Theodor Lipps, Das Selbstbewußtsein - Empfindung und Gefühl, Wiesbaden 1901

THEODOR LIPPS
Th e s el f - c o nf id e nc e
[- sensation and feeling -]
[1/2]

"It makes no more sense to seek the warmth of sympathy in the body than it makes sense to place the
warmth in the sense of a degree of temperature next to the cheerfulness, the offense, the certainty,
and to assign this warmth to t h e ego as a destiny that I do as cheerful or offended or certain of a
thing. I feel cheerfulness, I feel physical fatigue directly in the muscles. But I don't feel, neither see nor
feel stupidity or musical talent. And so I neither feel nor see, nor do I feel that I, the get these properties.
the gifted headed or stupidity, and thus the talented or stupid I is not something immediately Erlebtes
or enjoyed has, but something E q u i p p e d , the immediately experienced I n a d d i t i o n ,
t h o u g h t o f . I can be very stupid without being conscious of it: it would even be a sign of wisdom if I
had this consciousness. "

1. Different sense of the "I"

What do I mean when I say "I"? To this question, first can be a give answer with absolute certainty: I
mean not always the same with the suspect word. The concept of the I is ambiguous.

"I am dusty," I say, even if nothing is dusty but my clothes and barn. So here the "I" is the clothes I.

Another time I say: I feel "offended", cheerful mood, certain or certain of one thing. This insulted,
cheerful self is undoubtedly n o t the clothing self. I perceive the clothes-I sensually. Not the offended
or cheerful self. This f e e l me, I h a v e it in the s e n s e : While I feel the mortification or serenity, I
feel m y s e l f , namely just offended or cheerful.

Another time I say: I am hungry, warm, freshly washed, tired etc. So this I is the body-I. The same is close
to the clothing ego: or more correctly: the clothing ego is close to it. It is as close to him as the clothes are
close to the body. However, there is a difference between the two.

Even less is the body-I that I felt in cheerfulness, offense, certainty, or that feeling-I. Certainly I can
also f e e l "tired" and have the same self in mind that I mean when I say that I feel cheerful. But then
fatigue means something else. I feel "tired" of something, ie I feel t i r e d o f i t . As I said, fatigue in the
first sense of the word is physical fatigue. I find it in the muscles, it is sensually perceived by me in the
muscles, i.e. in the body. So the body ego, like the clothes ego, is the object of sensory perception. On the
other hand, I don't find fatigue in the second sense of the word in the muscles. I do not perceive it
sensually here or anywhere else. It is only "felt". It makes sense to everyone to look for tiredness, ie
weariness, somewhere in the body, that is, to attribute the characteristic to the body ego. This makes no
more sense than, conversely, it makes sense to look for muscle fatigue in the ego, or to describe it as a
characteristic of the ego that I mean when I say that I feel cheerful or offended or certain of a thing.

Another example of this contrast: In addition to the warmth of the body, there is the inner warmth. I feel
warmed up inside by a noble action, a personable personality or by the sight of a color. I then describe
the color as warm. Nobody confuses this inner warmth, ie the warmth of feeling or emotional sympathy
with body heat. Then nobody can confuse the body ego, which receives the physical warmth, with the
ego, which I warm, ie feel sympathetic or sympathetic. Again we have to say: It makes no sense to seek
the warmth of sympathy in the body than it makes sense to place the heat in the sense of a degree of
temperature next to the cheerfulness, the offense, the certainty, and this warmth t o assign to me as a
determination that I feel cheerful or offended or certain of a thing.

Finally I also say: I am mortal or immortal: or: I am musically gifted, stupid, forgetful etc. I feel cheerful, I
see dustiness, I feel physical fatigue in the muscles. But I neither feel nor see stupidity nor musical talent,
nor do I feel it. And so I neither feel nor see, nor do I feel the self that has these properties. The Gifted
headed or stupidity, and thus the talented or stupid I is not something immediately Erlebtes or enjoyed
has, but something E q u i p p e d , the immediately experienced a d d i t i o n t h o u g h t o f . I can be
very stupid without being conscious of it: it would even be a sign of wisdom if I had this
consciousness. And musical talent is innate to the child. So it is there before it comes to consciousness. Of
course, I only know about stupidity or talent because of consciousness: the musically gifted behaves
differently than the musically untalented. But the talent therefore does not c o n s i s t in such
experiences of consciousness that occur on occasion, but rather it is what is always there that makes
these experiences of consciousness possible or j u s t i f i e s t h e m . Considered in itself, it is the
"psychic" c o n s t i t u t i o n , s t r u c t u r e , o r g a n i z a t i o n , on which those experiences of
consciousness a r e b a s e d .

This also says what the ego, which we are talking about here, consists of. It is the psyche, whereby it
remains to be seen whether the psyche is something different from the brain or one and the same
thing. In the latter case, the self in question is the brain. I am equipped with this or that natural ability,
which means that the brain is equipped with it. After all, let's not only refrain from specifying any details,
but also from any special d e s i g n a t i o n this ego remains that it is the real on which the experiences
of consciousness are based and which is directly based on them. We explicitly recognize this by calling it
the real me. His contrast to the emotional ego is most evident where the two are directly linguistically
opposed to each other, as in the sentence: I feel cheerful. Here is the ego that feels, that is, that is active
in feeling or announces its existence, the real, the felt, the feeling ego.

Just as the designated "I" are different from one another, so what makes them an "I" or justifies their
claim to this name must be the same for everyone. I mean, when I speak of "me", not in many ways, but I
mean o n e , and I always mean the same thing in the last reason. So there must be a single, primary or
original ego, one that makes u p the meaning of the word "ego". And this must somehow be in all the
other "I's" or be included with them in such a way that they can also be called "I" because of this.

Now we have a plan for our investigation. We no longer ask the ambiguous question: What is the "I"?
Instead we ask: What is the original I, or the original content of self-consciousness? This is followed by
the further question: Which part of this original self or which relationship to it gives the other "I" the
right to the same name or gives us the reason

That first question can be determined immediately. in the end, the meaning of all of our concepts must be
something that is directly experienced. Whatever we think, the thought must always somehow derive its
content from something that is directly experienced. If not, it has no content, so it is not a thought. This
also applies to the concept of ego. Its original meaning must be given in something directly
experienced. The o r i g i n a l e g o must be a d i r e c t l y e x p e r i e n c e d e g o .

And we can add another remark right away. We do not lack ego consciousness in any moment of our
conscious life. Whatever I perceive, imagine, think, I always know m y s e l f as the perceiver, imaginer,
thinker. Everything that I have a consciousness of is somehow related to me. Only something that
is a l w a y s p r e s e n t t o me can therefore make up the original ego and thus the ultimate sense of
the concept of ego.
 2. The ego and the context of
the manifestations of consciousness

We now come across several answers to the question of the "I" that appear to be intended to establish
the original meaning of the "I". In any case, we assume here that they are meant. One of them is that the I
am nothing else than the sum or the epitome or the connection of the psychic phenomena. Instead of the
"psychic phenomena", there are probably also the "phenomena of consciousness": or sensations,
perceptions, ideas, thoughts etc. are used for this. There are undoubtedly always appearances of
consciousness, sensations etc. during our conscious life. And they are not just something thought or
developed, but something directly experienced. So far everything seems fine.

Only one thing is missing: and this is the most important thing: Those explanations are meaningless as
long as we do not know what is meant by the words "psychic appearance", "consciousness
manifestation", "sensation" etc. Maybe these words are ambiguous, or if you look more closely they don't
have the meaning they seem to have. Above all, what was supposed to be defined by them, ie the directly
experienced ego, could already be included in them. Then the definition belonged to the class of
definitions that psychologists encounter more often, although they should never encounter them, I mean
the class of definitions that rotate in circles.

Let us first consider the expressions that the I am the connection of the "psychic phenomena" or that it is
the connection of the phenomena of consciousness. These two expressions must mean the same thing
here: psychic phenomena must also mean the phenomena of consciousness if the context of the psychic
phenomena is to constitute the d i r e c t l y e x p e r i e n c e d ego. And instead of "appearances of
consciousness" I can also say "contents of consciousness". This means, without any secondary thoughts,
everything that is somehow given in consciousness, everything that ideally exists, everything that I find.

Let us now test the assertion that a connection between the contents of consciousness is what we mean
by the word "I". I see a landscape or imagine it. I imagine them as one or the other parts, elements,
features, features that are self-contained. Here there is undoubtedly a connection between the contents
of consciousness. The landscape i s one. The contents of consciousness are called color, expansion,
shape, warmth, maybe growth etc. And these are r e l a t e d in space and time . They make up a spatio-
temporal whole. Is this connection between the contents of consciousness "I"? Do I mean the landscape
when I say "I"?

Perhaps one replies, besides the landscape, all sorts of other things will still be part of my
consciousness. This may be the case. The landscape may be part of another context I have presented or
imagined. Is this further context "I"? And is the landscape, which is part of this wider context, p a r t
o f this ego? After all, there is no doubt: If that further connection is what I mean when I say "I", if the I
now experienced is given in it, every part of it must present itself to me as part of myself, namely of the
self that I experience directly at this moment, or of which I am now immediately conscious.

But it can also happen that the landscape completely f i l l s my consciousness . Especially when the
landscape captivates me to a high degree, I am very pleased, for example. Then in the end the landscape
has to be "I" or I have to be the landscape.

In the last few words, I have contradicted myself. The landscape interests or delights " m e " . The
landscape does not do this somewhere beyond my consciousness, but my interest , my joy, these are
experiences of consciousness. And they seem to be experiences of consciousness that are not included in
the landscape, which stand next to the content of consciousness that constitutes the landscape.

Indeed, it will be that way for us. It is certainly n o t t h e c a s e for the theory in question. Note well: I
feel " interested " in a landscape, I feel " p l e a s e d " . The interest and the joy appear as
qualities. Characteristics, determination of m i n e itself. But the sense of the theory in question is that
the directly experienced ego is not in itself, not a special content of consciousness, that it coincides with
the other overall content of consciousness. And this of course also means that the determinations which
are the determinations of the directly experienced I are determinations of the other general
consciousness content, that I cannot mean anything other than determinations of this general
consciousness content with determinations which I call determinations of myself.

So that would mean: The interest or the joy immediately appear to me as the interest or joy of the
landscape or of the imagined or imagined whole, of which the landscape is a part. The landscape or this
whole is, according to the statements of my immediate consciousness, what is interested or what is
joyful. The landscape or the whole is interested in itself or is happy about itself, if not actually, at least for
my immediate consciousness. I experience the presented landscape directly as self-participating. The
feeling of my sympathy or what I call so is in this experience.

Indeed, there are psychologists who explicitly assure that joy, interest, in short what is called feelings -
and surely that includes joy and interest - are nothing besides the general content of the consciousness,
but are qualities of this total content of consciousness. They call the feelings overall qualities or with an
unfortunate expression " shape qualities ".

What I have to reply now is that this view is n o t for m e at any ratetrue. Of course, I make a
requirement. Assuming that someone decides to call the color, which is otherwise called yellow, blue, for
him gold would undoubtedly be blue. So somebody could also insist on understanding something
completely different from the quality of a thing than what one would otherwise understand by it, e.g. B.
anything that is somehow related to this thing. Under this condition, however, the feelings would be
"shape qualities", ie qualities of the respective total consciousness content.

Because that the feelings are always part of the overall c o n s c i o u s n e s s or in r e l a t i o n t o

i t standing is undoubtedly. In particular, the feeling of joy in the landscape or in the entirety of what is
imagined, of which the landscape is a part, belongs to the landscape or to this overall consciousness
content. To be more specific: the joy of the landscape is certainly the joy o f t h e l a n d s c a p e , that
is to say related to it. You s h a l l b e l i a b l e , if one wants audrücken this to mean it.

However, the question at issue here is not whether one plays a more or less graceful game with the
concept of quality, but whether feelings can be described as qualities of the representational content of
consciousness in the sense in which the word " quality "is wont to be taken: in our case, if my enjoyment
of the countryside or on what else I for my consciousness perceive , imagine , think like, is a quality of the
whole from these contents of consciousness in p r e c i s e l y t h e s e n s e in which about
the v a s t n e s s o f the landscape, its uniformity or diversity, are qualities of the landscape.

And of course this question must be answered in the negative. And with that comes the point of asserting
that feelings are qualities of the total content of consciousness.

And with that comes the meaning of the assertion that the ego, as the qualities of which feelings appear,
is the total content of consciousness.

3. Consciousness of "Consciousness"

However, not everyone who identifies the original self with the context of the contents of consciousness
will feel affected by the above considerations. Most will say that is not what they mean. You will notice
that the landscape seen or imagined is certainly a connection between the contents of consciousness. But
it was irrelevant for the landscape that these contents of c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r e contents
of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . What constitutes them is the determined c o n t e n t , c o l o r s ,
s h a p e s , etc., apart from the fact that they are the contents of a consciousness. The landscape would
be the same landscape, even if it was not in any consciousness. If it is said against it, the M E if the
"connection of the c o n t e n t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ", it means that it is the connection to which
the c o n t e n t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s c o m e together a s s u c h , ie as simultaneous c o n t e n t s
of the consciousness .

So there is an ambiguity in that explanation. The same ambiguity, of course, lies in the explanation that
the I am the connection between the consciousness or the psychic. Here, too, the appearances
of c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r e meant a s s u c h , ie as b e l o n g i n g to c o n s c i o u s n e s s or the
psychic appearances as such, ie a s p s y c h i c . - It would obviously be better if such ambiguities
always existwould b e eliminated f r o m t h e o u t s e t .

However, even with this completed explanation, we have not yet become wiser. The new question now
arises: What are " c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s s u c h " ? What makes consciousness content f o r
m e consciousness content? Why, given a red that I have seen, am I not content to say that it is red, light
or dark, saturated or unsaturated, spatially determined in one way or another? What do I mean if I also
say that the red is a " content of c o n s c i o u s n e s s " ?

Certainly I do not mean a new quality of red in the sense of the qualities just described. Let us replace the
red for a moment with another content of consciousness, for example a large glowing gas ball. I have the
awareness that our solar system was before, I don't know how many million years ago, such a glowing
gas ball. This gas ball is now the content of my consciousness: but then, at least I suppose, there was no
consciousness whose content the gas ball could have been. In view of that time, I therefore deny the gas
ball existence as the content of consciousness. With that I am not denying him any quality that would
now have to him, now that he is conscious. But I have the consciousness, exactly the gas ball, which is
now the object of my consciousness, was then.

If the word "content of consciousness" does not denote a property of what is content of consciousness,
the only thing that remains is that it denotes a relationship. This is also directly indicated by the
expression "content" of consciousness.

And what relationship does the word mean, what relationship is the red when I call it the content of
consciousness? One will say: Well, to consciousness. But what is "consciousness" here? A setting where
the content comes and goes? Of course not. A vessel or cavity in which they are enclosed? Nor. The fact
that it is not appropriate to say that consciousness is the quality or the characteristic in which all the
contents of consciousness agree is evident from what has just been said. To be conscious, or what the
same thing says, to be content of consciousness, we said, is not a property of the content of
consciousness: then it cannot be a property c o m m o n t o all content of consciousness . However,
that is " consciousness"Necessarily something common to all contents of consciousness, provided that
they are precisely contents of consciousness. But what this consists of is precisely the question here.
Finally, one would not turn in circles any less if one wanted to say: Consciousness is the epitome or
context of the respective one One would have to add: the "content of consciousness as such." But we are
concerned with the meaning of this phrase.

Perhaps one thinks to withdraw from the matter by saying: Consciousness is - consciousness. That
means c o n s c i o u s n e s s cannot be This phrase may otherwise be in place: it is not here, but
consider what the question is here, not: what is consciousness itself or how is it done, but: what is it f o r
m e , what does it represent if it is a fact of consciousness or a content of consciousness itself. I have an
awareness that red is a content of consciousness: I have an awareness of the relationship between red
and consciousness. Here, inevitably, "consciousness", namely that to which the red is related, is itself a
content of consciousness. The consciousness of this relationship is a consciousness of red once, of
something to which red appears to relate, and finally of this relationship itself.

But we also easily see what this something, ie this "consciousness" that is present in our consciousness,
consists of. We only need to remember that the expression: red is the content of my consciousness, can
be replaced without loss of meaning by the other: it is there f o r m e . The relationship in question is
therefore the relationship with me, a relationship with the I directly experienced when experiencing red,
of course with an I that is itself the object of immediate experience.
 The directly experienced I appears here as the meaning of the word "consciousness2". At the same time,
as already indicated, the word "consciousness" has a double meaning. It is, as an abstract, the common of
all contents of consciousness as such", that is, the existence of all of them in consciousness."
Consciousness "in this sense is not the I, but it is the relationship to the I. On the other hand,"
Consciousness ", as a collective, is the totality of the conscious content of a moment. This consciousness
is again not the ego, but it is the totality of what is related to the ego.

4. The "I" as the unity of

sensations, ideas etc.

ause for a moment to use the other above-mentioned answers to the question of what the I am. Instead of saying that I am the
ion of the contents of consciousness as such, it is also said that it is the connection or unity of sensations, perceptions, ideas,
s of a moment. Here again we immediately suspect ambiguity. Indeed, there is one. The same often has a devastating effect in
ogy.

ny, "sensation" is the content of the sensation, that is, a current content of consciousness, e.g. B. R e d : the other time - a
on. The same applies to perception and imagination. We will immediately see what the word " sensation"means that there is a
ce between it and the c o n t e n t o f

on is obvious in any case. The c o n t e n t o f sensation , called red, is somewhere for my consciousness, for example on that
n the other hand, there is no point in saying that the s e n s a t i o n of red finds for my consciousness at this point.

ceived red is at the same time light or dark in quality, the taste of the apple that I taste or feel is sour, the sound that I hear
the shape that I see or is elliptical, but sensations are n e v e r a g a i n s t i t light or dark: there are no acidic sensations:
says that sensations sound: nobody speaks of elliptical sensations or ideas.

one occasionally behaves as if all of these phrases made sense. Feelings and content of ideas, as well as ideas and content of
re again completely mixed up. And you even build theories on this lack of clarity. It should be noted that this ambiguity cannot
ed for common usage. This makes a clear distinction. It was the psychologists who created the confusion.

ng in front of me is called a complex of sensations. Now there are sensations in me. Some even seem to think they are in my
ut the thing appears to me as outside of me. How does this happen? The beautiful word "projection" helps here. The complex
ations that is in itself in me is "projected" into the outside world.

