Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs.

Torres

FACTS
Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of P.D. No. 269. President Corazon C.
Aquino signed into law R.A. No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) and R.A. No. 6939 and R.A. No. 6939
(Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)) and vested solely upon the CDA the power to register cooperatives. Pursuant
to these laws CANORECO registered with the CDA.

The Board of Directors of CANORECO approved Resolution No. 22 appointing petitioner Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent
General Manager. The Board was composed of Ruben N. Barrameda (President); Elvis L. Espiritu (Vice president); Merardo
G. Enero, Jr. (Secretary); Marcelito B. Abas (Treasurer); Antonio R. Obias,Luis A. Pascua and Norberto Z. Ochoa as Directors;
Leonida Z. Manalo (OIC GM/Ex-Officio). On 28 May 1995, Obias, Ochoa, Pascua, and Ilan held a special meeting of the
Board of Directors of CANORECO. Without the President, Vice-President, and the Treasurer that Obias acted as temporary
chairman; that despite the fact that he had called the attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas and Espiritu
for the holding thereof, the three chose not to appear; and that those present in the special meeting declared all positions
in the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold elections by secret balloting with all the directors present considered
candidates for the positions.

Petitioners challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by filing with the CDA a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers with Prayer for Issuance of Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order.
CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners.

Because of the squabble and struggle between two groups vying for the control of the management of the Camarines
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., (CANORECO), the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 409
constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO. Herein petitioners
assert in their petition that there is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing
the President or his representatives to take over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. Although conceding that
while the State, through its police power, has the right to interfere with private business or commerce, they maintain that
the exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate
does not include the power to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. Accordingly, the creation
of the Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of take-over was illegal and void.

ISSUE
May the Office of the President validly constitute an Ad Hoc committee to take over and manage the affairs of an electric
cooperative?

RULING
No. The Court held that having registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) pursuant to Section 128 of
R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of R.A. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said laws. Article 38 of R.A. No.
6939 vests upon the board of directors the conduct and management of the affairs of the cooperatives, and Article 39
provides for the powers of the board of directors. Memorandum Order No. 409 has no constitutional and statutory basis.
It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic
organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the
members. It also runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall maintain a policy of
non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.

BUKLOD NG MAGBUBUKID vs E.M. RAMOS

FACTS

At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger
expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Originally owned by the MAnila
Golf and Country Club, he property was acquired by the [herein respondent EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of
developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".

Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise
known as the "Loyal Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1,
entitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."

In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development its
aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching to the application detailed development
plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon the
Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for
brevity), approving [EMRASON's] application. Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed
with property development.

It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay owing to the confluence of
events. Among these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the
possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation.

On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect,
ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.

On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmarinas, Cavite addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating in part, as
follows:

"In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the Municipality of Dasmarinas, Cavite, has approved the
development of your property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite, with a total area of 372 hectares,
more or less, into residential, industrial, commercial and golf course project. This conversion conforms with the approved
Development Plan of the Municipality of Dasmarinas Cavite".

On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of
which drew protest from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of land situated at Barangay
Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite owned by [EMRASON].

In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig,
Metro Manila, separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices. Collectively docketed as DARAB Case
No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional Director, Region IV, which had
jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its
Operations Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation lo determine whether or not the subject property is covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.

Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property.

In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered Exhibits:'A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence, [EMRASON]
received another set of notices of acquisition. As lo be expected, [EMRASON] again protested.

On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision
declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP.

The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to
non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.

On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian
Reform Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the department's official position
"to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the
Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares
x x x".

On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an order
affirming the Notices of Acquisition and Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he coverage under RA 6657
of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for which subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued.

Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his subsequent
order of January 6, 1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President.

On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
[(Deputy Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x x x, dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal.

Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration, followed later by another motion where under it invited
attention to legal doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no less than the Office of the President itself.

On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out with his second challenged issuance denying
[EMRASON's] aforementioned motion for reconsideration x x x.

From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP, EMRASON filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.

On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which enjoined then DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao and Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona from implementing the OP Decision of February 7, 1996
and Resolution of May 14, 1996 until further orders from the court. On September 17, 1996, the appellate court issued a
Resolution granting the prayer of EMRASON for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of Appeals,
with the prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction already issued be lifted, recalled and/or dissolved.

