Republic of The Philippines

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC (20)
G.R. No. 27498 September 20, 1927
Inestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-

appellant,
vs.
ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendant-appellee.
M. H. de Joya and Enrique Tiangco for appellant.

Vicente J. Francisco for appelle.
MALCOLM, J.:
The fundamental question which is being litigated in this case and its companion case, R. G. No. 27499,1
is whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it
should be set aside as belonging exclusively to the widow.
Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. The first named died on
July 8, 1925, leaving the second named as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was
named administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had
presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of
the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots
were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, when she presented a motion for a
revision of certain decrees within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was
joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was rendered by Judge of First Instance Rovira
concluding with this pronouncement of a judgment: "Therefore, and by virtue of the provisions of section
38 of Act. No. 496, decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925, relative to lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491
of this cadastral record, as well as the original certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 in regard
thereto, and hereby annulled and set aside, and it is ordered that in lieu thereof new decrees and
certificates of title be issued for lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491, as the exclusive property of Anastacia
Vianzon, of legal age, widow, and resident of Orani Bataan, free from all encumbrances and liens. In
regard to lot No. 460, the court sustains the decree already issued in due time with respect to said lot."
Sometime later, a motion for a new trial was presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel for the
losing party. This motion was denied by the trial judge.
On July 19, 1926, the administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery
of specified property and for damages. The issue was practically the same as in the cadastral case
Judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in the following language: "Therefore, the court renders
judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint in this case, and only declares that one- half of the
value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos
(P10), belonging to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must appear in the
inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino Tongco." The motion for a new trial was
denied by His Honor, the trial judge.
From both of the judgments hereinbefore mentioned, the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco
had appealed. The first action filed, which was in the cadastral case, has now become the last in number
and is 27399. The second action filed in the property case has now become the first in number and is
27498. As pursuant to the agreement of the parties the two cases were tried together, they can be best
disposed of together on appeal.
The first, third, fourth, and fifth errors assigned in the property case and the second error assigned in the
cadastral case primarily concern findings of fact and relate to the discretionary power of the trail judge.
The second error assigned in the property case and the first error assigned in the cadastral case attack the
ruling of the trial judge to the effect that the widow was competent to testify.
It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the
property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved
in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it
would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. No reversible error was committed in the denial
of the motion for a new trial for it is not at all certain that it rested on a legal foundation, or that if it had
been granted it would have changed the result.
Counsel for the appellant, however, asserts that if the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should
be, then the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises,
which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured. Counsel relies on that portion of section
383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an action or
proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the estate
of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person . . . ." Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this
statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on
the part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was
designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix
of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is
one by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy
holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff
and there is no defendant. Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archibishop of Manila [1920], 41 Phil.,
120 — nature of cadastral proceedings; Fortis vs. Gutierrez Hermanos [1906], 6 Phil., 100 — in point by
analogy; Maxilom vs. Tabotabo [1907], 9 Phil., 390 and Kiel vs. Estate of P. S. Sabert [1924], 46 Phil.,
193 — both clearly distinguishable as can be noted by looking at page 197 of the last cited case;
Sedgwick vs. Sedgwick [1877], 52 Cal., 336, 337; Myers vs. Reinstein [1885], 67 Cal., 89; McGregor vs.
Donelly [1885], 67 Cal., 149, 152; Booth vs. Pendola [1891], 88 Cal., 36; Bernardis vs. Allen [1902], 136
Cal., 7; Calmon vs. Sarraille [1904], 142 Cal., 638, 642; Bollinger vs. Wright [1904], 143 Cal., 292, 296;
Whitney vs. Fox [1897], 166 U. S. 637, 648.) Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse
party undertook to cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters. (4 Jones on
Evidence, pp. 767 et seq.; Stair vs. McNulty [1916], 133 Minn., 136; Ann. Cas., 1918D 201.) We are of
the opinion that the witness was competent.
The result, therefore, must be to adhere to the findings and rulings of the trial judge. No prejudicial error
is noted in the proceedings.
Judgment affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC(21)
G.R. No. L-17895 September 30, 1963
FELIX ASTURIAS, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NICOLAS MIRAS respondents.
Recto Law Office for petitioners.

Jose V. Resales for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners seek in this appeal the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals confirming in toto
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province wherein the contract of sale with right of
redemption executed by plaintiff-appellee Nicolas Miras on November 1, 1930 in favor of the spouses
Laureano Asturias and Julia Orozco (petitioners' predecessors-in-interest) covering the land in question,
was declared one of mortgage with usurious interest and therefore null and void. The defendants, now
petitioners, were consequently ordered to vacate the portion (4/5) of the land occupied by them, to pay
plaintiff the amount of P4,410.00 which represents the value of the coconuts gathered by them from 1931
to 1941 and from 1946 to 1948 in the concept of usurious interest, minus P500.00 which is the capital of
the loan a further sum of P5,760.00 which they were able to obtain from the produce of the land since
1948; and to return the P30.00 paid on account of the usurious interest from 1928 to 1930.
The contention of the petitioners is that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
admitting and giving credence to the oral testimony of plaintiff Miras tending to vary the terms of the
pacto de retro sale (Exh. 1 or B), contrary to the survivorship disqualification rule [Sec. 26(c), Rule 123,
Rules of Court in not holding that the action of plaintiff has already prescribed and that defendants-
petitioners acquired title to the land by prescription, and in ordering them to refund the alleged usurious
interest and the fruits of the land since 1930.
The pertinent facts as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
In order to pay his debt to the Philippine National Bank, Nicolas Miras, on November 1, 1928,
obtained from the spouses Laureano Asturias and Julia Orozco, a loan of P500.00 at 3% interest per
month secured by a mortgage in a private document of the land in question. Two years later, in 1930,
having paid only P30.00 as interest while the total indebtedness reached the sum of P830.00 — P500.00
representing the capital and P330.00 the balance of the unpaid interest for two years — Nicolas Miras,
Upon the request of the spouses, executed on November 1, 1930, a written document of sale with the right
of repurchase within seven years covering the same property for the amount of P830.00. Although not
expressed in the contract, the parties agreed that the spouses, in payment of the stipulated 3% per month
interest on the P830.00, were to be permitted to gather and benefit by the fruits of the coconut trees
planted and growing on the land. Miras remained in possession of the land, cultivating the portion not
occupied by the coconuts and raising therein other plants.
After Laureano Asturias died in 1934, and before the death of his widow, Julia Orozco in 1937,
Miras offered to redeem the property but the latter requested him to postpone the same to a later date as
she had not yet sufficiently benefited from the capital invested, as the price of copra unexpectedly went
down after 1930. Upon Julia Orozco's death in July 1937, Miras made the same offer to redeem the
property from petitioners herein, successors-in-interest of the spouses, who made the same request as
their deceased mother, and to which request Miras once more agreed.
In 1938, one year after Julia Orozco's death, petitioners discovered the document Exh. 1 or B and
noting that it was in the form of a sale, they agreed to partition the land among themselves
notwithstanding the fact that their father, Laureano Asturias, did not include said property in his will and
Miras continued in possession thereof, paying the land taxes thereon. In 1943, Amparo, Romeo and
Apolonia Camilon, children of the deceased Constancia Asturias, one of the heirs of the creditor spouses,
reconveyed to respondent Nicolas Miras their one-fifth (1/5) portion of the property in question, upon
receipt from him of the sum of P210.00, their share of the credit against Miras.1awphîl.nèt
When the petitioners attempted to enter the property in 1946 and tried to fence the same in 1948, in
order to exclude Nicolas Miras therefrom, the latter filed an action for forcible entry and prevented the
petitioners from continuing their act. In the same year, because of petitioners' continued refusal to have
the property redeemed, Miras filed the present case.
The contention that under the rule of survivorship disqualification, the testimony of respondent
Miras is inadmissible to vary the terms of the pacto de retro sale, untenable because, as found by the
Court of Appeals, no timely objection has been made against the admission of such evidence.
Furthermore, one of the petitioners (Fell Asturias) was made to testify on such prohibited matters overed
by the exclusion rule (t.s.n., May 27, 1953, PP. 65 70-71). In view of this, petitioners are correctly deem
to have waived the benefit and protection of the rule.1
As a consequence, the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after considering and
evaluating the evidence thus properly admitted, that the contract in question is one of a loan with usurious
interest and therefore is null and void, is conclusive upon us and can not be reviewed.
The claim of petitioners that the action of plaintiff-respondent Miras has already prescribed, and
that they in turn had acquired title to the land in question by acquisitive prescription, is without merit, in
view of the fact that, as found by the Court of Appeals, the present action is one primarily for
reivindication or recovery of property and only incidentally to declare the contract of sale with right of
repurchase null and void as having been executed for the purpose of disguising a usurious transaction.
This is evident from the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for, which, it is a settled rule,
determine the nature of an action or issue (Rone v. Claro, L-4474, May 8, 1952).
Article 4 of the Civil Code (the Provision applicable to this transaction) provides that "Acts
Performed contrary to law are void, except in cases in which the law itself gives validity to such acts". A
contract designed to hide a usurious agreement not only violates the law but contravenes public policy.
Such a contract can not be countenanced and is therefore illegal and void from its inception. Such being
the case, the prayer for the declaration of its nullity is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New Civil
Code. It is true that this is a new provision, but its principle is equally applicable to the case at bar, as was
held in the case of Eugenio v. Perdido (G.R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955) where, deciding that an action to
annul a sale made in 1932, in violation of the Homestead Act, had not prescribed, this Court said:
Under the existing classification, such a contract would be inexistent and the "action or
defense for the declaration" of such inexistence "does not prescribe" (Article 1410, New Civil
Code). While it is true that this is a new provision, it is nevertheless a principle recognized since
Tipton v. Velasco (6 Phil. 67) that "mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are
null and void." (See also Corpus v. Beltran, G.R. No. L-7487, October 27, 1955; Angeles v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-11024, January 21, 1958).
Neither did petitioners acquire title to the land by acquisitive prescription since it appears from the
facts found by the Court of Appeals, that possession of the property was obtained by the petitioners only
in 1946 and the original complaint was filed in 1948. Their claim that their possession dates back from
1930 when they started gathering the coconuts from the land in the form of payment of the usurious
interest on the loan is groundless. The mere fact that from 1930 they were permitted to enter the land for
the purpose of gathering the fruits of the coconuts did not make them possessors of the property in the
concept of owners to entitle them to claim prescription.1awphîl.nèt Such possession which was sporadic
and by mere tolerance of the owners and actual possessors of the land cannot be the basis of a claim of
ownership by prescription.
Having thus arrived at the conclusions above set forth, the decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering petitioners to refund to respondent Miras the usurious interest collected in the form of fruits of
the land since 1930 justified.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioners. So ordered.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION(22)
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC.,
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and
registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The then Court
of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the
petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares of stock. The then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled
that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315
is the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration.
Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision
affirmed while Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive
rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate court
denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.
The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:
In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16, 1971,
Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc.,
Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de Leon, Jr.,
Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks
representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E.
Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the defendants from disposing
of the said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment v. properties of
defendants having possession of shares of stock and for receivership of the
properties of defendant corporation . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the shares of
stock in the name of stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for
by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement between
defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and
remained in the possession of Razon. Appellees also alleged . . . that neither the
late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any amount whatsoever for the
1,500 shares of stock in question . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the intestate
estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of
First Instance of Manila.
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose
of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators
consisted of Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuason,
Jr., Victor Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle.
On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of
defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after
him, the plaintiff-appellant, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of
them actually served and were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971,
Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the
shares of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate
of stock over the said shares cancelled.
The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who refused to
deliver said shares to the plaintiff, until the same was surrendered by defendant
Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce.
Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon
distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian
Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon instruction of the
late Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was personally delivered by Chuidian on July 1,
1966 to the Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was himself
an associate of the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then, Enrique
Razon was in possession of said stock certificate even during the lifetime of the
late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered the said stock certificate
to defendant Razon until the time (sic) of defendant Razon. By agreement of the
parties (sic) delivered it for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the
parties as confirmed by the trial court in its order of August 7, 1971.
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were delivered
by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the
subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the
understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares
of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he was paid
therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders (TSN., pp. 4, 8, 10, 24-
25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, July 22, 1980, Exhs. "C", "11", "13" "14").
(Ro11o — 74306, pp. 66-68)
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged
misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case.
Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony
regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the
ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased
opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination
regarding such testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is

prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind." (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the
deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements
made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute
statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them,
thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims
or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give
false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho,
et al., 622 [1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the
deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned
by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule.
The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of
the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The
petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel.
Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled
in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily
be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure
of a party to object thereto. Thus:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as

the allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on the stand is
a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely
objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests
with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the
judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been
excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion
(Emphasis supplied). (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)
The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible having been settled, we
now proceed to discuss the fundamental issue on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc.
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of
participating in the bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators
were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose
F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however, did not start operations until
1966. According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators withdrew from the said corporation.
The petitioner then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends, among them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave
1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as
nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and held
by the petitioner but Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this
arrangement, Chuidian in 1966 delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering the
1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner had in his possession the
certificate of stock until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank of
Commerce under the parties' joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial
court's order.
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his
agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is
sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petitioner's contention is not correct.
In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we ruled:
. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of transfer
as prescribed by law must be followed (Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74
SCRA 65). As provided under Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang, 68 otherwise
known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines, shares of stock may be
transferred by delivery to the transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. Title
may be vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of
stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no
transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties until the transfer is properly
recorded in the books of the corporation (Sec. 63, Corporation Code of the
Philippines; Section 35 of the Corporation Law)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon,
Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the
records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of
the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. (See Section
30, Corporation Code) From the point of view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the
owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who claims ownership over
the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that
all the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the
corporation's by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74
SCRA 65 [1976]) or in accordance with the provisions of law.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which could
show that the 1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the
corporation's by-laws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the provisions of
the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must
be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the
delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code) Since the
certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the
late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the
questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration that he did not
require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the late
Juan Chuidian can not overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the
proper conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of
stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.
Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings that the
shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal
counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the testimony of
the private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his
legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's decision
declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock ownership.
The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his status as stockholder

issued to him; second, to vote at meetings of the corporation; third, to receive his
proportionate share of the profits of the corporation; and lastly, to participate
proportionately in the distribution of the corporate assets upon the dissolution or
winding up. (Purdy's Beach on Private Corporations, sec. 554) (Pascual v. Del
Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 87)
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied
the petitioner's motion to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive
rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are
declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129667. July 31, 2000](13)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC BAID Y OMINTA,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Eric Baid y Ominta guilty of the crime of
rape against Nieva Garcia y Saban, a mental patient, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages.
The information against accused-appellant, based on the complaint filed by the

offended woman and her mother, alleged -
That on or about the 22nd day of December 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a
mental patient suffering [from] schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will
and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of

the case on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr.

Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant's attending psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel
Reyes, the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant.
Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who was diagnosed as having suffered
from schizophrenia since 1988. In December 1996, she was confined at the Holy
Spirit Clinic in Cubao, Quezon City because of a relapse of her mental condition.[3]
On the other hand, accused-appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant sneaked into the
patients' room. He woke the complainant up and offered her a cigarette, at the
same time touching her foot. Complainant took the cigarette. As she smoked it,
accused-appellant caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because she
afterward removed her pants. It turned out she was not wearing any underwear.
Accused-appellant also removed his pants and the two had sexual intercourse.
Afterwards, they transferred under the bed and continued their sexual intercourse.
Complainant said she felt accused-appellant had an orgasm. A female patient who
had been awakened tried to separate the two, and, as she failed to do so, she went
out to call the two nurses on duty. The nurses responded but, when they arrived,
accused-appellant had left, while complainant had already put on her pants.[4]
Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for
medico-legal examination. She told him what happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her
narration of the incident into writing[5] and then gave her a physical examination.
His report stated:[6]
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pale
brown areola and nipples from which secretions could be pressed. Abdomen is
flabby and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with the pale brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating
the same disclosed an abraided posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy-type
hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock. External vaginal orifice
offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining finger and the
virgin-sized speculum. Vaginal canal is wide with flattened rugosities. Cervix is
normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.
Dr. Reyes said the fresh abrasion, located at 6 o'clock posterior of the
complainant's genitalia, could have been recently caused by a hard blunt object,
such as an erect penis during sexual intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr.
Reyes found that complainant was suffering from mental illness and that she had
lapses in the course of her interview.[7]
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He stated that he had been a nurse-aide

of the Holy Spirit Clinic since September 18, 1995. His job was to watch the
patients, especially when they become violent. He also fetched them from their
homes. He admitted that he knew the complainant but claimed he did not know
the reason for her confinement. He denied the allegations against him. He testified
that, on the date and time referred to by the complainant, he was asleep in the
nurse-aide quarters located about ten meters from the room where complainant
was staying. He admitted, however, that to go to the patients' room, he did not
have to pass by the nurses' station. He said he knew that, at the time in question,
there were two nurses on duty and ten patients in the room. He described the
patients' room as having an area of about eight by five square meters with wooden
beds arranged one foot apart from each other.[8]
Accused-appellant was questioned by the trial court. He testified that on December

22, 1996, he was on duty from 4 p.m. to 12 midnight. He was a stay-in nurse-aide
of the clinic. He stated that the clinic consisted of two floors and five rooms. The
room where complainant and the other patients were staying and his quarters were
both on the ground floor of the building. He admitted that the clinic was for the
mentally ill and that, as a nurse-aide, he was supposed to know the status of every
patient and his job was to watch them and pacify them whenever they become
violent. He said he was very well acquainted with the behavior of the patients
considering the length of time he had been working in the clinic. He claimed,
however, that he did not specifically know from what ailment complainant was
suffering, but only that she was undergoing treatment because of mental
deficiency.[9]
On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew it was prohibited

to give cigarettes to patients. He further admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he could
enter the patients' room anytime to check their condition and see to it that the
lights were turned off when they were not needed. He further stated that he was
not investigated by the police when he was invited to their headquarters.[10]
On June 20, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision,[11] the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined in and penalized by
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 7659, and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
accused is further ordered to indemnify the victim Nieva Garcia y Saban the amount
of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape.[12]
Complainant is suffering from schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder of unknown

etiology, characterized by disturbance in thinking involving a distortion of the usual
logical relations between ideas, a separation between the intellect and the emotions
so that the patient's feelings and his or her manifestations seem inappropriate to
his or her life situation, and a reduced tolerance for the stress of interpersonal
relations so that the patient retreats from social intercourse into his or her own
fantasy life and commonly into delusions and hallucinations, and may, when
untreated or unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked deterioration or regression in
his or her behavior though often unaccompanied by further intellectual loss.[13]
The following are the symptoms of schizophrenia:
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a
significant portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated):
(1) delusions
(2) hallucinations
(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition
Note: Only one criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or

hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's
behavior or thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each other.
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the

onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work,
interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to
the onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve
expected level of interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement).
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. This
6-month period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully
treated) that meet criterion A (i.e., active-phase symptoms) and may include
periods of prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or residual
periods, the signs of the disturbance may be manifested by only negative
symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in criterion A present in an attentuated
form (e.g., odd beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences).
D. Schizoaffective and mood disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective disorder and mood
disorder with features have been ruled out because either (1) no major depressive,
manic, or mixed episodes have occurred concurrently with the active-phase
symptoms; or (2) if mood symptoms, their total duration has been brief relative to
the duration of the active and residual periods.
E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the

direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a
general medical condition.
F. Relationship to a pervasive developmental disorder: If there is a history of

autistic disorder or another pervasive developmental disorder, the additional
diagnosis of schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are
also present for at least a month (or less if successfully treated).[14]
Schizophrenia is classified into five subtypes, namely, paranoid, disorganized

