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Signode Industries, Inc.

In early January 2014, Gary Reed, president of Signode Industries' Packaging Division, was
preparing his presentation for the national sales meeting later that month. One important element of
his presentation would be Signode's response to changing steel prices. Just two months before, the
major U.S. steel companies had announced a 6.8% increase in the price of cold rolled steel—the raw
material used in the manufacture of Signode's primary product, steel strapping.

Historically, the steel strapping industry had passed these price increases directly to the
customer. Signode's sales force, however, had responded to the announcement with emphatic
complaints about continued price cuts by competitors and about the company's significant price
differentials. Signode's major competitor, Alpha Corporation, had already announced an increase in
its book prices by 6.8% for a "select group of customers." The sales force, however, feared that actual
prices would remain constant, as Alpha was selectively cutting prices in an attempt to gain share.

Worried by the continued price cutting, Reed had visited each of the three regional sales
offices during December. In the great majority of his meetings, Reed found Signode's powerful and
respected sales force clamoring for no price increase and the authority to cut prices selectively. At one
meeting, Jack Davis, one of the regional managers, had presented an idea he called "price-flex,"
which was designed to allow sales representatives to selectively discount the book price for steel
strapping consumables by as much as 7% in order to meet competition. Davis maintained that price-
flex would allow Signode to continue charging premium prices to service-oriented customers, while
lowering prices for those customers who purchased on a commodity basis. Davis also argued that
ignoring price-flex or another competitive pricing plan would destine Signode to further market share
losses.

Reed knew that Davis had a point. Though the company had
been the market leader in the steel strapping business for 25 years, the
past decade had seen Signode's market share decline from 50% in 2007
to its current 40%. From this perspective, the proposal was very
appealing: with price-flex to meet competitive conditions, Davis and
the sales force promised a 5% to 10% increase in Signode's market
share.

However, Reed's response to the price-flex proposal was also


constrained by corporate financial needs. Reed planned to use the annual sales meeting to
address the sales force's concerns about competitive discounting and market share
erosion. He also wanted to announce Signode's reaction to steel price increases and his
decision on pricing policy.

Corporate Background

Signode Corporation was established many decades back and in 2013 had sales of $ 658
million (See Exhibits 1). It had become the market leader in the steel strapping industry due to
multiple initiatives it had taken over the years.

In the past years, Signode increased its research and development efforts, developing
automated and air-powered strapping tools. It opened new regional steel strapping plants and sales
offices to improve customer service. It had also invested significant resources to offer technical
services to its customers to help them choose the most appropriate product grades and customized
machines. In conjunction with these developments, Signode also doubled the size of its sales force and
became the market leader. In 1992 Signode added plastic strapping to its product line.

1
Signode's Organization

Previously organized along functional lines, in 2009 Signode switched to a divisionalized


structure. The corporation's main source of cash flow to cover interest and expansion expenses was
the Packaging Division, which had sales of $286 million. The Packaging Division was responsible
for all domestic sales of steel and plastic strapping systems.

Fifty-nine percent of the Packaging Division's revenues came from sales of steel strapping
systems. The balance came from sales of plastic strapping systems. Of steel strapping systems
revenues, 79% was from the sales of steel strapping consumables, 5% from the sale of machines, 7%
from the sale of hand tools, and 9% from the sale of other goods, including seals used to fasten the
steel strapping.

Packaging Division Products

Steel Strapping

Signode steel strapping was used by businesses to bind products for shipping. The strapping
could bind together a shipment of two-by-fours, seal the box in which a washing machine was being
shipped, or secure a stack of wooden logs. Small or infrequent users of strapping usually applied
the strapping with a hand tool that may or may not have been specially designed for the customer's
specific packaging needs. If the strapping process was the last step in an integrated assembly line—as
might be the case with a washing machine—it would probably be applied by a custom-designed
power strapping machine. Signode's engineering department would provide custom-designed
strapping machines, but the steel strapping consumables applied by the machines could be supplied
by any competitor.

Steel strapping was specified by two criteria—size and grade. Size referred to the width of
the strapping, and Signode produced over 170 standard sizes of steel strapping. The grade referred to
the thickness and strength of the strapping. There were three standard grades of strapping in the steel
strapping industry: Apex, Box Band Magnus (BBM), and Heavy Duty Magnus (HDM). Twelve
strapping sizes/ grades represented 73% of all strapping sales.

