Eminent Domain

5. Republic V. PLDT

KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER

The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results. in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.

The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In -either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6,
Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may; in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.

Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.

FACTS

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American
corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone System,
by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement
with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the
trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment
commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and
for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and
restore those severed.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

WON the Bureau of Telecommunications may Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
compel PLDT to enter into a contract with the without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
Bureau. protection of the laws.

HELD

YES. The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results. in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.

The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In -either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6,
Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may; in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.

Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.

Eminent Domain
People V. Fajardo
KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER

But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit
structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police
power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve
or assure the sesthetic appearance of the community.

FACTS

1. It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question.
2. Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant
Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent
to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek.
3. On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy
the view or beauty of the public plaza.
4. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a
place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been
living on leased property.
5. On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao,
Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

WON the subject Ordinance is valid.

HELD

No. It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building
"destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of
the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building
would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway.

Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation.

We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort
and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, Phil. 580), the State may not, under the
guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them
solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may
be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it
would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway.

The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it
is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
Eminent Domain
Amigable V. Cuenca
KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER

1. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.

FACTS

1. Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu
City
2. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167
square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
3. On March 27, 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

WON the government can be properly sued in this

case.

HELD

1. YES. In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, involving a claim for payment of the value of
a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

2. Considering that no annotation in favour of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and
that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

3. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible
at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
Eminent Domain
Phil. Press Institute V. COMELEC
KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER

2. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.

FACTS

1. On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772.

2. Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong
sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the
Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI. These letters read as
follows:
“This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the
Commission on Elections, you are directed to provide free print
space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as ‘Comelec Space’
3. In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates
the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

WON the Resolution 2772 of COMELEC is
unconstitutional for it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government,
and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
Sec. 2. Comelec Space.—The Commission shall procure free
print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for
use as ‘Comelec Space’ from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12,
1995. In the absence of said newspaper, ‘Comelec Space’ shall
be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province
or city.

Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space.—‘Comelec Space’ shall be

allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine
or periodical is circulated

HELD

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section
2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT.

1. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public
use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory “donation:” only once
during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or every day or once a week? or as
often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily
charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

2. The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of
 private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for
public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority
to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It
has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at
the heartof the problem.

3. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between
that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.

4. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation
for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper
publishers to “donate” free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to
publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest.