Criminal Procedure | 1

RULE 114 – BAIL

Definition
Rule 114, Sec. 1. Bail defined — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or
a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether
or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing
should still be held. (Zuño v. Cabebe)
When is the grant of bail discretionary?
Rule 114, Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary — Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. Should the court grant the application, the accused
may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to consent of the
bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding 6 yrs., the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the RTC after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
Bail after Conviction
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the
history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the RoC. It is likewise consistent with the trial
court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison. (Leviste v. CA)
Bail in Cases of Capital Offenses
Rule 114, Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application — At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination
unless the latter is dead, outside the Phil., or otherwise unable to testify.
The defense counsel insists that the accused should be entitled to bail considering the abolition of the death penalty in the 1986
Constitution. He advances the argument that due to the abolition of the death penalty, murder is no longer a capital offense being
no longer punishable with death. This is erroneous because although the Constitution states that the death penalty may not be
imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 19 [1], it does not follow that all
persons accused of any crime whatsoever now have an absolute right to bail. In Art. 111, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "capital
offenses" is replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua." (People v. Dacudao)
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Under Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the RoC, a capital offense is "an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission,
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death." It is clear from this provision that the capital
nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of
guilt, it evidently refers to a finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the
commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a
complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively observed by the
Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending
trial. (Bravo v. De Borja)
Remedy for Denial of Petition for Bail
The denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
The Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or
jurisdiction. Except in specific cases, bail is a constitutional right.1 Thus, as a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense
have the right to bail.
However, persons charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is
strong. In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder - an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was
acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses sufficient discretion to
determine, based on the evidence presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a
matter of right as the evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder. This
Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. This
is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in upholding the RTC's Order denying the Motion
to Fix Bail. (Recto v. People)
Recognizance
As a rule, release on recognizance is permissible only it is specifically allowed by law.
R.A. 6036
Sec. 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person charged with violation
of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony and/or a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six
months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both, where said person has established to the satisfaction of the
court or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond,
Sec. 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Sec. 1 hereof shall be required to sign in the
presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of
his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion
and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a
responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned
shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the
Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to
report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this
sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the amount forthwith fixed by the
Court.
P.D. 603
Art. 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. - A youthful offender held for physical and mental
examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of
the Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall
be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency

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Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
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within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful
offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department of Social
Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of his
parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required.
Custody of the Law v. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused
There is a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court
can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has
not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should
have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. (Miranda v Tuliao)
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the
custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority
to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the
accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. (Alawiya v CA)
Notice to Prosecution Mandatory
Section 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. — The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and
shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on a newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits
of witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are proposed to
be introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
Bail When Not Required
Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so
provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribe for the
offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal.
If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged,
without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on
his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
Bail No Bar rule
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. — An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor,
or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that
he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the
trial of the case.
Jose Antonio Leviste v. CA
GR No. 189122 (2010)
• Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the RTC of Makati City
for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision May.
as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
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• He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
• The CA denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.”
• Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
• Petitioner quotes Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the RoC was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Sec. 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the RoC? NO.
• Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
• Pending appeal of a conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
• Retired CA Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

• Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Sec. 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.
• In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
• On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully
ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
• Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the
perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether
any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal
and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in
the third paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either
allow or disallow bail.
• A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding
will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
• For the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court
en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted
by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;

• After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to
bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion
must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
People v. Luis Plaza
GR No. 176933 (2009)
• Raising only questions of law, the People’s petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision of the CA which affirmed
the Order of the RTC fixing bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza who was indicted for Murder.
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• The defense contended that in view of Judge Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only
Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00
which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.
• In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, the prosecution contended:
o That the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death;
o That it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be
charged with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the
amount of the bail bond;
o That the accused had already waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings;
o That Judge Buyser’s March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof,
produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter outside the Demurrer; and,
o That under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense
has rested its case.
ISSUE: Is bail available to an accused charged of a capital offense before conviction? YES.
• Sec. 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised RoC, as amended, provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right.
• The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus
depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. “[W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack
of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
A summary hearing is defined as “such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail.”
ISSUE: How about after conviction, but while pending appeal? YES.
• The People’s recourse to Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to support its contention that
respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Sec. clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused
after a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.
Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat v. Fernando Alarma
GR No. 151970 (2008)
• Respondent Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma own a 11.7-hectare parcel of land located in Iba, Zambales. The land
was posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal possession of
firearms.
o When the accused failed to appear in court, the trial court issued an Order for his arrest and the confiscation of
his bail bond in favor of the government.
o However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court issued a writ of execution
against the land, which was eventually sold at public auction.
o Petitioners Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat emerged as the highest bidders. Thus, the land was awarded to
petitioners and they immediately took possession of the same.
• Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against petitioners in the RTC of Iba,
grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the property bond.
• The RTC then dismissed the complaint and declared that the Order dated 14 April 1986 was a judgment on the bond.
• On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the proceedings on the execution, sale,
and issuance of the writ of possession.
• On a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, the SC affirmed the CA and denied the petition, ruling with finality
that the assailed 14 April 1986 Order was not a judgment on the bond.
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• After Petitioners obtained title to the lot, Respondents filed an action for the annulment of title and reconveyance of
ownership of the land with the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Br. 71.
• RTC: Dismissed the action contending that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment rendered by the RTC of Iba,
Zambales, Br. 70, a co-equal court.
• CA: the CA reversed the findings of the trial court and annulled Petitioner’s title. The appellate court also ordered that a
new title over the property be issued in the name of respondents.
• Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in finding a defect in the proceedings and in ordering the annulment of OCT No. O-7249. NO.
• Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the RoC states:
SEC. 21. — Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen
shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as
required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their
principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the
said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount
of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted.

• The provision clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgment on
the bond rendered against the surety.
o First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited.
o Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the
principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond.
• It is only after this 30-day period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court,
that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot
be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen
to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
• In the instant case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the court and that the trial court
declared his bail forfeited.
o The trial court gave the bondsmen, respondents in this case, a 30-day period to produce the accused or a
reasonable explanation for their non-production.
o However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been
rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the
property was put up for sale and awarded to petitioners, the highest bidders.
• These turns of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued, not on a
judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.
o An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done
such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond.
o As a rule, an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant "to show cause why judgment
should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond." Such order is different from a judgment on the
bond, which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period.
o The judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes
final, execution may issue at once. However, in this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an
amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this
violated respondents’ right to procedural due process.
• In addition, we find that the issue of good faith in buying the property at the auction sale is no longer material. This Court
in a previous case had already ruled upon the invalidity of the execution and sale of the land. As a result, the basis for
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which title to the land had been issued has no more leg to stand on. The appellate court, therefore, was correct in
ordering the annulment of the title to the land as a matter of course.
RULE 115 – RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

To Due Process
It is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that
i. the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
ii. that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
iii. that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
iv. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the accused
should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty.
Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by
the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process. (Marquez v. Sandiganbayan)
To be informed
1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 12. 1) Any person under investigation xxx shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remaid silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint or information
and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot
be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or
necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before
he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or information on which he
is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this case, although
the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft
only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not
charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests. (Canceran v. People)
To present evidence and be heard
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then
an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard"
does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists. (Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan)
To confront accusers and witnesses
The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to
afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of witnesses. The constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a
valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of
the witness and assess his credibility." (Go v. People)
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To counsel of own choice
A deprivation of the right to counsel divests the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing
field, so to speak. In a previous case, this Court held that an accused was deprived of his right to counsel when he retained
the services of a person who misrepresented himself as a lawyer. (People v. Serzo)
Waiver of Right to Counsel
Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under
investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid,
however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently, which
presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. (People v. Nicandro)
Against Self-incrimination:
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. What is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress. (People v. Yatar)
Against Double Jeopardy
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence allows
for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:
b. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
c. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which is in effect a failure to prosecute. (Bangayan Jr v. Bangayan)
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby
conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a
previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability. (Ysidoro v.
Leonardo de Castro)
Trial in Absentia
Sec. 14 (2), Art. 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid
trial in absentia are:
i. the accused has already been arraigned;
ii. he has been duly notified of the trial; and
iii. his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Parada v. Veneracion)
Presence Rule
Rule 116, Sec. 1(a), (b), (e). Arraignment and plea; how made —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy
of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment
and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
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(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the
judge to whom the case was raffled within 3 days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused
shall be arraigned within 10 days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held
within 10 days after arraignment.
Rule 120, Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is
absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
The Right to Cross-Examine
Due process is fundamental in our judicial system. In court litigation, it is upheld through the establishment of,
and strict adherence to, procedural rules that govern the behavior of party litigants. In our adversarial system,
the right of a litigant to cross-examine a witness is essential to the principle of due process. The right to cross-
examine a witness does not imply, however, an absolute command that an actual cross-examination be had. The
right is sufficiently protected when there is a real opportunity to conduct a cross-examination. What our laws
proscribe is the absence of a chance to cross-examine. (Dy Teban Trading v. Dy)
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on direct
examination. The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy
and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere
privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called. This right is available, of course, at the taking of
depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general
exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony
taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based
on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard against falsehoods and frauds.
(Republic v. Sandiganbayan)
As a general rule, the testimony of a witness, given on direct examination, should be stricken where there is not
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, as where the witness by reason of his death, illness, or absence
cannot be subjected to cross-examination. The direct testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the
cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination, and absence of a witness
is not enough to warrant striking his testimony for failure to appear for further cross-examination where the
witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined, or the matter on which further cross-examination is sought
is not in controversy.
“[I]f one is deprived of the opportunity of a cross-examination without fault upon his part, as in the case of the
illness or death of a witness after direct examination, it is generally held that he is entitled to have the direct
testimony stricken from the record. This doctrine rests on the common law rule that no evidence should be
admitted but what was or might be under the examination of both parties, and that exparte statements are too
uncertain and unreliable to be considered in the investigation of controverted facts” (People v. Seneris)
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental
right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. (Fulgado v. CA)
d. Compulsory Process
1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14.
1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
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Right to Speedy Trial
1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493)
Sec. 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules
on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine
of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after
consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or
other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief
Justice of the SC pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the RoC
Re: Circular No. 38-98
Sec. 8. Time Limit For Trial. — In criminal cases involving persons charged with a crime, except those subject to the
Rule of Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a
fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the court shall, after
consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or
other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court
Administrator pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 30 of the RoC.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays… An accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived
of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following:
i. duration of the delay;
ii. reason therefor;
iii. assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and
iv. prejudice caused by such delay. (Mari v. Gonzales)
In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give particular regard to the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. (Imperial v. Joson)
Remedy v. Denial of Right to Speedy Trial
Rule 119, Sec. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit — If the accused is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by Sec. 1(g), RULE 116 and Sec. 1, as extended by Sec. 6 of this rule, the information
may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right of speedy trial. The accused shall have
the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish
the exclusion of time under Sec. 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this
section. (sec. 14, cir. 38-98)
Briones v. People
GR No. 152009 (2009)
• A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service firearm of S/G
Gual while the latter approached the group where the former is involved in a mauling. S/G Gual positively identified
Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after giving weight to
prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi.
• On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defense. The CA found Briones guilty of robbery under Art. 293 in relation to
par.5 of Art. 294 of RPC and not of theft.
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ISSUE: Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. NO.
• The for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions
must obtain:
(a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted.
• In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.
• Evidence to be newly discovered, must be one that could not, by exercise of due diligence, have been discovered by the
court below. Briones failed to show he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm.
• The allegation the he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded in negative result is purely self-
serving. He now admits having taking the firearm and immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent to the place
of the incident.
• Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject firearm, but did not do anything
he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below.
• In petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding where certain evidence was not presented, the defendant, in order to
secure a new trial, must satisfy the court that; he has a good defense, and that the acquittal would in all probability follow
the introduction of the omitted evidence. Briones change of defense from denial to alibi to self-defense or in defense of
a relative will not change the outcome.
Dante Tan v. People
GR No. 173637 (2009)
• On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the
Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan the RTC (RTC) of Pasig City.
• The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources
Corporation (BW) shares and the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. In two other related cases, two Informations were filed
against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of
stock.
• On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation
praying that the cases be consolidated together which the trial court granted. Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001,
and pleaded not guilty to the charges. On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among
other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.
ISSUE: whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial. NO.
• The Court stated that an accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Sec. 14(2) of Art. III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, its “salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose
• In the case at bar, it was established that from the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admitted that no evidence was presented
for Criminal Case No. 119830.
o Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for
Criminal Case No. 119830. The question was whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.
o To this, the Court applied the four-factor test previously mentioned. It stated that in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
 Criminal Procedure | 12
o In this case, the Court found that there was no undue delay constituting a violation of Tan’s right to a speedy
trial.
• The Court stressed that although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods were not absolute. Where periods
had been set, certain exclusions were allowed by law. After all, the Court and the law recognize the fact that judicial
proceedings did not exist in a vacuum and had to contend with the realities of everyday life.
o As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for
the defense may no longer be available at this time, the Court stated that suffice it to say that the burden of
proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution.
o Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner would be acquitted. Unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
• The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution for the same offense.
Art. III, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
• Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of
dismissal. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably
sought, it dismissed the petition and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
People v. Begino
GR No. 181246 (2009)
• Appellant was formally charged of the crime of rape of an 8-year old girl. He pleaded not guilty. AAA, victim, testified
when she was already 14 years old, stating that while she and appellant were alone in the house, appellant was sharpening
his bolo while her mother, BBB, was out getting talapang.
o She was not aware that appellant had closed the door and windows of the house.
o Appellant approached AAA and removed her shirt, panties and bra. Appellant also removed his shorts and briefs and
laid AAA down on the bamboo bench
o With the bolo placed on his right side, appellant placed himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
o AAA tried to fight back and resisted but appellant was too strong, kissed her and touched her breasts
o AAA felt pain and blood oozed out of her vagina.
o After satisfying himself, appellant warned AAA that he would kill her and her mother BBB if she would tell anybody
about the incident
• Sometime in Nov 1998, AAA told her mother, claimed rape 4 times – 8 years old, Grade 3, 4, 5.
• BBB brought daughter to the DSWD, who conducted an examination which found the pertinent facts (e.g. lacerations on
AAA’s hymen were caused by penetrations of an erected and turgid sex organ)
• Appellant denied and asserted that he treated AAA and her siblings as his own children since he started living with their
mother. He further testified that from 6am to 6pm that same date, he was at the coconut plantation of Apolinarion Malaluan
husking coconuts.
o The distance of his house and coconut plantation is 30-minute walk.
o There was never a time he left the workplace since he took his lunch and snacks there.
o This was corroborated by Camilo and Reynaldo, his witnesses.
• RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape aggravated by the fact that victim is
below 18 years of age and offender common law husband of BBB
• CA: affirmed judgment
ISSUE: W/N appellant denied of right to be informed of charge against him – YES, as to the qualifying circumstance.
• Appellant could not be indicted for qualified rape and penalized under Par. 1 of Art 266-B
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o Under said law, death penalty shall be imposed if crime of rape is committed when the victim is under 18 years
old and offender is a “parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within 3rd
degree, or common law spouse of parent of victim”; these must be alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt
▪ In said case, the age of the victim has been sufficiently proved.
▪ Further, accused is not a stepfather, but a common-law spouse of BBB – no proof of marriage between
BBB and appellant.
o Since appellant is not stepfather of AAA, the prosecution’s failure to prove the qualifying circumstance bars
conviction for rape in its qualified form.
• What was proved was that appellant was common law spouse of BBB, but such was not alleged in the information.
o If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since the
latter admit of proof even if not pleaded.
o it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and consequently,
a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although
the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged
in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
o Since qualifying circumstance of “common law spouse” was not alleged in information for rape, he could not
be convicted of rape in the qualified form as he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.
▪ This is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense
• The qualifying circumstance of relationship, not having been properly pleaded, appellant should be convicted only of
statutory rape under Par. (d) of Art 266-A.