Research Question 1:

Given: negative moral judgment = ƒ[intention, perceived causal attribution, - valence of action]

What might this tell us about positive behaviors? Does the tendency to perceive positive or negative
morality arise along a more general continuum ƒ[action valence, perceived causal attribution]. Is this
reflected in tendency to act, such that moral motivation = ƒ (action valence, perceived causal ability)?

Research Question 2:

Implication of question 1. J-Man theorizes that self-referential thinking will account for the Identifiable
Victim Effect. While this makes some sense, it is possible that this research question will be muddied by
1. Entativity and 2. Causal attribution.

Question: can one mentalize about a group to a similar extent as a to a single person, but still display
less helpful tendency? This could happen to the extent that we fail to deconstruct the group and instead
treat it as a single entity. In this case, it is possible that we will fail to help because we will perceive less
causal potential. That is to say, we are able to help an individual, but less able to help a group as a
whole. Thus, working hypothesis:

Tendency to help group = ƒ (entativity x perceived ability to help group as a whole)

Research Question 3:

(Building off J-Man’s recent neural work.) There is evidence that greater entativity correlates with
increased activity in vmPFC when processing the group. However, they received the interesting result
that vmPFC activity was: HE group>Individual>LE group. People suggested that what we are seeing is an
“additive mentalizing effect.” However, this seems suspicious, given the lack of high activation for low
entativity groups. Should we not see such an additive effect here as well? (We might even expect to see
more activity in that case, since the “calculus” would be more complex.)

Counter-interpretation: vmPFC is not capturing entativity or mentalizing per say, but rather the process
of drawing a consistency inference during mentalizing. In this case, we’d receive the observed pattern.
Inferences about non-entativic groups would be non viable, and the process would be quickly shut
down. Inferences about individuals (pending other factors) would be comparatively “easy,” and would
show activation but with limited magnitude. Drawing inferences about the HE group would be viable,
and thus would occur, but would require more activity.

Note the waters could be muddied by other factors, e.g. how can we control for “mind-wandering
inference.” E.g.- inferences about more similar others should require less activation, but may tend to be
made more freely.

Research Question 4:

Discrimination by omission vs. commission.

I suspect it will be difficult to pry these effects apart in terms simply of “implicit bias.” That is to say, I
suspect we need to break “bias” down into its constituent elements before we can gain predictive
validity on these issues:

1. Positive associative valence = ƒ (ingroup, alliance potential/value)

2. Negative associative valence = ƒ (threat)

(Note: relation to Susan Fiske’s framework?)

I think we will tend to display commission that correlates with the specific valence of the group in
question. E.g. we will tend to help those that offer a positive associative valence, and hurt those who
have a negative associative valence. However, it is possible that groups are frequently valenced
neutrally. In this case, we would tend to discriminate by omission, since we will ignore them and help
those who are positively valenced. Thus the following patterns/predictions should emerge:

a.) Positively valenced association will predict helping tendencies

b.) Negatively valenced associations will predict harming tendencies
c.) Neutral valence should predict discrimination by omission.

It is possible, however, that neutral threat may tend to disseminate into specific domains (e.g. by
implicit halo effects, or). Thus, under conditions of threat/uncertainty, we may see:

a. Increased “implicit bias,” or more discretely “negative valence” increases

b. Increased discrimination by commission to those with initial negative valence.

Alternatively, neutral threat may not operate only by such simple “halo” effects. I would theorize (see
next set) that threatening conditions may create “identity heuristics” whereby we automatically begin to
identify more strongly with ingroups. Conditions of threat may alternatively create a situation where:

a. “Implicit bias” increases, but may be discretely broken down into both increases in ingroup+
valence, and increases in outgroup- valence, such that “neutral” groups will tend to take on
negative valence if made salient.
b. This would suggest a smaller interaction between pre-threat negative valence and post-threat
negative valence. I.e., negatively valenced groups will take on threat independently of the level
of this valence initially. (low – valence will take on nearly as much as high – valence.)
c. In any case, the introduction of neutral threat would here increase both helping ingroup and
hurting outgroup behavior.

Research question 5: Threat-Identity

Short version of long story. I believe that we may respond differently under conditions of neutral threat.
Mahzarin has found the legs of this theory suspect, but I realize might be because I’ve been framing it as
a “moderator” question. But my idea is that it goes beyond this. I think that threatening conditions
might cause a more primal identity response. When we are threatened (versus, e.g., challenged), I think
the self becomes blurred and an unconscious search for “ally-enemy” signals, which is not active under
non-threatening conditions, is triggered. I wonder if this would might be visible in terms of unconscious
identity. Thus I make the following sets of predictions:

a. Without threat, “identity priming” will not significantly impact implicit identity. (E.g., priming
gender vs. not priming gender will not predict greater me-gender association.)
b. With threat, identity priming will significantly impact implicit identity. (E.g., priming gender
under conditions of threat will lead to greater me-gender association.)
c. The tendency to modulate identity will be moderated by:
a. *Signal presentation order*
b. Signal relevance, valence (?)
d. In fact, without any signal being made, I would expect no change in implicit identity, however,
this may prove impossible to operationalize, since the tests themselves would tend to act as
cues. (I.e., if we measure gender identity first, we can expect identity modulation accordingly.)
Some information could be garnered by comparing main effect in counterbalanced sample, but
with the understanding that this will be difficult to interpret because order will matter.)
e. These effects might also relate to group valence. E.g. under conditions of threat, we might see
an increase in ingroup positive association and outgroup negative association. It would be
interesting to note the degree to which this might interplay with identity modulation.
(Correlations? Mediation analysis?)

Research question 6:

The mediating role of threat-identity signaling in other domains. (Many more could follow!)

1. Does identity modulation mediate the effects of stereotype threat

2. Does identity modulation mediate responses to threat vs. challenge. (E.g. some studies suggest
that women are negatively impacted by “threat” when completing a mathematical task,
whereas men are positively impacted. Does this arise from modulation of gender identity?)

Research question 7:

The effects of priming money… My working assumption relates to work in sociology etc. on “social” vs.
“economic” domains. (This is another literature I’m not well familiar with though!) However, I take a
slightly different approach to the issue. I don’t think domains are necessarily distinct, but rather that
money acts as a simplifying agent.

My thought here comes from my own experience as a poker player. Gamblers use chips instead of
money. Implicit in this practice is the idea that people will be more likely to gamble with chips than with
actual money. I believe this is because there is a decrease in associative richness. Thus poker chips
desensitize player. In a sense, I believe currency itself does the same thing. (Gamblers would be less
gambly if they were betting cash than if betting chips. But now imagine they are betting actual stuff. I
expect they’d be even more risk averse, such that the stimuli richness increases risk aversion:

Risk aversion = stuff salient > money salient > chips/securities/etc. salient

This desensitization idea could have implications for both ethical behavior and risk-tendencies. For
example, I would posit that by associatively desensitizing the subject, we will see less aversion to
(arguably) unethical behaviors across a wide variety of domains. For example:

1. Priming $$ (or making it salient) should increase “push” tendencies in the trolley-footbridge
dilemma
2. Priming $$ might make people more “obedient.” But how can we ethically operationalize this?
a. Ask what people would do, but this would be very muddy
b. Have participants rate morality of the situation, but this might not hit the right variable
c. Measure “implicit obedience identity”
3. Comparative conjoint analysis. Do we receive different trade-off values in “emotionally rich”
areas after money has been made salient?