(hebephrenic), catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual.[15]
Dr. Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant's attending psychiatrist and consultant

at the Medical Center in Muntinlupa, the Perpetual Help Medical Center, the
Philippine National Police, and the Holy Spirit Clinic, was presented as an expert
witness. According to her, complainant was, at the time of the incident, suffering
from an undifferentiated type of schizophrenia, described as having the
characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia but does not fit the profile for paranoid,
disorganized, or catatonic schizophrenia. Dr. Salangad stated that complainant
seemed to shift from one type of schizophrenia to another. Complainant was
catatonic when she first treated her, a situation where the patient shows waxy
flexibility (e.g., when a limb is repositioned, that limb remains in that position for a
prolonged period of time as if the patient is made of wax), mutism or agitation, and
the patient mimics words and actions during examination. Later, complainant
became paranoid, i.e., suspicious, hostile and aggressive. She also manifested a
behavior where she mumbled and smiled to herself.[16]
It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not

have been given credence by the trial court. It is argued that: (1) there were
serious inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her testimony in court;
(2) the prosecution failed to present witnesses to corroborate her testimony; (3)
complainant failed to identify accused-appellant; (4) the results of the medico-legal
examination were negative for spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed that
complainant had sexual intercourse seven days before the alleged incident; and (6)
the probability was that her allegations of rape were merely a product of her
fantasy.[17]
We disagree.
Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to
be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her
perceptions to others.[18] Her testimony indicates that she could understand
questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to
them. Thus she testified:
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q Miss Nieva Garcia, are you still confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic, Los Angeles
St., Cubao, Quezon City?
A Not anymore, sir.
Q On December 22, 1996, do you know whether you are at the Holy Spirit Clinic,
Los Angeles St., Cubao, Quezon City?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you there, Miss Witness?
A My mother asked me if I want to be confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic and I

chose to be confined at the Holy Spirit because during that time, I was then taking
my medicine.
Q At around three o'clock in the morning of December 22, 1996, do you know
where were you?
A Yes, I was lying on the bed inside the Holy Spirit Clinic.
Q And while lying on the bed, inside the Holy Spirit Clinic, do you know what
happened then, Miss Witness?
A At that time, there was a person shorter than the person (witness pointing to
the person dressed in yellow t-shirt whose name when asked, answered the name
Eric Baid) and that person is smaller than the person inside the courtroom was
disturbing "kinakalabit" another person inside the room.
Q And what happened after that first man entered the room at the Holy Spirit
Clinic?
A The girl was trying to avoid the other person because at that time, the accused
Eric Baid was entering the room.
Q And what happened after Eric Baid entered the room?
A When Eric Baid entered the room as if he knew me already and he asked me,
"Nieva, gusto mo ng sigarilyo?", at the same time, Eric Baid was touching my foot.
ATTY. VENTURANZA:
I would just want to manifest that the witness while testifying, she was smiling.
Q And after he asked you whether you like a stick of cigarette and touched your
foot, what happened next, Madam Witness?
A I said yes.
Q And what happened next after you said yes, I liked cigarette?
A After that, he caressed me.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q How did he caress you?
A He went on top of me.
COURT: (to the prosecutor)
Go ahead.
Q How about the other man who entered earlier, what happened him?
A The smaller person went in and out of our room twice, the first time that he
went, he touched the other woman beside me on the foot but the woman resisted
and shouted. After that, the second time, the other man went inside the room, he
touched the other woman but the woman shouted and that smaller one went
outside of the room.
Q When Eric Baid placed himself on top of you, where was that other man?
A He was no longer there.
….
Q When Eric Baid was already on top of you, do you know if the small man
entered again your room?
A No, sir.
Q And then, what happened when Eric Baid placed himself on top of you?
A I agreed.
Q Agreed to what?
A I agreed to the sex.
Q You mean to say that you and Eric Baid has sexual intercourse while on top of
your bed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened during the sexual intercourse while both of you were on
top of the bed?
A Somebody was awakened and told me, "Hoy, asawa mo ba iyan?

Kinukubabawan ka." and I answered no.
Q And was Eric Baid, was he able to consummate that sexual intercourse, Miss
Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And more or less, how long did the sexual intercourse last, Miss Witness?
A Around three to five minutes.
Q Why, was he able to insert his private organ into your private organ?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What did he do when he was able to insert his private organ into your private
organ?
A As if his orgasm suddenly appeared.
Q Do you understand when you say as if his orgasm suddenly appeared?
A They are like what they call, your Honor, as if "naiputok".
Q And what did he do when according to you "naiputok"?
A As if it was okay for him.
Q You were wearing an underwear?

A None, your Honor.
Q You were actually naked?
A I was wearing pants but I have no panty.
Q But who removed your pants?
A I was the one, your Honor.
Q What about Eric Baid, what was he wearing?
A He was also wearing pants.
Q Who removed the pants of Eric Baid?
A He was the one.[19]
When complainant was questioned on cross and redirect examination, she

explained how she was able to identify accused-appellant, to wit:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q You said a while ago that when the sex affair happened it was dark so all
throughout you did not see the face of the accused?
A During that time it was dark but the latter part when he opened the light, I
saw his face, sir.
Q When the light was opened, he was about to leave the room?
A About to leave, sir.
Q He was already facing the door?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were at his back left inside the room?
A No, Sir.
Q Where were you then?
A I was just inside the room in my bed not at his back, sir.
Q You were already on your bed when he was about to leave the room?
A Yes, Sir.
Q At that time that sex affair transpired between you and the accused, you did
not even know his name?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You were only told later on about this person?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. SALATANDRE: (to the Court)
That will be all, Your Honor.
COURT:
Any redirect?
PROSECUTION:
Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Go ahead.
PROSECUTION:
Q You said that you were only able to identify the accused when he put on the
lights, when he was about to leave the room, how far were you from the accused?
A This distance, sir. (parties stipulated a distance of four meters, more or less)
Q You said that you saw his face at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And before this incident of December 22, 1996, were there any other occasion
that he had any sexual intercourse with you?
A None, sir.
Q And you often saw him as attendant in that clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you said that room was dark, is it totally dark or was it only a little
dark?
A Little light, sir. It was a little bit dark and a little bit light. (medyo may ilaw)
Q So the time that you had sexual intercourse with the accused at that time, you
can identify the face of this person?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that medyo may ilaw, where was the light emanating at about 3:00 in
the morning?
A From the window outside, the room can be illuminated through the window,
Your Honor.
Q So when the light came from outside, was the source from the moon, from the
bulb of the Meralco post or from another light coming from another building or
house?
A It is the light actually coming from the ceiling of the building of the clinic which
was outside the window, Your Honor.[20]
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim
("inappropriate affect") during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering
questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering
from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and
coherent.
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's

consciousness and memory,[21] it is established that schizophrenic persons do not
suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of memory.[22] It has
long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental
handicap alone.[23]
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies between complainant's sworn

statement[24] and her testimony as to the number of times she and accused-
appellant had sexual intercourse and where they did the same, an examination of
the evidence for the prosecution, particularly complainant's sworn statement and
her interview with the examining medico-legal officer, shows that accused-appellant
had sexual intercourse with her in different positions at various places in the same
room. When complainant testified, she stated that, aside from the fact that
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on her bed, he made her transfer
later under the bed. Be that as it may, complainant has consistently established in
all of her statements that he had sexual intercourse with her on her bed. Whether
or not he had sex with her near the window and while facing him is of no moment
and does not negate the finding of rape. Whatever may be the inconsistencies in
her testimony, they are minor and inconsequential. They show that complainant's
testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the probative value of her
testimony, they reinforce it.[25]
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room where other patients
were sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is antithetical to the possibility of
the commission of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of
time and place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when the
malefactor and the victim are not alone.[26]
The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of

witnesses presented during the trial, so much so that, if the testimonies so far
presented clearly and credibly established the commission of the crime,
corroborative evidence would only be a mere surplusage.[27] In this case, the trial
court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of
which it adjudged accused-appellant guilty. In the absence of bias, partiality, and
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge, his findings as to their
credibility are entitled to utmost respect as he had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor on the witness stand.[28]
Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant destroy the
finding of rape since ejaculation is never an element thereof.[29] What
consummates the felony is the contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however
slight, to the vagina of his victim without her consent.[30] Neither is it required
that lacerations be found in the victim's hymen. We have held that a medical
examination is not a requisite for a rape charge to prosper as long as the victim
categorically and consistently declares that she has been defiled.[31] In this case,
aside from complainant's positive testimony, the medical examination of the
complainant showed an abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that she had recent
sexual intercourse.[32] That the deep healed lacerations found on the
complainant's genitalia may have been caused seven days prior to December 22,
1996 is immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
Accused-appellant also claims that complainant could have been hallucinating in

alleging that she had sexual intercourse with him on December 22, 1996. In
answer, suffice it to say that complainant was steadfast and consistent in stating
that she was raped by accused-appellant. She maintained her allegation of rape
when she was physically examined by the medico-legal officer, when she made her
statement to the police and again when she testified in court.[33]
Accused-appellant assails the trial court's finding of lack of consent on the part of
the complainant to the sexual act. As the facts show, complainant herself admitted
that she agreed to have sex with him after he gave her a stick of cigarette.
However, it should be stressed that complainant was in no position to give her
consent. As Dr. Salangad said in her testimony:
COURT:
Q If you claim that the private complainant is suffering from this kind of illness,
schizophrenia, and manifests behavior to the effect that she can not be active
during lucid intervals now if she is suffering from this kind or mental state, can she
give an intelligent consent considering that the private complainant is already
above 20 years of age?
A In her case, I would say no, Your Honor.
Q I will rephrase my question. Because when I asked to give an intelligent

consent, you might be referring to acts that are very important to her like, for
example, "do you want to eat?" of course, she will give an intelligent consent. "Do
you want to sleep?" of course, she will give an intelligent consent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q But things that would destroy her honor or reputation like for example having
sex with her, can she give an intelligent consent?
A No, Your Honor.
Q In other words, she would not know the consequences of her consenting to
such a proposal to have sex?
A Yes, Your Honor.
....
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q She can not give an intelligent consent to sex, your patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q Meaning she will just agree?
A She has said so when I asked her. She was just offered a cigarette.
Q Meaning if she opens her legs, she does not understand what she was doing?
A She probably knew what she was doing but when we say an intelligent
consent, she has weighed the pros and cons on an action and its future significance
and also based on the upbringing, sir.
Q That she was on top of the bed, then the accused allegedly opened the zipper
of his pants and pulled down the pants up to his knees and placed himself on top of
the patient and tried to insert his organ to her organ and the girl said she agreed to
it because she likes it, does it mean all those things that transpired she does not
know or understand what was happening?
A She knew what was happening but there is a difference in her judgment, in her
discernment. A child can be asked to lie down and knows that somebody was on
top of him or her and that is the thing of being aware. But the judgment of the
consent itself, the significance, the effect, we all know that a normal person does
not do these unless he or she contemplates it.
Q I just do not know if I am correct, my interpretation about what you are saying
is that physically they are doing that, meaning the organ of the accused was
inserted into the organ of the patient allegedly but the girl did not resist, the girl did
not comment whatsoever because she did not understand what is happening?
COURT:
No, she did not say that she did not understand what was happening, she can not
discern.
A Let me give you a little information. In the psychological state of mentally ill
patients, the basic instinct of a person is very prominent. They respond, they eat
and they can have sex, that is normal and they are just responding on the level of
their basic instinct. When you are a mature person or a normal person and you
have attained maturity and clearness of mind, you now, of course, try to put things
into their proper perspective, socially and morally, that is where upbringing and
education come in. I would say that the patient's case, she is more responding in
an instinctual level without the use of intellect.[34]
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an

expert witness. However, he cannot do this now as he did not raise any objection
to Dr. Salangad's qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary, he even cross-
examined her on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132,
§36, objections not timely raised are deemed waived.
The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert
testimony as a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make her a biased witness
and her testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of
the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character
of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and
any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of
all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly
fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058).
The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not
reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.[35]
It has not been shown in this case that the trial court abused its discretion in
appreciating the testimony of Dr. Salangad so as to justify setting aside its findings.
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
(1) By using force or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
....
To warrant a conviction for rape under paragraph (2) of Art. 335, a woman need
not be proven as completely insane or deprived of reason. The phrase "deprived of
reason" has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or
deficiency or some form of mental retardation, those who are feebleminded
although coherent.[36]
That the complainant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the rape is
shown by the fact that she was in the clinic precisely because of such illness and by
her behavior at the trial, during which she would smile for no reason at all while
answering the questions. Though she may not have totally lost her memory, it was
shown that she was suffering from an impairment of judgment, which made her
incapable of giving, an intelligent consent to the sexual act. It has been held that
where the rape victim is feeble-minded, the force required by the statute is the
sexual act itself.[37]
Even assuming then that the complainant consented to have sexual intercourse
with accused-appellant, the copulation would fall under the third paragraph of Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that complainant was mentally ill.
Sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged, or mentally deficient, feebleminded,
or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple.[38]
At any rate, complainant said in her sworn statement that she was afraid of
accused-appellant because of the nature of his job as a nurse-aid. Thus she stated:
28. Tanong : Ikaw ba ay natatakot kay Eric?
Sagot : Kaunti lang, dahil sa trabaho niya.[39]
As Dr. Salangad explained:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
….
Q Meaning that when she was asked on page 2 "Tanong 27 Q - Ikaw ba ay

tinakot o sinaktan ni Eric? S - Hindi naman po." This is her own answer, nobody
threatened her at that time?
A Yes, sir, but may I add. There was no direct threat but in her situation she
was brought there for confinement and treatment and for safekeeping. She is in a
situation wherein the attendants and the nurses are all authorities around her, who
dictate what to do. I believe that there was some kind of threat or force in that
level, although there was no direct threat in the action.
COURT:
Q In the mind of Nieva Garcia, who were those that might be threatening to her?
A The accused somehow had made the threat. Because in their daily activity,
the attendants and nurses dictate the things to do, they follow, they are bosses in
the clinic, they are in that kind of situation always, Your Honor.
Q That explains your presence during the investigation?
A To assist her in order that she is not afraid and in response to earlier question
of counsel if the patient was directly threatened or intimidated during the act, I am
giving you a general situation in an institution, in this kind of institution.
Sometimes they are restrained if they go out of line, they are ones who restrain
them, the attendants and the nurses do these, Your Honor.[40]
As already stated, accused-appellant invoked alibi in his defense. He claimed that,

at the time of the incident, he was in his quarters at the Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping.
For the defense of alibi to be believed, the following requisites must be met: (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense must be
proven; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
[41]
Accused-appellant's testimony itself demonstrates the untenability of his alibi.

First, his declaration that he was in another room of the clinic is uncorroborated.
Second, the room in which he said he was sleeping at that time of the incident was
only a few meters away from the patients' room where complainant was confined.
Third, he admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he was allowed to enter the patients' room
anytime for purposes of checking on the patients. Above all, his alibi cannot be
given credence because complainant has pointed to him as the culprit of the rape.
In cases in which the accused-appellant was identified by the victim herself who
harbored no ill motive against him, the defense of alibi was rejected.[42]
The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in
accordance with our recent rulings that moral damages may be awarded in rape
cases without any need of proof of moral suffering. However, in addition, civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should have been awarded the complainant
consistent with the ruling that rape victims are entitled to such an award without
need of proof except the fact of the commission of the offense.[43] On the other
hand, the plea of the prosecution that the indemnity should be raised to P75,000.00
cannot be granted because such amount is awarded only in cases of qualified rape.
In this case, there were no qualifying circumstances raising the penalty to death.
[44]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City is
AFFIRMED with the modification that, in addition to the award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages made by the trial court, complainant should be indemnified in the
amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G. R. No. 130331. November 22, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ADEL TUANGCO, NELSON PINEDA,

JR. and SONNY TUANGCO, accused.
ADEL TUANGCO and SONNY TUANGCO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In the morning of January 4, 1995, the naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a

bookkeeper employed by the Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative in Manila
was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters away from the national highway in
Apalit. Her body bore multiple stab wounds and her private parts were bloodied and
showed signs of sexual abuse.
On May 18, 1995 two informations were filed in court charging Adel Tuangco y
Dizon, Nelson Pineda Jr. alias "Jun Tattoo"[1], and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon alias
"Baba" with the crimes of rape with homicide and theft.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 95-1609(M) states:
"That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay
Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain which came as an afterthought
to them after executing their primordial intent to rape and kill victim AUREA EUGENIO, took and
carried away her wrist watch, three rings, earrings, P3,000.00 cash money and camera, the total value of
which amounts to P20,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
The commission of this offense added ignominy to the natural effects of the crime."
whereas the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-1610 (M) reads:
"That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay
Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with lewd design dragged Aurea Eugenio, reclined her in a
tree, opened wide her thighs, inserted a bottle of Pidol syrup in her vaginal canal and forcibly took turns
in having sexual intercourse with her against her will, after which, and by reason of such rape accused
with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed several times Aurea
Eugenio in her neck which caused her death.
That the commission of this offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, use of superior strength, nighttime which was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate
and insure its commission.
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 and
Republic Act No. 411."[2]
Adel Tuangco was arraigned on June 5, 1995; he pleaded not guilty to both
charges. In the course of the trial accused Sonny Tuangco was apprehended and
also pleaded not guilty. Nelson Pineda, Jr. remains at large.
The principal evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an

eyewitness, Silvestre Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. He gave his testimony through sign
language, which was interpreted by a sign language expert. The court's summation
of the evidence is as follows:
"On January 3, 1995 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was inside a 'beer house' along the national
highway. He had seven (7) companions at that time. (TSN, July 10, 1995, pp. 55-57). The group
consisting of eight (8) persons including the witness arrived at the said place at day time. When nighttime
came, witness Sanggalan together with three (3) of his companions left the place and proceeded to a rice
field near the highway. (Ibid, p. 58). Sanggalan described and identified the said three (3) other persons as
a) tricycle driver with tatoos over his body and scars on his arms; b) a person with a long chin and known
as 'Baba' and c) accused Adel Tuangco. Sanggalan stepped down from the witness stand and identified
accused Adel Tuangco as one of the three (3) other persons together with whom, he went to the rice field.
(Ibid, pp. 58-59). The tricycle driver with tatoos over his body and the person with an elongated chin were
not inside the court room at the hearing of these cases on July 10, 1995. Accused Adel Tuangco and the
person with elongated chin are brothers. (Ibid, p. 60).
The group of eight (8) persons were drinking beer and gin inside the 'beer house'. When night time came,
Sanggalan, accused Adel Tuangco, the person with tatoos over his body and the one with elongated chin
proceeded to the rice field where there was a waiting shed in which they stayed for a while. Inside the
waiting shed, the person with tatoos over his body, known as 'Tatoo', and the one with elongated chin,
known as 'Baba', took Pidol cough syrup. (Ibid, pp. 61-65). They went to the rice field because they were
very drunk. (Ibid, pp. 66). The four (4) stayed at the waiting shed until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. (TSN,
July 21 , 1995, p. 12).
The three, accused Adel Tuangco, 'Baba' and 'Tatoo' later left the waiting shed and went to the rice field
to follow a girl who was wearing a long hair. Through photographs of the deceased Aurea Eugenio,
witness Sanggalan identified her to be the girl whom the three followed into the rice field. (Ibid, pp. 14
and 27-28). As soon as they caught up with the deceased, Tatoo' pushed her. Adel Tuangco got hold of
the shoulder bag which the deceased Aurea Eugenio was carrying at that time. 'Baba' and 'Tattoo' then
pushed Aurea against a tree and stabbed her with a knife several times on the neck. At this point, Adel
Tuangco joined the two and also stabbed the deceased. The deceased fell down. (Ibid, pp. 15-19).
After the deceased fell down on the ground, 'Tatoo' inserted a bottle of Pidol cough syrup into her private
parts. Then 'Baba' pushed the bottle further into the private parts of the deceased. While the bottle was
being pushed, Adel Tuangco was hugging the deceased who at that time was still alive and resisting the
assault. Together, the three removed the blouse, bra, skirt and panty of Aurea Eugenio. Adel Tuangco
raped the deceased. 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' likewise successively raped Aurea in that order. (Ibid, pp. 19-23).
At the time that the three accused were raping Aurea Eugenio, witness Sanggalan was about three and one
half (3) meters away from them. While Adel Tuangco was raping the victim, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' were
beside them. When 'Baba' and 'Tatoo' took their respective turns in raping the victim the other two were
holding her hands. (Ibid, pp. 24-25).
After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her bag, 'Tatoo' got her camera and cash money while 'Baba
got her ring, earrings and watch. (Ibid, pp. 25-26). After the incident, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' went to the rice
field while Adel Tuangco went to the other direction. (Ibid, p. 29). Earlier, during the incident, Adel
Tuangco, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba', on two occasions, asked witness Sanggalan to leave. However, the witness
merely hid behind the grasses and trees. (Ibid, p. 30 and TSN, August 7, 1995, p. 31). When recalled to
the witness stand on January 17, 1996, Sanggalan identified accused Sonny Tuangco as the one he
referred to as 'Baba'.[3]
Dr. Dominic Aguda, a medico legal officer at the National Bureau of Investigation,
conducted an autopsy of the victim and made the following findings:
"Pallor, marked and generalized
Hematoma- 7.0 x 5.0 cms. left frontal region, head; 3.0 x 2 cms. right frontal region head; 7.0 x 6.0 cms.
right auricular region; 4.0 x 2.0 cms. right palm; 3.0 x 2.0 cms., left palm 2.0 x 2.0 cms. chest; 3.0 x 2.0
cms. chin
Abrasion- 3.0 x 2.0 cms., right chin; 2.0 x 1.0 cms. right breast 2.0 x 2.0 cms. left breast.
Lacerated wound. 2.5 cms. pre-auricular area, left
Stab Wounds-
1. Six (6) in number, gaping, within an area of 9.0 x 6.0 cms. located on the left side of the neck directed
medially involving the skin, blood vessels, lacerating the throat and esophagus, with depths from 2-5 cms.
One end is contused the other is sharp.
2. Three (3) in number, gaping, within an area of 6.0 x 5.0 cms. one end is contused, the other is sharp,
located on the right side of the neck; directed medially involving the skin, blood vessels, hitting the
trachea with depths from 2.4 cms.
Brain and visceral organs-very pale
Heart chambers- contain a very small amount of dark clotted blood.
Stomach- empty
Hymen- fresh lacerations on all sides with an opening of about 4.0 x 3.0 cms., massive blood clots
accumulated within vaginal canal.
Perineum- V- shaped median laceration measuring about 5.0 cms. (Exhibit "E")
Dr. Aguda explained the nature of the fresh lacerations on the hymen of the victim as well as the massive
blood clots accumulated within the vaginal canal. He testified that these injuries were caused not only by
human penis that penetrated the hymen but by a hard foreign object like a bottle. (Ibid, p. 30). The
abrasions on the left and right breast could have been caused by human bites. (Ibid, p. 25). The stab
wounds described as gaping and the stab wounds located within the neck area were inflicted on the victim
by her assailant using a single bladed weapon. (Ibid, p. 26). It is very possible that the victim was sexually
abused. (Ibid, p. 31 ). The heart chambers of the victim contained very small amount of dark clotted
blood, which means there was not enough blood anymore in the heart as the victim suffered massive
bleeding. This was due to the nine (9) stabbed wounds inflicted on the neck of the victim. The proximate
cause of death of the deceased was severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. (Ibid, pp. 34-
35). The abrasions and hematomas on the body of the victim are indications of struggling during the
sexual attack on the victim. (Ibid, p. 34).[4]
Both accused denied the charges. Adel Tuangco testified that he was at home in the
evening in question, a defense which was corroborated by his common-law wife
Liza Reyes Tuangco,[5] by his mother, Erlinda Dizon Tuangco[6] and his sister
Glessen. For his part Sonny Tuangco claimed he was alone in his house at
Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan in the evening of January 3, 1995.[7]
The trial court made the following findings of facts:
"From the evidence adduced in these cases, it was established that-
The victim Aurea Eugenio, single and a resident of Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Apalit
Pampanga was working as a bookkeeper in Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative located at the
City of Manila.
On January 3, 1995, the first working day of the year, she reported to office bringing with her a Kodak
camera to take pictures of her officemates for souvenir. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day, she told her officemates that she will go to their house in Apalit, Pampanga although she was not
scheduled to do so as it was an ordinary week day. She brought with her, the camera and the P3,000.00
cash money to be spent on the occasion of their town fiesta. From the office, she proceeded to the
terminal of Victory Liner Bus at Caloocan City, where, at 6:00 o'clock in evening, she boarded Victory
Liner Bus No. 272.
Between 7:00 and 7:30 o'clock in the evening, the bus stopped at Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan,
Apalit, Pampanga where the victim Aurea Eugenio alighted. From the national highway, the house of the
victim was about three hundred (300) meters away. Although lights can be seen from the said house, it
was very dark and silent on the road going to the same and coming from the highway. On either side of
the road were tall grasses and trees. On the side of the highway was a waiting shed. Inside the waiting
shed were four (4) persons. They were three (3) accused, namely, Adel Tuangco y Dizon, his brother
Sonny Tuangco y Dizon alias 'Baba' and Nelson Pineda, Jr. alias 'Jun Tattoo' and the prosecution eye
witness Silvestre Sanggalan alias 'Popoy, alias 'Pipi'.
Earlier, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the three (3) accused and witness
Sanggalan were inside a 'beer house' located along the national highway at Calumpit, Bulacan, drinking
beer and gin. Together with four (4) other persons, they started their drinking spree when it was still
daytime. When nighttime came, the three (3) accused and witness Sanggalan left their companions and
proceeded to a rice field near the highway. They stayed in the waiting shed located at the opposite side of
the road where the victim Aurea Eugenio alighted. The four (4) went to the rice field because they were
already drunk. While inside the waiting shed, accused Sonny Tuangco and Nelson Pineda took Pidol
cough syrup.
The three (3) accused left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to follow the victim who had already
crossed the national highway and was walking towards her house. The three (3) accused asked Sanggalan
to leave. However, instead of leaving, Sanggalan hid behind the bushes and trees, thus, he was able to
witness the incident in question.
As soon as the accused caught up with the victim, Nelson Pineda, Jr. pushed her while Adel Tuangco got
hold of her shoulder bag. Sonny Tuangco and Nelson Pineda pushed the victim Aurea Tuangco against a
tree and stabbed her several times in the neck. At this point, Adel Tuangco joined the two (2) and he also
stabbed the victim until she fell down. As the victim was lying on the ground, Nelson Pineda inserted the
bottle of Pidol cough syrup in her private parts. Sonny Tuangco further pushed the bottle into the body of
the victim. While the bottle was being pushed, Adel Tuangco was hugging the victim who was still alive
and resisting the assault being made against her person. Together, the three (3) accused removed the
blouse, bra, skirt and panty of Aurea Eugenio. Thereafter, Adel Tuangco, Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny
Tuangco, in that order, successively raped the victim. While Adel Tuangco was raping the victim, the two
(2) other accused were beside him. When Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco were taking their
respective turns in raping the victim, the two (2) other accused were holding her hands.
After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her bag, Pineda got her camera and cash money while Sonny
Tuangco got her ring, earrings and watch. Thereafter, Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco went to the
rice field while Adel Tuangco proceeded to the opposite direction.
The body of the victim was already stiff when found by witness Michael Enriquez the following day lying
on the rice field owned by his grandfather, Ignacio Enriquez. The body was lying on its back with the
hands upraised, the blouse raised upwards and naked from the waist down. The private parts of the victim
had an opening of about two (2) inches and with blood all over it.
The fresh lacerations on the hymen of the victim as well as the massive blood clots accumulated within
the vaginal canal were caused not only by human penis that penetrated her private parts but by hard
foreign object like a bottle. The abrasions on the breast of the victim could have been caused by human
bites. The stab wounds located within the neck area of the victim were inflicted by her assailant using a
single bladed weapon. The nine (9) stab wounds in the neck induced severe hemorrhage which was the
proximate cause of the victim's death. The abrasions and hematomas on the body of the victim are
indications of struggling during the sexual attack on the victim."[8]
The trial court ruled that the guilt of the accused as charged was established with
the required quantum of evidence and concluded that the three accused conspired
to commit the crimes charged. The accused were sentenced as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of theft defined in Article 309 in relation to Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code and of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined in Article 335, as
amended, of the same Code and hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 95-1609(M), the said accused are convicted of Theft and hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2)
years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum; the said accused are
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Aurea Eugenio, jointly and severally, the amount of
P3,000.00.
2. In Criminal Case No. 95-1610(M), the aforesaid accused are convicted of two (2) special complex
crimes of Rape with Homicide and each of them is hereby sentenced to two (2) death penalties; both of
them are ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Aurea Eugenio the sum of
P105,150.00 as actual damages, and the further sums of a) P50,000.00 for the victim's death, b)
P100,000.00 as moral damages and c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a total of P200,000, in each
of the two (2) crimes which they have separately committed and each shall pay one-half () of the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The case is before this Court on automatic review.
The Public Attorney's Office submits the following assignment of errors in the
appellants' brief:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF SILVESTRE SANGGALAN WHO IS A DEAF-
MUTE AND UNSCHOOLED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF SPECIAL COMPLEX
CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND THEFT."[10]
In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused- appellant

points out that because Silvestre Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in a
special school for deaf-mutes, the possibility that resort to conjectures and
surmises, brought about by overzealousness to understand what his witness really
wanted to say could not be discounted. Thus, accused-appellant cites certain
portions of Sanggalan's testimony which appeared unclear, e.g., the witness
admitted that the place where the incident happened was "very dark", and he was
inconsistent as to who, between Adel Tuangco or Jun Tatoo, was the first to rape
the victim. Thus, his handicap prevented a truthful narration of what really
transpired.
The Solicitor General prays for an affirmance of the decision in all respects. He
asserts that a deaf-mute is qualified to testify, and the interpreter explained that
through sign language, Sanggalan demonstrated how Eugenio was raped and
thereafter killed by appellants and Pineda, Jr. It is claimed that the inconsistencies
pointed out are minor and do not detract from the positive identification made by
witness Sanggalan of the accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed
Eugenio and took her personal effects.
After a very careful examination of the evidence of record, we resolve to affirm the
judgment of conviction. We find no cogent justification to disturb or set aside the
finding of the trial court upholding the credibility of the deaf-mute witness, on the
following rationalization:
"This Court, cognizant of the physical handicap of the eyewitness Silvestre Sanggalan, carefully
scrutinized his testimony and noted that the same were made, on several occasions from July 10, 1995
when he was called for the first time to testify until July 5, 1996 when he was recalled for the purpose of
cross-examination on behalf of accused Sonny Tuangco, in a candid and straightforward manner. While
the Court observes minor inconsistencies in his declarations, these are not reasons to render his testimony
incredible. On the contrary, it is well-established that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
are indications that the same is not rehearsed and all the more should be considered credible. Thus,
discrepancies in minor details indicate veracity rather than prevarication and only tend to bolster the
probative value of such testimony. (People vs. Mocasa, 229 SCRA 422).
This Court likewise evaluated very carefully, the qualifications and competence of Eva Sangco, the sign
language expert utilized by the prosecution and found the same to be sufficient to put on record with
accuracy, the declarations being made by witness Sanggalan on the witness stand. According to Eva
Sangco, sign language experts have different mode of communications. These are a) oral method b)
simultaneous method c) pantomine d) reverse interpretation e) speech reading f) natural signs and
gestures and g) interactive writings which are more on dramatization and drawing illustrations. In the
interpretation of the declarations of witness Sanggalan, Eva Sangco employed the natural homemade sign
method. Eva Sangco has undergone several trainings on this particular method. (TSN, July 21, 1995, pp.
7-8).
In its futile attempt to destroy the credibility of witness Sanggalan, the defense attacked his character and
present a witness in the person of Merlita Baliber to show that he is a drunkard and a drug addict.
Likewise the defense presented documentary evidence (Exh. "3") to show that Sanggalan had been
accused of rape in a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Rizal. These evidence
presented by the defense are unavailing. In People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170, it was held that even a
fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness. And in People vs. Tanco,
218 SCRA 494, it was held that the mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify
him from becoming a witness. For the test to measure the value of the testimony of a witness is whether
or not such is in conformity to knowledge and consistent with experience of mankind. (People vs. Morre,
217 SCRA 219). This Court finds it unnecessary to reiterate the earlier discussion as to why it gives
credence to the testimony of witness Sanggalan.
If at all, the evidence of the defense with respect to the character of Sanggalan substantiated the theory of
the prosecution- that these people, witness Sanggalan, and the three (3) accused were often times seen
drinking liquor and taking prohibited drugs. No less than defense witness Merlita Baliber testified that on
one occasion, she saw witness Silvestre Sanggalan and accused Nelson Pineda, Jr. going out of the 'beer
house' to join their three (3) other companions walking along the highway. That Baliber would deny that
accused Adel Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco were among those people, is expected. For, as admitted by
Baliber, she was asked by the mother of accused Adel Tuangco and accused Sonny Tuangco to testify in
these proceedings to help the said accused. (TSN, February 7, 1996, p. 35). Then too, the demeanor by
which Baliber was testifying immediately casts doubt on her motive for taking the witness stand and
renders incredible her testimony. Thus, on several times at the witness stand, she had been observed
smiling and not candid with her declarations. (TSN, February 7, 1996, p. 13). On one occasion, after
stating that Adel Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco have nothing to do with the rape-slay of Aurea Eugenio,
witness Baliber immediately laughed. (Ibid, pp. 25-26).[11]
The theory of the accused-appellant that Sanggalan "could not truthfully and
convincingly convey what really transpired on that fateful night" because he had no
formal schooling in a school for special persons like him and the interpreter was not
the one who had taught him is not tenable.
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.[12]
Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to
testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.[13]
Thus, in People vs. De Leon[14] and People vs. Sasota,[15] the accused was
convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. Although in People vs.
Bustos[16] the testimony of a deaf-mute was rejected, this was because there were
times during his testimony that the interpreter could not make out what the witness
meant by the signs she used. In the instant case, the interpreter was a certified
sign language interpreter with twenty-two (22) years teaching experience at the
Philippine School for the Deaf, had exposure in television programs and had
testified in five other previous court proceedings. She possessed special education
and training for interpreting sign language. The trial court evaluated her
competence to put on record with accuracy the declaration made by witness
Sanggalan on the witness stand, and she testified that she employed the natural or
homemade sign method.[17] Needless to stress, the manner in which the
examination of a deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and
controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not be
reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining
party was in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted.[18] The
imperfections or inconsistencies cited in appellants' brief arise from the fact that
there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is deaf-mute, but
these do not detract from the credibility of his testimony, much less justify the total
rejection of the same. What is material is that he knew personally the accused-
appellants, was with them on the fateful night when the incident happened, and
had personally witnessed the rape-slay and theft three and (3 ) meters away from
the scene. He did not waver in the identification of the three accused despite
rigorous cross-examination, and positively pointed to the accused-appellants as the
persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her personal effects.[19] The trial
court's assessment of the credibility of Sanggalan, whose testimony was found to
be candid and straightforward, deserves the highest respect of this Court.
Moreover, the testimony of Sanggalan was corroborated by the doctor who

