Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 23

Postmodernist Anthropology, Subjectivity, and Science: A Modernist Critique

Author(s): Melford E. Spiro


Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 38, No. 4, (Oct., 1996), pp. 759-780
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179198
Accessed: 15/08/2008 16:58

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org
PostmodernistAnthropology,
Subjectivity,and Science:
A ModernistCritique
MELFORD E. SPIRO

Universityof California, San Diego

Centralto the postmodernprojectin anthropologyis its critiqueof science and


the scientific method, a critiquewhich it shareswith (becauseit was borrowed
from) postmodernistthoughtmore generally.However, unless otherwise spe-
cified, in what follows the termspostmodernistandpostmodernismwill refer
to postmodernistanthropologyspecifically,not to postmodernismmore gener-
ally. (For a superbsurvey of the historyof postmodernistthoughtin general,
see Harvey [1989], especially chapter3.)
The postmodernistcritique of science consists of two interrelatedargu-
ments, epistemological and ideological. Both are based, however, on the
centralpostmodernnotion of subjectivity.First, because of the subjectivityof
the humanobject, anthropology,accordingto the epistemological argument,
cannot be a science; and in any event the subjectivityof the human subject
precludesthe possibility of science discoveringobjective truth.Second, since
its much-vauntedobjectivityis an illusion, science, accordingto the ideologi-
cal argument,serves the interestsof dominantsocial groups (males, whites,
Westerners),therebysubvertingthose of oppressedgroups(females, ethnics,
third-worldpeoples).
Since both of these argumentsstem from the central emphasis that post-
modernists place on subjectivity, my primaryconcern in this essay' is to
assess the postmodernistinterpretationanduse of thatcriticalconcept. Hence,
in what follows I shall do threethings. First, I shall summarizethose claims of
the postmodernistview of subjectivitywhich, in my view, are valid. Second, I
shall argue that although valid, these claims are not new, having been inno-
vated many years ago by the foundersof the Cultureand Personalitymove-
ment. Third, I shall arguethatthe postmodernistinnovationshave unfortunate
consequences for anthropologicalscholarship.
I A short version of this essay was presentedto the Symposiumon PostmodernSubjectivities
at the 1993 annualmeetings of the AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation, organizedby Claudia
Straussand TakieLebra.I am indebtedto David Jordan,MarcSwartz, and DonaldTuzinfor their
helpful criticisms of earlierdrafts.
0010-4175/96/4609-0100$7.50 + .10 ? 1996 Societyfor Comparative
Studyof Societyand History

759
760 MELFORD E. SPIRO

THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECTIVITY


Postmodernists(like symbolistsand interpretivists)stress thatthe understand-
ing of personsand groupsrequiresan understandingof theirmeanings-and I
agree with them. Moreover, since the anthropologicalinvestigatoris an actor
in a social field thatincludesboth himself andthe natives, postmodernistsalso
stress, correctlyin my view, thatfield work is dialogical;that the anthropolo-
gist not only observes the natives but is also observed by them; and that
anthropologicaldataare not producedby the anthropologist'saction alone nor
consist of the natives' actions alone but, rather,are producedby, and consist
of, the interactionbetween the anthropologistand the natives.
But if the anthropologist,among otherthings, investigatesmeaningsand if
meaningsare found in the psyches of persons, then it follows, postmodernists
correctlystress, thatthe anthropologistmust attendto subjectivity.Moreover,
since field work is a two-directional,not a one-directionalenterprise,it also
follows, they emphasize, that the anthropologistmust attend to the subjec-
tivity not only of the natives (the humanobject), but also his own (the human
subject). Once again I agree with them.
I agree with all of the above propositionsnot, however, because like Kant,
who claimed to have been awakenedfrom his philosophicalslumberby read-
ing Hume, I was awakenedfrom my anthropologicalslumberby readingthe
postmodernists.Rather, it is because much before the advent of postmod-
ernism, I had read Freud and Sapir, Mead and Benedict, DuBois and Kar-
diner, Hallowell and Devereux, Eriksonand Kluckhohn,and the other found-
ers of the Cultureand Personalitymovement for whom the subjectivityboth
of object and subject was a truism. ("Historicaltruth,"Appell has written,
"appearsto be the first casualty of the battle over the soul of anthropology"
[1992:196], quoted in Lewis [1994]).

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

The Subjectivityof the Object


Arguably, Freud was the inspiration for the founders of the Culture and
Personalitymovement. That inspiration,however, came not from his anthro-
pological but his psychological work, which consistently emphasized that
what was criticalto the elucidationof actors' ideas, beliefs, and values is an
understandingof their intentions, desires, and wishes, in short, their mean-
ings (unconsciousas well as conscious). Indeed, one of Freud'srevolutionary
innovations is his claim, first published one hundredyears ago (Breuer and
Freud 1893), that even seemingly meaninglessphenomena(such as neurotic
symptoms, dreams, and parapraxes)are meaningfuland that the task of the
analyst is to discover their meanings.
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 761

Two decades later, Freudintroducedhis second revolutionarycontribution


to the understandingof the subjectivityof the human object: the process of
"transference"(Freud 1912). Although Freudhimself was mainly concerned
with this process in the context of the analyst-patientrelationship,latersocial
theorists extended its application to other emotionally significant relation-
ships, including the anthropologist-nativerelationship.With some few ex-
ceptions, however (for example, Devereux 1951; Gladwinand Sarason 1953),
transferencewas rarely considered in early Cultureand Personalitystudies,
nor with some notable exceptions (for example, Crapanzano1980; Ewing
1987; Kracke 1978; S. LeVine 1981) is it emphasizedin contemporarypsy-
chological anthropology.
If Freudwas the grandfatherof Cultureand Personality,then EdwardSapir
was clearly its father. Like Freud, whose psychology he took as his model,
Sapir emphasizedthat the individualand his subjectivity-he used the term
personality-was absentfrom the anthropologyof his time. Thus, as early as
1932, Sapir emphasizedthat culturepatterns"cannotbe realisticallydiscon-
nected from those organizationsof ideas and feelings which constitute the
individual"because
the true locus of cultureis in the interactions
of specificindividualsand, on the
subjectiveside, in the worldof meaningswhicheach one of theseindividualsmay
unconsciously abstractfor himselffromhis participation
in theseinteractions"
(Sapir
1932, in Mandelbaum 1957:151).
To offer only one more example, as early as 1938 A. I. Hallowell, who
acknowledgedthe influenceof both Freudand Sapir,began to publisha series
of articleson Ojibwasubjectivity(Hallowell 1938). Nevertheless, Hallowell's
influence was not felt beyond the small circle of Culture and Personality
specialists until the 1980s, when his pathbreakingarticle on the self (though
published three decades earlier) was discovered by a new generationof an-
thropologists.In this article, Hallowell arguedinter alia that while "culture-
centered"ethnographieswere valuable for both "comparativeand analytic"
purposes, still
of necessitythe materialis presentedfromthe standpointof an outsideobserver.
Presentedto us in thisform,theseculturaldatado notpermitus to apprehend, in an
integralfashion,the most significantand meaningfulaspectsof the worldof the
individualas experiencedby himandin termsof whichhe thinks,is motivatedto act,
andsatisfieshis needs(Hallowell1954:79).
It should be noted, moreover, that Hallowell was not content to rely on
empathy and insight alone for elucidating the "meaningfulaspects of the
world" of individual actors. Consequently,he pioneeredthe anthropological
use of the Rorschachtest as a means for obtainingan objective assessmentof
their subjectivity, one that could make possible more precise cross-group
comparisons.In this regard,however, he influencedonly a few of his contem-
762 MELFORD E. SPIRO

poraries, the others arguing that projective tests were culture-bound,and


hence not suitable for the investigationof non-Westerngroups.2

The Subjectivityof the Subject


Freud, who once again is the pioneerfigure, first emphasizedthe importance
of the subjectivityof the subject-in this case, the analyst-in his concept of
"countertransference" (1910). Viewing the analyst's countertransferenceas a
formidableobstacle to objectivity, he stressed the paramountimportanceof
self-reflexivityas a means for dealing with this obstacle. (Since he believed it
highly unlikely, however, that anyone is capable of the kind of self under-
standingwith the honesty that genuine self-reflexivityrequires,Freud[1937]
recommended that every analyst undergo a personal analysis as well as a
periodic self-reflexive reexamination.)
Beginning, however, in the 1950s, psychoanalysiscame to view counter-
transferencenot only as an obstacle to objective understandingbut also (if
properly understood and dealt with) as an importantinstrumentfor such
understanding(Tyson 1984). In this regard,the psychoanalysts'stress on self-
reflexivity, like that of the psychological anthropologistsdiscussed below, is
very differentfromthatof manypostmodernistswho also stressits importance
(for example, Ruby 1982). For while the former two deploy their counter-
transferentialexperience in the service of understandingthe object (patients
and non-Westernpeoples, respectively), the latter-or at least some of
them-deploy it instead in the service of their own "self-growth"(for exam-
ple, Marcus and Fischer 1986:ix-x; Rabinow 1977).
Despite the influence of Freud, early Cultureand Personalityresearchers
seem not to have attendedto the role of countertransference in anthropological
field work, at least not explictly. Indeed, so far as I can tell, the first ethno-
graphicinvestigationto attendexplicitlyto countertransference is Gladwinand
Sarason'snuancedstudy of Trukesepersonality(Gladwinand Sarason 1953).
Unfortunately,this admirablestudy was still-born, perhaps because of its
heavy use of projectivetests, and has been neglectedever since. This was not
the fate, however,of anotherearly,but highly influential,workwhich (though
not explicitly psychological nor even, in the strict sense of the term, ethno-
2 It is a safe
bet, I dare say, that few of these critics had a first-handacquaintancewith these
tests nor with the anthropologicalstudies that employed them, including DeVos (1954) DuBois
(1944), Gladwin and Sarason (1953), Hallowell (1955: ch. 3), Henry (1947), Spindler (1955),
Wallace (1952). Rather,they relied for the most parton secondhandreportsof Lindzey's assess-
ment (Lindzey 1961) which had demonstrated,so the critics alleged, that these studies produced
neithervalid nor reliablefindings. In fact, however, Lindzey,a clinical psychologist, said nothing
of the kind, althoughhis balancedassessmentof these studiesdealt with theirweakness as well as
their strengths.
In any event, as a consequenceof the uniformedviews of the early critics, only few contempo-
raryfieldworkers(see DeVos andBoyer 1989;Suarez-Orozco1989) continueto employ projective
tests; and anthropology,at least in my view, has lost a valuableopportunityto establishobjective,
inter-grouppsychological comparisons. (For a similar view, see Schwartz[1992:338-40].)
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 763

graphic) dealt even more extensively with the anthropologist'scountertrans-


ference. I am referring,of course, to Tristes Tropiques(Levi-Strauss 1955).
More recently, a variety of anthropologistshave discussed their own coun-
tertransferentialreactions in field work with admirablehonesty and courage.
Here, I would mentionespecially the studiesof L. Bohannon[Bowen] (1964),
Briggs (1970), Crapanzano(1980), Kracke (1987), Read (1967) and R. Ro-
saldo (1984). Fromthe evidence of all these works, as well as my own field-
work experience, I would suggest that the countertransferential reactions of
field anthropologists,like those of clinical analysts, stem from theiranxieties,
inner conflicts, loneliness, investment in favoritetheories, personal values,
professional ambition, and so forth.
It was Devereux who, in a brilliant if exasperatingtour de force (1967),
provided the theoreticalrationalefor the importanceof countertransference,
not only in anthropologybut also in the other social sciences as well. It is
worth noting that in a preface to this book La Barrecommentedthat with its
publication"the un-self-examinedanthropologisthenceforthhas no right or
business anthropologizing"(La Barre 1967:ix). As in the case of the recent
views of psychoanalysismentionedabove, Devereux not only addressedthe
distortingeffects of countertransferencebut also emphasized its use "as an
importantand even indispensable source of relevant supplementarysocial
science data"(Devereux 1967:30). As he saw it, "it is not countertransference
per se, but the ignoring and mismanagementof countertransference[that] is
the real source of sterile error"(Devereux 1967: 202, italics in original).
Althoughaside from psychological anthropology,anthropologistshave typ-
ically not attendedto the countertransferential dimension of the anthropolo-
gist's subjectivity,neverthelessvirtuallyall of them have persistentlyempha-
sized others of its dimensions, which are usually subsumedunderthe concept
of ethnocentrism. Beginning with Boas, novice field workers have been
warnedof the distortinginfluenceof theirculturalbiases; and anthropological
training has attemptedto minimize such biases by requiringthat graduate
students acquire ethnographiccompetence in a wide range of non-Western
societies and cultures.
Despite such training,culturalbias, so postmodernistsclaim, is an inescap-
able characteristicof all Westernethnographers,as arethe otherbiases (such as
racial, gender, social class) that comprise partof their subjectivity;and these
biases, togetherwith those engenderedby colonialism and imperialism,pro-
duce serious distortionsin the collection and reportingof ethnographicdata.
While these claims, thoughoften exaggerated,cannotbe disregarded,post-
moderniststend to disregardother biases inherentin the Westernethnogra-
pher's subjectivity which are the reverse of those which they emphasize. I
have in mind, for example, the liberal political ideology of most Western
anthropologists,their lingering noble savagism, and their alienationfrom, if
not hostility to, Westernculture (Levi-Strauss1964:381, 388), which argua-
764 MELFORD E. SPIRO

bly account for the idealization of non-Westerncultures that characterizes


more than a few ethnographies.Having now examined my contention that
many of the postmodernistclaims concerning subjectivity,though true, are
not new-as is also the case, according to Eysteinsson (1990), with post-
modernistthoughtmore generally-we may now turnto my contentionthatin
some critical respects its innovative claims are invalid.

POSTMODERNIST INNOVATIONS REGARDING SUBJECTIVITY


Before assessing the postmodernist innovations, I wish to register two
caveats-the first relatedto my representationof the postmodernistposition
and the second to the representationof my own. First, since postmodernist
anthropologistsare as diverse a groupas any other, the following generalized
and schematic summaryof their views applies to most, but not all, of them.
Thatbeing so, some of my postmodernistfriendswill no doubtfeel thatI have
misrepresentedtheir views; and althoughI regretthat, I trustthey will appre-
ciate that an essay of limited space must confine itself to centraltendencies.
Second, since any theoreticalposition, as postmodernistsrightly stress, stems
from a particularpoint of view, it is importantto note that my assessment of
their innovationsis offered from the point of view of what John Searle calls
the "WesternRationalistTradition"and its epistemologicaland metaphysical
postulates. Because the postmodernistproject takes the repudiationof this
traditionas one of its centralaims, it is perhapsuseful to briefly summarize
these postulateswhich, following Searle(1993b: 60-68), I shall explicate in a
set of six, interrelated,propositions:
First, reality exists independentlyof human representations;and any true
statement about the world refers to "actual situations"in the world which
correspondto such a statement. In short, contraryto postmodernism,this
postulate holds that there is a "mind-independentexternalreality"which (in
the language of philosophy) is referredto as "metaphysicalrealism."
Second, language serves not only to communicatemeanings but also to
refer to objects and situations in the world that exist independentlyof lan-
guage. In short, this postulate holds that language, contraryto postmod-
ernism, has referential,and not merely communicative,functions.
Third, statementsare true or false dependingon whetherthe objects and
situationsto which they refercorrespondto a greateror lesser degree to these
statements.This, of course, is the "correspondencetheory"of truth,which, to
the extent that postmodernistshold a theory of truth-many of them, of
course, reject this concept as "essentialist"-stands in sharpcontrastto their
"coherence"or "narrative"theory, as it is variouslycalled.
Fourth,knowledgeis objective, which signifies, contraryto postmodernism,
that the truthof any knowledge claim is independentof the motive, culture,
ethnicity,race, social class, or genderof the person(s)who makesuch a claim.
Rather,its truthdepends on the empiricalsupportadducedon its behalf.
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 765

Fifth, logic and rationalityprovide a set of procedures,methods, and stan-


dards (of proof, validity, or reasonableness) which, contrary to postmod-
ernism, enables one to assess competing knowledge claims.
Sixth, there exist valid criteria (both objective and intersubjective)for
judging the relative merit of statements, theories, explanations, interpreta-
tions, and other kinds of accounts. According to this postulate, it is not the
case that Creationism, for example, is as true as Darwinism, that the geo-
centric view is as correctas the heliocentric,that shamanisticexplanationsof
dissociative states are as veridical as those of clinical psychiatry.
Postmodernistsrepudiatethese six postulates of the WesternRationalist
Traditionbecause of what they take to be two epistemologicalentailmentsof
their conception of subjectivity.First, the subjectivity of the human object
entails that the human sciences cannot-indeed ought not-be a science.
Second, the subjectivityof the human subject entails that it is impossible to
discover (what might be termed)objective or intersubjectivetruth.Beginning
with the first, I now wish to assess these claims insofar as they relate to
anthropology.(The following assessment is taken in part from Spiro [1994:
ch. 1]).

The Rejectionof Anthropologyas Science


Anthropologycannot (and should not) aspire to scientific status, postmod-
ernists argue (for example, Rabinow and Sullivan 1987; Rosaldo 1989; Tyler
1987) because science is in the business of discoveringcauses; whereasif the
subjectivity of the human object is taken seriously, then anthropologycan
only be in the business of discoveringmeanings. Althoughthe term meaning
is the black box of the anthropologicallexicon, still since postmodernists
believe (as I do) thatcultureand mind can be understoodonly by referenceto
intentions, purposes, desires, and the like, I take it that they are indicating
these subjective entities when they refer to meaning. If that is so, then their
opposing of meaningto cause only makes sense, however, in the hermeneutic
view that the scientific concept of cause refers to materialconditions alone
(Habermas1971, Ricoeur 1981, Vendler 1984). Thus, on that view a causal
account of culture refers to ecological niches, modes of production, subsis-
tence techniques, and so forth, just as a causal account of mind refers to the
firing of neurons, the secretionof hormones, the action of neurotransmitters,
and so on.
I would submit, however, that this materialistconception of cause repre-
sents an older view that is hardly credible today. To be sure, psychological
behavioristspersist in denying that non-materialthings like intentions, pur-
poses, and desires serve as causes of action, just as culturalmaterialistsdeny
thatthese mentalevents have causal relevancefor the creationand persistence
of culture;but these views, which reflect what the philosopherAdolf Griin-
baum [1984:3] has characterizedas the "ontologically reductive notion of
766 MELFORD E. SPIRO

scientific status," are dead as a dodo bird. As construedby even the most
tough-mindedphilosophersof science, intentions,purposes, and desires, for
all their being subjective, are no less causal than hormonal secretions and
subsistence techniques (Griinbaum1984:69-94; Hempel 1965:225-58).
Indeed, it is precisely because they hold that such subjective events are
causal that most psychological anthropologists,beginning with the Culture
and Personalitymovement, have insisted thatthey are critically importantfor
the understandingof mind and culture.Since postmodernists,however,do not
believe that intentions, desires, and so forth, have causal (explanatory)rele-
vance, then why do they insist that such subjective events are critical for
anthropologicalinquiry?'Tis a paradox.That paradoxaside, if causal expla-
nation is centralto the scientific enterpriseand if these subjective events do
have causal relevance, then, contraryto postmodernism,there are no valid
grounds(in this regardat any rate)for denying thatanthropologyis, or at least
in principlemight be, a science.
If now the scientific methodconsists both of the formulationof explanatory
theories in respect to some subject-matterand the employmentof empirical
and logical proceduresby which, at least in principle,they can be verified or
falsified, then the remainingquestionregardingthe scientific statusof anthro-
pology is whether its modes of inquiry conform to this paradigm. Writing
more than half a century ago, John Dewey put it this way.
The questionis not whetherthe subject-matter
of humanrelations[includinganthro-
pology]is orcaneverbecomea sciencein thesensein whichphysicsis nowa science,
but whether it is such as to permit . . . the developmentof methods which, as far as
they go, satisfythe logicalconditionsthathaveto be satisfiedin otherbranchesof
inquiry(Dewey1938:487).
Notice that Dewey refers to methods, not techniques, for whereas tech-
niques refer to the empiricalproceduresemployed for obtainingor eliciting
data, methodsrefer to the logical conditionsthat must be satisfied if the data
are to be judged evidentially relevant for the acceptanceor rejection of an
explanation or interpretation.Now with the exception of a few remaining
scientistic (not scientific) diehardsamong us, I dare say that virtually every
one else (postmodernistand modernist alike) agrees that the study of the
human world requiresvery differenttechniquesfrom those employed for the
study of the physical world. Thus, while subjective techniques, such as in-
sight, Verstehen,and empathy are critical in the study of mind and culture,
that is not the case, for example, in the study of atoms, molecules, and
galaxies.3
3 This, however, is not always the case. Althoughempathy,for example, is usually
regarded
as a technique unique to the human sciences, still it is not entirely absent from the physical
sciences. Thus, in his biographyof the brilliantphysicist and nobel laureate,RichardFeynman,
Gleick (1992:142) writes that Feynman'scolleagues suspectedthat if he wantedto know what an
electron would do undergiven circumstances,he merely asked himself, "If I were an electron,
what would I do?"
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 767

This consensus, however, does not obtain in respect to methods. Thus,


postmodernists(and others who follow in the hermeneutictradition)maintain
that, whereas the physical sciences employ objective methods, such methods
are not appropriatein the human sciences. In short, the subjectivity of the
human object requires that subjective proceduresof empathy, insight, Ver-
stehen) be used not only as techniquesbut also as methods of inquiry.But if
"method,"as I have already observed, refers to the logical conditions that
must be satisfied if data are to be judged evidentiallyrelevantfor the accep-
tance or rejectionof an explanationor interpretation,thenthis view is hardto
credit. As the philosopherRichardRudner(echoing Dewey) put it:
Toholdthatthesocialsciencesaremethodologically distinctfromtheothersciencesis
to holdnotmerely(orperhapsnotat all)thebanalviewthatthesocialsciencesemploy
differenttechniquesof inquiry,but ratherthe startlingview thatthe social sciences
requirea differentlogic of inquiry(Rudner1966:5,addedemphasis).
Such a view is "startling,"I would suggest, because if empathy,Verstehen,
and so forth, are employed not only as techniquesfor generatingdata, expla-
nations, and interpretations(the context of discovery) but also as methodsfor
assessing their truthvalue (the context of justification), then this subjective
methodology suffers from critical logical and empirical problems (Rudner
1966:5-6). Logically, it is of course hopelessly circular, the "hermeneutic
circle," as hermeneutiststhemselves recognize. Empirically, especially in
those all-too frequentinstancesin which the interpretationsof differentinves-
tigators disagree, it is useless: It provides no objective or intersubjective
criteriaby which conflicting interpretationscan be adjudicated.As the psy-
chologist MorrisEagle puts it, "If my interpretationor decipheredmeaningor
empathic grasp is radically different from and even contradicts yours, on
whose empathy of interpretationdoes one rely for knowledge?" (Ea-
gle: 1984:164).
Although it might now seem evident that, in the context of justification,
intellectuallyresponsibleinquiryrequiresobjective (that is, scientific) meth-
ods not only in the physical but also in the human sciences, postmodernists
rejectthis argumenton two grounds,empiricaland logical. As for the former,
virtuallyall postmodernistsdismiss the empiricalproceduresof the scientific
method(when used in the humansciences) as positivistic, a highly pejorative
term in their lexicon. In addition, many (but not all) of them also reject
(Western)logic as a "logocentric"and "linear"discourse invented by "hege-
monic" Westernmales and used by them to dominate non-Westernersand
females; hence, to "privilege"such a "phallocentric"discourseonly serves to
perpetuatetheir "patriarchal"interests.4 (I confess that I would look more
4 Two articles, both in the Newsletter on Feminism
publishedby the AmericanPhilosophical
Association, are typical of the genre. In one, the authorwritesthatmodusponens was inventedby
males as a means for determiningwho counts as a rationalbeing and that, since many women do
not recognize this logical law as a valid form of inference, this is an example of how logic
subserves the patriarchaloppression of women (Ginzberg 1989). In anotherarticle, the author
768 MELFORD E. SPIRO

