1
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA.
IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A.
TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint[1] for Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F.
Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother
and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E.
Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres,
represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the
petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a
married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in
1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born
Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September
3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein
private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein petitioners be compelled to
recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased
Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their
deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged
open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children as stated
in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the
herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs and their mothers
family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not
limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on
occasions of family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and
then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status
of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered
them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and
affection as above outlined.[2]
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego
and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with
Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the
following:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to portion of share of
the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as
the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her)
share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the
sum of P10,000.00 as atty.s fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.[3]
 2
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended
by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by
the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due
course on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court
of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision
promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was
denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the
following grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED
BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION.
C reads:
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE
IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE
PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN
ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF
THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN
ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE
PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL
CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED, OR AT LEAST MODIFIED
BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS
THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.[4]
Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate
child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS,
specifically Article 285 thereof, which states the manner by which illegitimate
children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority; x x x.
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family
Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of
Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it
is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if
based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any
exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription. The law cited
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
 3
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173 [during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one
(1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action
has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code.
Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case
pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears
to be: Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case?
As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or
impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be
given retroactive effect in this particular case?
The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by
the Family Code. The Committee did not define what is meant by a vested or
acquired right, thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each
particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for
each and every question that may arise in the future.[5]
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,[6] a case which involves a similar
complaint denominated as Claim for Inheritance but treated by this court as
one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, we had
occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it
and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application
to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of
private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by
private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application
will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this,
the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was
filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil
Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the
filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the
passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.[8]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
 4

SO ORDERED.

Jose Aruego, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of

successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego
and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian.
The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari
was then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect
on August 3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the
case.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect in so far as the instant case is concerned as its application
will prejudice the vested rights of respondents to have her case be decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall
have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the
Family Code in this case cannot be given a retroactive effect.
 5

HEIRS OF EDUARDO G.R. No. 157547 subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account
SIMON, Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
Petitioners, Present: accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check
or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within
BRION, Acting Chairperson,** five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
BERSAMIN,
-versus - ABAD,*** CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
VILLARAMA, JR., and More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin
SERENO, JJ.
Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of
Promulgated:
the principal amount ofP336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS, February 23, 2011 of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged
Respondent.
in his complaint the following:

BERSAMIN, J.: 2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising
from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22(BP 22).
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check dated
December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the
plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and
that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached
as Annex A;

3. However, when said check was presented for

Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late
Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin
Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No.
0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the
amount of P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the
account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines
has been closed contrary to his representation that he has an
existing account with the said bank and that the said check
was duly funded and will be honored when presented for
payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to
make good the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy
of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B, but
despite such demand defendant refused and continues to
refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply
with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled
to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as
reasonable attorneys fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus
additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.
 6
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty
of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which this action is
brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims
sought in this action which fraud consist in the
misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing
account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact
his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and
this action is one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph
(d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines
and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for
which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond
conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be finally
found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment.[3]
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through
the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.[4]
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, [5] pertinently
averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a
consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal
Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under
Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as
contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the
basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal
complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged
dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for payment
with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated
December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn
allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused
in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that,
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss
with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to
dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged pendency of another
action between the same parties for the same cause,
contending among others that the pendency of Criminal Case
No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the
criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however,
it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation
of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first,
by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in
Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any
allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any
 7
claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as
private complainant in the criminal case, during the
presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented
at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been
adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove
damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an
effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a
separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a)
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that
after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in
the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111
which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of criminal
case provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action
therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal
action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even
without any reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil
action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the
defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant
to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as
payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant
of the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the
check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to
that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the
same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the
bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and
effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the
defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the
plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended
only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering
that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even
crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted
separate and apart from the criminal case without a
reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense
charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the
defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are
created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any
reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint
the application for damages against the bond is totally without
any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.[6]
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages,[7] dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court
resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application
to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment,
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx
 8
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as
Sum of Money and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg.
22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical
but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the
recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the
amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded
on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver
of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there
was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that
there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of
prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a
complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any
allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim
them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for
them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the
meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil
action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys
that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and
34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this
must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is
to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not
waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil
branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the
filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed
legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs
submission that the herein case for sum of money is one
based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of criminal
case provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia;
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this
court on August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount
of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the
damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
implementation of the writ of attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to
RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants
physical possession the vehicle seized from him on
August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum
of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20,
2000,[8] viz:
Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be
a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and which
submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking
 9
into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the
Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly
in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation
to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld
the dismissal of Chans complaint, disposing:[9]
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
by petition for review,[10] challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith
and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused
him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the
dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based
on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of
injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal
act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of
the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal
injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought
to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in
nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an
accused arising from the commission of the offense in the
criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted
with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or
institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been
changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the
Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability arising
from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through
Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
 10
There is no more need for a reservation of
the right to file the independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The reservation and
waiver referred to refers only to the civil action
for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the offense charged. This does not include
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately
without a reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
civil actions which became effective
on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this
case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive
effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an
independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against
respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, may proceed independently even if there
was no reservation as to its filing.
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar
with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on
allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and
committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check
which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite
the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22
against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes
in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil action became effective on December 1,
2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may
be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules
may be given retroactive application. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is
therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming
the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for
reconsideration.[13]
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA
erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code;
that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc.
v. Velez[14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to
 11
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case
was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of
Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]
In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied
because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of
action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the
appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the
filing of his separate civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of
the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A would, therefore, be brought to naught.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111
of the Rules of Court,effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation
of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so
provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had
on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as
a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an
integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22
SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil
692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for
the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19
Phil 265).
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be
denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private
party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil
liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party
unable to recover even the face value of the check due her,
thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense
of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
 12
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in
the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is
specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing
fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint
may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.[18]
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in
effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are
nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural
laws.[19] Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the
time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested
right in the rules of procedure,[20] except that in criminal cases, the changes do
not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence
to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses,
because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post
facto under the Constitution.[21]
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the
violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
 13
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall
henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all
criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which
penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check
without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.[22]
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed, in accordance
with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994.
Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the
accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the
corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts
thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not
so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the
pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111
governing the proceedings in the actions as thus
consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect
on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation,[23] thus:
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the
civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was
also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised
Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The
reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed.
The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions.
(a) xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately
and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If
 14

the application is granted, the trial of both actions liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the
Rule governing consolidation of the civil and Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case
criminal actions. at bar.[24]

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-

97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v.
for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to Velez[25] to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI
involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal
cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This
rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and
filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the
distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,[26] the procedures for the
courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is
charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different
uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect
his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may
court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is Code,[27] as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP
also expected to expedite the disposition of these
cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be
institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid
down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial
the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation
of a separate civil action, which means that one can no Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check
is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and allegations of fraud and deceit.
would further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners
rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before B
the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
 15
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in
the MeTC in PasayCity on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must
be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of
the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the
third becomes nil.[28]
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381
ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of
all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in
Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the
information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No.
915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280
worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted
and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought
were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment
rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata;
otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed
Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision
dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming
the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly,
we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals
on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Simon V. Chua G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
Lessons Applicable: Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no
vested rights in the rules of procedure.
FACTS:
 December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a
Landbank Check dated December 26, 1996 worth P336,000.00
 December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.
 After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen - MeTC in
Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment
 Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia because
there is already a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 -
granted by the MeTC
 16

 Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of the
MeTC
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case
renders Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action
 In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right
to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action
based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code
 In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a
policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to
claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check

HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC

 Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in
the rules of procedure. xxx
 Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her
only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of
having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party
unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The
protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught. However, there is no independent civil action to recover the
value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. Applying
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 200 that the
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed
 DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts): issuance
of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of
estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-
interchangeable
 17

G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998 Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at
Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account
vs. of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded
Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which
FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together
FRANCISCO, respondents. with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate
court's decision1 promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court which ruled,2 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders
judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff,
as follows:
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of
said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement.
Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said
properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he
has the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.

1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
with costs against the plaintiff; court:

2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Francisco the administrator of the properties
described in paragraph eight (8) of the
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES
Complaint; and
160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL
CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the OTHERS, HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY
defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
for attorney's fees.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
SO ORDERED.
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE. 3
by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli
F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue "whether or not Article 116 of
the Family Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code"4
Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house
and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay
 18
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate
court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the
properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 1585 and 1606 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by
the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The
aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was
expressly repealed by Article 2547 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in
her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke
the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to
Article 2568 in relation to Article 1059 (second paragraph) of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does
not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested
or accrued while the said provisions were in force. 10 Hence, the rights
accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their
repeal. 11We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested
properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should
administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other
hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by
petitioner as "conjugal" are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these
were acquired by the latter either through inheritance or through his industry
prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that Eusebio is not
incapacitated contrary to petitioner's allegation.
We find petitioner's contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy
was acquired during the marriage. 12 Proof of acquisition during the coverture
is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
the conjugal partnership. 13 The party who asserts this presumption must first
prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. 14 Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable,
but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict
proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. 15
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her
marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner
failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his
parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their
marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not
yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his
second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his
own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 14816 of the New Civil
Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. 17 Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired
gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage
by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. 18 Hence, even if it be assumed
that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his
second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it
was acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title." 19
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents
aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their
father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the
said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner
relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as
the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the
business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove
that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the
fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as
to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly
noted:
. . . . And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner
herein] is the licensee of the sari-sari store (Exhibit "F-3";
Exhibit "G", pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed applicant
for a building permit does not establish that these
improvements were acquired during her marriage with
 19

Eusebio Francisco, especially so when her exhibits ("D-1",
"E", "E-I", "T", "T-1", "T-2", "U", "U-l" and "U-2"; pp. 38-40;
285-290, Record; TSN, January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are
diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all described
Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article
1431, New Civil Code; Section 4. Rule 129, Revised Rules
on Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store
constructed on the land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby
become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the
proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their
partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code).
Normally, this absence of evidence on the source of funding
will call for the application of the presumption under Article
160 of the New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal
but it cannot be so in this particular case again, by reason of
the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged
second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841; 9 Manresa;
cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1,
1983 Edition, page
421).20
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it
follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets
are exclusively his capital. 24 Even assuming for the sake of argument that
the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch as
Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio,
as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as to
impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped due to
a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when
petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did
not render him, in the Court's view, incapacitated to perform acts of
administration over his own properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents

assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In
contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property in as much as the
title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to
Teresita Francisco."

It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors
her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the
property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. 21 It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. 22 The phrase
"married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Eusebio Francisco. 23

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said
to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower court's ruling that the
properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
 20
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met
sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod
City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially,
the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college
and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going
vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple
established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their
own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage
for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together
when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old
Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital
covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o'clock in the morning.When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his
drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased
petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of
the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal
abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer
bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive
respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to
her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became
worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent
assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She
was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at
the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions
and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a
case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days
of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and
stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner
sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise
sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent
failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary
period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible
collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994,
submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that
there was collusion between the parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court,
an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his
answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the
birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the
complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied,
however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal
basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen
the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The
appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant
showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family
Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is
incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
 21
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has
been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and
that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."[1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court
of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines
set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, [3] promulgated on 13
February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption
that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein
outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In
any case, petitioner argues, the application
of the Santos and Molina dictashould warrant only a remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in
its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown
to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined
in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained
by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
`psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled
legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. [4] The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled,
and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith [5] under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an
entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent
enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the
term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to
assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract,
so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and
protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital
relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however,
 22

may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation
has not quite given up, neither should we. placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children.
Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his
drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was
chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of
their children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and
their children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the
promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She was battered again. Her
husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC
declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of

Republic vs CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding in this
case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before
a case would fall under the category of psychological incapacity to declare a
marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law. These
guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil

Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled
 23
G.R. No. 200620, March 18, 2015
ROBERTO L. ABAD, MANUEL D. ANDAL, BENITO V. ARANETA, PHILIP
G. BRODETT, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND ROBERTO V. SAN
JOSE, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY VICTOR AFRICA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case is a remnant of the multiple suits generated by the two factions
battling for control of two sequestered corporations since 2004, a controversy
we already resolved with finality in 2013.
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the Decision1 dated
October 21, 2011 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99789. The CA reversed the Order3 dated
June 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149
in Civil Case No. 06-095.
Respondent Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), along with Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC) were among those private companies sequestered by
the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) after the EDSA
People Power Revolution in 1986. PHILCOMSAT owns 81% of the
outstanding capital stock of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation (PHC). The
majority shareholders of PHILCOMSAT are also the seven families who have
owned and controlled POTC (Ilusorio, Nieto, Poblador, Africa, Benedicto,
Ponce Enrile and Elizalde).
During the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Enrique L.
Locsin and Manuel D. Andal, along with Julio Jalandoni, were appointed
nominee-directors representing the Republic of the Philippines through the
PCGG in the board of directors of POTC and the board of directors of
PHILCOMSAT. These PCGG nominees have aligned with the Nieto family
against the group of Africa and Ilusorio (Africa-Bildner), in the ensuing battle
for control over the respective boards of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and
PHC. Benito Araneta was also a nominee of PCGG during the term of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
On August 31, 2004, the following were elected during the annual
stockholders’ meeting of PHC conducted by the Nieto-PCGG group: Locsin
(Director and Acting Chairman); Oliverio Laperal (Director and Vice-
Chairman); Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. (Director, President and Chief Executive
Officer); Philip G. Brodett (Director and Vice-President); Andal (Director,
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer); Roberto V. San Jose (Director and
Corporate Secretary); Jalandoni, Lokin, Jr., Prudencio Somera, Roberto
Abad and Benito Araneta as Directors. Said election at PHC was the
offshoot of separate elections conducted by the two factions in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT, the Africa-Bildner group and the Nieto-PCGG group.
In the July 28, 2004 stockholders’ meetings of POTC and PHILCOMSAT,
Victor Africa was among those in the Africa-Bildner group who were elected
as Directors. He was designated as the POTC proxy to the PHILCOMSAT
stockholders’ meeting. While Locsin, Andal and Nieto, Jr. were also elected
as Directors, they did not accept their election as POTC and PHILCOMSAT
Directors. Instead, the Nieto-PCGG group held the stockholders’ meeting for
PHILCOMSAT on August 9, 2004 at the Manila Golf Club. Immediately after
the stockholders’ meeting, an organizational meeting was held, and Nieto, Jr.
and Locsin were respectively elected as Chairman and President of
PHILCOMSAT. At the same meeting, they issued a proxy in favor of Nieto,
Jr. and/or Locsin authorizing them to represent PHILCOMSAT and vote the
PHILCOMSAT shares in the stockholders’ meeting of PHC scheduled on
August 31, 2004.
Thereafter, the two factions took various legal steps including the filing of
suits and countersuits to gain legitimacy for their respective election as
directors and officers of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. The Africa group had
sought the invalidation of the proxy issued in favor of Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin
and consequent nullification of the elections held during the annual
stockholders’ meeting of PHC on August 31, 2004 (Civil Case No. 04-1049 of
RTC, Makati City, Branch 138). Prior to this, there was the pending case
involving the compromise agreement dated June 28, 1996 entered into by
Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio with the Republic of the Philippines and the PCGG
relative to the Ilusorio family’s shareholdings in POTC, including those
shares forcibly taken from him by former President Ferdinand Marcos which
were placed in the name of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-
Pasig Land Development (Mid-Pasig). By Decision dated June 15, 2005, this
Court affirmed the validity of the said compromise agreement in G.R. Nos.
141796 and 141804. As a result of the compromise agreement, the Ilusorio,
Africa, Poblador, Benedicto and Ponce Enrile families gained majority control
(51.37%) and the Nieto family and PCGG became the minority.
On November 17, 2005, Africa in his capacity as President and CEO of
PHILCOMSAT, and as stockholder in his own right, wrote the board and
management of PHC that PHILCOMSAT will exercise its right of inspection
 24
over the books, records, papers, etc. pertinent to the business transactions of
PHC for the 3rd quarter of 2005, specifically the company’s financial
documents.4cralawred
In his letter dated November 22, 2005, Nieto, Jr. said that Africa’s request will
be referred to the PHC Board of Directors or Executive Committee in view of
the several pending cases involving the Africa and Nieto-PCGG groups on
one hand, and the PHC and its board of directors on the other. He further
advised Africa to inform them in writing of his reasons and purposes for such
inspection.5 In reply, Africa reiterated his request for inspection asserting
that the PHILCOMSAT board of directors was elected on September 22,
2005 under circumstances in consonance with the final decision of this Court
and that there is no case against its legitimacy.6cralawred
On the day of the scheduled inspection, PHILCOMSAT sent its
representatives, Atty. Samuel Divina and Enrico Songco. However, Brodett
disallowed the conduct of the inspection which prompted PHILCOMSAT
through its counsel to make a written query whether the refusal of Brodett to
permit the conduct of PHC’s inspection of corporate books and financial
documents was with the knowledge and authority of PHC’s board of
directors. But no reply or communication was received by Africa from the
PHC.7cralawred
On February 2, 2006, PHILCOMSAT filed in the RTC a Complaint8 for
Inspection of Books against the incumbent PHC directors and/or officers, to
enforce its right under Sections 74 and 75 of theCorporation Code of the
Philippines. The original defendants were Julio J. Jalandoni, Luis K. Lokin,
Jr., Oliverio G. Laperal, Nieto, Jr., Prudencio C. Somera, and herein
petitioners Andal, Locsin, Brodett, San Jose and Araneta.
In its Order dated June 21, 2007, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Del Moral v. Republic of the Philippines9 and Olaguer v.
RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, Br. 48, Manila,10 said court ruled that
it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction considering that plaintiff is a
sequestered corporation of the Republic through the PCGG alleging a right of
inspection over PHC but which right or authority was being raised as a
defense by the defendants.
PHILCOMSAT appealed to the CA thru a petition for review under Rule
43 arguing that it is the RTC and not Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction
over the case involving a stockholder’s right to inspect corporate books and
records. Petitioners countered that the main controversy is rooted upon the
issue of who are the rightful representative and board of directors of
PHILCOMSAT. Accordingly, PHILCOMSAT’s right of inspection hinges on
the resolution of the ongoing power struggle within PHILCOMSAT,
specifically on the issue of who between the Africa and Nieto-Locsin groups
is the legitimate board of directors. It was further pointed out that POTC and
PHILCOMSAT were both under sequestration by the PCGG, and hence all
issues and controversies arising therefrom or related or incidental thereto fall
under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners also contended that the petition should be
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia as the CA may take judicial notice
of the fact that many cases involving Africa’s purported authority to represent
PHILCOMSAT are pending before several courts, which issue must
necessarily be resolved to determine who possesses the right of inspection
of PHC’s books and records.
Finding merit in petitioners’ arguments, the CA granted the petition, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of dismissal
dated 21 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149, in
Civil Case No. 06-095, isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. The court a quo
is reminded to hear and decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.11cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners are now before
this Court.
The issues submitted for our resolution are: (1) whether it is the
Sandiganbayan or RTC which has jurisdiction over a stockholders’ suit to
enforce its right of inspection under Section 74 of theCorporation Code; and
(2) whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action considering that
PHILCOMSAT never authorized Africa or any other person to file the said
complaint.
The petition has no merit.
Both issues presented in this case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the RTC in
intra-corporate disputes within the sequestered corporations of PCGG, and
who between the contending groups held the controlling interest in POTC,
and consequently in PHILCOMSAT and PHC, have already been resolved in
the consolidated petitions docketed as G.R. No. 184622 (Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corp. [POTC] and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation [PHILCOMSAT] v. Victor Africa, et al.),
 25
G.R. Nos. 184712-14 (POTC and PHILCOMSAT v. Hon. Jenny Lin Aldecoa-
Delorino, Pairing Judge of RTC Makati City, Br. 138, et al.), G.R. No.
186066 (Philcomsat Holdings Corp., represented by Concepcion Poblador v.
PHILCOMSAT, represented by Victor Africa), and G.R. No. 186590
(Philcomsat Holdings Corp., represented by Erlinda I. Bildner v. Philcomsat
Holdings Corp., represented by Enrique L. Locsin).12cralawred
On the first issue, we ruled that it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan
which has jurisdiction over cases which do not involve a sequestration-
related incident but an intra-corporate controversy.
Originally, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A vested the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the following in the
SEC, to wit:
xxxx
(a) Devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of the board of directors,
business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organization
registered with the Commission;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, members or associates; between
any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which
they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between
such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it
concerns their individual franchise or right as such
entity;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers
or managers of such corporations, partnership or
associations;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in
the state of suspension of payment in cases where the corporation,
partnership or association possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts
but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respective fall due
or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no
sufficient assets to cover its liabilities but is under the management of a
Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created pursuant to this
Decree.
Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation
Code), effective on August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-
corporate controversies and the other cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D.
No. 902-A was transferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 5.2
of the law, which provides:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court; Provided,That the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-
corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved
within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall
retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases
filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
To implement Republic Act No. 8799, the Court promulgated its resolution of
November 21, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC designating certain branches of
the RTC to try and decide the cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No.
902-A. Among the RTCs designated as special commercial courts was the
RTC (Branch 138) in Makati City, the trial court for Civil Case No. 04-1049.
On March 13, 2001, the Court adopted and approved the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 in
A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC, effective on April 1, 2001, whose Section 1 and
Section 2, Rule 6 state:
Section 1. Cases covered. – The provisions of this rule shall apply toelection
contests in stock and non-stock corporations.
Section 2. Definition. – An election contest refers to any controversy or
dispute involving title or claim to any elective office in a stock or non-stock
corporation, the validation of proxies, the manner and validity of elections,
and the qualifications of candidates, including the proclamation of winners, to
the office of director, trustee or other officer directly elected by the
stockholders in a close corporation or by members of a non-stock corporation
where the articles of incorporation or by-laws so provide. (bold underscoring
supplied)
Conformably with Republic Act No. 8799, and with the ensuing
resolutions of the Court on the implementation of the transfer of
jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court, the RTC (Branch 138) in Makati
had the authority to hear and decide the election contest between the
parties herein. There should be no disagreement that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of an action, being conferred by law, could neither be altered
nor conveniently set aside by the courts and the parties.
To buttress its position, however, the Nieto-Locsin Group relied on Section 2
 26
of Executive Order No. 14, which expressly mandated that the PCGG “shall
file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.”
The reliance was unwarranted.
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14 had no application herein simply
because the subject matter involved was an intra-corporate controversy, not
any incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to any case involving
assets whose nature as ill-gotten wealth was yet to be determined. In San
Miguel Corporation v. Kahn, the Court held that:
The subject matter of his complaint in the SEC does not therefore fall within
the ambit of this Court’s Resolution of August 10, 1988 on the cases just
mentioned, to the effect that, citing PCGG v. Pena, et al., all cases of the
Commission regarding ‘the funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally
acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, Subordinates, Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees, whether civil or criminal, are
lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,’
and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive and original
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.”
His complaint does not involve any property illegally acquired or
misappropriated by Marcos, et al., or “any incidents arising from, incidental
to, or related to” any case involving such property, but assets indisputably
belonging to San Miguel Corporation which were, in his (de los Angeles')
view, being illicitly committed by a majority of its board of directors to answer
for loans assumed by a sister corporation, Neptunia Co., Ltd.
De los Angeles’ complaint, in fine, is confined to the issue of the validity of
the assumption by the corporation of the indebtedness of Neptunia Co., Ltd.,
allegedly for the benefit of certain of its officers and stockholders, an issue
evidently distinct from, and not even remotely requiring inquiry into the matter
of whether or not the 33,133,266 SMC shares sequestered by the PCGG
belong to Marcos and his cronies or dummies (on which, issue, as already
pointed out, de los Angeles, in common with the PCGG, had in fact
espoused the affirmative). De los Angeles’ dispute, as stockholder and
director of SMC, with other SMC directors, an intra-corporate one, to be sure,
is of no concern to the Sandiganbayan, having no relevance whatever to the
ownership of the sequestered stock. The contention, therefore, that in view of
this Court's ruling as regards the sequestered SMC stock above adverted to,
the SEC has no jurisdiction over the de los Angeles complaint, cannot be
sustained and must be rejected. The dispute concerns acts of the board
of directors claimed to amount to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the stockholders, or is one arising
out of intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders, or
between any or all of them and the corporation of which they are
stockholders.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been held not to
extend even to a case involving a sequestered company
notwithstanding that the majority of the members of the board of
directors were PCGG nominees. The Court marked this distinction clearly
in Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, holding thusly:
The subject-matter of petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention involves
basically, an interpretation of contract, i.e., whether or not the right of first
refusal could and/or should have been observed, based on the
Addendum/Agreement of July 14, 1988, which extended the terms and
conditions of the original agreement of January 1, 1976. The question of
whether or not the sequestered property was lawfully acquired by Roberto S.
Benedicto has no bearing on the legality of the termination of the
management contract by NRHDC’s Board of Directors. The two are
independent and unrelated issues and resolution of either may proceed
independently of each other. Upholding the legality of Benedicto’s acquisition
of the sequestered property is not a guarantee that HIP’s management
contract would be upheld, for only the Board of Directors of NRHDC is
qualified to make such a determination.
Likewise, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed
complaint-in-intervention. The original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the
Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to (a) cases filedby the PCGG,
pursuant to the exercise of its powers under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and
14, as amended by the Office of the President, and Article XVIII, Section 26
of the Constitution, i.e., where the principal cause of action is the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, as well as all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related
to such cases and (b) cases filed by those who wish to question or challenge
the commission’s acts or orders in such cases.
Evidently, petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention is an ordinary civil
case that does not pertain to the Sandiganbayan. As the Solicitor General
stated, the complaint is not directed against PCGG as an entity, but against a
private corporation, in which case it is not per se, a PCGG case.
In the cases now before the Court, what are sought to be determined are
the propriety of the election of a party as a Director, and his authority to
act in that capacity. Such issues should be exclusively determined only
by the RTC pursuant to the pertinent law on jurisdiction because they
did not concern the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.13 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
 27
In the case at bar, the complaint concerns PHILCOMSAT’s demand to
exercise its right of inspection as stockholder of PHC but which petitioners
refused on the ground of the ongoing power struggle within POTC and
PHILCOMSAT that supposedly prevents PHC from recognizing
PHILCOMSAT’s representative (Africa) as possessing such right or authority
from the legitimate directors and officers. Clearly, the controversy is intra-
corporate in nature as they arose out of intra-corporate relations between
and among stockholders, and between stockholders and the corporation.
As to the issue of whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action since PHILCOMSAT never authorized Africa to file it,
we rule in the negative.
A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it
appears clearly from the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Conversely, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause
of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is
not entitled to any relief.14 Here, attached to the complaint is the Board
Secretary’s Certificate15 stating, among others, that PHILCOMSAT board of
directors had authorized its President to exercise the right of inspection in its
subsidiary PHC, and to file a case in court in case of refusal by PHC.
Petitioners insist that the board meeting held on September 22, 2005 where
the aforesaid resolution was approved, is void for want of a quorum “as the
majority of the legitimate directors of PHILCOMSAT were not present at and
notified of the meeting.” This clearly alludes to the Nieto-PCGG group’s non-
recognition of the election of the board of directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT conducted by the Africa-Bildner group.
The issue thus boils down to the legitimacy of the Africa-Bildner group as the
controlling interest in PHILCOMSAT.
In the same cited case of Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp.
(POTC) v. Africa,16 we have further settled with finality, under the doctrine
of stare decisis, the question of who between the contending factions (Africa-
Bildner) and (Nieto-PCGG) held the controlling interest in POTC, and
consequently PHILCOMSAT and PHC. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The question of who held the majority shareholdings in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT was definitively laid to rest in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R.
No. 141804, whereby the Court upheld the validity of the compromise
agreement the Government had concluded with Atty. Ilusorio. Said the
Court:
With the imprimatur of no less than the former President Fidel V. Ramos and
the approval of the Sandiganbayan, the Compromise Agreement must be
accorded utmost respect. Such amicable settlement is not only allowed but
even encouraged. Thus, in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, we held:
xxxx
The authority of the PCGG to enter into Compromise Agreements in civil
cases and to grant immunity, under certain circumstances, in criminal cases
is now settled and established. In Republic of the Philippines and Jose O.
Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. (173 SCRA 72 [1989]), this Court
categorically stated that amicable settlements and compromises are not only
allowed but actually encouraged in civil cases. A specific grant of immunity
from criminal prosecutions was also sustained. InBenedicto vs. Board of
Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC, and IBC (207 SCRA 659
[1992]), the Court ruled that the authority of the PCGG to validly enter into
Compromise Agreement for the purpose of avoiding litigation or putting an
end to one already commenced was indisputable. x x x (italics supplied)
Having been sealed with court approval, the Compromise Agreement has the
force of res judicata between the parties and should be complied with in
accordance with its terms. Pursuant thereto, Victoria C. de los Reyes,
Corporate Secretary of the POTC, transmitted to Mr. Magdangal B. Elma,
then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and Chairman of PCGG, Stock
Certificate No. 131 dated January 10, 2000, issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, for 4,727 POTC shares. Thus, the Compromise
Agreement was partly implemented.cralawlawlibrary
As a result of the Government having expressly recognized that 673
POTC shares belonged to Atty. Ilusorio, Atty. Ilusorio and his group
gained the majority control of POTC.
Applying the ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R. No. 141804 to Civil Case
No. 04-1049,the RTC (Branch 138) correctly concluded that the Nieto-
PCGG Group, because it did not have the majority control of POTC,
could not have validly convened and held the stockholders’ meeting
and election of POTC officers on August 5, 2004 during which Nieto, Jr.
and PCGG representative Guy De Leon were respectively elected as
President and Chairman; and that there could not be a valid authority
for Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin to vote the proxies of the group in the
PHILCOMSAT meeting.
For the same reason, the POTC proxies used by Nieto, Jr. and Locsin to
elect themselves respectively as Chairman and President of
PHILCOMSAT; and the PHILCOMSAT proxies used by Nieto, Jr. and
 28

Locsin in the August 31, 2004 PHC elections to elect themselves

respectively as President and Acting Chairman of PHC, were all invalid
for not having the support of the majority shareholders of said
corporations.

