Ong Chia v. Republic "practicable and convenient.
" That is not the case here, since reliance
J. Mendoza, Second Division; March 27, 2000:
Facts:
Ong Chia was born in Amoy, China. He arrived in Manila when he was
9 years old and has stayed here until he found employment and
eventually married a Filipina, bearing 4 children. At 66 years old in
1989, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under the Revised Naturalization Law. He earlier filed a petition for
citizenship in 1977 but this was suspended due to the 1986 Revolution.
He presented 3 witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Prosecutor
Moran was impressed by the testimony, so he no longer offered any
other witnesses against him due to Ong Chia’s knowledge of
Philippine history.
RTC granted Ong Chia Philippine citizenship. OSG appealed, stating
that Ong Chia: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had
been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence; (3)
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines; (4) has no known lucrative
trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient;
and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.
(1) OSG presented the 1977 application in which Ong Chia indicated
that he used "Loreto Chia Ong" in his childhood.
(2) As shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, he
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
address in his petition.
(3) OSG also argued that Ong Chia and his wife were married twice:
once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977.
That he actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 197, thus belies
his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they
had already been married.
(4) OSG also annexed his income tax returns from 1973 to 1977 to
show that his net income could hardly support himself and his
family.
CA reversed the RTC, ruling that due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions
not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal. It principally gave credence to the evidence submitted by the
OSG
Petitioner that the CA erred in relying on the documents presented
by the OSG as they were not formally offered in evidence. As such,
they are mere scraps of paper devoid of any evidentiary value
because under Rule 132, Sec. 34, the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. He also argued in the CA that his
case number was 031776, and not 031767 as what was used by the
OSG.
Issue:
Whether the documents presented by the OSG as evidence are
admissible?
Ruling:
YES. The rule relied on by petition is not applicable in this case, as this
is one of naturalization. Rule 143 provides that the Rules of Court shall
not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization, and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient. The only instance when
said rules may be applied by analogy in such cases is when it is
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on
appeal appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are
not covered by the rule on res judicata. The reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right
to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the CA. However, his
objections only consisted of the discrepancy with the case number,
which was a flimsy excuse. He offered no evidence to disprove the
authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
People v. Rubio
J. Carpio-Morales, Second Division; October 2, 2009:
Facts:
Rubio and Amaro were charged in Bais City RTC for rape and homicide
of a 16-year-old woman. The prosecution presented 7 witnesses to
establish the facts: Magdalena, Pepe, AAA’s father, Dr. Renacia, PO4
Sibala, Teves, and Conde. At around 6:00 a.m., Magdalena heard
someone scream “Ama, tabang!” to which she ran towards her son,
Pepe, for him to check where the sounds came from. They then saw
Rubio walking very fast towards the sugarcane plantation, and Amaro
running towards his house. They both saw the two of them carrying
bloodied hunting knives. They then saw AAA’s body with stab wounds
and legs spread at the crime scene. Teves, AAA’s uncle, saw Rubio and
Amaro run towards Amaro’s house while he was on his way to the
crime scene after hearing the news. Magdalena and Pepe then
reported the incident to the barangay captain. Magdalena then went
back to the crime scene and informed SPO4 Sibala of what she saw.
Amaro was also there at the crime scene but Magdalena did not point
to him because she was afraid of his notorious uncles. AAS’s father
talked with Magdalena, who she informed that she saw Rubio running
away from where the body was found. SPO4 Sibala talked with Pepe
about the crime, but he was hesitant to say anything. Five days after
the incident, Pepe and Magdalena went to the office of SPO4 Sibala
to implicate Rubio and Amaro. Dr. Renacia conducted a post-mortem
examination, confirming that AAA was raped and killed using the
analysis conducted by Conde.
Rubio and Amaro denied and charges and interposed alibi. Rubio said
that at around 6:00 a.m., he went to Amaro’s house to invite Jomar
help him gather cassava root crops in Alangilan, another barangay.