kindly upon the postmodernistproject if its proponents could resist such


drearyand endlessly repeatedcliches.)5
It should be noted that both argumentsare reasoned, not capricious. For
consistent with the postmodernistview that the concept of objective truthis
"essentialist"(anotherpejorativeterm in theirlexicon), theirprimaryintellec-
tual worries relate not to ethnographicresearch but ethnographicwriting
(Cliffordand Marcus 1986); and in the latterregardthe critical issue, as they
see it, is not so much the truthof ethnographicfindings, as the "authority"of
ethnographictexts. Thus, for Clifford, the problem (mentioned above) is
primarilya problemof textualauthority(1983:142), of which he distinguishes
four "modes" (experiential, interpretive, dialogical, and polyphonic); and
how one chooses among them dependson one's taste. It is only in a footnote
that Clifford mentions "modes of authoritybased on natural-scientificepis-
temologies," and then only to say that he does not intend to discuss them
(1983: n. 1).
In my view this cavalier dismissal of "natural-scientificepistemologies"
would, if taken seriously, have disastrousconsequences, not only, however,
for scholarship but also for civil society itself. Commenting on a similar
attitudeprevalentin his time, Dewey observed that it
encourages obscurantism;it promotesacceptanceof beliefsformedbeforemethodsof
inquiryhad reachedtheirpresentstate;and it tendsto relegatescientific(thatis,
competent)methodsof inquiryto a specializedtechnicalfield. Sincescientificmeth-
ods simplyexhibitfreeintelligenceoperatingin the bestmanneravailableat a given
time, the culturalwaste,confusionanddistortionthatresultsfromthe failureto use
thesemethods,in all fieldsin connectionwithall problems,is incalculable(Dewey
1938:535).
The Rejectionof ObjectiveTruth
Having examined the postmodernists'contentionthat the subjectivityof the
humanobject entails thatanthropologycannot (andought not) aspireto scien-
tific status, I now wish to examine theircontentionthatthe subjectivityof the
argues that since the Aristoteliansyllogism separatesthe form from the materialcontent of an
argument, it contributesto women's marginalizationand subordinationbecause traditionally
males are associated with form, females with matter(Cope-Kasten1989).
5 Bert States' insightfulcomments on the functions of the repetitionof these cliches in post-
modem literarycriticism-he refers to them as the "poststructuralcode"-also apply to post-
modern anthropology(which, of course, borrowedthem, as it has so much else, from literary
criticism). Hearingthese clich6s over and over again-"providing one is inside the code"-is not
a problem, States (1994:113) writes because
the termsare aestheticallyinert, theirinterestabsolutelyexhaustedin theirmission of demonstrat-
ing the code doing its workof recontextualizingothercodes. Thus, the code has much in common
with the Hari Krishnachant that achieves its remarkablemesmeric purity througha deliberate
poverty of invention.... The formulaicuse of the terminologyapparentlyfosters confidence,
uniformity,and brotherhoodamong code users .... The code's value consists simply in being
displayed by insiders for insiders .... Clarityis beside the point: what, after all, is there to be
clear about, since all 'ideas' are only context-dependentlogocentric re-inscriptionsplundered
from anotherdiscourse-in effect, re-tautologizations?
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 769

human subjectprecludesthe discovery of objective knowledge. This conten-


tion takes two forms: a restrictedform, which denies that there can be objec-
tive knowledge of the non-Westernhuman object, and an unrestrictedone,
which denies that there can be objective knowledge of any object. I shall
begin with the restrictedform, but since I have alreadyaddressedit at length
elsewhere (Spiro 1984, 1986, 1990, 1994: ch. 1) and since Gellnerhas recent-
ly subjected it to an incisive analysis (1992: 22-71), I shall treat it only
briefly. (For an illuminating discussion of the concept of objectivity as it
relates to the social sciences, see Rudner[1966: ch. 4]).
The restrictedform. The contentionthat anthropologycannot discover ob-
jective truths about the non-Westernhuman object is a conclusion derived
from two postmodernistpremises. First, human intentions, purposes, and
desires-that is, meanings-are wholly culturallyconstructed;and, seeing
that cultures differ one from another, meanings are culturally relative.
Second, since cultures not only are different but radically different, their
meanings are incommensurateone with another. From this postmodernists
argue that the meanings of Westernanthropologistsare thus incommensurate
with those of the non-Westernpeoples they study and that for Westernanthro-
pology non-Westernpeoples are wholly Other, that is, their minds and cul-
tures opaque to objective understanding,which precludesthe possibility of a
comparativestudy of culturalmeaning systems.
Althoughthese conclusions follow validly from theirpremises, in my view
(Spiro 1986, 1994: ch.l) both the premises and the conclusions are false.
Rather,however, than reiteratemy reasons for rejectingthe premises, here I
only wish to observe that the conclusions are both paradoxical and self-
defeating for the postmodernistproject itself. If (as postmodernistscontend)
anthropologicalinquiry is concerned with the study of meanings and if (as
they also contend) non-Westernpeoples are Other, then how can a Western
anthropologistcomprehendtheir meanings when, ex hypothesi, they cannot
be known?6Moreover, if their Othernessprecludesthe possibility of a com-
parativestudy of culturalmeaningsystems, then the very foundationalclaims
of postmodernism-that meaningsare wholly culturallyconstructedand cul-
turallyrelative and that culturesare radicallydifferentand incommensurable
-can only remainunfoundedspeculationswith no empiricalwarrant(see, in
this regard, Wikan [1993]).
Although many non-postmodernistanthropologistsalso view the elucida-
tion of meaningsas one of their centraltasks, since they do not view cultures
as incommensurable,they retainthe traditionalconceptionof anthropologyas
a comparativediscipline. For while they too are impressedby the extraordin-
ary range of culturaldiversity, they recognize (or at least many of them do)
that there are importantconstraints(for example, biological, psychological,
6 To their
credit, some postmodernists,recognizing this paradox, have bitten the bullet and
have turnedtheir attentionto the study of Westernculture.
770 MELFORD E. SPIRO