While it is true that judicial decisions should be given a prospective effect,

such prospectivity did not apply to the June 15, 2005 ruling in G.R. No.
141796 and G.R. No. 141804 because the ruling did not enunciate a new
legal doctrine or change the interpretation of the law as to prejudice the
parties and undo their situations established under an old doctrine or prior
interpretation. Indeed, the ruling only affirmed the compromise agreement
consummated on June 28, 1996 and approved by the Sandiganbayan on
June 8, 1998, and accordingly implemented through the cancellation of the
shares in the names of IRC and MLDC and their registration in the names of
Atty. Ilusorio to the extent of 673 shares, and of the Republic to the extent of
4,727 shares. In a manner of speaking, the decision of the Court in G.R. No.
141796 and G.R. No. 141804 promulgated on June 15, 2005 declared the
compromise agreement valid, and such validation properly retroacted to the
date of the judicial approval of the compromise agreement on June 8, 1998.

Consequently, although the assailed elections were conducted by the Nieto-

PCGG group on August 31, 2004 but the ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R.
No. 141804 was promulgated only on June 15, 2005, the ruling was the legal
standard by which the issues raised in Civil Case No. 04-1049 should be
resolved.17 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
October 21, 2011 and Resolution dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99789 are herebyAFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 29

NERWIN INDUSTRIES G.R. No. 167057 mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present: law.

CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Antecedents
* BRION,

BERSAMIN, and
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the
CORPORATION, and
ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Promulgated: Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:
Bids and Awards Committee,
Respondents. In 1999, the National Electrification Administration
April 11, 2012 (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a
contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and
DECISION delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles
and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in
BERSAMIN, J.: the countrys Rural Electrification Project. The said contract
consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC
or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In
response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the
same time, they were informed that only those who would
or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit
or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments direction, their financial bids.

from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location
of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or
project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing,
implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or
rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any
other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory
prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary
Following a thorough review of the bidders
qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including
private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the
bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified
bidders submitted their financial bids where private
respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all
schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted
a pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins]
manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified
supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and
deliver NEAs requirements.
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA,
PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of
Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA
administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs
 30
Board of Directors the approval of award to private
respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on
account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive
bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules
between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest
responsive and complying bidder) and the second
lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the
poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is
deemed substantial and extremely advantageous
to the government. The price difference is
equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of
crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules
between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole
and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of
$2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the
crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs.
of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of
supplying the woodpoles and specified in the bid
documents and as based on the pre-award
inspection conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors
passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material
requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the
delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date
of October 2001 fast approaching. In turn, it resolved to award
the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to
private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin]
protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was
a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific
Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged
false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-
qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project
to private respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding,
NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate
Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and
qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the
said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion
but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that
there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-
80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding,
NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to
the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to
file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the
issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was
granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No.
01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation
purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify
and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural
Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the
O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-
Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids
and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an
attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another
bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding
for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No.
03106921, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the
rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs,
contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the
corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.[3]
 31
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents
reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is
hereby issued by this Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu
Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from
appearing as counsel for the defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue
enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids
and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing
the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage
or damages which the defendants may suffer should it be
finally adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final
determination of the issue in this case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting
of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the
defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this
order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30,
2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to
the complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for
reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit answer. [6]
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a
special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC
had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and
from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of
Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and
in disqualifying respondents counsel from representing them.[7]
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders dated July 30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby
ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No.
03106921, private respondents complaint for issuance of
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction
before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on February 9, 2005.[9]
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
 32
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on
the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions,
except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government
projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of
the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which
prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but
not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case
considering that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled
and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20,
2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No.
03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the
propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a preliminary
injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and
worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed
order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW
Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which
was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at
the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated
July 20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court,
except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or
any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the governments direction, to restrain,
prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of
the national government as defined under
Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or
controversies instituted by a private party, including
but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those
claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that
unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely
supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the
prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or
National Resources Development projects of, and public
utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact,
earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the
Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition,
the Supreme Court had the same embodied in
its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the
ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or
Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government
Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National
Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of
infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the
Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The
term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement
and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports,
seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and
drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore
protection, power facilities, national buildings, school
buildings, hospital buildings and other related construction
projects that form part of the government capital investment.
 33
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even
from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent
Judges blatant disregard of a simple, comprehensible and
unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of
injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure
projects. Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although
expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single
exception where the said proscription may not apply,
i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner
in default because, in the first place, he should not have given
due course to private respondents complaint for
injunction.Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the
other grounds proffered by petitioners.[10]
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its
discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against
respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the
express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its
seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and,
secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court,
shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person
or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the
following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-
of-way and/or site or location of any national government
project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the
national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such
contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful
activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or
controversies instituted by a private party, including but not
limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have
rights through such bidders involving such contract/project.
This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in
an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue
in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the
contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under
the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and
winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without
prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under
existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3
hereof is void and of no force and effect.
 34
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing
was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin
obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition
under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed
all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No.
11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of
TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving
contracts and projects of the Government.
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A.
Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which
Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found
administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as
the result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in the amount
of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening retirement from
the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133
entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable
for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated
Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed
the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No.
8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the
rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise
obstinately disregarded this Courts various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government
infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A.
No. 8975.Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon.
Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon.
Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818
expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive
writs against the implementation or execution of a government
infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818,
the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for
grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government
infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning
a misunderstanding of the law or openly
manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In
any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD
1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars
enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice. His claim that the
said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997
Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived
subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges
should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the
facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they
should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast
of and be conversant with the rules and the
circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted
and which affect the disposition of cases before
them.
Although judges have in their favor the
presumption of regularity and good faith in the
performance of their judicial functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms
of the law obviates this presumption and
renders them susceptible to administrative
sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well
to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also
constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in
 35
disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which
judges are expected to know and apply properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are
serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount
of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed
under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to
dismissal or suspension.[12]
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment
and discussion of Nerwins other submissions superfluous and unnecessary,
the Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and
true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court
to use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing
jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction,
and to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts. Only
thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be
avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts.[13] It is an ancillary or
preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or
interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is
established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.[14]
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable.
In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),
Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be
issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient
interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be
entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must
aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute
a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive
writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right;
and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not
issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an
act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to
prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute.
Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.[16]
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded,
however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is
enough that:
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis
of facts affording a present right which is directly
 36
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a
clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its
existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the
evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the
hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need
only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of
the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the
decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so
since our concern here involves only the propriety of the
preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still
pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction,
the private respondent needs only to show that it has
the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
complaint xxx.[18]
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts
considering that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the
function of the appellate courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such
discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary,
should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that
is done, the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.[21]
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be
wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that
tend to disposeof the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for
the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible, [22] for it is
never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits
of a case,[23] or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy
whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and
irreparable harm [27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be settled.
Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of
their courts to render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should
be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the
granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth
remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent
the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the
claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower
courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin v. PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012
FACTS: In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an
invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the
supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood poles and 20,000 of
cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was awarded to him
being the lowest bidder. However, NEA’s board of directors passed a
resolution reducing by 50% the material requirements for IPB 80 to which
Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a
complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-
qualification bid were falsified. Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought
the opinion of Gov’t Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility of Nerwin.
NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB 80 contract. As a
result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which was grabted
by RTC Manila. PNOC – Energy Dev’t Corp issued an invitation to pre-qualify
and bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it
was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed
for TRO to enjoin respondents to the proposed bidding. Respondents
averred that this is in violation of a rule that government infrastructure are not
subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of
respondents. Hence, this petition.
 37

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which

prohibits issuance of TRO except SC to gov’t projects

HELD: Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance

of TRO, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions
against gov’t.
 38
G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015
BBB,*Petitioner, v. AAA,*Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the
Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581, which affirmed with
modification the issuance against him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.
Antecedent Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTC’s
issuance of the PPO against BB:
Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date
seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical student and was raising her
first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with the
help of her parents.
During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely,
[DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).
To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on
October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children,
including [CCC’s], was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by
virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of
happy moments and heated arguments. The two however have contradicting
statements as to the cause of their present situation.
[BBB] alleges that [AAA’s] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent
arguments. According to [BBB], [AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his
relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges, contrary to
[AAA’s] suspicion, are purely professional. According to [BBB], because of
their repeated fights, he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the
brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA]
herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children with her,
which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also
caused the family expense to double, making it even more difficult for [BBB]
to fulfill his financial obligations.
[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due
to [BBB’s] incessant womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of
denying the same, would even curse [AAA].
The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBB’s] alleged mistress, a woman
by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the
presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did nothing to stop the
same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to leave the conjugal home with the
children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. She however went back to
the conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving her son
[CCC] at her friend’s house.
What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of
[BBB] in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC] as
his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently from the two kids, putting
[CCC] at a disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB]
would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].
While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not
paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they were occupying, forcing
[AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find work to support the
family, after [BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the
family. According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient to
cover the family expenses, forcing her to request for loans from friends.
[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her
and/or their children. [AAA] alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought
the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives within the same compound
where [AAA] lives, to go through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every
move, i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home,
etc.
Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse,
[AAA] filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo issued a
 39

Temporary Protection Order (TPO). The TPO was thereafter, made
permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007], the
dispositive portion of which orders:
“x x x x
Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying,
or otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain from
insulting her, cursing her and shouting invectives at her;
coordinate with [AAA] in receiving such support;
Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated
family or household member at a distance of 100 meters;
Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of
employment or any specified place frequented regularly by the offended
party and children and any designated family or household member;

Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may
cause mental and emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her
extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and anyone else for that matter;
Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit
environment, specifically prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress [FFF] and
anyone else to be with them in instances where he would be allowed by this
Court to see their children;
Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to
Section 23 of RA 9262 with the undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the
violence sought to be prevented and that in case such violence is
committed[,] he will pay the amount determined by the Court in its judgment;
Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being
prayed by [AAA]) representing both reasonable attorney’s fees and cost of
litigation, including cost of suit.

Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total x x x x.”5
of 12 visits per year) at the latter’s residence for a maximum period of 2
years [sic] each visit, subject to further orders from this Court. For this
Ruling of the CA
purpose, [BBB’s every visit] shall be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who
shall coordinate with [AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children
BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated
for such visit, at the expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is
August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that the RTC’s (a) issuance of the PPO
directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB] visited the
against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their children, (c)
children;
directives for him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of litigation and to post an
excessive amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive
Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession
character lack factual bases.
of the motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:
On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the
One (1) Hyundai Starex Van
factual findings and dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the
1997 Model
case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings who shall be
Plate Number: WJP 902
awarded custody of the children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the
Chassis Number:
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443
their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB
displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule
Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until
causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that
further orders from this Court;
FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public
appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the
Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month
two had an extra-marital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in
(not Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support,
person or through text messages. The CA likewise did not favorably consider
inclusive of educational expenses, groceries, medicines, medical bills, and
BBB’s claim that he cannot provide financial support to AAA and the children
insurance premiums, starting from the month of January 2007 to be given
in the amount required by the RTC as his income merely depended on
within the first five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall
contractual hosting and events management assignments. The CA
 40
emphasized that AAA was in the position to know the sources of BBB’s
income. Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article 2139 of the Family
Code, the CA, however, ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled
to exercise custody over the children, who at that time were already older
than seven years of age.
The CA denied BBB’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way of the
Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010 which is likewise assailed in the instant
petition.
Issues
Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I factual issues which are subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC’S DECISION TO MAKE THE [TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(TPO)] PERMANENT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC’S AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF LITIGATION IN
FAVOR OF [AAA].
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC’S ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12cralawlawlibrary
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE THE UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES ADDUCED
BY AAA.13cralawlawlibrary
V AAA’s counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED
AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE,
ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE
AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED
STATES.14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in
the proceedings below relative to his financial position and AAA’s supposedly
baseless accusations and demands from him. In addition, he posits that the
text messages offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence,
doubt exists as to their admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the
current whereabouts and circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued
against him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and custody of DDD
and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in a college
dormitory. BBB and AAA barely get in touch with each other except when the
latter initiates the same.
In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, BBB continuously
violates the PPO, which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed
to be immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that
BBB still verbally abuses her. BBB has not posted the P300,000.00 bond
required from him. He likewise has not paid the attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the
eyes of the law, is also among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges
that in 2010, she left DDD and EEE under the care of BBB only because the
circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then
lapsed from the time she filed an application for a protection order and still,
no execution of the PPO ensued. She could not depend for financial support
from BBB. She was thus left with no choice but to yield custody over DDD
and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to BBB’s illicit affairs. AAA
points out that since their children are all older than seven years of age, they
are already capable of choosing for themselves whom they want to exercise
custody over them.
Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA had
entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority
over, and support of DDD and EEE.17cralawlawlibrary
Comment to the MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the MOA while
emotionally distressed and sans the former’s advice and guidance. Atty.
Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBB’s illicit relationship with FFF continues
in violation of the PPO issued by the RTC.
 41
In BBB’s Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted
with due care and full knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she
signed. Further, BBB’s alleged involvement with FFF is an issue which need
not be resolved in a judgment based on compromise.
Disquisition of the Court
The instant petition is not a proper
subject of a compromise agreement.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant
petition by rendering a judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for
by BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her
application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being
assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA.
The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No.
9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly
prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against
women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which
involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. x x x.22(Emphasis deleted)
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of
all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support,
custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor
children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent
action and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant
petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the
instant petition to compromise applies.
The courts a quo committed no
error in issuing a PPO against BBB.
Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in
the CA’s ruling that the RTC properly issued a PPO against BBB and that a
remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to determine who shall
exercise custody over CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the
children as with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the
PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO except items (d), (f),
(g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted custody over the
three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the
amount and manner of providing financial support, which are matters the
RTC is now directed to determine with dispatch.
The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an
amicable settlement as regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental
authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. While these matters can be
lawful subjects of compromise, AAA’s vacillation, as expressed by her
counsel, compels the Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to
resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are, however, not
precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues,
but the Court now requires the RTC’s direct supervision lest the parties
muddle the issues anew and fail to put an end to their bickering.
No grounds exist which compel this
Court to resolve the first three issues
raised by BBB since they are merely
factual in character.
In Padalhin v. Laviña,25 the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states
that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question
to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.cralawred
x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is a factual issue
which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. x x x
 42

