REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA

MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO AQUINO, Minor represented by his father, Manuel Aquino, and
ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all surnamed CONSOLACION, respondents.

Facts:

This is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land located in Mulanay, Quezon.

In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon, Judge Vicente del Rosario on March
21, 1981 rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang),
Mulanay, in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less 200 hectares which should be registered
in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion. The decision became final and executory. A decree and an original
certificate of title were issued.

More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Gumaca court an amended
petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part
of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only
29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry.

Petition was denied.

A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General’s Office only on September 2, 1971 or nearly one
year from the issuance of the order, Twenty-two days thereafter or on September 24 the Solicitor General appealed from
that order and filed a motion for extension of time within which to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was given due
course.

On appeal, the petition was denied on the ground that the 1970 order had allegedly long become final and unappealable.
The Solicitor General appealed to this Court.

The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued
on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land
(pasto de animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks.**

Issue:

1. Procedural: w/n the solicitor general should be bound by the acts of its surrogates – NO.
2. Substantive: w/n the issuance of certificate of title was proper

Held:

1. the Solicitor General’s Office should be served with the final order disposing of the petition and should not be
bound by the service on his surrogates, the special counsel and the fiscal.

The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on time, the Solicitor General’s Office was late in filing the
amendments to it is of no moment. In exceptional cases, like the instant case, the interest of justice may warrant
waiver of the rules
2. the 885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor
susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry as per
Land Classification Map and testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warden

It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during
the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title.

Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Spanish titles are not
indefeasible.

The instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an
adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not
subject to registration.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February 18, 1976 discontinued the use
of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.
JOSE CHING and CARIDAD CHING, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of
Laguna, Branch IV, Hon. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch II, and Spouses
CESAR ALVARADO and ARACELI ALVARADO, respondents.

Facts:

petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents had forced their way into the disputed
premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands
were based on the petitioners' claim that they were the owners of the said property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid
sale

The private respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to them by
right of inheritance. At any rate, they had argued, as the basic question was one of ownership and not of mere possession,
the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss the complaint.

Municipal Court: ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed property. It also required them to pay rentals at
P1,000.00 a month until actual surrender of the premises, as well as a P3,000.00 attorney's fee plus the costs of the suit.

Appellate Court: municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of ownership

Issue: w/n municipal court was divested the authority to try and decide the case at bar when the parties raised the issue of
ownership – NO.

Held:

R.A. No. 296, as amended, which was the law then in force. That law allowed the municipal court to receive evidence upon
the question of ownership in ejectment cases, but only whenever it was necessary to do so for the purpose of determining
the character and extent of possession and damages for detention.

It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of
its summary jurisdiction.4 This has to be so, for "were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by
making the efficacy of this kind of actions depend upon the defendant in all cases.

"The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the trial before the
Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical possession.

Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is declared in a great
number of cases that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on appeal will not be divested of its jurisdiction
by such allegations alone.

The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and registered in the name of
petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.10 The basis of the registration is a deed of sale executed in his
favor by Felix Carpio, the former owner, who had acquired it from Brigido Alvarado, Cesar Alvarado's supposed father.11
The record does not show that such registration has been challenged since the issuance in 1978 of the said certificate of
title, which in the absence of evidence to the contrary should be presumed valid. There is no encumbrance on the land, and
there is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificate.12 Such registration, it may be added, is binding
against the whole world unless annulled for cause in proper cases.

It is true that petitioner Cesar Alvarado had filed a complaint in the court of first instance of Laguna against the petitioners
and several others for the annulment of the deed of sale invoked by the petitioners.13 However, that fact alone could not
divest the municipal court of jurisdiction to continue trying the question of possession, more so since the question of
ownership was appropriately being litigated in the annulment suit. Significantly, the deed of sale being challenged in that
action was different from the contract involved in the exception just cited.

the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over the property in question did not, as claimed,
have the effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. As permitted in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No.
296, the plaintiff in an ejectment case may introduce such evidence for the purpose of proving the character of his possession
and the amount of damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession.14 The petitioners were only trying to
prove their right to possession and damages by establishing their right of ownership
TEOFISTO, FELICISIMO and MAXIMO, all surnamed UMBAY, and FILOMENA, FRANCISCO, SUSANA, CELERINA and
JOSEFA, all surnamed ENANORIA, petitioners, vs. PLACIDO ALECHA, NICOLASA LABAJO and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

No. L-67284. March 18, 1985.*

This case is about the right of the heirs of the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,265 square meters to
recover a portion thereof with an area of 500 square meters allegedly usurped by the adjoining owner.

