Planters Bank, GR No. 138291, March 7, 2000, p. 14.
 15
CA Decision, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 33-34.

Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 568, 581, August 19, 1988;
16

Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 263, 269, December 14, 1978; and Domingo v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, 4 SCRA 1151, 1156, April 28, 1962.

See Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 106, citing Gloria Cuhinusayan vda. de Oliver et al. v. Sesinando
17

Cruz et al., SP-116191-CAR, June 22, 1981.

Although Executive Order No. 228, issued on July 17, 1987, allowed the transfer of ownership of lands
acquired by farmer-beneficiary after full payment of amortization, there is no allegation in this case that
the petitioner has fully amortized his payment.

18
187 SCRA 96, 104-105, July 2, 1990, per Gancayco, J.

Administrative Order No. 2, issued March 7, 1994, defined abandonment or neglect as a "willful failure of the
19

agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any
crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.

20
Medrana v. Office of the President, 188 SCRA 818, 826, August 21, 1990.

21
Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 692, 699, December 18, 1992.

22
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 35.

23
Talavera v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 778, 782, February 27, 1990.

24
164 SCRA 568, 584-585, August 19, 1988.

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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-
SAVAGE, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEÑA, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-
SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12
Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in
Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied by respondent Judge as well as their motion to
reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of
Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), 1 Supervising Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed an application for search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. 2 The application sought the authorization
to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought
iron furniture found therein which were allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art.
189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was issued by respondent
Judge on 16 October 1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following day by NBI agents. 3 Seized from the factory were
several pieces of furniture, indicated in the Inventory Sheet attached to the Return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have
remained in NBI custody up to the present. 4

On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused of did not
exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching
questions; and, (d) the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. 5

On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash where they additionally alleged that the assailed warrant
was applied for without a certification against forum shopping. 6 On 30 January 1998 respondent Judge denied the Motion to
Quash and the Supplemental Motion to Quash. 7 On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of their motion to
quash and alleged substantially the same grounds found in their original Motion to Quash but adding thereto two (2) new
grounds, namely: (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and, (b) respondent court failed to
"substantiate" the order sought to be reconsidered. 8 The denial of their last motion 9 prompted petitioners to come to this Court.

The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a) questions involving jurisdiction over the offense; (b) the need
for a certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the existence of the crime.

Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not designated as a special court for
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain
branches of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for IPR.
The courts enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The sala of Judge Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was
designated Special Court for IPR for the 7th Judicial Region. 10 Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96
was issued providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the Regional Trial Courts. 11

The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the Court has
consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not
a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 12 The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in
all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. 1 In the instant case, the premises searched located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court. 14

Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts for IPR. Administrative Order No. 113-95
merely specified which court could "try and decide" cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive
jurisdiction with regard to all matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one court.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg.129, and not by a procedural rule, much less by an
administrative order. 15 The power to issue search warrants for violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts
enumerated in Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95.

Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should have been dismissed outright since it was not
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, citing as authority therefor Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals. 16 In that case, we sustained the quashal of the search warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum shopping
as private respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he was denied by the courts of
Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here there is no allegation of forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a
certification against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings,
omitting any mention of "applications." 17 In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such
certification even from "applications." Our ruling in Washington Distillers required no such certification from applications for
search warrants. Hence, the absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant.

The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving design patents punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised
Penal Code exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan Herrero seems to agree as he filed the corresponding Information against
petitioners on 17 March 1998. 18 However, since the IPR Code took effect on 1 January 1998 any discussion contrary to the view
herein expressed would be pointless. The repealing clause of the Code provides —

All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic Act No. 165, as amended;
Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential
Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed (emphasis
ours). 19

The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the
Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article.

The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts specifically alleged
were the manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing any license
or patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding Mendco and the buying public. 20 The Code defines "unfair
competition" thus —

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he
shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those
of the one having established such goodwill, or shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result,
shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the
following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which
they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or
dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such
appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent
vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the
false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the
mind of the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other
act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit goods, businesses or services of another. 21

There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the controlling provisions on Unfair
Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment
of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused, 22 for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable
consideration. 2 Respondents invoke jurisprudence to support their contention that "unfair competition" exists in this
case. 24 However, we are prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in
the IPR Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent infringement as defined by the same Code —

Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. — 76.1. The making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing a
patented product or a product obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process, or the use of a
patented process without authorization of the patentee constitutes patent infringement. 25

Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code, we are constrained to invoke the
provisions of the Code. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such
application would be beneficial to the
accused. 26 Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the acts alleged, then that
Code must be applied here.

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 27 Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the
search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the
warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration.
Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in
accordance with established jurisprudence. 28

In petitioners' Reply with Additional Information they allege that the trial court denied their motion to transfer their case to a
Special Court for IPR. We have gone through the records and we fail to find any trace of such motion or even a copy of the order
denying it. All that appears in the records is a copy of an order granting a similar motion filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with
regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12. 29 This attachment being immaterial we shall give it no further attention.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998, denying the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 dated 30 October 1997 and the Supplemental Motion to Quash dated 10 November 1997
filed by petitioners, as well as the Order dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 March 1998,
is SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and
respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by virtue of the illegal search warrant.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

De Leon, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1
Original Record, pp. 222-223.

2
Id., p. 1.

3
Id., pp. 5 and 9.

4
Id., p. 11; Rollo, p. 31.

5
Original Record, pp. 13-14.

6
Id., p. 30.

7
Id., p. 84.

8
Id., p. 86.

9
Id., p. 124.

10
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95, 2 October 1995.

11
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96, 21 October 1996.

Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109560, 26 May 1995 244 SCRA 346, citing Malaloan v. Court of
12

Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, 232 SCRA 249.

13
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, 232 SCRA 249.

14
Par. 3, (h), Sec. 14, Chapter II, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

15
See Note 13.

16
G.R. No. 118151, 22 August 1996, 260 SCRA 821.

17
Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court.

18
Original Record, pp. 239-240.

19
Subsection 239.1, Section 239, Part V, RA 8293.

20
See Note 16.

21
Sec. 168., Part III, RA 8293.
 22
People v. Subido, G.R. No. 21734, 5 September 1975, 66 SCRA 545.

23
People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950).

24
Cigarette Manufacturing Co. v. Mojica, 27 Phil. 266 (1914); Ogura v. Chua, 59 Phil. 471 (1934).

25
Chapter VIII, Part II, RA 8293.

26
Act No. 3815.

27
Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

28
Nolasco v. Pano, G.R. No. 69803, 30 January 1987, 147 SCRA 509.

29
Rollo, p. 156.

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