Table A Steel Strapping Grades, Uses, and Sales for Signode, 2013
Grade Use % Sales
Apex Packages and corrugated boxes 33.3%
Box Band Magnus (BBM) Bricks and medium weight steel packages (tin plate) 26.8%
Heavy Duty Magnus (HDM) Rolls of steel and freight car bracing 33.4%

Signode also produced custom sizes and grades of strapping, primarily for larger customers.
It was the only supplier of custom strapping. These custom orders represented only 6.5% of total sales
of steel strapping. Table A outlines applications and Signode's sales for each grade.

Plastic Strapping

When Signode started producing plastic strapping in 1992, the market for plastic strapping
consumables was only $10 million. By 2013 that market had grown to $170 million, of which
Signode's share was $90 million (53%). The top grades of plastic strapping could, in some cases, be
used as a substitute for Apex and BBM steel strapping.

Tools and Equipment

The application of steel and plastic strapping required specialized tools or machines. Signode
produced more than 550 standard types and sizes of steel strapping machines and tools in 2013,
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ranging from simple hand tools to fully automatic customized power strapping machines. (See Exhibit
2 for pictures of steel strapping tools and equipment.)

Along with its standard product line, Signode also designed custom tools and machines to fit
the buyer's production lines. Few custom tools were made, and they accounted for less than 1% of
steel strapping systems revenues. Steel strapping machines were nearly all custom made, and as a
result demand was quite uncertain. For example, although 200 units had been purchased in 2013,
fewer than 100 units were expected to be sold in 2014. Each machine had a head that tensioned and
sealed the strapping. The heads were built to standard Signode design specifications, while the
superstructures of the machines were custom built to the needs of specific plants. About 25% of steel
strapping consumables were applied by this specialized power strapping equipment.

Signode's plastic strapping machines and tools could be used only with Signode plastic
strapping because of strapping specifications and tolerances. Once customers purchased a Signode
plastic application device, they were committed to purchasing only Signode strapping. Although
demand for steel machines had stagnated over the past several years, the installed base of plastic
strapping machines was still growing.

Packaging Division Organization

Gary Reed was president and COO of the Packaging Division. (See Exhibit 3 for an
organization chart.) An engineer by training, Reed joined Signode after graduating from Bradley
University. He worked his way through the sales organization into positions of general management,
where he proved his abilities by turning around several smaller divisions. He noted that Signode's
culture sometimes led salespeople to offer services to customers without knowing costs or effect on
market share. As Signode came out of the recent recession, Reed realized the environment had
changed:

We were not going to recover as we had in the past. Steel strapping was a
mature product. With the market moving toward commoditization, could Signode
continue to differentiate its steel strapping business indefinitely?

Sales and Marketing

When Reed took over the Packaging Division, he was determined to improve its marketing
efforts. To this end, he appointed Henry Hernandez vice president of marketing. Reed had worked
with Hernandez before and had confidence in his abilities.

In his new position, one of Hernandez's major responsibilities was the development of more
sophisticated methods of measuring and segmenting the market. At Reed's behest, Hernandez
quickly established product managers to oversee the marketing process for both steel and plastic
strapping systems. It was believed that the product managers would help eliminate the traditional
"black magic" the sales force had used in its market analysis.

Clay Hamilton, the division vice president of sales, like Reed, had worked his way up through
the sales organization. In 2013 there were 180 salespeople reporting to Hamilton through 24 district
managers and 3 regional managers. During the recent recession, Reed and Hamilton had cut the sales
force from 235 to 180.

Although the sales force was organized geographically, Signode had traditionally developed
markets by specializing some of its sales representatives by industry. Signode experts would study an
industry's unique strapping needs, design specialized equipment to meet those needs, and then
follow up with service and sales of strapping consumables. Because of this systems sales approach,
the Signode sales force maintained multiple contacts within customer organizations, ranging from
vice presidents of manufacturing and operations to plant managers and purchasing agents. During
the 2000s, Signode also had experimented with the use of distributors to serve the lower end of the
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market, but the company had not been satisfied with the results.

Salespeople were compensated with a base salary and a volume bonus system. The
marketing and sales organizations together set dollar sales quotas at the beginning of each year.
Salespeople earned a 2% bonus on sales over their quota. The average salesperson in 2013 earned
$35,000 per year, of which 70% was salary and 30% bonus.