Natalio Enanoria was the owner of Lot No. 5280 located in the mountain of Barrio Valencia, Carcar, Cebu. His title was issued
in 1922. He died in 1924.

In 1963 his heirs asked a surveyor to relocate the lot, They discovered that its 500-square-meter portion was occupied by
Placido Alecha, the owner of the adjoining Lot No. 5281 which is its southeastern boundary

Alecha refused to vacate the disputed portion, He removed the concrete monuments hence the heirs sued Alecha.

The trial court ordered Alecha and his wife to vacate the said 500-square-meter portion. However, the Appellate Court
reversed that decision and dismissed the complaint of the Enanoria heirs. Subsequently, the heirs raised the issue to the
issue however it failed to file an appellees brief.

Issue: w/n the action of the heirs is barred by prescription or laches – NO.

Held: the action of the heirs of Enanoria to recover the 500 square meters portion of their registered land does not prescribe
and cannot be barred by laches. Nor can Alecha, the adjacent owner, acquire that 500-squaremeter area by prescription
because it is covered by a Torrens title.

Section 46 of the Land Registration Law, now section 47 of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529 effective June 11,
1978), provides that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.

Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors because the latter
merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor-in interest.

the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop f orever any question as to its legality. “Once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the
‘mirador de su casa’, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against
a Torrens title. The right to recover possession of registered land is im prescriptible because possession is a mere
consequence of ownership.

In this case, the petitioners’ action to recover the 500 square meters cannot be barred by the equitable defense of laches or
delay because they became aware of the encroachment only after they hired a surveyor in 1963 to ascertain the true area
and boundaries of Lot No. 5280. Laches presupposes waiver of one’s right.

There was no waiver in this case, The petitioners, poor, ignorant rustics, never intended to renounce their right to the 500
square meters.

Trial court decision affirmed.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK and COURT OF APPEALS,**
respondents.Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, acting as a land registration court dismissed petitioner’s
application for the cancellation of annotations of an encumbrance on its transfer certificates of title.

G.R. No. 86679. July 23, 1991.*

Petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16) transfer
certificates of title.

petitioner alleged that spouses Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its real estate mortgages

Annotated subsequent to the foregoing memoranda of the mortgage lien of petitioner on the above-mentioned properties
is a “Notice of Levy re Civil Case No. 69035, CFI-Manila, Continental Bank vs. Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay Balingit”
for a total sum of P96,636.10, as entry No. 285511 at the back of the titles

For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under
Act 3135, as amended, the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses
in favor of petitioner. The sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered on April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a
memorandum thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the foreclosed properties.

Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption period, petitioner consolidated in its name the ownership of all the
foregoing mortgaged properties for which new transfer certificates of title were issued in its name.

However, the annotation of the notice of levy in favor of private respondent was carried over to and now appears as the
sole annotated encumbrance in the new titles of petitioner

On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank, as successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank,
filed an opposition to the petition contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings,
the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.

Trial Court: denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Section 112 of Act 496) under which the petitioner seeks remedy has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court that the relief therein can only be granted if there is no adverse claim or serious objection
on the part of any party in interest otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary
case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. Accordingly, an annotation of an adverse claim may be ordered
cancelled only where the issue involved is not controversial or so disputed as to warrant that it be litigated in an ordinary
action.

Considering that the issue of whether the notice of levy should be cancelled as sought by the petitioner becomes
controversial in view of the opposition and adverse claim of the oppositor Interbank, this Court, as land registration court
and in accordance with the jurisprudence above cited, has no jurisdiction to entertain and act on the contested petition. The
cancellation prayed for should be threshed out in an ordinary case.

Petitioner appealed. CA affirmed TC.

Issues: w/n RTCs have jurisdiction to act upon the petition whether they are acting as a land registration court or a court of
general jurisdiction - YES

w/n the annotation on the certificate of title can be cancelled - YES

Held:
Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) which took effect on June 11, 1979,
regional trial courts acting as land registration courts now have exclusive jurisdiction not only over applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, but also over petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions..

Even under Act 496 (Land Registration Act), specifically Section thereof, the court of first instance, sitting as a land
registration court, has the authority to conduct a hearing, receive evidence, and decide controversial matters with a view to
determining whether or not the filed notice of adverse claim is valid.

Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional
trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for ‘original registration’ but also ‘over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions

It is undisputed that private respondent is a subsequent lien holder whose rights over the mortgaged property are inferior
to that of petitioner as a mortgagee. Being a subsequent lien holder, private respondent acquires only the right of
redemption vested in the mortgagor, and his rights are strictly subordinate to the superior lien of the anterior mortgagee.13
After the foreclosure sale, the remedy of the second mortgagee is limited to the right to redeem by paying off the debt
secured by the first mortgage.

The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed,
and the purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter
the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the annotation of subordinate liens.

the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3135, the land which
was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the
annotation of said creditor’s attachment lien on the certificates of title of said land.

The contention of private respondent in its opposition that the extrajudicial foreclosure is null and void for failure of
petitioner to inform them of the said foreclosure and the pertinent dates of redemption so that it can exercise its
prerogatives under the law18 is untenable. There being obviously no contractual stipulation therefor, personal notice is not
necessary and what governs is the general rule in Section 3 of Act 3135, as amended, which directs the posting of notices
of the sale in at least three (3) public places of the municipality where the property is situated, and the publication thereof
in a newspaper of general circulation in said municipality.

Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent’s predecessor in interest arising from the judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner’s certificates of titles, is already without force and
effect considering that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title for more than ten (10) years without being
duly implemented. Properties levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10) years
during which the judgment can be enforced by action.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND
MAXIMO VITUG, respondents.

No. L-57757. August 31, 1987.

FACTS: Donata Montemayor is the administrator of 30 parcels of land of her late husband Clodualdo Vitug who died
intestate. Several portions of such land (TCT-2289, TCT-2887, and TCT-2888) were mortgaged to PNB as security for certain
loans availed by Salvador Vitug, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani, respectively. The loans were never paid so the bank
foreclosed all the mortgaged properties. PNB as the highest bidder, purchased the lots, and subsequently sold the same to
the Vitugs and the Fajardos.

Meanwhile, Donata executed a contract of lease for a lot covered by TCT-2887-R to her sons Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug.
After a few years, the same brothers filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages in the CFI Pampanga
against the PNB, the Vitugs, the Fajardos, and Marcelo Mendiola, the special administrator of Donata’s intestate estate. They
claimed that the 30 parcels of land form part of the conjugal property of the spouses Donata and Clodualdo and they claim
a share interest of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage of said properties to the PNB and the subsequent public
auction. They invoked the Vitug vs. Montemayor case where the SC ruled on the conjugal nature of the 30 parcels of land.

ISSUES:

1. w/n the PNB can rely merely on the Torrens Certificate of Title covering Donata’s properties for the processing of
the respective mortgage loan applications? -YES
2. w/n the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article
160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow -NO.
3. w/n the earlier action for reconveyance and partition concerning the 30 lots real actions and binding upon the PNB
by virtue of the Vitug vs. Montemayor decision – NO.

RULING: (1) Yes. The PNB had sufficient reason to rely on the Torrens Certificate of Title of the mortgaged properties.
The SC ruled that in processing the loan applications, the PNB had the right to rely upon the face of the certificate of title.
Clearly, it appears that Donata (a widow) owns the properties and the PNB had no reason to doubt her status and ownership.
The PNB also found no liens or encumbrances covering the properties. The clean facts reasonably cancel the need to make
further inquiry.

The Court applied the well-known rule in jurisdiction that a person has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens Certificate
of Title when dealing with a registered land. It is not necessary to inquire beyond its face, except when such person has an
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would prompt him to inquire further. The Court ruled that a Torrens title
“concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final degree of registration” and upon such registration,
the person is assured of ownership without going to court or sitting “at the veranda of his house” to avoid the fear of losing
his land.
(2) The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the
face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property
is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse,
this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil
Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes,
the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was
not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor.

(3) No. The SC maintained that although actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, they are
actions in personam which are binding only upon the persons who are parties thereto. The PNB is not a party in the cited
case and is therefore not bound by the decision. In addition, there is no showing that the PNB was aware of the case
decision when it extended the mortgage loan involving the subject properties. The court settled that if the PNB knew that
said properties were conjugal, it would not have approved the mortgage application without securing the consent of the its
co-owners. Therefore, the PNB is considered as a purchaser for value in good faith when it sold the foreclosed properties at
a public auction.