ecological) on thatdiversity;consequently,cross-culturaldifferencesin mean-


ing systems are not so radicalas to precludeanthropologistsfrom understand-
ing non-Westernpeoples. In short, for them culturaldiversitydoes not entail
that the non-Westernobject is Other. This, at least, is the testimony of many
seasoned field workers, including, for example, Bourguignon("The differ-
ences between human groups are not so radical that we cannot recognize
ourselves as we are, or as we mightbe, in others"[1979:79]), E. Bruner("We
understandotherpeople and theirexpressionson the basis of our own experi-
ence and self-understanding"[1986:6]), Erikson("Youwill not see in another
what you have not learnedto recognize in yourself" [1964:29]), and R. Paul
(We should be wary of social science theories that do not come "close to
correspondingto what one's own actual experience of being alive is like"
[1990:433]).
The unrestrictedform. This form of the contentionthat the subjectivityof
the human subject precludes the discovery of objective knowledge applies,
unlike the first, not to the non-Westernhuman object uniquely but to all
objects (non-humanas well as human,Westernas well as non-Western);and it
is groundednot in the postmodernistconception of culture but in its meta-
physics and epistemology. (For an importantdiscussion, see Reyna [1994].
For an illuminating, mostly postmodernist,examinationof the concept of
objectivity itself, see the collection of essays in Megill [1994].)
In opposition to the metaphysicalrealismof the WesternRationalistTradi-
tion, postmodernismis committedto metaphysicalidealism. Although some
metaphysicalidealists rejectthe very notion of an objective reality,this is not
the case for most postmodernistanthropologists;rather,they reject the notion
that such a reality exists independentlyof human representations(for ex-
ample, Rabinow 1986). To put it differently,they deny the existence of a
mind-independentreality. Since here, however, I am concerned not with
metaphysicalidealism as such but with the epistemologicalimplicationsthat
postmodernistsderive from it, my evaluationof this philosophical position
can be expressed by a single passage in Searle (1993a:38-39) which, in my
opinion, is decisive.
When[metaphysical idealists]presentus withan argument theyclaimto do so in a
languagethatis publiclyintelligible.But,I wishto argue,publicintelligibility
presup-
poses the existence of a publicly accessible world .... Wheneverwe use a language
thatpurports to havepublicobjectsof reference,we commitourselvesto realism.The
commitment is nota specifictheoryas to howthe worldis, butratherthatthereis a
for someoneto claimin a publiclanguagethat
way thatit is. Thus,it is self-refuting
metaphysical realismis false, becausea publiclanguagepresupposesa publicworld,
andthatpresupposition is metaphical realism.
Let us now turn, then, from metaphysicalidealism, as such, to the epis-
temological implicationsthat postmodernistsdraw from it, especially as they
relate to science. Since the external world, they argue, is perceived and
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 771

understoodby means of one or anothercultural"discourse,"all knowledge-


claims (whether of the physical or the human world) are "culturallycon-
structed,"hence necessarily subjective; moreover, since every cultural dis-
course is arbitrary,all knowledge-claims are also necessarily relative. That
being so, then as Nietzche (to whom postmodernismis profoundlyindebted)
argued, "Thereare not facts, but only interpretations."7
If, now, there are only interpretations-hence, if knowledge-claimsdo not
correspond to any facts, none at any rate that can be agreed upon-then
objective knowledge, postmodernistsargue, is impossible, and science is only
a particularkind of "story telling."8 Moreover, since scientific stories are
derived from one or anotherdiscourse, the criteriafor their assessment, like
those for any other story, can only be subjective. Given this view, it requires
but a short step to conclude that to "privilege"the knowledge claims of
Westernscience is hopelessly ethnocentric.As Feyerabend(who both influ-
enced and was influenced by postmodernistanthropologists)put it, "There
exist no 'objective' reasons for preferringscience and Westernrationalismto
other traditions"(quoted in Rorty 1995:34).
But if science is just anotherkind of story telling, then scientific theories
rest not so much on objective knowledge and an objective logic as on the
'interests' (racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, economic) of the story tellers.
Since, then, its truth claims are not so much empirically as ideologically
grounded,science is a form of dominationwhich, in the case of anthropology,
is evident in the asymmetriesof power that characterizeethnographicfield
work and writing(see Fabian1983, 1991; Haraway1989; Lutz 1990; Rosaldo
1986; Said 1989; and the critiqueby Spencer 1989).9
Since, however, hardly any one would deny that science is influenced by
ideology and interests, what makes the postmodernists'view exceptional is
that, for them, they are not one aspect of science but the whole of it: Ideology
and interests do more than influence the conduct of science, they dominate
it.1? In short, if warfare, according to Clausewitz, is diplomacy by other
7 Since such a stance, Gellner observes, "means in effect the abandonmentof any serious

attemptto give a reasonableprecise, documented, and testable account of anything . . . [it is


unclear]why, given thatuniversitiesalreadyemploy people to explainwhy knowledge is impossi-
ble (in philosophy departments),anthropologyshould reduplicatethis task, in somewhat ama-
teurishfashion" (1992:29).
8 In this regard, postmodernistthought has already had an impact on American politics.
According to the "new faith" in Washington,"what sort of person a politician is and what he
actuallydoes," a New YorkTimesreporterwrites, "arenot really important.What is importantis
the perceived image of what he is and what he does. Politics is not about objective reality, but
virtualreality"(Kelley 1993:64).
9 Although in this respect, as in most others, the influence of Foucault on postmodernist
thoughtis prominent,it should be noted that "criticalanthropology,"which also emphasizes the
asymmetriesof power in ethnographicfieldwork and writing, arose independentlyof Foucault.
For a balanced advocacy of critical anthropology,see Diamond (1980: Introduction)and Wolf
(1980). For one not so balanced, see the collection of articlesedited by Nencel and Pels (1991).
10 Since postmodernistthoughtis cross-disciplinary,it is not surprisingthatthis anthropologi-
772 MELFORD E. SPIRO

means, then for postmodernists,science-to borrowan expressionfrom Ha-


raway (1986)-is politics by other means.
Thus, Bruno Latour,whose studies of the laboratorysciences are widely
cited by postmodernists,holds that scientific laboratoriesare entirely shaped
by political agendasand that"nothingof any cognitive quality"takes place in
them (1983:161, my addedemphasis).Again, for Bob Scholte the concernof
the physical sciences with discoveringlawful relationsand order-his exam-
ple is the concept of biological constants-is primarilyideologically moti-
vated. "Law and orderin 'nature',"he writes (1984:964), "becomescientific
means to rationalizelaw and orderin society."Or considerCatherineLutz on
the scientific study of emotion. Since Western students of emotion, she
claims, view emotions as "irrational,""chaotic,""uncontrollable,"and "dan-
gerous"and since moreoverthese are the very qualitiesby which they "define
women," it is then evident-never mind that both claims are false (Spiro
1993)-that "theacademicliteratureon emotion can be considereda form of
political discourse on gender relations. . . . That literaturearises out of and
reenters a field of power struggles for the definition of true womanhood"
(Lutz 1990:78).
Consider, finally, Rosaldo's critique of The Nuer which, ratherthan ad-
dressing Evans-Pritchard'smethods or the accuracy of his findings-what
one would normally expect of a critique of an ethnographicmonograph-
addressesonly Evans-Pritchard's allegedly "close links to contextsof domina-
tion" and his putative attempt"to deny the connections between power and
knowledge .. . and to bracketthe purity of [the] data. .from the contam-
inatingcontextsthroughwhich they are extracted"(1986:88). In that attempt,
Rosaldo continues, Evans-Pritchard implictly"askshis readersto set aside the
context of colonial domination and view his study as [an] . . . objective
scientific account" (1986:93). Just in case, however, we mistake Evans-
Pritchard's"persona... of the detachedironicobserver"from the real thing,
Rosaldo asks us to consider two rhetoricalquestions:"Why did the govern-
ment of the Anglo-EgyptianSudanrequesthis report?"and "How much did it
pay for the researchand the publicationof its results?"(1986:88).
If now science is ideologically motivated storytelling whose function is
domination,then what makesone scientific storybetterthananotheris not, so
postmodernistscontend, that one is true and the other false but that one is
good and the other bad, the latterqualities being taken here not as cognitive
but as moral and political predicates. Hence, given their moral and political
commitments,a scientific story is "good"insofaras it "empowers"subjugated
cal argumentfinds an exact parallel in history. As summarizedby Appleby and her associates,
postmodernisthistoriansargue that the temporal orientationof history is "merely the willful
impositionon subordinatepeoples of a Western,imperialistichistoricalconsciousness;it provides
no access to true explanation,knowledge, or understanding"(Appleby et al. 1994:205). More-
over, historical 'facts' "do damage. They reinforce the hegemony of white Westernmen over
women, other races, and other peoples" (1994: 205).
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 773

groups (ethnic and racial minorities, women, third-worldpeoples) and "bad"


