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Case Study: Air India vs.

Nargesh Meerza

Introduction : A case note examining the first de-facto case of


sexual discrimination at the work place: Air India v Nergesh Meerza &
Ors 1981 AIR 1829.

Air India, a state-owned company, required female flight attendants


to retire under three circumstances: (1) upon reaching 35 years of age,
(2) upon getting married, or (3) upon first pregnancy. The Ld. Supreme
Court struck the rules down, holding that these requirements
constituted official arbitrariness and hostile discrimination.

Air India vs. Nargesh Meerza


Citation: AIR 1981 SC 1829 : (1981) 4 SCC 335
Bench: S.Murtaza, Faizal Ali, A. Varadarajan and A.N. Sen, JJ

Issues
1. Whether Air Hostess and Assistant Flight Pursers in Air
India or Flight Stewards in Indian Airlines corporation from
separate categories though both are members of the same
crew.
2. Whether differential treatment meted out to Air Hostesses
would attract the equality clause of the constitution.
3. Whether the restriction on marriage of Air Hostesses with in
the first four years of service is unreasonable and arbitrary.
4. Whether the termination of services of Air Hostesses on first
pregnancy is unreasonable and arbitrary.
5. Whether the procedure of extension of the age of retirement
of an Air Hostess by the Managing Director is violation of
Article 14.

Observation of the Court:


In considering the fundamental right of equality of opportunity a
technical, pedantic or doctrinaire approach should not be made. Article
14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. It
applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable
basis. But where the class or categories of service are essentially
different in purport and spirit, e.g., where different scales of pay, service
terms, leave, etc. are introduced in different or dissimilar posts, Article
14 can not be attracted.

Even if there be one class of service having several categories with


different attributes and incidents, such a category becomes a separate
class by itself and no difference and discrimination between such
category and the general members of the other class would amount to
any discrimination or to denial of equality of opportunity. Though a
rule of universal application cannot be laid down, in order to judge
whether a separate category has been carved out of a class of service,
the circumstances such as the nature, mode and manner of recruitment
of a particular category from the very start; the classification of the
particular category; the terms and conditions of the service of the
members of the category; the nature and character of the posts and
promotional avenues; the special attributes that the particular category
possesses which are not to be found in the other classes and the like,
have generally to be examined. It is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal applicability but the circumstances mentioned above may be
taken to be illustrative guidelines for determining the question.

Decision
1. Regarding the first issue, the court held that having regard
to the various circumstances, incidents, service conditions,
promotional avenues, etc. of the Assistant Flight Pursers and
Air Hostesses, it is clear that the Air Hostesses though
members of the cabin crew are an entirely separate class
governed by different set of rules, regulations and conditions
of the service.( The slight difference in the job functions
performed by them is not relevant to this decision.)

2. Regarding the second issue, the court held that since the Air
Hostess from a separate category of circumstances namely, i)
restriction on marriage within the first four years of service,
and ii) early retirement at 35 years, extendable to 45 years at
the option of the Managing Director, do not violate Article 14
of the Constitution on the ground of discrimination.

3. Regarding the third issue, the court held that so far the
restriction on marriage within the first four years of service is
concerned, the provision do not suffer from unreasonableness
or arbitrariness. According to the Air India Regulations, an
Air Hostess starts her career between the age of 19 to 26
years. Most of the Air Hostesses are not only SCC which is the
minimum qualification but posses even higher qualifications
and there are very few who decide to marry immediately after
entering into the service. Thus the Regulation permits an Air
Hostess to marry at the age of 23 if she has joined the service
at the age of 19 which is by all standards a very sound and
salutary provision. Apart from improving the health of the
employee, it helps a good deal in the promotion and boosting
up of our family planning programme. Secondly, If a woman
marries near about the age of 20 to 23 years, she becomes fully
mature and there is very chance of such marriage proving a
success, all things being equal. Thirdly, it has been rightly
pointed out by the Air India Corporation that if the bar of
marriage within four years of service is removed then the
Corporation will have to incur huge expenditure in recruiting
additional Air Hostesses if they conceive and any period short
of four years would be too little a time for the Corporation to
phase out such an ambitious plan.

4. Regarding the fourth issue, the court held that the provision
according to which the service of Air Hostesses would stand
terminated on first pregnancy is not only manifestly
unreasonable and arbitrary but contains the quality of
unfairness and exhibits naked despotism and is, therefore,
clearly violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It amounts
to compelling the Hostesses not to have any children and thus
interfere with and divert the ordinary course of human nature.
By making pregnancy a bar to continuance in service of an Air
Hostess, the Corporation seems to have made an
individualized approach to a woman’s physical capacity to
continue her employment even after pregnancy is undoubtedly
is a most unreasonable approach. The termination of service of
an Air Hostess under such circumstances is not only a callous
and cruel act but an open insult to the Indian Womanhood. It
is extremely detestable, abhorrent to the notions of a civilized
society and grossly unethical in disregard of all human values.
Pregnancy is not a disability but one of the natural
consequences of marriage and is an immutable characteristic of
married life. Any distinction, therefore, made on the ground of
pregnancy cannot be held to be extremely arbitrary.

5. Regarding the fifth issue, the court further held that the
provision of extension of service of the Air Hostesses ‘at the
option’ of the Managing Director (Regulation 47) confers a
discretionary power without laying down any guidelines or
principles and liable to be stuck down as unconstitutional. The
option to continue in service may be exercised in favor of one
Air Hostess and not in favor of other and is thus
discriminatory. Under the Air India Regulations the extension
of the retirement period of an Air Hostess was entirely at the
mercy and sweet will of the Managing Director. The
conferment of such a wide and uncontrolled power on the
Managing director was violation of Article 14 as it suffered
from the vice of excessive delegation of powers.

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