Additional: Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of Donata Montemayor to the said
properties. They never raised the conjugal nature of the property nor took issue as to the ownership of their mother, Donata
Montemayor, over the same. Indeed private respondents were among the defendants in said two cases wherein in their
answers to the complaint they asserted that the properties in question are paraphernal properties belonging exclusively to
Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in nature.21 Thus they leased the properties from their mother Donata
Montemayor for many years knowing her to be the owner. They were in possession of the property for a long time and they
knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did
not do anything.22 It is only after 17 years that they remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are guilty of laches.23
Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug as occupants and lessees of the property in
question cannot now dispute the ownership of their mother over the same who was their lessor

The complaint is dismissed.

SPOUSES ANTONIO BORNALES and FLORENDA DIAZ BORNALES, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ISABEL MARQUEZ DUMOLONG, respondents.

No. L-75336. October 18, 1988.*

Facts:

Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, was originally awarded a parcel of land in Capiz in 1927. Sixto and Isabel whose
marriage was not blessed with any child lived separately since 1920. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited extramaritally with
Placida Dumolong with whom he had a son by the name of Renito Dumolong and other children.

In November 1977 Placida filed a petition for reconstitution of title over the lot. Reconstitution was granted in a decision. In
March 1978, a "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property” and the sale of said lot for P6,000.00 to spouses
Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong and to spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong, was executed by Renito
Dumolong and by Isabel Marquez Dumolong whose supposed thumbmark appeared in the document.

About three months later, the spouses sold the lot for P40,000.00 to petitioner-spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz
Bornales through a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Alleging forgery of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property", private respondent Isabel Marquez
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against Placida Dumolong, Renito Dumolong, spouses Carlito Patanao and
Minda Dumolong, spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreto Dumolong, and spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against all the defendants including the petitioners herein who
were expressly declared purchasers in bad faith. The subject land was held to be the conjugal property of Sixto Dumolong
and plaintiff Isabel Marquez and that the Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was a forgery through
the machinations of the defaulted defendants. The appellate court affirmed the appealed decision.The petitioners claim that
they were not aware of any defect in the title of their vendors.

CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

w/n Bornales invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title? Ruling:

Held:

No. The Bornales spouses have been tenants/lessees of the land during Sixto’s lifetime. Having been cultivators of the land,
it is unimaginable that they were unaware of the transactions affecting the land. It appears that they were aware that Isabel
was the legal wife of Sixto and was a rightful heir to the properties of the latter.

The fact alone that the petitioners knew that they purchased the property with full knowledge of the flaws and defect in the
title of the vendors is proof of their bad faith. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their
vendors who procured title by means of fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against
Isabel to the extent of her interest. The Torrens system should not be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the
rightful owner. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

The petitioners claim that they were not aware of any defect in the title of their vendors because the certificate of title in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest which their lawyer examined contained nothing to put them on guard. The fact
however remains that the petitioners knew and were parties to the fraud committed against the private respondent. Having
bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud,
petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein.

The Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith. [Palanca v. Director of Lands, 43 Phil. 149 (1922).] Thus,
it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of the flaws in his transferor’s title. If at all, the petitioners only acquire the right which their vendors then had.

ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffsappellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES
LADRIDO IGNACIO, EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and MANUEL P. LADRIDO, defendantsappellees,

No. L-77294. December 12, 1988.*

The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan
comprosing of an area 154,267 square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of
Title. Rosendo H. Te,sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000 with the confirmation of Ana Te.. A
Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.Later Viajar found out that the propert
was in possession of Ladrido and demanded for its return but latter refused.

Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y.
Ladrido. During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his mother and co-
plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. Defendant Ladrido died and substituted by his wife and children

The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square
meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
that the area of 11,819 square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area
of 14,036 square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been
in the possession of the defendants; and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.The
lower court rendered its judgment in favour of the defendants.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision if court a quo

Contention of the Petitioners: Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion mentioned
therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in
question having remained the registered land of the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in
derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

Issue: Whether the land registered protected from ownership by accretion in accordance with article 457

Ruling: No. The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution
of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. InPayatas
Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55.Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of
the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old
Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).

The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff’s estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title,
cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against
the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks.
RODOLFO L. CORONEL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ELIAS MERLAN, BRIGIDO
MERLAN, JOSE MERLAN, TEODORICO NOSTRATIS, SEVERO JECIEL, SANTIAGO FERNAN and FORTUNATO OCAMPO,
respondents.
No. L-70191. October 29, 1987.*
Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land registered under his name
against the private respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago
Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Coronel alleged that at the time he
purchased the parcel of land, the defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will". Despite
demands to vacate the premises, the defendants refused to.
The defendants denied Coronel allegations. They contended that the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided
share of brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of
the three heirs of Bernabela Lontoc. The Merlan brothers never sold their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody. It
was actually their other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions, hence plaintiff’s ownership is fraudulent, void, and
without effect. The Merlans have always been in open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of the lot
throughout the years.
The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring them as the absolute owners of the remaining 1 1/3 of the
2/8 portion pertaining to the late Bernabela Lontoc
Issue: Whether the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is the true owner of all the property 41
Ruling: No, the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is not necessarily the owner of all property.
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true
owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake
or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included.
Lontoc’s property was survived by three sets of heirs. 1) Bernardino Merlan; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan; and 3)
Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat.
Bernardino Merlan sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. However,
Ignacio sold his interest to Mariano Manalo, which Coronel also bought later on.
The deed of sale was registered in the name of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. The private respondents never sold their 1/3
share, what their coowners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo sold only
the 2/3 share to third-party defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and adverse possession of their
1/3 share over the lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The 1/3 undivided portion of the private
respondents was mistakenly included in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano Manalo. The petitioner is bound to
recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the
torrens title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest

GALICANO GOLLOY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE VALDEZ , JR., CONSOLACION VALDEZ ,
LOURDES VALDEZ , SOLEDAD VALDEZ and BENNY MADRIAGA, respondents.

G.R No. 47491. May 4, 1989. *

Facts:

Petitioner possessed and a registered owner of a 41, 545-sq.m parcel of land for more than 20 years. On the other hand, the
Southwest portion of the petitioner’s land is bounded by the respondents’ land.The respondents subdivided their land
among themselves and placed 2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of the petitioner’s land. Hence, petitioner filed
an action to quit title. In the per-trail, the parties agreed that they will appoint a public surveyor to relocate the disputed
area to determine the true and correct boundaries of their parcels. Subsequently, the surveyor submitted a report wherein
there are overlapping on the boundaries of the 2 lands and that the overlapping are due to the defect in the survey on
petitioner's land since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey. Wherefore, he submitted a report that
respondents' land, prevails over petitioner's land, since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute. It is hardly persuasive that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga
Balanga, believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, however, no such objection was made. These
facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never believed that she
has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion. Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or
predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost 50 years when the property was
registered, up to when the respondents placed 2 monuments inside his land, the latter if they have any right at all to the
overlapped portion, are guilty of laches.

Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept
of an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from August 15, 1919, when the property was registered, up to February, 1966, when
the private respondents caused the placement of two (2) monuments inside his land), the latter if they have any right at all
to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches. In the case of Caragay- Layno vs. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718, 723-724
[1984]), this Court stated ___ “Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty (20) years from the
date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the deceased
DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim
to the disputed portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action.
Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the
Inventory of Property and in the title.” “The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the indefeasibility of
a Torrens title. For, mere possession of certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder’s true
ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the
land illegally included.”

In a more recent case, the case of Lola vs. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA 439, 449 [1986]), this Court ruled: “We also agree with
the petitioners that laches effectively bars the respondent from recovering the lot in dispute. Although the defense of
prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because, admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of
respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to respondent’s
failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty two (32) years. There are precedents for this ruling. In the following
cases, we upheld the equitable defense of laches and ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title holder in asserting
his right over the disputed lot bars him from recovering the same.”

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and
OSCAR ANGLO, respondents.

No. L-31303-04, May 31, 1978.*

Topic: Land already registered as patrimonial property of the State

Facts:

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed
a written opposition to the application for registration.

The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court, hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application and
trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are
accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner
Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.

On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.

Issue: Whether the registration of the lots valid.

Ruling:

No, the registration of the lots is not valid.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were
portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420
paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents
is null and void. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private
respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
ROSALINA TONGSON, applicant-appellee, vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL., oppositorsappellants, MACARIO
BERMEJO, ETC., oppositor.