insofar as it perpetuatestheir subjugation(see Abu-Lughodand Lutz 1990;
Lutz 1990; Scheper-Hughes1992, 1994. For an importantanalysis of this
"moralmodel" of science, as he calls it, see D'Andrade[1995]).
It is now perhaps evident that this conception of science is far removed
from-indeed it is an explicit critiqueof-the WesternRationalistTradition,
accordingto which science is the disinterestedpursuitof reliable knowledge,
or (more grandiosely) Truth. That this Enlightenmentconception, however,
has been honoredmore often in the breachthanin the practiceis, of course, a
truism. Anyone acquaintedwith the conduct of science, whether as partici-
pant or observer, knows that scientists are motivated not only by the Holy
Grail of knowledge-nor only, I would add, by the political and power
motives stressed by postmodernists-but also by ambition and envy, fame
and power, wealth and prestige, and an assortmentof other, all too human
motives."l It is also well-known that the influence of such non-cognitive
motives on the conduct of science (but also on every othertype of knowledge
production)can be disastrous,rangingfrom unwittingdistortionsand misin-
terpretationsto the willful cooking of data and the falsifying of reports.
It is precisely, however, because of these non-cognitive motives that sci-
ence (and, I would add, any disciplined search for knowledge) needs an
objective methodas a means for counteractingtheirinfluence. Moreover,it is
because scientific norms, uniquely,requiresuch a method that science, post-
modernistclaims to the contrarynotwithstanding,has been capableof discov-
ering objective knowledge. (Indeed, in view of its extraordinaryintellectual
achievements, I would suggest that the cavalierdismissal of science by post-
modernistsis stunning.)
Lest, however, I be misunderstood,let me stressthatnon-cognitivemotives
are never, in my view, absent from scientific (or any other type of) inquiry,
and no method, however objective, can eliminate them. Nor, I might add, is
the influence of these motives necessarily negative. Thus, in the context of
discovery, as I emphasizedin a previoussection, they may generateimportant
ideas, interpretations,and findings. In order, however, for the truth-valueof
these (and all other)ideas, interpretations,and findingsto be established,they

11 In this connection, the following excerpts taken from James Clerk Maxwell's Inaugural
Lecture as Professor of ExperimentalPhysics in the University of Cambridge, in 1871, seem
quaint beyond belief:
[Scientists] are not studying or attemptingto study the workingof those blind forces which, we
are told, are operatingon crowds of obscurepeople. . . . [T]heiractions and thought[are] more
free from the influence of passion. . . . [W]hen the action of the mind passes out of the intellec-
tual stage, in which truthand errorare the alternatives,into the more violent states of anger and
passion, malice and envy, fury and madness; the student of science, though he is obliged to
recognizethe powerfulinfluencewhich these wild forces have exercisedon [the rest of] mankind,
is perhaps in some measure disqualified from pursuingthe study of this part of human nature
(Quoted in Gillispie 1960: Foreword).
774 MELFORD E. SPIRO

must be tested;and it is in this phase of scientific (or any other)inquirythat it


is critical that the influence of non-cognitive motives be counteracted.
In short, it is here, in the context of justification, that the objective proce-
dures of the scientific method-procedures which assess the truthof an idea
or the validity of an interpretationby testing its predictive or retrodictive
consequences-are indispensableif objective knowledge is to be discovered.
Not only indispensable,but also efficacious. For if, in order to gain accep-
tance by the scientific community,the ideas, interpretations,and findings of
the individual scientist must first pass throughthe crucible of the scientific
method, then sooner or later-more often later than sooner-the distortions
and misinterpretations engenderedby the biases and interestsof the individual
scientist are discovered(and usually rectified), if not by the individualscien-
tist him or herself, then by the communityof scientists. In sum, if science has
discoveredobjective knowledge, it is not because scientists, unlike the rest of
mankind,arecapableof transcendingtheirsubjectivitybut becausethe latter's
banefuleffects on the conductof science are, more often thannot, neutralized
by the norms of science as a social institution.
I would now contend that, in the context of justification, the need for
objective proceduresis arguably more importantin the human than in the
physical sciences. For if subjectiveinterestsareformidableobstaclesto objec-
tivity, for example in physics, then surelythey are even more so, for example
in anthropology, in which the potentiality for ideologically motivated
distortion-imperialist and anti-imperialist, racist and anti-racist, ethno-
centric and multicultural,sexist and feminist-is much the greater.Thus, if
ethnography,as postmodernists(and others) insist, is an interpretiveenter-
prise and if the ethnographer'sinterpretationsare processed (as they surely
are) through all those and other ideological filters, then without objective
assessment procedures,how much credence can be placed in any interpreta-
tion, no matterhow empathicor insightful the ethnographer?
Hence, just as it is a genetic fallacy for scientific materaliststo contendthat
because interpretationsare subjective, ethnographersmust employ objective
techniqueseven in the context of discovery, so also it is a logical fallacy for
interpretivepostmoderniststo insist that they can only employ a subjective
method even in the context of justification. It is not only fallacious but
irresponsible.For if, on principle,ethnographerswill not employ an objective
methodfor assessing the validity of their interpretations-and, consequently,
conflicting interpretationsare merely differentstories to be accepted or re-
jected because one is morally or politically better than another-then any-
thing goes, in which case the ethnographicenterpriseis not only empirically
dubious but intellectuallyirresponsible.
AlthoughI have done so before (Spiro 1986), it is perhapsuseful to empha-
size once againthat, althoughthe scientific methodis applicableno less in the
human than in the physical sciences, this does not entail that the empirical
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 775

proceduresthey employ in compliance with that method must be the same.


For while methods, as I indicatedearlier, refer to the logical conditions that
must be satisfied for assessing the validity of an interpretation(or explana-
tion), nonethelessthe empiricalproceduresemployedin physics, for example,
for achieving such a valid assessment may be inappropriatein anthropology.
Hence, while I have no principledobjectionto laboratoryexperimentation,
quantification,mathematicalmodeling, and so forth, for assessing the validity
of ethnographicinterpretations-on the contrary,I believe ChairmanMao's
dictum that 100 flowers should bloom-nevertheless, I believe that in prac-
tice these procedures are only rarely appropriate(or efficacious) for that
purpose. But though holding that in regardto its assessmentprocedures,the
scientific method is pluralistic (not only across disciplines, but also within
them), I do not believe, however, thatthis is the case in regardto that method
itself. If the aim of responsibleinquiryis objective knowledge, then regard-
less of discipline, the most reliable method (so far at least) for achieving that
aim is the scientific method.

CONCLUSION
I wish to conclude not with my own words, but with those of a heterogeneous
group of prominentscholars who, while sharing(as I do) some of the moral
and political commitments of postmodernists, reject both their politicized
conception of science and the metaphysicalidealism from which it derives
much of its intellectualunderpinnings.
Consider, first, the words of a distinguishedMarxisthistorian. "I used to
think," Eric Hobsbawm(1993:63) writes,
thattheprofessionof history,unlikethatof, say,nuclearphysics,couldat leastdo no
harm.Now I knowit can.... [Thatbeingso] we havea responsibility to historical
abuseof historyin particu-
factsin general,andforcriticizingthepolitico-ideological
lar ... [One reason] is the rise of "postmodernist"intellectualfashions . . . partic-
ularlyin departments which imply that all "facts"
of literatureand anthropology,
claimingobjectiveexistencearesimplyintellectualconstructions. In short,thatthere
is no cleardifferencebetweenfactandfiction.Butthereis, andforhistorians,evenfor
themostmilitantlyantipositivist betweenthe
onesamongus, theabilityto distinguish
two is absolutelyfundamental. We cannotinventour facts ... Eitherthe present
Turkishgovernment, whichdeniestheattempted genocideof theArmenians in 1915,
is rightor it is not.
Consider,again, the words of anotherprominenthistorian.Defending John
Hope Franklin(the distinguishedhistorianof the Americanblack experience)
against his postmodernistcritics, George Fredrickson(1993:32) writes that
these critics
[question]theexistenceof a realityor set of objectivefactsexternalto the historian's
"discourse"[becauseforthem]historyis increasingly viewedas a formof fiction...
[But]if we cannotprovethattheHolocaustrevisionistsarewrongin someinarguable
way,we areclearlyin deeptrouble.
776 MELFORD E. SPIRO