, the thing is n o t a complex of sensations, but a complex of sensory contents. Red, sweet, hard, these are not sensations, as
s they are sensory content or something sensed. And this feeling is there and only where I f e e l i t . A sensory content never
ace other than that which it has for my sensation, more generally, for my consciousness. He has no place at all if or as long as
n't have one for my consciousness. And the " s e n s a t i o n " has n o place a t a l l . It is in me, but not spatially, but in
f belonging to me.

at is the sensation different from the content of the sensation or the sensed. First of all, a double answer is possible. One can
sation is the process or course of feeling, ie the process or process by which it happens that in a given moment a sensory
, e.g. B. Red is there. However, there is no question of this here. This real process is not itself conscious. But we want to know
hat the "sensation" is, or what the same thing says, as an i m m e d i a t e consciousness experience, we ask what the
ate consciousness experience consists of, for the sake of which we call a felt red not only red, but also sensory content or felt ,

e answer is simple. "Sensory content" is just a more specific name for content of consciousness. Accordingly, the answer to our
n must be the same as the answer to the question of what makes the content of consciousness for me: I not only find the red, I
n myself, or find myself related to the red. The directly experienced sense of the word "sensation" also consists in the
ship to the ego, of course, in turn, to the directly experienced ego. It consists in being for me or belonging to me. Looking at the
idea" and "idea content" leads to the same result.

er, we have to determine this situation a little more precisely. A content of feeling or a sensation, m e r e c o n t e n t
 sciousness. It is at the same time or appears to me as objectively real, that is, it immediately presents itself to me as something
ndent of me, as something that is there and as it is, without me, so to speak, out of my own perfection. It is not only for me, but
existence in itself or for itself. This is also a direct relationship with me, although, if you like, a negative one. Independence
me", existence "without me", as something "foreign" to me, something "outside of me", something different "than me", as a non-
hese expressions include this relationship.

ntly then the relationship to me, by means of which red as content of consciousness or sensation,or that seems to me
o n g t o another relationship: and it must be a relationship of the opposite kind. The red must also present itself as not
ndent of me, that is, as conditioned by me.

experience the red, and every physical content of consciousness in general, insofar as it is conditioned by me, or conversely, I
nce all physical content of consciousness in relation to me insofar as the mode of existence of the content of consciousness for
notice, grasped -, Apperceiveness , the degree to which they are present to me or the object of my attention appears to be
dependent on me.

ies a moment which the conscious mind can generally characterize as conscious content or as "subjective". It is also the only
t that gives a l l contents of consciousness, whatever they may be called, this characteristic for my immediate experience. I
o w e r over all contents of consciousness in the designated sense ; In relation to all of this, I experience myself as dominant: I
ng them closer to me to a greater or lesser degree, acquire them more intimately or less intimately, more or less bring them
spiritual possession. It is this freedom of apperception, although not without limits, this my spontaneity towards the contents
ciousness that makes them all appear in a peculiar way as inwardly or spiritually " m i n e " . And the consciousness of this
that is the consciousness, that it is the content of consciousness. The "contents of consciousness are the elements of
here of power of the I.

ame time it is said that the I now experienced c a n n o t a p p e a r as contents of consciousness. It is thateverything
as content of consciousness. That is why the ego is content of consciousness for me at all times. The I experienced now passed
ext moment and thus also became objective. I can look at it. Conversely, looking at it at any time implies that it is no longer
is now experiencing, but rather a past, and thus it is just objective to me. The I therefore appears to me as content of
usness whenever I look at it: or what the same thing says, it appears to me as content of consciousness, whenever
p e a r s " t o m e at all .

e can say to what extent the assertion is right that the I am the connection of the manifestations of consciousness or of
ons and ideas etc. This assertion appears at first as a simple circular definition.

s of consciousness, sensations, ideas should make the "I". In truth, the ego makes the "contents of consciousness", "sensations"
eas".

er, that claim is not without merit. The ego to which the concurrent contents of consciousness appear is o n e . Thus, by virtue
elationship, it connects them all to unity, namely to the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness, the only one we
f, is in this fact. Instead of "unity" we can also say "context". Then our result is: Dsa I i s not only the connection of the
s of consciousness, but it is what c r e a t e s this connection .

beyond the scope of this study if I add: The I is the only thing that creates a "connection" at all. Also the connection of the
pe, of which I spoke above, exists only through the ego. The spatio-temporal connection is a mere juxtaposition or one after
er, unless the unified relationship approaches an ego. After all, the same applies to any context that we may somehow talk
No relationship is without a relationship. But the ultimate meaning of every " relationship " is a way of uniting a manifold
the unified and unifying relationship to the one point, the ego. But I won't go into that here.

5. "I", feeling and feeling

is this ego, which is always required for the "contents of consciousness", sensations, ideas etc., without which all these
ose their meaning for me? What kind of I is this "I"?
 " f e e l " the perceived red . The questionable ego is given in the feeling.

en first in this feeling of conditioning, in this feeling of activity, or as I also said, in the feeling of domination or power over
tents of consciousness, in the feeling of " mine ". It is then given in every feeling at all. B. also in those feelings of
lness, offense, certaintyof which I spoke at the beginning. The ego given in these feelings is an immediately experienced
s not just thought or developed. And I never miss it. I a l w a y s "feel" somehow. The ego gained here must therefore be
inal or primary ego we are looking for.

es us a new task. We have t o c o n c e p t u a l l y d e l i m i t t h e f e e l i n g : above all in relation to the content of

on, which is also directly experienced.

imitation is at first the simplest possible: we c a l l feeling that in which I find and have "me" immediately and originally,
nce, in short, in what I "feel".

talk about this in more detail below: I feel or find color as an element in a thing, for example, as I sometimes assumed
on the wall. I find the wall red or see it red. I also feel that my body is hungry. On the other hand, I feel the pleasure or the
or the certainty in me. I feel and at any time just me funny or moody, offended, certain of one thing, etc.

e generalize this: The sensory contents are the elements of the world of things I perceive, including that of my body. They
ute my perception of the world of things. I find this world of things immediately different from me and contrasted with
s distinction and juxtaposition already lies in the immediate awareness that it is perceived by me. The content of
ons thus presents itself to me directly as opposed to me. They are " o b j e c t i v e " contents of consciousness: m y
ct".

ast, feelings are elements or determinations of myself. They are ego contents or e g o qualities . They constitute the ego,
the ego, which I do not think or open up, but experience directly, which I have in every moment of my life, the direct
usness ego or the directly experienced "subject". We already called it the feeling ego because it is in the feelings. It is the
we call it an ego feeling.

course, now gives a definition of feelings that is not a common psychological commodity. It therefore needs special
tion.

all, you cannot prevent anyone from calling feelings what they want to call. Fortunately, however, there is one type of
hat is now generally recognized as "feeling" in psychology, namely feelings of pleasure and reluctance.

w have a starting point for scientific terminology. We ask: W h y do lust and displeasure have this special name? What is
al about them that justifies the special name? This question cannot be answered by pointing out that pleasure and
nce are contents of consciousness of a special quality, of a different quality, for example than certainty, surprise and the
cause, like pleasure and certainty, tones and colors are qualitatively different from one another. And yet we call them
e n s o r y contents and as such c o n t r a s t t h e m w i t h feelings . But the special name can only justify itself from the
position of pleasure and displeasure within the consciousness or from its special meaning for the same.

s particular position or meaning now consists in the fact that pleasure and reluctance are qualities or determinations of
se of self.

at is the case, then we have to define feelings at all as contents of consciousness that immediately present themselves as
s of the sense of self.

old this definition of feelings. This also removes the limitation of the concept of feelings to pleasure and displeasure.

at the emotions "constitute" the I, how the contents of the senses constitute the perceptual image of the world of things
ifferent from and opposed to us. But that's not exactly. In both cases, "constituting" has initially a similar
g. However, it also has a significantly different meaning in both cases.

sory content "constitutes" that perception picture of the world of things, that is: I do not see a thing and, moreover, I feel
 red, sweet, hard are attached to the thing. But the spatial u n i t y o f these sensory contents i s the thing insofar as it
for perception.

e, now I do not feel myself either, and besides, clinging to me, lust, striving, certainty, but feeling pleasure, striving,
y i s feeling myself. Feeling and feeling, feeling and feeling is one and the same.

in every feeling as such; as soon as we can say of any content of feeling, there is something objective in it. And if I
nce distinguishable feelings at the same time, then these are what make up the self that I am experiencing.

ame time, "constituting" or "deciding" is again a very different matter in both cases. The sensory contents c o m b i n e to
hing, they s e t the same, and finally the whole world directly experienced t o g e t h e r . Feelings, on the other hand, do
nect to the ego: the ego is not composed, but simply at all times. So there is only one feeling at a time.

es not exclude the difference of simultaneous feelings: just as little as the simplicity of the sound excludes the difference in
one strength and timbre. I have the tone in each of these qualities: and yet when I have them all, I don't have the tone more
ce. Likewise, I don't feel in the simultaneous feelings more than once, but only once. But in this one feeling I can, as
t sides or determinations, the multiple qualities of feeling, e.g. B. the striving to distinguish certainty. The simultaneous
do not stand side by side like several tones, or also like the color, the hardness, the taste of one and the same thing, but
enetrate" each other, as in one tone, if you will, those tonal qualities "penetrate" ,

ompare the contents of feelings and feelings even further. Not all of them, but most of the emotional content has its place. I
color somewhere out there, I feel hunger in the body. The fact that I hear the sound somewhere, that it sits or is
here for my ear, cannot be said in the same way. It has only one quasi-location: d. H. the visible, even if only vaguely, from
he sound "comes" has a place. The tone has it, only if it is bound to this visible thing for me, that is, it forms a mental unity

other hand, feelings never have a place unless you are the e g o wanted to call it their place. The feeling, including the ego,
y not somewhere. Perhaps one thinks that when I want to raise my arm, I feel wanting in my arm, or I feel courage in my
ut that only means that I feel the tension of the muscles that my desire c a u s e s in my arm, and that I instruct the
on of the breast, which requires courage, in the breast. That means the place of the feelings is a l w a y s a mere quasi-

all at all, but some types of sensory content are spatially extended. I feel the color, the pressure, the warmth as spread
urface. On the other hand, feelings are not extended, the ego does not fill any space. This does not mean that its spatial
on is zero, but that the concept of expansion, like that of place, does not apply to feelings at all.

trast between the content of feelings and feelings is the most fundamental within psychology. It is synonymous with the
opposition between subject and object , between I and non-I.

ntrast has yet to be completed. A new moment arises, which is important for the separation of sensory content and
.

ady know this moment. For us, sensory content is not just " o b j e c t s " or figurative. That is also the content of our
tion. Rather, for us they are at the same time original, that is, as far as no further knowledge objects, they
j e c t i v e l y r e a l . However, as we have already emphasized, the immediate awareness of this objective reality is the
ess of a special relationship with "me". I have already described it as the awareness of independence from myself, of being
me, of being without me, of being existence of something other than I, or also of being conscious or experiencing the non-I
.

LITERATURE - Theodor Lipps, The Self-Confidence - Sensation and Feeling, Wiesbaden 1901

THEODOR LIPPS
Th e s el f - c o nf id e nc e
 [- sensation and feeling -]
[2/2]

"An impulse may be physiological what it wants, for my consciousness it can never consist of anything other
than the existence of an imagined person and a feeling of striving towards the realization of what is imagined."

" Apart from the immediate feeling ego and the r e a l e g o , I identify n o t o n l y the body and the clothes
with me. I also say: I build a house if I don't lift a finger while doing it. That is my builder. And this one doesn't
actually build it either. The workers build it. But the builder builds it at my command. That is why he
is m y builder. And work builds on it and thus indirectly on my command. That is why they are his and
indirectly m i n e Workers. "

" Here I so identified no longer my body but outside it contained p e o p l e with m e . I identify with me the
builder and further the workers. I say I and I mean them. But here you can clearly see how this is done. Your
building comes from me, namely my will. In this respect it is also my building. Your build is my build, so you are
me. I build t h r o u g h i t . My activity includes hers: I, that is, my will, works in them. "

6. Possibility of confusing
feelings and sensations

The very contrast between the contents of the senses and the ego, which the contents of the senses have in
common with the contents of the imagination, and then in a special way this directly experienced contrast, makes
it seem surprising that some, even serious psychologists, appear to be impossible, who To differentiate between
the content of sensations on the one hand and the contents of the ego or feelings on the other, yes, that some of
them basically confuse the two so to speak. They fail at the entrance to psychology. We have to ask how such a
mix-up is possible.

We already stated at the outset: certain sensory contents and feelings have names that sound the same. I recall
one of the examples given: I feel warmth on my body, and I feel warmed up inside by a person, an action and the
like. That warmth is the same as that I feel in the stove. T h i s warmth is the warmth of my s y m p a t h y . I
add another to this example: I feel my body as hungry; and I feel hungry for knowledge, or I "hunger and thirst for
justice". But in such cases the contradiction between the content of the sensation and the feeling is not difficult to
recognize, but rather clear. The hunger for knowledge has nothing to do with physical hunger. It is a wish,
aspiration, desire.

However, the use of language does not only know such individual, identical-sounding terms. He also generally
opposes our sharp distinction between the content of feeling and feeling. He allows me to "feel" desire and
striving as well as physical warmth. On the other hand, he has nothing against "feeling" w a r m t h ,
h u n g e r and the like.

There is no doubt that there is a reason for this. And we have to try to recognize this reason. Nowhere in
psychology is it sufficient that we reject common language. We also have to try to understand him. Then it will
always prove to be somehow useful, at least as instructive.

Physical hunger is also associated with a craving, namely for food. And in practical life we are not concerned with
the specific nature of the sensory content, called h u n g e r , but with this desire. This is the first to understand
that double meaning of the word h u n g e r .

But it is also understood that we "feel" hunger. When we speak of hunger, we mentally add the feeling of
desire. And then hunger is indeed both. Content of content and feeling. And if the desire is really important to us,
then the hunger is primarily a feeling for us.

The same applies to painsensation. Here the confusion we are talking about seems ineradicable. By continuing it
from this kind of sensation, one has built up feeling teachings, and in particular "explained" feelings
physiologically, without seeing that one was not dealing with feelings at all. Books have been written about the
"physical feeling", in which a great deal is said about the body, nothing about feelings or something unrelated to
the matter.

"Pain" is once a sensory content, e.g. B. drilling or tearing in the tooth. Next to it is the "mental pain", such as the
death of a loved one. This pain is an i n t e n s e , yet peculiarly colored f e e l i n g of d i s p l e a s u r e . Again,
the reason for the same name is easy to find. Pain in the former sense is an i n t e n s e sensation that
is u s u a l l y a c c o m p a n i e d by r e l u c t a n c e . Again, however, when we feel pain, it is not the particular
nature of this sensation content, but the way in which it appears to us that it is important.

This does not prevent us from easily discovering the contradiction between the feeling and the content of the
senses, as with hunger, even with little thought. I feel hunger like boring and tearing, and in v i e w o f this
content of my consciousness I have the feeling of displeasure, reluctance, defense. I clearly represent myself and
my feelingtowards the object, the object of feeling.

Two facts make this distinction particularly good. It has rightly been noted - this is an insight that is important for
other reasons as well - that attention to the nature of physical pain, observation of it, can reduce the
accompanying displeasure. So while the content of the feeling is as clearly present to me as possible, the feeling
can recede.

And secondly. The feeling of discomfort is not inextricably linked to the sensation of pain. Pain of a certain kind -
as well as hunger - can be extremely pleasing to me as a sign of recurrent health. Then of course there is no pain
or hunger as s u c h relish. But this is irrelevant here. It is sufficient that in such cases, for whatever reason, the
displeasure that otherwise accompanies the content of the sensations in question has disappeared and turned
into its opposite. The content of sensations has remained the same.

As a third, particularly interesting example of a type of sensory content that must be confused with feelings, I add
the tensions in muscles and vision. The mix-up here is specifically a mix-up with the feeling of striving aimed at
precisely this tension. The situation is otherwise quite analogous to that of pain and hunger.

Why do I say that I "stretch" my bow? Why do I call the change in shape I am doing here a "tension"? Because I
have trouble getting them out and h o l d i n g t h e m , because it requires a tangible tension of the will, or a
tangible striving. This is the only thing that has the shape change in question ahead of others, which I simply refer
to as shape changes. This tension of my will makes the change of form a "tension". That means: tension in itself or
originally is not the name for something felt or perceived, but for a feeling, especially for the feeling of tension or
striving. This is also indicated by the "tense attention", which is nothing but a clearly palpable striving to grasp
and hold onto something internally.

From there, however, the name is then transferred to the objective process or fact, in particular to the change in
form to which such striving is linked, ie in view of which we cannot avoid feeling ourselves in this way. This is
how the objective tensions arise. This is how the tension sensations arise. The peculiar sensation that arises when
I stretch a muscle bears this name because I " s t r e t c h " the muscle , that is, because I want to call the
muscle state and thus the sensation content into being and hold it there.

Still o n e must be hinzugefühgt supplementing. Striving seems to be contained in the tension twice: as striving
and as reluctance. But b o t h is again o n e . And in a way, both are striving. Striving is striving against
resistance: not only in fact, but also for my feeling. The feeling of striving i s , as long as such it i s , is not that
in "satisfaction" to s o l v e , a t t h e s a m e t i m e feeling of resistance. Both are the same feeling when
viewed from different sides. resistancebut is resisting or "resisting". So the feeling of striving that accompanies
the tension of the bow is also a feeling of resistance or reluctance. The bow exerts resistance. This feeling of
resistance is my sense of aspiration, related to the object, the arch. The exact same thing applies to the tension of
the muscle.

Incidentally, here is the source of tension, tension, tension in n a t u r e . A stone lies z. B. on a pad. Now there is a
state of tension: the stone "strives" for the earth, ie it should actually fall. And this in turn means: It is in m e an
aspiration or tendency to drop it in my mind based on past experience. That the tendency compels me directly
through the sight of the stone, or that it is given to me directly in and with the perceived stone, makes the
tendency towards the s t o n e . This tendency remains as a tendency, ie I cannot realize it because the
document, more precisely because my consciousness of its existence, "again" relies on experience. This is the
"state of tension". He is the perceived objectiveFacts in which there is nothing of striving and resistance, including
tension, together with my tension, ie my striving and the resistance contained therein.

It is easy to understand that the concept of tension is still transferred from the sensations of muscle tension to
analogous sensations, such as that of skin tension. The sensation seems similar in itself. Otherwise, it usually
arises under the same conditions. Of course it can, and muscle tension can also arise in a n o t h e r way. But
once the name has been established for the reason given, this is no reason to replace it with another. The name is
simply determined once the name for the c r a f t e d Become sensation .

From what was said last here, however, one can see at the same time how little, even with tension sensations, the
confusion of feeling and sensation content is excusable. The memory of the tensions that are brought about "in
another way", that is to say by galvanic irritation, should suffice to prevent this confusion once and for all, despite
the usually close connection. In such cases we have the sensation without the feeling.

7. Specific subjectivity of
body sensations

However, what has been said above about the special relationship of feeling to pain, hunger, and tension is not yet
sufficient if we want to fully understand the use of language, which calls all these sensory contents feelings. Even
if I sharply separate the hunger itself and the accompanying feeling in hunger, according to common usage, I can
call hunger a feeling. I can say: I feel hungry and at the same time feel displeasure, reluctance, defense against it.

This brings us to the most important thing: hunger and pain are specific body sensation contents. As such, a
specific subjectivity suits them, that is, a specific, directly experienced relationship with me or belonging to me.

We believe that colors exist, ie they are objectively real, even if they are not felt. Here I do not understand a
" color " to be the physical fact on which the color sensation is based, but what is directly given in the color
sensationor experienced. In the case of the scientifically educated, a different insight corrects that belief. That
being said, and at every moment when this insight is not present to us, the belief in question exists for each of
us. By presenting the green color of the wall behind me, which I do not see now, and paying attention to the
content of the presentation, I have consciousness. This color, this green, exists behind me, it exists as the green
that I would see if I turned around.

Different with hunger. I cannot see hunger as existing unless it is felt. Hunger, this peculiarity that is
directly given in the feeling of hunger, is only when it is felt. Now every content of feeling as such is subjective to
me or belongs to me. This subjectivity has already been mentioned above. Here we can say briefly: feeling is an
existence f o r m e as an object of m y inner a c t i v i t y , e.g. B. my observation.

This now applies not only to feeling, but also to being imagined. When feeling, however, there is a moment that is
missing from being merely imagined: what is felt is particularly close to me, it affectsme stronger under the same
circumstances, makes a bigger impression than what is just presented, especially than the mere fantasy content. I
feel more intense about it or feel o n e with it to a higher degree . Herein lies a new essential moment of
subjectivity. We want to briefly describe it as the moment of the specific emotional closeness of the sensed.

If we summarize this with what has been said above, the result is that hunger and also every other specific body
sensation content has the peculiarity that whenever it exists, it is there f o r m e , both as something sensed
and as such that it is at the same time that specific Suitable for feeling. It is in its n a t u r e the specific
subjectivity or this specific way of being for me or of being bound to me. Nobody knows why it lies in its
nature. The basis of the sensation of hunger is a state of the body, and as such it is directly related to the brain, to
whose functions the sensory content is bound. I can hold my hand between the color and the facial organ: or I can
close the eye. On the other hand, I cannot close the organ of the feeling of hunger, nor can I hold my hand between
it and hunger.

The special way of tying the body sensation content to me is not the only one. I have already said that the body
sensation content, which we call muscle tension, comes directly from our will according to our
consciousness. This applies to all elements of the movement and position sensations. By moving arbitrarily or
staying in a position, the perceived physical competencies of the body appear to us as an immediate outflow of
our will.

So the body sensation contents appear to be tied to me or the ego in two ways. They ind once a l l bound to me
in the sense that they cannot be that without being felt by me and at the same time having that specific "closeness
to feeling". They are also p a r t l y s o long as they arise directly from me, that is, my striving.

And from this it is completely understandable that the use of language also calls the body sensation content
feelings. In "feeling", for common usage, as for us, lies the moment of subjectivity . Only that the parlance further
understood, that emotions not only identifies the contents of consciousness which the ego as features or
regulations b e l o n g , but also those who in a special way it b e l o n g or it appear linked.

8. Return feelings and sensations.

The affects.

On the other hand, the facts brought up in the course of our consideration must have served to make
the c o n f u s i o n o f the contents of feelings and feelings seem increasingly incomprehensible. So far we have
viewed this mix-up essentially from one side: One calls sensation contents feelings and throws them together
with real feelings: one speaks of physical feelings and means body sensation contents.

This confusion may now be rejected far from yourself. You can see the feelings. However, these feelings can be
traced b a c k t o t h e c o n t e n t o f sensations , to be thought of as complexes or mergers of them.

This provides a point of view that in a way reverses the confusion that has been combated so far. This point of
view now seems almost self-evident to some. It corresponds to a prevailing one, we can confidently say, a fashion
direction.

Unpsychologischer sense does the demand for a falsely so-called " objective s method applied" in
psychology. There is also a confusion of terms in this "objective" method. No doubt the method of every science
should be objective: that is, every scienceshould take the facts into consideration for them as they are: undeterred
by prejudices, uninfluenced by "demands" that are not made by the facts themselves, uninhibited by the
tendencies brought from elsewhere. Now the only direct facts given to the psychologist are the facts of his own
consciousness or his own consciousness experiences. So psychological objectivity consists first of all in the fact
that these facts come into their own absolutely unclouded. You must be the starting point and the last resort
everywhere.

But this objectivityyou now compare it with another one, which is the complete opposite. The "objective", that is,
the exterior, the exterior, that which is independent of the psychologist's consciousness, the physical, physical or
physiological should be the starting point of the psychological consideration. One turns to the real or
alleged e x p r e s s i o n s of the life of consciousness, to the accompanying and subsequent phenomena. One
does not see that, before we can speak of it, one must first show that and to what extent the side effects in
question deserve this name, and of w h a t actually, that is, from which moments of the life of consciousness they
are or should be utterances, side effects or consequences. And one does not see or appear to not see that one
cannot show this, that one cannot gain any "objective" knowledge of the relationships of consciousness life to this
physical or physiological one, unless one first of all of consciousness life itself , namely of one's own life of
consciousness, since this can only be observed directly, has gained a completely clear picture. In this way you
create an "objective" method that is often far removed from objectivity. You save yourself the first and most
important psychological work, which is of course the most difficult, and you gain a psychology,

A consequence of this tendency to think is the now confusing cult of body sensations, especially the specific body
sensations, which can also be summarized under the name of organ sensations . No wonder: You
as s e n s a t i o n s , and even more particularly as b o d y sensations, the "objective", ie the physical, closer
than other mental processes. People are now making a face to solve every psychological question by
monotonously invoking "organ sensations".

So the phenomena of will and attention have had to put up with being dissolved into organ sensations. What
characterizes the affects is supposed to be organ sensations. Aesthetic enjoyment, it is assured, consists of organ
sensations. Ultimately, scientific cognition and moral consciousness will have to put up with going the same way.

All of this is completely consistent when feelings are organ sensations. We would have no reason to speak of
wanting or attention at all, without the directly experienced f e e l i n g o f will and attention . And the affects
are initially characterized by feeling. The aesthetic pleasure i s c o m p l e t e a feeling. And cognition and moral
consciousness are directly experienced ways of how I, namely the self given in feeling , relate to representational
contents of consciousness. This is how we encounter feelings everywhere in psychic life.

Let us first mention the only fact that one could argue with an appearance of right for the traceability of feelings
to organ sensations. Affects, including the feelings that characterize them, can be artificially created by influencing
the body, such as narcotics. One seems to conclude that what is created here is body sensations. So affects are
body sensations.

But this is an odd way of arguing. Assume there are n o affectsBody sensations, what are they then? Or do we
ask: What are they f o r u s ? We answer: For us, affects are what they are for e v e r y o n e who is not spoiled
by "psychology". Affects are - affects, with a German word e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t s , ie ways of the course
of the psychic happenings. They are peculiarly ziegler_gef1.html characterized ways of this process.

And what are the feelings that accompany them? What are feelings anyway? In very general terms, symptoms of
consciousness from the way in which the psyche, the personality, the psychic individual, what he experiences,
what he is given, what is going on in him, are affected by how it operates , against reacted. Or viewed from the
side of the psychic processes: Feelings are the directly given consciousness symptom of the way in which the
psychic processes and connections of such behavior relate to the psyche, to their beings which are the same
everywhere or which change from individual to individual, to dispositions, Temperament and natural, to the
originally givenor acquired tendencies or directions of activity, towards the permanent or temporary
constitutions, responsibilities, dispositions, habits. They are, for example, in a given case the sympathy for the fact
that an operation or connection of such is in accordance with a natural direction of activity of the psychic
individual, is thereby favored, or the opposite.

Anyone who pays homage to the view of physiological materialism, I ask that in the foregoing, instead of psyche,
individual, personality, each time: brain or cerebral cortex. For him, the "psychic processes" are simultaneously
transformed into mechanical brain processes -.

In the above, the essence of the affect, though general, is nevertheless fully described. Affects, we said, are
peculiar modes of the psychic process, they are a peculiar psychological process. According to what has just been
said, the accompanying, peculiar feeling is easily given.

And what role do those external influences play here through which affects are artificially produced? They create
organ sensations. Undoubtedly. But initially they create a psychological, or if you prefer, "central" overall state
and at the same time modify the overall character of the psychic process. Everyone knows that the intoxicated is
mentally different from the sober. His diminished and, for the moment or for the moment, increased his mental
ability, his lack of will and the blind rapidity of his will, his dullness and his increased ability to express what is
right now in his mood or in a particularly impressive way, which shows everything towards
another p e r s o n a l i t y , ie a modified overall constitution of the same. And so there is ultimately no overall
physical condition that would not affect the psyche or the "center" somewhere and alter the personality. On the
whole, I am psychologically different, even when I am full, than when I am hungry, when I am rested, when I am
tired.

But if it is so, then it is no wonder that particularly i n t r u s i v e changes in my overall physical state, such as
those that occur with artificially created affects, also cause particularly intrusive changes in the overall
psychological state. May this or that organ sensation arise. The first thing that is certain is the changed overall
mental state.

And in the resulting peculiar way of psychic events or their course we now have the affect without further
ado. And in the special way in which this peculiar way of psychic occurrence stands or affects the whole of the
psyche, we have at the same time the ground of the feeling or the course of the feeling, whereby the affect for our
consciousness is directly characterized.

External influences therefore generate the affects and feelings that they generate, not because they cause certain
organ sensations, but because, in short, they determine a certain rhythm or mode of functioning of the overall
psychic life. The generation of affects and accompanying feelings through external influences is understandable,
not because feelings are organ sensations, but because they are n o t , the real reason for which is to be found in
the relationships between psychic events and the responsibility of the psyche, or because Feelings The
immediately experienced answer is to the question of what a psychic event and the way it happens mean for the
psyche .

9. Independence of feelings
from body sensations

In addition, we still have to differentiate between the theory that emotions are based on organ
sensations. Feelings, I said, should be "complexes" or "products of fusion" of such sensations. The two are not the
same. When tones merge into sounds, consciousness takes the place of the new, which we call sound. Assuming
that body sensations merge into feelings in t h i s sense, the feeling would be new after all. The only question
then was whether that explanation for the existence of this new thing applies.

However, sounds are only somewhat r e l a t i v e in comparison to tonesNew. Again, they are something similar
to the tones. Sounds sound or sound just as well as sounds, only in a different way. Accordingly, body sensation
contents could only " m e r g e " into something of the s a m e kind , into an
overall b o d y sensation indistinguishable from consciousness ; not something completely incomparable with
it. And that is what feelings are, be they feelings of pleasure or reluctance, or feeling of certainty or feeling of
familiarity or whatever. To this completely new thing, body sensations can melt as little as tones to colors or
colors to smells.

However, the concept of merging must obviously not be taken too sharply here. Merging is unfortunately often a
name for all sorts of things. The amalgamation in question means any kind of more or less intimate connection of
simultaneous bodily sensations to a whole or to an overall sensation comprising various sensible physical
conditions, such as hunger, tension etc. This would remove the difference between the two assumptions that
feelings are complexes and that they are a fusion of body sensations. Accordingly, we also want to neglect this
difference in the following.

Then we have to say: Feelings, n o matter how one can grasp the physical "overall feeling", are
certainly n o t such overall sensations. Let us first assume that feelings should be t h e respective total body
sensation , ie one in which a l l current body sensations are included as elements or factors. Then every physical
sensation would have to influence the nature of the feeling. And with the change of individual elements, it should
be able to turn a feeling into its opposite.

But that's not the way it is. May, as I think, this or that bodily sensation stop or disappear, a convincing reason
always awakens in me the feeling of certainty , an object the feeling of doubt, Neither does the occurrence of a
new body sensation transform the feeling of surprise towards a new object into a feeling of familiarity. Likewise,
pleasure in a beautiful line is always given by the beautiful line, displeasure in an ugly form is always given by this
ugly form. Certainly my physical condition can prevent me from turning to the form internally as I would
otherwise. Then the feeling of pleasure or displeasure weakens. But that has nothing to do with the claim that the
complex of all simultaneous body sensations i s feeling. If this were so, qualitatively different body sensations
would inevitably result in a q u a l i t a t i v e l y changed feeling.

So you will first have to be comfortable attributing c e r t a i n emotions to c e r t a i n g r o u p s of body

sensations, and eventually perhaps also to individual body sensations. From the outset, care must of course be
taken to ensure that the body sensations to which a real feeling , that is to say
a f e e l i n g now e x p e r i e n c e d , are to be attributed, must be real body sensations , that is to say a feeling
now experienced . They may not be merely i m a g i n e d body sensations, more
precisely, c o n c e p t u a l contents corresponding to the body sensation content . Of course, such could only
be p r e s e n t e d withFeelings, such as feelings that have had or are experienced in memory, coalesce
into o n e .

Nor can i m p u l s e s b e substituted for the actual body sensations , such as movement i m p u l s e s instead of
the movement sensations. I experience an impulse for a movement, that is: I experience that a movement is
presented by me and at the same time an effort to carry it out is felt by me. An impulse may be physiological what
it wants, for my consciousness it can never consist of anything other than the existence of an imagined person and
a feeling of striving towards the realization of what is imagined.

It is said first of all that not the feeling of s t r i v i n g can be attributed to such "impulses". This would mean that
the striving is due to itself. Nor can o t h e r feelings be attributed to it. A feeling d i f f e r e n t from a feeling of
striving can certainly not at first be identical to the feeling of s t r i v i n g contained in the "impulses" . The
only thing left is that it would be identical with the i d e a s to which the aspiration relates. On the other hand,
what has just been said applies: with a mere imagination , only an imagined feeling can be integrated
into o n e coincide. And there was the further peculiarity: This presented feeling would be the object of an
effort. The overall result would not be a feeling, but a striving for one. - Of course, things would not get any better
if you wanted to replace the movement impulses with "intended" movements.

In fact, those who attribute feelings to body sensations are apparently usually meant as follows:
they identify certain feelings with c e r t a i n body sensations or complexes of them. And they mean
mostly r e a l body sensations.

For example, as indicated above, they assure that the sense of aspiration is a complex of sensations of
tension. Another is pleasure, the sensation of a "light tickle" or a complex of aspiration sensations, displeasure a
complex of diffraction sensations. The feeling of logical agreement, of truth , of certainty, should, according to the
analogy of such assurances, be thought of as a sensation of nodding your head or yes, the feeling of negation as a
sensation of shaking your head, the feeling of doubt as a sensation of twitching in the shoulders and the like. As a
consequence of a word from JAMESsay: We don't nod our heads because we agree with an assertion, we agree
with it because we nod, etc.

We try to take such theories seriously. Then we also have to say here: it r e a l l y i s n o t so. A convincing
argument evokes in me the feeling of approval, truth, certainty, even if I caprice myself instead of nodding,
shaking my head. That feeling does not turn into a feeling of negation or untruth. Likewise, I do not succeed in
transforming my displeasure with ugly shapes, discordant sounds and harmonies, inharmonious combinations of
colors or even with a low level of conduct into arbitrary stretching movements. And so, finally, as far as I can see,
among all the body sensations or complexes of those to which certain emotions have been or could be attributed,
there is not a single one that cannot be removed or exchanged for an opposite one without the feelings, which
have been forced on us by perceived or imagined things, conceived or recognized facts, would have undergone
any qualitative change. If I like, I can breathe quickly or slowly, shortly or longly, I can use physical exercise to
make my vessels expand, the blood to flow to the periphery, the pulse rate to increase. Never does such a thing
make the ugly for me, the pleasing detestable, the sublime common, what is desirable becomes the object of
disgust, or vice versa. If I generate the body sensations in question arbitrarily, they may happen in contradiction
to a palpable striving or "impulse" to generate If I like, I can breathe quickly or slowly, shortly or longly, I can use
physical exercise to make my vessels expand, the blood to flow to the periphery, the pulse rate to increase. Never
does such a thing make the ugly for me, the pleasing detestable, the sublime common, what is desirable becomes
the object of disgust, or vice versa. If I generate the body sensations in question arbitrarily, they may happen in
contradiction to a palpable striving or "impulse" to generate If I like, I can breathe quickly or slowly, shortly or
longly, I can use physical exercise to make my vessels expand, the blood to flow to the periphery, the pulse rate to
increase. Never does such a thing make the ugly for me, the pleasing detestable, the sublime common, what is
desirable becomes the object of disgust, or vice versa. If I generate the body sensations in question arbitrarily,
they may happen in contradiction to a palpable striving or "impulse" to generate the pleasing is adverse, the
sublime is common, the desirable is the object of disgust, or vice versa. If I generate the body sensations in
question arbitrarily, they may happen in contradiction to a palpable striving or "impulse" to generate the pleasing
is adverse, the sublime is common, the desirable is the object of disgust, or vice versa. If I generate the body
sensations in question arbitrarily, they may happen in contradiction to a palpable striving or "impulse" to
generateMovements that result in opposite sensations. But according to what has already been said above, for the
representatives of the theory we are fighting, this could mean nothing else than: I create a feeling in contradiction
with a tangible impulse to have the opposite feeling. I repeat: If body sensations are feelings, then voluntarily
generated body sensations are arbitrarily generated feelings and impulses for body sensations impulses for
feelings.

It is very striking that our organ sensation psychologists do not seem to have made the simple attempts just
mentioned. It is an all the more striking fact that some of them seem to expect all the best for psychology from
experimental psychology or what they call it. Of course, it is easy to overlook the obvious means to achieve a
goal. I think that experimental psychology would be much better off if this tendency were less strong.

For further criticism I mention once again the supposed identity of the sense of aspiration or will with sensations
of tension. Already above I remembered the possibility of artificially creating the tension. Then the feeling of
striving that accompanies the randomly generated, precisely because they are arbitrarily generated, is missing. So
both are not identical.

The opposite case can also occur: I want to move my arm, for example the right one, or I want to. But the arm is
paralyzed. Now there is a feeling of striving, but the tension sensations are missing. Here one says: But tensions
arise in the other, the l e f t arm: and one adds with a serious expression: the tensions felt in this left arm,
that i s the feeling of striving to move the right arm. But if both arms are paralyzed? Well, then there is some
other tension, the feeling of striving to move your right arm. You can see what results from it: If any tension is the
feeling of a striving aimed at any object or happening, then for my consciousness everything presented is at the
same time the object of my striving. There are any tensions in my body at any time.

This again touches on a point of general importance. We hear the representatives of body sensation theory
repeatedly talking about body sensations that occur on any occasion. We hear them state or at least assert their
existence. But that's not all. Feelings are not only there, they are also related to objects. To be more precise: by
somehow feeling certain, I also feel with this certainty related to an object. The whole opposing theory remains
completely meaningless, unless it also makes this relationship understandable.

It is certain, however, that the body sensations, which should be one and the same thing with a feeling related to
an object presented, must do so for mine C o n s c i o u s n e s s o f somehow belonging to the object
presented . In particular, the tension sensations, which should make up the feeling of striving to move the right
arm, must appear immediately as belonging to this arm. This feeling cannot be arbitrary tensions just because
they are there. And least of all are tensions suitable for this that already appear to belong to a n o t h e r part of
the body, for example the left arm. But there is no doubt that tensions in the left arm that are there for
my c o n s c i o u s n e s s - and there can only be talk of such tensions - also turn my consciousness to the left,
and thus n o t belonging to the right arm with sufficient certainty. The

same applies to the identification of attention and tension sensations, such as sensations of scalp tension or
tension in the eyes. The feeling of attention doesn't have to be, but it can be a feeling of striving. However that
may be, in any case I do not find or feel attentive at all, but attentive to something. Now I ask: If I have
consciousness, now to notice this, then that, now a color, then a shape, then a tone, what is the consciousness of
my r e f e r e n c e now to t h i s , then to t h a t ?

I said that the body sensation theory should show and make it understandable that the body sensations belong to
the objects to which the feelings appear. Assuming such a conscious affiliation was e s t a b l i s h e d . So the task
would not be exhausted. It should also be shown what it is for consciousness. And put it, you made it really
serious. Then it would turn out that in every consciousness of a "belonging" the relationship of mine, namely the
ego given in feeling, to the objects that appear to belong to each other is contained.

It would finally show that every consciousness of a relationship a t a l l , this reference may now belong or
otherwise, it is a way of inclusion in the "unity of apperception", that is, a way of summarizing the relation of the
object to the ego differentiated from it, or conversely, of summarizing the relation of my ego to the object , the
merging of the object into a single a c t o f this relationship, that every conscious relationship between the
object passes through the ego in such a way that an ego differentiated from it has the necessary precondition. This
ego is given in the feeling.

I do not want to discuss this in more detail here. I just want to suggest that what the body sensation theory, if
instead of just talking about feelings and identifying feelings with body sensations, would have asked the question
of how it is with the r e l a t i o n o f the "feelings", ie the Body sensations related to the objects of feelings,
immediately and apart from everything else, should not have dissipated into anything. I want to suggest that the
theory in question should have taken a more serious look at the most general psychological facts, and especially
the most general facts of life in c o n s c i o u s n e s s , that superficial consideration was not enough for them.

But of course, we also want to stay on the surface here. To r e j e c t the theory, it is sufficient to refer to facts
that also illuminate the view that remains on the surface.

Let us go further in revealing such facts. Attention is a complex of sensations of tension. But if I now pay attention
to these sensations of tension and I am aware of this fact, so if I feel mindful of the tension or inwardly directed,
do I then find the tension directed towards itself? Is that what is two things for my consciousness and is opposed
to one another for my consciousness?

And if I'm on any o t h e r Body sensations or complexes of such attentions, when I finally visualize my entire
physical condition, when I feel pleasure or displeasure at it, when I feel the wish that it is not what it is when I
experience it as something independent of myself or existing in my consciousness, is the feeling that I have in the
face of the complex of body sensation content exactly this complex of body sensation content?

And finally, the opposite: if I d o n ' t pay attention to the body sensations and the whole complex of them, to my
overall physical condition? Then the feelings can be there. I give myself entirely to any context of thought. I live
entirely in it, I totally absorb it. I feel continuously from thought to thought, feel affirmative and negative, doubtful
and certain. I feel satisfied every time I approach the goal. I feel happy when I get the result I'm looking for. I feel
that I have taken the most of my time and I am extremely interested. In short, I have the most vivid feeling: I
experience myself most intensely in this feeling.

And now we assume that these thoughts have nothing to do with body sensations. They do not refer to it in any
way. Then the complex of my body sensations for my consciousness is not there at all. Turning to my thoughts is
turning away from them. The concentration on them excludes them from my consciousness. Also violent body
sensations, headache, hunger are extinguished for my consciousness. Then the less intrusive, the tensions of the
muscles and the like need not be removed from consciousness. And it is precisely this subsequent concentration
on that context that makes me e x p e r i e n c e t h o s e i n t e n s e f e e l i n g s . Feelings are

s o l i t t l e body sensations. Maybe one thinks that I have at least one of the body sensations in such
cases d a r k consciousness. Even then, that contradiction remains. The f e e l i n g s are me n o t dimly
aware.

10. I-feeling and body-I

Feelings, I said, are ego feelings. The complex of body sensation contents makes up the immediately given
body. By contrasting the feelings with the contents of the body sensation as something else, we have at the same
time contrasted the body with this ego. We recognized the feeling ego as the original ego. So the original ego
cannot exist in the body.

This brings us back specifically to the ego question. This very fact that the body is the original self is asserted by
some with certainty. Let us first go into this in a few words. We already saw the beginning: However, we also call
the body I. The use of language not only allows me, as emphasized above, to say: I feel hungry. I must also say that
I feel m e hungry: just as I say, I feel cheerful or offended or certain of one thing. The ego lying here, it is said, is
the original or constitutes the last core of the ego consciousness. I, that means originally: This complex of hunger,
thirst, muscle, tendon and joint sensation etc.

First I ask here: W h i c h body is the "I" because there are many bodies. The next answer, which would also be
the correct one, would be: Well, m y body, that is, the body that belongs to "me" and that I experience as
"me". Then the explanation turns in a circle.

Maybe you think you’re escaping this circular motion by saying, "My body,"Body or the immediately experienced
complex of body sensations. I can experience hunger, thirst, muscle tension etc., ie I only feel in this body or as
elements of this complex of sensations. This makes this complex different from any other.

That is correct. But now the question arises: What, in turn, distinguishes these e x p e r i e n c e s from others
who are experiences in the same sense, for example from the colors now seen or the sounds now heard? What
makes it that only she, and not just the latter, are elements of the I? What is this ego character or this specific
subjectivity? Is it the same with the q u a l i t y o f the body sensation content?

That can not be. The warmth now belongs to the ego, sometimes to the non-me. Sometimes "I" is warm, just like
I'm hungry, soon the oven is warm. And yet this is the same warmth both times. It is m y warmth when it
belongs to "my" body. But the question is: What makes this body have a special relationship with the I, which is
designated by the word "mine"?

Some respond by pointing out the constancy or permanence of the body sensations. This certainly cannot mean
that these feelings enjoy a special immutability. As far as I can see, they are the most changeable we know. I now
feel this, now that tension, hunger gives way to satiety, etc. But only this can be meantBodily sensations always
there a r e , that there is a never missing although constantly changing in nature total body sensation for us.

But don't we always have facial impressions ? The eye is closed, then I inevitably have the gray field of view filled
with the light mist in front of me. Why don't I see "me" in it; why isn't " I " gray or the field of view?

In addition, as long as nothing is added, a constant or permanent complex of sensations is nothing more than a
constant or permanent complex of sensations. Constancy and permanence a r e but not in terms of subjectivity
or ego. They are found everywhere in the objects of our consciousness in a higher or lower degree. This does not
mean, however, that these objects of our consciousness are always "I" in a corresponding degree, for example the
starry sky more than the clouds. Iness has no degrees at all.

Finally, the constancy or permanence in question is meaningless from the start for the ego question if it is not
constancy or permanence for my c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The reason for the reference to this so-called constancy
and permanence was undoubtedly the fact that the directly experienced ego is there for our consciousness a t
a l l t i m e s . Then the complex of body sensations, in which we should have the directly experienced ego, must
always exist for our consciousness. And at the same time the urgency of self-consciousness or the intensity of self-
awareness must go hand in hand with the urgency of body consciousness. But we saw above how little this is the
case.

For the rest, the identification of the body with the directly experienced ego contradicts the nature of this body
and this ego. The body is a thing among other things, a piece of the world of sensory perception, towards which I
am aware that "I" perceive it, that "I" live in it, that it surrounds "me". In short, the body belongs to the periphery
of my life of consciousness. In contrast, the ego is the center of it. But it is impossible for the center to coincide
with the periphery or a part thereof.

And it is just as impossible that the absolutely u n i f i e d ego coincides with the c o e x i s t e n c e o f my
body. But the I directly experienced is absolutely unified:absolutely uniform. And the body is a juxtaposition of
parts, the complex of sensory contents, in which the perceptual image of the body consists, is a juxtaposition of
sensory contents. Certainly they form a unit for me: but only if I c o m b i n e them into one unit . The
consciousness of the unity of the body or the content of sensations is nothing but the awareness that I have to
summarize the manifold of these contents in unity and experience has to summarize them in unity. The unity of
the body sensation content, the belonging to a uniform "complex", therefore presupposes the ego. Without this,
the content in question is a multitude: here a tension, there a pressure, again a pain in another place, etc.

And it is also not appropriate to establish two centers of consciousness life. Those I am fighting against, as I said,
see at least two types of feelings, namely feelings of pleasure and displeasure, real f e e l i n g s . And most see
these feelings as strange contents of consciousness that cannot be traced back to anything else. With this they
have inevitably recognized a n "I", namely that which I find in pleasure and displeasure.

But once this ego contained in lust and reluctance is given, there is no longer any space for another ego, especially
for an ego that would be given to me, immediately, in the body. I repeat: I only feel once at a time.

And it is least of all to establish a center in my life of consciousness and next to it a complex that plays the role of
the center again, a simple, nowhere, foreign to all spatial concepts, and next to it a and located at this particular
point in the spatial world even a spatially expanded self that diverges into a spatial multiplicity.

11. Origin of the body ego

But now the question is, how d o I g e t t o call my body "I" despite everything. Let us remember immediately
that we do not only do this honor to the body, that in sentences like "I am dusted" I also honor the clothing with
the name "I". Not the one hanging in the closet, but the one I'm wearing now. Of course I do this because the
clothes are mine. Then there is the presumption that I call the body "I" for the same reason. Or more precisely:
The body will be called me because it belongs to me, the clothing because it belongs to the body, and
thus " b e l o n g s " to me .

And we have seen how this is the case. I recall the special subjectivity of the specific body sensation content.

Here we have to distinguish between the two factors of this particular subjectivity . One was this: The contents of
the specific body sensations, hunger, tension, warmth of the body, pressure on the surface of the body, do not
exist without being felt and thus at the same time in the corresponding specific emotional proximity.

There are two sides to this. The in such sentiments given may, if it exists at all, unable to escape the apperceptive
power, which I particularly felt, as indeed all the contents of consciousness h a v e o p p o s i t e . On the other
hand: I can Me When even exist in such sentiments given, h i s Do not withdraw power, that is, from the power
that i t perceives on m e and my feeling. The warmth of my body, for example, is bound to me in this way for
as long as it exists, but on the other hand I am also bound to this warmth. She will get rid of me, but neither will I
get rid of her.

The second factor is different: certain body sensation contents or certain sensible states of responsibility of the
body, namely those resulting from arbitrary movements and positions taken arbitrarily, are in every sense - if not
without limits - of my powersubjected. We may add: once the body has become a unified thing for us, this my
power over those responsibilities is at the same time a power over the body, namely with regard to these
responsibilities, it is a relative power over the w h o l e body. This power does not have that downside; that is, it
is not at the same time a bond of myself to these responsibilities or through them.
The question now is: What does it actually mean that I call my body "I"? My attachment to him, especially that
inevitable specific proximity or my power over the body? Both make the body specifically subjective. Both attach
him to me and make him "my" body. But not about my body, but about the body-I is here. - As you can see, this
question also applies to the clothing ego: If I call the clothing "I", it is because I am bound to it or that it
is bound to m e , ie in particular that it relates to body movements , my will, follows and necessarily follows?

Here we have to say from the start: As if I were b o u n d an identification of the body and the ego, or a mental
acceptance of the body into the ego, should not be seen in any way. As far as this fact is concerned, the body
rather clearly faces me. He p u r s u e s me, sometimes friendly, but often enough, so in all physical pain, even
hostile. Supposedly, something other than my body haunts me, not as inevitable as the body - because this is
impossible - but at least with the greatest persistence. A person may be sitting on my neck. Then it will surely
become "mine" in a special sense. If he does evil to me, he becomes my e n e m y , and appears to me in this
capacity as something specific to me. But he is very far from being "me".

On the other hand, we see quite well how that extension of the concept of self can and must
result from m y p o w e r over the body. The "mine" of which I have j u s t spoken is a passive one, which I
only endure , perhaps inevitably endure. Now he is faced with the active "mine" in which I know that I am
active, conditional, and freely generating. In this sense, "mine" is the body that I c o n t r o l . And now like this to
the e g o We can easily see this if we also replace things or people outside the body instead of the body.

By doing this, we also get to add to what was said about the majority of the "Iche" at the beginning of this
study. Apart from the immediate emotional ego and the "real me", I identify n o t o n l y the body and the
clothes with me. I also say: I build a house if I don't touch a finger. The one who builds it is my master builder. And
this one doesn't actually build it either. The workers build it. But the builder builds it at my command. That is why
he is "my" builder. And build the work on it and thus indirectly on my orders.

Here identifying I therefore no longer my body but outside it contained p e o p l e with "I". I identify with me the
builder and further the workers. I say "I" and I mean her. But here you can clearly see how this is done. Your
building comes from me, namely my will. In this respect it is also my building. Your build is my build, so you are
me. I build t h r o u g h i t . My activity includes hers: I, that is, my will works in them.

This goes even further. LUDWIG XIV says, and others think it - and the facts give them a right to do so: L ' é t a t
c ' e s t m o i ! [I am the state! - wp] what the "state" does they do. In the "State "they act, their will or - their
mood. I also identify a

material t h i n g lying outside my body with me. The stick that I hold in my hand touches the wall. But that he
does this stems from my will I say: I touch the wall. So here is the stick "I."

And now there is no need to say what makes the b o d y me. The b o d y is closer to me than the stick. In what it
does, I i m m e d i a t e l y feelactive. The body moves, but in it I am, and it is completely the moving one, that is,
the movement comes directly from my will. The hand grabs the stick; in the end, however, I am the sane. So the
hand is a piece of mine. I work on the surrounding world through my body. But as the one that works in him,
I feel.

After all, there is a difference between the body ego and the ego that works in the builder and the construction
workers, and also between the body ego and the ego that works in the floor. I said, the body is
me i m m e d i a t e l y close.

Here is the point where that other of the above two factors, which I said that together make my
body " m y " Make body, namely the a t t a c h m e n t o f the directly experienced I t o t h e
b o d y , becomes significant. It should be noted that this is not a matter of physical or physiological facts, but
only of our consciousness. The stick can exist without being there f o r m e , especially as p e r c e i v e d . It is
therefore not in his nature to be an object of my w i l l that is immediately and inevitably present . In contrast,
this is the nature of my body. There is no intervening condition. The inevitable and immediately my current body
acts, and in it I find just m e acting.
All egoism of a real outside of me, so we see, points to one and the same starting point, namely to the will that I
directly experienced. So in this want, if you want, in the " w i l l " , we have the last I, the primal I. But just as we
want, we experience ourselves in a mood of pleasure, offended, certain of a thing, etc. So the feeling ego in general
is the original ego, or everywhere it makes up the ultimate and actual meaning of the word e g o .

One now measures the value of the idea of a brain atom that finds the body sensation sphere in the central
windings of the cerebral cortex, and now thinks that this is where the ego or the original ego consciousness is
sitting, and which, as confirmation, also adds that the ego is me "Central point" of the life of consciousness. Such
thoughtlessness arises when the one who wants to relate the life of consciousness to the physical does not first
take the seriousness of contemplating the life of consciousness.

12. The "real me".

Let us now finally turn to the "real self", which we base on the directly felt self. It is the being who is active in the
psychic phenomena or who announces his existence. It is the feeling, imagining, feeling, wanting, in the sense of
the real s u b s t r a t e o f the psychological facts or processes called sensation, imagination, feeling, willing. In a
word, it is the p s y c h e .

Some psychologists want to forbid that in psychology one speaks of a real ego, a psyche, a substrate of psychic
phenomena: they sense the intangible soul-lending somewhere in the brain. Now there is no question of this. The
real me is the real me, no matter how you be being"But with such a real self, with a substrate of the
manifestations of consciousness, psychology operates everywhere and at any time. No psychologist, for example,
disregards the dispositions, the original or acquired psychological properties of the individual, the memory traces
or memory positions in them .

Some also determine this substrate more precisely, about the brain or as large cerebral cortex in fact, we know
that phenomena of consciousness are bound to the brain this means.. we know that they are somehow bound in a
non-assignable manner to that which p r e s e n t s itself to the senses of a foreign individual under suitable
circumstances as the brain and connection of material brain processes . But we do not know whether in these
effects on the senses of a foreign individual and what can be recognized because of them, the w h o l e nature of
the substrate of the psychic phenomena is revealed. And nobody can be denied that this is n o t the case. We
have to be satisfied with saying: The real I or psyche is what is revealed to the senses of the foreign individual in
the image of a brain and material brain processes, i n s o f a r a s it can be revealed in i t . We thereby mean
that the riddle of the life of consciousness could be deeper than a materialistic physiology of the brain can dream.

But we also do that in psychology n o u s e . Psychology does not have to approach the phenomena of
consciousness with any, be it materialistic or not materialistic presuppositions about the nature of the soul, but to
determine this being as it results from the phenomena of consciousness.

We are talking about a "soul" only for the sake of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Then every single c o n t e n t o f the
concept of soul must also be taken from these phenomena and only from them. Psychology is not metaphysics,
but - psychology.

At the same time, however, the other is said: may the substrate of the life of consciousness be the brain and
nothing else, ie may it reveal its nature on all sides in a context of phenomena that the word "brain" understands,
or may it have one side , which does not reveal itself in it, but only reveals itself in that life of consciousness: in
any case we are not dealing with those phenomena in psychology. The substrate of the phenomena of
consciousness is therefore n o t the brain for p s y c h o l o g y , ie it cannot be considered as such. For her it is
simply the substrate of the phenomena of consciousness that she has to determine from them. Psychology is also
not physiology, but - psychology.

How does the psyche or the real ego relate to that directly experienced ego or that ego feeling? I said that the
psyche was the very basis of the manifestations of consciousness. T o b e more precise, it is f i r s t o f
a l l the b a s i s on which I f e e l . This is the whole original sense of the real me. The same is only in the
second place the basis of the representational contents of consciousness. If and only if these for my immediate
consciousness of t h a t bound I or by appearing due, they are also bound to my thinking or recognizing
indirectly as this r e a l self.

The real ego, I can also say, behaves analogously to the ego of the ego feeling, just as the " r e a l " tone, which
the physicist is talking about and which he defines more precisely as air vibrations, relates to the immediately
given tone or the tone as content my sense of sound. These two are not the same at all. I don't hear air vibrations
when I hear a sound. But the air vibrations u n d e r l i e this tone . That is why they are called "clay". So we also
call the substrate of the manifestations of consciousness "I" for no other reason, because it is the basis of the
directly experienced ego, which initially has only this name. Without it, the real me would be no more than a
nameless something.

In contrast to real sound, we can call the sound given in the sound sensation the phenomenal or the sound
phenomenon. In the same sense, the feeling ego can be called the phenomenal ego or the ego phenomenon. In the
perceived tone, the real one "appears" to me. In it he announces his existence, reveals it. In the same sense , the
real I a p p e a r s t o me in the sense of self or is the feeling in which the real I announces or reveals its existence
to me. Only here the revelation is an immediate one, not like the one conveyed by the senses.

The phenomenal sound i s not when it is not felt, as i s the phenomenal ego is not if it is not experienced, that
is, felt. In contrast is the real sound real and just as real I real, because they both a r e , regardless of whether
they are for my c o n s c i o u s n e s s , ie, more precisely, regardless of whether they are thought. That is why the
phenomenal self is no less real. Yes, like the phenomenal tone, it is the primal fact. Yet o n e we must add. The
prohibition to speak of a real ego or a substrate of the manifestations of consciousness does not turn out to be as
harmless as it may initially appear. It was tempting to put something else in the place, namely the "consciousness"
itself. Since one needed a substrate of consciousness and not it

C a l l i n g t h e s o u l , p s y c h e , r e a l s e l f , and not wanting to identify it with the brain without further

ado, that's how it was called c o n s c i o u s n e s s , meaning that consciousness was made its own substrate. The
abstract "consciousness" has been r e i f i e d . This is how a "consciousness" emerges that produces the contents
of consciousness, that feels, thinks, feels, wants, a consciousness that has innate or acquired abilities, etc. One
speaks of an individual consciousness and means the i n d i v i d u a l w h o has consciousness , yes one
finally makes the abstract collective concept of consciousness in generalan all-consciousness that is really nothing
but a general soul or a world soul. This is how a mythology of consciousness emerged, by thinking of avoiding an
alleged soul metaphysics.

The concepts of the upper and lower consciousness also belong here, the splitting of consciousness, the
alternating consciousness and the like. There is no upper and lower consciousness and no splitting of
consciousness into two simultaneous "consciousnesses", as it can happen and also normally happens that there is
another series besides a series of psychic processes goes relatively independently. And there is no alternating
consciousness, but only changing responsibilities of the one substrate of the psychic phenomena. If one
"consciousness" knows nothing of the other or does not remember its contents, this means that
the i n d i v i d u a l i s aware of himself not remembered in one state of psychological experiences or
achievements in the other state. And we understand this when we know that the overall responsibility of the
psyche is one of the fundamental conditions of every memory.

It was time for those who deal with such phenomena to use clear psychological terms.

The foregoing spoke of ego consciousness. We recognized the feeling ego or the ego feeling as the primary ego
and the core of every ego consciousness. We found the various outer zones of the ego lying around this core, and
the real ego underlying it.

LITERATURE - Theodor Lipps, The Self-Confidence - Sensation and Feeling, Wiesbaden 1901