No. L-34463. September 27, 1977.*

Topic: Mangrove lands are neither timber nor mineral

Facts:

As early as 1905 the parcel of land (LOT 855) was under the exclusive possession of Francisco Borja who cut trees therefrom
and converted them into firewood. Moreover, he established a salt factory, selling salts and the firewood. After his death,
his son Arturo took possession of the land, continued to cut trees up until 1910. May of 1917, Antero Borja sold the land to
Deogracias Gayacao evidenced by a private instrument.

Deogracias on the other hand sold 5 parcels of land to Santiago Bermejo one of the parcels known as parcel No. 4 is cadastral
Lot No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the public instrument. During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel
of land, cut trees for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. Upon his death in 1951, his children took possession
of this parcel of land and when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
LOT 855 appeared in the Revised Inventory of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo. When Macario Bermejo took
possession of the land in 1953 he converted it into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes. However, due

to lack of funds, the construction of the fishpond was not completed. On May 30, 1956, Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz.

The possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with that of their predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful,
continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners for a period of not less than fifty years.

Issue:

Whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of the predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as
1905, asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as
part of the timber domain which is not disposable.

Ruling:

The decision of the lower court is affirmed. "In the case of Mapa v. Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase
'agricultural lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. Whatever may have

been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public
lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral
lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which
vested prior to its enactment," 9 What is even more persuasive as to the correctness of the decision reached by the lower
court is that in the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through Justice Ostrand who was famed for his authoritative opinions
on public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Revised Administrative
Code, was equally explicit:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered by the application there are mangrove
lands as shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable,
inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress ... It could be said, therefore, that even on the assumptions that the parcel of
land in question could be characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached by the lower court is not
without support in the applicable authorities.

In fact, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in the appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally
mangrove swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are
small and sparse fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber, do not convert
the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain." Based on such
a finding which must be accorded due weight and is control the sole question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision
arrived at by the lower court is not open to any valid objection.
CASIANO AMPOLOQUIO, LUCIO BURLESA, MIGUEL DE CASTRO, NORBERTO GUBERTO, PANFILO DONAYRE, BENITO
ESTREMOS, MARCIAL FERNANDEZ, ADRIANO FLORENTINO, RUBEN GUBATO, EMILIANO INGLES, KWONG KIO,
PEDRO LUMANTAD, ANDRES METILLA, GLICERIO METILLA, JUANITO METILLA, BUENAVENTURA PANOY, MARCOS
POLICAME, FLORENTINO ROJAS, TRANQUILINO SURALTA, GERVARIO VALEZCAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF SALVADOR ZARTIGA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 46800-01. April 29, 1994.*

Topic vii. Lots forming part of the public dominion

Respondent Salvador Zartiga claimed ownership over nine (9) lots which a total area of more or less 289.9920 hectares. He
claimed that he had been the absolute owner and possessor of said parcels of land, having bought the same from Datu
Julian Bagobo under a deed executed in 1927, but that petitioners had occupied certain portions of the nine (9) lots, about
forty-nine (49) hectares of the 285 hectares, without his knowledge and consent. Petitioners, on the other hand, denied
private respondent's ownership and alleged that the land in question is public land; that neither private respondent nor his
predecessor-in-interest had occupied the property. The Director of Lands intervened, asserting the property subject matter
of Civil Case No. 670 to be "public agricultural land, owned by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Municipality of Bansalan, on its part, filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the nine (9) parcels of land
included in the petition for registration were reserved for townsite of, and actually occupied by, the Municipality of Bansalan.
Evidence was introduced to the effect that about 10,000 people inhabited the poblacion of Bansalan and that approximately
500 buildings, private and government-owned, as well as schools, markets, religious, commercial and residential structures,
and other constructions, including municipal roads and other infrastructures, already stood in place within the disputed area.

The trial court and Court of appeals ruled in favour of Zartiga and awarded him the Lots No. 2326, 2325, 2342, 2343, 2344
and 2416.

Issue: Are the disputed lands form part of the public domain?

Ruling:

Evidently, the litigated area was forestal land. The fact that Datu Julian Bagobo and the other occupants had to make kaingin
in order to clear the lots is certainly indicative of the forestal nature of the same. Datu Julian Bagobo and his predecessors
who claimed possession over the area did not and could not have acquired ownership over the said land considering that
the same was then inalienable and non- disposable. It remained so for many years. In fact, it was only on February 4, 1956
when the contested portions of the public domain were declared and classified as alienable and

disposable per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-480 issued by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The picture becomes clear enough. Respondent Zartiga knew that he could not directly acquire the lots since they were part
of the public domain. So, he had to get access to the land indirectly. He also realized that the indirect way was Datu Julian
Bagobo who claimed possession over the area. He had to clothe the datu with a color of ownership so that the latter could
subsequently transfer the land to him. Respondent accomplished this in a haphazard manner — by railroading the issuance
of a tax declaration to the uneducated datu and manipulating the alleged sale within the same day. This explains why there
could not be sufficient and concrete evidence of the alleged deed of sale, why the contested lots could never be accurately
identified (boundaries were not uniformly identified) and why private respondent never raised a hand when the townsite of
Bansalan was being developed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. AYALA Y CIA. and/or HACIENDA CALATAGAN, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants; MIGUEL TOLENTINO, ET AL., intervenors-appellants. No. L-20950. May 31, 1965.

Topic: Waters are properties of public dominion.; Portions of territorial waters.

Facts:

In an amended complaint filed against Ayala Y Cia et al., the plaintiff sought the annulment of titles allegedly obtained by
the defendant over portions of the territorial waters of the public domain. The defendant company caused the survey and
preparation of a composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan, increasing its area from 9,652.583 hectares (as evidenced by TCT
No. 722) to 12,000 hectares, by taking or including therein lands of public dominion. Thus, plaintiff also prayed for recovery
of possession of such areas in

excess of those covered by TCT No. 722, and for which fishpond permits were already issued in favor of bona fide applicants.
Miguel Tolentino and 22 others alleged holders of fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries over the areas
supposedly outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, were allowed to intervene in the case and make demand for
recovery of possession of said areas, and claim for damages for the deprivation of possession thereof allegedly by the illegal
acts of defendants.

The defendants contended that the excess was insignificant in nature and attributable to the inaccuracy of the magnetic
survey that was used in the preparation of the plan upon which OCT No. 20 was based.

After trial, the court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T-9550 issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363
and 182, as well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its
private property covered by TCT No. 722. This ruling was based upon the finding that the disputed areas form part of the
navigable water, or are portions of the sea, beach and foreshores of the bay.

Issue: Whether the areas in dispute are territorial waters of the public domain.

Ruling: The decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.

The areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore,
beach, or of the navigable water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of
registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer
title on the registrant.

In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons (and which were
purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia., and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or
of the territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering
the reversion of said properties to the public dominion.

Land registration; Non-registrable properties revert to public dominion.—When lots covered by a Torrens Title issued in the
name of private individuals are found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, areas not capable of
registration, a court commits no error in ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion.

Possessors in good faith; Right of retention and non-liability for damages.—Where there is no showing that purchasers of
nonregistrable property are not purchasers in good faith, it is held that they have a right to retention of the property until
they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made thereon, and, also, they cannot be made liable for damages allegedly
suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DlSTRICT 13 BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BOARD OF DlRECTORS,
NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioners, vs. HON. EMMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, the
SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN, and PiNAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
INC., respondents., PlNAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of National Defense; HON. EMETERIO DE JESUS, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of National Defense; GENERAL RIGOBERTO ATIENZA, in his capacity as the Chief of Staff;
Armed Forces of the Philippines, COLONEL MANUEL V. REYES, in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General, Armed
Forces of the Philippines; and the TASK FORCE COMMANDER, Task Force Preserve (Tabak Division), 1st Infantry
Division, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, respondents.

G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

Topic: Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529; Spanish Title

Facts:

Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO) was claiming to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of
land located in municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose Del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal. PIADECO relied on the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 as incontrovertible evidence of its
ownership. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. In 1964, the NAWASA
director ordered the cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate.
It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco.
Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director
of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a
Certificate. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious validity of the title in his opinion, stating “Private ownership of land must be
proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with clear identity of the land claimed xxx no definite area seems
to have been mentioned in the title.

