Could miracles be subject to scientific explanation? If so, why? If not, why not?

Imagine that you are walking through a forest with many trusted friends that you have known for many
years. Suddenly, one of your friends stops and picks up a large stick. He holds it out in front of him, and
casts it onto the floor. As soon as the stick hits the floor, it is instantly transformed into a live snake,
which promptly slithers off. You are all very sure this is not a trick, hallucination, and that there was no
natural cause for this event. How could you explain such an event to anyone, whilst maintaining any
scientific coherence? We may doubt that any such event should happen, since it would not conform to
our understanding of natural and physical laws. However, in what circumstances, if any, might a miracle
be scientifically explicable?
My aim is not to assess the credibility or likelihood of miracles, although this will inevitably be discussed.
Rather, it is to understand to what extent miracles can be part of a scientific world view. In evaluating
whether miracles could be subject to scientific explanation, I will first describe the key features of the
scientific method. After briefly discussing the different kinds of miracle, I will outline Hume’s account of
miracles. I will assess William Adam’s response to Hume (that nature is not impeached by the
occurrence of miracles). I will then argue that Hume’s definition of miracles is slightly too restrictive. It
confines miracles necessarily to failure in terms of credibility, and as a support for religious
epistemology. I will assess Holland’s account that certain events that are consistent with natural law can
be miracles if they are spiritually significant. I will contend that this definition would allow scientific
explanation. However, this account would devalue the term miracles to be mere coincidences. I will
suggest that large amounts of testimony may qualify as rational evidence for belief. Despite this, I will
argue that the scientific method is fundamentally at odds with the nature of miracles. I will conclude
miracles cannot be coherently explained by science.

In subjecting miracles to scientific explanation, it is important to know what science is and entails. The
demarcation problem highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between what we should allow to be
science, and what we should noti. There is no definitive separation between science and pseudo-
science. There has been much philosophical debate in this field. However, for the purposes of this essay
I will express some key features of science that are largely uncontroversial. Science is concerned with
the pursuit of knowledge. Science builds knowledge from systematic observation, measurement,
experimentation, and testable hypotheses about the world. ii These two conceptions seem to be
extremely compatible and uncontroversial. However, if, hypothetically, we were to clearly and directly
experience divine revelation, in a way that is immeasurable and untestable, then we may see a conflict
between what we know to be true, and what is scientifically justifiable. Can these ‘non-natural’ events
be fairly evaluated by science in any reasonable way?

There are many interpretations of what a miracle is. Some suggest that miracles surpass or exceed the
power of nature, arguing that regularity and natural law in the universe exist and are stable, yet can be
overcome (or have no influence) on the supernatural. Another explanation proposes that miracles are
merely a negation of, or violation of the laws of nature. If we accept this account, and believe in
miracles, then the laws of nature cannot be maintained as absolute. Finally, with a different
understanding, some argue miracles to be any event that may have religious or spiritual significance to
the individual. This interpretation is less restrictive to miracles, allowing personal justification, however
does not offer any objective criteria that we may qualify miracles and non-miracles with. It is important
to note that the debate of whether a miracle can be subject to scientific explanation, is a different
question to whether we should believe in miracles. However, the two questions are naturally entwined,
and cannot properly be discussed without reference to the other.

In “of miracles”iii, arguing against the existence of miracles, Hume first clarifies the principle of
evidence. He believes that in order to assess the validity of beliefs, we must judge them according to
the evidence. This is a scientifically accepted view. David Hume defines miracles as “a violation of the
laws of nature” (Hume, 1748). Hume contends that a miracle is an event that would not happen in an
ordinary situation. Given only the natural world, and the natural forces that act upon it, a miracle would
never occur. A miracle must not comply with the rules of nature; Hume describes miracles as
transgressions of particular natural laws. As well as this Hume presents another stipulation for an event
to be miraculous: the event must be credited to an agent. For example a deity or an invisible agent that
takes an active role in producing a specified effect. This addition can be considered as part of Hume’s
attack on religion, especially the Christian faith.

This description does not allow for there to be changes in the natural laws of the universe, rather it
suggests that any miracle is in direct contrast to the physical and logical laws that we understand. This
definition seems to restrict miracles to be not only inexplicable scientifically, but inexplicable entirely.
Since, by definition, they undermine the very laws that science, logic, and reason have developed.
However, if an event were to be authenticated as a miracle under this classification, the epistemic
significance would be more substantial. In this way, despite miracles being conceivable (in that we may
broadly imagine experiencing such events without logical contradiction) 1, they are naturally impossible.
Since Hume’s account firmly asserts the validity of natural laws, by his description miracles are
necessarily naturally impossible2. It is important to note that according to this account natural laws are
beyond mere regularities; natural laws are absolute principles that cannot be broken, as opposed to a
noticed pattern in the natural world. This account makes it necessarily impossible to scientifically
explain miracles. Even if supernatural events were to occur, it is in there nature to be against the rules
on which science is based. Even if we were to allow someone to argue that a miraculous event was
observable, and measurable, since the miracle must be against natural law, no testable hypothesis can
be offered that would increase our understanding of the event, or its cause.

Despite this, perhaps large and reliable testimony, may be acceptable grounds for believing in miracles.
If enough credible witnesses came forward giving detailed and similar accounts of miracles, then we
may take this as rational grounds for belief. From a fair point of view, it would certainly constitute as at
least some kind of evidence against natural laws, though perhaps not strong. Some may claim that such
events are merely due to our misunderstanding of natural law, or an illusion. However, at what point of
testimony, if any, would it be scientifically rational to accept miracles? I will proceed with explaining
Hume’s position on testimony as a foundation for a belief in the miraculous.

Hume anticipates testimony as being offered as a defence for a belief in miracles and argues that “no
human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle” (Hume, 1748). Michael Root explains that
Hume gives three criterion for assessing the credibility of testimony; integrity, authority, and
plausibilityiv. I will focus on the plausibility, since I believe it is what Hume’s disagreement is primarily
based on. Hume argues that any testimony is only credible given the initial assumption that natural laws
are without exception. Any testimony of a miraculous event (according to Hume’s definition) is a
violation of natural law. Consequently, any testimony of a miraculous event is necessarily implausible,
and weakens its own credibility.

In Hume’s account of miracles, then, miracles are impossible to explain scientifically. However, it is
unclear whether this is because of the nature of miracles themselves, or because of Hume’s description
of them. Since his definition and understanding of miracles is that they are impossible, it would
naturally follow that they are scientifically inexplicable, since one cannot explain an impossible event. I
will then, assess some critiques of Hume’s account, and see if any other interpretations of miracles can
allow any form of scientific explanation.

In direct contrast to Hume’s account William Adams argues,

1
Here I mean that, although a miracle may be impossible to understand, we are still able to imagine there occurrence. For example
whilst I cannot clearly imagine a square triangle, I am much more able to imagine a human levitating (breaking the natural laws of
gravity).
2
I use naturally impossible here to mean ‘in contradiction to known natural laws’, for example the law of gravity.
 “The uniformity of nature is in no way impeached or brought into question by the supposition
of miracles”v

He suggests that rather than being violations of the laws of nature, miracles in fact preserve the
uniformity of nature. If a miracle is an interruption, of sorts, of a law or laws of nature, then for a
miracle to occur, there must be a clear understanding of those laws. In the same way that a rivers flow
can only be changed, if there is a prior natural flow for it to follow, miracles can only occur if there is a
natural law to be broken. Perhaps, if this is the case then miracles can be explicable only in relation to
science. Without the proper scientific rules and theories for a miracle to interrupt, a miracle could not
exist, since it would not contradict any of our understandings, and would therefore be a ‘normal event’ 3.

Whilst a miracle claim may only exist in contrast with the laws of nature, this account fails. A miracles
necessary link to the laws of nature does not demonstrate that the two can conform to a coherent and
consistent belief system. Whilst we may gain a concept of a miracle only through means of
understanding natural law, this does not mean a miracle is not necessarily naturally impossible. It
seems however, that this is a mere point of view; If Hume saw a man raised from the dead, he may
argue that it violates the laws of nature, whereas Adams may argue that the laws were only affected
supernaturally, and therefore the laws of nature are merely reinforced by this example. Either way,
though the miracle may rest on an understanding of scientific knowledge, it is still difficult to
scientifically explain. I will move on to what I believe is a stronger criticism of Hume’s account.

If we are to accept Hume’s standard for miraculous claims, then it seems that any miracle claim, true or
not, is automatically false and unscientific. I believe this is too restrictive a definition, allowing for no
amount of testimony, or miraculous instances to validate a belief in miracles. By his account, miracles,
are necessarily inexplicable in science. I propose that a science interested in attaining knowledge and
truth, must at least be open to the possibility of miracles. That is not to suggest, that it is scientifically
rational to accept miracle claims. Rather, in the scientific method of choosing the best possible theory to
explain the world, perhaps enough testimonial evidence, or clear examples of natural laws being
broken, the possibility of the supernatural may gain some authority. Hume’s account, though clear, and
rational limits miracles to fail in terms of credibility automatically. If you were to accept Hume’s account
completely, miracles would not be scientifically explicable, or even possible.

RF Holland, argues that a miracle may be consistent with natural law vi. An individual may view an event
to have large religious significance. This, he claims, is enough for an event to be miraculous. He uses an
example of a mother who witnesses her son fall onto some train tracks as a train approaches. Yet, the
train happens to stop mere inches from the boy. The mother, caring deeply for her son and fearing his
death, views the event of his not dying as a miracle. We later find out that the train driver had become
drowsy and fallen asleep on the brake pedal at, luckily, the exact right time to stop the train before it
hit the boy. Even though we fully understand the reasons why this event happened, according to
Holland, this event can still be miraculous. Holland’s account argues that miracles can be seen in terms
of significance to human life, rather than in opposition to natural law. If we were to accept such cases
as these as miracles, we could certainly scientifically explain them. We could analyse how the driver
was feeling due to what he had eaten, and reason that he would fall asleep at this exact time. Nothing
in these examples contradicts science, in fact science could help explain why this astonishing event
happened. The mother would still view the event as extremely significant, perhaps even a sign from the
divine.

If we accept the criterion of an event being of religious significance to an individual, such events as
Holland describes would count as miracles. However, I consider this criterion to be inappropriate. If we
can clearly explain all of the details of an event, with no contradiction to natural law, then almost any
event could be called miraculous. This definition, therefore, degrades the concept of miracles to
arbitrary or coincidental events. Just because an events occurrence is unlikely or remote, this does not
mean it is miraculous. By this account then Miracles can be scientifically explained, although this would
merely be an account of how the coincidence came about, and consequently not be curious or
3
Here I use ‘normal event’ to be an event that breaks no laws, and is consequently no of interest of significance.
remarkable. Though the mother may see the event as a miracle, without breaking of the laws of nature
this would reduce miracles to mere subjectively significant coincidences.

If we subscribe to Holland’s view that miracles can be mere events of personal religious significance,
then miracles can be scientifically explained, though there explanation would certainly be philosophically
uninteresting. It seems then, since the nature of miracles is to be against the principles that uphold
science, that miracles cannot be scientifically explicable. Although Hume’s definition of miracles is
perhaps too restrictive, perhaps too the scientific method is restrictive as well. It restricts science to the
explainable, and demonstrable, in order to allow the best theories to tell us about how the world works.
If miracles are defined as the violation or suspension of a natural law then they are breaking what we
consider the rules of science. However, this is not what makes them scientifically inexplicable. The
scientific method is simply not able to evaluate truly miraculous events. If enough people directly
experienced miracles, scientists may view it as a good reason to believe in the supernatural. However,
due to the immeasurable nature of non-physical or unnatural causes of miracles, these kinds of miracles
cannot be scientifically tested, hypothesised, or experimented on, and consequently they cannot be
scientifically explained. Science is used for creating, testing and comparing theories about how the
world works, in order to have rational justification for a system of beliefs. However, it does not claim to
be a method of knowing absolute truths, as shown by its pragmatic and changing nature. Consequently,
even if miraculous events were to occur regularly and observably, no miracle can be scientifically
explained. I thus conclude, miracles cannot be coherently explained by science.

Bibliography
i

Resnik, David B. (2000). "A pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem". Studies In
History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2): 249
ii
Wilson, Edward O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1st ed.). New York, NY:
Vintage Books. pp. 49
iii
David Hume Of Miracles (introduction by Antony Flew). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court
Classic, 1985 (1748)
iv
Michael Root, “miracles and the uniformity of nature”, American Philosophical quarterly,
volume 26, number 4, October 1989
v
Adams, William, 1767, An Essay in Answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles , 3rd ed.,
London: B. White.
vi
Holland, R.F. (1965), “The Miraculous,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2:43-51

Also

Locke, John, 1706, A Discourse of Miracles, In Ian T. Ramsey, ed., The Reasonableness of
Christianity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958

Mackie, J. L., 1982, The Miracle of Theism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Swinburne, Richard, 1970, The Concept of a Miracle, London: Macmillin and Co.

Web resources

McGrew, Timothy, "Miracles", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/miracles/>.