11.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in
duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by
laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial
court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that
they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that
it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the
legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal
with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are
more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental
right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to
violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its
operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without
distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be
imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by
learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a
receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of
the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The
very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is
denied, with costs against the appellants.
12.

Yu Cong Eng Vs. Trinidad

47 Phil 385

G.R. No. 20479

February 6, 1925

Facts: The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila,
with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person,
company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the
purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in
any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was arrested, his books were seized,
and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and
on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the petition against the fiscal, or
prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and
against the judge presiding.

Issue: Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep
proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an
adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. But we are
clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature, because it would be
oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the
Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the
status of their business and directing its conduct.
13.

Layno v Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. L-65848; 24 May 1985; 136 SCRA 536

FACTS:

Petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr., the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was
accused “of grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official and/or
administrative duties” for “knowing fully well that he has no authority,” he suspended and prohibited
Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan members from participating and exercising
their official functions” as such thus causing them injury “consisting of the salaries due to said officials
not [being] received by them.” Respondent Sandiganbayan suspended him on October 26, 1983,
notwithstanding petitioner’s opposition to the same.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner’s suspension pendente lite violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

RULING:

YES. Suspension “does not impair petitioner’s foregoing constitutional right since the same is not a
penalty or a criminal punishment, because it was not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction
or as a result of judicial proceeding.” Further: “The suspension is merely a precautionary or preventive
measure issued even before the case is tried on its merits, purposely to ensure the fair and just trial of
the case.”

Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there
would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga.

“In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension.”

Petition is GRANTED and the preventive suspension imposed on petitioner is SET ASIDE.
14.

Deloso vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989 173 SCRA 409

FACTS

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which preventively
suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) from his position as provincial
governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.

Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While
he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) for issuing
to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the
Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to
the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter, thereby, causing undue injury to the
Municipality of Botolan.

Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely

HELD

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial
office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination
of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term.

The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic
Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the
Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of
this case.

The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic
application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension limited to only ninety (90)
days after which Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales.
15.

Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194, September 22, 1986

Facts:

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress,
vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period
of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the
election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made
by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In
Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the
petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of
due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they
can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to
him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
16.

Galman v Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. 72670; 12 Sep 1986; 144 SCRA 43

Facts:

An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination
of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the
participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as
opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration. The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26
military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of
President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing
of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked
later on. The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross
violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the
prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue:

Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double
jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court
that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated,
and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President
ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken
with due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its
failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and
double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the
account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined
verdict of the accused. The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was
set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was
granted.
17.

Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927

Facts:

Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of NorthCollege
Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the
disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion,
proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton
county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were
paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas of
Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor
was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate
District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May
1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey’s application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its
record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment
of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926,
the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme
Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was
rightly directed.

Issue:

Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.

Held:

All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him
in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the person
sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a
direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12
of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted.
This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not
become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it
can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be
properly ignored as within the maxim “’de minimis non curat lex.” The Court cannot regard the prospect
of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant
interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial
consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should
weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not
the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were
drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to
organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in
the county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the large fines
provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without
opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions,
with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence,
unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful
disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant
had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the
trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help
the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the
disqualification.
18.

Eastern Broadcasting v Dans; G.R. No. L-59329; 19 Jul 1985; 137 SCRA 628

FACTS:

A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of
national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE
contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the
closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court
could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and
academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme
Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the closure of the radio station without hearing constitutes a denial of due process.

RULING:

YES. The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang
Tibay v CIR (69 Phil 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations
curtailed. It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due
process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that
any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849)

Petitioner’s motion to withdraw or dismiss the petitioner is GRANTED for being moot and academic.
19.

Tatad v Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. L-72335-39; 21 Mar 1988; 159 SCRA 70

FACTS:

In October 1974, a formal report was filed charging petitioner with alleged violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. No action was taken on said report until it was revived on December 12,
1979, two months after it became public that petitioner had a falling out with the president. Criminal
charges were thereafter lodged against petitioner.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates petitioner’s right to
due process.

RULING:

YES. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutional guarantee of “speedy disposition” of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill
of Rights, the inordinate delay is violative of the petiitioner’s constitutional rights.

Petition is GRANTED. Criminal charges against petitioner are DISMISSED.

20.

Gonzales v Civil Service Commission; G.R. No. 105752; 02 Sep 1993; 226 SCRA 66

Wa jud
21.

Valladolid v Inciong; GR No. L-52364; 25 Mar 1983; 121 SCRA 205

FACTS:

Petitioner Ricardo Valladolid was refused admittance by JRM when he reported for work on February
16, 1979 from a cumulative 50-day leave. [He requested a five-day vacation leave on December 30,
1978, a fifteen-day sick leave on January 8, 1979 and a thirty-day sick leave on January 23, 1979. Only
the first two leaves were granted.]

On February 22, 1979, he filed for illegal dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay.

On February 28, 1979, JRM filed an application for clearance with the Ministry of Labor for willful breach
of trust and gross neglect of duty.

On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the order denying the application for clearance with
preventive suspension and directing JRM to reinstate Valladolid to his former position without
backwages and without loss of seniority rights.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not JRM was deprived of due process by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor.

RULING:

NO. JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that applications for clearance
have to be summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the
filing of the opposition. There is no violation of due process where the Regional Director merely required
the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.

Petitions are DENIED.

22. Makabuyung to. May Zaldivar vs SB, Zaldivar vs Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316, lahat magkakaiba ang titles.
But same ang content. Weird shizzle.

Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan; G.R. Nos. L-79690-707 & L-80578; 01 Feb 1989; 166 SCRA 316

FACTS:

Petitioner Zaldivar moved for Special Prosecutor Gonzales to be cited in contempt for defying the
Supreme Court’s cease and desist orders and for issuing contemptuous statements to the media.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Gonzales is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

YES. Statements made by respondent Gonzales to the media were contemptuous as they imply
members of the Supreme Court acted on a manner not befitting the officers of the highest court of the
country. Respondent is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzales seems
unaware of is that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests.
23.

Ortigas v Lufthansa; G.R. No. L-28773; 30 Jun 1975; 64 SCRA 610

FACTS:

Petitioner Ortigas filed a complaint against the airline. After the issues were joined, a pre-trial was
heard, the parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts and thereafter went to trial. Of the 24 times
the case as set for hearing, it was postponed at least 10 times at the instance of the defendant. When
the defendant’s witnesses failed to appear in court on September 28, 1966, the trial judge denied all
motions for postponement and ordered the entire testimony of one of defendant’s witness stricken out
on account that plaintiff’s counsel was not able to finish cross-examining said witness. The case was
then deemed submitted for decision on the evidence already presented.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the striking out of the witness’ entire testimony was arbitrary or oppressive to the
defendant’s cause.

RULING:

NO. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in
civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right
of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less
constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental
law.

Judgment appealed from is MODIFIED by raising the award of moral and exemplary damages to plaintiff
Ortigas to P150,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively. In all other respects, including as to the payment
of interest on the said amounts, the same is affirmed.
24.

Suntay v People; G.R. No. L-9430; 29 Jun 1957; 101 Phil 833

FACTS:

On January 10, 1955, petitioner Emilio Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs. On January 20, 1955, he left the Philippines for San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. The respondent Secretary on March 7, 1955 instructed
the Ambassador to the United States to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport
issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges
against him.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without hearing violates his constitutional
right to due process.

RULING:

NO. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of
the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge
in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically
or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact,
such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed
with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not
violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him
cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should
always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

Petition is DENIED.
25.

Tañada v Tuvera; G.R. No. L-63915; 29 Dec 1986; 146 SCRA 446

FACTS:

Petitioners move for reconsideration/clarification of the Court’s April 24, 1985 decision affirming the
necessity for publication of presidential decrees and issuances which are of general application.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” meant publication in the Official Gazette is
not always imperative.