They then passed by his aunt Cristuta’s house where they borrowed
a carabao and they arrived at Alangilan at 11:00 a.m. He and Jomar
could not return home in the afternoon because it was then raining
and the flood rendered the river they had to pass through impassable.
They thus spent the night in Alangilan and went home the next
morning. Amaro said Rubio went by his house at around 6:30 to invite
Jomar to gather cassava with him. As he was waiting for the drizzle to
subside, he saw two of his neighbors running. When he asked them
what the commotion was about, they told him that AAA had been
killed. He thereupon followed his neighbors to the crime scene and
there saw the body of AAA. He waited for the police to arrive, and
when they did arrive at 2:00 p.m., they conducted an investigation.
He was not interrogated. Jomar corroborated Rubio’s testimony in
that he had a bolo with him when they went to gather cassava.
Cristuta corroborated the testimonies of his nephews, in that after
Rubio and Jomar had left, she heard people shouting and was soon
informed by Teves that AAA had been killed.
RTC and CA convicted the accused, relying on circumstantial evidence.

Issue:
Whether the guilt of Rubio and Amaro was established beyond moral
certainty?
Ruling:
NO. Central to the present case's uncertainty are the glaring
inconsistencies in the testimonies and oddities in the reactions of the
prosecution witnesses that cannot be conveniently overlooked nor
easily dismissed as products of faulty memory for they bear on
credibility of testimony, which is all the more material in the
determination of the existence of circumstantial evidence.
Pepe’s sworn statement mentioned that he actually first went to the
scene of the crime, and then later on informed his mother of what he
saw, then it was his mother who reported to the barangay captain.
However, on cross-examination, Pepe mentioned that he first told
what he saw to Culi, and not to his mother, and it was Culi who
reported the incident to the barangay captain. Magdalena’s sworn
statement mentions that she only saw Rubio hurriedly leaving the
area where the shout for help was coming from. SPO4 Sibala only also
asked about Pepe about the incident, and not Magdalena.
Magdalena's failure to then and there inform the police at the crime
scene that Amaro, who was then present, was one of the two she and
her son Pepe saw running cautions this Court against readily
according her credibility. As for Teves, despite his opportunity to
report to the police what he claimed to have seen, he only later
related the same to the relatives of the victim. There was also an
existing altercation between Teves and Amaro’s mother regarding a
sugarcane cutter which Rubio and Amaro allegedly stole. While the
Court takes judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get
involved in the solution of crimes due to risks to their lives and limbs,
Teves had not alleged the presence of any such or similar risk
Even if the Court were to credit the identification of appellants as the
ones seen running away from the crime scene at 6:00 a.m., this is the
only circumstance that was established during the trial. Such
circumstance certainly does not meet the first requisite. Even if
appellants were seen carrying bloodied hunting knives, there is no
showing that they matched the instruments, if it was more than one,
used in stabbing AAA vis - à- vis the size of the wounds in her body.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is
more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. To say its probative value, circumstantial evidence must be
tested against four necessary guidelines: (a) It should be acted upon
with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but
that of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with
certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable
doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense.
Arriola v. People
J. Mendoza, Second Division; May 30, 2016:
Facts:
Arriola and Tabuzo were charged for 21 counts of falsification of
public documents. Tabuzo was coordinated with Greg Business
Agency, a local accounting firm, to procure community tax certificates
(CTC) for 21 of its clients. She then personally visited the firm to get
the names of the 21 clients, promising that she will deliver the CTCs
after two days. When they met after two weeks, the Liaison Officer
finally got the CTCs, but was found to be fake upon presentment at
the City Treasurer to secure an Order of Payment. At around 4:30 in
the afternoon of the same day, Liberty M. Toledo, then the City
Treasurer of Manila, was apprised of the falsified CTCs. The CTCs
bearing the same serial numbers were counter-checked from the files
of the Office of the City Treasurer and were found to have been
actually stamped as "UNEMPLOYED" under "MANILA, CLASS A —
ONLY," having been issued to unemployed residents of the City of
Manila for a fee of P5 each. Further verification from the records
disclosed that the CTCs with the same serial numbers were
requisitioned by and issued to Arriola, Local Treasury Operations
Officer I of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. It was then
found that Arriola remitted then CTCs issued to him.
The prosecution's principal witness, Toledo, the City Treasurer of
Manila at the time of the incident, testified that she merely presumed
that Arriola conspired and connived with Tabuzo in the falsification
because he was the accountable officer who requisitioned for the
booklets containing the falsified CTCs. Toledo claimed that the
accountable officer should be held liable for any alterations done on
the subject CTCs.
Arriola interposed the defense of denial. In the year 2002, he
admitted to have occupied the position of an accountable officer who
held the responsibility of requisitioning CTCs. He had 5 employees
then under him who issued the CTCs to individual taxpayers and it was
to them that he gave the CTC booklets for such purpose. Such
booklets were under Class "A" at the cost of P5 each. He further
averred that after receiving the amount of P25 from each booklet
from the collectors, he immediately remitted the same to the Office
of the City Treasurer. The booklets which were returned to him no
longer contained the originals thereof as what was returned were the
duplicate and triplicate copies; hence, he had no control in the
issuance of the originals. From his assessment of the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the booklets, he found no unusual alterations of
any portions thereof.
RTC found Arriola and Taburzo guilty as charged. Although there was
no direct evidence linking Arriola to the commission of the crime,
adequate circumstantial evidence was adduced by the prosecution
which established with moral certainty that he was the perpetrator of
the alterations in the subject CTCs. The manner by which the two
accused committed the felonious acts revealed a community of
criminal design, and so it eventually concluded that conspiracy
existed. It brushed aside Arriola's defense of denial for his failure to
substantiate the same by sufficient and competent evidence. CA
affirmed, as all the element of the crime of falsification of public
documents were proved by circumstantial evidence.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
NO. There is no direct evidence that links Arriola to the commission
of the crime. As the RTC itself stated, "although no eyewitness could
particularly delineate the particular scheme or method used in the
falsification of subject CTCs, the vestiges of all alterations made
thereon could only be pinned down to the public accountability of
accused Arriola and his complicity with known fixer, Tabuzo." The RTC
was, thus, compelled to rely solely on the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence which appeared to have been established to
justify its finding of guilt:
1. On January 18, 2002, Arriola requisitioned from the
Accountable Forms Section of the Office of the City
Treasurer of Manila the issuance of 1000 pieces of Class A
 CTCs as evidenced by his signature appearing on the
Requisition Slip, ;
2. That as shown in the Accountable Forms Control Card,
Arriola was issued 1000 pieces of Class A CTCs with inclusive
control numbers;
3. That Class A CTCs were issued only to unemployed residents
of the City of Manila for a standard fee of P5 each;
4. That on January 21, 2002, Arriola remitted the amount of
P1,500 representing the collection for the issued Class A
CTCs as well as the triplicate copies thereof;
5. That the collection for the triplicate copies of the CTCs were
among those remitted by Arriola and these were all Class A
CTCs;
6. That Tabuzo delivered to the Liaison Officer of Gregg
Business Agency, the CTCs, now categorized as Class B CTCs,
because a higher fee was charged for each CTC ranging from
P143 to P5,005 depending on the declared taxable income
of the taxpayers;
7. That Gregg Business Agency paid Tabuzo the amount of
P38,500 for securing the latter CTCs;
8. That the CTCs found in the possession of the Liaison Officer
were fake as the CTCs bearing the same control numbers
had already been issued to unemployed residents of Manila
per files of the Office of the City Treasurer.
Lending much weight on Toledo's testimony, the RTC concluded that
because Arriola was the accountable officer who requisitioned the
subject CTCs, then he "is the only person who could have
accomplished the crimes charged." Not a shred of definitive evidence
was proffered by the prosecution to prove that Arriola, between the
time he received the booklets of CTCs on January 18, 2002 and before
their issuance to the unemployed residents of Manila, had the Class
A CTCs duplicated or copied and that, thereafter, supplied the details
written on the CTCs found in the possession of the Liaison Officer.
There is absolutely no proof of what transpired during that interval.
The prosecution, in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to
surmise that A must have falsified the Class A CTCs during such
interregnum.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events
pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but
collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from
scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a
puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing
to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.
People v. Ramelo
J. Martires, Third Division; November 22, 2017:
Facts:
Ramelo was charged in Leyte RTC with the murder of Nelson with a
kitchen knife. The prosecution presented 4 witnesses: Ortega
(barangay captain), Vega (barangay tanod and Nelson’s uncle),
Alfredo (Nelson’s father), and Dr. Udtujan. At around 1:55 a.m., Vega
saw Nelson standing outside the basketball court of the barangay
when Ramelo suddenly appeared behind him and stabbed him. Vega
then immediately confiscated the knife Ramelo used, but Ramelo was
able to get away. Vega then turned over the weapon to the chief
tanod, and there they reported the incident to the police. Dr. Udtujan
attended Nelson but reported his death a day after as the stab
perforated his stomach and caused massive bleeding.
The defense presented Ramelo and Pilapil as witnesses, establishing
self-defense. At between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, Ramelo was
at a store near the basketball court where he noticed Nelson drinking
with 3 people. He was then approached by Nelson and his
companions while he was smoking and was suddenly slapped by one
of them without any provocation. A scuffle then occurred. He was
further manhandled by Nelson and his companions until Ramelo fell
down. Nelson then sat on his abdomen and punched his face, while
more people joined in, including Vega. Nelson also tried to smash
Ramelo's head with a stone but the latter was able to evade it. Fearing
that they intended to kill him, Ramelo pulled out his knife which was
concealed in his right shoe and stabbed Nelson with it. Ramelo
handed his knife to Pilapil and ran away. Pilapil gave the knife to Vega.
Ramelo then also surrendered to the PNP. Pilapil saw Nelson holding
Ramelo by the neck, to which he pacified them, and they heeded him.
RTC found Ramelo guilty and did not give credence to his submission
of self-defense. It gathered from Pilapil's testimony that no unlawful
aggression came from Nelson and that Ramelo was the one who
initiated the attack. CA affirmed RTC, but modified the conviction to
homicide ratiocinating that the attendance of treachery was not duly
established. It gleaned from the testimonies of the witnesses that
there was a prior confrontation between Nelson and Ramelo; and
that the latter approached the former from the front. Hence, Nelson
was forewarned of an impending danger and could have foreseen the
attack by Ramelo.
Issue:
Whether the submission of self-defense should be appreciated?
Ruling:
NO. The story of Ramelo reaching for his knife under his shoe while
Nelson and his companions were pinning him down is absurd. It is
incredulous how Ramelo, with his back and legs against the ground
and the force of Nelson's weight on him, could have reached for his
knife. It would take a contortionist to accomplish such feat under the
circumstances. Also, it is inconceivable for Nelson's companions — all
six of them — to have done nothing when Ramelo allegedly reached
for his knife while they were kicking at his legs. Ramelo's version of
the incident deserves scant consideration. Any unlawful aggression
which Nelson may have directed against Ramelo had already ceased
when the latter stabbed the former, as testified by Pilapil. When the
unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making
the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.
While Vega's testimony may have suggested the suddenness of the
attack, there was no showing that Ramelo consciously and
deliberately adopted the means and manner employed by him in
stabbing and killing Nelson. Besides, Vega stated that the attack
employed was frontal, which indicates that the victim was not totally
without opportunity to defend himself. Thus, homicide is proper.
When the accused pleads self-defense and effectively admits that he
killed the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
of the prosecution. It becomes incumbent upon him to prove his
innocence by clear and convincing evidence. To successfully claim
self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove that: (1) the victim
mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused; (2) that the
means employed by the accused to repel or prevent the aggression
were reasonable and necessary; and (3) the accused did not offer any
sufficient provocation. The most important of these elements is
unlawful aggression because without it, there could be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete. For unlawful aggression to
be appreciated there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.

Chua v. People
J. Del Castillo, Second Division; July 13, 2015
Facts:
Chua was charged with 54 counts of BP22 violations. Chua and See
were long-time friends. Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks
of varying amounts to See pursuant to their rediscounting
arrangement at a 3% rate. However, See claimed that when he
deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient
funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good
the checks.
In the MeTC, the prosecution formally offered as evidence the
demand letter sent by See. Chua objected its admissibility since it is a
mere photocopy and it does not show any proof that he actually
received it. Chua then filed a Motion to Submit Demurrer to Evidence.
The MeTC judge vacated and the motion was not ruled upon. The
prosecution then rested its case as to not delay the proceedings. After
several years, See finally found the Demand Letter dated November
30, 1993, which prompted the prosecution to file a Motion to Re-
Open Presentation of Prosecution's Evidence and Motion to Allow
Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence. The MeTC
refused to take cognizance of the supplemental formal offer on the
ground that the same was filed by the private prosecutor without the
conformity of the public prosecutor. The Demand Letter however still
found its way into the records of the case. There was no formal offer
of the November 30, 1993 demand letter.
Chua averred that the papers given to him were blank, and it was for
the purpose of giving See the authority to retrieve a car which was
supposed to serve as payment for Chua's obligation to See. Chua
again filed a Demurrer to Evidence with leave of court pointing out
that the demand letter was merely a photocopy and does not contain
his signature. He argued that prosecution fabricated the November
30, 1993 demand letter to remedy the lack of a proper notice of
dishonor upon Chua. While the November 30, 1993 demand letter
contains Chua's signature, the same should not be given any
probative value since it does not contain the date when he allegedly
received the same. Hence, there is simply no way of reckoning the
crucial 5-day period that the law affords an issuer to make good the
check from the date of his notice of its dishonor.
MeTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence, and convicted Chua for 54
counts of BP 22 violations. It found that although there was no date
when accused received the demand letter, it was still dated on
November 30, 1993, thus it is presumed that the accused received the
said demand letter on the date reflected on it. It has been said that
admission verbal or written made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof. RTC affirmed
the conviction.
In the CA, Chua argued that (1) for more than 10 years, the
prosecution never adverted to its existence. He thus surmised that
this was because the document was not really missing but in fact
inexistent — a mere afterthought as to make it appear that the
second element of the offense is obtaining in the case; (2) the subject
demand letter is not a newly discovered evidence as it could have
been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence; and, (3)
his counsel's admission of the physical existence of the demand letter
and Chua's signature thereon does not carry with it the admission of
its contents and his receipt of the same. CA still affirmed his
conviction
Issue:
Whether the November 30, 1993 demand letter should be admitted
as newly discovered evidence?
Ruling:
NO. There is no way to ascertain when the 5-day period under Section
22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua
actually received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The
MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was
likewise the date of Chua's receipt thereof. There is simply no such
presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the
inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received
subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the
purported demand letter was still blank when presented to him for
signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given
Chua's denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of
his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However,
all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however,
adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua's actual receipt thereof.
The demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a
newly discovered evidence within the purview of the law. Per See's
statements in his affidavit, the said evidence was already known to
him at the time he led his complaint against Chua. It was also
apparently available considering that it was just kept in his house.
Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable diligence, he could have
promptly located the said demand letter and presented it during trial.
However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.
In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22,
the following essential elements must be present: "(1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment."
People v. Urzais
J. Perez, Third Division; April 13, 2016
Facts:
Urzais, Alex, and Ricky were charged in the Cabanatuan RTC for
carnapping with homicide through the use of an unlicensed firearm,
against Mario and his green Isuzu Highlander car. Only Urzaisi was
caught and he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 3
witnesses: Shirley, SPO2 Figueroa, and Dr. Concepcion. Shirley, the
widow of Mario, narrated that Mario used to drive for hire their car.
He left at around 4:00 a.m. and headed for the terminal at the public
market to ply his usual route. Mario did not return that day, which
prompted Shirley to inquire with the market, who told her that a
person had hired their vehicle to go to Manila. The next day,
November 13, Mario’s co-members of the driver’s association
accompanied Shirley to Mario’s supposed location, but they headed
to the police station informing her of Mario’s death. She retrieved the
car on November 21. SPO2 Figueroa testified that he received a flash
alarm about a carnapped Isuzu Highlander. They then found the
vehicle in a subdivision, at around 3:00 p.m. of November 20. They
apprehended the driver, Urzais. Dr. Concepcion testified that Mario’s
cause of death was one gunshot wound in the head.
Urzais interposed the defense of denial. He testified that he ordered
from Alex and Ricky a P60,000 owner-type jeepney for use in his
business. They, however delivered the Isuzu Highlander instead at
around 3:00 p.m. of November 13. The brothers told Urzais that his
P60,000 would serve as initial payment with the remaining
undetermined amount to be paid a week after. He then borrowed
money to pay the balance, but the brothers ghosted him. His friend
Angeles even advised him to surrender the car since it could be a “hot
car”. He was initially hesitant to this idea as he wanted to recover the
amount he had paid but he eventually decided to sell the vehicle. He
removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back.
When he arrived home the next day, he was arrest by a CIDG member
Villareal. He only learned about Mario’s state when he was put in
custody. He admitted that he only used the name “Urzais” to secure
a second passport, and that his real name was Michael Tapayan.
Angeles testified that Urzais is his neighbor in the subdivision, and
that he previously did not own any vehicle until the Isuzu Highlander
was purchased for P30,000 from his friends in Bulacan. Angeles
advised him that the vehicle might have been carnapped due to its
very low selling price. Angeles corroborated his testimony that he did
not want to surrender the car at first as he wanted to recover his
payment for it.
RTC found Urzais guilty, based on the disputable presumption that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. It held that
the elements of carnapping were proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt through the recovery of the purportedly carnapped
vehicle from the accused-appellant's possession and by his continued
possession thereof even after the lapse of one week from the
commission of the crime. CA affirmed, noting the absence of
eyewitnesses to the crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial
evidence was presented to prove Urzais’s guilt, solely, on his
possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.
original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the
killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
Presently, there is only one circumstantial evidence. This sole
circumstantial evidence of possession of the vehicle does not lead to
an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. The prosecution did not
offer any iota of evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much
less with accused-appellant's participation. There is even a variance
concerning how accused-appellant was discovered to be in
possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated evidence
says accused-appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at
a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates,
while the latter testified he was arrested at home. In any event,
accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a
missing vehicle whose owner had been found dead. There is perhaps
guilt in the acquisition of the vehicle priced so suspiciously below
standard. But how this alone should lead to a conviction for the
special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed
by the appellate court is downright disturbing.

Urzais argued that there is no direct evidence that he robbed and

murdered the victim; and that the lower courts erred in convicting
him based on circumstantial evidence consisting only of the fact of his
possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

Issue:
Whether the disputable presumption, that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act, is sufficient to hold accused
guilty?

Ruling:
NO. The presumption should only be limited to cases where such
possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is
rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent
thereto. In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of
denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the
story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and
Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless, once the
explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from
the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the
burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that
would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this
burden, the prosecution was unable to discharge.

Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle

belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force
upon things. It is qualified by the death or rape of the owner, driver,
or occupant of the vehicle in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Thus, the prosecution has to
prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or
murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the