31.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong; G.R. No. L-29646; 10 Nov 1978; 86 SCRA 270

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Manila passed an ordinace making it unlawful for any alien to be employed in
any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of
Manila without securing an employment permit from the City Mayor who has discretion whether or not
to grant said employment permit.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not assailed ordinance violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

RULING:

YES. While it is true that the State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means
of livelihood.
32.

Dumlao v COMELEC; G.R. No. L-52245; 22 Jan 1980; 95 SCRA 392

FACTS:

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and
has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for re-election for the same office.
Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted, Section 4 of which disqualifies any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office
to which he seeks to be elected from running for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 violates the equal protection and due
process guarantee of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid. The need for
new blood assumes relevance.

Paragraph 1, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is declared VALID. Portion of Paragraph 2, Section 4,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is declared NULL AND VOID.
33.

Forbes v Chuoco Tiaco; G.R. No. L-6157; 30 Jul 1910; 16 Phil 534

FACTS:

Defendant Chinese national was deported to China and was allegedly threatened to be deported again
when he came back to the Philippines. He filed for a preliminary injunction prohibiting plaintiffs from
deporting him. Said injunction was issued by the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the political rights of aliens are protected by due process of law.

RULING:

NO. The political rights of aliens is not governed by that “due process of law” which governs in dealing
with their civil rights. The certificate of admission is a mere license and may be revoked at any time. An
alien’s right to remain in the territory of a foreign government is purely a political one and may be
terminated at the will of such government. No cases have been found, and it is confidently asserted that
there are none, which establish a contrary doctrine.
34.

Peralta v COMELEC; G.R. No. 47771; 11 Mar 1978; 82 SCRA 30

FACTS:

The 1978 Election Code (Presidential Decree No. 1269) grants voters the option for straight party or
block voting where the vote for a party, group or aggrupation would be counted as a vote for all its
candidates.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not block voting violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What it proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based
upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies
equally to all those belonging to the same class.

Instant petitions are DISMISSED.

35.

Ceniza v COMELEC; G.R. No. L-52304; 28 Jan 1980; 95 SCRA 763

FACTS:

The Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980.
The said legislation classified the chartered cities into “highly urbanized” and “component” cities based
on the annual income of each city and provided that “the registered voter of a component city may be
entitled to vote in the election of the officials of a province of which the city is a component, if its
charter provides”, while “voters registered in a high urbanized city shall not participate nor vote in the
election of the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located. In
effect, the City of Mandaue is classified as a component city and its registered voters cannot participate
in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu as expressly provided in the city’s
charter (RA 5519).

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the assailed legislation violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and
privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the
law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials
while granting it to another individual or group of voters in the same city. neither can it be considered
an infringement upon the petitioners’ rights of suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter
in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited
to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the questioned statues neither
withdraw nor restrict.

Petition is DISMISSED.
36.

UNIDO v COMELEC; G.R. No. 56515; 03 Apr 1981; 104 SCRA 17

FACTS:

Petitioner asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the same prime time and the same
number of television and radio stations all over the country to be used in its campaign for “NO” votes in
the plebiscite for the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa as that
utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide “Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo” in campaigning for “YES”
votes on the proposed constitutional amendments.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not COMELEC’s denial of petitioner’s request to be afforded the same privilege as the
president was violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

NO. It is undeniable and but natural that the head of state of every country in the world must, from the
very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are
opposed to him. The opposition cannot be placed at par with him.

Appeal is DISMISSED.
37.

Gumabon v Director of Prisons; G.R. No. L-30026; 30 Jan 1971; 37 SCRA 420

FACTS:

Petitioners were meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes.
They invoked the ruling in People v Hernandez where the existence of the offense was negated and the
accused were sentenced to a penalty of prision mayor.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Hernandez doctrine applies in the case at bar.

RULING:

YES. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been
freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the
contrary, it would render it nugatory.

Petition for habeas corpus is GRANTED.

38.

People v Hernandez; G.R. Nos. L-6025-26; 18 Jul 1956; 99 Phil 515

FACTS:

Amado Hernandez and several others were accused of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies. They were convicted of the crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder.

RULING:

NO. Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients to the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants as means
“necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion. The crime, therefore, is simple rebellion.

Motion for bail is GRANTED.

39.

Nuñez v Sandiganbayan; G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617; 30 Jan 1982; 111 SCRA 433

FACTS:

Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1606 which provides that public officers and employees convicted with estafa may only
appeal their conviction by certiorari to the Supreme Court, whereas other estafa indictees are given
more prospects of reversal of the decision against them as they are entitled to appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and the Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not PD 1486 as amended by PD 1606 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

RULING:

NO. The constitutional mandate for the creation of a special court to hear offenses committed by public
officers was the authority to make a distinction between prosecution for dishonesty in public service
and prosecution for crimes not connected with public office.

Petition is DISMISSED.
40.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon; G.R. No. L-81958; 30 Jun 1988; 163 SCRA 386

FACTS:

The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, for the
temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. The Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges said order for being discriminatory against
domestic helpers and women of similar skills.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the assailed department order violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. There is strong evidence that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances. Such is not the case for male
workers.

Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to “enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers.” This Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.

Petition is DISMISSED.
41.

The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA; G.R. No. 114714; 21 Apr 1995; 243 SCRA 666

FACTS:

The Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issued Resolution
No. 01, series of 1994 amending and increasing the compensation and other benefits under Part. II,
Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract
for Seafarers. POEA also issued Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994 informing all Filipino
seafarers, manning agencies, shipowners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers of the said
adjustments.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the assailed issuances violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino
overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life
and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

42.

Himagan v People; G.R. No. 113811; 07 Oct 1994; 237 SCRA 538

FACTS:

The trial court issued an order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of
Section 47, RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) which suspends a member of the PNP with complaints for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is 6 years and one day or more from office until the case is
terminated.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is a violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

RULING:

NO. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Petition is DISMISSED.
43.

Almonte v Vasquez; G.R. No. 95367; 23 May 1995; 244 SCRA 286

FACTS:

Respondent Ombudsman subpoenaed petitioners in connection with his investigation of an anonymous

letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB).

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was a violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.

RULING:

NO. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any
form and in a manner,” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of
the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

Petition is DISMISSED.
44.

People v Cayat; G.R. No. 45987; 05 May 1939; 68 Phil 515

FACTS:

Accused was sentenced to a fine for violating Act No. 1639 which prohibits a member of a non-Christian
tribe “to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make.”

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Act No. 1639 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

RULING:

NO. The prohibition is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-
Christian tribes. It has been the and experience of the past that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors
the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of
the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

Judgment is AFFIRMED.
45.

Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v Treasurer of Ormoc City; G.R. No. L-23794; 17 Feb 1968; 22 SCRA 603

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing a tax “on any and all products of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.”

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Ordinance No. 4 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

YES. The ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by petitioner sugar company and
none other. Even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Decision appealed from is REVERSED. Defendant-appellees are ordered to refund the tax paid under
protest.
46.

Philippine Judges Association v Prado; G.R. No. 105371; 11 Nov 1993; 227 SCRA 703

FACTS:

Section 35 of RA 7354, the law creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, withdraws the franking
privileges from the judiciary, along with certain other government offices.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Section 35 of RA 7354 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution.

RULING:

YES. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of
the Judiciary for such privilege.

Petition is GRANTED and Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is
SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the judiciary.