Cecilia Zulueta, Petitioner, People v.
Marti
vs.
Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents belonging to Dr.
Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed against her
husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila which rendered
a decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress.”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as
evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving
the same documents were admissible as evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be
admissible as evidence.
Held:
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
“for any purpose in any proceeding.
Lagangang Butas LAW, Uncategorized July 27, 2017 3 Minutes
People v. Marti
G.R. No. 81561; 18 January 1991
FACTS:
On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to
the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4)
packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if the packages could
be examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were simply
gifts of books cigars, and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and
was sealed with masking tape for shipment.
As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau
of Customs and/or Burueau of Posts, the proprietor of the forwarding agency
opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted therefrom and he
found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to NBI, and informed them that
the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his
office and found the shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves,
some of which were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked underneath
tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the appellant in
violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found guilty.
Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure,
and further, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched
and seized packages.
ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s
constitutional rights be invoked against the State?
HELD:
No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State in the absence of
governmental interference. This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government; and the search and seizure clauses
are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency
who made search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the alleged act of the
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private individual in violation of a constitutional right cannot be invoked against
the State.

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JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY
INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as
acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON.
FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines
(FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the
Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training,
testing, certification and deployment of the former and other related issuance,
principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right
to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived
individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also
averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory
and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and
property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary
International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil
case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on
February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was
made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however,
dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the
said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise
of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects
either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation
of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion
so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of
legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so
use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend
that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to
ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating
entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for
abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are
deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements
pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process
clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable
regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
ORQUIOLA vs TANDANG SORA DEV’T CORP.
FACTS: Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689in
TandangSora, Quezon City, adjacent to Lot 707-Aand 707-B registered in the
name of Herminigilda Pedro.In 1964, Pedro sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to
Mariano Lisingwho subdivided them into smaller lots.A portion of Lot 707-A-2
was sold to petitioners Sps. Victor and HonorataOrquiola.In 1969, Ledesma
filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City against Pedro and Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689.
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 The RTC ruled against Pedro and Lising. The Deputy Sheriff of
Quezon City directed Sps. Orquiola, through an alias writ of execution, to
remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying.
To prohibit the RTC from issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff
from implementing the alias writ of execution, Sps. Orquiolafiled with the Court
of Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel
of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since
they were not impleaded in the case, the writ of demolition issued in connection
therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law.
The CA dismissed the petition. It held that as buyers and successors-
in-interest of Lising, petitioners were considered privies whoderived their rights
from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the alias writ of execution may be enforced against
petitioners.
(2) Whether or not petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders
in good faith.
RULING: On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution
cannot be enforced against them. They argue that the appellate court erred
when it relied heavily on the ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First,
the petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of
the dispute after the original action was commenced and became final and
executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the
commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the
disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was
based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con
El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest
of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third,
petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while
the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest
and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land.
In a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, the applicable
rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond
the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. Hence,
Sps. Orquiolaare fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens
system.
On the second issue,the Court concluded that petitioners acquired the
land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.
A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is
a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property. Petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising,
the civil case was commenced sometime in 1969. The CA overlooked the fact
that the purchase of the land took place prior to the institution of the case. In
other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Ledesma claimed the
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lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the
time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. It was only in 1998,
when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-12918.The institution of Civil Case cannot serve as notice of such adverse
claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.

Strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the

court.Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. Sps.
Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

The petition is GRANTED.Respondents are hereby enjoined from

enforcing the decision through a writ of execution and order of demolition
issued against petitioners.

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