Countering the Establishment’s Narrative

(‘48, ‘65, ‘71, ‘99 and present)

Pre-partition:

US President Woodrow Wilson presented his famous fourteen points in 1918. The crux of these was
an acknowledgement that the nations to have an inalienable right for self-determination. In reality,
these points were presented by the US President as an attempt to break the strength of dominant
colonialist powers of the era like Britain, Spain, Portugal and Netherlands who ruled over their
colonies with absolute power, at the expense of the local populace.

The ”Atlantic Charter” was a statement issued on 14 August 1941 that set out American and British
goals for the period following the end of the Second World War. The US’s President Franklin D.
Roosevelt included the same principal for self-determination in the Charter in 1941 as a prerequisite
for contributing in the Allied war effort. After the end of WW2, Along with the Marshall Plan, the
U.S. pressured Britain and France to dismantle their colonial empires so that the whole third world
could be opened up to American capital. Although the decolonized countries were seemingly
independent, U.S. policy makers believed that these countries’ only purpose was to “provide raw
materials, investment opportunities, markets and cheap labour” to “complement the industrial
countries of the West” (Chomsky, 1992). Britain and the rest of colonial powers were forced to
relinquish direct authority over their colonies. The organizations and institutions of NATO, GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which then turned into ITO and later WTO, as well as the
dismantling of the British empire were all derived from the Atlantic Charter.

It was the dismantling of the British Empire that gave rise to several issues within its ex-colonies,
chiefly being Kashmir in the Indian subcontinent. Kashmir was the largest semi-autonomous state,
out of 560 within the sub-continent, which was ruled by a Dogra Raja Hari Singh. During partition, all
of these states except 3 either acceded to India or Pakistan. These 3, Kashmir, Hyderabad and
Junagarh, wanted to remain independent of either Pakistan or India.

Post-partition:

At partition, the Kashmiri (Dogra) ruler, and a very popular political leader Sheikh Abdullah both
opted for remaining independent. In October ‘47, Pakistan encouraged the Tribals to enter Kashmir
in with Pakistan army regulars, and they started liberating areas, to a point that they reached
Srinagar treasury. The famous anecdote is also true that the tribals and Armed Forces started
arguing with each other as to who would have the greater share of the booty in the treasury. At the
same time, in Gilgit-Baltistan, ordinary people along with Hari Singh’s own Gilgit scouts kicked out
his governor from the state.

The initial intent of the tribals and army regulars was to take Srinagar, but when they reached Uri,
they first stared encountering stronger resistance. The Dogra Raja fled to India and signed the
accession treaty. The Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar and they started pushing back the
Pakistani forces to the point where they hold ground today even after 70 years. The actual war
wasn’t a quick affair, as it had kept on raging between Oct ‘47 to Jan ‘49.

India took this issue to the UN promising plebiscite, and Liaquat Ali Khan, who was the prime
minister at that time, accepted the ceasefire. A ceasefire line was demarcated in Kashmir. The tribal
hated this, and one such tribal shot Liaquat Ali Khan for accepting the condition. The same line then
turned into line of control in 1972 after the Simla Accord in the northern parts, and became the
working boundary in areas adjacent to Sialkot sector. Both are treated different legally under
international law.

This shows how the issue actually got stalled when global institutions were called into arbitration,
and the people resented this, and was taken as a compromise even back then. Now the question
here is: Why was a need felt to accept International arbitration even when the rulers knew that this
has the potential to get the issue stalled indefinitely?

This is because Muslims rulers in general felt weak and insignificant, and helpless without external
help, and in order to obtain any objective that seemed insurmountable, they ultimately sought
outside help. Envisioning Pakistan’s standing with other nations even before its creation, Jinnah
stated in 1946, ‘Naturally no nation stands by itself. There will be an alliance with other nations
whose interests are common’ (Ahmed, 1951:284).

Also, during the Kashmir war, Jinnah requested USD 2 billion aid, but US ignored the request, and
instead, kept neutral.

In ’51, frustrated with the lack of progress on Kashmir, a group of army officers (including a Major
General) came up an elaborate plan, which is now known as the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, to
topple the government, in order to resume the war for Kashmir’s liberation, but they were all caught
and sentenced. This showed that even the senior officers had a genuine desire to liberate Kashmir
back then, and deemed it practical enough to partake in such an effort.

On 3 June 1949, Soviet Union sent an invitation to PM Liaquat Ali Khan which came as a surprise to
the United States. With India's strict commitment towards the Non-aligned Movement (NAM)
influenced the United States to send an invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950. Liaquat Ali Khan chose
to visit the US and postponed the USSR visit. The US was viewing cooperation with Pakistan as
aligning with its regional efforts against perceived the threat of the USSR, while Pakistan sought
strengthening against India in return. This was the very first example of our leaders presenting
themselves to the superpower for its bidding, so that help against a local rival could be obtained.

Although the US’s president Truman’s request Liaquat Ali Khan to let the CIA formulate a base in
Pakistan, strictly to keep an eye on the activities of Soviet Union, was not accepted by the PM. This
either showed that the Muslim rulers were initially sceptical of a complete subordinate role under
the US, as the British links within Pakistan were still very strong, or that they were too afraid of
angering the USSR in return.

Next year, Liaquat Ali Khan was himself shot by a disgruntled pushtun tribal, who was later
portrayed as an Afghan nationalist. This shows the emotions of the Ummah, and the resentment
that it felt for taking such a weak stance on Kashmir.

Lesson learned (Kashmir War):

Based on their mind-set, the lesson that our rulers learned at that time, was that Kashmir cannot be
won unless a great power’s supports Pakistan in this effort, or at the very least, strengthens Pakistan
militarily and financially to a certain point, that it can hold its own against India. But this cannot be
achieved until complete sovereignty is compromised, and a subordinate role is accepted.

Friends or Masters?

Pakistan joins US backed regional military alliances SEATO in ’54, CENTO in ’55. President Dwight
Eisenhower requested prime minister Suhrawardy to lease Peshawar Air Station to the American
Army for keeping an eye on soviet Union and its ballistic missile programme. This time, the request
was accepted by the PM.

In December, 1958, Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan declared: “We need friends for our security;
we shall hold fast to those we have and we shall seek new friends because the more friends we have
the better it is for our country. We shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steady,
dependable friends” (Khan, 1966:28). Ayub’s era was the first time that Pakistan had presented itself
as a full spectrum agent for the US, and the US in return exploited Pakistan to its fullest.

Over the years, through financial and military aid (under SEATO, CENTO and RCD), US upgraded
Pakistan’s military, G3 rifles replaced 3 naught 3s, F-86 jets replaced WW2 era fighters. The same
principal was now in working: Pakistan wanted to be strengthened against India. US wanted a
collaboration against USSR. So now, a regional alliance of US and British agents against Communism
was beginning to take shape with Iran (headed by the British agent Shah), Pakistan and Turkey.

Although during visit to Washington, Ayub Khan expressed his concern over growing friendship of US
and India and eventually on any military transaction between two countries. US’s President Kennedy
assured Ayub Khan that in case America gave arms to India, Pakistan would first be consulted (Khan,
1967:138).

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 showed that Indian Army was no match to China’s. This shocked Nehru
and on 26th October, he appealed to friendly countries to come for India’s help. The appeal evoked
immediate response, particularly Britain and US, the two countries supplying $70 million worth of
military equipment to meet India’s urgent requirements (Bowles, 1971:439).

Washington agreed for military aid to India without condition it to an agreement on Kashmir,
contrary to Pakistan’s wishes. The sight of ‘The strengthening of Pakistan’s most determined foes by
Pakistan’s closest ally’ caused great bitterness in Pakistan (Burke and Ziring, 1990:241).

Kennedy softened Pakistan’s anxiety by stating:

“In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of aid to
India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion. Chinese incursions into the
subcontinent are a threat to Pakistan as well as India and both have a common interest in opposing
it” (Stebbins, 1963:272). This clearly showed that the US envisioned cultivating both Pakistan and
India as its agents, the former primarily against the USSR, and the latter against Communist China.

By the time the Sino-Indian war of ’62 ended, the US had helped develop Pakistan’s armour and air-
power. So much so, that it had a qualitative edge over India, which had itself started undergoing
changes in armament and equipment, under US and British help, after losing the war to China.
Pakistan wanted to utilise the qualitative edge, before the Indian defence build-up was complete.

The US actually foresaw this, and on October 28th ’62, Kennedy wrote to Ayub Khan, suggesting that
he should assure Nehru that, “He could count on Pakistan’s taking no action on the frontiers to
alarm India” (Khan: 141). The Indo-China border clash had left India completely defenceless and
almost totally at the mercy of the West.

Considering the US’s approach to Pakistan, the Soviet approach to India was quite different in
comparison. In 1960, Soviet Ambassador Mihail Kapitsa was reported to have told Pakistanis:

“We support India and Afghanistan against you because they are our friends, even when they are
wrong. But your friends do not support you, even when they know you are right (Choudhary,
1975:35).
What is generally believed to have been concerning for the US, was the move for an air link between
China and Pakistan. An agreement was signed between them, according to it, Pakistan was given
traffic rights at Canton and Shanghai in exchange of rights for China at Karachi and Dacca.

By this time America was beginning to lose her patience with its agent’s attitude. She promptly held
up a pending $ 4.3 million loan for Pakistani airports improvement (Stebbins: 173-74).