Considernow the words of a young anthropologist,moved to reflect on the


consequencesof postmodernistthoughtfor understandingthe horrorsof state
terrorat the Fin de Siecle. "The notion that ethnographicrepresentations,"
Suarez-Orozco(1994: 37-38) writes,
areto be treatedas arbitrary
"texts"or "fictions"
simplyprivilegingcertaincapricious
positionshas a certainrhetorical whentreatingquaintfolkloristic
appeal,particularly
phenomenalike the cockfight or folk poetry. . . . When turningto death camps, rape
camps,andtorturecamps,the ideaof treatingevents-and theirrepresentations-as
"fictions" becomes instantly repulsive. ... As cultural anthropologycontinues its
affairwith "subjectivity". . . and righteouslyrenouncesany "scientific"pretensions,
craft. . . [But]howcansuchananthropology
it is becominga storyteller's be of useto
ourunderstanding-and dismantling-ofethniccleansings,rapecamps,andtorture
camps?
Consider, finally, the words of a distinguished and anti-fascist political
philosopherof the past generation. Defending metaphysicalrealism against
the politically inspired criticisms of metaphysicalidealists, HannahArendt
(1968:237) argued that metaphysical realism is a necessary condition for
politics because the political enterpriseis kept alive as a humanpossibility by
the need to confront"unwelcomefactual truths."Hence, while stressingthat
human subjectivityraises formidableproblems for the conduct of social in-
quiry,still "theymust not serve as justificationsfor blurringthe dividing lines
between fact, opinion, and interpretation,or as an excuse for the [scholar]to
manipulatethe facts as he pleases."
REFERENCES

Abu-Lughod,Lila; and CatherineLutz. 1990. "Introduction,"in CatherineLutz and


Lila Abu-Lughod, eds., Language and the Politics of Emotion. Cambridge:Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress.
Appell,GeorgeN. 1992."Scholars,TrueBelievers,andtheIdentityCrisisin Ameri-
can Anthropology."Reviews in Anthropology,21:193-202.
Appleby,Joyce;Lynn Hunt;and MargaretJacobs.1994. Tellingthe Truthabout
History.New York:W. W. Norton.
Arendt,Hannah. 1968. BetweenPast and Future:EightExercises in Political Thought.
New York:Viking.
Bourguignon, Erika. 1979. Psychological Anthropology:An Introductionto Human
Nature and CulturalDifferences. New York:Holt, Rinehartand Winston.
Bowen, ElenoreSmith(LauraBohannan).1964. Returnto Laughter.New York:
Doubleday.
Breuer,Josef;andSigmundFreud.1893-1895[1955].Studieson Hysteria,vol. 2 of
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Worksof Sigmund Freud.
London:HogarthPress.
Briggs, Jean L. 1970. Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Cambridge:
HarvardUniversityPress.
Bruner,EdwardM. 1986."Experience in VictorW. Turnerand
andIts Expression,"
EdwardM. Bruner,eds., The Anthropologyof Experience. Urbana:University of
IllinoisPress.
Clifford,James.1983. "OnEthnographic
Authority." 1:118-46.
Representations,
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 777

Clifford, James;and George E. Marcus, eds. 1986. WritingCulture:The Poetics and


the Politics of Ethnography.Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Cope-Casten, Vance. 1989. "A Portraitof Dominant Rationality."American Philo-
sophical Association Newsletter on Feminismand Philosophy, 88:29-34.
Crapanzano,Vincent. 1980. Tuhami:Portraitof a Moroccan. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
D'Andrade, Roy. 1995. "Moral Models in Anthropology."CurrentAnthropology,
36:399-408.
Devereux, George. 1951. Reality and Dream: The Psychotherapyof a Plains Indian.
New York:New York University Press.
. 1967. From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences. The Hague:
Mouton.
DeVos, George. 1954. "A Comparisonof PersonalityDifferencesin Two Generations
of JapaneseAmericansby Means of the RorschachTest."Ngoya Journalof Medical
Science, 17:153-65.
DeVos, George; and L. Bryce Boyer. 1989. SymbolicAnalysis Cross-Culturally:The
Rorschach Test. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress.
Dewey, John. 1938. Logic: The Theoryof Inquiry.New York:Henry Holt.
Diamond, Stanley, ed. 1980. Anthropology: Ancestors and Heirs. The Hague:
Mouton.
DuBois, Cora. 1944. ThePeople ofAlor. Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress.
Eagle, MorrisN. 1984. RecentDevelopmentsin Psychoanalysis.New York:McGraw-
Hill.
Erikson, Erik H. 1964. Insight and Responsibility.New York:Norton.
Ewing, Katherine. 1987. "Clinical Psychoanalysisas an EthnographicTool." Ethos,
15:16-39.
Eysteinsson, Astradur.1990. The Concept of Modernism.Ithaca:Cornell University
Press.
Fabian, Johannes. 1983. Time and the Other: How AnthropologyMakes its Object.
New York:Columbia University Press.
. 1991. "Dilemmas of Critical Anthropology,"in LorraineNencel and Peter
Pels, eds., ConstructingKnowledge: Authority and Critique in Social Science.
London: Sage Publications.
Fredrickson,George M. 1993. "Pioneer."The New YorkReview, September23:30-
34.
Freud, Sigmund. 1910. [1958]. The FutureProspectsof PsychoanalyticTherapy,vol.
11 of TheStandardEditionof the CompletePsychological Worksof SigmundFreud.
London:HogarthPress.
. 1912. [1958]. The Dynamics of the Transference,vol. 12 of The Standard
Edition of the CompletePsychological Worksof SigmundFreud. London:Hogarth
Press.
. 1937. [1964]. Analysis Terminableand Interminable,vol. 23 of TheStandard
Edition of the CompletePsychological Worksof SigmundFreud. London:Hogarth
Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1992. Postmodernism,Reason and Religion. London:Routledge.
Gillispie, CharlesCoulston. 1960. TheEdge of Objectivity:An Essay in the History of
Scientific Ideas. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.
Ginzberg, Ruth. 1989. "Feminism,Rationality,and Logic." AmericanPhilosophical
Association Newsletter on Feminismand Philosophy, 88: 34-39.
Gladwin, Thomas;and SeymourB. Sarason. 1953. Truk:Man in Paradise. New York:
Wenner-GrenFoundationfor AnthropologicalResearch.
778 MELFORD E. SPIRO

Gleick, James. 1992. Genius: The Life and Science of RichardFeynman.New York:
Pantheon.
Griinbaum,Adolf. 1984. The Foundationsof Psychoanalysis:A Philosophical Cri-
tique. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Habermas,Jurgen. 1971. Knowledgeand HumanNature. Boston: Beacon Press.
Hallowell, A. Irving. 1938. [1955]. "Fear and Anxiety as Cultural and Individual
Variablesin a PrimitiveSociety."Journalof Social Psychology,9:25-47. Reprinted
in Cultureand Experience. Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress.
. 1954. [1955]. The Self and its Behavioral EnvironmentExplorations, II
(April). Reprintedin Cultureand Experience.Philadelphia,PA: Universityof Penn-
sylvania Press.
. 1955b. Culture and Experience. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Haraway, Donna Jean. 1986. "Primatologyis Politics by Other Means," in Ruth
Bleier, ed., FeministApproachesto Science. New York:PermagonPress.
. 1989. Primate Visions. New York:Routledge.
Harvey,David. 1989. The Conditionof Postmodernity:An Enquiryinto the Origins of
CulturalChange. Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
Hempel, Carl. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York:The Free Press.
Henry, William. 1947. "The Thematic Apperception Technique in the Study of
Culture-PersonalityRelations." Genetic PsychologyMonographs, 35:3-135.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1993. "The New Threatto History."TheNew YorkReview,Decem-
ber 16, 62-64.
Kelley, Michael. 1993. "DavidGergen, Masterof the Game."New YorkTimesMaga-
zine. October 31, 1964.
Kitcher, Philip. 1994. The Advancementof Science: Science withoutLegend, Objec-
tivity withoutIllusions. New York:Oxford University Press.
Kracke, Waud. 1978. Force and Persuasion: Leadership in an AmazonianSociety.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
. 1987. "Encounterwith Other Cultures:Psychological and Epistemological
Aspects." Ethos, 15:58-81.
La Barre, Weston. 1967. "Preface,"in George Devereux, FromAnxietyto Method in
the Behavioral Sciences. The Hague: Mouton.
Latour,Bruno. 1983. "Give Me a Laboratoryand I Will Raise the World,"in KarinD.
Knorr-Cetinaand Michael Mulkay, eds., Science Observed: Perspectives on the
Social Study of Science. London;Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Levi-Strauss,Claude. 1955 [1964]. TristesTropiques.New York:Atheneum.
LeVine, Sarah. 1981. "Dreamsof the InformantAbout the Researcher:Some Diffi-
culties Inherentin the ResearchRelationships."Ethos, 9:276-293.
Lewis, HerbertS. 1994. "On the ParlousState of AnthropologyToday."Manuscript.
Lindzey, Gardner. 1961. Projective Techniquesand Cross-CulturalResearch. New
York:Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Lutz, Catherine. 1990. "EngenderedEmotion: Gender, Power, and the Rhetoric of
Emotional Control in American Discourse," in Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-
Lughod, eds., Language and the Politics of Emotion. Cambridge:CambridgeUni-
versity Press.
Mandelbaum,David G., ed. 1957. EdwardSapir: Culture,Languageand Personality.
Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Marcus, George E.; and Michael M. Fischer. 1986. Anthropologyas Cultural Cri-
tique: An ExperimentalMoment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
POSTMODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY: A MODERNIST CRITIQUE 779

Megill, Allan, ed. 1994. RethinkingObjectivity.London:Duke University Press.


Nencel, Lorraine;and Peter Pels, eds. 1991. ConstructingKnowledge:Authorityand
Critique in Social Science. London:Sage Publications.
Paul, RobertA. 1990. "WhatDoes Anybody Want?Desire, Purpose, and the Acting
Subject in the Study of Culture."CulturalAnthropology,5:431-51.
Popper, Karl. 1963. Conjecturesand Refutations.New York:Basic Books.
Rabinow, Paul. 1977. Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco. Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress.
. 1986. "Representationsare Social Facts: Modernity and Postmodernityin
Anthropology,"in JamesCliffordandGeorge E. Marcus,eds., WritingCulture:The
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography.Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Rabinow, Paul; and William Sullivan. 1987. InterpretiveSocial Science: A Second
Look. Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress.
Read, KennethE. 1967. The High Valley.London:George Allen and Unwin.
Reyna, S.P. 1994. "LiteraryAnthropology and the Case Against Science." Man,
29:555-81.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1981. Hermeneuticsand the Human Sciences. New York:Cambridge
University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1995. "Untruthand Consequences."New Republic, July 31, 32-36.
Rosaldo, Renato. 1984. "Grief and a Headhunter'sRage: On the CulturalForce of
Emotions," in Edward Brunner, ed., Text, Play and Story. Washington, D.C.:
Proceedingsof the AmericanEthnologicalSociety.
. 1986. "Fromthe Door of His Tent:The Fieldworkerand the Inquisitor,"in
James Cliffordand George Marcus, eds., WritingCulture. Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress.
. 1989. Cultureand Truth:The Remakingof Social Analysis. Boston: Beacon.
Ruby, Jay, ed. 1982. A Crack in the Mirror:ReflexivePerspectivesin Anthropology.
Philadelphia:University of PennsylvaniaPress.
Rudner,Richard. 1966. Philosophyof Social Science. EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Said, EdwardW. 1989. "Representingthe Colonized: Anthropology'sInterlocutors."
Critical Inquiry, 15:205-25.
Scheper-Hughes,Nancy. 1992. "HungryBodies, Medicine, and the State: Towarda
Critical Psychological Anthropology,"in Theodore Schwartz, GeoffreyM. White,
and CatherineA. Lutz, eds., New Directions in PsychologicalAnthropology.Cam-
bridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
. 1994. "The Violence of EverydayLife: In Searchof a Criticaland Politically
Engaged Psychological Anthropology,"in Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozcoand George
and Louise Spindler, eds., The Making of Psychological Anthropology,II. Fort
Worth:HarcourtBrace College Publishers.
Scholte, Bob. 1984. "Reason and Culture: The Universal and the ParticularRe-
visited." AmericanAnthropologist,86:960-65.
Schwartz,Theodore. 1992. "Anthropologyand Psychology: An UnrequitedRelation-
ship,"in TheodoreSchwartz,GeoffreyM. White, andCatherineA. Lutz, eds., New
Directions in PsychologicalAnthropology.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Searle, JohnR. 1993a. "Is There a Crisis in AmericanHigherEducation?"Bulletin of
the AmericanAcademyof Arts and Sciences, 56: 24-47.
----. 1993b. "Rationalityand Realism, What is at Stake?"Daedalus, 122:55-84.
Spencer, Jonathan. 1989. "Anthropologyas a Kind of Writing."Man, 24:145-64.
Spindler, George D. 1955. Sociocultural and Psychological Processes in Menomini
Acculturation,vol. 5. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
780 MELFORD E. SPIRO

Spiro, Melford E. 1984 [1994]. "Some Reflections on Cultural Determinism and


Relativismwith Special Referenceto EmotionandReason,"in RichardA. Shweder
and Robert A. LeVine, eds., Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press. Reprintedin Cultureand HumanNature.New Bruns-
wick: TransactionPublishers.
. 1986 [1992]. "CulturalRelativismand the Futureof Anthropology."Cultural
Anthropology,1:259-86. Reprintedand expandedin AnthropologicalOtheror Bur-
mese Brother?: Studies in Cultural Analysis. New Brunswick:TransactionPub-
lishers.
. 1990 [1992]. "On the Strange and the Familiarin Recent Anthropological
Thought,"in JamesE. Stigler, RichardA. Shweder,andGilbertHerdt,eds., Cultur-
al Psychology: Essays on ComparativeHuman Development. Cambridge:Cam-
bridge University Press. Reprintedin AnthropologicalOther or BurmeseBrother?
Studies in CulturalAnalysis. New Brunswick:TransactionPublishers.
. 1993. "On a Feminist/ConstructionistView of Emotions." Manuscript.
. 1994. Cultureand Human Nature, 2nd ed., Benjamin Kilbore and L. L.
Langness, eds. New Brunswick:TransactionPublishers.
States, Bert 0. 1994. "Notes on the PoststructuralCode." The American Scholar
(Winter), 111-16.
Suarez-Orozco, Marcelo M. 1989. Central American Refugees and U.S. High
Schools: A Psychosocial Study of Motivationand Achievement.Stanford:Stanford
University Press.
. 1994. "Terrorat the Fin de Siecle: The Systematizationof Hatred in a
ParanoidEra." Manuscript.
Tyler, Steven. 1987. The Unspeakable:Discourse, Dialogue, and Rhetoric in the
PostmodernWorld.Madison:University of Wisconsin Press.
Tyson, Robert L. 1984. "Countertransference: Evolution in Theory and Practice."
Journal of the AmericanPsychoanalyticAssociation, 34: 251-74.
Vendler,Zeno. 1984. "UnderstandingPeople," in RichardShweder and Robert Le-
vine, eds., CultureTheory.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Wallace, Anthony F. C. 1952. The Modal Personality Structureof the Tuscarora
Indians as Revealed by the RorschachTest. Washington:Bureauof AmericanEth-
nology (Bulletin 150).
Wikan, Unni. 1993. "Beyondthe Words:The Power of Resonance,"in Gisli Palsson,
ed., Beyond Boundaries: UnderstandingTranslation and Anthropological Dis-
course. Berg: Oxford/Providence.
Wolf, Eric R. 1980. "TheUnited States. The CulturalPredicamentof the Anthropolo-
gist," in Stanley Diamond, ed., Anthropology:Ancestors and Heirs. The Hague:
Mouton.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi