Arrest Search Seizure Digests 1 14

Arrest, Search and Seizure
1. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. BONGCARAWAN, respondent 2
2. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. SALANGUIT, respondent 4
3. SOLIVEN, petitioner vs. MAKASIAR, respondent 6
4. MICROSOFT CORP, petitioner vs. MAXICORP, INC, respondent 7
5. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CA, respondent 9
6. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. TIU WON CHUA, respondent 10
7. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, respondent 11
8. UMIL, petitioner vs. RAMOS, respondent 12
9. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. NUEVAS, respondent 14
10. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. DEL ROSARIO, respondent 16
11. ROBIN PADILLA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent 18
12. CABALLES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent 20
13. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. LIBNAO, respondent 22
14. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CANTON, respondent 24
(SandeeSuan) Page 1 of 25
[G.R. No. 143944 July 11, 2002]
1. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. BONGCARAWAN, respondent
FA C T S
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Pp. – Win)
- Filed a criminal case against defendant for violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
- Argued that defendant have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing
approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription. It was found
out when the security personnel of M/V Super Ferry 5 requested him to open his
Samsonite suitcase
- Trial court rendered a decision convicting defendant of reclusion perpetua and fine of 500
000
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Bongcarawan – Lost)
- Argued that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired
pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
- Argued that that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge
that the same contained "shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess
the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged.21
- Appealed to SC the decision of the trial court
ISSUE
- Whether or not defendant if guilty for violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
HELD
CONCLUSION: Defendant is guilty. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.16 Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the
search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case
of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State."19 The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
- As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,23 this Court has ruled that to
warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of
such articles.24 It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict
an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.25 Hence, the
burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or
animus possidendi.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence,
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
- There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace
and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does
not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the
state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until
now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
- The accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and
incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. In this case, the accused-appellant
admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected.28 Why
he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination
lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses
and brushes would be confiscated,29 but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not
his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches.30
[G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001]
2. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. SALANGUIT, respondent
FA C T S
-
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Pp. – Lost)
- Filed a case against accused for violations of R.A. No. 6425 for possessing shabu and
marijuana
- Argued that after showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes
and his group started searching the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a
white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams
- Trial court rendered decisions convicting accused for six (6) months of arresto mayor and
a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional for possessing the
shabu and reclusion perpetua and fine of 700 000 for possessing the marijuana
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Salanguit – Win)
- Argued and assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia but only of shabu; (2) that the search
warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be
searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
- Also argued that the search warrant only authorized the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana
ISSUE
- Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime charged
HELD
CONCLUSION: Accused is guilty for possessing the shabu but not of marijuana. He is only
sentenced to (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months.
The appeal is partially granted
RULE:
- Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b
) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the
evidence before the police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with
by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case
APPLICATION:
- In this case, Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void
because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and
the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court. However, the fact
that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
- Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession
of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.
However, , in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425,"
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search
and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
sets of paraphernalias (sic).”
- Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity. This contention is without merit. However,
the rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched. This is obtaining in the case
- The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on
the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party.
This is contested by accused-appellant.
- Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to
the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets
of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed,
the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other
items subsequently found.
- The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of
a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu.
However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one
arrested and the premises within his immediate control.18 The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a
weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by
SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
- The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality
to justify their seizure. In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession
of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not
have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to
prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in
accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of
the drug must be upheld.
[G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988]
3. SOLIVEN, petitioner vs. MAKASIAR, respondent
FA C T S
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Soliven, et al.. – Lost)
- Argued that (1) they were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) their rights
were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, cannot initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
- Appealed to SC the validity of the criminal case
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Makasiar, et al. – Win)
- Filed a criminal case against Petitioners for libel
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioners are validly prosecuted for libel
HELD
CONCLUSION: Petitioners are validly prosecuted. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
- Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On
March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and
upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a
prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16,
1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support
- It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
- Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
[G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990]
4. MICROSOFT CORP, petitioner vs. MAXICORP, INC, respondent
FA C T S
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Microsoft Corporation and Lotus Dev’t Corporation – Win)
- Argued that there was probable cause for issuing the warrant and the things confiscated
are violation of copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49
("Section 29 of PD 49")4 and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code ("RPC"). This was supported by NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"),
and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante") who testified on what they discovered
during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications
from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities
using petitioners’ products.
- Appealed to SC the decision of CA
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Maxicorp Inc. – Lost)
- Filed a case to nullify the search warrants and to return the confiscation of their
properties as instituted by Petitioner on the ground that there was no probable
cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants.”
- CA promulgated a decision in their favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not the search warrants for Petitioner are validly issued
HELD
CONCLUSION: The search warrants and the confiscation are valid except with respect to
articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and
96-454. The appeal is partially granted.
RULE:
- Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally
just and proper."19 Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.20
- The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,24 not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
- A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be
seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to
those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential
abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be
committed
- In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant
shall issue "in connection with one specific offense." The articles described must bear a
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued.34 Thus, this rule requires that the
warrant must state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended
for use in the commission of a specific offense.
- It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow.38 The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or
precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the
property or its character is a matter of concern.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, for purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only
proof that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant application
proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he
purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’
software.27 Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit,
affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit.28 Pante, the computer
technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners’ software on the same
computer unit.29 There was a comparison between petitioners’ genuine software and
Maxicorp’s software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.
30 Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of "Joel Diaz," which petitioners
explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more
than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
- This also applies to the Court of Appeals’ ruling on Sacriz’s testimony. The fact that Sacriz
did not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the
existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited
to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying,
assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit
goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses on such other acts stand
untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine
personally and thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine
probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court.
- Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The
articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also
specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e)
specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized
copying of petitioners’ software. This language meets the test of specificity.40
- However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c)
states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
- The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or
other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the
description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its
licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the
Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to
products used in copyright infringement or unfair competition.
[G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998]
5. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CA, respondent

FA C T S
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (CA, Judge Casanova, Hussain, et al. – Win)
- Filed a case for the nullification of the search warrant and confiscation of the firearms and
explosives owned by Respondents as instituted by Petitioner
- Argued that the place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. The place searched was Apartment No. 1. It is a place
other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's
Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
- Argued that the search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of
the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being
handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in
violation of the law
- The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the
warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in
violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE
- Whether or not the search warrant and the confiscation was valid
HELD
CONCLUSION: The search warrant and the confiscation was invalid. The appeal is dismissed
APPLICATION: In this case, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical
configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to
make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even
after having received the warrant — which directs that the search be "limited only to the
premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" — thus literally excluding the
apartment units at the rear of the store — they did not ask the Judge to correct said
description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be
searched — clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to
Judge Bacalla in support of their application — was sufficient particularization of the general
identification of the place in the search warrant
- The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical
error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the
search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on
the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the
warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had
written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind
- The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as
well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would
open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search. 
[G.R. No. 149878 July 1, 2003]
6. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. TIU WON CHUA, respondent
FA C T S
- Filed a case against accused with the crime of illegal possession of a regulated drug, i.e.,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu,"
- Argued that by virtue of a search warrant, they were able to obtain the shabu
- Trial court rendered a decision convicting accused
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Chua, et al. – Lost)
- Argued that the search warrant was issued in the name of Timothy Tiu but the real name
of accused is Tiu Won. It also did not include appellant Qui Yalin. Thus, because of this
defect, the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an
illegal search, the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
ISSUE
- Whether or not the search warrant was valid
HELD
CONCLUSION: The search warrant was valid. Accused are guilty of the crime charged. The
appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon "probable
cause"; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge
must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.8
- A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant,9
especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related
activities of the accused. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it
contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.10 We
have also held that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not
invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described
APPLICATION:
- In this case, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the
correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because
the place to be searched was described properly. Besides, the authorities conducted
surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently
implementing it. They can therefore be presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity
of the persons and the place to be searched although they may not have specifically known
the names of the accused. Armed with the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B was
conducted
- We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it
was not part of the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is
mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly
described in the warrant.12 Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful
arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach or
control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing
violence or of escaping.13 In this case, appellants were arrested inside the apartment,
whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.
(SandeeSuan) P a g e 10 o f 2 5
[G.R. No. 149462 March 29, 2004]
7. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, respondent
FA C T S
- Filed a case against accused for violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, R.A. 6425 or illegal possession
of drugs
- Argued that the police officers by virtue of a search warrant was able to obtain the drugs
at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City where
accused was present
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Del Norte – Win
- Argued that the prosecution failed to establish who owned the house where the search
was conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did not automatically make her
the owner of the marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant
specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be searched, and that
since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting the confiscated drugs
as evidence against her
- Argued that the marijuana seized as a result of the search is inadmissible due to the
irregularity of the search warrant which contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not
Priscilla del Norte. She alleges that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she claimed she
saw Ising nearby and pointed her to the authorities, but her efforts were futile – the
authorities arrested her.
- Appealed to SC the decision of the decision of the trial court
ISSUE
HELD
CONCLUSION: Accused is not guilty. He is acquitted. The appeal is granted
RULE:
- The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be
searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes
in the name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant,
provided the place to be searched is properly described.
- In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, we cannot countenance the irregularity of the search warrant. The authorities
did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did not
conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the
warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials
informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the
same person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. The authorities based
their knowledge on pure hearsay.
- On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's witnesses failed to establish
appellant's ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for
their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented.
[G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991]
8. UMIL, petitioner vs. RAMOS, respondent
FA C T S
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Umil, et al. – Lost)
- Filed a writ of habeas corpus to question their arrest as members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines
- Argued that the questioned arrests are made without warrant such that it violated their
constitutional rights
- Appeal to SC the decision of CA
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Ramos, et al. – Win)
ISSUE
- Whether or not
HELD
CONCLUSION: Petitioners are not illegally arrested without a warrant. The petitions are
dismissed.
RULE:
- Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
- It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest
APPLICATION:
- In this case, these requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other
cases at bar.
- In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched
to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential
information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the
information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among
the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump
along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same
information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes,
Biñan, Laguna. 12
- It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests
without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2)
safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon)
were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their
exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as
residents or occupants thereof.
- In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on
the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers,
where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis
supplied)
- In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December
1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil
Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to
Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at
7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
- In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA
courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the
unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.
- This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a
Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest
without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned
arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but
on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a
long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the
arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual
facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
[G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007]
9. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. NUEVAS, respondent
FA C T S
- Filed a case against accused for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425
- Argued that the drug was found out in possession of accused by PO3 Teofilo B. Fami
(Fami) and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) who conducted a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo
City
- CA promulgated a decision convicting accused
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Nuevas, Din, and Inocencio – Win)
- Argued that they were illegally searched and arrested without a warrant for there was no
basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection of the plastic bags of Nuevas
and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time
- Appealed to SC the decision of CA except Nuevas
ISSUE
- Whether or not accused were illegally searched and arrested without a warrant
HELD
CONCLUSION: Accused Din and Inocencio were illegally searched and arrested without a
warrant. They are acquitted. The appeal is granted.
RULE:
- Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.35 The constitutional
proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
APPLICATION:
- In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The
searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a
lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.”
- Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and
Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In
Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside
a blue cloth.43 In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was
"packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in
plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.45
- However, there is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag
with the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate
attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police,
gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as an
informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find
excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court
would have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. But with respect
to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had
actually been given.
- The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted
into surrendering something incriminating to authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s testimonies do
not show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify
on Din’s composure—whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time—which fact we find
necessary to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any
permission made by the police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by
Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the
validity of consented search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms,
for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof.
- Turning to Inocencio’s case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the
crime charged. Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought
to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying.58 Taking a
look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the
same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to
Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to
illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that
Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the
illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no part in any
delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
[G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999]
10. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. DEL ROSARIO, respondent
FA C T S
- Filed a case against accused, with, Jun, Boy Santos, and Dodong, for the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and
killed her
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Del Rosaio – Win)
- Argued that there was presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his
co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya and that he
was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and
"Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide
- Also argued that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of him within the meaning of Sec.
5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court
ISSUE
HELD
CONCLUSION: Accused is not guilty. He is acquitted. The appeal is granted
RULE:
- A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act
done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as
to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.
- Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2)
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest,
and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense
of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into
custody has committed the crime.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption
from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and
unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused
from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and
was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.
- In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be
expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances
would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a
person whom he only saw for the first time that day.
- In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the
driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by
asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill
since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to
an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime
since he was ordered to help them escape.
- The arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier
explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was
arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were
not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
[G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997]
11. ROBIN PADILLA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

FA C T S
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Padilla – Lost)
- Argued (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential
agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms;
and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (CA and Pp. – Win)
- Filed a criminal case against Petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under
P.D. 1866
- Argued that the firearms were caught when Petitioner engaged in a hit and run incident which was
chased by the police and successfully apprehended him. The police obtain from the accused one
(1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with
ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions,
without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
- CA promulgated a decision convicting the accused
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner was validly arrested without a warrant
HELD
CONCLUSION: Petitioner was validly arrested. He is guilty and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day, as maximum. The appeal is dismissed.
RULE:
- Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
- Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at
once to the scene.”
- The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, 44 are as
follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured
in a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then
sought to arrest petitioner. As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave
chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having
sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he
found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who
effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
- Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith
& Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as
he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
- Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event
or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner, 38 its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented
hood and railings thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in
the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information
- The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they
came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his
hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the
M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.
- Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done
by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first
instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search
58 of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the
arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was contemporaneous
with the arrest
- Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith,
a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search,
that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run)
or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or
the proceeds of some criminal offense.
- Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the
face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the
records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances.
- The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension.
Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical
purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to
be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab
the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question
and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering
inconsistent excuses
[G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002]
12. CABALLES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
FA C T S
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Caballes – Win)
- Argued that his constitutional right was violated when the police officers searched his
vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when samples of
the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction
- Argued that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol,
merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary
to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any
consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained
in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (CA and Pp. – Lost)
- Filed a criminal case against Petitioner for theft
- Argued that Petitioner with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable
Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said
owner National Power Corp. It was found out when Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep of Petitioner unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves and searched it
- CA promulgated a decision convicting Petitioner
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner’s constitutional right was violated so as to acquit him of the crime
of theft
HELD
CONCLUSION: Petitioner’s constitutional right was violated. He is acquitted. The appeal is
granted
RULE:
- The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute
but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4)
consented warrantless search;11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.13
- Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to
the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3)
flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a
fixed area.
- This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom")
of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers
that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline,
he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so;
(4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;32 (5) the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of
marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one
who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused
belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.33
- Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is
not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.
In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.38
- Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search
is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.42 The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.43 Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location;
(3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;44 (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;45 (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.46 It is the State which has the burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given.47
APPLICATION:
- In this case, none of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's
vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential
report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle
which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with
cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
- It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. The articles were neither
transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what
was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask
petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is
not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search
- Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle
"with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the
search. He claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and
how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged
"consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity,
which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 
(SandeeSuan) P a ge 21 o f 2 5
[G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003]
13. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. LIBNAO, respondent
FA C T S
(a) Plaintiff-Appellee’s Arguments (Pp. – Win)
- Filed a case against accused for violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a
transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos
- Argued that the drugs was found out when SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down
a passing tricycle in a checkpoint where accused were seated inside. In front of them was
a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked
about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located
at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag. As soon as the barangay
captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-
accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in
plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
(b) Accused-Appellant’s Arguments (Libnao and Valencia – Lost)
- Argued that her arrest was unlawful for it was on the absence of a warrant for her arrest.
She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not
committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns
the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or
under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any
evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
- Only accused Libnao appealed to SC the decision of the trial court
ISSUE
- Whether or not accused was validly searched and arrested
HELD
CONCLUSION: Accused was validly searched and arrested. She is guilty of the crime charged
sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
The appeal is dismissed.
RULE:
- Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.10 Peace
officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection.11 When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction.12
- In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by
the accused;
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting
suspiciously;
(c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would
transport a quantity of marijuana;
(d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification
papers when requested to do so;
(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused
belong -- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;
(f) where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the
accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy
operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with
him;
(g) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a
suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;
and
(h) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying
fitted the description given by a civilian asset.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause.
The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three
months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant
and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19,
1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a
tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a
suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were
asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these
circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal.
- It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense.
She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4
of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted
to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a
crime in flagrante delicto
[G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002]
14. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CANTON, respondent
FA C T S
- Filed a case against accused for violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425
- Argued that the drug was found out when accused, being a departing passenger bound
for Saigon, Vietnam, passed through the metal detector booth of the airport and a beeping
sound was emitted. Accused was then searched and brought to a comfort room and was
searched further. The three packages of drugs individually wrapped and sealed in gray
colored packing tape were then discovered. The first was taken from her abdominal area;
the second, from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh
- Argued that accused was found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated
drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within the
exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover,
accused voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed
herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by
airport security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine
hydrochloride seized from accused during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Canton – Lost)
- Argued and assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the
ground that the seized items were not in plain view
ISSUE
- Whether or not the accused was validly searched and arrested without a warrant
HELD
CONCLUSION: Accused was validly searched and arrested. She is guilty and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000)
and the costs. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
- Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned
shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder
hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure
of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not
be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures
- Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
confiscation of the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which
resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her
to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages whose
contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously
false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of
the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A.
No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action
of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society."28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room
was justified under the circumstances.
- We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure
conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not
precede the search. The search was pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235
and consent searches
- Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN’s passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the
limits of the afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.