Pakistan’s disappointment at being used like a tissue paper by the US was demonstrated by
Pakistan’s attitude at the council meeting of SEATO, held at Manila in mid-April, 1964. Pakistan took
a stand, that because of her preoccupation with the grave threat to her security, as she would not be
in a position to make a contribution to SEATO. Even Ayub Khan complained, “Now Americans do not
hesitate to let down their friends. Today their policy is based on opportunism and is devoid of moral
quality” (Dawn, 1960, April 20).

In July 1965, at suggestion of the US, the session of the World Bank Consortium was postponed from
17 July to 27 September. In this meeting member countries were to announce their contributions for
Pakistan’s development programme. Ayub Khan’s reaction to American suggestion was that:

“It is our right as an independent nation to normalise our relations with our neighbours, however
different our ideologies might be and that right we shall not allow to be compromised. It was in this
context that I said, we are looking for friends, not masters.” (Khan, 1966:09). It is ironic, that this was
also title of Ayub Khan’s book, as Pakistan had been used against the USSR by the US, and after its
worth was seen to have lessened in the eyes of the US against a much more potentially rewarding
India, the Pakistani agent rulers started complaining.

In the meanwhile, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic, allegedly Prophet s.a.w’s
hair, from Dargah Hazratbal in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Muslims
in the valley. This, coupled with the fact that India’s military reforms and re-armament with the help
of the US and Britain weren’t yet complete, was viewed by Pakistan as a situation, ideal for revolt in
Kashmir.

Lead-up to ’65 war, the war itself, and its aftermath

In August ’65, Ayub Khan on the advice of Foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, green lighted
operation Gibraltar. In which, Kashmir would be infiltrated with up to 40,000 regular Pakistan army
under the guise of locals. It was reasoned that the conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the
words of retired Pakistani General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir
problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general
war." (M.E. Sharpe, 2004)

The plan was multi-pronged. Infiltrators would mingle with the local populace and incite them to
rebellion. Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare would commence, destroying bridges, tunnels and highways,
harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking
airfields, with a view to create the conditions of an "armed insurrection" in Kashmir — leading to a
national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed that India would neither counter-attack, nor
involve itself in another full-scale war, and the capture of Kashmir would rapidly follow.

According to then Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Nur Khan, there was little coordination
amongst the military services on the impending operation. Pakistani author Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
notes that Muhammad Musa, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, was reportedly so confident that
the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air
Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action.
The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri
people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian
rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did
not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation
Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but
Pakistani Army regulars. This is the exact same approach was replicated in the Kargil conflict in ’99.

The operation ultimately started failing, and to ease the pressure, Operation Grand Slam was
launched on 1st Sept, to cut the vital logistical link between India and Jammu in Akhnoor. This led to
a stalemate after India’s reinforcements.

Pakistan wanted to keep the skirmishes local. While India opened a new front in Punjab on 6th
September. This led to a full blown war, which is now known as the ’65 war. This caused Pakistan to
stop its thrust in Kashmir, to reinforce its divisions in Punjab. The war was essentially a stalemate,
and the US and USSR intervention forced both parties to their original positions.

Both countries used weapons, supplied by US in the name of containing communism, against each
other. During the war, Islamabad was calling upon the Americans to fulfil their treaty obligations
under the Alliance and Washington’s refuted these on the grounds that these treaty obligations
could only be invoked by Pakistan in the event of an attack from a communist country and not from
an attack by India. The secret correspondence between Islamabad and Washington shows that these
differences moved from conceptual reality to being painful for Pakistan.

When US imposed an arms embargo on the subcontinent, an action which hurt Pakistan much more
than it did to India. As US was more interested in India, which by virtue of its size, resources, political
and economic potential and geographic location, was of great importance to the US’s national
interests. It had changed its decade old posture, as the US’s present military alliance with Pakistan
had become irrelevant to the present situation in Asia, as relations were straining between Soviet
Union and Communist China.

Ayub Khan, ignorant of US policy shift, was begging for its role in a permanent resolution of Kashmir
problem. In a secret meeting between him and US ambassador, he said, “Now is the time for
honourable settlement. This is the time when we can use not the pressure but realities of situation
to press for honourable settlement. US hope not to come into middle of current IndoPak crisis but
she is in middle. UN has weakened and won’t work. However, despite UN, there are bilateral
obligations. You can warn us and India too but you cannot avoid responsibility. You are on trial. You
cannot hedge or hide from this obligation. Otherwise, dispute will go on interminably”

Soviet Union believed that if China entered the war on the side of Pakistan, USA would join India.
Such development (according to the USSR) would have brought Pakistan under the complete
domination of China and India under that of USA, undermining Soviet influence in both the major
South Asian countries. Thus Prime Minister Kosygin of USSR offered good offices of his country
towards a peaceful settlement of Indo-Pakistani differences. Hence the Tashkent agreement of 1965
was signed under USSR’s arbitration.

US embassy in New Delhi also proposed restructuring of Indo-Kashmir relations to include a large
measure of autonomy for the Valley and the installation of a popular government there. “This will be
politically feasible for the government of India. Such a settlement might usefully include the offer of
Pakistan of access to the Valley for trade purposes, a guarantee of legitimate Pakistan’s interests in
water resources and eventually the opening of the border between India and Pakistani Kashmir to
permit a free exchange of people between two parts of the divided State. If a real reconciliation did
take place between India and Kashmiri people, Pakistan’s continued call for “Self Determination”
would ring increasingly hollow and she could expect to win little international support for her
position. If the people of Kashmir can find security in the Indian Union and under an autonomous
government of their own choosing, come to appreciate the economic advantages of remaining with
India, the ground will have been substantially cut out from under Pakistani protests of their concern
for the welfare of the Kashmiris”

Richard Nixon assumed office in the end of 1960s. Interestingly, President Nixon usually claimed
himself to be the friend of Pakistan but took no concrete steps to formulate a policy, favourable to
Pakistan. US priorities had changed in South Asia. This is reflected in the memorandum for the
President which was submitted by US secretary of State, William Rogers who recommended on
February 10, 1970, that, “We do not have overriding political and security interests in South Asia
which require us to get back into arms business. Our relations with both India and Pakistan are
generally good, despite the recent Indian flirtation with Hanoi and the disappearance of our former
‘Special Relationship’ with Pakistan and our intelligence facilities in that country. India is relatively
more important to our interests than Pakistan. India will react sharply to any US policy change. If we
can please only one of the two countries, we should lean towards India, the larger and more
influential power… Pakistan’s unhappiness will be containable. It will continue to maintain good
relations with us…because we are Pakistan’s largest aid donors.”

This policy shift which reflected lessening of security interests in South Asia was primarily due to the
Détente experienced between US and USSR from ’69 to ‘79.

Lesson learned (’65 war):

The establishment never wanted to provoke a full blown war with India, which is why they used the
guise of locals for the army regulars in Operation Gibraltar. But when the Punjab front was opened,
the painful reality hit them that it is not in the interest of the superpower to allow its agent Pakistan
to even provoke a small scale conflict with India. An open war is simply, out of question. But as
Pakistan’s provocations had led to an open war, punishment was meted out to Pakistan, because it
detracted from the US’s then envisioned regional efforts against USSR and Communist China. The
establishment also realised that the US would ultimately try to win over, and favour India, if it has to
choose between it and Pakistan, considering India’s size and potential. According to Dawn
newspaper, “The war led US to place economic and military embargoes on Pakistan, which resulted
in an economic collapse.” (Dawn, July 04, ‘12)

The ’71 war, and its aftermath

During the 70s, Pakistan was again seen as a potential ally, but only for warming relations with
China, in order to create a wedge between the Sino-Soviet relations. As per the ongoing Détente’
between the US and the USSR, the US was least interested in developing Pakistan militarily. Faced
with the prospect of a potential civil war back home, and no guarantees by the US that Pakistan
would have its support in quashing it, Pakistan still presented its services for the US’s cause.

In July 1971, it was announced that Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger had made a
secret trip from the Pakistani soil to Peking and that, as a result, the American President would visit
China early in 1972. The Sino- American diplomatic break-through created perception of an
emerging alliance between them directed against Soviet Union. Soviet Union penalised Pakistan for
its efforts to facilitate such a break through by sending eight shiploads of Soviet arms to India
(Donaldson, 1974: 226).
On the other hand, Dr. Henry Kissinger in his book, White House Years states, “Our relations with
Pakistan were marked by a superficial friendliness that had little concrete content”.

In policy appraisal of Pakistan after 1971 elections, the State Department was informed by US
embassy in Islamabad, “with a new government led by the Awami League, we see the potential for
warmer relations than we have had with the government of Pakistan since 1965. Sheikh Mujeeb
seems favourably disposed towards USA. On the other hand, Bhutto’s new political power may
create difficulties for us. In private, he has stressed her desire for good relations with us but in past
years and in the recent election campaign, he sharply criticised US policies in Pakistan and
elsewhere. More radical leftist elements in his Peoples Party are openly anti-American. In any case,
we expect Pakistan’s early withdrawal from CEATO and CENTO, a move supported both by Awami
League and Peoples Party. Our public image in Pakistan suffered grievously, especially in West
Pakistan because of our failure to back Pakistan in 1965 IndoPak war. The ‘image’ of US is more
favourable in East Pakistan, except with leftists” (Khan: 1999, 427).

In April 1971, US cut off small scale supply of military equipment to Pakistan and a few months later,
economic aid was suspended in order to pressure Islamabad to come to terms with Bangladeshi
movement’ (Rose, 1978:411).

On April 15, ’71, Senator Clifford Case and Senator Walter Mondale submitted a resolution, urging
the administration to cut off all military assistance and sale of arms to Pakistan (New York Times,
1971, April 16). On May 6, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted for the immediate
suspension of the sale of arms to Pakistan until the ‘civil war’ was over (New York Times, 1971, May
07).

With the Soviet Union completely on India’s side and America virtually neutralised from supporting
Pakistan, India had no hesitation in attacking Pakistan. Even Dr. Kissinger admits, “The victim of the
attack was an ally…to which we had made several explicit promises concerning precisely this
contingency” (Kissinger: 886).

In the aftermath of the brief ’71 war, India forced Pakistan to sign the Simla Agreement, in exchange
for the release of 70,000 PoW soldiers. The most important clause of the said Agreement was that
Pakistan had to compromise upon each and every issue between India and Pakistan, as each and
every issue would be settled through bilateral negotiations. This is the reason India has, many a
times, maintained that Kashmir dispute is a bilateral issue and must be settled through bilateral
negotiations as per Simla Agreement, 1972 and thus, had denied any third party intervention even
that of United Nations.

Secondly, the agreement converted the ceasefire line of the ’48 war into a Line of Control. This
identification of a new "cease-fire line" by both the states has been argued by India as making
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan insignificant. As according to India, the
purpose of UNMOGIP was to monitor the cease-fire line as identified in Karachi agreement of 1949
which no longer exists.

Lesson learned (’71 war)

The loss of East Pakistan was an utter humiliation for the establishment domestically. There was a
public outcry, and this was the primary reason that they had to cede control to a civilian, Bhutto,
who became the first and only Civilian Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), and then Prime Minister,
until being deposed by Zia in ’77.
The services of Pakistan for the US weren’t deemed sufficient enough to grant it a rescue against
India, especially when the US intended to bring India to its fold, and the US and USSR were
continuing their détente’.

The categorization of every issue as “bilateral” under the Simla accord, and the conversion of
ceasefire line into LoC was another humiliation, under which the latter one brought the ceasefire
line a step closer towards becoming a permanent border.

The Afghan War, its aftermath, and Kashmir

Zia deposed Bhutto, and assumed power in ’77. In April 1979, the United States suspended
economic assistance to Pakistan over concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program under the Foreign
Assistance Act.

With the backing of Zia ul Haq in November '79, activists of Jamaat-e-Islami attacked the US Embassy
and completely razed the surrounding structures to the ground. Meanwhile, two US soldiers were
killed and the rest of the authorities hid in a secure basement to save their lives.

Not even a month had passed since then, that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Now the
United States again felt the need for Pakistan. In this regard, the United States ignored Pakistan's
nuclear program, and in 1980, the Carter and Brzezinski administration offered $ 400 million to Zia
to help fight the war against Communism. Zia-ul-Haq rejected this offer by famously quoting this as
merely “peanuts”. The next year, Ronald Regan’s new administration came up with another offer,
which doubled the number of dollars, along with the promise to arm and equip Pakistan with
modern defensive weapons.

It is reported that Zia-ul-Haq accepted this offer on the condition that he would not be affiliated with
the United States this time under a government agreement such as SEATO or CENTO, but the effort
would be allowed to remain informal because of the presence of the Soviet Union in the
neighbourhood.

Pakistan took full responsibility for the recruitment, training and launching of Afghan Mujahideen
from its soil. and the US role remained limited. An American ambassador attempted to visit a
refugee camp in Peshawar where ISI recruited mujahideen from where combatants were then sent
into Afghanistan. He was not allowed to enter the frontier at that time and was turned away from
the Attock pull.

As soon as the Afghan War was won and the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the US again
re-imposed sanctions due to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The restrictions imposed under the
Pressler Amendment lasted the entire decade of the 90's. The bitter experience of the sanctions was
relatively harsher this time, because under them, the delivery of Block 52 F-16s and their spare parts
was were also halted, which led to 2 of their 4 squadrons being grounded. Furthermore, with the
closure of US aid, the defensive capabilities of the Pakistani forces were greatly diminished and their
officers saw a marked reduction in their perks and privileges.

So a pattern was beginning to emerge up until now. That Pakistan presents itself to the superpower
to be used, in order to be strengthened against India in return. The superpower uses then it for its
benefit. If Pakistan tries to make space for itself within the system given by the US, or if its utility is
fulfilled in the eyes of the superpower, it is set aside like a tissue paper and left out high and dry.
Only to be used and then thrown out, again and again and again.
One interesting exception came at the end of Afghan war in '88. It is reported that the well-trained
militants who had fought the Soviet Union, needed to be diverted somewhere, otherwise they could
become a headache for the establishment. So the Pk-estb backed militants were diverted to Kashmir
instead, and it is no coincidence that the Kashmir insurgency erupted in' 89, just one year after the
Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan in ‘88.

The success of the insurgency, and the relative disinterest of the superpower on the issue
encouraged the establishment to prop up public opinion domestically in favour of it, and maintained
a flow of Mujahideen into the restive region.

Our analysis in this regards is that these Mujahideen were diverted to Kashmir due to the fact that
the US wanted the British backed government in India to be weakened. A slow burning insurgency in
Kashmir achieved much in this regard.

Kargil and its aftermath

When Musharraf took over as army chief, he initiated Operation KP (Koh Paima) in October 1998.

Maj-Gen Javed Hassan, KP’s commander, who considered himself a geopolitical strategist, assumed
that the nuclear shield would guarantee military and diplomatic success in Kargil since India would
not up the ante. Also, that KP would cut off India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, NH1, resulting in its
withdrawal from Siachen. Furthermore, Musharraf, a professed disciple of Napoleon’s, believed that
luck favoured the brave.

As the operation progressed, Musharraf flew with the prime minister to the battlements near Kargil
and showed him the plan. His Chief of the General Staff told Nawaz that he was about to enter the
history books as the only PM who had solved the Kashmir imbroglio. Later, another officer told
Nawaz that he would rank only second to Jinnah in Pakistani history.

Late in the game, the air and naval chiefs were brought into confidence. Perplexed, both asked
“What would be achieved?” They were also concerned that KP would lead to an all-out war with
India. They were told that war with India was unlikely, courtesy of the nuclear shield. Instead, KP
would force India to the negotiating table. One general said there was no choice but to fight India
since our animosity was eternal.

The euphoria ended in May 1999 when India detected the intrusion. It responded with an intense
and sustained artillery barrage with 30-kilometer Bofors guns. A total of 250,000 shells, bombs and
rockets were fired at Pakistani positions in a three-week period. Pakistan was forced to deploy its
artillery. But it ran out of shells in just two days, not the two months that they were supposed to
last. The operations commander lost his nerve and began to ask for Allah s.w.t’s forgiveness,
admitted that he had made a mistake, and asked everyone to pray. Around that time, India released
the transcript of a phone conversation between Musharraf and his Chief of General Staff which
dispelled Musharraf’s contention that Pakistan was not involved in the operation.

The world then came down hard on Pakistan. The G-8 called on Pakistan to withdraw
unconditionally, as did the US and the ‘all-weather friend’ China. France forbade Pakistani
submarines, most of which were of French origin, from entering French waters. And India turned off
the back-channel diplomacy with Pakistan, which was expected, but world condemnation had not
been anticipated.
Then, the GHQ’s spin-doctors got to work immediately, hoping to convince the gullible public that
the politicians had squandered the military’s hard-won victory. Which they successfully did, and this
in turn helped in the coup against Nawaz Sharif the very same year.

Nasim Zehra’s book gives a detailed account of the issue, and makes it amply clear that operation KP
was criticised by several generals. Maj-Gen Shahid Aziz said it was an “unsound military plan based
on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparation and in total disregard to the regional and
international environment, was bound to fail.” Lt-Gen Durrani said that the Kargil incursion had
“brought home the realities of international politics” and exposed the dangers of getting carried
away by “self-serving hopes and hypes.” Lt-Gen Gulzar called KP a “blunder of Himalayan
proportions.” Lt-Gen Ali Quli termed the attack on Kargil “the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history.”

Lessons from Kargil

So another pattern is beginning to emerge here. That although the Pakistani establishment doesn’t
want to let go of Kashmir, but considers itself bound by the “Rules Based International Order”, on
which the US is the hegemon, which doesn’t tolerate a full blown war in the regionS so the
establishment can't do much else except launching proxies. And whenever such an urge to liberate
Kashmir strikes, then the most that they can muster up, is a half-baked undercover operation, which
falls apart, the very first instance it comes across any difficulties. The generals then seek the
superpower’s intervention, in order to rescue them from the mess.

The Kargil operation also follows the same pattern, but its underlying reasons as reported in local
discussions were somewhat different. The establishment was seeing Nawaz Sharif getting closer to
Indian PM Vajpaiyee, and this meant that the foreign policy direction was being set by the civilians,
as well as the relationship with the US. This was intolerable and needed to be hijacked, to take back
the reigns of foreign policy, and hence, Kargil was carried out, which achieved the desired objective.
The same pattern was repeated when Pathankot and Uri attacks were carried out 16 years later at
the behest of the establishment to derail the closeness being developed by Nawaz Sharif and Modi.
It is not that the establishment didn’t want to develop relations with India at the behest of the US,
the only issue was that it couldn’t allow the civil setup to take the lead in this regards.

Our analysis in this regards is that in India, the Vajpaiyee government lost the vote of confidence
motion in the Lok Sabha by a single vote on 17 April 1999, and hence the unplanned Kargil War was
launched by Musharraf in May ’99, which helped Vajpaiyee win a comfortable third term in office
after the elections in October ’99.

9/11 and beyond

The same cycle was repeated for the third time as well, but the difference this time from the
previous two was that 9/11 had happened, and the US had given the ultimatum to the whole world
that “Either you’re with us, or against us”. In a widely reported phone call, 9 demands were placed
by the US from Pakistan. The then senior US officials, including Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell,
believed that even if 5 of them are accepted, then that would be enough for them, but the
Commando Musharraf was so much frightened of the US, that he accepted all the conditions. He
successfully sold these demands to the Pakistani high command. Inculcating so much fear of the US’s
wrath within the Generals, that they felt themselves insecure within their GHQ fortress as well.

Although Musharraf was quite popular within the army, but as he lacked roots within the general
populace, so he needed long lasting legitimacy for his rule. For this, international legitimacy was
successfully sought with the collaboration of the US, as its subordinate agent. And then, there was
no red line that he crossed. The Kashmir insurgency was first curtailed and then minimized to just a
shadow of its former self.

Previously, the US had to spend two years enticing and encouraging Zia to embark on the huge
endeavour of engaging the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but compared to him Musharraf and the top
military leadership buckled under the pressure of just a single phone call. Mullah Zaeef famously
quoted this in his book that, “The Pakistani generals are so afraid of the US that even when relieving
themselves in their toilets, their fear being observed by the US.

And then there was no red line, that Musharraf didn’t cross, or precedence, that he wouldn’t break,
in helping the US fight its ugly war in Afghanistan, which continues to this day, unabated. From
giving the CIA and US Private Military Corporations direct access on ground, to intelligence sharing,
to handing over Taliban and Mujahideen, to launching operations which did widespread damage to
the Tribal areas, and so much more.

The significance it had for Kashmir was that the US forced Pakistan to tone down, and then minimise
the crossing of Mujahideen across LoC. This was accompanied by a crackdown against those who
raised question against the collaboration with the US in War on Terror. This amounted to an
effective U-turn regarding the ongoing Kashmir policy since ’89.

An officer in command of managing the mujahideen who were infiltrated across the LoC was
reported as saying that when the policy of U-Turn regarding Kashmir came, and after that whenever
the numbers of Mujahideen needed to be cut down, then the mujahideen were knowingly inserted
across LoC from those points where they would be located and shot. This policy of sending
Mujahideen into unsafe as well as safe areas continued, until the numbers were reduced to within
an acceptable range.

Although training and recruitment centres are still allowed to exist, like the Lashkar e Tayyiba
complex headed by Hafiz Saeed in Muridke, the Jaish e Muhammad complex run by Maulana
Masood Azhar in Bahawalpur and scattered centres of Hizb ul Mujahideen run by Syed Salahuddin in
Azad Kashmir, and all of them with the establishment’s backing. But as for the moment, their only
utility is in venting the pressure, whenever the establishment needs to release it, or to achieve a
temporary domestic objective, for example the Pathan Kot and Uri attacks carried out by these
militants in order to undermine the ongoing dialogue between Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi, so
that the establishment could then attempt to do the same, when it is directly controlling the levers
of power, later. Another example of this is quoted by Christine Fair, that Jaish e Muhammad was
utilized by the Pakistani establishment to carry out the recent Pulwama attack, so that suitable
conditions could be created for Modi’s victory in the upcoming elections.

One result of the reduction in support for Mujahideen from Pakistan was that, the lack of outside
support precipitated the Kashmiri resistance to grow indigenously. Burhan Wani, martyred in 2016,
was one such indigenously trained and nurtured Mujahid.

An Overtly Deterrence Focused Posturing

The establishment has, over the years, developed a unique mind-set when tackling issues related to
its much larger neighbour. This can’t be called fatalistic, as there’s substantial amount of effort
involved in developing the structure emanating from this mind-set. The mind-set can, however be
termed as, overtly “Deterrence Focused”.

According to this mind-set, conventional forces would primarily be utilized in order to repel the
invading force, but never to penetrate deep into the enemy territory in order to annex it. Although
there are 2 specialized strike corps of the army, 1 Corps of Mangla and 2 Corps of Multan, raised for
this specific purpose, but considering the handicapped approach witnessed in Operation Gibraltar in
‘65 and Kargil conflict in ’99, in which army regulars from 1 Corps were only inserted under the guise
of locals, without sufficient artillery or air cover, this meant that these have never been utilized to
their true potential.

During the “Strategic Depth Doctrine” era of the 90s, influence was maintained through the proxy
Taliban in Afghanistan, while at the same time, armoured divisions deployed in Bahawalpur,
Rahimyar Khan and Punnu Aaqil, so that a bulwark can be deployed against India, in case it tries
insert itself in the easily penetrable desert regions, to cut Pakistan in half. And in case, the bulwark is
broken through, then a favourable non-hostile environment needed to be maintained in
Afghanistan, so that a retreat and re-attack can be launched.

Similarly, after the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which can act as force multipliers in any conflict,
made the “Strategic Depth Doctrine” all but obsolete; the payload delivery ranges of Ballistic Missiles
like Ghauri and Shaheen were only increased to a specific point, that they were able to neuter the
2nd strike capability of India till the Andaman Islands. The “Minimum Credible Doctrine”
encompassed this whole deterrence based approach.

Later on, the changes in Army’s Green Book the at the US’s behest, the establishment, without
reducing the existing capabilities, increased the focus on developing the capabilities needed to
counter the domestic resistance US’s War on Terror.

Similarly, when India realized the flaws of its old and inflexible “Sundarji Doctrine”, after observing
slow troop mobilization during the “Operation Parakram” right after the 2001 Mumbai attacks, it
went back to the drawing board, and came up with the new “Cold Start” doctrine to increase troop
mobility, and to focus on small insertions across the whole of Pakistani border, instead of a single or
couple of deep ones, so that it doesn’t invoke a strategic nuclear response.

To counter this, the Pakistani establishment revised the “Minimum Credible Deterrence” Doctrine
into the “Full Spectrum Deterrence” doctrine, under which, tactical nukes were developed, which
are shorter range and lower yield, and hence could be used in the battlefield even with lesser
penetrative enemy forces.

When India acquired the S-400 interceptor missiles, the Pakistani establishment gave a go-ahead to
start developing “Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles” (MIRVs) to counter the S-
400s. Similarly, when India acquired the SSBN Arihant, the nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarine capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, which affectively ensured the second strike
capability for India, the Pakistani establishment greenlighted retrofitting nuclear cruise missiles in
the torpedo chambers of Agusta 90-B Diesel Electric submarines. Both the MIRVs and addition of
nuclear tipped missile launch capabilities on existing Agusta 90-Bs are still a work in progress.

This is the same limited mind-set which is utilized for decision making regarding Kashmir as well. As
according to the stated policy of the establishment, two objectives have been achieved successfully
after supporting a low level insurgency in Kashmir:

1. The Indian forces have been preoccupied in the valley, and substantial logistical support is
needed to maintain the troop numbers due to the resistance to indian rule, which ensures
lesser focus by india on the rest of the border with Pakistan.
 2. The Kashmir valley is breathtakingly beautiful, and has billions of US dollars in tourism
potential. Due to the small scale insurgency and large scale political instability in Kashmir,
little to no tourism is a huge opportunity cost, which is being borne by India due.

The Reality

It is with this mind-set that our defenders have been protecting the nation. This isn’t meant to
disrepute the whole institution, but to expose the dominant policy which is being implemented since
day one.

For them, the limited and myopic strategic objectives are sacrosanct, and the blood of 100,000
Kashmiri Muslims spilled, and the dishonouring of the honour of 70,000 Kashmiri women since ’48,
isn’t.

For them, the limited borders within which they implement their will are sacred, and are afraid of
losing territory, and this automatically restricts them from going all-out against the bigger Indian
rival. This is also the reason why they look towards the US, and do its bidding, and cross every red
line, and break every precedence; Anytime any conflict escalates beyond their limited perceived
mind-set.

This is also the reason that they try to maintain parity with the Indian rival, not to protect the
Ummah, but to protect their institutional assets and their master’s objectives, and this is why the
Ummah is perceived to be little more than cannon fodder, dispensable and expendable, just so that
the shiny missiles could be protected.

They match their assets vs their rival’s assets, and cannot perceive the effect of Imaan on the
battlefield.

This monthly was an attempt to understand the mind-set of the establishment, their perceptions,
and the motivations behind their policies.

What can be safely stated is that they’re unlikely to perceive or come up with a solution on their
owe, which is not dependent on the US for its support, or which disregards the man-made borders,
or which isn’t deterred from fighting a war, for the fear of losing territory, or which considers Muslim
honour and blood sacrosanct compared to territory or military assets.

And that holistic solution is solely the upcoming Khilafah In Sha Allah.