Rule on Pre-Trial proceedings

Rule 118 (Sec. 2) – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing, and signed by accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.

(People vs. Saturnino Villanueva, GR No 181829, Sept. 1, 2010) Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-
trial order must be signed not only by him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel
may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference;
eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused of the facts agreed upon

Agreements covering the matters: (i) plea bargaining, (ii) stipulation of facts, (iii) marking of evidence, (iv) waiver of
objections to admissibility, (v) MODIFICATION OF ORDER OF TRIAL, or (vi) such matters as will promote a fair
and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case – these must be APPROVED by the Court

Rule 118 (Sec. 4) – PTO – such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the
course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the Court to prevent manifest injustice.

Amendment of PTO

- Check the Order of the Court after the Pretrial Conference

- If none: 05-06-10-SC
- Meritorious motions: 5 days from receipt in order to comment ‘
- Motion for Correction of Pretrial Order was done in Alviola vs. Avelino, AM MTJ-P-08-1697, 2008

Order of Reverse Trial

- Order of reverse trial should be contained in the pretrial agreement in order to be binding.
- People of the Philippines vs. SPO1 Marcial, et. Al (GR Nos. 152864-65, Sept 27, 2006)
- This is discretionary upon the judge

San Juan vs. Sandiganbayan | GR 173956 | August 6, 2008

While it is true that pre-trial has already been terminated, records show that, before the Pre-Trial Order dated
November 7, 2005 was issued, the Court made clear to all the parties, considering the numerous documentary evidence
sought to be marked and presented by the parties, that the said Order was "without prejudice to the comment [on the
Pre-Trial Order] of the prosecution and the accused;" that is, the Court may still accept any modification of the
said Order from both the prosecution and the accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave the
prosecution and the accused a period of time "to file a formal manifestation with respect to some changes they
would like to propose in the Pre-Trial Order" notwithstanding the commencement of the trial (re: proceedings)

Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the pre-trial has effectively been terminated, the Court gave both
the prosecution and the accused the opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-Trial Order or to modify their
submissions or in some instances, even to withdraw the stipulations they made during the pre-trial. The Court’s
position is consistent with the exercise of its discretion to decide how best to dispense justice in accordance with the
circumstances of the proceedings before it. The decision to grant the prosecution’s motion for additional marking of
documentary exhibits is another exercise of this judicial prerogative, which prerogative was made known to the parties
in the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005, when the Court stated that such was subject to modification "in order
to prevent manifest injustice."
The guidelines on the conduct of the pre-trial, including A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, were prescribed by the Honorable
Supreme Court to "abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets."
The Court does not mean to disregard or ignore these guidelines but the Court is compelled to take into consideration,
in the interest of substantial justice, the various submissions of both the prosecution and the accused mentioned above
in connection with the agreements reached by the parties that they be allowed to submit their comments on the pre-
trial order, even while the trial had begun so as not to delay the proceedings.

Jurisprudence on Relaxation of Rules in the Interest of Substantial Justice

[ G.R. No. 219309, November 22, 2017 ]

ANGELINA CHUA AND HEIRS OF JOSE MA. CHENG SING PHUAN, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES
SANTIAGO CHENG AND AVELINA SIHIYON, RESPONDENTS.

This is not to say, however, that the rules governing pre-trial should be, at all times, applied in absolute terms. While
faithful compliance with these rules is undoubtedly desirable, they may be relaxed in cases where their application
would frustrate, rather than facilitate, the ends of justice.48 The relaxation of these rules, however, is contingent upon
a showing of compelling and persuasive reasons to justify the same. 49

(Siasoco v. CA, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999)

The interest of justice and equity demand that they be considered to avoid a result that is iniquitous. Truth cannot be
barred by technical rules. For this reason, our ruling case law holds that amendments to pleadings are generally favored
and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice so that every case may so far as possible be determined on its
real facts and in order to prevent the circuity of action.

( Ildefonso Samala & Benjamin Babista, v. CA, G.R. No. 128628, August 23, 2001.)

We should always bear in mind that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be avoided. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.

( Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda (GR 201234, 2014)

The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous,
application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice.
The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property
on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

(Alonso v. Villamar [16 Phil. 315, 322 (1910)

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid
to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should
be no vested rights in technicalities.

(G.R. No. 219510, Curammeng vs People of the Philippines)

Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the
rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it
would result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. 27