In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among
Union Bank v. Santibañez
G.R. No. 149926, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 228
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of
P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit
Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal
sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC
and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of
another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and
Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.
Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During
the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund
and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three
(3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them
was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime,
a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its
assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint
for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and
Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued
against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
was in the United States and there was no information on his address or
the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a
party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her
brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the
Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement
estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said
document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez;
thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points
out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was
already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the
agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it
should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE:
Within the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was
pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was
in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not
been approved by the probate court. Within there can be a valid partition
among the heirs before the will is probated.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim
left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as
follows:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim
left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as
follows:
o (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire
thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being
so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid.
The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus
filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the
claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain
and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing
guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-
maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty.
G.R. No. 104482 January 22, 1996
BELINDA TAREDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers
and sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TANEDO, representing her
minor daughter VERNA TANEDO, petitioners
 vs.
 THE COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAREDO AND TERESITA
BARERA TAREDO, respondents
FACTS:
October 20, 1962: Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of
absolute sale
in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and the
latter’s wife, Teresita Barera (private respondents) whereby he
conveyed for P1,500 one hectare of his future inheritance from his
parents.

February 28, 1980: Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro made
another a davit to rea rm the 1962 sale.

January 13, 1981: Lazaro acknowledged therein his receipt of P
10,000.00 as consideration for the sale.

February 1981: Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property
to his children (petitioners) through a deed of sale dated December
29, 1980

 On June 7, 1982, Ricardo recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in
the Registry of Deeds
 are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject
Petitioners led a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds
of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of Ricardo. They contend that
Lolo Matias desired that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive
from him should be given to his (Lazaro’s) children.
Ricardo (private respondents) however presented in evidence a
“Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale” wherein Lazaro revoked the
sale in favor of his children for the reason that it was “simulated or
ctitious - without any consideration whatsoever.”
LAZARO’S VERSION: He executed a sworn statement in favor of his
children. BUT he also testi ed that he sold the property to Ricardo,
and that it was a lawyer who induced him to execute a deed of sale
in favor of his children after giving him ve pesos (P5.00) to buy a
“drink”. LABO
Trial court ruled in favor of Lazaro’s children. Ca a rmed TC’s
decision.
ISSUES:
 1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid? NO
 2. Was
Ricardo’s registration of the deed of valid? YES
HELD: SC rules in favor of Ricardo.
Pursuant to Art 1347, the contract made in 1962 (sale of future
inheritance) is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between the parties. (“No contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.)
However, Article 1544 governs the preferential rights of vendees in
cases of multiple sales. The property in question is land, an
immovable, and ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith
registers it rst in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of
sale in favor of Ricardo was later than the one in favor of Lazaro’s
children, ownership would vest with Ricardo because of the
undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have
not registered the sale to them at all.
Lazaro’s children contend that they were in possession of the
property and that Ricardo never took possession thereof. As between
two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a
preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if
the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
21. SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS,
SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F.
SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE
LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:]
TOPIC: II. General Provisions
DOCTRINE: Whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the
property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of
acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent
of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed
Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita
Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. Petitioners
Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law
of Rita.
2. Respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her
lifetime.
3. Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject
property which is a part of her share in the estate of her
deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate.
a. It was evidence by documents entitled, “Bilihan
ng Lupa”
4. Respondents Lumbao later on took actual possession thereof
and built a house which they have been occupying as exclusive
owners up to the present.
5. Lumbaos made several demands from Rita and the heirs for
them to execute the necessary documents to effect the
issuance of a separate title in their favor.
a. Lumbaos alleged that prior to her death, Rita
informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could
not deliver the title to the subject property because
the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs
from Maria had not yet been partitioned
6. Lumbaos alleged that the petitioners acted fraudulently and are
conspiring with another by executing a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement portioning among themselves the properties of
Maria, including the subject property.
7. Lumbaos then sent a formal demand to petitioners but the latter
refused to reconvey the subject property. So the Lumbaos filed
a Complaint for Reconveyance before RTC of Pasig City.
8. Petitioners denied the alleged sale to Lumbaos and that the
Extrajudicial Settlement was duly published as required by law.
9. Lumbaos then amended their complaint, discovering that the
petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favour
of Julieta S. Esplana for P30,000.
10. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the
Lumbaos to pay them P30,000 for expenses incurred.
11. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao.
12. Hence the petition:
a. Petitioners contend that they are not bound by the
“Bilihan ng Lupa” because it is null and void for being
falsified because of the following:
i. one of those documents made it appear
that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were
witnesses to its execution and that they
appeared personally before the notary
public, when in truth and in fact they did
not.
ii. Identity of the properties were not
established by the evidence presented
iii. Respondents are estopped by laches from
claimining
iv. Claim on the properties had already
prescribed.
ISSUE: Are the petitioner heirs bound to the “Bilihan ng Lupa” executed
by the Rita, their mother, in favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao?
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
1. General Rule: heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest
2. whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the
property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a
mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the
 decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the
heirs
3. In the present case the heirs cannot escape the obligation of
the deceased since they only inherited the property.
4. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their
deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their
mother had and what is valid and binding against her is
also valid and binding as against them.
5. Death of a party does not excuse non-performance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of
the deceased.
6. Heirs must reconvey to the respondent Lumbaos the 107sq. m.
lot.
OTHER ISSUE: the documents “Bilihan ng Lupa” is presumed valid being
notarized, a public instrument, unless the contrary has been proved. In
the case, petitioners failed to prove the falsity of the documents.
Testate Estate of the late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor, The Parish
Priest, G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979.
20
JUL
[AQUINO, J.]
FACTS
Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testator’s three
sisters. The will also contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male
relative who shall pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as
priest. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as
the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of
Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not
delivered to that ecclesiastic.
ISSUE
Whether the testator’s nearest male relative who took the priesthood after
the testator’s death falls within the intention of the testator in providing to
whom the bequest is to be given.
RULING
NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest
male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
case of representation, when it is proper” (Art. 1025, Civil
Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who
became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of
the rice lands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was
likewise inoperative.
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
Facts:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died in
Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for
the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by
the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and
Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
designating Junquera as executor thereof. The document, drafted in
Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the
presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto
Leonardo who acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. After due trial, the
probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery.
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under
the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that
he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of
heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law
making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced
heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the
order of the court declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs
of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
memorandum he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration,
Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights. In the waiver,
five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed
estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting
as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim;
that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the
waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed
before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been
executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance
of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of
subject matter.
After due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs
who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to
Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial
court's order declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of
the estate of Vito Borromeo.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is
not a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real
and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the
decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The
claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement, according
to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is
improper.
Respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of
hereditary rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the
properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a partition of the
properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it was
executed in the course of the proceedings. He further maintains that the
probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all
the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those
entitled to the same.
Held:
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be
noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed
the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No.
L-18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising
jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to
the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated
December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated
December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of
the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7,
1975, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL
and VOID;
SO ORDERED.
SEP
12
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley v. JUAN
POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue. G.R. No. L-43082. June
18, 1937
FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and
personal properties. The will bequeathed Matthew Hanley, Thomas'
nephew, the money and the real estate. Also stipulated was that the
property will only be given ten years after Thomas' death.
The CFI appointed PJM Moore as considered trustee to administer the
real properties. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and Pablo
Lorenzo was appointed in his stead.
Juan Posadas, the CIR, assessed inheritance tax against the estate
amounting to P2,057.74. Lorenzo paid the tax after he was ordered by
the CFI due to the CIR's motion. Lorenzo claimed that the inheritance tax
should have been assessed after 10 years and asked for a refund.
The CIR denied the protest and reassessed Lorenzo of P1,191.27 which
represents interest due on the tax and which was not included in the
original assessment. However, the CFI dismissed this counterclaim and
also denied Lorenzo’s claim for refund against the CIR, thus the case.
ISSUES :Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance.
Whether the inheritance tax be computed from its value ten
years later.
Whether the compensation of the trustees should be part of the
estate subject to tax.
RULING:
YES. The delinquency in payment occurred when Moore became
trustee. The interest due should be computed from that date and it is error
of Lorenzo to compute it one month later. A surcharge 25 per centum
should be added to the tax and interest due and unpaid within ten days
after the date of notice. The CIR communicated with Moore and a date
was fixed. As the tax and interest due were not paid on that date, the
estate became liable for the payment of the surcharge.
NO. The Court held that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at the
time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the
actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the
tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time
regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
NO. A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his
services . But from this it does not follow that the compensation due him
may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject
to tax.
Uson v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953.
25
JUL
[BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.]
FACTS
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death
in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no
other heir except his widow Maria Uson. Maria Uson sought to recover
lands held by Maria del Rosario who had four illegitimate children with
Nebreda, which the latter contends that her children are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights,
and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect.
ISSUE
Whether or not the illegitimate children may have successional rights
under the new Civil Code by way of its retroactive effect.
RULING
NO. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former
legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any
vested or acquired right of the same origin. The law commands that the
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article
657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in
favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.
Bonilla v. Barcena, G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976.
25
JUL
[MARTIN, J.]

FACTS

Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over parcels of land.

Pending the proceeding, she died. The counsel for deceased plaintiff filed
a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the
court denied the counsel’s prayer for lack of merit, and dismissed the
complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to
sue.

ISSUE

Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death
of the plaintiff.

RULING

YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.” From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. When Fortunata
Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her
heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There
is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.