At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject
property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoined the
release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a Manifestation
and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable party in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950;
that the writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved, having been issued in violation of Section 55 of the CARL;
and that the Petition for Review of EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because -the latter's participation was "not being in any way
prejudicial to the interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal complexion of the case."
The appellate court, however, affirmed the propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON given that under Section 5 of
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, appeals from judgments or final orders of the
OP or the DAR under the CARL shall be taken to the Court of Appeals, through a verified petition for review; and that under
Section 3 of the same Administrative Circular, such a petition for review may raise questions of facts, law, or mixed questions
of facts and law.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already converted/classified
as residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.. The Court of Appeals further observed
that the subject property has never been devoted to any agricultural activity and is, in fact, more suitable for non-
agricultural purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property could be placed under the CARP.
HELD:

NO. Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines the coverage of the CARP, to wit:

SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a
total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification
of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can
be raised thereon.

A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly identifying and
classifying farmlands within one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without prejudice to the implementation of the land
acquisition and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)

Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land."

The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been
reclassified as residential prior to said date.

Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive where
it is governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails throughout the municipality in accordance with that
plan. It is partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits,
height districts and building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use regulation that are antecedents of
modern comprehensive zoning, (pp. 11-12.)

The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental
regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. This regulation must and does utilize classification
of uses within districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is impossible to deal specifically with each
of the innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly, (zoning has been defined as the confining of certain classes
of buildings and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones.) It has been stated that zoning is the regulation by districts
of building development and uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is not only capable of this definition but has
acquired a technical and artificial meaning in accordance therewith. (Zoning is the separation of the municipality into
districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the districts so created, in accordance with their construction,
and nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the general
welfare.) Numerous other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with these have been given in the cases, (pp. 27-
28.)

The concept that concerns this Court in the instant cases is the reclassification of agricultural lands. In Alarcon v. Court of
Appeals, the Court had the occasion to define and distinguish reclassification from conversion as follows:

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to
the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural
lands to agricultural use.

Under the present Local Government Code, it is clear that the authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in
the Sanggunian of the city or Municipality.

Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval on July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning and
reclassifying of the subject property for residential use. It need not comply with any of the requirements or conditions which
DAR and Buklod are insisting upon.

DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not reviewed and approved by the NPC, in violation of the line in Section
3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, stating that "[c]ities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning
Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning." Consideration must be given, however, to the use of the word
"may" in the said sentence. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary. It
is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes
that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction
is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Since consultation with the NPC was merely discretionary,
then there were only two mandatory requirements for a valid zoning or subdivision ordinance or regulation under Section
3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, namely, that (1) the ordinance or regulation be adopted by the city or municipal board
or council; and (2) it be approved by the city or municipal mayor, both of which were complied with by Resolution No. 29-
A.

GANCAYCO vs CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY

FACTS
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City Council
issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At the
outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building
code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of
local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by
constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building
owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under
the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of
using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he
be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66,
“subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the
enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.”
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent
a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA
from demolishing his property.

The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use
of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches
and prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already
violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned
property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely
implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.

The RTC rendered in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it
allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation for the public's benefit, the ordinance was
confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners' right to equal protection of laws but the
CA upheld the validity of the Ordinance and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation. It held
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its
constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the
owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its
powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks,
streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco's private
property.

ISSUES
1. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
2. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

RULING
1. The Court find that the petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances
of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading
act.
2. Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the
exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the
ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the
demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard
to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to
do so.
3. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication
that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect
the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make
that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or
the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and
property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have
the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not
such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS vs THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE

FACTS
BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision is the largest subdivision in the country. The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted
Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 entitled, "An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the
Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws." Sections 11.5 and
11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque from
residential to commercial areas.

The United BF Homeowners' Associations, Inc., several homeowner's associations, and its residents filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the said Ordinance.

Petitioners alleged that the reclassication of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone
is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque
and the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation on the lot buyers' titles which provides that "the property shall be
used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose."

On the other hand, public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of
police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.

ISSUE

1. Whether the power of local government units to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances has legal limitations;
2. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power
3. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is constitutional considering that it impairs a contractual obligation
annotated in homeowners' titles and violates the doctrine of separation of powers;

RULING

The petition is without merit.

1. The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 pursuant to the provisions of RA 7160
and Executive Order No. 72. 14 14 Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council,
as the legislative body of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants.
2. The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the nonimpairment clause. 28 28 The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

In Ortigas & Co ., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co ., the Court held that contractual
restrictions on the use of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through zoning
regulations. The Court held:

“…while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, while non-impairment of contracts is

constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the most general welfare of the people." Invariably described
as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only
if it is power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
constitutional guarantee…”

Likewise, in Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that the power of the Metro Manila
Commission and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevails over the
deed restrictions on the lot owners in Bel-Air Village which restricted the use of the lots for residential purposes
only.