In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
intent to subject to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from
the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and [AAA].31 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original and italics ours)
substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorney’s fees in
Laviña’s favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses
Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads
Padalhin’s counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are
not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are
[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only
factual and not legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a
messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between
petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.26 (Italics in the
the parties.32
original and emphasis ours)
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why
In BBB’s case, he avers that the RTC and the CA’s (a) issuance of the PPO,
he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted
(b) award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in AAA’s favor, and (c)
authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise
directive for him to post a bond in the amount of P300,000.00 all lack factual
noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which
bases. The first three issues presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration
the text messages were sent.
of evidence. While the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a
petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes exceptions,27 BBB’s case does not fall
Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of
in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord with each other as
the text messages requires an interpretation of the rules of evidence, this
to their factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus,
Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had admitted
binding upon this Court.
authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those
messages as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s
The doubt raised by BBB anent the
arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to
admissibility of the text messages as
take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already
evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.
apparent.
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that any
The deletion from the PPO of the
question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered
directive of the RTC and the CA relative
moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the
to the award of support is not warranted.
subject messages.29cralawlawlibrary
While CCC is not BBB’s biological son,
he was legitimated under the latter’s name.
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text
Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
messages which were sent by him and FFF to AAA since they were
receive support from BBB.
unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings
filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody,
attributed to him by AAA. The Appellant’s Brief30 filed before the CA stated in
which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support.
part that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB
justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him.
[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB]
replied to. It is totally obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are
This Court is not persuaded.
only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and
the adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home despite the
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and
entreaties of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
leading up to their separation, and up to the time that the instant case has
 43

former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the award to
legitimated.” Article 178 states that “[l]egitimation shall take place by a him of custody over the children.
subsequent valid marriage between parents.”
This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s resolve the question of custody. Since the children are now all older than
biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay
legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then, with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay
the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its
acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code entirety. However, if any of the three children would choose to be under
pertinently provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to
be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered and any of the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should
against the person relying thereon. give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children.
Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and
means and the necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of
in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or
estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in
contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade
resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the
a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the
spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus,
effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and
the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the
pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same
best interests of the children.
rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s
support.
A final note on the effectivity and
violation of a PPO
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from
raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s status and filiation.
The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO
However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court
is not a process to be trifled with. It is only granted after notice and hearing.
now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that “the civil status [of a child] cannot
Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be punishable with a fine ranging
be attacked collaterally.” The child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by way
from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
(P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.35cralawlawlibrary
purpose.”34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for a PPO
before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that “[a] PPO shall
collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.
be effective until revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose
favor the order was issued.”
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity
to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be
Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA
granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise
had executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by compromise is sought
visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support.
to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out AAA’s vacillation anent
the MOA’s execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly
The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit
or unwittingly, have imposed upon this Court the undue burden of
reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took
speculating whether or not AAA’s half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is
place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological,
tantamount to an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court,
emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA.
however, refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised
Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does
 44

in the instant petition for the Court to dispose of revolve around the propriety
of the PPO’s issuance. The Court resolves that principal query in the
affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without any
equivocation, files an application for its revocation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent
Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 STANDS except items (d),
(f), (g), (h) and (i)36 thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court
for it to accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with
dispatch the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three
children;
(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and
(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4,
2014, respectively, areNOTED.

SO ORDERED.
 45

G.R. No. 201931, February 11, 2015 1. The remaining assets of the Petitioner Dona Adela Export
Int’l., Inc., (Dona Adela) consists of the following:
DOÑA ADELA1 EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, v. TRADE
AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND Asset Appraised Value Remarks
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), Respondents. 1.1 Land P5,616,000 w/ REM to TRC
1.2 Building 6,480,000 w/ REM to TRC
DECISION 1.3 Sewing machines 942,000 w/o chattel mortgage to
TRC (sic)
1.4 Sewing machines 755,000 w/chattel mortgage
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: 1.5 Furnitures and Fixtures w/o appraised value

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 2.

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision 2 dated
November 15, 2011 and the Order3 dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 in SEC Case No. MC06-103
for Voluntary Insolvency. The RTC approved the Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement filed by respondents Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI). Respondents stipulated in their agreement that petitioner shall
waive its rights to confidentiality under the provisions of the Law on Secrecy
of Bank Deposits and theGeneral Banking Law of 2000.
The facts follow:
On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc.,
(petitioner, for brevity) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency.4 The case
was docketed as SEC Case No. MC06-103 and raffled off to the RTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211.
On August 28, 2006, the RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all
civil proceedings against petitioner. In the same order, the RTC set the initial
hearing on October 19, 2006.5cralawlawlibrary
Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking
her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged
appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof of their respective
claims.
On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into
Compromise Agreement6incorporating therein her proposed terms of
compromise, the pertinent portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The detailed list of the abovementioned assets and the
corresponding appraised value is attached hereto as Annex
A;
3. The claims of the creditors of Petitioner previously submitted
with their respective proofs of claim are shown below:
NAME OF CREDITOR AMOUNT
Technology Resource Center 29,546,342.45
BPI 11,069,575.82
*TIDCORP
City of Mandaluyong as of 3/25/09 1,061,370.12
4.
*TIDCORP has not yet submitted its peso amount of claim
xxxx
WHEREFORE, undersigned receiver respectfully proposed for the
concerned parties of this (sic) proceedings to enter into a compromise
Agreement under the following terms and conditions:
a. That the remaining assets of the Petitioner mentioned under
1 above be assigned and applied to their respective claims
in the following manner:
a.1. The real estate property mentioned under 1.1 and 1.2
above with real estate mortgage (REM) to Technology
Resource Center (TRC) be assigned and applied to its
credit. All costs and expenses for the transfer of the
 46
registration of the said property, including its unpaid real
estate taxes due to the City of Mandaluyong, and cost for
cancellation of real estate mortgage shall be borne by TRC.
a.2. For TRC to assign and waive its rights over the sewing
machines and equipments under chattel mortgage to it
mentioned under 1.3 above as its share for the
administrative costs of this proceedings.
a.3. To assign to BPI and TIDCORP the sewing machines
and equipments mentioned under 1.3 and 1.4 above in
proportion with their credits.
a.4. All other remaining assets of Petitioner under 1.5 above
be assigned to the Court-appointed receiver, Atty. Arlene T.
Gonzales for payment of receiver’s fees.
a.5. All other administrative expenses, if any, shall be for the
account of TRC, BPI and TIDCORP, in proportion to their
respective credits.
b. That for the abovementioned purpose mentioned under 3.a.
above, the appraisal value of the property (as appraised by
Royal Asia Appraisers which was previously submitted to the
Honorable Court) be made as the basis in determining the
value of the properties; and the amount of the claims that will
be approved by this Honorable Court be made as the basis
in the determination of the amount of credits due to the
respective creditors.
c. Furthermore, that the Compromise Agreement being
proposed herein shall be without prejudice to rights of the
creditors to enforce actions against other debtors who are
jointly and solidarily liable with the petitioner.
d. Finally, that the petitioner, Dona Adela Int’l., Inc., be
discharged from its debts to the party-creditors by virtue of
the Compromise Agreement as being proposed herein.7
On May 26, 2011, petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr.,
and Technology Resource Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement8 wherein petitioner agreed to transfer a 351-square
meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027 with existing improvements
situated in the Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full
payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement bears the conformity of
Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance,
Manifestation and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement.9cralawlawlibrary
On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement10which contained the following
terms:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER. – The parties agree that
the outstanding principal obligation of petitioner to TIDCORP
shall be in the amount of NINE MILLION FORTY-FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHT & 15/100 PESOS
(P9,044,708.15), while to BPI in the amount of ELEVEN
MILLION SIXTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY FIVE & 82/100 PESOS (P11,069,575.82).
2. SETTLEMENT. – TIDCORP and BPI both hereby agree to
accept all the machineries in petitioner’s inventory set aside
pursuant to the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement dated 18 October 2010 filed by the Receiver,
Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales. The said machineries valued
at THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P350,000.00) shall be divided equally between TIDCORP
and BPI.
3. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. – TIDCORP and BPI hereby
agree that acceptance of the abovementioned settlement
shall constitute payment of petitioner’s aforesaid obligation
pursuant to Act No. 1956 (Insolvency Act). However, the
benefit of payment under the said Insolvency Act shall only
be in favor of petitioner and shall not in any manner affect
the claims of TIDCORP and BPI as against its sureties
and/or guarantors.
4. EXPENSES AND TAXES. – All necessary expenses,
including but not limited to, fees of the Receiver,
documentation and notarization, as well as all fees incurred
or to be incurred in connection to the full implementation of
this Agreement shall be for the account of Mr. Epifanio C.
Ramos, Jr.
All taxes and fees incurred or to be incurred including but not
 47
limited to gross receipts tax shall be for the account of the
petitioner.
5. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY. – The petitioner and the
members of its Board of Directors shall waive all rights to
confidentiality provided under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on
Secrecy of Bank Deposits, and Republic Act No. 8791,
otherwise known as The General Banking Law of
2000. Accordingly, the petitioner and the members of its
Board of Directors by these presents grant TIDCORP and
BPI access to any deposit or other accounts maintained by
them with any bank.For this purpose, the petitioner and the
members of its Board of Directors shall authorize TIDCORP
and BPI to make, sign, execute and deliver any document of
whatever kind or nature which may be necessary or proper
to allow them access to such deposits or other accounts.
TIDCORP and BPI shall be further authorized to delegate to
any person, who may exercise in their stead, any or all of the
powers and authority herein granted to them or substitute
any person in their place to do and perform said powers and
authority.
18. HOLD FREE AND HARMLESS. – The petitioner shall
indemnify and hold TIDCORP and BPI, their respective
Board of Directors, and officers free and harmless against
any liability or claim of whatever kind or nature which may
arise from, or in connection with, or in relation to this
Agreement.11 (Underscoring supplied)
Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed
Compromise Agreement12 of TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that
petitioner has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and
officers. He argued that he cannot be held liable for the expenses and taxes
as a consequence of the auction or distribution/payment of said machineries
to the creditors; hence, his name should be deleted as a party to the
Compromise Agreement.
Likewise, Atty. Gonzales filed a Manifestation and Comment (On Dacion En
Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) with Motion for Payment of Administrative
Expenses and Receiver’s Fees.13 Atty. Gonzales manifested that she is
entitled to payment of administrative expenses and receiver’s fees in the total
amount of P740,200.00. She further stated that it is just and fair for her to
ask her due for services rendered as officer of the Court from TRC who
benefitted the most from the insolvency proceedings; and, that she is waiving
the administrative expenses and receiver’s fees due from TIDCORP and BPI.
In its Comment,14 TRC requested that the receiver’s fee be reduced to
P106,000.00. In her Reply,15Atty. Gonzales said that she will accept the
amount of P106,000.00 being offered by TRC.
On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving
the Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered based on
the foregoing exchange of pleadings, as follows:
1. Finding the aforequoted Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement dated May 26, 2011 executed by and between
Dona Adela Export International, Inc., represented by its
president Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource
Center, represented by its Director General Dennis L.
Cunanan, to be in order and not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that
the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October
24, 2011 intimated her conformity to the Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement, the same is
hereby APPROVED and is made the basis of this judgment;
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated
July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, with the exception of paragraph 4
thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes, the same is
likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the
fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on
October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement;
3. Pursuant to its Comment filed on October 19, 2011,
Technology Resource Center is hereby ordered to pay the
Court-Appointed Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales the sum
of P106,000.00, representing its proportionate share of the
 48
administrative expenses incurred by the receiver with legal
interest from date of termination of this insolvency
proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission who is directed to cause the removal of petitioner Dona Adela
Export International, Inc., from the list of registered legal entities and to make
a report to this Court of its Compliance within fifteen (15) days from said
elimination so that the Court could terminate the instant insolvency
proceedings and release the Court-Appointed receiver from her duties and
responsibilities.
SO ORDERED.16
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration17 and claimed that
TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes on it several obligations such as
payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of confidentiality of its bank
deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
In its Order18 dated May 14, 2012, the RTC denied the motion and held that
petitioner’s silence and acquiescence to the joint motion to approve
compromise agreement while it was set for hearing by creditors BPI and
TIDCORP is tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto. There was
no objection filed by petitioner to the joint motion to approve compromise
agreement prior to its approval, said the RTC. The RTC also noted that
petitioner’s President attended every hearing of the case but did not
interpose any objection to the said motion when its conditions were being
discussed and formulated by the parties and Atty.
Gonzales.19cralawlawlibrary
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the depositor
concerned is required by law before any third person or entity is allowed to
examine bank deposits or bank records. According to petitioner, it is not a
party to the compromise agreement between BPI and TIDCORP and its
silence or acquiescence is not tantamount to an admission that binds it to the
compromise agreement of the creditors especially the waiver of
confidentiality of bank deposits. Petitioner cites the rule on relativity of
contracts which states that contracts can only bind the parties who entered
into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of
such contract and has knowledge thereof. Petitioner also maintains that
waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly shown,
either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
explanation.
Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement because petitioner and its counsel
participated in all the proceedings involving the subject compromise
agreement and did not object when the compromise agreement was
considered by the RTC.
Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality under
Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 1405 and 8791 does not require the express or
written consent of the depositor. It is TIDCORP’s position that upon
declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court obtains complete jurisdiction
over the insolvent’s property which includes the authority to issue orders to
look into the insolvent’s bank deposits. Since bank deposits are considered
debts owed by the banks to the petitioner, the receiver is empowered to
recover them even without petitioner’s express or written consent, said
TIDCORP.
TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement
approved by the RTC is binding on petitioner and its Board of Directors by
reason of estoppel. The compromise agreement is not an ordinary contract.
Since it was approved by the insolvency court, the compromise agreement
has the force and effect of judgment; it is immediately executory and not
appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery, TIDCORP concluded.
The main issue for our consideration is whether the petitioner is bound by the
provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that
petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits under
R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking
Law of 2000.
The petition is meritorious.
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the
parties in a civil case is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory.20cralawlawlibrary
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through
fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a motion with the trial court that
approved the compromise agreement to reconsider the judgment and nullify
or set aside said contract on any of the said grounds for annulment of
contract within 15 days from notice of judgment. Under Rule 37, said party
 49
can either file a motion for new trial or reconsideration. A party can file a
motion for new trial based on fraud, accident or mistake, excusable
negligence, or newly discovered evidence. On the other hand, a party may
decide to seek the recall or modification of the judgment by means of a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that “the decision or final order is
contrary to law” if the consent was procured through fraud, mistake, or
duress. Thus, the motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration is the
readily available remedy for a party to challenge a judgment if the 15-day
period from receipt of judgment for taking an appeal has not yet
expired.21cralawlawlibrary
In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based
on compromise agreement assailing the waiver of confidentiality provision in
the Agreement between its two creditors, TIDCORP and BPI, in which
petitioner was not a party. After the trial court denied the motion on the
ground of estoppel, petitioner sought a direct recourse to this Court.
We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final
resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law
are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when
the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of
whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of
law.22cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner submits the lone question of law on whether the waiver of
confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI is
valid despite petitioner not being a party and signatory to the
same. According to petitioner, R.A. No. 1405 requires the express and
written consent of the depositor to make the waiver effective.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits enacted in
1955, was first amended by Presidential Decree No. 1792 in 1981 and
further amended by R.A. No. 7653 in 1993. It now
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except when the examination is made in the course of a special or general
examination of a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board
after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank
fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, or
when the examination is made by an independent auditor hired by the bank
to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit
purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the
bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be
disclosed. These are under any of the following instances: (a) upon written
permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a
competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials
or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the
Anti-Money Laundering Council may inquire into a bank account upon order
of any competent court.23cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI
and TIDCORP only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or its
representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is waiving the
confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the
confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the
agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said
provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner who was not
a party and signatory to the said agreement.
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to
interpose its objection during the proceedings. It is an elementary rule that
the existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated since a waiver by
implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not
only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the
right should not be construed as a surrender thereof; the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against the existence and validity of such
waiver.24cralawlawlibrary
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the
 50
RTC, all its property, assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the
appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the order of the RTC appointing
Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed to assign and convey to
Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies, estate and effects
with all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto,25 pursuant to Section
3226 of the Insolvency Law.27 Such assignment shall operate to vest in the
assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from
execution.28 Corollarily, the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement that petitioner waives its right to confidentiality of its
bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as
receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects of petitioner have
been assigned and conveyed to her29 and she has the right to recover all the
estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the insolvent
debtor.30cralawlawlibrary
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into
Compromise Agreement, she did not sign or approve the Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP and BPI. In her Manifestation
and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC
and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) there is no
showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of
confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits. Atty. Gonzales stated
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
13. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF TIDCORP AND BPI
The undersigned receiver is in conformity with the compromise agreement of
TIDCORP and BPI, attached hereto as Annex C, which they submitted to
this Honorable Court under the abovementioned Joint Motion in so far as
the sharing scheme of the sewing machine inventories of Dona Adela is
concerned. However, the undersigned receiver has the following comments
on the other provisions of the said compromise agreement:
cralawred
xxxx
13.2.The undersigned receiver reiterates that Dona Adela has no cash or
other assets to source payment for expenses and taxes provided under
no. 4 of the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. In fact, except for the
amount of P5,000.00 she initially asked for administrative expenses and
the appraisal fees for the assets of Dona Adela advanced by MR.
EPIFANIO RAMOS, she has been shouldering all the administrative
expenses of this insolvency proceedings.
xxxx
21. As also mentioned under 13.2. above, Dona Adela has no cash to source
payment for the abovementioned administrative expenses and receiver’s
fees, and its assets, which should have been the source for payment for
administrative expenses and receiver’s fees before the distribution to the
creditors, have already been assigned to the creditors by compromise
agreement.
22. After considering its savings from foreclosure expenses, sheriff’s fees
and other related expenses had it pursued foreclosure proceedings, it is just
fair for the undersigned receiver to ask her due for services rendered as
officer of this Honorable Court from TRC who benefitted the most from the
insolvency proceedings.31 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-
TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required written
consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver. We, thus, hold that
petitioner is not bound by the said provision.
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only
upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the
doctrine of relativity of contracts.32 The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of
the Civil Code which provides that “contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs x x x.”33 The sound reason for the exclusion
of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie
which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an
obligation.34 Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a
compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the
court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the
compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and
approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on
the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the
compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the
compromise agreement.35cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
second paragraph of the November 15, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, in SEC Case No. MC06-103 is
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011,
filed by creditors Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, with the exception of
paragraph 4 and paragraph 5thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes and
Waiver of Confidentiality, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the same is
 51

not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and
the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24,
2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint Motion to Approve Agreement.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 52
G.R. No. 192383 December 4, 2013
ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
LUCILA C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case deals with the right of a person to whom an immovable property
has been unconditionally given to demand its participation.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz (Isabelo) claimed that in 1975 he and his
sister, respondent Lucila C. Dela Cruz and (Lucila) and Cornelia C. Dela
Cruz (Cornelia), bought on installment a 240-square meter land in Las Piñas
from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid the down payment
and religiously paid the monthly amortizations.1 On the following year,
Isabelo constructed a residential house on the subject lot.2
Because of Lucia’s plea for the siblings to help their cousin, Corazon L.
Victoriano (Corazon), who was in financial distress, Isabelo agreed to have
the lot they bought used as collateral for the loan that Corazon planned to
secure from the Philippine Veterans Bank. To make this posible, Lucila paid
the P8,000.00 that they still owed Gatchalian Realty, Inc. On January 18,
1979 the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) S-
80735 in Lucila’s name3 and this was mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. But,
since Corazon failed to pay her loan, the bank foreclosed on the property on
March 1, 1989 for P286,000.00. Lucila redeemed it on March 27, 1992.4
On October 7, 2002 Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver5 relinquishing all
her share, interest, and participation to half of the lot to Isabelo and the other
half to her niece, Emelinda C. Dela Cruz (Emelinda). On even date, Isabelo
and Emelinda executed a Kasunduan6 acknowledging their respective rights
in the property. Claiming ownership of half of the subject property by virtue of
Lucila’s affidavit of waiver, on August 22, 2005 Isabelo filed an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City in SCA 05-
0008, seeking the segregation of his portion of the land and the issuance of
the corresponding title in his name. But Lucila countered that the property,
including the house built on it, belonged to her since she paid for the same
out of her income as pawnshop general manager and from selling jewelry. 7
She claimed that her affidavit of waiver did not cede ownership of half of the
property to Isabelo since the affidavit made clear that her waiver would take
effect only if the problems that beset their family were resolved. Since this
condition had not been met, she had every right to revoke that waiver as in
fact she did so on September 24, 2004 in the Kasulatan ng Pagpawalang
Bisa ng "Affidavit Waiver."8
On February 7, 2008 the RTC rendered a Decision9 denying Isabelo’s
complaint for lack of merit. It also ordered him to pay Lucila P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and to bear the costs of suit.10
The RTC ruled that Lucila’s ownership was evidenced by the tax declaration,
the real property tax payment order, and the title to the land in her name.
Isabelo’s testimony on cross-examination conclusively also showed that
Lucila owned the property.11
Isabelo’s contention that it was he and Cornelia who paid for the monthly
amortization of the property cannot be believed since Cornelia herself
testified that Lucila paid for all the amortizations on the land.12
Further, the RTC held that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver did not confer title over
the property on Isabelo considering that, absent an annotation on TCT S-
80735, the waiver cannot ripen into an adverse claim. More importantly,
Lucila already cancelled the waiver through the Kasulatan that she
subsequently executed.13
The RTC was also unconvinced that the house belonged to Isabelo. It noted
that the receipts for the construction materials and survey plan that he
presented did not prove ownership. Recovery of property, not partition was
the proper remedy. Isabelo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV 90797. On December 18, 2009 the latter court rendered a
Decision14 affirming the RTC ruling that Isabelo failed to established his right
to half of the subject property as would entitle him to have the same
partitioned. But the CA deleted the award of attorney’s fees and costs for
failure of Lucila to justify her claims and for the RTC’s failure to state in its
decision the rationale for the awards. Isabelo moved for reconsideration but
the CA denied it.15
Issue Presented
 53
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in failing
to rule that Lucila’s cession of half of the property to Isabelo through waiver
did not have the effect of making him part owner of the property with a right
to demand partition.
Ruling of the Court
In partition, the court must first determine the existence of co-ownership. The
action will not lie if the plaintiff has no proprietary interest in the subject
property. Indeed, the rules16 require him to set forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title to the property. It would be premature to order
partition until the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.17
At bottom, the question is: did Lucila’s affidavit of waiver ceding to Isabelo
half of the subject property conveys to him a right of ownership over that
half? The CA agreed with the RTC that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver did not
vest any property right to Isabelo since the condition she set in that affidavit
had not been fulfilled. This then gave Lucila the right in the meantime to
rescind the waiver, something that she eventually did. But, contrary to the
position that the CA and the RTC had taken, Lucila’s waiver was absolute
and contained no precondition. The pertinent portion of the affidavit of waiver
reads:
That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive all my share, interest
and participation in so far as it refer to the one half portion (120 SQ. M.) of
the above-parcel of land, with and in favor of my brother ISABELO C. DELA
CRUZ, of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at Las Pinas City, and the
other half portion (120 SQ. M.) in favor of my niece, EMELINDA C. DELA
CRUZ, also of legal age, single, Filipino and residing at Sto. Rosario
Hagonoy, Bulacan; x x x x18
Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put everything in proper
order, I hereby waive…" if her intent was to set a precondition to her waiver
covering the property, half to Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her
intention, she could have stated, "subject to the condition that everything is
put in proper order, I hereby waive..." or something to that effect. When she
instead said, "That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive my
share, interest and participation" in the two halves of the subject property in
favor of Isabelo and Emelinda, Lucila merely disclosed what motivated her in
ceding the property to them. She wanted to put everything in proper order,
thus she was driven to make the waiver in their favor. Lucila did not say, "to
put everything in proper order, I promise to waive my right" to the property,
which is a future undertaking, one that is demandable only when everything
is put in proper order. But she instead said, "to put everything in proper
order, I hereby waive" etc. The phrase "hereby waive" means that Lucila
was, by executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the property,
irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to the same. After he and his
co-owner Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo became the owner of half
of the subject property having the right to demand its partition.
WHEREFORE, THE Court:
1. GRANTS the petition;
2. SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 18, 2009 and resolution dates
May 25, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 90797 as well as the
Decision dated February 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas in
SCA 05-0008;
3. ORDERS the partition of the subject property between petitioner Isabelo
C. Dela Cruz and Emelinda C. Dela Cruz;
4. ORDERS the remand of the records of SCA 05-0008 to the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas; and
5. DIRECTS the latter court to proceed with the partition proceedings in the
case in accordance with Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Isabelo C. Dela Cruz, Petitioner, vs. Lucilla C. Dela Cruz, Respondent
G.R NO. 192383; December 4, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Dela Cruz and his sisters/respondents Lucila and
Cornelia were co-owners of a 240-square meter land in Las Pinas which they
bought on installment from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid
for the down payment and religiously paid for the monthly amortizations.
Upon Lucia’s plea to help out a financially distressed cousin
(Corazon), the siblings agreed to make use of the lot as collateral and
security for a loan from the Philippine Veterans Bank. In order to make this
possible, Lucia paid the P8,000 outstanding balance to Gatchalian Realty
and had the deed of title registered in her name. The title was then
 54

mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. However, Corazon was not able to pay for
the loan and the mortgaged lot was then foreclosed by the bank. The
foreclosed lot was however redeemed by Lucia.

In 2002, Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing all her

share, interest and participation to her brother Isabelo and her niece
Emelinda. Isabelo then filed an action for partition seeking the segregation of
his portion of said lot and the corresponding title in his name. This action
was, however, contested by Lucila claiming that the waiver she executed
ceding ownership of her share to Isabelo was subject to a condition that their
family problems would be resolved. She claims that this condition did not
happen and that she had every right to revoke the waiver. This was made
evident by the revocation she made through an affidavit dated September 24,
2004. The RTC ruled in favor of Lucia and this was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Lucila’s cession of the
property through waiver did not have the effect of making Isabelo part owner
thereof.

Ruling: In deciding this case, the SC considered the wordings used by

Lucila in her waiver. The court noted that the phrase used “ To put
everything in order, I hereby waive all my share, interest and participation…”
means that the intention of Lucila was to waive her right to the property,
irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to it. It disagreed with the
lower court’s interpretation that such wordings intends a precondition of
waiver for if such was the intent, the phrase containing words such as “
subject to the condition that everything is put in order” would have been
used. Therefore, the SC ruled that the affidavit of waiver executed by Lucila
makes Isabelo and Emelinda co-owners of the waived share of
Lucila. Isabelo then has the right to demand partition.
 55

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 151258

Petitioner,
- versus -
- versus -
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 17808
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ Present:
Respondent. SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO,
x-------------------------x Respondents. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954 BRION,
Petitioner, PEREZ,
SERENO, and
- versus - REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, February 1, 2012
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM,
JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
DECISION
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
SERENO, J.:
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE
VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO case on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
hazing.[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, andRONAN DE GUZMAN, Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This
Respondents. widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which
x-------------------------x became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law
FIDELITO DIZON, was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their
Petitioner, sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was
meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent

- versus - act in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing
punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
G.R. No. 155101
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
Respondent.
country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
x-------------------------x
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu;
GERARDA H. VILLA, Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo
Petitioner,
in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center;
 56
Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito
Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City. [6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in
this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still
bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o
act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law. [7] Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as
immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon
to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and
to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in
evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No.
151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and
the trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis
Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel
Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera,
Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some
members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards,
they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed
that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing,
they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received
threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from
the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some
of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included
the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel
rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol
Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped,
or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the
back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of
lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two
Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given
the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived
their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes
were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were
also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles.
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes
were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first
day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded
 57

that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino 16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys

shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
 58
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding
of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the
following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban,
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General,
Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.)
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were
also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito
Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of
₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way
of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation
of his right to speedy trial.[16]Meanwhile, on different dates between the years
2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the
CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano
on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions
were individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that
the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive
the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari,
questioning the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30
August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues
first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived
of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that
served as basis of acquittal of the other accused. [22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited
Dizons right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to

present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no
longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right
should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking
for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the
hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing
date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have
likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part
of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. [23]
claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of
the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to
undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.[24]Further,
petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that the individual
blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys
death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr.
Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered
fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death
of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated
by ill will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space
of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not
work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space
was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation.
He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who
admitted knowing it was not true and that he was just making it up. [27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was
negated by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes
to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had
59
kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to
prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with
Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his
manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-
He G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4
(Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that
there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court
should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting
crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said
article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.
According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts
finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the
commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
 60
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,
praying for the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and
Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The
Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate
trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De
Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to
commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court
found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-
accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various reasons, the initial
trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years
after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the
9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that
the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period
of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay,
as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but
were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to
speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the
trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to
individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was
pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of
Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In
contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender
dies prior to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service
of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties
(las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated
on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liabilityex delicto).[33] However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the
death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his
criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil
liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed
and terminated.
 61
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the
reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of
September; and the 5thand 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated
that it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have
not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down
the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present
evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present
evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested
in open court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate
evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the
other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and
pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all times
down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next
trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original
dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25
August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case,
and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same
date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of
the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial
court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver
of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due
process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence.
According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should
have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were
not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to
present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the
dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of
any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to
present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that
the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence,
thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less
than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present
evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend
oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing of the defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995.
The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular
membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement
of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very
same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared
that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling
against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule
115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance
during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his
right to be present for trial on such date only and not for
the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June
1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of
his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights
 62

may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be

coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even
through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of
the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may
be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to
see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present
evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is
simply warned of the consequences of another failure to
attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not
even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to
deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without
even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence
in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused
and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could
personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x
x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to
present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a
last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial
dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At
any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of
evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have
done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence.
Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent
denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid
waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to
vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand
of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts
have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense
as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may
nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt
by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record
to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or
irregularity that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide
the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application
of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits
direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that
all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged
extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the
fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension and
he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over
from one judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at
the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has
been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since
the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we
shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
 63
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right
to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the
accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case
against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed
by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that the
prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case
when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its
disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires
that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with
unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. [54] In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and
the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the
length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice
wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of
the case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to
acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal
would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have
previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when
a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the
correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching. [62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the
case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case
would reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow
progress of the proceedings in the case below:
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated
to the Court of Appeals and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring them to secure certified true copies of
the same.
While we are prepared to concede that some of the
foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the
petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right
to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to
the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply
with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the
records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution,
through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete
records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the
same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order
dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on
the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order
was complied with. It appears, however, that even until
August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made
the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss
filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
 64
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995,
until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years,
there was no action at all on the part of the court a
quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to
set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not
act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x
x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information
was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until
28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained
interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the
arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the
unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the
criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases;
similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded
the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints
before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the
Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information which was
filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case,
where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has
dragged on for a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was
violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject
of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De
Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system.
It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same
or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in
idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system
of jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution
of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental
rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this
particular constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
 65
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing
the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty
imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of
the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a
competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a]
verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of
such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy
for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as
an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases
with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the
State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the
hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater
penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. [77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge
the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty
on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution
is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to
a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3)
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review
must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; [82] or a
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused
cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which
seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction
of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis
of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private
complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public
respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x
x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of
 66
individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court;
and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by
Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to
hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess,
and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion
cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the
facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an
application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double
jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19
acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical
injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double
jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher
penalty against the accused.[91]We have also recognized, however,
that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case
is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear
that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the
accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the
victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on
him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the
death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical
attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category
of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the
period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period
must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much
the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla,
CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the
said period is absent, the crime committed should be
deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los
Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil.
398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries
inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug,
Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis
supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in
finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical
injuries. According to the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be
no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A
review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of
slight physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity
for labor nor required medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not
die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in
which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling
cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
 67
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly
contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused
were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death
was the multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation
rites.[100]Considering that the CA found that the physical punishment heaped
on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was patently erroneous for the
court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light
felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator
shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from
that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial
felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in
the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not
subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries
punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and
abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to
the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case
the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of
the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies
and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned
provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from
and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held
criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs. [102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their
acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the
CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to
have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the
Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable
as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless
a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in
ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of
homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical
injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that
there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny
Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation
rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
 68
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of
slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found
guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein
the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain
advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather,
the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire
to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically
strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order
to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-
Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and
psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of
thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a
moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and
evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. [107]The basic postulate
of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings
who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and
pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment
sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the
crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame
of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus,
it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional
felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or
malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an
act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two
things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine
the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a
licit and an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a
determination to do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as
the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers
to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the moving
power that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of
using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term
felonious means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an
evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the requirement
of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious
and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or
omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with
malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained
of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence
of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for
conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of doloor
 69
malice. The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a
prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury
inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of
an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person
performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack
of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. [127] Verily, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is
inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a
vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.[129] Beingmala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. [135] It
is said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been
associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous
tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle
Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities
worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of
hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young menrecruited into the
military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their
loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and
sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy
to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain
membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a
student wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a
neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to
two semesters long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to
interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn
chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a
specified grade point average; to participate in the organizations activities; and
to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and
its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation
activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte
stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual
that serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the
recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing
or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other
similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire
membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.[149]
 70
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact,
more than a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a
secret society namedKataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga
Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and
Daughters of the Nation).[150] TheKatipunan, or KKK, started as a small
confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic
Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member
through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought to a
dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They
were made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or
[pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand
the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na
punyal.[155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to
sign membership papers with the his own blood. [156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the
following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the
fourth classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted
in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in
various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas
MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the
academy during his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the
candidate-victim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part
of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what
was known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each candidate
to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metalboard onto connected mattresses
leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to
climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and
barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they
pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers
chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others
pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the
victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State
University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a
pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to
repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape,
the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks;
blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the
pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the
body; and body slamming, an activity in which active members of the fraternity
lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground. [166] The fraternity
members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical
abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went
through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn
University in Alabama.[168]The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig

a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner
leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed
and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise,
butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its
members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated
as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings,
during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running
the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they
ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs. [169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim
Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of
the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion
and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-
victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and
physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200
times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida
sought initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity
during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity
culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones,
together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned
on his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which
lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his
buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the
71
intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-
night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial
birth by fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the
hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that
hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the
organization to establish unity among the pledgesand, hence, reinforces and
ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include
leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-
esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit
dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause. [182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to
hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed
services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of
military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the
first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an
injury to his [or her] person therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the
efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting
and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted
criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187]Most anti-hazing laws in the
U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences
for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws
consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
rituals
 72
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except
hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4
felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term
of not less than one year and not more than three years. [191] Indiana criminal
law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits
criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a
deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness
resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious
bodily injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a
fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student
or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class
C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail
felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by
confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less
than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the
hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted
of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to
exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would
otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and
subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a
Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another. [203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited
remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family
resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing
statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus
interficendi or intent to kill not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation
rites does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus
malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were
equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background
or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement
that with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or
the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the
trial court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent
to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its
finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been
motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers
parking space had been stolen by the victims father. [207] As to Villareal, the
court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one
of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals brother. [208] The
CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and
Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil and
criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and
so for the death of
Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face
 73
the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for
the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido
Marquez to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full
appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the
Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and
we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were
told the members of the fraternity and
their batch and we were also told about
the fraternity song, sir.
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house
and we were made to ride a van and we
were brought to another place in
Kalookan City which I later found to be
the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head
down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of
the Aquilans who were inside left us
inside the van, sir.
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the
effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay ka
and the people outside pound the van,
rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and
how strong a voice these remarks uttered
upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense
of excitement in their voices, sir.
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being
rocked through and through, what were
the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka
sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did
they continue during the rocking of the
van which lasted for 5 minutes?
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on
hearing voices, sir.
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical
beating] were being inflicted, was there
any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were
discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were
pounding and beating us, it was just
like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some
of them enjoyed looking us being
pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you
heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked
us whether matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya
pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those
particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were
utterances simultaneously, I could not
really pin point who uttered those words,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during
the conduct of this Bicol Express?
 74
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court
what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet
Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would
say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya
nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so
that would in turn sort of justifying him in
inflicting more serious pain on me. So
instead of just walking, he would jump on
my thighs and then after on was Lenny
Villa. He was saying to the effect that
this guy, his father stole the parking
space of my father, sir. So, thats why he
inflicted more pain on Villa and that went
on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular
accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was
accusing you of having your family have
his brother killed, what was your
response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that
he was just making it up sir. So he said
that I knew nothing of that incident.
However, he just in fact after the Bicol
Express, he kept on uttering those
words/statements so that it would in turn
justify him and to give me harder blows,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular
mentioning that Lenny Villas father
stole the parking space allotted for his
father, do you recall who were within
hearing distance when that utterance
was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance,
sir.
Witness There were different times made this accusation so
there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the
next accusation against Lenny Villas
father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet
Dizon came near to us and when
Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered
those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to
Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs
and sometime he stand up and he kicked
his thighs and sometimes jumped at it,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right
now. You mentioned also
that accusations made by Dizon you
or your family had his brother killed,
can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations
that were charged against you while
inflicting blows upon you in
particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in
particular if I knew that his family who had
his brother killed, and he said that his
 75
brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it
was just a story that he made up and I
said that I knew nothing about it and
he continued inflicting blows on me,
sir. And another incident was when a talk
was being given, Dizon was on another
part of the pelota court and I was sort of
looking and we saw that he was drinking
beer, and he said and I quote: Marquez,
Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo
diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang
nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka
sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did
ever a doctor or a physician came around
as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr.
Marquez, have you stated that there was
a briefing that was conducted
immediately before your initiation as
regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what
they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a
particular place, we would be mocked
at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at,
ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the
likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there
would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could
immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and
legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school
uniforms like long sleeves, it would be
covered actually so we have no thinking
that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you
would have bruises on your body but that
will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or
implements that you expect that would
create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be
hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much
of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
 76
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist
only of physical initiation, meaning body
contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called
psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of
things calculated to terrify you, scare
you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made
belief situation intended to, I repeat,
terrify you, frighten you, scare you
into perhaps quitting the initiation, is
this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was
initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you
that your family were responsible for the
killing of his brother who was an NPA, do
you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement
said to you by Dizon that you did not
believe him because that is not true,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing
you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you,
scaring you or frightening you into
quitting the initiation, this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I
think, why he was saying those things
was because he wanted to inflict
injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only
perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this
to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were]
subjected to the same forms of initiation
by all the initiating masters? You said that
earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped
on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express
for instance, the masters would run on
your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was
followed by the initiating masters not only
on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
 77
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever
forms of initiation was administered
by one master, was also administered
by one master on a neophyte, was
also administered by another master
on the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by
the CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the
accused were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear
on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified
by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and
Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake
of substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of
Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially
because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent
to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of
homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as
reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa
and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats
referred to by the CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh;
and who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung
kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while saying, [T]his
guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the testimony
clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent
to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer
to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully
appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset,
the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological
pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked,
ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay
ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina
mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to
that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the
death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas
father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor
General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part
of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting
psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the
initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role
playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue
and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct
of hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-
Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed
during the period of interpellations on why we included the
phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte
or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made to
undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday,
like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit
to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity,
 78

sorority or similar organizationor playing and putting a injure not proven beyond
noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the reasonable doubt
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the
building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after
making him turn around several times but the reality is that he The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the
these are the mental or psychological tests that are
Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members
resorted to by these organizations, sororities or
fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of
hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or Revised Penal Code.
insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis
supplied)
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles
262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must
must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence
not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill
of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys
the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent,
psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established
the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of
whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a
as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of
specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive
Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it
the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt
up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as
of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per
constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not
se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional
directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless
fraternity initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
his intentions are.[223]

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the
existence of intent to kill.Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [220] Instead, we
adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled
that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.[221]
The existence of animus
iniuriandi or malicious intent to
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances [224] that the mere
infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the
accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind
her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of
criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus:
Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded
that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she
 79
actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that
as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the
religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the
guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of
water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous
breakdown by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him.
The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious
intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability for murder
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused
should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato,
we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and
external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their
intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of
weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may
be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny
Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before
the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They
were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would
last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they
were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol
Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon,
they were once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals
were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes
were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the
neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human
barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical
and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul
or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order
that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical
activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates;
and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days
before the rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila
Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation
process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and
voluntarily consented to undergo physical initiation and
hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they
voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become
members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation,
they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of
common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they
were made aware that traditional methods such as
mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment
would take place. They knew that the initiation would
involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were
also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time
they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified
that accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can
already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his
part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit
 80
in the arms and legs, that a wooden paddle would be used
to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and
legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without
consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the
first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of
initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof
showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the
specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts
of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were
done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional rounds on the second night were held upon the
insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with
the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity
members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were
performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was
used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly
the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries,
which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and
taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went
through the same process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny
Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that
Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common
crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into
consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical
injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation
in the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The
following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is
enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all,
are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present
and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death,
it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who
commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape
or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for
making a new offense under this definition of the crime of
hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of
persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that has
already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong
signal across the land that no group or association can require
the act of physical initiation before a person can become a
member without being held criminally liable.
 81
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the
rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization,
he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that
resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are
already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would
like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a
legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or
offenses, because these very same acts are already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very
telling difference: When a person or group of persons
resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible
or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is
homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention
to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of
hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from
the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what
will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they
should really shun this activity called hazing. Because,
initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts
of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-
called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay
pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong
nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact
ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na:
Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr.
President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not
have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in
the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not
have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or
establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel
situation where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic
elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent
were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even
the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization,
the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a
new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these
results are not going to be proven by intent, but just
because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb
the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing,
precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of
what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when
they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention
is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact
of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and
we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to
prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters intended
 82
to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical
pain can easily escape responsibility and say, We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites.
This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or
maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well
have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of
homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution
will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming
there was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge
is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law,
would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is
present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present.
First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or
not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second
question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not
be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis
supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the
issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing
Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this
Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy
as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary
to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed
by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the
commission of sodomy forced into another individual by
another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be
modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of this
section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we
qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to
aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will
change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from
hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In
fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any
association for that matter, it can be with or without the
consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person
joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not
negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens
from the malpractices that attend initiation which may have
been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or
injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is
announcement that there will be physical hazing or
whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is
duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has
to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at
a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the
parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on
the part of the victim.
 83
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the
position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite
and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts
new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the
private proclivities of some individuals when they do their acts
in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of
couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in
ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream
of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr.
President. Such that the act may even be entered into with
consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be
done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is
passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction
of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical
injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning
that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim,
then we would not have passed any law at all. There will
be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will
always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction
of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation
rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we
would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will
not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain
or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical
injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties.
But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can
only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this
proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the
committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the
same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent,
Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority
Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there it
is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can
just make this a special law on hazing. We will not include
this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a
possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law
and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code,
Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a
special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This
dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique
as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered
the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to
presume that Lennys parents would not have consented[239] to his participation
in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by
them asmala in se.
 84
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through
Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations
very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing
or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering
has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly
considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation
of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual
background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members
guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal
liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed
by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done
without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence
on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence
or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury
or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or
skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in
doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the
degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct,
the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful,
in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is
minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from
a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person
to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of
each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure
secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims
 85
heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its
requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of
the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries,
veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple
hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have
resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee
blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the
blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became
so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that
the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the
abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the
lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim
suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and
thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood
from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be
taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila
Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they
were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different
objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back
of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to
play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny,
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal officer
explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple
injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as
follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony
on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that
you have enumerated on the body of the
deceased Lenny Villa previously marked
as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by
themselves would not cause the death of
the victim. The question I am going to
propound to you is what is the cumulative
effect of all of these injuries marked from
Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise
of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are
talking of the whole body. At the same
manner that as a car would not run minus
one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in
human approach is to interpret all those
injuries in whole and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity
members were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a
culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates
a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing
facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was
the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds
to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of
physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have
been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity
accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening
the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities
 86
the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review
in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were
intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to
Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law
to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose
the misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood.
There must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he
joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it
offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give
up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he
felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes,
joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under
the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they
were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug,
and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused
fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no
law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the
prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to
the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay
damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the
amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral
damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It
also awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally
paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of
death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we
sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory
damages, including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the
victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents. [276] Though
we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual
expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the
Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief
suffered on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article

2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in
the amount of ₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding
petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision
correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of ₱50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus legal
interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality
of this Decision until satisfaction.[280]Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et
al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and
the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
87
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151258: February 1, 2012
is ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites.
After the second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or
alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon
and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty
in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed
these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized,
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
 88

helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping
bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed
him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
separate civil action.
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is
hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed
by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first,
denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt. While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel
for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel
thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.

ISSUES:

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: whether or not the death of Villareal
extinguished his criminal liability

HELD:

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

Criminal Law- how criminal liability is extinguished

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of
Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In
contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the
offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to
the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term
"pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including civil
liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex
delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the
delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a
 89

HYPTE R. AUJERO, G.R. No. 193484 REYES, J:

Petitioner,
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Present: from the November 12, 2009 Decision1 and July 28, 2010 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107233 entitled “Hypte R. Aujero v.
National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine Communications
CARPIO, J., Satellite Corporation.”

Chairperson,
In its November 12, 2009 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s
- versus - PEREZ, petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the National
Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC) July 4, 2008 and September 29, 2008
SERENO,
Resolutions, the dispositive portion of which states:
REYES, and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
BERNABE, JJ.  assailed Resolutions dated July 4, 2008 and September 29,
2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-08921-2004
CORPORATION, [NLRC NCR CA No. 049644-06] are AFFIRMED.
Promulgated:
Respondent. SO ORDERED.3

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the above

January 18, 2012
Decision but this was likewise denied by the CA in its July 28, 2010
Resolution.

The Antecedent Facts

It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent

DECISION
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an
accountant in the latter's Finance Department. On August 15, 2001 or after
thirty-four (34) years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His
application for retirement was approved, effective September 15, 2001,
 90
entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a
half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner
was Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two
Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos (P274,805.00).4
On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release
and Quitclaim5 in Philcomsat’s favor, following his receipt from the latter of a
check in the amount of Nine Million Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty-Seven and 91/100 Pesos (P9,439,327.91).6
Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for
unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement
pay is Fourteen Million Fifteen Thousand and Fifty-Five Pesos
(P14,015,055.00) and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as
supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than
enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the
petitioner, he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire
need thereof and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed the
quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no single centavo would be
released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat's
favor.7
The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his
retirement benefits, which is equivalent to one and a half of his monthly
salary for every year of service, is provided under the Retirement Plan that
Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees.8 On
November 3, 1997, Philcomsat and the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) executed a Trust Agreement, where UCPB, as trustee, shall hold,
administer and manage the respective contributions of Philcomsat and its
employees, as well as the income derived from the investment thereof, for
and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Retirement Plan.9
The petitioner claims that Philcomsat has no right to withhold any
portion of his retirement benefits as the trust fund created pursuant to the
Retirement Plan is for the exclusive benefit of Philcomsat employees and
Philcomsat had expressly recognized that it has no right or claim over the
trust fund even on the portion pertaining to its contributions.10 As Section 4 of
the Trust Agreement provides:
Section 4 – The Companies, in accordance with the
provisions of the Plan, hereby waive all their rights to their
contributions in money or property which are and will be paid
or transferred to the Trust Fund, and no person shall have
any right in, or with respect to, the Trust Fund or any part
thereof except as expressly provided herein or in the Plan.
At no time, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with
respect to the participants and their beneficiaries under the
Plan, shall any part of the corpus or income of the Fund be
used for or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive
benefit of Plan participants and their beneficiaries.11
The petitioner calls attention to the August 15, 2001 letter of
Philcomsat's Chairman and President, Mr. Carmelo Africa, addressed to
UCPB for the release of P9,439,327.91 to the petitioner and P4,575,727.09
to Philcomsat, which predated the execution of his quitclaim on September
12, 2001.12 According to the petitioner, this indicates Philcomsat’s pre-
conceived plans to deprive him of a significant portion of his retirement pay.
On May 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria (LA Lustria) issued a
Decision13 in the petitioner’s favor, directing Philcomsat to pay him the
amount of P4,575,727.09 andP274,805.00, representing the balance of his
retirement benefits and salary for the period from August 15 to September
 91
15, 2001, respectively. LA Lustria found it hard to believe that the petitioner
would voluntary waive a significant portion of his retirement pay. He found
the consideration supporting the subject quitclaim unconscionable and ruled
that the respondent failed to substantiate its claim that the amount received
by the petitioner was a product of negotiations between the parties. Thus:
It would appear from the tenor of the letter that,
rather that the alleged agreement, between complainant and
respondent, respondent is claiming payment for an
“outstanding due to Philcomsat” out of the retirement
benefits of complainant. This could hardly be considered as
proof of an agreement to reduce complainant’s retirement
benefits. Absent any showing of any agreement or
authorization, the deductions from complainant’s retirement
benefits should be considered as improper and illegal.
If we were to give credence to the claim of
respondent, it would appear that complainant has voluntarily
waived a total amount of [P]4,575,727.09. Given the purpose
of retirement benefits to provide for a retiree a source of
income for the remainder of his years, it defies
understanding how complainant could accept such an
arrangement and lose more than [P]4.5 million in the
process. One can readily see the unreasonableness of such
a proposition. By the same token, the Quitclaim and Waiver
over benefits worth millions is apparently unconscionable
and unacceptable under normal circumstances. The
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that waivers must be
fair, reasonable, and just and must not be unconscionable
on its face. The explanation of the complainant that he was
presented with a lower amount on pain that the entire
benefits will not be released is more believable and
consistent with evidence. We, therefore, rule against the
effectivity of the waiver and quitclaim, thus, complainant is
entitled to the balance of his retirement benefits in the
amount of [P]4,575,727.09.14
In its July 4, 2008 Resolution,15 the NLRC granted Philcomsat’s
appeal and reversed and set aside LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision. The
NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for unpaid retirement benefits and
salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed in
September 12, 2001 following his receipt from Philcomsat of the amount
of P9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full settlement of all his claims
against Philcomsat. According to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to allege,
much less, adduce evidence that Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his
consent to the quitclaim. The petitioner is well-educated, a licensed
accountant and was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President prior to his
retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim without
understanding the consequences and implications thereof. The relevant
portions of the NLRC’s July 4, 2008 Resolution states:
After analyzing the antecedent, contemporaneous
and subsequent facts surrounding the alleged underpayment
of retirement benefits, We rule that respondent-appellant
have no more obligation to the complainant-appellee.
The complainant-appellee willingly received the
check for the said amount, without having filed any
objections nor reservations thereto, and even executed and
signed a Release and Quitclaim in favor of the respondent-
appellant. Undoubtedly, the quitclaim the complainant-
appellee signed is valid. Complainant-appellee has not
denied at any time its due execution and authenticity. He
never imputed claims of coercion, undue influence, or fraud
against the respondent-appellant. His statement in his reply
to the respondent-appellant’s position paper that the
quitclaim is void alleging that it was obtained through duress
is only an afterthought to make his claim appear to be
convincing. If it were true, complainant-appellee should have
asserted such fact from the very beginning. Also, there was
no convincing proof shown by the complainant-appellee to
prove existence of duress exerted against him. His stature
 92
and educational attainment would both negate that he can
be forced into something against his will.
It should be stressed that complainant-appellee
even waited for a period of almost three (3) years before he
filed the complaint. If he really felt aggrieved by the amount
he received, prudence dictates that he immediately would
call the respondent-appellant’s attention and at the earliest
opportune shout his objections, rather than wait for years,
before deciding to claim his supposed benefits, [e]specially
that his alleged entitlement is a large sum of money. Thus, it
is evident that the filing of the instant case is a clear case of
afterthought, and that complainant-appellee simply had a
change of mind. This We cannot allow.
In the instant case, having willingly signed the Deed
of Release and Quitclaim dated September 12, 2001, it is
hard to conclude that the complainant-appellee was merely
forced by the necessity to execute the quitclaim.
Complainant-appellee is not a gullible or unsuspecting
person who can easily be tricked or inveigled and, thus,
needs the extra protection of law. He is well-educated and a
highly experienced man. The release and quitclaim executed
by the complainant-appellee is therefore considered valid
and binding on him and the respondent-appellant. He is
already estopped from questioning the same.16
Philcomsat’s appeal to the NLRC from LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006
Decision was filed and its surety bond posted beyond the prescribed period
of ten (10) days. On June 20, 2006, a copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was
served on Maritess Querubin (Querubin), one of Philcomsat’s executive
assistants, as Philcomsat’s counsel and the executive assistant assigned to
her were both out of the office. It was only the following day that Querubin
gave a copy of the said Decision to the executive assistant of Philcomsat’s
counsel, leading the latter to believe that it was only then that the said
Decision had been served. In turn, this led Philcomsat’s counsel to believe
that it was on June 21, 2006 that the ten (10) day-period started to run.
Having in mind that the delay was only one (1) day and the
explanation offered by Philcomsat’s counsel, the NLRC disregarded
Philcomsat’s procedural lapse and proceeded to decide the appeal on its
merits. Thus:
It appears that on June 20[,] 2006[,] copy of the
Decision was received by one (Maritess) who is not the
Secretary of respondents-appellants’ counsel and therefore
not authorized to receive such document. It was only the
following day, June 21, 2006, that respondents-appellants[’]
counsel actually received the Decision which was stamped
received on said date. Verily, counsel has until July 3, 2006
within which to perfect the appeal, which he did. In PLDT vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 60250, March 26, 1984, the Honorable
Supreme Court held that: “where notice of the Decision was
served on the receiving station at the ground floor of the
defendant’s company building, and received much later at the
office of the legal counsel on the ninth floor of said building,
which was his address of record, service of said decision has
taken effect from said later receipt at the aforesaid office of its
legal counsel.”
Be that as it may, the provisions of Section 10, Rule
VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, states, that:
“SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES
NOT BINDING. The rules of procedure and
evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity shall not be controlling and the
Commission shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
all in the interest of due process. x x x”
Additionally, the Supreme Court has allowed appeals from
decisions of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed
beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice.
Moreover, under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, the
NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, correct,
amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in
 93
substance or in form. Further, Article 221 of the same
provides that: In any proceedings before the Commission or
any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.17
In his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the
CA, the petitioner accused the NLRC of grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to the respondent’s belated appeal by relaxing the application of
one of the fundamental requirements of appeal. An appeal, being a mere
statutory right, should be exercised in a manner that strictly conforms to the
prescribed procedure. As of July 3, 2006, or when Philcomsat filed its appeal
and posted its surety bond, LA Lustria’s Decision had become final and
executory and Philcomsat’s counsel’s failure to verify when the copy of said
Decision was actually received does not constitute excusable negligence.
The petitioner likewise anchored his allegation of grave abuse of
discretion against the NLRC on the latter's refusal to strike as invalid the
quitclaim he executed in Philcomsat’s favor. According to the petitioner, his
retirement pay amounts to P14,015,055.00 and P9,439,327.91 he received
from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims against it is
unconscionable and this is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim
as null and void.
By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the
petitioner’s claims, holding that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of
validity of the petitioner’s quitclaim. Thus:
discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s appeal.
The Supreme Court has ruled that where a copy of
the decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk nor
one in charge of the attorney’s office, such service is invalid.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Maritess Querubin,
the person who received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s
decision, was neither a clerk of Atty. Yanzon, private
respondent’s counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty.
Yanzon’s office. Hence, her receipt of said decision on June
20, 2006 cannot be considered as notice to Atty. Yanzon.
Since a copy of the decision was actually delivered by
Maritess to Atty. Yanzon’s secretary only on June 21, 2006,
it was only on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of
private respondent’s appeal commenced to run. Thus,
private respondent’s July 3, 2006 appeal to the NLRC was
seasonably filed.
Similarly, the provision of Article 223 of the Labor
Code requiring the posting of a bond for the perfection of an
appeal of a monetary award must be given liberal
interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits. If only to achieve substantial
justice, strict observance of the reglementary periods may be
relaxed if warranted. However, this liberal interpretation must
be justified by substantial compliance with the rule. As the
Supreme Court ruled in Buenaobra v. Lim King Guan:
We note that in the instant case, private respondent
substantially complied with the filing of its appeal and the
required appeal bond on July 3, 2006 – the next working day
after July 1, 2006, the intervening days between the said two
dates being a Saturday and a Sunday. Substantial justice
dictates that the present case be decided on the merits,
especially since there was a mere one-day delay in the filing
by private respondent of its appeal and appeal bond with the
NLRC. x x x.18 (citation omitted)
The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the
In the same vein, this Court finds that the NLRC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
 94

excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid the Deed of

received by Querubin is inexcusable negligence. Since the perfection of an
Release and Quitclaim dated September 12, 2001 –
absolving private respondent from liability arising from any appeal within the ten (10)-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional
and all suits, claims, demands or other causes of action of
requirement, Philcomsat’s failure to justify its delay should have been reason
whatever nature in consideration of the amount petitioner
received in connection with his retirement – signed by enough to dismiss its appeal.
petitioner. x x x
The petitioner also claims that the CA erred in upholding the validity of the
The assertion of petitioner that the Deed of Release
and Quitclaim he signed should be struck down for subject quitclaim. The respondent has no right to retain a portion of his
embodying unconscionable terms is simply untenable.
retirement pay and the consideration for the execution of the quitclaim is
Petitioner himself admits that he has received the amount
of [P]9,327,000.00 – representing his retirement pay and simply unconscionable. The petitioner submits that the CA should have taken
other benefits – from private respondent. By no stretch of the
into account that Philcomsat’s retirement plan was for the exclusive benefit of
imagination could the said amount be considered
unconscionably low or shocking to the conscience, so as to its employees and to allow Philcomsat to appropriate a significant portion of
warrant the invalidation of the Deed of Release and
his retirement pay is a clear case of unjust enrichment.
Quitclaim. Granting that the source of the retirement pay of
petitioner is the trust fund maintained by private respondent
at the UCPB for the payment of the retirement pay of private- On the other hand, Philcomsat alleges that the petitioner willfully and
respondent’s employees, the said circumstance would still
not justify the invalidation of the Deed of Release and knowingly executed the subject quitclaim in consideration of his receipt of his
Quitclaim, for petitioner clearly understood the contents retirement pay. Albeit his retirement pay was in the reduced amount
thereof at the time of its execution but still choose to sign the
deed. The terms thereof being reasonable and there being of P9,439,327.91, Philcomsat alleges that this was arrived at following its
no showing that private respondent employed coercion, negotiations with the petitioner and the latter participated in the computation
fraud or undue influence upon petitioner to compel him to
sign the same, the subject Deed of Release and thereof, taking into account his accountabilities to Philcomsat and the latter’s
Quitclaim signed by petitioner shall be upheld as financial debacles.
valid.19 (citations omitted)

Philcomsat likewise alleges that the NLRC is clothed with ample authority to
The petitioner ascribes several errors on the part of the CA. Specifically, the
set aside technical rules; hence, the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of
petitioner claims that the CA erred in not dismissing the respondent’s appeal
discretion in entertaining Philcomsat’s appeal in consideration of the
to the NLRC, which was filed beyond the prescribed period. There is no
circumstances surrounding the late filing thereof and the amount subject of
dispute that Querubin was authorized to receive mails and correspondences
the dispute.
on behalf of Philcomsat’s counsel and her receipt of LA Lustria’s Decision on
June 20, 2006 is binding on Philcomsat. Also, the failure of Philcomsat’s Issues
counsel to ascertain when exactly the copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was
 95
In view of the conflicting positions adopted by the parties, this Court
is confronted with two (2) issues that are far from being novel, to wit:
a. Whether the delay in the filing of Philcomsat’s appeal and
posting of surety bond is inexcusable; and
b. Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in
Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his
right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.
Our Ruling
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
confined to the correction of errors of jurisdiction and will not issue absent a
showing of a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Not every error in a proceeding, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or of fact, is an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of
discretion.20 The prerogative of writ of certiorari does not lie except to correct,
not every misstep, but a grave abuse of discretion.21
Procedural rules may be
relaxed to give way to the
full determination of a
case on its merits.
Confronted with the task of determining whether the CA erred in not
finding grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's decision to give due course
to Philcomsat's appeal despite its being belatedly filed, this Court rules in
Philcomsat's favor.
Procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in absolutely
meritorious cases. A review of the cases cited by the petitioner, Rubia v.
Government Service Insurance System22and Videogram Regulatory Board v.
Court of Appeals,23 where this Court adhered to the strict implementation of
the rules and considered them inviolable, shows that the patent lack of merit
of the appeals render liberal interpretation pointless and naught. The contrary
obtains in this case as Philcomsat's case is not entirely unmeritorious.
Specifically, Philcomsat alleged that the petitioner's execution of the subject
quitclaim was voluntary and he made no claim that he did so. Philcomsat
likewise argued that the petitioner's educational attainment and the position
he occupied in Philcomsat's hierarchy militate against his claim that he was
pressured or coerced into signing the quitclaim.
The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause free from the constraints of technicalities.24 Far from having gravely
abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly prioritized substantial justice over
the rigid and stringent application of procedural rules. This, by all means, is
not a case of grave abuse of discretion calling for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
Absent any evidence that
any of the vices of
consent is present and
considering the
petitioner’s position and
education, the quitclaim
executed by the petitioner
constitutes a valid and
binding agreement.
 96

In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo,25 this Court courts as the law between the parties.29 Considering the petitioner's claim of
reiterated the standards that must be observed in determining whether a fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds
waiver and quitclaim has been validly executed: the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against

public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the signing the release and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the same. That no portion of
the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does
gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law.
annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown
that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was in
for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to
must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.26 (emphasis supplied) invalidate the quitclaim. "Dire necessity" may be an acceptable ground to
annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee
In Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission, 27 this Court ruled that: was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the
release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute
It is highly unlikely and incredible for a man of petitioner’s
position and educational attainment to so easily succumb to it.30 While it is our duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also
private respondent company’s alleged pressures without even
defending himself nor demanding a final audit report before behooves us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our
signing any resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was laws.31
indeed exerted against him, there was no urgency for
petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He knew the nature of
the letter that he was signing, for as argued by respondent The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and
company, petitioner being "a man of high educational
educated with a college degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into
attainment and qualification, x x x he is expected to know the
import of everything that he executes, whether written or performing an act against his will. As no proof was presented that the said
oral.”28
quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception, misrepresentation, the
same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees
said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting the benefits thereunder.
who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers
This Court will never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations
seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing
for the purpose of giving imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate
a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the
from his obligations under a valid and binding release and waiver.
 97
The petitioner's educational background and employment stature
render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into
signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the petitioner to
relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and
understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner
allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency
in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable
conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a
mere pretention.
The CA and the NLRC were unanimous in holding that the petitioner
voluntarily executed the subject quitclaim. The Supreme Court (SC) is not a
trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.
Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve and whether the
petitioner voluntarily executed the subject quitclaim is a question of fact. In
this case, the factual issues have already been determined by the NLRC and
its findings were affirmed by the CA. Judicial review by this Court does not
extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper labor tribunal has based its determination.32
Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are generally
accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding on the SC.
Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially
when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the SC is not duty-
bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a
clear showing that the same were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. 33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed November 12, 2009 Decision and July 28, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107233 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE CORPORATION, Respondent.
REYES,J.:
FACTS:
It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the
latter's Finance Department. After thirty-four (34) years of service, the
petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was
approved, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to
one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time,
the petitioner was Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary
of Two Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos
(P274,805.00).
Petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaimin Philcomsats favor.
Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid
retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is
Fourteen Million Fifteen Thousand and Fifty-Five Pesos (P14,015,055.00)
and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement
for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to
declare his quitclaim as null and void.
Labor Arbiter issued a Decisionin the petitioners favor, directing Philcomsat
to pay him the amount of P4,575,727.09 and P274,805.00, representing the
balance of his retirement benefits and salary for the period from August 15 to
 98

September 15, 2001, respectively.

NLRC granted Philcomsats appeal and reversed and set aside LAs Decision.
The NLRC dismissed the petitioners complaint for unpaid retirement benefits
and salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he
executed following his receipt from Philcomsat of the amount of
P9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full settlement of all his claims against
Philcomsat.

By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the petitioners

claims, holding that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the respondents appeal. The CA further ruled that the
NLRC was correct in upholding the validity of the petitioners quitclaim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in

Philcomsats favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim
against Philcomsat?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

LABOR LAW

While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees
who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers
seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing
a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the
courts as the law between the parties.[29]Considering the petitioner's claim
of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court
finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it

improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the
subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself
from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding
thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to
lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his
retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that
his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.

DENIED
 99

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001 D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

KAPUNAN, J.: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to

pay plaintiff, as follows:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker
of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City 1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
to his death.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the
tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that: 3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning
capacity.
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival 4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
(DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15
p.m. of the same date.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while
SO ORDERED.2
victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo
[were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of
the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by decision of the RTC in toto.
2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached
to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the grounds:
chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole
[p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
jumped out for safety.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE
[p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the PETITIONER.
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
(RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
 100
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and,
therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report,
being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from
his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely
learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same.
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of
the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies,
suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath
the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore,
excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are
entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or
by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of
Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the
above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner
contends that the last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also
testified before the trial court. InRodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which
involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report
also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained
in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of
the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was
available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which were
of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the
summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn
statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter,
having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the
testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the
course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but
not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the
fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does
not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners
on his Report and made himself available for cross-examination by
the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain
utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed
from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in
open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the
matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of
 101
the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary
rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v.
Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is
daily needed; the occasions in which the officials would be
summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness
are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily
work something is not done in which testimony is not needed
from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or
delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a
certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not
extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence,
Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers
that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with
accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do
in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall
be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to
require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was
not presented to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of
Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and
this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said
report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was
not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of
Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being
no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the
statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of
proving the truth of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar
as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony
which were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego
indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen
Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute.
PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the
building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He
observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally
damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the
chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the
chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony
that the cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the
chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion.
Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the
application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a
result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a
rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while
the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give
rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts
or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part
of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such
as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who
 102
had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that
necessary evidence is absent or not available. 22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of
the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches
over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the
matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on
the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show
that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of
defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly,
some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident,
or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case
at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the
14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working with
appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of
appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the
situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur
therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its
employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to
know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that
likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the
requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application
of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was
negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the
accident which befell respondent’s husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As
stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the
plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements,
the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care
or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to
explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from
arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only
 103
after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
established.1âwphi1.nêt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand
Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care.
According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman
and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due
care but, in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the
part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for being
hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible.
Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the
affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The inadmissibility
of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the
part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof
of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the
cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the
death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded
from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee,
his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on
behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits
as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other
laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other
agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal
injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and
remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery
under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of
conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex
Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the
employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining
corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take
the required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the
deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of
First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority
of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus
Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of
both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in
the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu
Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled thatan injured worker has a
 104
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to
proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the
benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court
reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its
motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that
the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to
dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up
the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the
criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report
was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not preclude them
from bringing an action before the regular court because they
became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser
amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based
on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was
not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was
reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs.
Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case,
the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act
could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by
workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under
the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under
the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under
the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still
sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception
because private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when
she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private
respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of
the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing
the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there
was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the
prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case
is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged
negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of
the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her
sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her
personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her
knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It
was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and
his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a
 105
standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee
may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is
mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in
her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent
Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the
appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public
prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said
memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law
waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was
no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence,
notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee
before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she
received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police
investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6,
1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal
complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The
death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of
the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is
civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing,
We are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she
learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and
received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will
make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the
facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only
elementary school for her educational attainment; that she did not
know what damages could be recovered from the death of her
husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more
from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent
"failed to allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits
from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an
issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or
adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant
of the facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was
the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months
before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued
a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against
petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly
show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2,
1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two
choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive
the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between
inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or
proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by
the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature,
the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible
unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold
people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to
prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a
single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by
election. Hence, the rule in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously
pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of
action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be
generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person
against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all
material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to
make an intelligent decision.
 106
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver
is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record
or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the
basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s
contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as
plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the
ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to
plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the
defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself
pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to
her husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake
of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver
is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that
there may be civil liability. InFloresca, it was the negligence of the mining
corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations.
Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but aconclusion of law, over which only the courts
have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have
decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake
of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at
bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband
died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished
her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is
dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form.
Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies
available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary,
private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine
legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Court’s ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to
mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of
the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse
his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory.
Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The
records do not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive
from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received
P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from
November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the
same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was
P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC
is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial
court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for
such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than
that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the
Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages.
Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent
double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that
of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that
awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other
respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
 107

FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker
of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City
to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to
the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing
the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the
claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies
provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at
bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to
avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.

Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right
of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from
the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

RULING:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself)
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not
cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence
arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense
relating to the incident.
 108
March 18, 2015
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed
by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed the Order 2 dated March
22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro
denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen
by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to
the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot
along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they
constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of
the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA)
over the subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that
he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground
that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a
criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification
Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the
Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he
had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He
further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have
the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s
family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article
172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for
review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It
ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did
not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner
was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the
crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the
petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant
of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in
the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the
said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction
between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those
who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing
law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which
petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on
April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the
MTC ordered:
 109
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for
lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order
denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the
issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to
receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila,
it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-
acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public
land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused
cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the
court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order
disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had
been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of
falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which
was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not
left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where
he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be
adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the
lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status
under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not to have
lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the
time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in
Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a
warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower
court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his wife and
counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against
him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial
of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument
regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is
contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of
one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his
application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present
situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that
he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the
Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in
falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or
intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of good
faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved
in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the
Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC
when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause,
petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s
jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly
ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of
the parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the
evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted
for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
 110
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied
petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act."
Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born
Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who
became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different,
"re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain"
to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-
acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of
the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of
the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with
the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes
more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have
been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated
January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that
his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A.
9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate
Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was
responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:
 111
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of
the Senate version, "Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are
deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of
this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born
citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are
considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to
say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after
the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens
because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this
distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely
retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost
their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the
effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this
new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to
future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens
are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one
of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman
Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63,
and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship
by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship,
he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required
oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing
his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on
the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of
his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction
to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers
Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of
which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without
any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and
retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is
likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the
accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to
Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position,
of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
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(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that
he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact
he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the
time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his
Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the
said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of
probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody
of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash
warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held
in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
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Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it
lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground
stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of
merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of

the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No.
SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.