G.R. No.
123546 July 2, 1998 IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING ESTABLISHED FACTS, the Court finds
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOERAL
GALLENO, Accused-Appellant.
PER CURIAM:
What could be more compelling than deciding a case which involves the
sexual abuse of a five-year old child? Equally important is the fact that the
case before us involves the highest penalty imposable by law. Being the
guardian of the most fundamental liberties of every citizen, the Court must
pass upon every intricate detail of the case at bar to determine whether or
not accused-appellant committed the gruesome act imputed against him.
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of Branch
14 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Roxas
City, relying on the defense of denial. Since the case involves the death
penalty, the matter has been elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as Criminal Case
No. C-4629 for the crime of Statutory Rape, reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon prior authority and
approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, and the original complaint filed by the
guardian of the offended party, accuses JOERAL GALLENO of the crime of
STATUTORY RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16, 1994, at Brgy.
Balighot, Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused did, then and there, wilfully and feloniously, and without the
permission of anyone, enter the house of EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old
child, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her thereby inflicting
upon the latter a vaginal laceration which caused continuous bleeding and
her admission of five (5) days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued, resulting in a judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
accused JOERAL GALLENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt under Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused JOERAL GALLENO is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Let this DECISION serve as clear signal, warning the perverts, the misguided
elements of our society, especially their lackadaisical parents in their innate
moral obligation and responsibility in educating their children that in this
corner of the world the wheels of justice is not asleep and its unforgiving
hands and watchful eyes are as vigilant as ever.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
In flashback, let us visualize the events.
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar
Garganera who had to leave the province to find work in Manila after
separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with her younger brother, 3-
year old Eleazar, was thus left under the care and custody of their uncle,
Emeterio Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-
appellant, 19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well to Evelyn's family due to
his frequent visits at the Obligars' abode as he was paying court to
Emeterio's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at
the sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children
had all earlier left for school. The only persons left in the house were niece
Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to
his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by
the Obligars' residence and found the two children left to themselves. The
prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred
at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a
laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our mind, life-
threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is
based on the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle Emeterio, and the
doctors who examined and treated her. The Solicitor General summarized the
same in this wise:
2. Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn.
After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. Then he
forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-years old
while appellant was a fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's
vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. (pp. 10-11 and 18-25, tsn,
Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of
"madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left
Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn, Garganera, January 10,
1995; pp. 6-7, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The spouses were
laborers in a sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from their
house. They arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emeterio noticed that there was
blood in Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ.
(pp. 11-12, tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9, tsn, Obligar, February 7,
1995).
5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer. Emeterio
spread the child's legs and saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood
was oozing therefrom. He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal
medicine on Evelyn's vagina but this did not stop the bleeding. (pp. 12-14,
tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic
of Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. Dr.
Orosco reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood,
about 1 centimeter in diameter, in her vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal
laceration, measuring 1.0 centimeter x 0.5 centimeter, between the 3:00
o'clock and 6:00 o'clock position. He also affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal
laceration could have been caused by a blunt instrument inserted into the
vagina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been
forcibly inserted into her vagina and that a human penis in full erection is
considered a blunt instrument. (pp. 4-7, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994; p.
14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her
injuries. The child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and
that its insertion caused her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco,
November 28, 1994).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat Evelyn,
Dr. Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which continued to bleed,
advised Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for further
medical treatment (p. 8, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995).
9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial
General Hospital where she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma.
Lourdes Lañada, Dr. Lañada, upon examining Evelyn, found that "there was
a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the
presence of about 10-15 cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada
recommended that Evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital
because the wound in her vagina, which was still bleeding, had to be
repaired. Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not admitted into the
hospital that day and went home with Emeterio to Barangay Balighot. (pp. 6-
8, tsn, Lañada January 4, 1995; pp. 15-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Lañada
opined that "a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the vagina." (p.
9, tsn, Lañada, January 4, 1995). According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal
laceration may be caused (1) by trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits
her genital area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like
the insertion of a speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of a blunt
foreign object into the vagina, like a finger of a penis of a man in full erection.
(pp. 8-10, tsn, Lañada, January 4, 1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn back to the Roxas
Memorial General Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machel Toledo,
the resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding
in the genital area. Dr. Toledo ". . . pack(ed) the area to prevent further
bleeding and (he) . . . admitted the patient for possible repair of that
laceration and blood transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to
bleeding." Two hundred five (255) cc of blood was transfused to Evelyn and
she was given antibiotics to prevent infection. However, she was no longer
operated on because the laceration had healed. Five days later, Evelyn was
discharged and sent home with medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn,
Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed
that the child suffered severe compound laceration which could have been
caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection
that was forcibly inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her
vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood.
(pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on
August 19, Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon
Police Station on August 18, 1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1
Paulino Durana. That same day, appellant was apprehended in a house near
the Balighot Elementary School and brought to the police station. (pp. 17-19,
tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and 21, tsn, Durana, January
16, 1995).
(pp. 164-171, Rollo.)
Denial is presented as the defense. Accused-appellant testified that when he
arrived at the Obligar residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found
the two children, Evelyn and Eleazar (also referred to in the record as Pilfo).
While seated at the balcony, accused-appellant was approached by Evelyn,
who knew him (tsn, April 5, 1995, pp. 5 and 8). He cajoled her by throwing
her up and down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand covering
her vagina (Ibid., p. 21). Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring
finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child since his
fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear.
Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon
seeing this, he immediately went down the house and got some bark or
leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's wound.
The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused-
appellant went home. (Ibid., pp. 9-10).
Accused-appellant further testified that on August 18, 1994, at around 9
o'clock in the morning, he was arrested. On the same day, Emeterio Obligar
asked him to admit the offense so that he could be released the next day, but
accused-appellant did not do so (Ibid., pp. 26-27).
Accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno was also called to the witness stand
and he testified that he learned about the arrest of his son on August 18,
1994 (tsn, May 12, 1995 p. 6). The following day, he went to the house of the
Obligars to ask Evelyn what happened to her. The child allegedly answered
that a finger was accidentally inserted into her genital organ, but that
Penicola who was then present, butted into the conversation and told Raul
Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was likewise inserted (Ibid., p. 8).
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, pointing
out in its decision that accused-appellant's defense of denial hinged on the
argument that the statement of Evelyn as to how she sustained her vaginal
laceration was a mere concoction and a plain distortion of facts by her
guardian. The trial court called this a "desperate attempt of the defense to
becloud the charge of rape."
The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police Officer Paulino
Durana that during the interrogation of Evelyn which he conducted at the
PNP Station of Maayon, Emeterio and Penicola Obligar did not interfere with
the responses of Evelyn, although, true enough, it was difficult to obtain
answers from her because of her tender age.
The trial court deemed the following circumstances significant in finding
accused-appellant culpable:
1. Accused-appellant failed to explain how his left ring finger accidentally
came in contact with Evelyn's vagina, while in the process of throwing her up
and down. Besides, the prosecution was able to establish that Evelyn was
wearing shorts. And assuming for the sake of argument that Evelyn was not
wearing any pants or underwear at that time, accused-appellant failed to
explain how his finger could possibly penetrate the victim's vagina by about
one-fourth of an inch (p. 23, tsn, April 5, 1995).
2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with her 3-year
old brother, in pain and bleeding.
3. Evelyn's statement given to Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, the physician who
examined her at the Roxas Memorial General Hospital, that it was accused-
appellant's finger which injured her, was a consequence of the victim's
confusion.
4. The formal offer of settlement made by accused-appellant's father Raul
Galleno militates against the cause of the defense.
Hence, the instant appeal and review, with accused-appellant assigning the
following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED
TO CONCLUSIVELY AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE
LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED PARTY'S VAGINA
THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY DEPRIVING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND
DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT, WHEN HE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS
EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS
ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AS UNJUSTIFIED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
EXTENDED BY THE PARENTS OF THE ACCUSED TO THE OFFENDED
PARTY AS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.
(pp. 81-82, Rollo.)
One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape victim,
and more especially so for a 5-year old statutory rape victim. However, in our
consideration of the matter before us, we set aside emotion and observe
impartiality and coldness in drawing conclusions.
Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the
testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the prosecution,
namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr. Machael
Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the
offended party, is not impeccable considering that they found that there was
no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused
the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada herself testified that
Evelyn told her that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the
laceration. In addition, accused-appellant banks on the victim's testimony on
cross-examination, that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused
the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to accused-appellant's father,
Raul Galleno.
We are not persuaded.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or
give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence
and form opinions upon the facts proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial
Practice, Vol. 1, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and opinions
of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert
testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject
matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the
court in reaching a judgment (Ibid., p. 886).
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the
aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the
possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such
expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment
on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible
causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's
inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the
conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina
(People vs. Cañada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]). In rape, the important
consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ (People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily,
it is entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not
reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her
vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declarations, particularly as to
what really caused the laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her
tender age, was just confused. This is best exemplified by the testimony of
Dr. Lourdes Lañada on cross-examination, as follows:
Q Now, Doctor, at the time that you conducted your examination, you were
aware that this child was only five years old?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that tender age, Doctor, is it possible that the child may not know
the difference or distinction between fingers of the hands and a finger
protruding between the legs of a person?
A Yes, sir, it is possible.
Q So that it is possible, Doctor, that the child may have referred to a finger
that is between the legs?
WITNESS
You mean the penis?
PROSECUTOR OBIENDA
Yes.
WITNESS
It is possible.
(tsn, p. 27 March 30, 1995.)
Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if not the
outright incredulity of the version of accused-appellant which is not in
accord with ordinary human experience. We thus can not help expressing
sentiments similar to those of the trial court when it said:
The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to his
credibility. He failed to explain how his ring finger accidentally came in
contact with the genitalia of Evelyn, while in the process of throwing her up
and down, when it was established by the prosecution that at that time
Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia argumente" that Evelyn
was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate the vagina
for about one-fourth of an inch . . . when she was in shorts. The Supreme
Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that) evidence, to
be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact
of events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No
better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony
than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)
Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence." This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of Accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno, tried to destroy the credibility of
logic and human experience (Regalado, Remedial law Compendium, Vol. II, Evelyn when he took the stand and testified that the child disclosed to him
1988 ed., p. 434). There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided that it was accused-appellant's finger which was inserted into her vagina.
by law. However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant Nevertheless, this testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of the victim,
rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to wit:
to the teachings of logic and everyday experience (Sibal and Salazar;
Compendium on Evidence, 1995 ed., p. 6, citing Alfred Asmore Pope FISCAL OBIENDA
Foundation vs. New York 138 A. 444, 106 Conn. 432).
Q You said that Joeral Galleno the accused in this case hurt you while you
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with a long were in the farm, can you tell the Honorable Court which part of your body
fingernail) of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of was hurt by Joeral Galleno?
one fourth of an inch. Admittedly, accused-appellant's right hand held the
child while his left hand supposedly held her in the vagina area. Why would
he hold the child's vagina if his only intention was to frolic and kid around A (Witness pointing to her vagina)
with her?
Here.
Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring Evelyn (and
after applying to the wound the sap of madre de cacao), he left her in the Q When you said you were hurt did you bleed?
company of an even younger child, the victim's 3-year old brother. He did not
even make an effort to immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what WITNESS
had happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the incident.
A Yes, Sir.
Accused-appellant also said that after the alleged accident, before going
home, he removed Eleazar's shorts and put them on Evelyn. Assuming this
to be true, this only shows that the child was still bleeding. Why then would FISCAL OBIENDA
he leave the child considering that there was no adult to attend to her?
Significantly, his act of immediately leaving the place, when considered in the Q What was used by Joeral Galleno in hurting your sexual organ?
light of the other evidence, reflects his fear because of what he had done. The
proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the innocent are A His (Pitoy). Penis.
as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its
conclusions.
COURT

All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the
credibility of accused-appellant's story on which his defense is based. Make the translation of "Pitoy" into Penis. Do you agree that the translation
of Pitoy is Penis in English?

Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony of

accused-appellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who was earlier ATTY. DISTURA
presented during the trial as a prosecution witness), who testified that a
laceration is caused by a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a Agreeable, Your Honor.
blunt but a sharp instrument (tsn, pp. 32-33, March 30, 1995).
FISCAL OBIENDA
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a
concocted story of what really happened, we apply the rule that the Q What did Joeral Calleno do with his Pitoy (Penis) to your vagina (Putay)?
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full
credence (People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the
A It was inserted (ginsulod) to my vagina (Putay).
fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support
her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an
engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment Q When Joeral Galleno inserted his penis (Pitoy) to your vagina (Putay), that
and even stigma (People vs. Dones, supra.). was the reason why it bleed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was very painful?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you cried because of the pain?
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q And you were brought to the Doctor and admitted to the hospital because
of that?
A Yes, Sir.
(tsn, pp. 10-12, January 10, 1995.)
Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that he was
deprived of a fair and impartial trial since the trial court showed bias by
discounting his testimony, and by actually participating in the cross-
examination of accused-appellant.
We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA 198 [1996]) that a
judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and
prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details
after the witness has given direct testimony. And such discretion to question
witnesses in order to clear obscurities in their testimony cannot be assailed
as a specie of bias.
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial,
it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge extensively
propounds questions to the witnesses which will have the effect of or will
tend to build or bolster the case for one of the parties. We have, however,
carefully examined the record and transcript of stenographic notes of the
instant case. The trial court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did
propound questions but this was done only for clarification purposes and not
to build the case for one of the parties. For instance, accused-appellant, in
his brief, refers to the questions propounded by the trial court on his act of
cajoling the child. A perusal of the line of questioning referred to hardly
shows bias on the part of the trial court, but pure clarification.
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant questions the validity of his
arrest.
It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection
is deemed waived (People vs. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]). An accused
should question the validity of his arrest before he enters his plea in the trial
court (Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996]). He is estopped
from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move for
the quashing of the information before the trial court (People vs. Compil, 244
SCRA 135 [1995]) or if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by entering a plea and by participating in the trial (People vs. De
Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People vs. Lopez, Jr., supra).
It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised this matter
before entering his plea of "not guilty" to the charge (pp. 63 & 67, Record).
Further, this issue was not even touched during the trial.
Lastly, accused-appellant, in his fourth assigned error, argues that the trial
court misinterpreted the financial assistance extended by his parents as an
attempt to settle the case. Accused-appellant even banks on the alleged close
relationship between Emeterio Obligar and Raul Galleno as compadres, and
the fact that Emeterio borrowed forty pesos from Raul Galleno, despite the
fact that Emeterio already knew that accused-appellant caused the laceration
in Evelyn's vagina.
Accused-appellant also draws attention to two incidents involving alleged
financial assistance extended by Raul Galleno to the spouses Emeterio and
Penicola Obligar. First, Emeterio Obligar, whom Raul Galleno said is
his compadre, borrowed P40.00 for fare going to Roxas City where Evelyn was
confined. Second, on August 20, 1994, Raul Galleno and his wife and one of
the brothers of Penicola Obligar went to Roxas Memorial General Hospital.
There he gave P400.00 financial assistance to Penicola Obligar. Raul Galleno
later admitted that the sum of P440.00 was returned to him by the spouses.
Accused-appellant insists that these offers of financial assistance were not
attempts at an amicable settlement but were prompted out of a sincere desire
on the part of Raul Galleno to help the offended party.
We find no merit in me above-stated argument. It may be inferred that Raul
Galleno wanted to settle the case by offering an amount to the spouses
Obligar, to wit:
Q Now, according to you, you were paid in the amount of Four Hundred
Pesos (P400.00) then you expected your Comareng Pening as financial
assistance to Evelyn Garganera, isn't it?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How long after August 19, 1994, that your Comareng Pening returned to
you the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A A week after when Evelyn had already checked up from the hospital.
Q It was given by you or as voluntary financial assistance, why did you
receive the amount or the payment returned to that amount of Four Hundred
Pesos (P400.00)?
A That was telling me that they refused already for the settlement of the case.
Q And that is why they returned the amount of Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00).
(tsn, pp. 29-30, May 12, 1995.)
From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court, it may be
gleaned that Raul Galleno no longer had any interest in aiding the victim
when he found that the Obligar spouses would still pursue the case against
his son, accused-appellant, and hence he found that his offer for settlement
was unavailing. Hence, on this point we likewise agree with the trial court
when it took the financial assistance to mean an act of settling the case. This
act does manifest a father's attempt to rescue his guilty son from sure
incarceration.
The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year old Evelyn
Obligar Garganera may unfortunately haunt her all her life. Justice may not
be able to save her from this nightmare but it can calm and assure her that
her tormentor and abuser shall undoubtedly face retribution.
Four members of the Court - although maintaining their adherence to the
separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472,
February 7, 1997) that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty is unconstitutional - nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the
evidence on record, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83
of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the record of the
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and
Purisima, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that
meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the
res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the
fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the
felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23,
2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA)
through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge
the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was
stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after
stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk
to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his
uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their
way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had
stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am
despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was
personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years,
who was in the complex at the time.2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long
period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally
arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2)
stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm
encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right
hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s death. Not only
because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo
Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who
relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the
hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon
was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution
witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack
against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while
behind the victim on the latter’s neck and stabbing the victim with the use of
his right hand," Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend
himself."4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and his witness’
testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day
after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his
arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding, there would be no
reason for him to immediately leave his residence, especially because he was
also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is
hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under
Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating
nor other aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo
Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of
Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden
of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱50,000.00 representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing
the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his
assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by
Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his
home during the incident did not overcome the positive identification,
especially as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and
employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did
not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be
unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and
Estaño were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and
credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial
court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their
deportment during testimony, and of assessing their credibility and
appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial
reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions
reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such
assessment and conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court
could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions
without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the
circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the
result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission
by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to
contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great
weight and respect.13
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts
properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering
that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled
Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14
Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind
and had "encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the
stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right
sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left
nipple."15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection of how Salafranca had attacked
Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding
the CA concurred with. We join the CA’s concurrence because Mendoza’s
eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by
Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means
Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon
from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the latter’s
movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or
defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal
Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of
statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing
incident. The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he
answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore
because he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.17
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the
residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by
Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the
Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital,
Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told
Estaño that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing
Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after
his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired
and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance
of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an
hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of
which was an exception to the hearsay rule.18
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its
hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following
requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time
the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d)
that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed
him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending
death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred
under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view
that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the
nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of
his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject
of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered
in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae
concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño,
Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by
Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to
the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca
as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act."22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the
death indemnity of ₱50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of
Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the
damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted
herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d)
exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral
damages which were different from the death indemnity.27 The death
indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and
reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.28 Although mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable
with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an
amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo
ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as
moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound
to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental
anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human
nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain
and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.1âwphi1 It is inherently
human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes
the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives
them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.30
The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-
recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is
already settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are
not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 are
warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim
to deny them compensation by way of actual damages.31
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed
in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such
damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC
should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary
damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that
treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such,
inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v.
Catubig:34
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as
it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is
deemed reasonable and proper,35 because we think that a lesser amount
could not result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil
damages by adding to the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity
the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall
bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1 (1) reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 04-
0052;2 and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case
No. 2001-315.3
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie)
is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158
Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque
City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus
damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles
in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as
lessees thereof.1 a vv p h ! 1
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F
JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Parañaque City, and
hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this
age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Parañaque City, and ___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.
hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
(sgd.) (sgd.)
WITNESSETH ROSALIE PALAÑA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSOR LESSEE
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the
lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner (sgd.)
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Parañaque Ctiy;
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd
Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters under the following
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
terms and conditions, to wit:

a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, (sgd.) (sgd.)
SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00), Philippine Currency. 1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees
to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly Republic of the Philippines)
rental; City of Manila)s.s.

b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the ACKNOWLEDGMENT

expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric appeared the following persons:
consumptions in the said premises;
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Parañaque City on 2/1/99;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Parañaque City on 11/11/99;
alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Parañaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of
the Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this
original conditions at their expenses;
instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2)
instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and and voluntarily acts and deeds.
sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of
flammable or combustible materials.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and
Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila,
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental Philippines.
every time it falls due or violate any of the above conditions
shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease.
Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR. Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December IBP # 00262-Life Member4
_____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already
occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a
letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the
vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished,
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five (5)
the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had
receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of ₱2,570,000.00. been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus,
The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie’s handwriting, read: they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and the
subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos)
from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist
Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ]aque City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons
the terms 6 yrs. Contract. claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property
subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building
₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.) situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________ Baclaran, Parañaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to
December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO
(sgd.) THOUSAND PESOS (₱72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to December
____________________ 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years
Ferdinand Chua thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until
the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased premises subject of
this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie]
2. Received cash the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) as attorney’s fees
₱500,000.00 and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) per [Rosalie’s] appearance in Court
From Moshiera Latip as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.

(sgd.) [Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________ SO ORDERED.7
Received by
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses
3. Received cash Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it
₱70,000.00 from was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further
Moshiera Latip on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the
signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of
(sgd.) Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of
12-11-99 ____________________ the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only
Received by:6 starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of
execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are
indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the
brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was
Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2)
under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of
₱2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their
lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this
down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not
adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared
an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already
fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected
from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the
[MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered
for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the
former –
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court
appearance as and for attorney’s fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the
RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract
of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized,
remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise
found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the
contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of ₱2,570,000.00
merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of
this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the
Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice
was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane
Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the
stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalie’s appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Parañaque City Branch 274 dated
September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January
13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be
ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the
ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of
prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of
the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that
the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is
not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the
recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 which cited
State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that
it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any
fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of
which the court has no constructive knowledge.1avvphi1
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent
that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not
meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice
of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran
area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of
Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously
known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare
allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of
₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the
CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in
Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor.
On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence
provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on
judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on
a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to
Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be
proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court – What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the
practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State
Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to
take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice
to be promptly resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from
the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence
signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing
payment of ₱2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were
executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had been
found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount of
₱2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of
the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial
building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road,
Baclaran, Parañaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is
for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December
2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms
of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another
agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about the
time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of execution of the
latter is unclear.13
We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists a lease ₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua
did not sign the other two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00,
respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is
undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, (sgd.)
doing away with the need for her husband’s consent. The findings of the ____________________
three lower courts concur on this fact. Ferdinand Chua

The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 2. Received cash
1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latip’s admission that they
₱500,000.00
occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk From Moshiera Latip
sales during the holiday season.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts (sgd.)

amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of
goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial
notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart
from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane
Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and
not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code
provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be
understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for
₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it
made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals
of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to
this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts,
already set forth above, are again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from
[O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located
at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ]que
City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by
3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:14
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of
the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s receipt of cash in varying
amounts. The first receipt for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2)
cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease
period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were
subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the ₱2,000,000.00 is
not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained
operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered
as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a
full year after the commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip
can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid
rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the
stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of
₱2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability
of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The
petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent
Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already
received by her as advance rentals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000.]
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying
their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding
excess payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a
refund the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not
belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the
expense of another.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of
the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the
December 24, 1993 Decision 2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA
disposed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit." 3
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by
the CA reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner’s claim for refund is
hereby DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit."
4
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution 5 denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00
representing petitioner’s tax withheld for the year 1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following
items are reflected:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Income P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss) P8,286,960.00
Less:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00
1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
————————
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE
"It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a
total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being
claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the
same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of
P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
"On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the
amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of
P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return
or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the
same year.
"Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on
the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent
Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112.491.00.
"The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition on the
ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual
Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet
credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00
which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax
liability.chanrobles.com : law library
"Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied
by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6,1994." 6
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. 7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to
its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax
Return that the said amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding
year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to
grant the claim for refund. . . .
"Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded
as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris
against the person or entity claiming the exemption. In other words, the
burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund." 8
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
refund of P112,491.00, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid
for the taxable year 1989." 9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year
1989 and was thus entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to
Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code which states that a corporation entitled
to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said
amount for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989
Income Tax Return that it would apply the said amount as a tax credit for
the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a tax
refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR
was forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since
petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the
excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year, the Tax Court
held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and the CA
ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not
present its 1990 Return, which would have shown that the amount in
dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the
appellate court are binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply
where, inter alia, the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or
when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant facts which if
considered would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such
exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did
not apply the amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms.
Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner’s accounting department,
testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a
certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner’s vice-president, stating that
the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically
credited/offset against any succeeding quarters’ income tax liabilities for the
rest of the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were
the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner’s
claim. In fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the
tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily disproved petitioner’s
claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was
attached to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A
final adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or
gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly
showed that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it
could not have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not
even file an opposition to petitioner’s Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment
Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however,
the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon
that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the
Return after the trial. The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however,
specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly
by the technical rules of evidence." 13 The paramount consideration remains
the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues
is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering undisputed
facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration
clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the
holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner could not have applied the amount
as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well as the other
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court
committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure
a just determination of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. 14 But there can be no just determination of the
present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality, the Return
submitted before the CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the
undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990; accordingly, it
incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the
tax refund which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.chanrobles.com :
chanrobles.com.ph
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration was not the final adjustment Return, but petitioner’s first
two quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This allegation is wrong. An examination
of the records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to
the Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns
for 1990 mentioned by respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for
Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents’ specific
contention, petitioner submitted before us its Surrejoinder, to which was
attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final
Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the
CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897,
involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court
held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . .’’ 18
Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said
case. 19
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 20
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial
notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA
Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court.
Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was
fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of
the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice
thereof.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
To our mind, respondents’ reasoning underscores the weakness of their case.
For if they had really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund,
they could have easily proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed,
it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing
therein — that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that
it refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioner’s other
documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of
petitioner’s case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark
truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax
exemptions and are to be construed strictissimi juris against the claimant.
Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner has established its claim.
Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules of procedure; it
may have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should not
compel the Court to disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner
suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the amount
claimed as tax credits.
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner.
Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the
government to keep money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the
expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to
observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same
standard against itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed,
the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the
amount of P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in 1989. No
costs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, on official business.
G.R. No. 157177 February 11, 2008
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution2 dated February 12, 2003, which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453,3 requiring Bank of Philippine
Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B.
Reyes (respondents) the amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial
court, to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together
with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM
account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling
every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car
as its prize to be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero
Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of the new
accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having
homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made to
sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her
exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88
and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip
for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said
bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the
mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was
filling up the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to
where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable
balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only
and then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her
signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces
of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing
the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the
name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and
brought the same to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of
her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount
of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card
from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States
(Exhs. "T", "U"- "U-1") and returned to Manila on January 31, 1991
(Exhs. "V"-"V-1").
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her
statement of account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM account
only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager
assured her that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her
employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI with
the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of
said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and
when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip
stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion
thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and
when the latter saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was
validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will
be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank,
Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer demanding
return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest (Exhs. "B" and "C").
The same was received by defendant on July 25, 1991 and October
7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit
down and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be
submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff
filed this instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine
Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the
amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the
express teller account she opened on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. "3" to
"3-C"), however, it was the only amount she deposited and no
additional cash deposit of P100,000.00 was made. That plaintiff
wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her
account was not sufficient and could not accommodate the same.
Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the amount to be withdrawn
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiff’s signature
superimposed on said corrections; that the original copy of the
deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00,
however, instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of
the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for
Jesusa Reyes had already left without signing the deposit slip. The
documents were subsequently machine validated for the amount
of P100,000.00 (Exhs. "2" and "4").
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the
transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in
the bank’s teller tape (Exhs."1" to "1-C").
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to
a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with flying colors
(Exhs. "5" to "5-C"), indicative of the fact that he was not lying when
he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when
plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7,
1990; defendant further alleged that they even went to the extent of
informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim would not be given credit
(Exh. "6") considering that no such transaction was really made on
December 7, 1990. 4
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision5 upholding the versions of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of the
plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against defendant
Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per
annum from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees.6
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited
only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy; that what should control
was the deposit slip issued by the bank to respondent, for there was no
chance by which respondent could write the amount of P200,000.00 without
petitioner's employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections; that
it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's bankbook
was submitted to be updated after the lapse of several months when the
alleged error claimed by petitioner was corrected; that Article 1962 of the
New Civil Code provides that a deposit is constituted from the moment a
person receives a thing belonging to another with the obligation of safely
keeping it and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the depositary
is obliged to keep the thing safely and to return it when required to the
depositor or to his heirs and successors or to the person who may have been
designated in the contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision dated October
29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision with modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the
missing P100,000.00 can stand some modification. The interest
thereon should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12, 1991, the
last day of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-appellees'
 counsel under the first demand letter dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B),
or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when defendant-appellant
received said letter. Interest is demandable when the obligation
consist in the payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages to a
reasonable sum of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not intended to
enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. The award
of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The absence of malice and bad faith, as in this
case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a
reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case has
not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the judgment
appealed from is in all other respects AFFIRMED. Without costs.7
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that the
RTC correctly gave credence to the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and
Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund transfer of P100,000.00
from Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit
of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for
these two to concoct a story of falsification against a banking institution of
the stature of petitioner if their claims were not true; that the duplicate copy
of the deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the
fact that it was not machine-validated and the original copy altered by the
bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with the altered amount
"validated," is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee Cicero
Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and
categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration therein made;
that petitioner must account for the missing P100,000.00 because it was the
author of the loss; that banks are engaged in business imbued with public
interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing
with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by them
received are properly accounted for and duly posted in their ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the
amount of P100,000.00 representing an alleged additional deposit of
respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion by resolving the issue based on a conjecture and ignoring
physical evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as it is
contrary to law, in holding BPI liable to respondents for the payment
of interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as it is
contrary to law, in holding BPI liable for moral damages and
attorney's fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00
and P30,000.00, respectively. 8
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's
finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her
newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts.9 As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial
court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record
or are based on substantial evidence.10 Such rule however is not absolute,
but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there
is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of
fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record.11 We hold that this case falls under exception Nos.
1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own
affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law.12 In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence,13 or that evidence which is of greater weight or is
more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean
absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on
one side than on the other.14
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for
determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability
or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must
first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify
was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the
testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a
better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the
basis of their demeanor.
and taking ordinary care of her concerns,16 would make sure that she would
check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her
signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature is
very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures
are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the amount
of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount
of P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account
was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence
and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended
to respondent Jesusa's transactions.
The teller's tape,17 Exhibit "1" unequivocally shows the following data:
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.0018
BIG AMOUNT

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the 151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record.
***200000.00
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented
by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully prove by
preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit 151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
***200000.00
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset,
respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller PB BALANCE ERROR
account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and
transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that BAL. 229,257.64
she had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not
borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that
Capati prepared a withdrawal slip15 for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the 151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund
transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express Teller ***200000.00
account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip.
We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in BIG AMOUNT
the first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings account
and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388

Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip
***200000.00
without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for
respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of business
151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
TOD
151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145
***2000.00
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
***22917.00
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.0019
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.0020
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
***2000.00
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the second
column shows the date of the transactions; the third column shows the bank
transaction code; the fourth column shows the teller's code; and the fifth
column shows the client's account number. The teller's tape reflected various
transactions involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which
included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388 and her new
Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that respondent Jesusa's
initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her
Savings Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45
seconds as shown in Exhibit "1-c."
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she
was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount
of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a
discrepancy;21 thus, the word "BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big
amount" means that the amount was so big for her to approve,22 so she
keyed in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to process
the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's approval.23 The
letter "J" appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to show that she
overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount of P200,000.00
at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the
transaction, because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's
passbook was wrong;24 thus appeared the phrase "balance error" on the tape,
and the computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in
the withdrawal of P200,000.00.25 Since it was a big amount, she again had to
override it, so she could process the amount. However, the withdrawal was
again rejected for the reason "TOD, overdraft,"26 which meant that the
amount to be withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there
was a debited amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's
passbook, reducing the available balance to only P198,322.48.27
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of
respondent Jesusa's balance.28 Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to
the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage,
Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of
overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.29
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition
of the figure "1" on the figure "2" and the change of the word "two" to "one" to
show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's savings account
was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the
alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00
by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but
since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and the
withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27
seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's
new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original
intention to withdraw the amount of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as
she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit
to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her
savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the amount of P100,000.00
from her savings account to her new Express Teller account. We give great
evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the
bank's computer terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the
ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been
purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter,
that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer
of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate
copy of the deposit slip30 was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the
stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there
was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows
that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific
denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of
respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is
convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business.
She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip
for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip
for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new Express Teller
account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a balance
of P249,657.6431 as of November 19, 1990.32 Thus, at first glance, these
appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by
fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent
Jesusa, while the original copy33 of the deposit slip was left in her
cage.34 However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned
out that respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient to accommodate
the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip and
had already left the teller's counter thereafter and Capati was still inside the
teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the
latter told her, "Ok naman iyan,"35 and Capati superimposed the figures "1"
on "2" on the deposit slip36 to reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00 for
respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and signed the alteration.
Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of
the deposit slip, which bore Torneros’s stamp mark and which was given to
respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her transaction, was not
machine-validated unlike the original copy of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by
Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a violation of the bank's
policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction,37 nevertheless, we find
that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of
evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited
to the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.38 We have, on many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.
Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical
evidence should prevail.39
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for
respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a false story against a
banking institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises, which we
cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of
evidence.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other issues raised
by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution dated February 12,
2003 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner, is DISMISSED.
No Cost
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS,
and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN,
RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-
installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly
challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and
animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July
27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court
against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the
murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul
Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617
against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero;
Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo;
Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal
Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were
Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the
murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial
ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including
two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their
testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence
consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs
taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited
prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then
Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the
leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for
thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group
and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega
added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and
used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered
away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police.
Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later
stabilized.1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie
Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then
she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos
pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga
nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette
vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the
"Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.2 He then saw a man wearing a
yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin
iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers
appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they
again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting
him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an
electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued
Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave
Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They
backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from
them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another
man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already
fallen.3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left
side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his
nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar
but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed
Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw
accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he
tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry
Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did.7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the
blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps8 and then tried to flee
towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin.
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged
down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in
the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm.,
frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left
side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side;
3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0
cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right
knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm.,
upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal
region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior
cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials
and fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press
people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the
event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national
and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the
Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the
incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by
Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give
information leading to the arrest of the killers.11 Several persons, including
Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on
the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of
the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his
office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that
time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he
cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits
he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting
Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why
his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused,
Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y
Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los
Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because
he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified
that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers
however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer
opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the
aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal
Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits
them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No.
86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on each of
them an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN
(14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No.
86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los Santos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
(20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY
(20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-
48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on
him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No.
86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No.
86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-
49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate
penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision
Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los
Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of
Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual
damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo
Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
had been under detention during the pendency of these
cases shall be credited to them provided that they agreed in
writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to
release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando
Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained
for another cause or charge.
 The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has
become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the
Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is
denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the
decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the
penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion
perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the
information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y
Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as Maximum is
hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of
being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has
been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said
cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme
Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE
ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT
THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME
FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL,
SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED
CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE
ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN
THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG
THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER
AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR
CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE
 VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W"
TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE
CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER,
NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS
SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses,
Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable,
doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the
testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced
only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo
even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at
providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the witness
stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case
as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and
unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several
times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward
announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever
received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his
sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before
announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that he would
cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them
again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them
and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify
more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's
death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial
court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not
enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his
testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his
evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot
disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As
trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions
of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does
not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his
whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a
truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with
imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a
witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the
others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses'
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe
with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the
medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body which
could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. 35 The
contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks
and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage
was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by
contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt
wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with
stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly
disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight
to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is
the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-
operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat.
Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave
testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit
merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to.
Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to
impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the
witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was
being mauled at the Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement
at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 — as he was being
chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and
the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and
the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by
appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took
the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,
must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to
the circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The value of this kind
of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the
original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying
the scene at the time of the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the
only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of
the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can
be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or
by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified
by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part
of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected
to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However, when the
accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for
accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to
prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not
have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were
adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the
defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the
other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including
Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used
the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness
stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until
Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing
objection to their admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to
identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the
accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission
of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that
only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and
Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or
hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only
once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures.
The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate
them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of
Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison
and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang
and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal
code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When,
while several persons, not composing groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused
and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually
killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical
injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all
those who shall have used violence upon the person of the
victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was
 killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course
of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one
distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after
said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the
incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much
as fifty in number65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the
victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force
and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They
followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several
meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the
ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself
against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers
continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor
could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his
assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost
consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant
case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and
consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense the
victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a
yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the
rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found,
Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run
away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the
information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and
spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time
they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of
purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo.
Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among the
conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a
conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act
of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of
the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three
years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, 70 warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity
of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan
and Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following
amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
 (c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., is on leave.
G.R. Nos. 138874-75 January 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL
BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;"
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM," Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over
one’s action.1 Our legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it
would an adult, and it sees youthful misconduct as evidence of unreasoned
or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some
extent of leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is
presumed to have acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another
instance when the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James
Anthony and James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of
the penalties we imposed upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor
at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers,
together with Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape;
and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City
in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal
injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO’; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY
UY who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty
of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts
of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages; (c) ₱150,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration
anchored on the following grounds:
I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER
JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT
BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-
AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION
FOR DNA TESTING.4
The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by
Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño and Balansag in their separate motions for
reconsideration, we deemed it appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a
painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie of evidence presented before
the trial court in response to the movants’ plea for the reversal of their
conviction, still we are convinced that the movants’ guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we
denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James
Andrew’s minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the
crimes were committed. To substantiate such claim, he begs leave and pleads
that we admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the
ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother
James Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrew’s birth in the proffered
Certificate of Live Birth is not legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to
secure from the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato, as well as the National
Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James’ Certificate of Live Birth,
and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers’ motion,
solely on the issue of James Andrew’s minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his
comment.1âwphi1 Attached therewith are clear and legible copies of James’
Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of the City Civil Registrar
of Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry
October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed
only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16,
1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed
on James Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
– When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of
this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is
one degree lower than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.5 On the
other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion
temporal.6 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our
Decision dated February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304,
the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43527 July 3, 1990
ELISEO ARANETA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43745 July 3, 1990
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have
inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death of the
victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused? This is the focal
issue addressed to this Court in this case.
In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, 6th
Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute, herein
petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a petitioner, Eden Ng y
Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged with murder for the
death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to multiple gun shot wounds on
March 23, 1972.
After arraignment, with all the accused entering a plea of not guilty, and
the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated
August 30, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Finding accused Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute and
Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of homicide and there
being proved the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender without any aggravating circumstance to
offset the same, the court sentences each one of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Manuel Esteban, Jr. the sum of P12,000.00
for the death of the latter; the sum of P20,000.00 by way
of moral damages; the sum of P169,600.00 by way of
consequential damages and to proportionately pay the
costs.
2) Acquitting accused Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito
Boy Santiago of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, with costs de oficio. Their release is hereby
ordered unless there is valid ground for further detaining
them.
The gun of Araneta (Exhibit "P") is hereby confiscated in
favor of the State and ordered delivered right away to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
In the event that accused Araneta and Bautista would
appeal, an appeal bond of P14,800.00 for each of them is
hereby fixed.
SO ORDERED. 1
Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista appealed their conviction to the
Court of Appeals.
On February 20, 1976, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming the
decision of the trial court with modification as to the civil liability of
petitioners for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased by decreasing the
same from the amount of P169,600.00 to only P43,200.00. 2
Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista filed separate petitions for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which were consolidated
per resolution of this Court dated September 6, 1976.
Petitioner Araneta, Jr. submits two legal issues for consideration, to wit:
I
ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS AND FINDINGS IN THE
DECISION ITSELF, PETITIONER ARANETA CANNOT BE
CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE; BUT, AT MOST, ONLY OF
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES; and
II
ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS AND FINDINGS IN THE
DECISION ITSELF, PETITIONER ARANETA SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED ON THE GROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE
AND/OR DEFENSE OF STRANGERS. 3
Petitioner Bautista assigns the following errors:
I Araneta, Jr. fired his gun with his left hand (his right hand is atrophied),
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT ARE NOT CLEARLY CONTRARY TO
LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT IN ITS
FINDINGS INDULGED IN SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES TOTALLY UNCALLED FOR AND
COMPLETELY UNWARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ARE
GROUNDED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT AND THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE
CONFLICTING STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND
INFLUENCE HAVE EITHER BEEN OVERLOOKED OR
MISINTERPRETED, WHICH OTHERWISE WILL LEAD TO
ACQUITTAL.4
The facts of this case as found by both the trial court and the appellate court
on the basis of the evidence show the following:
At about a little past midnight of March 22, 1972, while the victim Manuel
Esteban, Jr. and his companions Jaime Roque, Eduardo Saguil, Jesus Dizon
and Charles Go were having a drinking spree at the mezzanine floor of the
Sands Kitchenette, Rizal Avenue, Manila, a napkin container was thrown to
their table coming from a group of three or four persons, which included the
petitioners. The victim approached the group of petitioner Araneta, Jr. after
which a heated argument ensued. Petitioner Bautista pushed the left
shoulder of the victim causing the latter to spin at which time, petitioner
hitting the victim, who was then in a stooping position, at the back. Having
been shot, the victim drew his gun and fired indiscriminately hitting Manuel
de Guzman, a companion of petitioner Araneta, Jr. on his left thigh. The
bullet which wounded De Guzman hit the wall and ricocheted, hitting one of
the accused Eden Ng along his umbilical cord. Petitioner Bautista then held
the victim who was bent forward, on his right wrist and poked a gun at him.
At this point, petitioner Bautista suddenly fired his gun hitting the chest of
the victim. Roque and Saguil together with a bouncer from a nearby Soda
Fountain brought the victim to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he
was pronounced dead on arrival.
We will first dispose of the second issue raised by petitioner Araneta, Jr. that
he should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense and/or defense of
strangers.
The rule is well-settled that an indispensable requirement of self-defense and
defense of strangers under paragraphs 1 and 3, respectively, of Article 11,
Revised Penal Code is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. 5 This
element is not present in the case at bar.
Petitioner Araneta would have Us believe that the unlawful aggression
emanated from the victim alleging that the latter was under heavy influence
of liquor at the time of the incident, that it was he who suddenly accosted
their group because of the napkin container thrown at his table and that he
was the first to fire the shot.
For unlawful aggression to be present in self-defense, there must be an
assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind
on the person defending himself. 6 In this case, there was no actual physical
assault on petitioner Araneta, Jr. or any member of his group. Neither was it
shown that the victim exhibited an intimidating attitude that is offensive and
positively strong, showing the wrongful intent to cause an injury. 7 When the
victim approached the group of Araneta, Jr., presumably to confront them as
to the napkin container thrown at their table, he was not yet brandishing his
gun as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. A mere threatening attitude
on the part of the victim will not constitute unlawful aggression. 8 If there
was any unlawful aggression, it came from the group of petitioner Araneta,
Jr. when Bautista pushed the victim's shoulder after which petitioner
Araneta, Jr. fired the first shot hitting the victim. It was only at this time
when the victim drew his gun and fired indiscriminately. These facts have
been duly established by the evidence for the prosecution.
Petitioner Araneta, as the accused, must establish self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence. 9 He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after he himself admitted shooting the victim. 10
There being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, petitioner
cannot claim the justifying circumstance of self-defense to absolve him from
criminal liability for inflicting injury upon the victim. But for what crime
should he be held liable — homicide or slight physical injuries?
Per the post-mortem findings report prepared by Dr. Abelardo B. Lucero,
Medico Legal Examiner, Manila Metropolitan Police, the victim died of "shock
and hemorrhage due to multiple (2) gunshot wounds in the anterior and
posterior chest lacerating the diaphragm, liver, stomach and spleen." 11 Dr.
Lucero testified that wound No. 1 located at the anterior right chest is a
contact wound because the muzzle of the gun touched the skin of the body of
the victim which is a fatal wound, while wound No. 2 found at the back of the
victim is a slight wound making it possible for the victim to fire a gun even
after sustaining such wound. Per opinion of Dr. Lucero, wound Nos. 1 and 2
have been caused by bullets of different caliber, or at least by different
firearms, with wound No. 2 inflicted ahead of wound No. 1. The trial court
then ruled that wound No. 2 was caused by the gun of petitioner Araneta, Jr.
who was established to have fired first and that wound No. 1 was inflicted by
petitioner Bautista.
Petitioner Araneta, relying on this finding of the trial court, now argues that
wound No. 2 not being a fatal wound but only a slight wound would not
make him criminally liable for the death of the victim. He points out that had
not petitioner Bautista subsequently shot the victim during the scuffle for the
gun of the latter, the victim would not have died. He asserts that since there
was no conspiracy established, the liability of petitioner Araneta, Jr. should
only be for the crime of slight physical injuries.
The State through the Solicitor General in opposing the theory of petitioner
Araneta, Jr. argues that the denomination of wound No. 2 as "slight" merely
refers to the gunshot wound of entry and that the medical findings show that
the victim died due to shock and hemorrhage caused by two gunshot wounds
— wound No. 1 and wound No. 2. The Solicitor General further contends that
since none of the wounds is "thru and thru" and therefore one cannot be the
wound of entry while the other the wound of exit, the conclusion becomes
ineluctable that the two gunshot wounds, one in front and one at the back
caused the shock, hemorrhage and the laceration of the internal organs.
Petitioner Araneta, Jr. retorts by saying that the two (2) gunshot wounds are
"thru and thru" thus resulting in four wounds, two of entry and two of exit;
thus, the "two (2) gunshot wounds" which caused the shock and hemorrhage
resulting in the death of the victim refer to the wounds caused by gunshot
No. 1 fired by petitioner Bautista.