In addition to its sales representatives, Signode employed two groups of specialists to assist
in systems selling and account service. Power equipment specialists helped the field sales force with
equipment sales, and industry specialists assisted on sales to customers in important industry
segments. These specialists developed sales training programs to explain equipment applications,
increase selling skills, and promote better technical knowledge of Signode's equipment line. The
specialists also helped with the preparation of equipment and industry surveys and ROI justifications.

The director of national accounts also reported to Clay Hamilton. Signode's five national
account managers (NAMs) targeted the 250 largest accounts and managed them in cooperation with
the field sales force. The NAMs called on senior executives, made presentations on how Signode
reduced customers' costs, and negotiated national, multi-location purchase contracts. Local
relationships were handled by the district sales representatives.

Steel Strapping Market

The steel strapping industry was closely tied to the cycles and overall health of the industrial
economy. Industry shipments of steel strapping consumables had declined from a high of 479,000
tons in 2003 to 360,000 tons by 2013. The total dollar sales of steel strapping was approximately $330
million. During this period, imports increased and began to play a role in the low-price segment of
the market. Through the 2000s, domestic competitors had continued to add production capacity. In
2013 industry capacity utilization was estimated to be between 60% and 70%.

Market Segmentation

Signode segmented its accounts based on annual dollar volume and shipping quantity, as
shown in Table B.

Table B Signode's Market Segmentation


Segment Annual $ Volume Shipping Quantity
National Over $23,000 Carload (20 tons)
Large $8,000-23,000 Carload or truckload (13 tons)
Midrange $3,500-8,000 Less than truckload
Small Under $3,500 Skid (0.6 ton)

Signode's five national account managers were responsible for the 250 largest accounts that
did business across two or more sales regions, though they closely tracked only the top 180.
Signode's market share had remained stable in the national and large accounts, but profitability
in these accounts had varied widely, with contribution rates ranging from 21% to 45%. (See
Exhibits 4 and 5 for more data by account size.)

There was a great deal of movement between segments of Signode's customer base: 44% of
small-segment customers in 2013 had not bought any Signode products in 2012; 22% of 2013's
midrange accounts had been small accounts in 2012, while 23% of large accounts had been
midrange or small accounts the previous year. This movement, however, was not as pronounced
among the national accounts. Experience taught that once a national account was lost, it was
extremely difficult to get back.

Signode also segmented the market by industry, which was a natural outgrowth of its
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historic market development strategy. The corporation's 98% market share in the Primary Metals
industry and its 82% share in the Forest Products industry were the two most dramatic examples of
the success of this segmentation scheme. Signode quite literally grew up with these and similar
industries, providing specialized service and equipment to meet unique strapping needs. By 2012
Signode's eight largest target industries accounted for 32% of Apex strapping sales, 70% of Box
Band Magnus sales, and 75% of Heavy Duty Magnus sales. (See Exhibit 6 for strapping sales by
product and industry.)

Long-standing relationships with these industries meant Signode was sensitive to their
perceptions of the strapping industry. Though the feedback was not always what Signode wanted to
hear, it could be powerful. For example, an executive from a large steel company commented:

We're paying for product innovations that were developed 10 to 15 years


ago. Our market is shrinking. We don't need new tools or machines. We need steel
strapping at cheaper prices to run through our existing tools and machines.

The marketing department was very concerned about customer price sensitivity and its
relationship to the service component of Signode's value-added system. To improve
Signode's understanding of its account base, Hamilton asked the regional and district sales
managers to evaluate their accounts based on (1) relative price paid and (2) service consumed.
Looking at the top 164 accounts and then further into the top 1,200 accounts, sales managers ranked
them on a scale of 1 to 10. Those accounts paying the highest price for Signode steel strapping were
indicated by a 10. Those paying the lowest price were given a 1. The accounts were then evaluated
on a separate but similar scale for service consumed. Service included applications review and
engineering, free parts, unbilled time of service personnel, demonstration tools, tool repair,
custom strapping machine design, and sales calls. The results of this survey for the top 164
accounts are shown in Exhibit 7, where the two separate evaluations (price paid and service
consumed) are combined into one matrix.

Competition

There were six major competitors in the steel strapping industry. In 2013 these six and
Signode accounted for 92% of steel strapping shipments—down from 95% in 2007. (See Exhibit 8 for
more data by competitor.) Aside from Signode, none of the industry competitors produced custom
steel strapping or machines. Many competitors imported their machines and tools or sold another
manufacturer's equipment. Indeed, some did not even carry a line of equipment, but sold only
strapping. No competitor provided the level of service that Signode could provide.

Because of its market leadership, Signode's book price was the standard market price. A
competitor would set its book prices at some discount off Signode's price, and the discount would
usually reflect the level of service provided (e.g., lesser service would carry a higher discount).
Traditionally, Signode had raised its steel strapping prices in tandem with the cost of raw materials.
Its competitors usually followed suit, raising their book prices a similar amount.

Pricing in the Steel Strapping Market

Because Signode's raw materials accounted for approximately 70% of the cost of steel
strapping, sophisticated customers could easily determine "fair prices" for the products and services
received. Although customers in many industries had been willing to pay a price premium when
purchasing a strapping system, it was exceedingly difficult to justify higher prices for consumables
after the initial introductory period. Nonetheless, Signode attempted to use the relationships it
established to recover the loss it sustained on the design and installation of machines through sales of
strapping, parts, and service at higher profit margins. Until the mid 2000s, Signode succeeded with a
strategy summarized by one sales executive as "we won't take a nickel out of the price for anyone."

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Starting in the early 2000s, however, customer buying behavior had begun to change.
Pressures to reduce costs led to an increased sophistication of buyer purchasing departments.
Traditionally, Signode and many of its competitors had designed specialized machinery for
customers, sold them below cost, and then reaped profits on the sale of consumables. During the
2000s, however, increased competition within the strapping market along with cost-cutting pressures
from buyers led to an unbundling of the traditional product package. Some customers would now
buy their specialized machinery below cost and then meet their requirements for strapping through a
closed bid process. Customers also began to increase the frequency but decrease the size of their
purchases; shipments of greater than 36,000 pounds declined from 52.9% of total strapping sales in
2010 to 47.9% in 2012. In 2014, this trend toward the unbundling of product and services led Signode
to start charging most customers for machine service.

Some years back, Alpha had reassessed the steel strapping industry as a slow-growth
market. As a result, it cut its sales force by 50%, serving only its largest customers direct. In addition
to trimming costs, Alpha began selectively offering its large accounts 5% discounts off its standard
prices, which were set 5% below Signode's standard steel strapping prices. While smaller competitors
were already discounting at that level, Alpha's position as the second-largest producer meant that
this price discount represented a special challenge. To counter the general discounting and respond to
Alpha's move, in 2006 Signode instituted a 5% reduction on the price of HDM strapping in all
markets.

The price cut, however, did not discourage continued discounting by Alpha, Bentley,
Sanford, and other competitors. For example, in 2007 Alpha responded to Signode's HDM price cut
by keeping the 10% price differential for large accounts and extending the discounting on all grades
of strapping to other market segments. Midrange accounts received an 8% discount, and small
accounts received a 6% discount off Signode's prices. To protect its market share position, that same
year Signode responded with an 8% discount on all products for 34 of its selected largest accounts
that purchased more than 25 carloads of steel strapping per year.

Signode sales managers reported that the company continued to lose share. In 2008 Signode
boosted the discount on all products to 14% for all of its national and large accounts. It also extended
discounts of 8% to midrange accounts and 4% to small accounts. The corporation also started to
charge selectively for tool repair and replacement parts. The competition maintained its price
differential of 5%-10% off Signode's discounted (not book) price.

Alpha's 2008 decision to cease production of custom tools and machines had left Signode as
the only full-service supplier. From 2009 to 2011, the market seemed to stabilize and Signode regained
approximately 3% of the market.

The recent recession brought reports from the field that competitors were increasing their
discounting. Market information was uncertain, but it seemed that Alpha and Sanford were offering
selective discounts (in addition to their book differential) of between 5% and 10% off their book
prices. Jersey Steel and Plymouth were selectively discounting roughly 10% to 15% off their book.
Bentley and American Metal seemed to be leading the discounting by selectively offering as much as
15% to 20% off their book prices. Throughout this period, Signode attempted to uphold the price
umbrella by refusing to increase either selectively or generally its discounts. It continued to lose share.

At this point, Signode actually had three pricing levels. First was the book price—the pre-
2008 standard pricing levels. In 2012, very few customers paid the book price. Second was the
standard "4-8-14" percentage discounts to the small, midrange, and large segments of the market.
Almost all customers received these price discounts, and in all but name, they had become Signode's
standard prices. Finally, a process of additional selective discounting had evolved. Many of the very
large and national accounts bought their strapping through a competitive bidding process. When
Signode salespeople found they were being severely underbid on a very large contract with an
important customer, they would request permission to lower prices further than the standard
discount to meet this competitive situation. The request would be passed up through the ranks of
sales management and then Reed, Hernandez and Hamilton would then decide what price Signode
should bid on the contract. This process was in no way standardized; each case was evaluated on its
own merits. Table C shows that most of Signode's customers received no additional discounts.
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Table C Distribution of Price Discounts, 2013
% of Signode's % of Signode's
Accounts $ Volume
No discounts (book price) 9% 1%

Standard discounts only (4-8-14)


90 89
Additional discounts* (4-8-14
discounts and special discounts) 1 10

100% 100%

* To be read as "1 % of Signode's customers, representing 10% of its sales volume, received
discounts in addition to the standard discounts."

In November 2013 the Big 8 steel companies announced a 6.8% increase in the price of
strapping steel. Signode's major competitor, Alpha Corporation, had already announced book price
increases of 6.8% for a select, but unnamed, group of customers. It was unclear, however, how much
Alpha's or other competitors' actual prices would change. Reed believed he had three possible
courses of action.

Reed's Options

First, Reed could increase Signode's strapping prices to offset the increased price of cold
rolled steel. This pricing strategy would remain consistent with the company's traditional policy of
passing on raw materials cost increases directly to the customer. Reed knew, however, that the sales
force had responded to the announced steel price increase with intensified complaints about
Signode's price differentials and had pleaded for no price increase. They feared that Signode's
competitors had increased their book prices, but had decided to maintain current actual price levels in
an effort to gain share.

Second, Reed could maintain Signode's current book prices. Because reports indicated that
customers in the midrange and small segments were particularly responsive to low prices and a range
of product choices, Hamilton became a strong advocate of the "no increase" option. He argued that
the Packaging Division would need increased market share to satisfy the corporation's cash flow
requirements. Hamilton also asserted that increasing prices could cause serious damage to the sales
force's morale.

Third, Reed could institute the price-flex proposal as outlined by Davis. After evaluating the
market and the price-flex proposal, Hernandez agreed that this was a good choice—one that could
combine price increases and discounts. Hernandez believed that the price-flex policy essentially
would give the sales force an efficient means of performing the same kind of selective discounting
that Reed, Hamilton, and Hernandez had already been doing. Reed had pondered the options but had
not yet decided what he wanted to say at the January sales meeting. To begin his analysis, Reed wrote
down his goals:

• Maintain profitability

• Halt market share erosion

• Provide cash to the corporation

• Bolster sales force morale

Reed had to anticipate the market impact of his pricing policy. Also, he had to develop a
detailed implementation plan. Finally, he would need to present a complete explanation of his
reasoning to the most powerful and respected sales force in the strapping industry.

7
8
Exhibit 1 Consolidated Financial Data ($ in thousands)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Signode Corporation
Revenue $695,183 $695,504 $700,252 $650,387 $658,737
Packaging Division

Revenue $298,264 $285,777 $311,469 $285,114 $285,950


Cost of sales $207,500 195,408 218,579 195,766 181,473
R&D expense 2,810 3,335 3,473 3,762 2,879
Freight expense 0 0 0 0 0
Gross margin 87,954 87,034 89,417 85,586 101,598
Selling expense 24,677 23,705 26,736 25,708 24,178
Materials management 11,001 12,037 11,737 10,792 12,560
expense
General and administrative 8,597 7,031 7,446 6,489 8,547
expense
Direct expense 44,275 42,773 45,919 42,989 45,285
Other income 0 41 96 73 550
Operating income 43,679 44,302 43,594 42,670 56,863
Other (income) and 8,485 9,898 10,235 10,596 9,975
expense
EBIT $35,194 $34,404 $33,359 $32,074 $46,888
RONA (fully allocated) 17% 16.1% 13.8% 29.9%

9
10
Exhibit 2 Steel Strapping Tools and Equipment

11
CR-34 TH-34-114
Hand Tools For retaining strips. General use. High tension.
Manual tensioners
Signode hand tensioners allow
operators to bring strap to desired
tension with minimal interruption and
strap waste. There are four basic
types of tensioners for steel
strapping. Each tensioner type fulfills
specific packaging needs. The
manual tensioner types available
include the feedwheel type, the push
type, the windlass type, and the rack
and pinion type.