conducted the autopsy. Dr. Aguda testified that Eugenio had nine (9) stab wounds
on the neck, fresh hymenal lacerations and massive blood clots within the vaginal
canal, caused, among others, by the entry of a hard foreign object like a bottle and
that the abrasions and hematomas on the cadaver indicated that Eugenio struggled
during the assault.[20]
The defense of alibi must yield to the positive identification of the accused-
appellants by Sanggalan, and the attempt of the mother of the accused-appellants,
Erlinda Tuangco, a sister, Glessen Tuangco, and the common-law wife of Adel
Tuangco, Liza Reyes, to corroborate such a defense must fail. Moreover, no proof
was adduced to show the physical impossibility of the accused being at the scene of
the crime; the evidence shows that the rape-slay took place in Sitio Dalan Baka,
Barangay Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, which was ten to fifteen
minutes from the residence of Adel Tuangco in Frances Bukid, Calumpit, Bulacan.
[21] In the case of Sonny Tuangco, who went into hiding after learning that his
brother Adel was arrested, and who stayed with a relative in Caloocan City for
about one (1) year until he was apprehended by the police authorities,[22] his
flight should be taken as an admission of his guilt.
We also find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of conspiracy among the
accused-appellants as rationalized by the trial court thus:
"First, they were together drinking in a pubhouse from where they proceeded to the rice field and stayed
inside a nearby waiting shed.
Second, as soon as the victim was seen walking towards her house, the three (3) accused immediately
followed her.
Third, when they caught up with the victim, they simultaneously attacked her by stabbing her neck with
bladed weapon. Thereafter, when the victim fell down, the accused aided each other in raping the victim.
Fourth, before fleeing from the scene of the crimes, the accused took the victim's cash money and
personal belongings."[23]
The imposable penalty for the rape with homicide is death. Pursuant to Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of the Republic Act No. 7659,
"when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death". Because of the finding of conspiracy in the commission of
the complex crime of rape with homicide, the imposition of two death penalties
upon each of the accused-appellants is correct.[24]
The imposable penalty for theft is prision correcional in its minimum and medium
period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P200.00 but does not exceed
P6,000.00. In this case, the amount of P3,000.00 which is the cash taken from the
victim, was the only amount proven, as the value of the other objects taken was
not established. Thus, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days of prision correcional as maximum.
The civil indemnity must also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[25]
Thus, the civil indemnity ex delicto should be P100,000.00 for the victim's death.
The award of exemplary damages is justified in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty, as the insertion of the bottle into the private
part of the victim caused unnecessary moral and physical pain while the victim was
still alive.
Four justices of this Court, however, have continued to maintain the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y
Dizon for the crimes of theft and rape with homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 95-
1609(M) and 95-1610(M) is hereby affirmed with the modification that the civil
indemnity ex delicto is increased to P100,000.00.
Upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records
of this case, be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
T H I R D D I V I S I O N ( 1 4 )
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, G.R. No. 143439
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Promulgated:
Respondent.
October 14, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-x
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled 'SUSAN
RAMIREZ, Petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC,
MALABON, MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Respondents.
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN for arson[3] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband
of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel
raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the
purpose of proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the
elements of the crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo
Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5,
Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house
owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo
Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan
Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he
successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it
was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well as
Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a
consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the
house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and
together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and
others.
COURT:
You may proceed.
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the
source of that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline
in the house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of
the accused inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that
person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point
him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked
his name, he gave his name as Maximo Alvarez.[4]
In the course of Esperanza's direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed
'uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion[5] to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition[6] to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion,
the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other
witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying
Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the
records.[7] The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the
other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999.[8]
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case
No. 19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9] with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.[10]
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting
aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal
Case No. 19933-MN.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. ' During their

marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants
or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is' consequent
danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.[11]
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.[12]
In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that
laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the
court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or
indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception
is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly
attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it
comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a
crime committee (by) one against the other.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital
life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law
Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the
alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and
confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to
protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The
Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to
protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in
the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no
longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In
fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed,
the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth
before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated,
must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the
objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco[14]), it was
the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court,
RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify
against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EVIDENCE
Admissibility (1998)
The barangay captain reported to the police that X was illegally keeping in his house in the barangay an Armalite M16 rifle. On the
strength of that information, the police conducted a search of the house of X and i ndeed found said rifle. The police raiders seized
the rifle and brought X to the police station. During the investigation, he voluntarily signed a Sworn Statement that he was
possessing said rifle without license or authority to possess, and a Waiver of Right to Counsel. During the trial of X for illegal
possession of firearm, the prosecution submitted in evidence the rifle. Sworn Statement and Waiver of Right to Counsel,
individually rule on the admissibility in evidence of the:
1. Rif le; [2%]
2. Sworn Statement; and [2%1
3. Waiver of Right to Counsel of X . [1%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.Therifleisnotadmissibleinevidencebecauseitwasseizedwithoutapropersearchwarrant.Awarrantlesssearchisnotjustified.Therewastimetosecure
asearchwarrant.(People us. Encinada G.R. No. 116720,
October 2. 1997 and other cases)
2. The sworn statement is not admissible in evidence because it was taken without informing him of his custodial rights and
without the assistance of counsel which should be independent and competent and preferably of the choice of the accused.
(People us.
Januario, 267 SCRA 608.)
3. The waiver of his right to counsel is not admissible because it was made without the assistance of counsel of his choice. (People
us. Gomez, 270 SCRA 433.)
Admissibility (2002)
Acting ona tipby aninformant, policeofficers stopped acar being drivenby D andordered him toopen the trunk. Theoff icers found abag
containingseveral kilos of cocaine. Theyseized the car and the cocaineasevidence andplaced D under arrest. Without advisinghim ofhisright
toremainsilent and to have the assistanceof an attorney, theyquestionedhim regardingthecocaine. In reply, D said, “Idon’t know anything
about it. I t isn’t even mycar.”D was chargedwithillegal possessionofcocaine, a prohibiteddrug. Upon motionofD , thecourt suppressedthe
useof cocaineasevidence and dismissed thecharges against him. D commencedproceedingsagainst thepolice f orthe recoveryofhiscar. In
hisdirect examination, D testified that he owned thecar but had registeredit in the nameof afriendforconvenience. On cross-examination, the
attorneyrepresenting the police asked, “ After your arrest, didyou not tell the arrestingofficers that it wasn’t your car?”I f youwereD ’sattorney,
would youobject to the question? Why? (5%)
Remedial Law Bar Examination Q & A (1997-2006)

Admissibility; Admission of Guilt; Requirements (2006)
What are the requirements in order that an admission of guilt of an accused during a custodial investigation be admitted in
evidence? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1
The admission must be voluntary.
2
The admission must be in writing.
3
The admission must be made with the assistance of
competent, independent counsel.
4.
The admission must be express (People v.
Prinsipe, G.R. N o. 135862, M ay 2, 2002).
5.
I n case t he accused waives his right s t o silence and to counsel, such waiver must be in writing, executed with the
assistance of competent, independent counsel.
Admissibility; Document; Not raised in the Pleading

(2004)
I n a complaint for a sum of money filed before the MM RTC, plaintiff did not mention or even just hint at any demand for payment made
on defendant before commencing suit. During the trial, plaintiff duly offered Exh. "A" in evidence for the stated purpose of proving the
making of extrajudicial demand on defendant to pay P500.000, the subject of the suit. Exh. " A" was a letter of demand for defendant to pay
said sum of money within 10 days from receipt, addressed to and served on def endant some two months bef ore suit was begun. Without
objection from defendant, the court admitted Exh. "A" in evidence. Was the court's admission of Exh. "A" in evidence erroneous or not?
Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The court's admission of Exh. "A" in evidence is not erroneous. It was admitted in evidence without objection on the part of
the defendant. I t should be treated as if it had been raised in the pleadings. The complaint may be amended to conform to the
evidence, but if it is not so amended, it does not af f ect the result of the trial on this issue. (Sec. 5 of R ule
10).
Admissibility; Electronic Evidence (2003)
a) State the rule on the admissibility of an electronic
evidence. b) When is an electronic evidence regarded
as being
the equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other f
orm of writing, such term shall be
by: sirdondee@gmail.comPa ge51 of66 deemedto

include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.
(Sec. 1 of Rule 3, Rules of E lectronic E vidence effective A ugust 1, 2001).
An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of
Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules. (Sec. 2 of Rule 3,
I d.). The authenticity of any private electronic document
must be proved by evidence that it had been digitally signed and other appropriate security measures have been appli ed.( S ec.
2 of Rule 5, Id.).
(b)AnelectronicdocumentshallberegardedastheequivalentofanoriginaldocumentundertheBestEvidenceRuleifitisaprintoutoroutput
readablebysightorothermeans,showntoreflectthedataaccurately.(Sec. 1 of Rule 4)
Admissibility; Object or Real Evidence (1994)

At the trial of Ace for violation of the Dangerous Drug
s
Act, the prosecution offers in evidence a photocopy of the marked P100.00 bills used in the “buy-bust” operation. Ace
objects to the introduction of the photocopy on the ground that the Best Evidence Rul
prohibits the introduction of secondary evidence in lieu of the original. a) Is the photocopy real (object) evidence or
documentary evidence? b) I s the photocopy

admissible in evidence?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The photocopy of the marked bills is real (object) evidence not documentary evidence, because the marked bills are real
evidence.
b)Yes, thephotocopyisadmissiblein evidence, becausethebest evidencerule does not apply toobject or real evidence.
Admissibility; Objections (1997)

What are the two kinds of objections? Explain each
briefly. Given an example of each.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Two kinds of objections are: (1) the evidence being presented is not relevant to the issue; and (2) the evidence is incompetent or
excluded by the law or the rules, (Sec. 3, Rule 138). An example of the first is when the prosecution of fers as evidence the
alleged offer of an I nsurance company to pay f or the damages suf f ered by the victim in a homicide case.
(See 1997 N o. 14).
Examples of the second are evidence obtained in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and
confessions and admissions in violation of the rights of a person under custodial I nvestigation.