We agree with petitioner Araneta, Jr.
The postmortem findings report details the wounds sustained by the victim
—
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
(1) Gunshot wound of entry marked I measuring 1.5 cm. in
diameter surrounded with powder burns located in the
anterior right chest, midclavicular line at the level of the 4th
cartilage, 51.6 inches from the heel. The bullet is directed
obliquely downwards to the left at an angle of 45 degrees
posteriorly and came out thru gunshot wound of exit I-A
measuring 0.8 cm. x 0.9 cm. located in the left lateral chest
at the level of the 9th intercostal space 46 inches from the
heel, post axillary line fracturing the right 4th cartilage
lacerating the diaphragm, stomach and spleen. (fatal)
(2) Gunshot wound of entry II measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm. with
collar contusion 56 inches from the heel, preceded by 4 cm.
elongated almost triangular reddish superficial abrasion
measuring 0.2. cm. at its lowest and widening upwards to
0.5 cm. at its base, located in the left posterior midlateral
chest and the bullet came out thru gunshot wound of exit II-
 A measuring 1 x 0.9 cm. located in the lateral posterior left
shoulder 59.5 inches from the heel.
The bullet was fired directed obliquely upwards to the left at
an angle of 35 degrees lacerating the skin and subcutaneous
tissues for a distance of 7 cm. and came out thru a rugged
everted gunshot wound of exit II-A, 56 inches from the heel
(slight injury).
xxx xxx xxx 12
We can clearly see that there were four gunshot wounds. The gunshot fired
by petitioner Bautista, produced gunshot wound of entry I located at the
anterior right chest with the bullet coming out thru gunshot wound of exit I-
A in the left lateral chest. The second gunshot fired by petitioner Araneta, Jr.
caused gunshot wound of entry II located in the left posterior midlateral
chest with the bullet coming out thru gunshot wound of exit II-A at the
lateral posterior left shoulder. The bullet fired from the gun of petitioner
Araneta, Jr. only lacerated the skin and subcutaneous tissues, thus, its
classification by Dr. Lucero as a slight injury. The bullet fired from the gun of
petitioner Bautista lacerated the diaphragm, liver, 13 stomach and spleen
proving to be fatal to the victim. There can be no other conclusion except that
the "two gunshot wounds" indicated under the cause of death refer to the
gunshot wounds of entry and exit located at the anterior right chest and the
left lateral chest, respectively, produced by the gunshot fired by petitioner
Bautista which lacerated the diaphragm, liver, stomach and spleen.
The nature of the wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. having been
settled as a slight injury, should he be held responsible for the death of the
victim?
There is no pretension that there was any conspiracy between the
petitioners. There was no concerted action pursuant to a common criminal
design between the petitioners. 14 In the absence of conspiracy, each of the
accused, herein petitioners, is responsible only for the consequences of his
own acts. 15
Thus, in a case where one accused inflicted the mortal wound by stabbing
the victim with a knife while the other two assailants merely hit the victim
with a bamboo on the left arm and the head, the former was held guilty of
murder while the latter was held liable only for lesiones leves or slight
physical injuries. 16 In still another case where two persons attacked a single
victim, one inflicting a fatal wound hacking the victim with a bolo almost
amputating the left arm completely, while the other also using a bolo struck
the victim just below the armpit causing a wound that would heal in ten (10)
days, the one who inflicted the mortal wound was convicted of murder while
the other only of less serious physical injuries. 17
The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound
which did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contributed to it in
order that he may be held liable for homicide. 18 His liability should therefore
be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that petitioner
Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill.
The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than
that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted
homicide and not merely for slight physical injury.
Anent the issues raised by petitioner Bautista, We note that they involve
questions of fact, namely: whether or not he shot the victim and whether or
not he was present at the inception of the shooting incident — which this
Court will not ordinarily review. Except in criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the Supreme
Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, allowed only
on questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition for
review on certiorari, and only when there are special and important reasons
therefore. 19
Petitioner invokes the exceptions that the findings of respondent court is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures, 20 that the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts, 21 and that there was grave abuse of
discretion 22 to justify a review of the findings of facts of respondent court.
Petitioner Bautista primarily decries the fact that the respondent court as
well as the trial court did not give weight to the negative results of the
paraffin test to which he was subjected to nine (9) hours after the shooting
and instead indulged in speculations, surmises and conjectures when they
concluded that "many things had happened between the shooting and the
time Bautista was subjected to paraffin test." 23 He contends that the
supposition of the respondent court that the petitioner being a policeman
must be aware that gunpowder can be easily removed by washing the hands
with vinegar, or even with soap and water and knowing such must have done
so, was totally unfounded and unsupported by evidence.
However, an examination of the records reveals that there are other
circumstances upon which the respondent court based its conclusion that
petitioner Bautista fired his gun, thus —
a) The ballistics results show that the gun of appellant
Bautista was newly oiled. Specifically the finding was that it
has "traces of thick oil." Appellant Bautista failed to refute
the prosecution evidence that his gun at the time of his
examination in the morning of March 23, 1972, was newly
oiled. Neither did he explain the presence of thick oil in his
gun. His obvious purpose of oiling his gun is to remove
traces of gun powder.
 b) The ballistics test itself shows that one chamber in the
gun of Bautista was found to have smoke rings. Smoke
rings, according to the testimony of the ballistics expert,
appears in the chamber of a revolver whose bullet was fired.
Only one chamber had smoke rings. The other five chambers
do not have any. This shows that appellant Bautista fired
only one shot which is in accordance with the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. The lame explanation of
Bautista that the said smoke ring is attributable to the fact
that in the month of February he participated in quelling
student demonstrations, fails to explain why, despite the fact
that his gun is newly oiled, said smoke ring was still present
at that time. The obvious conclusion is that because he was
racing against time, Bautista forgot, in his desire to
exculpate himself, to clean the inner chamber of his service
revolver.24
These circumstances are nevertheless of no moment because of the positive
identification of petitioner Bautista as the person who shot the victim by the
prosecution witness Eduardo Saguil. Petitioner, however, discounts the
testimony of Saguil for the reason that he gave two (2) conflicting statements
— one before the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP) given on March 23, 1972
wherein he failed to identify the person who fired the fatal shot and the other
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on March 24, 1972 wherein
he identified petitioner as the assailant.
This apparent inconsistency in the statements of Saguil was satisfactorily
explained at the trial during his direct and cross examinations. He testified
that he had no choice but to sign the sworn statements given before the MMP
because he was intimidated by the investigating officers who did not want
him to implicate petitioner Bautista as the person who shot the victim since
petitioner was their comrade. In fact, when he insisted that it was Bautista
who shot the victim, the investigating officer Rolando Atanacio stopped the
taking down of the statement and instead indicated therein that Saguil
refused to continue with the same. It is for this reason that Saguil together
with another prosecution witness Jaime Roque decided to proceed to the NBI
to give another sworn statement this time disclosing the whole truth.
Petitioner Bautista deplores the fact that the respondent court chose to give
full credence to the testimony of Roque placing the former at the scene of the
incident prior to the actual shooting and disregarded his version that he
merely responded to the crime scene as a police officer after he heard the
shots coming from the Sands Kitchenette.
Roque affirmatively identified petitioner Bautista as the person who, during
the confrontation pushed the victim on the shoulder making him spin.
Petitioner Bautista on the other hand, alleged that he was in the vicinity of
the crime scene that night of March 22, 1972 because he conveyed his
compadre Arsenio Sanchez whom he accidentally met to take a ride for La
Loma. However, Sanchez was never presented as a witness to corroborate
this claim of petitioner. The trial court properly observed that the non-
presentation of Sanchez is an evidence wilfully suppressed which if presented
will be adverse to Bautista. 25
Petitioner Bautista also capitalizes on the failure of Roque to identify him and
his co-accused in his sworn statement given before the NBI on March 24,
1972. This failure is explained by the fact that at the start he did not know
their names, but merely recognized their faces. It was only when the pictures
of the accused were shown that he came to know of their names.
We sustain the trial court's conclusion on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses Saguil and Roque, 26 as it is in a better position to decide the
question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their behavior and manner of testifying.27 The impressions of the court a
quo on this matter is binding upon Us unless there appears a grave abuse of
discretion or an obvious misapprehension of facts. 28 The trial court noted
that "no evil or bad motive was shown to have existed before the incident
which would prompt Roque and Saguil to testify in the manner they did if
such were not the fact. 29 The absence of evidence as to an improper motive
actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain
no improper motive existed and their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit. 30 Hence, the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses that he
was at the crime scene at the inception of the incident and pointing to him as
the person who confronted and last shot the victim together with all the
attendant circumstances cannot be overcome by the mere denials of
petitioner Bautista. 31
As We uphold the factual findings of the respondent court, We therefore rule
that petitioner should be held liable for the death of the victim by inflicting
the fatal wound upon him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 20, 1976
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court dated August 20,
1973 is hereby AFFIRMED as to the conviction of Benjamin Bautista y
Mendoza for homicide, and MODIFIED as regards Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y
Macute, who is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted homicide penalized under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code, and considering the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any other attendant circumstances, petitioner
Araneta, Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months
of prision correccional.
The civil indemnity for the death of Manuel Esteban, Jr. is hereby increased
from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
Benjamin Bautista is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the damages
as herein modified.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and convicted of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, 2 was meted by the trial
court 3 the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court
committed the following errors, to wit:
I Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE
CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR
ALLEGED "KNOWLEDGE" OF TH6E CRIME MORE THAN
FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
THE WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 5
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its Brief,
and duly supported by the evidence on record:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
[Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki's
houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy
cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back
of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14).
Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the
store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his
rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his
house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters
distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24).
Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the
kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his
employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin
stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw
4 appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9,
1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was
sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering
between life and death) (Ibid.).
from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo")
rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a
blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the
illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax")
inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p.
22).
Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside
the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a
brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the
nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and
informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki.
Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they
saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying
prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's
drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki
was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17). 6
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out
their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. He posits
that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September
17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly concluded
that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this gruesome crime only
on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was merely the
date 7 when Rondon and Batin executed their respective
affidavits, 8 narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15,
1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malaki's store. As
to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records
are ample testimonial evidence negating appellant's protestation, to wit: (1)
after having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin
immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed
him that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the
crime scene; 9 (2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU
detachment in their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who
robbed Malaki on that fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a similar
statement later at the Silago Police Station.11
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the police
blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right away by
Batin to the crime.12 We do not believe, however, that it was necessary for the
prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police
blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's
case. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as
evidence is not indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was
not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the
Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to
impeach Batin's credibility as witness. 14 Having failed to do so, appellant
cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which
appellant himself should have done.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only
on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of
the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony less credible. The
non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
experience. 15 In fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved in
criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, 16 is of
judicial notice. 17 At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is
that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate
court. 18 This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial
court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor,
conduct and attitude at the
trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when
patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial
court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence, 20 we found none in this case.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the admission
as evidence of Malaki's wallet 21 together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's
residence certificate; 22 (2) his identification card;23 and (3) bunch of
keys, 24 violates his right against self-incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant
sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation,
wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid
Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under
our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ."
It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27 It does not
apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the
question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for
his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also
for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it
would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in
his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and
defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything
that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential
articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it
is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, .
. . but testimonial compulsion 28
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of
evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III,
Section 12, viz:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him. (Emphasis ours.)
 xxx xxx xxx
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in
uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, 29 is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly,
appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own
counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation.
Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the
constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do
not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence
certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the
crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very
wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card,
residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore,
even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the
same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of
other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt
as perpetrator of the crime charged.
We, now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he demurs on
the prosecution's evidence, contending that they are insufficient to sustain
his conviction.
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled
that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all
the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these
essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5)
circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which by their
"concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy the requirements for
the conviction of the appellant, 32 specifically: (1) appellant was seen by
Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in
his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their
discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and
he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to
multiple stab wounds", 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on
August 6, 1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet
underneath a stone at the seashore in Barangay Hingatungan; 36 (4)
appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he
accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's
wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's flight and his subsequent disappearance from
Hingatungan immediately after the incident. 38
On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not inspire belief. He
maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together with his
wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a gambling spree allegedly in
the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did
not bother to call appellant's wife to the witness stand to corroborate
appellant's alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any
other person who may have seen the appellant in the said place, if only to
provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak
in view of the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses, 39 it becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the
defense to present any corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that appellant
was in his house when the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant
must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. 41 In
this case, appellant himself admitted that his house was just about eighty
(80) meters away from the house of
Malaki. 42 It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to
negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the trial.
Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while
gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in
the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly
inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why
appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found
Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from appellant's
purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had
knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a
stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same. 43
In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery,
appellant was correctly convicted by the trial court of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
 G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT,
ARNOLD GOMEZ Y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS Y DELANTAR, AND
ROGER JALANDONI Y ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants
Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando
Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with
murder before the Las Piñas Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-
0854.1crallawlibrary
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in
the evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2
Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote
Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified
as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having
entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for
further questioning.2crallawlibrary
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi
behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang
Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve
himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two
suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one
suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone
fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man
whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came
from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his
gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a
taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver
they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las
Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito)
immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that
accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted
robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that
Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3
Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3crallawlibrary
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had
killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38
caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the
crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the
dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical
Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4crallawlibrary
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in
accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with
the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the
police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution
presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas
and some of his co-accused.5crallawlibrary
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time
of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was receiving police pay of
P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent P99,999 for burial
expense, P16,000.00 for the interment services, and P50,000.00 for purchase
of the cemetery lot.6crallawlibrary
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or
testify in the case,7 the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum on
March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to
an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of
the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty
of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the
possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with
P165,999.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as exemplary damages, and P2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of
earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the
accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since
the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime
before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this
Court.10crallawlibrary
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence
that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting
PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could prove
their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 12crallawlibrary
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented
sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused.
Thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the
taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The
officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the
questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of
the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led
to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab
drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to
the police station where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to
show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police
afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he
saw running away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged
PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to “Kua Justin”
as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in
Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in
entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all
named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by
Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of
“Kua Justin,” one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an
organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile
phones with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms
qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In “aid of armed men,” the
men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of
the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they
are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed
firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not
among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as qualifying a homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case
may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed
firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in
conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas,
exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and
entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.
But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of
the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken
from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest,
a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—
the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest
had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at
the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment
using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to
current jurisprudence.18crallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June
14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-
appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando
Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime
of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the
award of exemplary damages by increasing it to P30,000.00, with an
additional P50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 212196 January 12, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused
Ramil Doria Dahil (Dahil) and Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate
Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and
Castro were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for
the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or
deliver to a poseur buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT TEN
THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug, without
authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of
20.6642 grams of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, in the Information which reads: That on or about the 29th day of
September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
custody and control Five (5) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY TWO
TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (20.6642), which is a dangerous drug,
without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of
130.8286 grams of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, in the Information which reads: That on or about the 29th day of
September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
custody and control One (1) brick in form wrapped in masking tape of dried
marijuana fruiting tops weighing ONE HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and
EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A
GRAM (130.8286), which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
Dahil, on the other hand, filed a motion for reinvestigation and his
arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented PO2
Arieltino Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz)and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as
witnesses.
On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned
through inadvertence.6 The RTC informed the parties of the situation and the
defense counsel did not interpose any objection to the reopening of the case
and the arraignment of Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he pleaded
not guilty. Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he was adopting
all the evidence already adduced.
Version of the Prosecution
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the
agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3,
conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the information they
received that a certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried
marijuana in TB Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino,
Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of PDEA formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4) police
officers, namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team
leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2
Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as
his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening.
Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz together with the informant went to the house of
Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When PO2 Corpuz and
the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The
informant then introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil
asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying and the latter answered
that he would buy ₱200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took
out from his pocket six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to
PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items, PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) ₱100.00
marked bills to Castro.
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had
been consummated. The rest of the buy-bust team then rushed to their
location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and
recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing
marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched the person of Castro and confiscated
from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then
brought by the buy-bust team to the PDEA office. There, the seized items
were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1Licu. First, the six (6) plastic sachets
of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-
1" to "A-6" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5)
plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked with "B-1" to "B-5" and
with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Finally, the marijuana brick
confiscated from Castro was marked "C-RDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then
prepared the request for laboratory examination, affidavits of arrest and
other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items7 was also
prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz
brought the confiscated drugs to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded positive results for
marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential
contents of the prospective testimony of the forensic chemist, to wit:
1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3 Dela
Cruz;
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory,Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga;
3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;
4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the
substance subject of the letter request with qualification that said
request was not subscribedor under oath and that the forensic
chemist has no personal knowledge as from whom and where said
substance was taken;
5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in
Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002; and
6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7,
2007.9 After much delay, the public prosecutor was finally able to orally
submit his formal offer of exhibits after almost two years, or on January 6,
2009.10 He offered the following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of
Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked
money, (4) Brown envelope containing the subject illegal drugs, (5) Inventory
of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination Request, and (7) Chemistry
Report No. D-0518-2002.
Version of the Defense
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver
came looking for him after he had arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver
with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked by the
unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered
that there were many persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted
from the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into one of
the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal
selling and possession of marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was on 4th
Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of
chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he knew a certain
Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the
said person and then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought
him to Clark Air Base where he was charged withillegal possession of
marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for
violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 each for the crime of
illegal sale of marijuana;Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of
₱300,000.00 each for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of
selling and possession of illegal drugs against the accused. All the elements
of the crimes were established. To the trial court, the evidence proved that
PO2 Corpuz bought marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the
marijuana purchased and then handed the marked money to Castro.
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC
ruled that the same was not fatal considering that a photocopy of the marked
money was presented and identified by the arresting officers.12 It did not give
credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it
could easily be concocted with no supporting proof.
 CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the Accused-
Appellants,13 they argued that there were irregularities on the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from them. The
prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
which generated clouds of doubts as tothe identity of the seized items
presented in evidence.14
In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of the crime of illegal sale and possession of
marijuana. As to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that the
prosecution witnesses were able to account for the series of events that
transpired, from the time the buy-bust operation was conducted until the
time the items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its
view, the prosecution was able to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana
actually took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz,
there was an actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6)
sachets containing marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2)
₱100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to transact ₱200.00 worth of the
illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of marijuana, was also thus
established by the prosecution.17 Another five (5) plastic sachets of
marijuana were recovered from Dahil’s possession while one (1) brick of
marijuana from Castro’s possession.18
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused
during the buy-bust operation were the same drugs presented before the
RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana,
which were sold by Dahil toPO2 Corpuz were marked "A-1" to "A-6" and with
letters "RDRC," "ADGC"and "EML," the five (5) plastic sachets recovered in
the possession of Dahil were marked "B-1" to "B-5" and with the initials
"ADGC" and "EML," while the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was
marked "C-RDRC."19
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of
custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu testified that the said drugs were
marked at the police station. An inventory of the seized items was made as
shown by the Inventory Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad
Pamintuan. The Request for Laboratory Examination revealed that the
confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to the PNP crime
laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry Report No. D-
0518-2002 showed that the specimen gave positive results to the test of
marijuana. The accused failed to show that the confiscated marijuana items
were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to the crime
laboratory for examination.20
Hence, this appeal.
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement
officers substantially complied with the chain of custody procedure required
by R.A. No. 9165.
The Court’s Ruling
Let it be underscored that appeal incriminal cases throws the whole case
open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the
liberty of the accused, this Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed
and examined the records of the case and finds that there is merit in the
appeal. The Court holds that that there was no unbroken chain of custody
and that the prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of
operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal
transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-
bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention
of the framers of the law. It is susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious
of which is its use as a tool for extortion.22
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if
not indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous drugs should be
established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were the
same substances boughtduring the buy-bust operation. This rigorous
requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs
the function of ensuring thatunnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.23 In People v. Catalan,24 the Court said:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus
delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving
the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs
are missing but also when there are substantial gapsin the chain of custody
of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the
evidence presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody,
Section 1(b) of Dangerous DrugsBoard Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
which implements R.A. No. 9165, explains the said term as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer
of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21
(1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photographthe same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR)of R.A. No. 9165 enumeratesthe procedures to be observed
by the apprehending officers toconfirm the chain of custody, to wit:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrantis served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;
xxx
The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied
with.
Although the prosecution offered inevidence the Inventory of the Property
Seized signed by the arresting officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the
procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not observed. The
said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2)
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official who shall be required tosign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
First,the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after
seizure and confiscation as it was only done at the police station. Notably,
Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In this case,
however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA Office Region 3
was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The
prosecution also failed to give sufficient justification for the delayed conduct
of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:
Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?
A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.
Q: And did he sign that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he when he signed that?
A: In our office, sir.
Q: Already in your office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?
A: Our investigator, sir.
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or
equipment for the preparation of the documents so, we invited him to
our office.25
PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excusethat they failed to immediately conduct an
inventory because they did not bring with them the material or equipment for
the preparation of the documents. Such explanation is unacceptable
considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of
weeks.26 They should have been prepared with their equipment even before
the buy-bust operation took place.
Second,there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the
Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant
dela Cruzwho prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the other hand,
testified that it was their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1
Licu’s testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their
investigator.28
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were
photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: Q: After
you arrested Ramil Dahil,did you conduct the inventory of the alleged seized
items?
A: Yes, sir (sic).
Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: In our office, ma’am
Q: Were pictures takenon the alleged seized items together with
Ramil Dahil?
A: No, ma’am.29
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this
was:
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you
conduct an inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the
inventory?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized items?
A: Pictures were takenon the accused, ma’am.
[Emphasis supplied]
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2
Corpuz testified that no pictures of the seized items were taken while SPO1
Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague
statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the
alleged drugs were indeed taken. The records are bereft of any document
showing the photos of the seized items. The Court notes that SPO1 Licu
could have misunderstood the question because he answered that "pictures
were taken on the accused" when the question referred to photographs of the
drugs and not of the accused.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were preserved.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates that
substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly comply with the law
does not necessarily render the arrestof the accused illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible.30 The issue of non-compliance
with the said section is not of admissibility, but of weight to be given on the
evidence.31 Moreover, Section 21 of the IRR requires "substantial" and not
necessarily "perfect adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.32
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved, the proper chain of custody of the seized items must be shown.
The Court explained in People v. Malillin33 how the chain of custody or
movement of the seized evidence should be maintained and why this must be
shown by evidence, viz:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution
must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows: first, the seizure and marking, ifpracticable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized bythe apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court.
First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the
Apprehending Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they have been seized from the
accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that
the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimens will use the markingsas reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the markedevidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus,
preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.35
It must be noted that marking isnot found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different
from the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the said law.
Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this Court had
consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti.36
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed
their initials on the seized items. They, however, gave little information on
how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless, that the marking
was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only
placed at the police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, to wit: Q:
So, after recovering all those marijuana bricks and plastic sachets of
marijuana and the marked money from the accused, what else did you do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to
our office, sir.
Q: So, in your office, what happened there?
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for
crime lab examination, joint affidavit of arrest, booking sheet, and all other
documents necessary for the filing of the case against the two (2), sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you
confiscated from the accused, what did you do with those?
A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized
items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the
unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must conduct guesswork on how
the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in
transit. Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent
their immediate marking thereof.
Still, there are cases whenthe chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as
when the marking of the seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the
police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the
presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent
application of the requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the
conviction of the accused in this case. Aside from the fact that the police
officers did not immediately place their markings on the seized marijuana
upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no showing that the
markings were made in the presence of the accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs when
they were about to send them to Camp Olivas for forensic examination. This
damaging testimony was corroborated by the documentary evidence offered
by the prosecution. The following documents were made at the PDEA Office:
(1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of
Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory Examination Request. Glaringly, only the
Laboratory Examination Request cited the markings on the seized drugs.
Thus, it could only mean that when the other documents were being
prepared, the seized drugs had not been marked and the police officers did
not have basis for identifying them. Considering that the seized drugs wereto
be used for different criminal charges, it was imperative for the police officers
to properly mark them at the earliest possible opportunity. Here, they failed
in such a simple and critical task. The seized drugs were prone to mix-up at
the PDEA Office itself because of the delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the
RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC RD,39 Exhibit A-5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did
not have the initials of the apprehending officers on the back. Bearing in
mind the importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the
procedure are too conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They placed
uncertainty as to the identity of the corpus delicti from the moment of seizure
until it was belatedly marked at the PDEA Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of
the seized drug by the apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the
case. The officer testified that he marked the confiscated items only after he
had returned tothe police station. Such admission showed that the marking
was not done immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse of
a significant intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to
the Investigating Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the police officer
who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who
will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing.42 This is
a necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating
officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary
documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating
officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the
required documents.
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly,
there was no testimony from the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized
items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a
drug-related case toeffectively perform his work without having custody of
the seized items. Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to
resort to guesswork as to whether PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the
seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had
custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting
his investigation on the same items.
In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to
establish the chain of custody as the apprehending officer did not transfer
the seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending officer kept the
alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred
them to the forensic chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of
custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said case.
Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the
Forensic Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic
chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the
laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance. In
this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided
some information on the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas, to wit:
Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought
to the crime laboratory, who brought the same to the crime lab?
A: Me and my back-up, ma’am.
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?
A: I think it was the following day, ma’am.45
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was
offered on how the seized marijuana was handled and transferred from the
PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs
overnight without giving detailson the safekeeping of the items. The most
palpable deficiency of the testimony would be the lack of information as to
who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on
the subject drugs, did not appear in court despite the numerous subpoenas
sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on
the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated
testimony of the forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the
subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the stipulations was "that said forensic
chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the letter-request
with qualification that said request was not subscribed or under oath and
that forensic chemist has no personalknowledge as from whom and where
said substance was taken."47 This bolsters the fact that the forensic chemist
had no knowledge as to who received the seized marijuana at the crime
laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link.
The police officer, who both served as apprehending and investigating officer,
claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but
there was no showing who received the drug from him. The records also
showed that he submitted the sachet to the laboratory only on the next day,
without explaining how he preserved his exclusive custody thereof overnight.
All those facts raised serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized item have not been fatally compromised. Hence, the accused inthe
said case was also acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic
Chemist to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic
chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the criminal case. No
testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever as to how the
drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was
transferred to the court. The forensic chemist should have personally
testified on the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties resorted to a general
stipulation of her testimony. Although several subpoenae were sent to the
forensic chemist, only a brown envelope containing the seized drugs arrived
in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links in the chain of and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are being
custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the location of the held for some other lawful cause.
misplaced marked money, which was not even indispensable in the criminal
case. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this
decision and to inform this Court of the date of the actual release from
The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of copy.
testimony of the forensic chemist. No explanation was given regarding the
custody of the seized drug in the interim - from the time it was turned over to SO ORDERED.
the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records of
the said case did not show what happened to the allegedly seized shabu
between the turnover by the investigator to the chemist and its presentation JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
in court. Thus, since there was no showing that precautions were taken to Associate Justice
ensure that there was no change in the condition of that object and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof, the WE CONCUR:
accused therein was likewise acquitted.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there
was no compliance with the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 because of the inadequate physical inventory and the lack of
photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro.
No explanation was offered for the non-observance of the rule. The
prosecution cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section 21 of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The four links required
to establish the proper chain of custody were breached with irregularity and
lapses.

The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving
the presumption of regularity of the performance of official duties could apply
in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the performance of duty could
not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records
were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The presumption stands
when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of
regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be presumed innocent.52

Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of
the seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before the
Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the
accused.53

For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by
the accused. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 27,
2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and
Rommel Castro y Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them