RULING:

NO. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that
a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it
would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but
simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It
is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
26.

Tropical Homes, Inc. v NHA; G.R. No. L-48672; 31 Jul 1987; 152 SCRA 540

Facts:

72’ Tropical Homes, Inc. entered into a contract with Cordova (respondent)

73’Cordova was informed contract was cancelled due to non-payment of installments for a
period of seven (7)months

75’Cordova filed a letter-complaint with the DOTasking for a refund of the total payments he
made amountingto P8,627.86.case was referred to respondent National Housing Authority (NHA)

NHA HELD:Tropical Homes, Inc. be ordered to refund to Arturo Cordova78, P.D. No. 1344 was
passed : National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decidecases of the
following nature:a) Unsound real estate business practices; b ) Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by sub-divisionlot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman;The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory
after the lapse of fifteen (15)days from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of
the PhilippinesTH went to Office of the pres, The President failed to act on the appeal.TH petition for
certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction

ISSUE:

The only issue raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344.

Held:

P.D. No. 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds that a) it deprives herein petitioner access to courts of
lawand b) the manner of appeal provided for therein is violative of due process.

The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by
statutein which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
(Bello v.Francisco, 4 SCRA 134; Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, 47 SCRA 153). In other words, appeal is a
right of statutory and not constitutional origin.

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency
overcertain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition
of anadministrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in
countless controversieswhich cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.

The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial review of NHA decisions affirmed
orreversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review.We, therefore, hold that P.D.
No. 1344 in so far as the vesting of exclusive original jurisdiction over casesinvolving the sales of lots in
commercial subdivisions to NHA and the mode of appeal provided therein areconcerned, is not
unconstitutional.
27.

Alba v Nitorreda; G.R. No. 120223; 13 Mar 1996; 254 SCRA 753

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao suspended petitioner for gross misconduct after it found
that the latter was partial to the Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI)
school owners and acted against the interest of complaining students. Respondent did not comport
himself in accordance with justness, sincerity and professionalism required by the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees (R.A. 6713).

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 is
unconstitutional for their failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain cases from the decision of
the Ombudsman and is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to present his side at the scheduled preliminary
conference. His non-appearance thereat is attributable to no one else but himself and he cannot be
allowed to now pass the buck to the Graft Investigating Officer who had complied strictly with the
abovequoted procedure in the conduct of administrative investigations. Furthermore, undisputed is the
fact that not only did the Office of the Ombudsman give due course and consideration to petitioner’s
counter-affidavit, but it also entertained and resolved his motion for reconsideration which is not
ordinarily allowed in the adjudication of administrative cases where the penalty imposed is suspension
of not more that one month. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s claim, he was in fact given all opportunity to
be heard, albeit through pleadings.
28.

People v Lagao; G.R. No. 118457; 08 Apr 1997; 271 SCRA 51

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of parricide for the death of his wife. The accused entered a plea
of not guilty upon his arraignment and trial on the merits ensued.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the RTC erred in issuing the warrant of arrest without fixing the bail and without stating
that evidence of guilt was strong.

RULING:

NO. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was authorized under paragraph (b), Section 6 of Rule 112. It
was not required that since no bail was fixed in the warrant of arrest the court should state that the
evidence of guilt was strong. There was no need to stress the obvious, and if accused honestly believed
that the evidence of guilt was not strong he should have filed a petition for admission to bail.

Appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged November 04, 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 49 is AFFIRMED in toto.
29.

Go v CA; G.R. No. 101837; 11 Feb 1992; 206 SCRA 138

FACTS:

Petitioner, in a case of road rage, shot the victim and fled the scene. After establishing that that
petitioner was probably the assailant, the police launched a manhunt. Six days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself before the police to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the
police. He was immediately detained.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.

Petitioner is ORDERED released upon posting of a cash bail bond without prejudice to any lawful order
that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
30.

Ang Tibay v CIR; G.R. No. 46496; 27 Feb 1940; 69 Phil 635

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However,
the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s
Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely
busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.