1) Specific objections: Example: parol evidence and
best evidence rule
General Objections: Example: continuing objections
(Sec. 37 of Rule 132).
2) The two kinds of objections are: (1) objection to
a
question propounded in the course of the oral examination of the witness and (2) objection to an offer of evidence in writing.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
theref or shall become reasonably apparent otherwise, it is waived. An offer of objection in writing shall be mad
within three (3) days after notice of the offer, unless a different period is allowed by the court. In both instances the grounds f
or objection must be specif ied. An example of the first is when the witness is being cross-examined and the cross
examination is on
a
matter not relevant. An example of the second is that
the evidence of f ered is not the best evidence.
Admissibility; Offer to Marry; Circumstantial Evidence
(1998)
A was accused of having raped X. Rule on the
admissibility of the following pieces of evidence:
1
an of f er of A to marry X; and (3%]
2
a pair of short pants allegedly left by A at the crim
e
which the court, over the objection of A, required him to put
on, and when he did, it fit him well. [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. A's offer to marry X is admissible in evidence as an I mplied admission of guilt because rape cases are not allowed to be
compromised.(Sec. 27 of Rule 13O;
People vs. D omingo, 226 SCRA 156.)
2.Thepairofshortpants,whichfittheaccusedwell,iscircumstantialevidenceofhisguilt,althoughstandingaloneitcannotbethebasisofconviction.The
accusedcannotobjecttothecourtrequiringhimtoputtheshortpantson.Itisnotpartofhisrightagainstself-incriminationbecauseitisamerephysicalact.
Admissibility; Offer to Pay Expenses (1997)
A, while driving his car, ran over B. A visited B at the hospital and offered to pay for his hospitalization expenses. After the filing of the
criminal case against A for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. A's insurance carrier offered to pay for the injuries and
damages suffered by B. The offer was rejected because B considered the amount offered as inadequate. a) Is the offer by A to pay the
hospitalization
expenses of B admissible in evidence? b) I s the of f er

by A's insurance carrier to pay for the
injuries and damages of B admissible in
evi dence?
by: sirdondee@gmail.comP a ge52 of66
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The offer by A to pay the hospitalization expenses of B is not admissible in evidence to prove his guilt in both the civil
and criminal cases.(R ul e 1 3 0 ,
Sec. 27, fourth par.).
(b) No. I t is irrelevant. The obligation of the insurance company is based on the contract of insurance and is not admissible in evidence
against the accused because it was not of f ered by the accused but by the insurance company whi ch is not his agent.
Admissibility; Private Document (2005)
May a private document be offered, and admitted in evidence both as documentary evidence and as object evidence? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it canbe considered as both documentary andobject evidence. A privatedocument maybe off eredand admittedinevidence both as
documentaryevidence and asobject evidence. A document can alsobe considered asanobject for purposesofthecase. Object s as evidenceare
t hose addressed t ot he senses of the court. (Sec. 1, Rule 130, Rules of Court) Documentaryevidenceconsistsof writings or
any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbolsorother modes of writtenexpressions, offered ns proof of theircontents. (Sec.
2, Rule 130, Rules of Court) Hence, aprivat
e
document may be presented as object evidence in order
to 'establish certain physical evidence or characteristic
s
that are visible on the paper and writings that compris
e
the document.
Admissibility; Proof of Filiation; Action of Partition (2000)
Linda and spouses Arnulf o and Regina Ceres were co- owners of a parcel of land. Linda died intestate and without any issue. Ten
(10) persons headed by Jocelyn, claiming to be the collateral relatives of the deceased Linda, filed an action for partition with the RTC
praying for the segregation of Linda’s ½ share, submitting in support of their petition the baptismal certificates of seven of the
petitioners, a family bible belonging to Linda in which the names of the petitioners have been entered, a photocopy of the birth
certificate of Jocelyn, and a certification of the local civil registrar that its office had been completely razed by fire. The spouses Ceres
refused to partition on the following grounds: 1) the baptismal certificates of the parish priest are evidence only of the administration of
the sacrament of baptism and they do not prove filiation of the alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; 2) entry in the f amily bible is
hearsay; 3) th
certification of the registrar on non-availability of the records of birth does not prove filiation: 4) in partition cases
where filiation to the deceased is in dispute, prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship in
a
settlement ofestateproceedingsisnecessary; and5)
there is need for publication as real
property is involved. As counsel f or Jocelyn and her co-petitioners, argue against the objections of the spouses Ceres so as to
convince the court to allow the partition. Discuss each of the five (5) arguments briefly but completely. (10%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) The baptismal certificate can show filiation or prove pedigree. I t is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court
and special laws to show pedigree.
(T rinidad v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188

[1998]; H eirs of I Lgnacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, 300
SCRA 345 [ 1998] ).
(2) Entries in the family bible may be received as
evidence of pedigree.(Sec. 40, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
(3) The certification by the civil registrar of the non- availability of records is needed to justify the presentation of secondary
evidence, which is the photocopy of the birth certificate of Jocelyn.( H ei rs of
I gnacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.)
(4) Declaration of heirship in a settlement proceeding is not necessary. I t can be made in the ordinary action for partition
wherein the heirs are exercising the right pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in- interest, to ask for partition as co-
owners (I d.)
(5) Even if real property is involved, no publication is necessary, because what is sought is the mere segregation of Linda’s share in
the property. (Sec. 1 of
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) N o, They are not duplicate original copies because
there are photocopies which were not signed (Mahilum v.
Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 482), They constitute secondary
evi dence. (Sec. 5 of Rule 130).
(c) Theloangivenby A to B may be proved bysecondary evidencethroughthe xeroxed copiesof thepromissorynote. Therulesprovidethat
when the original document islost or destroyed, or cannot be producedin court, the offerer, uponproofofits executionorexistenceandthecause
ofits unavailabilitywithout badfaith onhispart, mayproveits contents bya copy, or byarecital of itscontents in someauthenticdocument, orby
thetestimony of witnessesintheorder st at ed (sec. 5 rul e 130)
Rule 69; Id.)

Admissibility; Rules of Evidence (1997)
Give the reasons underlying the adoption of the
following rules of evidence:
(a)DeadManRule
(b) Parol Evidence Rule
(c) Best Evidence Rule
(d) The rule against the admission of illegally obtained
extrajudicial confession
(e) The rule against the admission of an offer of
compromise in civil cases
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The reasons behind the following rules are as follows:
(a)DEAD MAN RULE: if death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the other.
(Goni v. Court ofAppeals, L-77434. September 23,
1986, 144 SCRA 222) .T hi s i s t o pr event t he t empt at i on t o

perjury because death has already sealed the lips of the
party.
(b) PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: I t is designed to give certainty to a transaction which has been reduced to writing,
because written evidence is much more certain and accurate than that which rests on fleeting memory only. (F rancisco,
Rules of Court V ol. V II, Part I. p. 154)
(a) The copy that was signed and lost is the only "original" copy for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule. (Sec. 4 [b] of Rule
130).
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(c) BEST EVIDENCE RULE: This Rule is adopted
for the prevention of fraud and is declared to b
e
essential to the pure administration of justice.(M oran,
V ol. 5, p. 12.) I f a party is in possession of such evidence
and withholds it, the presumption naturally arises that
the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes.
(F rancisco. Rules of Court, vol. V II. Part I,
pp, 121,122)
(d) An illegally obtained extrajudicial confession nullifies the intrinsic validity of the confession and renders it
unreliable as evidence of the truth.(M oran, vol.
5, p. 257) it is the fruit of a poisonous tree.
(e) The reason f or the rule against the admission of an offer of compromise in civil case as an admission of any liability is that
parties are encouraged to enter into compromises. Courts should endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon
some fair compromise. (A rt. 2029, Civil Code). During pre-trial, courts should direct the parties to consider the
possibility of an amicable settlement. (Sec. 1[a] of
former Rule 20: Sec. 2 [a] of new Rule 16).

Best Evidence Rule (1997)
When A loaned a sum of money to B. A typed a single copy of the promissory note, which they both signed A made two photo
(xeroxed) copies of the promissory note, giving one copy to B and retaining the other copy. A entrusted the typewritten copy to his
counsel for safekeeping. The copy with A's counsel was destroyed when the law office was burned. a) I n an action to collect on
the promissory note,
which is deemed to be the "original" copy for the purpose of the "Best Evidence Rule"? b) Can the photocopies in the hands
of the parties be considered " duplicate original copies" ? c) As counsel for A, how will you prove the loan given to A and
B?

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 27498 September 20, 1927

Inestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-

M. H. de Joya and Enrique Tiangco for appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-17895 September 30, 1963

FELIX ASTURIAS, ET AL., petitioners,

Recto Law Office for petitioners.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is

. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as

The petitioner's contention is not correct.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:

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. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his status as stockholder

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

[G.R. No. 129667. July 31, 2000](13)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC BAID Y OMINTA,

The information against accused-appellant, based on the complaint filed by the

When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr.

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Subject is in non-virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.

Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He stated that he had been a nurse-aide

Accused-appellant was questioned by the trial court. He testified that on December

On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew it was prohibited

Complainant is suffering from schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder of unknown

(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)

(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior

(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition

Note: Only one criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or

B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the

E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the

F. Relationship to a pervasive developmental disorder: If there is a history of

Schizophrenia is classified into five subtypes, namely, paranoid, disorganized

Dr. Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant's attending psychiatrist and consultant

It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not

PROSECUTION: (to the witness)

A Not anymore, sir.

Q Why were you there, Miss Witness?

A My mother asked me if I want to be confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic and I

Q And what happened after Eric Baid entered the room?

PROSECUTION: (to the witness)

A After that, he caressed me.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q How did he caress you?

A He went on top of me.

COURT: (to the prosecutor)

PROSECUTION: (to the witness)

A He was no longer there.

PROSECUTION: (to the witness)