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Arrest Search Seizure Digests 1 14

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Arrest, Search and Seizure

1. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. BONGCARAWAN, respondent 2

2. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. SALANGUIT, respondent 4

3. SOLIVEN, petitioner vs. MAKASIAR, respondent 6

4. MICROSOFT CORP, petitioner vs. MAXICORP, INC, respondent 7

5. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CA, respondent 9

6. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. TIU WON CHUA, respondent 10

7. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, respondent 11

8. UMIL, petitioner vs. RAMOS, respondent 12

9. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. NUEVAS, respondent 14

10. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. DEL ROSARIO, respondent 16

11. ROBIN PADILLA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent 18

12. CABALLES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent 20

13. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. LIBNAO, respondent 22

14. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CANTON, respondent 24

1. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. BONGCARAWAN, respondent

2. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. SALANGUIT, respondent

3. SOLIVEN, petitioner vs. MAKASIAR, respondent

4. MICROSOFT CORP, petitioner vs. MAXICORP, INC, respondent

5. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CA, respondent

6. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. TIU WON CHUA, respondent

7. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, respondent

8. UMIL, petitioner vs. RAMOS, respondent

9. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. NUEVAS, respondent

10. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. DEL ROSARIO, respondent

11. ROBIN PADILLA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

12. CABALLES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

13. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. LIBNAO, respondent

14. PEOPLE, petitioner vs. CANTON, respondent

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