Issue: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

Held: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no question now
that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817,
Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue
regulations “deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner
as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and
occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end.” Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by
the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an
administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when
Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”
ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN

Topic: Mineral Lands | 193 scra 71

Facts:

The evidence for the applicant who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-
in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was
planted with camote, casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the
present; that he has been paying the

taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral
testimony, applicant submitted tax declarations both dated March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for
urban land and improvement therein. The receipt showing payment of the taxes on such tax declarations is dated Feb. 8,
1949. The said tax declarations show that they cancel tax declaration No. 439 dated Feb. 10, 1947 which was presented by
the Oppositor Atok Big Wedge Mining Company as its Exhibit 14, and the land tax under Exh. 14 was paid by applicant in
1947. Applicant has also submitted Exh. `C’, which indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and real property
receipts of the municipality of Itogon where the property is located were burned and destroyed during the last world war.
The Atok Big Wedge Mining Company came in also as oppositor claiming that the land in question is within its mineral
claims - Sally, Evelyn and Ethel Atok Big Wedge Mining Company submitted Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, all showing that the annual
assessment work of these mineral claims were maintained from 1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from 1946 to 1967
for Ethel. It was likewise shown that these mineral claims were recorded in the mining recorder’s office; Sally and Evelyn on
Jan. 2, 1931 and Ethel on March 18, 1921.” Petitioner’s presentation of evidence proving registration of the mining claims of
petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931, at the latest, notably about sixteen (16) years before
private respondent declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private respondent
filed the land registration proceedings in 1965, apparently impressed the court a quo. And so it ruled in favor of petitioner
as oppositor in the land registration proceedings, the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise:

“The mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when the applicant declared the land for taxation purposes based on
his documentary exhibits. So the evidence of the applicant cannot prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. The foregoing facts show that the mining company had established its rights long before
applicant asserted ownership over the land. The perfection of mining claims over the mineral lands involved, segregated
them from the public domain and the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the locator.”

The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of the applicant, ruling that the applicant possessed the land in
the concept of an owner.

Issue: Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested on petitioner after it had allegedly located and
recorded its mining claim in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

Ruling:

The records bear out that private respondent has been in possession of subject parcel of land in concept of owner for more
than thirty (30) years. The court a quo made the following factual findings based on the testimony of private respondent:
The land applied for is almost 90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces newly planted to palay at the time of the
ocular inspection and others planted to vegetables such as potatoes, banana plants, flowering plants and fruit trees such as
mangoes, jackfruits, coffee plants, avocados and citrus - all fruit bearing.

We agree with respondent Court of Appeals that “a reading of tsn. would rather persuade that applicant had shown quite
well that subject property had been in continuous and adverse possession, first, of his predecessor-in-interest, Dongail and,
after the death of the latter, himself, years before, that is, long before the outbreak of the last war.”

We also learn from our reading of our past and present mining laws in their proper historical perspectives, that the process
of recording mining claims could not have been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. The
recording of a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon
the land subject of the claim. The power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. In fact, this strengthens our holding that the
rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion
of any or all other persons whose claims are subsequent to the original mining

locator. Thus, if no minerals are extracted therefrom, notwithstanding the recording of the claim, the land is not mineral land
and registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. Equally borne out by the records is the fact that petitioner
has indeed applied for a mining lease under P.D. No. 1214. For that reason, it has, in effect, waived its right to secure a patent
and it shall have been governed, if private respondent’s claim of adverse and open possession of the subject land for more
than 30 years were not established, by P.D. No. 463 in its activities respecting its mining lease.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.*
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty years. The application was raffled to the RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. The OSG duly
designated the Jose Velazco, Jr. to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, who testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both

Ruling:

No. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly
invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of
the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

(2) Accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens Title. There must be a separate action for the registration thereof.

Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-ininterest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.”—Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.—It is clear that Section
48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act,
as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been “in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.

Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.—It is
clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand,
among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private
ownership of timber or mineral lands.

Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription; Alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.—There must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land Act; If a public land is declared patrimonial by law or proclamation, can the period of possession prior to such
conversion be reckoned in counting the period of prescription? No.—The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession
before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly
within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property
can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of
prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
Topic: Nature of Reclaimed Lands.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates
Authority (PEA). PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA
"the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, on
April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311,
and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA
and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of
PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report
are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task
Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld
the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.The Philippine Daily Inquirer and
Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands
of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a
Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

Issue: Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution.

Ruling:

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged
and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present
state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when
actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the
Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public
agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.

The DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not.
Thus, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public
domain.

Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.

Thus, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then
can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold
the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.