Compendium

COMPENDIUM
(PETITIONER)
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

PETITIONER BTC-6
BTC-6
BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2020
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
W.P. No. _____/2017
Ainetic Corporation & Another v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal &

Others
With
W.P. No. _____/2017
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Union of India

And
W.P. No. _____/2017
Raymond Sketcher & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTs. ……& …….OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDISTAN
___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS
LORDSHIP’SCOMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF
ALLAHABAD
Page 1 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE 1 ..................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports, AIR 1974 SC 1539. .....Error!
Bookmark not defined.
2. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344. ........................... 6
3. Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044. ............................. 8
4. Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748. ....... Error! Bookmark not
defined.
5. State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 453.
Error! Bookmark not defined.
6. Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622. ............................................... 13
7. A.V. Papayya Sastri v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 2007 SC 154. ........... Error! Bookmark not
defined.
8. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214.
Error! Bookmark not defined.
9. Baldota Brothers v. Libra Mining Works, AIR 1961 SC 100...... Error! Bookmark not
defined.
10. Tungabhadra Industries v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372.
19
11. Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceuticals Works Limited v. Employees, AIR 1959 SC
633. 20
12. Gopal Das v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 1. ......................................................... 21
13. Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O., AIR 1971 SC 870. ......................................................... 23
14. Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715. 27
15. Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 1124. ................................. 27
16. Magan Bhai v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCC 400. .................................................. 31
ISSUE 2 ................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27. .... Error! Bookmark not defined.
2. Kasturi Lal Laxmi Reddy v State of J&k., (1980) 4 SCC 1. ........................................ 33
3. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318. ................................................... 34
4. Sushila Saw Mill v. State of Orissa, (1995) 3 SCC 615. ............. Error! Bookmark not
defined.
5. Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1295. ................................................... 36
6. Ramesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124. ............................................... 37
Page 2 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
7. State of Karnataka v. Dr.Pravin Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081. .......................... 38

8. Collector & District Magistrate v. S. Sultan, AIR 2008 SC 2096. ............................... 39
9. Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129. ...... Error! Bookmark not defined.
10. O.K Ghosh v. E.X Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812. .......................................................... 42
11. Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 896. ....................................................... 43
12. Gokaraju Rangaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1473. ...................... 44
13. State of U.P v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 865. ......... Error! Bookmark not defined.
14. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1442. ............... 46
15. Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1963 SC 1047. .......... Error! Bookmark not
defined.
16. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 56. ................................... 49
ISSUE 3 ................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
1. MSM Sharma v. Shrikrishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395. ............................................... 50
2. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88. ............... Error! Bookmark not defined.
3. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978SC 597. .................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
4. Harendra Nath Barua v. Dev Kanta Barua, AIR 1958 Assam 160. ... Error! Bookmark
not defined.
5. K Anandan Nambiar v. Chief Secretary, AIR 1966 SC 657. ....................................... 56
6. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.
494 of 2012 (Supreme Court, 24/08/2017). ......................................................................... 58
7. Justice Ripusudan Dayal (Retd.) and Ors. v. Respondent: State of M.P. and Ors., AIR
2014 SC 1335....................................................................................................................... 61
8. Brad laugh v. Gossett, (1824) 12 QBD 271. ................................................................. 64
ISSUE 4 ................................................................................................................................... 66
1. State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh, etc., AIR 1967 SC 212. .......................................... 66
2. Devadasan v. UOI, AIR 1964 SC 179. ......................................................................... 68
3. Budhan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191. ............................................................... 70
4. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh Yadav, 1977 SCR (1) 616. ................................ 72
5. Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR 1974 SC 2192. ................................ 74
6. Pu MyllaiHlychho and Ors. v. State of Mizoram and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1537. ......... 76
7. S.K.G Sugar Ltd v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1533. ............................................... 79
8. State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, AIR 1969 SC 917. ................................................. 81
9. Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.,
AIR 2005 SC 1537. .............................................................................................................. 84
10. A.K Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710. ........................................................ 87
11. R.K. Garg and Ors. v. Union Of India (UOI) And Ors, (1981) 4 SCC 675. ............. 90
Page 3 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
12. D.C. Wadhwav. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579. .................................................. 94
Page 4 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
ISSUE 1
1. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhatt, 2002 ACJ 1762 (MP).
Equivalent Citation: MANU/MP/0057/2001, 2002 ACJ 1762, 2001 (1) MPHT 259
IN THE MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Writ Petition No. 4520/99
Decided On: 11.07.2000
Appellants: New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

Vs.
Respondent: Rajendra Prasad Bhatt and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
C Prasad
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Shri N.S. Ruprah, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: Shri Atulanand Awasthy and Shri Vivekanand Awasthy, Advs.
Subject: Motor Vehicle
Disposition:
Petition allowed.
5. Section 163 of the Act provides for scheme to be framed by the Central Government for
payment of compensation in case of hit and run motor accidents. Section 163 of the Act reads
as follows :--163. Scheme for payment of compensation in case of hit and run motor
accidents.-- (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make a
scheme specifying the manner in which the scheme shall be administered by the General
Insurance Corporation, the form, manner and the time within which applications for
compensation may be made, the officers or authorities to whom such applications may be
Page 5 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
made, the procedure to be followed by such officers or authorities for considering and
passing orders on such applications, and all other matters connected with, or incidental to, the
administration of the scheme and the payment of compensation. (2) A scheme made under
sub-section (1) may provide that-
(a) a contravention of any provisions thereof shall be punishable with imprisonment for such
term as may be specified but in no case exceeding three months, or with fine which may
extend to such amount as may be specified but in no case exceeding five hundred rupees or
with both;
(b) the powers, functions or duties conferred or imposed on any officer or authority by such
scheme may be delegated with the prior approval in writing of the Central Government, by
such officer or authority to any other officer or authority;
(c) any provision of such scheme may operate with retrospective effect from a date not earlier
than the date of establishment of the Solatium Fund under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of
1939), as it stood immediately before the commencement of this Act:
Provided that no such retrospective effect shall be given so as to prejudicially affect the
interest of any person who may be governed by such provision."
It is relevant here to state that Section 163 of the Act not only provides for making of scheme
but also provides for the officer or the authorities to whom the application for compensation
is to be made in case of hit and run motor accidents. Rule 20 of the Solatium Scheme, 1989,
provides for procedure for making the claim application. It reads as follows:--
20. Procedure for making the claim application.-- (1) The applicant shall submit an
application seeking compensation under this scheme in Form I alongwith duly filled in
discharge receipts in Form II and the undertaking in Form V to the Claims Enquiry Officer of
the Sub-Division or Taluka in which the accident takes place.
(2) An application under Clause (1) shall be made within a period of six months from the date
of the accident: Provided that an application made after six months but not after 12 months
from the date of the accident may be accepted by the Claims Enquiry Officer, if he is satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds to condone the delay.
Page 6 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
(3) Where the Claims Enquiry Officer does not accept the grounds advanced by the applicant,
he shall record speaking orders and communicate to the applicant reasons for not accepting
the claim application."
A plain reading of Rule 20 of the Solatium Scheme, 1989, makes it clear that an application
seeking compensation under the Scheme is to be filed in Form I before the Claims Enquiry
Officer of the Sub-Division in which the accident had taken place. Thus, under the Scheme a
particular forum has been provided for claiming compensation in case of hit and run motor
accidents. This being the position, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 were ill-advised to file application
before the Tribunal. Tribunal having no jurisdiction in the matter ought to have upheld the
objection of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, his order cannot be allowed to stand.
Page 7 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
2. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Ruplal Singh And Anr 2000 ACJ 502 (Pat).
Equivalent Citation: 2000 ACJ 502
IN THE PATNA HIGH COURT
Claim Case No. 1/57 of 1989
Appellants: Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Vs.
Respondent: Ruplal Singh And Anr.
Judges/Coram: L N Prasad
Subject: Civil
Acts/Rules/Orders: The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Disposition: Set Aside
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though from the allegation in the
claim case, it can be said that the deceased Bhola Singh, son of the claimant met with an
accident while he was standing by the side of Bajaj pick-up van, an unknown truck came
and dashed which resulted in his death so for this accident death involving an unknown
vehicle the insurance company is not at all liable and insurance company is liable only
when the offending vehicle is insured with the company for the accident case. The
claimant himself has alleged that one unknown unidentified truck came rashly and
negligently and dashed against the deceased resulting in his death. In that view of the
matter, no liability can be fastened as against the appellant because it is a case of hit and
run by unknown vehicle and the legislature foreseeing such accident made a special
provision even under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 to safeguard such contingency and
interest of hit and run claim. Section 109-A clearly indicates that in such situation when
the offending vehicle is unidentified then the claimant can file a petition for compensation
before the Collector concerned who is competent authority to deal with such matter.
Page 8 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
3. Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78.
Equivalent Citation: 1969 AIR 78, 1968 SCR (3) 662
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeals Nos. 260 to 263 of 1967
Appellants:Dhulabhai and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent:The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
Hidayatullah, M. (Cj), Bachawat, R.S., Vaidyialingam, C.A., Hegde, K.S., Grover, A.N.
Subject: Sales Tax/VAT
Act/Rules/Orders: Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Article 226, Constitution Of India.
Disposition: In Favour of Assessee
54.Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya MANU/SC/0211/1963 :

[1963]50ITR93(SC) or Kamla Mills MANU/SC/0291/1965 : [1965]57ITR643(SC) can be
said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed.
The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as
follows :-
(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's
jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil
Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases
where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory
tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
Page 9 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the
scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided
may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the
particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may
be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a
liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that
all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so
constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are
prescribed by the said statue or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before
Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a
revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any

provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for
refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a
compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of
constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the
decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are
declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the
scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the
conditions above set down apply.
Page 10 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
4. 4. The Secretary Of State vs Mask And Co.
Equivalent Citation: (1940) 42 BOMLR 767, MANU/MH/0038/1940
IN THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appellants: The Secretary Of State

Vs.
Respondent: Mask And Co.
Judges/Coram:
Thankerton, G Rankin, M Jayakar
Subject: Customs
Relevant Section:
Disposition:
In Favour of Assessee
20. It has been held that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is excluded in three cases in which
an appeal under Section 188 had been taken-C. S. No. 747 of 1920, already referred
to, Bhiwandiwala & Co. v. Secy, of State , which is referred to by the High Court, and Thin
Yick v. Secretary of State for India in Council [1939] 1 Cal. 257, Each of these cases related
to an appeal against an adjudication under Section 182. In the case referred to in 71 M. L.J.,
Notes of Recent Cases, p. 40, Varada-chariar J. held that jurisdiction was not excluded in
circumstances similar to the present case, except that there had been no appeal under Section
188, and, for the reasons already explained, their Lordships do not find it necessary to
consider the question. Similarly, in the cases of Vacuum Oil Co. v. Secretary of State for
India (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 258:s. c. 34 Bom. L.R. 1057 and Ford Motor Co. of India v.
Secretary of State for India (1937) L.R. 65 I.A. 32: s.c. 40 Bom. L.R. 269, no appeal had been
taken under Section 188; the question of jurisdiction was not in issue, though in the former
case an issue had been framed, but it was abandoned by the Advocate General. It was
Page 11 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
submitted on behalf of the respondents that an exclusion of the subject's right of resort to the
civil Courts would be ultra vires of the Indian Legislature in view of the provisions of Section
32 of the Government of India Act, 1915, which re-enacted Section 65 of the Government of
India Act of 1858, and reference was made to Secretary of State for India v. Moment (1912)
L.R. 40 I.A. 48:s. c. 15 Bom. L.R. 27, which was a case of tortious trespass on land. But. in
their Lordships' opinion, neither Section 32 nor the principleinvolved in the decision in
Moment's case affect the validity of an Act of the Indian Legislature which creates an
obligation and provides an exclusive code for its determination; such an obligation is not
covered by Sub-section (2) of Section 32.
Page 12 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
5. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Limited, AIR 1952 SC 192.
Equivalent Citation: 1952 AIR 192, 1952 SCR 583
Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1951
Appellants: Veerappa Pillai.

Vs.
Respondent: Raman and Raman Limited.
Judges/Coram:
Sastri, M. Patanjali (Cj), Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Mukherjea, B.K., Das, Sudhi Ranjan, Aiyar,
N. Chandrasekhara.
.Subject: Motor Vehicle
Relevant Section: The constitution of India, Article 226
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
The writs referred to in Art. 226 are intended to enable the High Court to issue them in
grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to
exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record
and such act, omission or error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice.
Page 13 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
6. State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Deo, AIR 1964 SC 685.
Equivalent Citation: AIR 1964 SC 685, MANU / SC / 0279 / 1963
Appeal (civil) 293-294 of 1959
Appellants:State of Orissa
Vs.
Respondent:Ram Chandra Dev and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala
Ayyangar, JJ.
Subject: Civil, Propery.
Relevant Section:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80; Constitution Of India - Article 226,
Constitution Of India - Article 31(1); Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 9
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
8. On the merits, the position is absolutely clear.
Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very
wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said article even for
purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who
invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases
of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the article clearly
Page 14 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must
be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened.
The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226.
5. .Than Singh v. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1419
Civil Appeal Nos. 86 to 97 of 1962
Appellants: Than Singh

Vs.
Respondent: . Supdt. of Taxes,
Judges/Coram:
Gajendragadkar, P.B. (Cj), Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C., Ayyangar, N.
Rajagopala
Subject: Sales Tax/ VAT
Relevant Section:
Art. 226, Constitution of India.
Disposition:
In favour of Department.
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide
terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial
restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article.
Page 15 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
6. Burma Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1320.
Equivalent Citation: AIR2004SC1815, 2004(3)ALT9(SC), 2004(106(2))BOMLR376,

2004(176)ELT24(S.C.), JT2004(1)SC232, 2004(1)SCALE341, (2004)3SCC214,
[2004]1SCR483
Equivalent Citation : (2004 )3SCC 214
Civil Appeal Nos. 5559, 5561, 5562, 5563-5564, 5565-5566 and 5567-5568 of 2001,
3211/2002, C.A. No. 207/2004 (Arising out of SLP (C) 6064/2002), C.A. No. 208/2004
(Arising out of SLP (C) 8657/2002) and C.A. No. 209/2004 (Arising out of SLP (C)
19877/2001)
Appellants:Jamshed Hormusji Wadia

Vs.
Respondent:Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai and Anr.
Judges/Coram:
R.C. Lahoti and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
Counsels:
R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor General, Harish N. Salve. Sr. Adv. (NP), F.S. Nariman,
R.F. Nariman, Dushyant Dave, Gopal Subramanium, V.A. Mohta and Yashank P. Adhyaru,
Sr. Advs., Sameer Parekh, Darius Khumbatta, Sweety Manchanda, P.P. Mohanty, Jina
Mullick, Gaurab Banerjee, Nandini Gore, Ruby Singh Ahuja, R.N. Karanjawala, Rajesh
Kumar, Meghna Sati, M. Karanjawala, Vivek Shara, P. Venugopal, P.S. Sudheer, Rajiv
Tyagi, Tapes Tyagi, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Sunil Kr. Verma, Himanshu Gupta and S. Barthakur,
Advs. for Sunil Kumar Jain, H. Devarajan, V. Ramaswamy, Happy, P.N. Gupta, Aarohi
Balla, Sujata Kurdukar, Vibhu Bhakru, P.N. Puri, S.N. Singh, Vimal Chandra S. Dave, K.K.
Rai, Bankey Bihari, J.B. Dadachanji, K.J. Gandhi, Buddy A. Ranganadhan, Sunita Sharma,
V.N. Raghupathy, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agarwal, E.C. Agrawala, Jay Savla, Reena Bagga,
Meenakshi Ogra, Ruby Singh Ahuja, Meghna Mishra, Vivek Sharma, Sandeep Kapur,
Page 16 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Bharagava V. Desai, Sanjeev Kr. Singh, P.H. Parekh, P.N. Puri, S. Saini and V. Ramaswamy,
Advs. for D. Mahesh Babu, S.V. Deshpande, D. Mahesh Babu, S.R. Setia and S. Udaya
Kumar Sagar, Advs. for the appearing partie
Subject: Property
Disposition:
Disposed off
33. An overview of the nature of jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution becomes necessary. The framers of the Constitution visualized the Supreme
Court as a Court having a final and appellate jurisdiction on questions relating to the
constitutional validity of laws. It was to have appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution except where an appeal
had come to this Court on a Certificate given by the High Court. In spite of the Certificate
having been refused, this Court could grant a special leave. (The Framing of India's
Constitution, B. Shiva Rao, pp. 483 & 488). Article 136 as framed, opens with a non-obstante
clause giving it overriding effect on all other provisions contained in Chapter IV of the
Constitution and confers a discretionary jurisdiction on this Court to grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India. It is well-settled that Article
136 of the Constitution does not confer a light to appeal on any party; it confers a
discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. The very conferment
of the discretionary power defies any attempt at exhaustive definition of such power. When
no law confers a statutory right to appeal on a party, Article 135 cannot be called in aid to
spell out such a right. (Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. -
MANU/SC/0118/1959 : (1959)ILLJ413SC , The State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and Anr. -
MANU/SC/0200/1959 : AIR1960SC391 and Basudev Hazra MANU/SC/0552/1971 :
1971CriLJ646 ). Article 136 cannot be read as conferring a right on anyone to prefer an
appeal to this Court; it only confers a right on a party to file an application seeking leave to
appeal and a discretion on the Court to grant or not to grant such leave in its wisdom. The
discretionary power of this Court is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136
itself qualifying that power. The power is permitted to be invoked not in a routine fashion but
in very exceptional circumstances as when a question of law of general public importance
arises or a decision sought to be impugned before this Court shocks its conscience.
Page 17 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
(Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadanatham - MANU/SC/0073/1979 : 1979CriLJ875 . This

overriding and exceptional power has been vested in this Court to be exercised sparingly and
only in furtherance of the cause of justice (Subedar v. The State of UP
MANU/SC/0199/1970 : 1971CriLJ25 . The Constitution Bench in Pritam Singh v. The State
- MANU/SC/0015/1950 : 1950CriLJ1270 cautioned that the wide discretionary power
vesting in this Court should be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only when
special circumstances are shown to exist. In another Constitution Bench (The Bharat Bank
Ltd., Delhi - MANU/SC/0030/1950 : (1950)NULLLLJ921SC Mahajan, J. (as His Lordship
then was) reiterated the caution couching it in a different phraseology and said that this Court
would not under Article 136 constitute itself into a Tribunal or Court just settling disputes
and reduce itself into a mere Court of error. The power under Article 136 is an extraordinary
power to be exercised in rare and exceptional cases and on well-known principles.
Page 18 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
ISSUE 4
7. Prabhu Chawla v. state of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 4245.
Equivalent Citation : AIR 1961 SC 100
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 845-846 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 1554-1555 of
2011)
Appellants: Prabhu Chawla
Vs.
Respondent: State of Rajasthan and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
J. Chelameswar, Shiva Kirti Singh, Abhay Manohar Sapre
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: P.K. Goswami, Sr. Adv., Arunabh Chowdhury, Jayant
Mohan, Vaibhav Tomar, Karma Dorjee, Advs. for Coac, Rajshekhar Rao, Chatanya Puri and
D. Mahesh Babu, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Shiv Mangal Sharma, AAG, Saransh Kumar, Brajesh Pandey,
Ram Naresh Yadav, Ruchi Kohli and Milind Kumar, Advs.
Subject: Criminal
Subject: Constitution
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 19 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 397, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC) - Section 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482; Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC);Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 228A
, Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
8. Tungabhadra Industries v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1964SC1372, 1965(2)ALT421(SC), [1964]5SCR174
Civil Appeals Nos. 781-783 of 1962
Appellants:Thungabhadra Industries Ltd.

Vs.
Respondent:The Government of Andhra Pradesh
Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.
Subject: Sales Tax/VAT
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XIX Rule 4,
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XIX Rule 1(1);
Constitution of India - Article 131(1),
Constitution of India - Article 136;
Turnover and Assessment Rules - Rule 18;
Supreme Court Rules, 1950 - Order XVIII - Order XIX Rule 4
Page 20 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
In Favour of Assessee
Page 21 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
9. Madhu Limaye v. Maharashtra 1978 AIR 47
Equivalent Citation: MANU/SC/0103/1977, 1978 AIR 47, 1978 SCR (1) 749
Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 1977
Appellants:Madhu Limaye
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Maharashtra
Judges/Coram:
D.A. Desai, N.L. Untwalia and P.K. Goswami, JJ
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Mrs. V.D. Khanna, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: M.N. Phadke, Sr. Adv. and M.N. Shroff, Adv.
Subject: Criminal
Acts/Rules/Orders: Code of Criminal Procedure Section 482.
Disposition: Appeal Allowed
At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the
inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost
invariably, barring a few exceptions :-
(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the
redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party ;
Page 22 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other
provision of the Code.
Page 23 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
10. Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi (2013) 9 SCC 293.
Equivalent Citation: AIR 2013 SC 2753, 2013 ( 1 ) Crimes 195 ( SC), JT 2013 ( 2 ) SC 240,
MANU / SC / 0063 / 2013
SLP (Criminal) No. 1800 OF 2009
Appellants: Prashant Bharti

Vs.
Respondent: State of NCT of Delhi
Judges/Coram:
D.K. Jain, Jagdish Singh Khehar
Subject: Criminal
Acts/Rules/Orders: The code of civil procedure, Section 482.
Disposition: DISPOSED
23. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the
following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by
invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and
indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject
and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the
accusations as false.
Page 24 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the
prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by
the prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the
court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal -
proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise
of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would
otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom)
specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
Page 25 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
11. R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866.
Appellants:R.P. Kapur
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Punjab
Judges/Coram:
K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.
Subject: Criminal
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution Of India - Article 136, Constitution Of India - Article 21, Code of civil
procedure, section 482.
Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the
provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However,
we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be
exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the
High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings
against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the
Page 26 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal
proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an
accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the
proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases
under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating
evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information
Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be
legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process
of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in
which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise.
In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do
constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the
case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this
class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with
the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or
may not support the accusation in question.
Page 27 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
12. Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466:.
Equivalent Citation: K.S. Radhakrishnan, A.K. Sikri
Criminal Appeal No. 686/2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 9547 of 2013)
Appellants: Narinder Singh and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
K.T. Thomas and M.B. Shah, JJ.
Subject: Criminal.
Disposition: Appeal Allowed.
Relevant Section:
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 307; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482
14. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power
of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plentitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelines
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or
Page 28 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the
offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption
Act, or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavor stand on a different
footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private
or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of
cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the
High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the
ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding.
Page 29 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
ISSUE 3
13. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1336.
Equivalent Citation: 1982 AIR 1325, 1983 SCR (1) 145, MANU/SC/0111/1980
Criminal Appeal Nos. 273 of 1979 and Writ Petition Nos. 89, 165, 168, 179, 434, 564, 754,
756, and 976 of 1979 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1732 of 1979
Appellants: Bachan Singh

Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab
Judges/Coram:
Chandrachud, Y.V. ((Cj), Bhagwati, P.N., Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh, Gupta, A.C., Untwalia,
N.L.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: R.K. Jain, R.P. Singh, Shiv Kumar Sharma, Suman Kapur
and Sukumar Sahu, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: R.S. Sodhi, Hardev Singh, R.L. Kohli, R.C. Kohli and Deba
Prasad Mukherjee, Advs.
Subject: Criminal
Relevant Section:
Constitution of India - Article 14, 21,19
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) Secion 482.
Page 30 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed.
Page 31 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
14. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597..
Writ Petition No. 231 of 1977.
Appellants: Maneka Gandhi

Vs.
Appellants:Union of India (UOI) and Anr.
AND
Respondent: Union of India.

Vs.
Respondent:Union of India (UOI) and Anr. etc.
Judges/Coram: Beg, M. Hameedullah (Cj), Chandrachud, Y.V., Bhagwati, P.N.,

Krishnaiyer, V.R. & Untwalia, N.L., Fazalali, S.M. & Kailasam, P.S.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Madan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: S.V. Gupte, Attorney General, Soli J. Sarabjee, Additional Sol.
Genl. Of Indian, R.N. Sachthey and K.N. Bnhatt, Advs.
Subject: Criminal
Acts/Rules/Orders: Constitution of India Articles 14, 19 (1) (a)
Page 32 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Disposed off
Page 33 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
15. Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454;
Equivalent Citation: AIR 1983 SC 454, 1983 LablC 662, (1983) IILLJ 1 SC, 1983 (1)
SCALE 864, (1983) 2 SCC 442, 1983 (2) SLJ 323 SC
Appellants: Bhagat Ram

Vs.
Respondent: State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors
Judges/Coram:
D.A. Desai and R.B. Misra, JJ.
Subject: Service
Subject: Civil
Acts/Rules/Orders: Constitution Of India - Article 136, Constitution Of India - Article 14,

Constitution Of India - Article 226, Constitution Of India - Article 311(2)
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
Page 34 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
16. People’s Union of Civil Liberties vs. Union of India and Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 476.
Civil Appeal No.. 4294 of 1998
Appellants: People’s Union of Civil Liberties

Vs.
Respondent: . Union of India and Ors
Judges/Coram:
V.N. khare, S.B. Sinha.
Relevant Section:
Constitution of India - Article 19,
Constitution of India - Article 21
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution of India - Article 21.
Disposition:
Petition Disposed.
Page 35 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
17. S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.
Equivalent Citation: AIR 1982 SC 149, 1981 Supp (1) SCC 87, 1982 2 SCR 365
Appellants: S.P. Gupta

Vs.
Respondent :Union of India
Judges/Coram:
A Gupta, D Desai, E Venkataramiah, P Bhagawati, R Pathak, S M Ali, V Tulzapurk
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Disposition: Appeal Dismissed
Justice Bhagwati, observed that an open Government directly emanates from the right to
know which is implicit in the right of free speech and expression. Therefore, the disclosure of
information in regard to the functioning of the Government must be the rule and secrecy an
exception.
Page 36 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
18. Raj Narain V. Indira Nehru Gandhi, 1975 AIR 2299.
Equivalent Citation:
Appeal (civil) 887 of 1975
Decided On: 07/11/1975
Appellants: Indira Nehru Gandhi

Vs.
Respondent: Raj Narain
Judges/Coram:
A.N. Ray (Cj), H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution of India - Article 329A
Constitution of India - Article 19(1),14
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
Page 37 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
19. Dinesh Trivedi, MP v. UOI, (1997) 4 SCC 306.
Writ Petition (C) No. 664 of 1995
Appellants: Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. and S.V. Manohar, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Ram Jethmalani and Rajeev Dhawan, Sr. Advs., Arvind
Nigam and Kamini Jaiswal, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, P.P. Malhotra, Sr.
Adv. and P. Parmeswaran, Adv.
Subject: Constitution, Criminal.
Acts/Rules/Orders: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 197; Official

Secrets Act, 1923 - Section 5
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
Page 38 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
20. State of U.P. v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 865.
Appellants:The State of U.P.

Vs.
Respondent:Raj Narain and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.N. Ray, C.J., A. Alagiriswami, K.K. Mathew, N.L. Untwalia and R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Niren De, Attorney General of India, B.D. Agarwala and
O.P. Rana, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Shanti Bhushan and J.P. Goyal, Advs. for Respondent no. 1,
Yogeshwar Prasad, S.K. Bagga and S. Bagga, Advs.
Subject: Media and Communication
Subject: Law of Evidence
Disposition:
Petition Allowed
Page 39 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
21. Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 1987.
Equivalent Citation: 1995 AIR 1236, 1995 SCC (2) 161
Decided On: 8 August, 1966
Appellants: Chandra Mohan

Vs.
Respondent: . State of U.P.,
Judges/Coram:
K. Subba Rao, Cj, M. Hidayatullah, S.M. Sikri, V. Ramaswami, J.M. Shelat
Subject: Criminal
Acts/Rules/Orders: Constitution of India 1950, Arts. 233 to 237
Disposition:
Disposed off
The Indian Constitution, though it does not accept the strict doctrine of separation of powers,
provides for an independent judiciary in the States; it constitutes a High Court for each State,
prescribes the institutional conditions of service of the Judges thereof, confers extensive
jurisdiction on it to issue writs to keep all tribunals, including in appropriate cases the
Governments, within bounds and gives to it the power of superintendence over all courts and
tribunals in the territory over which it has jurisdiction.
Page 40 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
22. Kumar Padma Prasad v. UOI, AIR 1992 SC 1213.
Equivalent Citation: 1992 AIR 1213, 1992 SCR (2) 109, MANU/SC/0227/1992
Transfered Case (Civil) No. 101 of 1991
Appellants:Kumar Padma Prasad

Vs.
Kuldip Singh, P.B. Sawant and N.M. Kasliwal, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appearing Parties: V.R. Reddy, Addl. Solicitor General, Anil B. Divan, P.K. Goswami,
K.K. Venugopal and Ram Jethmalani, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Shanti Bhushan, Indira Jaising, Soli J. Sorabjee, Jitendra

Sharma and Prashant Bhushan, Advs.
Acts/Rules/Orders: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) rticles 50, 136, 139A, 217(2),
233, 236(b)
Subject: Service
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
Page 41 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
23. SakinalaHarinath vs. State of A.P, 1994 (1) APLJ (HC) 1.
Equivalent Citation: 1993 (3) ALT 471, MANU/AP/0251/1993
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
Writ Petition No. 518 of 1993 and W.A. No. 302 of 1992
Appellants: Sakinala Hari Nath and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
M Rao, S P Rao, D R Reddi.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: S. Ramachandra Rao, M.R.K. Choudhary, Raghuram and

P. Venkateswarlu, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor-General of India, S. Venkata

Reddy, Adv. General, Y. Suryanarayana, K. Jhansi Rani and P.V. Krishnaiah, Advs.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution of India - Article 141,214 , 323, 226. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 -
Section 14, Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 15,28
Disposition:
Petition Allowed
103. In the result, we declare that Article 323-A(2)(d) of the Constitution of India is
unconstitutional to the extent it empowers Parliament, by law, to exclude the jurisdiction of
Page 42 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
the High Court under Article 226 and consequently, we further declare that Section 28 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to the extent it divests the High Court of its jurisdiction
under Article 226 is unconstitutional. As the vires of no statute is questioned in any of the
Writ Petitions, we are of the view that the petitioners should approach the Andhra Pradesh
State Administrative Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for
redressal of their grievances: when the petitioners have an effective alternative remedy, we
are not inclined to adjudicate the individual merits of any case. If the petitioners approach the
Administrative Tribunal, it shall entertain their representations and dispose of them in
accordance with law. With the above declarations and directions, both the Writ Petitions and
Writ Appeals are disposed of. No costs.
Page 43 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
24. State of West Bengal v.The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West
Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 1476
Equivalent Citation: AIR2010SC1476, 2010 6 AWC6073SC, (2010)3CALLT6(SC)
Civil Appeal Nos. 6249-6250 of 2001 in W.P. (Crl.) 24 of 2008, SLP (Crl.) No. 4096 of 2007
and W.P. (C) No. 573 of 2006
Appellants: State of West Bengal and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
K.G. Balakrishnan, R.V. Raveendran, D.K. Jain, P. Sathasivam, J.M. Panchal
Counsels: For Appearing Parties: G.E. Vahanvati, S.G., B. Datta,
Subject:Civil
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 44 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
25. Nixon M Joseph v. UOI, AIR 1998 Ker 385.
Equivalent Citation: AIR 1998 Ker 385
Appellants: Nixon M Joseph

Vs.
Respondent:The Union od India.
Judges/Coram:
K. Narayana Kurup, J.
Page 45 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
26. Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India(1993) 4 SCC
441:
Equivalent Citation: AIR 1994 SC 268, MANU/SC/0073/1994
Writ Petition no. 1306 of 1987
Appellants: Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India
Judges/Coram:
S.R. Pandian, A.M. Ahmadi, Kuldip Singh, J.S. Verma, M.M. Punchhi, Yogeshwar Dayal,
G.N. Ray, Dr. A.S. Anand and S.P. Bharucha, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appearing Parties: Malin K. Benerjee, Attorney General, Kapil Sibal, Fali Sam
Nariman, Ram Jethmalani and P.N. Lekhi, Advs
Relevant Section:
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 46 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed
27. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918
Equivalent Citation: 1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3) 1, [ 1994 ] 2 SCR 644
Civil Appeal No. 3645 of 1989, with (T.C.(C) Nos. 5 to 9 of 1993; C.A. Nos. 193, 194, 1692,
1692A, 1692C and 4627-30 of 1993 and I.A. No. 4 in C.A. No. 1692 of 1993).
Appellants:S.R. Bommai and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent:Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
S.R. Pandian, A.M. Ahmadi, Kuldip Singh, J.S. Verma, P.B. Sawant, K. Ramaswamy, S.C.
Agrawal, Yogeshwar Dayal and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, Milon K.
Banerjee, P.L. Dubey, Attorney General, Ram Jethmalani and Arun Jaitley, Advs.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
28. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1442.
Page 47 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Equivalent Citation: AIR2004SC1442, 2004(106(2))BOMLR615, (2004)2CALLT39(SC),

JT2004(1)SC152, 2004(1)SCALE91, (2004)2SCC476, [2004]1SCR232, 2004(2)UJ836
Civil Appeal Nos. 4294 and 4295 of 1998
Appellants:People's Union for Civil Liberties and Anr.

Vs.
Respondent:Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
V.N. Khare, C.J. and S.B. Sinha, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Prashant Bhushan, Vishal Gupta, Sanjiv Sen, Nandini
Gore, Sanjay Parikh, Meghna Satti and Manik Karanjawala, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Dipankar P. Gupta, Sr.

Adv., Manish Singhvi, Prateek Jalan, Pritish Kapur, Y.P. Mahajan, S.N. Terdal, P.H. Parekh,
Sameer Parekh, Anil Shrivastav and Jyoti Dutt, Advs., D.S. Mahra, (NP), Sushma Suri (NP)
and P. Parmeswaran, (NP), Advs.
Relevant Section:
Atomic Energy Act, 1962 - Section 27
Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed
Page 48 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
72. In order to claim immunity from disclosure of unpublished State documents, the
documents must relate to affairs of State and disclosure thereof must be against interest of the
State or public interest.
75. Mathew, J., however, in his concurring- opinion opined that the question of national
importance vis-a-vis administration of justice should be the criteria for determining the claim
of privilege stating:
"...But the Executive is not the organ solely responsible for public interest. It represents only
an important element in it; but there are other elements. One such element is the
administration of justice. The claim of the Executive to have exclusive and conclusive power
to determine what is in public interest is a claim based on the assumption that the Executive
alone knows what is best for the citizen. The claim of the Executive to exclude evidence is
more likely to operate to subserve a partial interest, viewed exclusively from a narrow
department angle. It is impossible for it to see or give equal weight to another matter, namely,
that justice should be done and seen to be done. When there are more aspects of public
interest to be considered, the Court will, with reference to the pending litigation, be in a better
position to decide whether the weight of public interest predominates."
Page 49 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
29. BandhuvaMuktiMorcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802.
Petition No. 73 of 1962
Appellants: Bandhuva Mukti Morcha

Vs.
Respondent: Union of India
Judges/Coram:
Bhagwati, P.N..
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Mines Act 1952-Sections 2
Disposition:
Petition Allowed
Page 50 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
30. Re Delhi Laws Act Case AIR 1951 SC 332.
Equivalent Citation: 1951 SCR 747
Decided On: 23/05/1951
Appellants: In re THE DELHI LAWS ACT, 1912,THE AJMER-MERWARA

(EXTENSION
Vs.
Respondent: THE PART C STATES (LAWS) ACT, 1950.
Judges/Coram:
Kania, Hiralal J. (Cj), Fazal Ali, Saiyid, Sastri, M. Patanjali, Mahajan, Mehr Chand,
Mukherjea, B.K. & Das, S.R. & Bose, Vivian
Subject:
Acts/Rules/Orders: Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Section -7, Ajmer-Merwara
(Extension of Laws) Act, 1947
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
Page 51 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
31. NageswareaRao v. APSRT Corp., AIR 1959 SC 308
Equivalent Citation: 1959 AIR 308, 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 319
Appellants: Nageswarea Rao

Vs.
Respondent: Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
Judges/Coram:
Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Bhagwati, Natwarlal H., Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P., Subbarao, K.,
Wanchoo, K.N
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution of India, Art. 31, Motor Vehicles Act.
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
Page 52 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
32. Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1973SC1461, MANU/SC/0445/1973, [1973]SuppSCR1,

(1973)4SCC225
Writ Petition (civil) 135 of 1970
Appellants:Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru

Vs.
Respondent:State of Kerala
Judges/Coram:
Sikri, S.M. (Cj) Shelat, J.M., Hegde, K.S. & Grover, A.N., Ray, A.N. & Reddy, P.J. &
Palekar, D.G., Khanna, Hans Raj Mathew, K.K. & Beg, M.H., Dwivedi, S.N. Mukherjea, B.K.
Chandrachud, Y.V.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 53 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
33. Daryano v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457 (1962) 1 SCR 574.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1958Gau160
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
Civil Rule No. 89 of 1958
Appellants: Harendra Nath Barua

Vs.
Respondent: Dev Kanta Barua and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
Sarjoo Prasad, C.J. and Haliram Deka, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: P.K. Goswami, S.R. Khound and B.K. Goswami, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: S.M. Lahiri, Adv. General, D.N. Medhi, Sr. Govt. Adv., R.C.
Choudhuri, H. Goswami and G.S. Bhattacharyya, Advs.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Government of India Act, 1935 - Section 71;
Parliamentary Oaths Act ;
Page 54 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Assam Legislative Assembly Procedure and Conduct of Business Rules - Rules 131,
Assam Legislative Assembly Procedure and Conduct of Business Rules - Rules 158,
be doubted, but we have to remember that in this case, the Constitution has guaranteed the
same powers and privileges to the State Legislature and its members as those of the House of
Commons, and in dealing with the limitations of those powers and privileges, we cannot
depend very much upon American precedents. In this respect, our Constitution is patterned
more upon the lines of the Australian Constitution than upon the powers of the Congress in
America.
13. Mr. Goswami has lastly appealed to us in the name of a free and independent Press in a
democratic set up and its role in educating public opinion. The Speaker is also duly
authorized to order for search and seizure on topics of interest. He contends that the
Constitution under Article 19(1)(a) has guaranteed the freedom of the Press, which should be
free to criticise the public activities of individuals and politicians and any encroachment on
such freedom from any quarter calculated to stifle fair criticism should be strongly
suppressed. The learned Counsel has referred to another felicitous passage from Mr. Justice
Douglas' lectures wherein the eminent Judge observes:
Democracy requires an informed citizenry, and an important factor in keeping the citizens
informed is a free press. Newspapers and magazines which are free to print the whole truth,
even when it may prejudice the position of some vested interest serve the, cause of an
enlightened public opinion. By presenting the 'pros' and 'cons' of the major issues, of the day,
they help keep public opinion in a healthy state of thoughtful ferment.
He has placed before us the publication in question and the English translations thereof in
order to show that there is nothing in the article to which exception could be taken on the
ground of unfairness or illegitimate criticism, much less on the found of contempt or breach
of privileges of the case or its members. We are however, precluded from entering into the
merits of that question. the Speaker is also duly authorized to order for search and seizure.
Page 55 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Granting that Sri Goswami's contentions are well founded, it simply amounts to this that in a
given situation, Speaker "A" may not have taken the same steps, which Speaker "B" has
done, but as I shown in this case, it is not for this Court to pronounce upon the propriety of
the Speaker's action.
Mr. Goswami urges that the article in the present instance was neither a libel upon any
particular member nor did it concern the character or conduct of any member in his capacity
as a member. In case of complaints founded upon documents as in respect of publication in
newspaper or book, the normal procedure appears to be that it should be lodged by a member
of the House, who should deliver a copy of the offending document on the table of the House
and the passages complained of read aloud by the Clerk or the Secretary for the information
of the House before any further proceedings are taken on that complaint.
We will have to examine later the relevant Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the
Assam Legislative Assembly; but the contention of Mr. Goswami is that none of these
formalities have been observed in the present case.
Mr. Goswami further urges that there is no question here of the validity of any proceedings in
the Legislature of the State, nor was the Speaker or the Secretary acting in the exercise of his
powers for regulating procedure or conduct of business or for maintaining order in the
Legislature; according to the learned Counsel, the case was thus taken out of the immunity
provided by Articles 212 or even 194(3) of the Constitution. He, therefore, submits that in
such a case he has every right to approach this Court as the highest Court in the State for and
appropriate writ where, due to the unwarranted action of those dignitaries, his rights and
liberties have been invaded.
The Speaker as the chief custodian of the powers and privileges of the State Legislature is not
merely the constitutional head of the Legislature, but also the chief functionary thereof. "He
is", as May points out, "the representative of the House itself in its powers, proceedings and
dignity", It may be that ordinarily he would not take notice of an alleged contempt or breach
of privilege, except where it is committed in the House itself, provided the matter is brought
to his notice in due course by a regular complaint instituted by any of the members of the
House; but, there is nothing to prevent him from taking notice of such contempt or breach of
privilege where the offending publication has attracted his attention and then set the House
and the machineries thereof in motion for an appropriate action against the offender.
Page 56 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
34. K Anandan Nambiar v. Chief Secretary, AIR 1966 SC 657.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1966SC657, 1966CriLJ586, [1966]2SCR406
Appellants:K. Anandan Nambiar and Anr.

Vs.
Respondent:Chief Secretary, Government of Madras and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, R.S. Bachawat and V.
Ramaswami, JJ.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Defence of India Act, 1962 ;
Defence of India Rules, 1962 -- Rule 30(1) and 30(1)(6) ;
Constitution of India - Article 359(1)
Cases Referred: Makhan Singh vs. State of Punjab (and connected appeals)
MANU/SC/0039/1963
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
Citing Reference:
Page 57 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Ansumali Majumdar v. The State Discussed
Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab MANU/SC/0039/1963

Discussed
MANU/UKAL/3330/1980
Pillalamarri Venkateswarlu v. The District Magistrate, Guntur and Another Discussed
21. Besides, if the right on which the whole argument is based is not a fundamental right, it
would be difficult to see how the validity of the Rule can be challenged on the ground that it
permits an order of detention in respect of a Member of Parliament and as a result of the said
order the Member of Parliament cannot participate in the business of Parliament. It appears
that a similar question had arisen before the Madras and the Calcutta High Courts, and the
decisions of these High Courts are in accord with the view which we are inclined to take in
the present proceedings. In Pillalamarri Venkateswarlu v. The District Magistrate, Guntur and
Another I.L.R. [1951] Mad. 135, it was held by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court
that a Member of the State Legislature cannot have immunity from arrest in the case of a
preventive detention order. Similarly, in the case of K. Ananda Nambiar I.L.R. [1954] I. Cal.
272, it was held by the Madras High Court that once a Member of a Legislative Assembly is
arrested and lawfully detained, though without actual trial, under any Preventive Detention
Act, there can be no doubt that under the law as it stands, he cannot be permitted to attend the
sittings of the House.
22. In Ansumali Majumdar v. The State I.L.R. [1954] I. Ca;. 272., the Calcutta High Court
has elaborately considered this point and has held that a member of the House of the Central
or State Legislature cannot claim as such Member any immunity from arrest under the
Preventive Detention Act. Dealing with the argument that a Member of Parliament cannot, by
reason of his detention, be prevented from exercising his rights as such Member, Harries, C.J.
observed that if this argument is sound, it follows that persons convicted of certain offences
and duly elected must be allowed to perform their duties and cannot be made to serve their
sentence during the life of a Parliament.
Page 58 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
35. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.
494 of 2012 (Supreme Court, 24/08/2017).
Equivalent Citation: 2017(10)SCALE1
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, T.C. (Civil) Nos. 151, 152 of 2013, W.P. (Civil) Nos.
833, 829, 932 of 2013, Conmt. Pet. (Civil) No. 144 of 2014 in W.P. (C) No. 494/2012, T.P.
(Civil) Nos. 313, 312 of 2014, S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2524/2014, W.P. (Civil) Nos. 37, 220/2015,
Conmt. Pet. (C) No. 674/2015 in W.P. (C) No. 829/2013, T.P. (Civil) No. 921/2015, Conmt.
Pet.(C) No. 470/2015 in W.P. (C) No. 494/2012, Conmt. Pet.(C) No. 444/2016 in W.P. (C)
No. 494/2012, Conmt. Pet. (C) No. 608/2016 in W.P. (C) No. 494/2012, W.P. (Civil) No.
797/2016, Conmt. Pet.(C) No. 844/2017 in W.P. (C) No. 494/2012, W.P. (C) Nos. 342 and
000372/2017
Appellants: Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors.

Vs.
Judges/Coram:
J.S. Khehar, C.J.I., Jasti Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, Rohinton Fali Nariman,
Abhay Manohar Sapre. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Sanjay Kishan Kaul and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
Overruled/Reversed:
M.P. Sharma and Ors. vs. Satish Chandra and Ors. MANU/SC/0018/1954
Kharak Singh vs. The State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0085/1962 (Partially)
Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur vs. Shivakant Shukla MANU/SC/0062/1976
Union of India (U0I) and Ors. vs. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde and Ors.
MANU/SC/0371/1977
Page 59 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
The former challenge was rejected. The question which this Court addressed was whether
there was a contravention of Article 20(3). Article 20(3) mandates that no person Accused of
an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Reliance was placed on a
judgment1 of the US Supreme Court holding that obtaining incriminating evidence by an
illegal search and seizure violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the American
Constitution. While tracing the history of Indian legislation, this Court observed that
provisions for search were contained in successive enactments of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Justice Jagannadhadas, speaking for the Bench, held that a search or seizure does
not infringe the constitutional right guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution:
...there is no basis in the Indian law for the assumption that a search or seizure of a thing or
document is in itself to be treated as compelled production of the same. Indeed a little
consideration will show that the two are essentially different matters for the purpose relevant
to the present discussion. A notice to produce is addressed to the party concerned and his
production in compliance therewith constitutes a testimonial act by him within the meaning
of Article 20(3) as above explained. But a search warrant is addressed to an officer of the
Government, generally a police officer. Neither the search nor the seizure are acts of the
occupier of the searched premises. They are acts of another to which he is obliged to submit
and are, therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense.
9. Having held that the guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by a search and
seizure, the Court observed that:
A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the
State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law.
When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such Regulation to
constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to
the Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different
fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is it legitimate to assume
that the constitutional protection Under Article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory
provisions for searches.
But the judgment in Boyd v. United States 116 US 616, extended the Rule even to
documents procured during the course of a constitutionally impermissible search265.
Page 60 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
This Court refused to read the principle enunciated in Boyd into Article 20(3) on the ground:
"we have nothing in our Constitution corresponding to the Fourth Amendment".
This Court held that the power of search and seizure is "an overriding power of the State for
the protection of social security". It further held that such power (1) "is necessarily regulated
by law"; and (2) Since the Constitution makers have not made any provision "analogous to
the American Fourth Amendment", such a requirement could not be read into Article 20(3).
It was in the said context that this Court referred to the right of privacy:
A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the
State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law.
When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such Regulation to
Constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the
American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different
fundamental right, by some process of strained construction.
198. I see no warrant for a conclusion (which is absolute) that their lordships held that there is
no right of privacy under our Constitution. All that, in my opinion, their Lordships meant to
say was that contents of the U.S. Fourth Amendment cannot be imported into our
Constitution, while interpreting Article 20(3). That is the boundary of M.P. Singh's ratio.
Such a conclusion, in my opinion, requires a further examination in an appropriate case since
it is now too well settled that the text of the Constitution is only the primary source for
understanding the Constitution and the silences of the Constitution are also to be ascertained
to understand the Constitution. Even according to the American Supreme Court, the Fourth
Amendment is not the sole repository of the right to privacy266. Therefore, values other than
those informing the Fourth Amendment can ground a right of privacy if such values are a part
of the Indian Constitutional framework, and M.P. Sharma does not contemplate this
possibility nor was there an occasion, therefore as the case was concerned with Article 20(3).
Especially so as the Gopalan era compartmentalization ruled the roost during the time of the
M.P. Sharma ruling and there was no Maneka Gandhi interpretation of Part III as a cohesive
and fused code as is presently.
Page 61 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
36. Justice Ripusudan Dayal (Retd.) and Ors. v. Respondent: State of M.P. and Ors.,
AIR 2014 SC 1335.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 613 of 2007 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
Appellants: Justice Ripusudan Dayal (Retd.) and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: State of M.P. and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
P. Sathasivam, C.J.I., Ranjan Gogoi and Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K.K. Venugopal and Sushil Kr. Jain, Sr. Advs., Puneet
Jain, Ashish Kumar, Chhaya Kirti, Ankur Talwar, Amit Dayal and Pratibha Jain, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Mishra Saurabh, Vanshaja Shukla, Ankit Lal, C.D. Singh and
Sunny Chowdhary, Advs.
Relevant Section:
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt Evam Uplokayukt Act, 1981 - Section 2,
Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt Evam Uplokayukt Act, 1981 - Section 11(1),
Page 62 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt Evam Uplokayukt Act, 1981 - Section 13(3);
Central Provinces and Berar Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 - Section 3,
Central Provinces and Berar Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 - Section 3(2),
Held: It is clear that in the matter of the application of laws, particularly, the provisions of the
Lokayukt Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, insofar as the jurisdiction of the
Lokayukt or the Madhya Pradesh Special Establishment is concerned, all public servants
except the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha for the
purposes of the Lokayukt Act fall in the same category and cannot claim any privilege more
than an ordinary citizen to whom the provisions of the said Acts apply. In other words, the
privileges are available only insofar as they are necessary in order that the House may freely
perform its functions but do not extend to the activities undertaken outside the House on
which the legislative provisions would apply without any differentiations. As rightly
submitted by Mr. K.K. Venugopal, in India, there is rule of law and not of men and, thus,
there is primacy of the laws enacted by the legislature which do not discriminate between
persons to whom such laws would apply.
The laws would apply to all such persons unless the law itself makes an exception on a valid
classification. No individual can claim privilege against the application of laws and for
liabilities fastened on commission of a prohibited Act. The scope of the privileges enjoyed
depends upon the need for privileges, i.e., why they have been provided for. The basic
premise for the privileges enjoyed by the members is to allow them to perform their functions
as members and no hindrance is caused to the functioning of the House. It is clear that the
basic concept is that the privileges are those rights without which the House cannot perform
its legislative functions. They do not exempt the Members from their obligations under any
statute which continue to apply to them like any other law applicable to ordinary citizens.
Thus, enquiry or investigation into an allegation of corruption against some officers of the
Legislative Assembly cannot be said to interfere with the legislative functions of the
Assembly. No one enjoys any privilege against criminal prosecution. According to Erskine
May, the privilege of freedom from arrest has never been allowed to interfere with the
administration of criminal justice or emergency legislation. Thus, in any case, there cannot be
any privilege against conduct of investigation for a criminal offence. There is a provision that
in case a member is arrested or detained, the House ought to be informed about the same. In
Page 63 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
order to constitute a breach of privilege, however, a libel upon a Member of Parliament must
concern his character or conduct in his capacity as a member of the House and must be
"based on matters arising in the actual transaction of the business of the House"..
Page 64 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
37. Brad laugh v. Gossett, (1824) 12 QBD 271.
Bradlaugh v Gossett
Divisional Court
9 February 1884
(1884) 12 Q.B.D. 271
Lord Coleridge , C.J. , Mathew and Stephen , JJ.
1884 Feb. 9
Parliament—House of Commons—Internal Regulation of its own Procedure—
Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866(29 Vict. c. 19) .
The House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majesty's Courts in its
administration of that part of the statute-law which has relation to its internal procedure only.
What is said or done within its walls cannot be inquired into in a court of law. resolution of
the House of Commons cannot change the law of the land. But Court of law has no right to
inquire into the propriety of a resolution of the House restraining a member from doing
within the walls of the House itself something which by the general law of the land he had a
right to do, viz., take the oath prescribed by the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866 (29 Vict. c.
19) . An action will not lie against the Serjeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons for
excluding a member from the House in obedience to a resolution of the House directing him
to do so; nor will the Court grant an injunction to restrain that officer from using necessary
force to carry out the order of the House. The plaintiff, having been returned as member for
the borough of N., requiredthe Speaker of the House of Commons to call him to the table for
the purpose oftaking the oath required by 29 Vict. c. 19 . In consequence of something
whichhad transpired on a former occasion the Speaker declined to do so: and theHouse, upon
motion, resolved “that the Serjeant-at-Arms do exclude Mr. B. from the House until he shall
engage not further to disturb the proceedings of the House.” In an action against the Serjeant-
at-Arms praying for an injunction to restrain him from carrying out this resolution:—
Held, that, this being a matter relating to the internal management of the procedure of
the House of Commons, the Court of Queen's Bench had no power to interfere.
Page 65 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
*279 the right of the Court of Queen's Bench to ascertain in case of need the extent of the
privileges of the House, and to deny emphatically that the Court is bound by a resolution of
the House declaring any particular matter to fall within their privilege, these declarations are
of the highest authority. Lord Denman says 11 : “Whatever is done within the walls of either
assembly must pass without question in any other place.” Little-dale, J., says : “It is said the
House of Commons is the sole judge of its own privileges; and so I admit as far as the
proceedings in the House and some other things are concerned.” Patteson, J., said:
“Beyond all dispute, it is necessary that the proceedings of each House of Parliament should
be entirely free and unshackled, that whatever is said or done in either House should not be
liable to examination elsewhere.” And Coleridge, J., said :
“That the House should have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the course of its own
proceedings, and animadvert upon any conduct there in violation of its rules or derogation
from its dignity, stands upon the clearest grounds of necessity.” Apply the principle thus
stated to the present case. We are asked to declare an order of the House of Commons to be
void, and to prevent its execution in the only way in which it can be executed, on the ground
that it constitutes an infringement of the Parliamentary Oaths Act 15 This Act requires the
plaintiff to take a certain oath. The House of Commons have resolved that he shall not be
permitted to take it. Grant, for the purposes of argument, that the resolution of the House and
the Parliamentary Oaths Act contradict each other; how can we interfere without violating the
principle just referred to? Surely the right of the plaintiff to take the oath in question is “a
matter arising concerning the House of Commons,” to use the words of Blackstone. The
resolution to exclude him from the House is a thing “done within the walls of the House,” to
use Lord Denman's words. It is one of those “proceedings in the House of which the House of
Commons is the sole judge,”
Page 66 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
ISSUE 4
1. State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh, etc., AIR 1967 SC 212.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1967SC212, 1967CriLJ265, [1966]3SCR830
Criminal Appeals Nos. 198 of 1965 and 29-32 of 1966
Appellants:State of Nagaland
Vs.
Respondent:Ratan Singh, etc.
Judges/Coram:
P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and S.M. Sikri, JJ.
Subject: Criminal
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order IX Rule 8
Cases Referred:
In Re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 and
the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 MANU/SC/0010/1951;
Hamdard Dawakhana and Anr., vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
MANU/SC/0016/1959;
Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala vs. The State of Bombay and Ors.

MANU/SC/0288/1960;
D.S. Garewal vs. The State of Punjab and Anr. MANU/SC/0154/1958
Page 67 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
38. It was lastly contended that there is discrimination between one set of rules and another;
that in some of the other backward tracts of Assam the rules are different and a comparative
study was made before us of the different rules, as for example, Rules of 1874, 1937 and the
Assam Frontier Administration of Justice Regulation, 1945 which applied to Balipura,
Lakhimpur, Sadiya and Tirap tracts and had been appointed in Tuensang Division in 1955.
The main differences are in the matter of appeals against acquittals and the power of transfer.
In so far as the appeals against acquittals are concerned, it is, of course, obvious that where
such a power is not conferred there cannot be an appeal against acquittals. In so far as transfer
is concerned, we see no difficulty because the rules were different to start with in different
districts and even if the provisions for transfer may not be in one part the spirit of the Code of
Criminal Procedure would permit transfer in that part. Similarly, in some places confirmation
of sentence above 7 years is required and in some others there is only a right of appeal. This
depends on how advanced each area is. The attempt, of course, is to bring these territories
under the Criminal Procedure Code applicable in the rest of India, by such stages as appeal
justified. As that stage is not yet reached little differences must exist but no discrimination
can be spelled out from the differences. Art. 371A of the Constitution itself contemplates a
different treatment of these tracts and the differences are justified by the vast differences
between the needs of social conditions in Nagaland and the various stages of development of
different parts. We do not, therefore, consider that a comparison of these rules leads to any
conclusion that there is likelihood of discrimination which would offend the Constitution.
Page 68 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
2. Devadasan v. UOI, AIR 1964 SC 179.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1964SC179, (1965)IILLJ560SC, [1964]4SCR680
Petition No. 87 of 1963
Appellants:T. Devadasan
Vs.
Respondent:The Union of India (UOI) and Anr.
Judges/Coram:
S.K. Das, Acting C.J., K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Raghubar Dayal and J.R.
Mudholkar, JJ.
Subject: Service
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Disposition:
Petition Allowed
14. It seems to us that the argument based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution in fact turns on the
same considerations as the argument that Art. 16(1) is infringed by the aforesaid rule. What
Art. 14 provides is that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
Page 69 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. What is meant by equality in this
Article is, equality amongst equals. It does not provide for an absolute equality of treatment
to all persons in utter disregard in every conceivable circumstances of the differences such as
age, sex, education and so on and so forth as may be found amongst people in general.
Indeed, while the aim of this Articles is to ensure that invidious distinction or arbitrary
discrimination shall not be made by the State between a citizen and a citizen who answer the
same description and the differences which may obtain between them are of no relevance for
the purpose of applying a particular law reasonable classification is permissible. It does not
mean anything more.
15. It is an accepted fact that members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes are by and large
backward in comparison with other communities in the country. This is the result of historical
causes with which it is not necessary for us to deal here. The fact, however, remains that they
are backward and the purpose of Art. 16(4) is to ensure that such people, because of their
backwardness should not be unduly handicapped in the matter of securing employment in the
various services of the State. This provision, therefore, contemplates reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of backward classes who are not adequately represented in
the services under the State. Where, therefore, the State makes a rule providing for the
reservation of appointments and posts for such backward classes it cannot be said to have
violated Art. 14 merely because members of the more advanced classes will not be
considered for appointment to these posts even though they may be equally or even more
meritorious than the members of the backward classes, or merely because such reservation is
not made in every kind of service under the State.
Page 70 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
3. Budhan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1955SC191, 1955(3)BLJR249, 1955CriLJ374, [1955]1SCR1045
Appellants:Budhan Choudhry and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent:The State of Bihar
Judges/Coram:
M.C. Mahajan, C.J., B.K. Mukherjea, Sudhi Ranjan Das, Vivian Bose, N.H. Bhagwati, B.
Jagannadhadas and T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: B.K. Saran and M.M. Sinha, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and R.C. Prasad,
Adv.
Subject: Criminal
Relevant Section:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - Section 30
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 143,
Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 347,
Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 366;
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC) - Section 28,
Page 71 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC) - Section 209
Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed
12. Section 30, however, empowers the State Government in certain areas to invest the
District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class with power to try as a Magistrate all
offences not punishable with death. There is an obvious classification on which this section is
based, namely, that such power may be conferred on specified Magistrates in certain
localities only and in respect of some offences only, namely, all offences other than those
punishable with death. The Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its
own people which may vary from place to place. As already observed, a classification may be
based on geographical or territorial considerations. An instance of such territorial
classification is to be found in the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949
which came up for discussion before this Court and was upheld as valid in The State of
Punjab v. Ajaib Singh MANU/SC/0024/1952 : [1953] S.C.R. 254, S. K. Das J., and the
learned Chief Justice have in their respective judgments referred to certain circumstances,
e.g. the distance between the place of occurrence and the headquarters where the Court of
Session functions at considerable intervals, the inconvenience of bringing up witnesses from
the interior, the difficulty of finding in the backward or out of the way places sufficient
number of suitable persons to act as jurors or assessors, all of which make this classification
quite a reasonable one. In this sense, the section itself does not bring about any discrimination
whatever. The section only authorises the State Government to invest certain Magistrates
with power to try all offences not punishable with death and this authority the State can
exercise only in the specified places. If the State invests any Magistrate with powers under
section 30 anybody who commits any offence not punishable with death and tribal by a Court
of Session under section 28 read with the second schedule is also liable to be tried by the
section 30 Magistrate. The risk of such liability falls a like upon all persons committing such
an offence. Therefore, there is no discrimination in the section itself.
Page 72 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
4. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh Yadav, 1977 SCR (1) 616.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1977SC202, 1977CriLJ186, (1976)4SCC213, (1976)SCC(Cri)556,

[1977]1SCR616
Appellants:The State of Uttar Pradesh

Vs.
Respondent:Lalai Singh Yadav
Judges/Coram:
P.N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ.
Subject: Media and Communication
Subject: Criminal
Relevant Section:
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 295A
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 99A,
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 99C,
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 99D;
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 124A,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 153A,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 295A;
Page 73 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed
9. A drastic restriction on the right of a citizen when imposed by statute, calls for a strict
construction, especially when quasi-penal consequences also ensue. The imperial authors of
the Criminal Procedure Code have drawn up Section 99A with concern for the subject and
cautionary mandates to government. The power can be exercised only in the manner and
according to the procedure laid down by the law. Explicitly the section compels the
government to look at the matter which calls for action to consider it as to the clear and
present danger it constitutes in the shape of promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between
different segments of citizens or as to its strong tendency or intendment to outrage the
religious feelings of such segments (there are other proclivities also stated is the section with
which we are not concerned for the present purpose) and, quite importantly, to state the
grounds of its opinion. We are concerned with the last ingredient. When the section says that
you must state the grounds it is no answer to say that they need not be stated because they are
implied. You do not state a thing when you are expressively silent about it. To state 'is to
declare or to set forth, especially in a precise, formal or authoritative manner; to say
(something), especially in an emphatic way to assert' (Random House Dictionary).
Page 74 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
5. Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR 1974 SC 2192.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1974SC2192, (1974)IILLJ465SC, (1974)2SCC831,

[1975]1SCR814, 1975(1)SLJ1(SC)
Civil Appeal Nos. 2289 of 1970 and 632 of 1971
Appellants:Samsher Singh
Vs.
Respondent:State of Punjab and Anr.
AND
Appellants:Ishwar Chand Agarwal

Vs.
Respondent:State of Punjab
Judges/Coram:
A.N. Ray, C.J., A. Alagiriswami, D.G. Palekar, K.K. Mathew, P.N. Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna
Iyer and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: G.L. Sanghi, S.P. Agarwala, A.T.M. Sampath, A.K. Sanghi
and E.C. Agarwala, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: F.S. Nariman, Addl. Sol. Gen. of India, H.R. Khanna, O.P.
Sharma, V.M. Tarkuknde and S. K. Mehta, Advs. for respondent No. 1
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 75 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
27. Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary or Cabinet system of Government
of the British model both for the Union and the States. Under this system the President is the
Constitutional or formal head of the Union and he exercises his powers and functions
conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of
Ministers Article 103 is an exception to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
because it specifically provides that the President acts only according to the opinion of the
Election Commission. This is when any question arises as to whether a member of either
House of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clause
(1) of Article 102.
28. Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor
is the Constitutional or formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers and functions
conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of
Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to
exercise his functions in his discretion.
29. The executive power is generally described as the residue which does not fall within the
legislative or judicial power. But executive power may also partake of legislative or judicial
actions. All powers and functions of the President except his legislative powers as for
example in Article 123, viz., ordinance making power and all powers and functions of the
Governor except his legislative power as for example in Article 213 being ordinance making
powers are executive powers of the Union vested in the President under Article 53(1) in one
case arid are executive powers of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1) in the
other case.
Page 76 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
6. Pu MyllaiHlychho and Ors. v. State of Mizoram and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1537.
Equivalent Citation: AIR2005SC1537, JT2005(1)SC263, 2005(1)PLJR305,

2005(1)SCALE239, (2005)2SCC92, [2005]1SCR279
Civil Appeal Nos. 661-662 of 2003
Appellants: Pu Myllai Hlychho and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: State of Mizoram and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
R.C. Lahoti, C.J., Shivaraj V. Patil, K.G. Balakrishnan, B.N. Srikrishna and G.P. Mathur, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Anil Nauriya, Beena Madhavan and Sumita Hazarika,
Advs. for Lawyer's Knit & Co
For Respondents/Defendant: U.U. Lalit, Sr. Adv., Prasenjit Keswani, Hemantika Wahi and
Ajay Choudhary (NP), Advs.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution of India - Article 371A(1),
Page 77 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Constitution of India - Article 371A(2);
Mizoram Autonomous District Councils (Constitution and Conduct of Business of the

District Councils) Rules, 1974 - Rule 7(1);
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1988 - Section 2
Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed
11. "163. Council of Ministers to aid and advise Governor - (1) There shall be a Council of
Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise
of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his
functions or any of them in his discretion.
(2) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the
Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the
Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor
shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his
discretion.
(3) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the
Governor shall not be inquired into in any court."
12. There are several powers and duties for the Governor and some of these powers are to be
exercised in his discretion and some other powers are to be exercised by him with the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers. The executive powers of the State are vested in the
Governor under Article 154(1). Article 163(1) states that there shall be a Council of Ministers
with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his
functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution, required to exercise his
functions or any of them in his discretion.
13. Article 163(2) states that if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as
respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion,
the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity of anything done
by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to
have acted in his discretion. Article 143 in the Draft Constitution became Article 163 in the
Page 78 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Constitution. The draft Constitution in Article 144(6) said that the functions of the Governor
under that Article with respect to the appointment and dismissal of Ministers shall be
exercised by him in his discretion. This draft article was omitted when it became Article 164
in the Constitution. There are certain powers and functions of the Governor which speak of
the special responsibilities of the Governor. These articles are 371A(1)(b), 371A(1)(d),
371A(2)(b) and 371A(2)(f). Similarly, there are certain provisions in the Sixth Schedule,
where the words "in his discretion" are used in relation to certain powers to be exercised by
the Governor.
Page 79 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
7. S.K.G Sugar Ltd v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1533.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1974SC1533, (1974)4SCC827, [1975]1SCR312
With Petition No. 370 of 1969
Appellants:S.K.G. Sugar Ltd.

Vs.
Respondent:State of Bihar and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
A.N. Ray, C.J., A. Alagiriswami, K.K. Mathew, P.K. Goswami and R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: P.K. Chatterjee, N.H. Hingorani and Rathin Das, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: L.N. Sinha, R.K. Garg, S.C. Agrawal and S.S. Bhatnagar, Advs.
for respondent No. 1
Cases Referred:
A.K. Jain and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. MANU/SC/0089/1969;
The Belsand Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Thakur Girja Nandan Singh MANU/BH/0003/1969;
Hukam Chand etc. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. MANU/SC/0506/1972
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 80 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 - Section 16(1);
16. There is no dispute with regard to the satisfaction of the first condition. Existence of
condition (b) only is questioned. It is however well-settled that the necessity of immediate
action and of promulgating an Ordinance is a matter purely for the subjective satisfaction of
the Governor. He is the sole Judge as to the existence of the circumstances necessitating the
making of an Ordinance. His satisfaction is not a justiciable matter. It cannot be questioned
on ground of error of judgment or otherwise in court--see State of Punjab v. Sat Pal Dang
[1969] 1 S.C.R. 633. The contention is devoid of merit. Moreover, after the coining into force
of the President's Act 8 of 1969, this question-had become merely academic.
17. This takes us to the other contentions. They are interlinked. To us, none of them appears
to be well-founded.
18. The first question is, whether after the commencement of the Central Act on April 1,
1955, the whole of Act 7 of 1937 became 'void' and inoperative? The question further
resolves itself into the issue : To what extent this fife-Constitution Act 7 of 1937 was
repugnant to the Central Act, and, in consequence stood repealed or altered?
Page 81 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
8. State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, AIR 1969 SC 917.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1969SC903, [1969]1SCR478
Civil Appeals Nos. 1427 and 1428 of 1968
Appellants:State of Punjab
Vs.
Respondent:Satya Pal Dang and Ors. and Baldev Parkash and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
M. Hidayatullah, C.J., J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, G.K. Mitter and A.N. Grover, JJ.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Ratio Decidendi:
"Ordinance passed by local government shall not be invalidated unless contrary to
provisions of constitution."
Page 82 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
13. The question here is did the Governor possess the power to prorogue the Legislature and
was his action bad merely because he was making way for the resummoning of the
Legislature after passing an Ordinance under Article 213(6)
(6) "213. Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legislature.
(1) If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where
there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both Houses of the Legislature are in
session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him
to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to
him to require:
Provided that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the President, promulgate any
such Ordinance if:-
(a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the
previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature; or
(b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same provisions for
the consideration of the President; or
(c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under the
Constitution have been invalid unless, having been reserved for the consideration of the
President, it had received the assent of the President.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an
Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance-
(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative
Council in the State before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six
weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a
resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the
Page 83 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or as the case may be, on the
resolution being agreed to by the Council; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
Explanation - Where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council are
summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from
the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.
(3) If any so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which would not be
valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, it shall
be void:
Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relating to the effect of
an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of Parliament of an existing
law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated
under this article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act
of the Legislature of the State which has been reserved for the consideration of the President
and assented to by him."
The power under Article 213 is available to the Governor when the Assembly is not in
session. Subjective satisfaction means the personal satisfaction of the Governor. The position
after the 7th March adjournment of the Assembly was this: The Assembly was in session but
it was put in a state of inaction for 2 months by the adjournment which the (Governor had no
power to rescind and the Speaker would apparently not be prepared to recall. Time was
running out and the Budget Session of the Assembly had to reach a conclusion before March
31. After that date no money could be drawn from the Consolidated Fund (Article 266(3)).
The Governor thus had to act and act quickly to put back the Legislative machinery of the
State into life. Only two courses were open. One was for the Ministers to ask the Speaker
under Rule 16 to recall the Assembly which was, perhaps, attempting the impossible. The
other was to prorogue the Assembly to get rid of the adjournment and then to resummon the
Assembly. The second was not only a reasonable solution but the one most properly adapted
to achieve a constitutional result and it was followed. The action of the Governor may now be
considered.
Page 84 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
9. Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.,
AIR 2005 SC 1537.
Equivalent Citation: AIR2005SC325, 2005(1)ALD(Cri)262, 2005(1)PLJR380,

2004(4)RCR(Criminal)963, 2004(9)SCALE302, (2004)8SCC788, 2005(1)UJ165
Civil Appeal Nos. 7256-7257 of 2004 [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7697-7698 of 2003]
Appellants:Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment

Vs.
Respondent:State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava, B.P. Singh, H.K. Sema and S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Soli J. Sorabjee, Sr. Adv., Manish Singhvi, P.H. Prarekh,
Sameer Parekh, D.P. Mohanty and Shlreen S.P. Singh, Advs. for P.H. Parekh and Co
For State: Satish K. Agnihotri, Rohit K. Singh and Amit Mishra, Advs. Vivek K. Tankha,
Ashok K. Gupta, Farrukh Rasheed and Siddartha Singh Chauhan, Adv. for the Respondent
No. 4
Subject: Civil
Relevant Section:
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 120B
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1983 - Section 5,
Page 85 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1983 - Section 6,
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1983 - Section 13(1),
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1983 - Section 13(2);
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 120B,
Disposition:
Appeal Allowed
14. Thus, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Sorabjee, a seven Judges' Bench of this Court has
already held that the normal rule is that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers and not independently or contrary to it. But there are exceptions under
which the Governor can act in his own discretion. Some of the exceptions are as set out
hereinabove. It is however clarified that the exceptions mentioned in the Judgment are not
exhaustive. It is also recognized that the concept of the Governor acting in his discretion or
exercising independent judgment is not alien to the Constitution. It is recognized that there
may be situations where by reason of peril to democracy or democratic principles an action
may be compelled which from its nature is not amendable to Ministerial advice. Such a
situation may be where bias is inherent and/or manifest in the advice of the Council of
Ministers.
15. Mr. Sorabjee also points out that this Court in the case of Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak
(supra) has carved out a further exception. In this case, an MLA filed a complaint against the
then Chief Minister of Maharashtra in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Court,
Esplanade, Bombay, charging the Chief Minister with commission of offences punishable
under Sections 161 and 185 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The Metropolitan Magistrate refused to entertain the complaint without
requisite sanction of the Government under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Against the Order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, R.S. Nayak filed a Criminal Revision
Application in the High Court of Bombay wherein the State of Maharashtra and Shri Antulay
were impleaded as Respondents. During the pendency of this Criminal Revision Application,
Shri Antulay resigned as the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra. A Division Bench of
the Bombay High Court dismissed the Revision Application, but whilst dismissing the
application it was recorded by Gadgil, J. as follows:
Page 86 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
"However, I may observe at this juncture itself that at one stage it was expressly submitted by
the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents that in case if it is felt that bias is well
apparently inherent in the proposed action of the concerned Ministry, then in such a case
situation notwithstanding the other Ministers not being joined in the arena of the prospective
accused, it would be a justified ground for the Governor to act on his own, independently and
without any reference to any Ministry, to decide that question."
Page 87 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
10. A.K Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1982SC710, 1982CriLJ340, 1981(4)SCALE1904,

(1982)1SCC271, [1982]2SCR272
Writ Petition Nos. 5433, 5724 and 5874 of 1980
Appellants: A.K. Roy and Ors.

Vs.
Judges/Coram:
Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., D.A. Desai, P.N. Bhagwati, V.D. Tulzapurkar and A.C. Gupta, JJ.
Counsels:
For Intervenor: V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh, Manik Tarkunde, R.N. Karanjawala and Bhim
Singh, Advs
Relevant Section:
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 52,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 124;
Indian Evidence Act - Section 106
Page 88 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Disposed off
16. It is thus clear that the Constituent Assembly was of the view that the President's power to
legislate by issuing an ordinance is as necessary for the peace and good government of the
country as the Parliament's power to legislate by passing laws. The mechanics of the
President's legislative power was devised evidently in order to take care of urgent situations
which cannot brook delay. The Parliamentary process of legislation is comparatively tardy
and can conceivably be time-consuming. It is true that it is not easy to accept with equanimity
the proposition that the executive can indulge in legislative activity but the Constitution is
what it says and not what one would like it to be. The Constituent Assembly indubitably
thought, despite the strong and adverse impact which the Governor-General's ordinance-
making power had produced on the Indian community in the pre-independence era, that it
was necessary to equip the President with legislative powers in urgent situations. After all,
the Constitution makers had to take into account life's realities. As observed by Shri Seervai
in 'Constitutional Law of India' (2nd Ed., p. 16), "Grave public inconvenience would be
caused if on an Act, like the Bombay Sales Tax Act, being declared void no machinery,
existed whereby a valid law could be promptly promulgated to take the place of the law
declared void". Speaking for the majority in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India
MANU/SC/0011/1970 : [1970]3SCR530 , Shah J. said: "The President is under the
Constitution not the repository of the legislative power of the Union, but with a view to meet
extraordinary situations demanding immediate enactment of laws, provision is made in the
Constitution investing the President with power to legislate by promulgating Ordinances."
The Constituent Assembly therefore conferred upon the executive the power to legislate , not
of course intending that the said power should be used recklessly or by imagining a state of
affairs to exist when, in fact, it did not exist; nor, indeed, intending that it should be used
mala fide in order to prevent the people's elected representatives from passing or rejecting a
Bill after a free and open discussion, which is of the essence of democratic process. Having
conferred upon the executive the power to legislate by ordinances, if the circumstances were
such as to make the exercise of that power necessary, the Constituent Assembly subjected
that power to the self-same restraints to which a law passed by the legislature is subject. That
is the compromise which they made between the powers of Government and the liberties of
the people. Therefore, in face of the provisions to which we have already referred, it seems to
us impossible to accept Shri Garg's contention that a ordinance made by the President is an
Page 89 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
executive and not a legislative act. An ordinance issued by the President or the Governor is as
much law as an Act passed by the Parliament and is, fortunately and unquestionably, subject
to the same inhibitions. In those inhibitions, lies the safety of the people. The debates of the
Constituent Assembly (Vol. 8, Part V, Chapter III, pp 201 to 217) would show that the power
to issue ordinances was regarded as a necessary evil. That power was to be used to meet
extra-ordinary situations and not perverted to serve political ends. The Constituent Assembly
held forth, as it were, an assurance to the people that an extra-ordinary power shall not be
used in order to perpetuate a fraud on the Constitution which is conceived with so much faith
and vision. That assurance must in all events be made good and the balance struck by the
founding fathers between the powers of the Government and the liberties of the people not
disturbed or destroyed.
Page 90 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
11. R.K. Garg and Ors. v. Union Of India (UOI) And Ors, (1981) 4 SCC 675.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1981SC2138, (1981)25CTR(SC)406, 1981(3)SCALE1743,

(1981)4SCC675, [1981]1SCR947, 1982(14)UJ12
Write petition. Nos. 355, 360, 863, 994, and 3624 of 1981
Appellants: R.K. Garg and Ors.

Vs.
Judges/Coram:
Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., A.C. Gupta, A.N. Sen, P.N. Bhagwati and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.
For Intervener:
Relevant Section:
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Ordinance, 1981 ;
Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1981 - Section 4
Page 91 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Petition Dismissed
6. The Ordinance was issued by the President under Article 123 which is the solitary Article
in chapter III headed "Legislative Powers of the President." This Article provides inter-alia as
follows:
(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is
satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action,
he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an
Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance:
(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration
of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period
resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of
those resolutions: and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament
would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.
It will be noticed that under this Article legislature power is conferred on the President
exercisable when both Houses of Parliament are not in session. It is possible that when
neither House of Parliament is in session, a situation may be arise which needs to be dealt
with immediately and for which there is no adequate provision in the existing law and
emergent legislation may be necessary to enable the executive to cope with the situation.
What is to be done and how is the problem to be solved in such a case ? Both Houses of
Parliament being in recess, no legislation can be immediately undertaken and if the
legislation is postponed until the House of Parliament meet damage may be caused to public
weal. Article 123 therefore confers powers on the President to promulgate a law by issuing an
Ordinance to enable the executive to deal with the emergent situation which might well
include a situation created by a law being declared void by a Court of law. "Grave public
inconvenience would be caused", points out Mr. Seervai in his famous book on Constitutional
Page 92 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Law, if on a statute like the Sales-tax Act being declared void, "no machinery existed
whereby a valid law could be promulgated to take the place of the law declared void". The
President is thus given legislative power to issue an Ordinance and since under our
constitutional scheme as authoritatively expounded by this Court in Shamsher and Anr. v.
State of Punjab MANU/SC/0073/1974 : (1974)IILLJ465SC the President cannot act except in
accordance with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, it is really the executive
which is invested with this legislative power. Now at first blush it might appear rather
unusual and that was the main thrust of the criticism of Mr. R.K. Garg on this point-that the
power to make laws should have been entrusted by the founding fathers of the Constitution to
the executive, because according to the traditional outfit of a democratic political structure,
the legislative power must belong exclusively to the elected representatives of the people and
vesting it in the executive, though responsible to the legislature, would be undemocratic, as it
might enable the executive to abuse this power by securing the passage of an ordinary bill
without risking a debate in the legislature. But if we closely analyse this provision and
consider it in all its aspects, it does not appear to be so startling, though we may point out
even if it were, the Court would have to accept it as the expression of the collective will of
the founding fathers. It may be noted, and this was pointed out forcibly by Dr. Ambedkar
while replying to the criticism against the introduction of Article 123 in the Constituent
Assembly-that the legislative power conferred on the President under this Article is not a
parallel power of legislation. It is a power exercisable only when both Houses of Parliament
are not in session and it has been conferred ex-necessitate in order to enable the executive to
meet an emergent situation. Moreover, the law made by the President by issuing an
Ordinance is of strictly limited duration. It ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks
from the reassembly of Parliament or if before the expiration of this period, resolutions
disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those
resolutions. This also affords the clearest indication that the President is invested with this
legislative power only in order to enable the executive to tide over an emergent situation
which may arise whilst the Houses of Parliament are not in session. Further more, this power
to promulgate an Ordinance conferred on the President is co-extensive with the power of
Parliament to make laws and the President cannot issue an Ordinance which Parliament
cannot enact into a law. It will therefore be seen that legislative power has been conferred on
the executive by the Constitution makers for a necessary purpose and it is hedged in by
limitations and conditions. The conferment of such power may appear to be undemocratic but
it is not so, because the executive is clearly answerable to the legislature and if the President,
Page 93 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
on the aid and advice of the executive, promulgates an Ordinance in misuse or abuse of this
power, the legislature cannot only pass a resolution disapproving the Ordinance but can also
pass a vote of no confidence in the executive. There is in the theory of constitutional law
complete control of the legislature over the executive, because if the executive misbehaves or
forfeits the confidence of the legislature, it can be thrown out by the legislature. Of course
this safeguard against misuse or abuse of power by the executive would dwindle in efficacy
and value according as if the legislative control over the executive diminishes and the
executive begins to dominate the legislature. But nonetheless it is a safeguard which protects
the vesting of the legislative power in the President from the charge of being an undemocratic
provision. We might profitably quote here the words of one of us (Chandrachud, J, as he then
was) in the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India MANU/SC/0370/1977 : [1978]1SCR1
where, repelling the contention of the petitioner that the interpretation which the Union of
India was inviting the Court to place on Article 356 would impair the future of democracy by
enabling the Central Government to supersede a duly elected State Government and to
dissolve its legislature without prior approval of Parliament, the learned Judge said-
...there may be situations in which it is imperative to act expeditiously and recourse to the
parliamentary process may, by reason of the delay involved, impair rather than strengthen the
functioning of democracy. The Constitution has therefore provided safety-valves to meet
extraordinary situations. They have an imperious garb and a repressive content but they are
designed to save, not destroy democracy. The fault, if any, is not in the meeting of the
Constitution but in the working of it.
Page 94 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
12. D.C. Wadhwav. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1987SC579, JT1987(1)SC70, 1986(2)SCALE1174,

(1987)1SCC378, [1987]1SCR798
Writ Petition Nos. 412-15 of 1984
Appellants: Dr D.C. Wadhwa and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: State of Bihar and Ors.
Judges/Coram:
P.N. Bhagwati, C.J., K.N. Singh, M.M. Dutt, G.L. Oza and Ranganath Misra, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Soli J. Sorabji, J.B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain, T.N.
Ansari and Joel Pares, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: L.N. Sinha, Jai Narain, P.P. Singh, D. Goburdhan and S. Relan,
Advs.
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Page 95 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
Disposition:
Petition Allowed
6. The determination of this question depends on the true interpretation of Article 213 which
confers power on the Governor of a State to promulgate ordinances. This Article in so far as
material, reads as follows:
213. (1) If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or
where there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both Houses of the Legislature
are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for
him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances
appear to him to require.
….
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an
Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance-
(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative
Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of
six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a
resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the
Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the
resolution being agreed to by the Council, and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
Explanation-Where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council are
summoned to re assemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from
the later of these dates for the purposes of this clause….
The power conferred on the Governor to issue Ordinances is in the nature of an emergency
power which is vested in the Governor for taking immediate action where such action may
become necessary at a time when the Legislature is not in Session. The primary law making
authority under the Constitution is the Legislature and not the Executive but it is possible that
when the Legislature is not in Session circumstances may arise which render it necessary to
Page 96 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
take immediate action and in such a case in order that public interest may not suffer by reason
of the inability of the Legislature to make law to deal with the emergent situation, the
Governor is vested with the power to promulgate Ordinances. But every Ordinance
promulgated by the Governor must be placed before the Legislature and it would cease to
operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or if before the
expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly
and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any. The object of this provision is that since the
power conferred on the Governor to issue Ordinances is an emergent power exercisable when
the Legislature is not in Session, an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor to deal with a
situation which requires immediate action and which cannot wait until the legislature
reassembles, must necessarily have a limited life. Since Article 174 enjoins that the
Legislature shall meet at least twice in a year but six months shall not intervene between its
last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next Session and an
Ordinance made by the Governor must cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from
the reassembly of the Legislature, it is obvious that the maximum life of an Ordinance cannot
exceed seven and a half months unless it is replaced by an Act of the Legislature or
disapproved by the resolution of the Legislature before the expiry of that period. The power
to promulgate an Ordinance is essentially a power to be used to meet an extra-ordinary
situation and it cannot be allowed to be "perverted to serve political ends." It is contrary to all
democratic norms that the Executive should have the power to make a law, but in order to
meet an emergent situation, this power is conferred on the Governor and an Ordinance issued
by the Governor in exercise of this power must, therefore, of necessity be limited in point of
time. That is why it is provided that the Ordinance shall cease to operate on the expiration of
six weeks from the date of assembling of the Legislature. The Constitution makers expected
that if the provisions of the Ordinance are to be continued in force, this time should be
sufficient for the Legislature to pass the necessary Act. But if within this tune the Legislature
does not pass such an Act, the Ordinance must come to an end. The Executive cannot
continue the provisions of the Ordinance in force without going to the Legislature. The law-
making function is entrusted by the Constitution to the Legislature consisting of the
representatives of the people and if the Executive were permitted to continue the provisions
of an Ordinance in force by adopting the methodology of repromulgation without submitting
to the voice of the Legislature, it would be nothing short of usurpation by the Executive of the
law-making function of the Legislature. The Executive cannot by taking resort to an
emergency power exercisable by it only when the Legislature is not in Session, take over the
Page 97 of 129
PETITIONER BTC-6
law-making function of the Legislature. That would be clearly subverting the democratic
process which lies at the core of our constitutional scheme, for then the people would be
governed not the laws made by the Legislature as provided in the Constitution but by laws
made by the Executive. The Government cannot by-pass the Legislature and without enacting
the provisions of the Ordinance into an Act of the Legislature, repromulgate the Ordinance as
soon as the Legislature is prorogued. Of course, there may be a situation where it may not be
possible for the Government to introduce and push through in the Legislature a Bill
containing the same provisions as in the Ordinance, because the Legislature may have too
much legislative business in a particular Session or the time at the disposal of the Legislature
in a particular Session may be short, and in that event, the Governor may legitimately find
that it is necessary to repromulgate the Ordinance. Where such is the case, repromulgation of
the Ordinance may not be open to attack. But otherwise, it would be a colourable exercise of
power on the part of the Executive to continue an Ordinance with substantially the same
provisions beyond the period limited by the Constitution, by adopting the methodology of
repromulgation. It is settled law that a constitutional a authority cannot do indirectly what it is
not permitted to do directly. If there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the constitutional
authority from doing an Act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by adoption of
any subterfuge. That would be clearly a fraud on the constitutional provision.
Page 98 of 129

Compendium - RESPONDENT

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Compendium - RESPONDENT

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

W.P. No. _____/2017

Ainetic Corporation & Another v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal &

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Union of India

Raymond Sketcher & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTs. ……& …….OF

7. State of Karnataka v. Dr.Pravin Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081. .......................... 38

12. D.C. Wadhwav. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579. .................................................. 94

IN THE MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT

Writ Petition No. 4520/99

Decided On: 11.07.2000

Appellants: New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

Subject: Motor Vehicle

Equivalent Citation: 2000 ACJ 502

IN THE PATNA HIGH COURT

Claim Case No. 1/57 of 1989

Decided On: 06.02.1988

Appellants: Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Acts/Rules/Orders: The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

Disposition: Set Aside

3. Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78.

Equivalent Citation: 1969 AIR 78, 1968 SCR (3) 662

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 260 to 263 of 1967

Decided On: 05.04.1968

Appellants:Dhulabhai and Ors.

Subject: Sales Tax/VAT

Disposition: In Favour of Assessee

54.Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya MANU/SC/0211/1963 :

(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any

4. 4. The Secretary Of State vs Mask And Co.

Equivalent Citation: (1940) 42 BOMLR 767, MANU/MH/0038/1940

IN THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT

Decided On: 15.03.1940

Appellants: The Secretary Of State

Thankerton, G Rankin, M Jayakar

5. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Limited, AIR 1952 SC 192.

Equivalent Citation: 1952 AIR 192, 1952 SCR 583

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1951

Decided On: 17.03.1952

Appellants: Veerappa Pillai.

.Subject: Motor Vehicle

Relevant Section: The constitution of India, Article 226

6. State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Deo, AIR 1964 SC 685.

Equivalent Citation: AIR 1964 SC 685, MANU / SC / 0279 / 1963

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (civil) 293-294 of 1959

Decided On: 25.11.1963

Subject: Civil, Propery.

8. On the merits, the position is absolutely clear.

5. .Than Singh v. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1419

Equivalent Citation: 1964 AIR 1419, 1964 SCR (6) 654

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 86 to 97 of 1962

Decided On: 04.02.1964

Appellants: Than Singh

Subject: Sales Tax/ VAT

Art. 226, Constitution of India.

6. Burma Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1320.

Equivalent Citation: AIR2004SC1815, 2004(3)ALT9(SC), 2004(106(2))BOMLR376,