Feedwheel type-for general use


The feedwheel tensioner has a
serrated feedwheel which engages
the strapping firmly. There is no limit
to the amount of slack it can pull out
of the strap. Fast and easy to use, it
requires the use of painted and
waxed strapping and is designed for
use on flat surfaces.

General use. Medium tension.


Power Strapping Machine (M200 Series)
Exhibit 3 Organization Chart

Signode Industries
CEO
J.M. Harris
International Packaging Division
Division Fastener and Industrial
President and COO
Products Division
Gary Reed
V.P. V.P. V.P. V.P.
Manufacturing Marketing Sales Materials Management
Stephen O Donnell Henry Hernandez Clay Hamilton Jane Mack
Marketing Planning East Regional
Manager Manager

Marketing Information Midwest Regional


Systems Manager Manager

- Advertising Manager West Regional


Manager
Customer Service
Manager Power Equipment
Specialists, Director
Product Managers
Steel Systems Plastic Industry Specialists,
Systems Director

National Accounts,
Director
Exhibit 4 Sales Volume, Contribution, and Product Use by Account Size
National
Small Midrange Large Accounts Total
Sales Volume and Contribution
% of total strapping market 19% 22% 23% 36% 100%
Signode share 2007 35 44 45 55 50
Signode share 2013 25 34 39 54 40
Contribution 54 42 34 28 36
% of sales time 12 35 20 33 100%

Product Use

Apex 62 46 23 20
Box Band Magnus 16 21 40 30
Heavy Duty Magnus 22 32 35 45
Custom strapping 0 1 2 5
100% 100% 100% 100%

Note: These estimates were provided by the industry specialists and reflect the lack of agreement within Signode regarding true
market share by segment and product line. Thus, the numbers do not necessarily agree with all data in the case text.

Exhibit 5 Signode Strapping Sales by Account Size


Purchase Size
2013 sales ($000) Small Midrange Large*
(Skid: 0.6 ton) (Truckload: (Carload: 20
% of strapping sold 13 tons) tons)
Tons shipped $14,000 $29,200 $89,800
Average price per ton 11% 23% 66%
Number of customers 13,412 31,875 103,307
$1,043 $916 $869
21,550 3,609 1,428
Account Migration, 2012-2013
% of increase from lower size 22% 23%
Number of new customers 9,435 648
Number of lost customers 9,177 132
669
136
* Includes the 250 national accounts.
Exhibit 6 Segmentation by Industry (%)
Product Usage
Industry %o f Signode's Signode's Apex BBM HDM
Total 2007 Share 2013 Share
Market
Pkgd Consumer Prods 18.0% 50% 42% 9% 12% 79%
Consumer Durables 12.0 50 47 26 46 28
Paper 5.6 48 48 62 14 24
Metal service 3.9 39 37 14 28 58
Synthetic fibers 3.9 26 31 7 85 8
Primary Metals 3.3 98 98 0 0 100
Forest Products 3.1 86 82 0 100 0
Transportation 2.2% 40% 39% 56% 18% 26%
52.0%

Note: These estimates were provided by the industry specialists and reflect the lack of agreement within Signode regarding true
market share by segment and product line. Thus, the numbers do not necessarily agree with all data in the case text.

Exhibit 7 Top 164 National Accounts

Note: A similar scattergram (distribution of accounts) was found for Signode's top 1,200 accounts.
a. Cost to serve includes sales expense, unbilled repair, parts, tools, and application and engineering services.
Exhibit 8 Data on Industry Competition ($ in millions)
Signode Alpha Sanford Bentley American Jersey Plymouth
Metal Steel
CCorporate sales, $659 $835 $984 $100 $1,700 $30 $80
2013
SSteel strapping $133 $70 $30 $33 $17 $13 $10
sales, 2013
12013 Capacity 71% 82% 63% 90% 53% 90% 70%
utilization
12007 Market 50% 22% 10% 6% 3% 2% 2%
share*
12013 Market 40% 21% 9% 10% 5% 4% 3%
share
Sales force 180 50 23 25 48 15 8
SSales volume Less than 1% 32% 55% 50% 0% 15% 25%
through
distributors

* Imported and other steel strapping sold through distributors had a market share of 5% in 2007 and 8% in 2013.

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