Nations and Nationalism 15 (1), 2009, 109–128.

Identity and European integration:

diversity as a source of integration1
LAURA CRAM
Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, UK

ABSTRACT. This article explores the concept of European Union identity and its
significance for European integration by drawing upon insights from theories of
nationalism and national identity. European Union identity is viewed as an ongoing
process which is banal, contingent and contextual. The central hypothesis is that:
European integration facilitates the flourishing of diverse national identities rather
than convergence around a single homogeneous European Union identity. The role of
the EU as facilitator for diverse understandings of collective identities encourages the
enhabitation of the EU at an everyday level and the reinforcement of a sense of banal
Europeanism which is a crucial aspect of the European integration process. Facilitating
diversity may thus provide a vital source of dynamism for the integration process.

KEYWORDS: banal Europeanism, European union, identity, integration

A working rule for integration

Experience would thus suggest a general rule for integration. To be acceptable as a
substitute for special group facilities – local, national, or even segregated ones –
integrated facilities must usually be better facilities. International government and
administration would have to be better than the national governments and the national
administrations it would replace. And it would have to be better not just in the opinion
of distant experts who arrive by airplane to check the accounting books but also in the
experiences and emotions, in the feelings and daily lives of the populations directly
concerned. No capabilities for such international government are now in sight(Deutsch
1969: 171).

The process does not abolish nations as politico-cultural communities. It may create
space for the flourishing of nations, and in a significantly qualified sense, of
nationalism(MacCormick 1999: 302).

Introduction

There is considerable interest among scholars of the European Union (EU) in

the concept of a European Union identity. The extent to which an identifiably
‘European Union’ identity can be said to have emerged at the expense of

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110 Laura Cram

existing national-state identities has come under extensive scrutiny. With

some welcome exceptions (see for example, Diez Medrano and Guttierez
(2001) on ‘nested identities’, Laitin (2001) on ‘layered identities’, Risse (2003,
2004) on the ‘marble cake’ model, Citrin and Sides (2004) on ‘hybrid’
identities and Ichijo and Spohn (2005) on ‘entangled identities’) the notion
of competition between national and European Union identities within the
EU literature continues to be pervasive. There is also an implicit notion that
the convergence of diverse national identities towards a shared European
Union identity is the likely outcome. Risse, for example, while recognising the
continuing importance of collective identities at the national level and their
intermingling with European aspects of identity in his ‘marble cake’ image,
has nevertheless argued in his study of the relationship between the imple-
mentation of the Euro and European identity, that the Euro constitutes a
‘huge step towards the symbolic creation of a European polity. The more their
past currencies leave the mental maps of Euroland citizens, the more current
ambivalences in popular attitudes will recede in the background’ (2003: 502).
Evidence of the emergence of a shared European Union identity is also
often assumed to equate with a greater degree of European integration and
vice versa. For example, ‘the greater the differences are between countries, the
lower is the potential for a European identity on which a European demos can
be based’ (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002: 52). Viewed from a top-down
perspective, the Europeanisation of identity has thus far been very limited,
‘The empirical studies demonstrate that the socializing effects of European
institutions are uneven and often surprisingly weak, and in no way can be
construed as shaping a new, post-national identity’ (Checkel 2005: 815).
Meanwhile, the extension of EU membership can only be expected to inhibit
this process. These approaches and assumptions are, however, insufficiently
nuanced. First, the coincidence of state and nation is rare and the focus on the
existing national state identities distorts the picture. Second, the focus on a
‘heroic’ European Union identity in conflict with or eroding national identities
can be misleading. Finally, the notion of an inexorable move in the direction of
a convergence of identities in the European Union is problematic.
This article approaches European Union identity and its significance for
European integration from the perspective that European Union identity is an
ongoing process which is banal, contingent and contextual. The central hypothesis
is that European integration facilitates the flourishing of diverse national identities
rather than convergence around a single homogeneous European Union identity.
The role of the EU as facilitator for diverse understandings of collective identities
encourages the enhabitation (cf. Billig 1995) of the EU at an everyday level and the
reinforcement of a sense of banal Europeanism2 which is a crucial aspect of the
European integration process. Facilitating diversity may thus provide a vital
source of dynamism for the integration process.
In the following sections, examples from existing nation states, stateless
nations, extra-territorial nations, divided territories and nationless states are
used to explore:

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Identity and European integration 111

 The contingent and contextual nature of identity;

 The importance of banal as distinct from heroic Europeanism;
 The concept of unity in diversity as extending beyond and beneath the
boundaries of the national states which constitute the formal membership
of the EU.
Finally, the implications of these findings for the study of the European
integration process are explored.

Identity as contingent and contextual

Much of the detail of human nature is a social construction in each case. But this
means primarily that opportunities and their costs and benefits are largely a function of
what others have done or are doing . . . But there are constraints that seem even more
perversely the product of social interaction. For example, people in different societies
are seemingly constrained by different norms. Such constraints seem to play a large
role in defining the groups to which individuals become committed . . . The arguments
for many of these norms, and especially for those that help to motivate loyalty to
groups, is that they work as well as they do because they serve relevant interests, even if
often in complicated ways that may be opaque to the participants(Hardin 1995: 70–1).
How the various perceptions or ‘imaginings’ (cf. Anderson 1991) of the EU by
the European people(s), and of their place within it, are derived is crucial for
understanding the process of European integration. However, when studying
the process of ‘identity in formation’ (Laitin 1998), the various opportunities,
constraints, internal and external challenges under which actors operate must
be understood. ‘Making claims about how ‘European’ certain (groups of)
individuals are requires capturing the myriad ways the type and level of
European attachments interact’ (Haesly 2004: 99). Thus, ‘when two indivi-
duals claim to ‘feel European’, they might mean totally different things in
terms of both the intensity of the feeling they describe and the imagined
political community they refer to’ (Bruter 2003: 1154). To understand the
process of European Union identity formation, and the nature and complex-
ities of the relationship between European Union identity and the range of
national and sub-national identities with which it interacts, it is important to
recognise not only the importance of the context within which identity is
formed but also the contingent nature of identity as a process.
Renan (1990: 19) famously wrote in 1882 that the very existence of a nation
‘is a daily plebiscite’. National identity, in this view, is less a romanticised
notion of emotional attachment to a homeland or culture than a choice, or act
of will, even a calculated decision concerning the costs and benefits of
affiliation.3 This argument is consistent with the contingent nature of func-
tional nationalism as described by Deutsch et al. (1957: 87): ‘The issue of
political integration (thus) arose primarily when people demanded greater
capabilities, greater performance, greater responsiveness, and more adequate
services of some kind from the governments of the political units by which
they had been governed before. Integration or amalgamation were first

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112 Laura Cram

considered as possible means to further these ends, rather than as ends in

themselves’ (emphasis added). From this perspective, the initial decision to
support integration, to maintain the status quo or to push for devolved
powers, is taken in response to a more or less rational calculation concerning
the costs and benefits of integration or devolution. Although an important
distinction should be maintained between national identity and nationalism,
the actions of the self-interested may have a lasting impact: ‘in trying to gain
and exercise power for its own ends, the efforts of nationalists may transform
a people into a nationality’ (Deutsch 1966: 104). This point is also made by
Breuilly (1982: 65) in relation to the process of unification nationalism4 in
nineteenth-century Europe: ‘Nationalism was more important as a product
than as a cause of national unification’.
Deutsch et al.’s (1957: 85) thesis on the contingent nature of national
identity is that ‘political habits of loyalty to a particular unit could be more
easily shifted to a political unit of another size, either larger or smaller, if this
seemed to offer a more promising framework within which this attractive way
of life could be developed’. However, what constitutes a more attractive way
of life is not a given. The context in which calculations and declarations
regarding sub-national, national or European Union identity are made cannot
be overlooked. As Edelman ([1967] 1985: 195) has argued, ‘the study of the
construction of meaning must focus upon the interpretations of the subjects
more than upon the observation of objects’.
The interpretations of the subjects may not always be straightforward. For
example, Hardin’s (1995: 70) rational interpretation of support for national
movements recognises the strategic rationality identified by Deutsch and
Breuilly, ‘. . . individual identification with such groups as ethnic groups is not
primordial or somehow extra-rational in its ascendancy of group over
individual interests but is rational. Individuals identify with such groups
because it is in their interest to do so.’ However, Hardin also recognises that
members may not always be aware of the rational basis of their affiliation.
Thus, he continues (Hardin 1995: 70), ‘A group gains power from coordina-
tion of its members, powers that may enable it to take action against other
groups. Hence, the group may genuinely be instrumentally good for its
members, who may tend, without foundation, to think it is inherently, not
merely contingently, good.’ The evolution of actors’ ‘mental models’ may,
thus, be key to an understanding of ‘identity driven’ behaviour: ‘we must
understand the relationship between the mental models that individuals
construct to make sense out of the world around them, the ideologies that
evolve from such constructions, and the institutions that develop in a society
to order interpersonal relationships’ (Denzau and North 1994: 1). The EU as
an institution provides a context within which calculations as to the con-
tingent benefits of affiliation with any given level of administration are made.
Thus, how and in what ways the EU has impacted upon the negotiation of the
various territorial identities which coexist within its borders, and what this
means for European integration, requires detailed analysis.

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Identity and European integration 113

Banal vs. heroic Europeanism

Billig (1995: 44) notes that the term ‘nationalism’ is frequently reserved by
scholars to refer to ‘outbreaks of ‘‘hot’’ nationalist passion, which arise in
times of social disruption and which are reflected in extreme social move-
ments’. This ‘heroic’ aspect of national identity is also pervasive in the study
of European Union identity, for example:

Without shared memories and meanings, without common symbols and myths,
without shrines and ceremonies and monuments, except bitter reminders of recent
holocausts and wars, who will feel European in the depths of their being, and who will
willingly sacrifice themselves for so abstract an ideal? In short, who will die for Europe?
(Smith 1995: 139).

What is often neglected however, Billig argues, is the day to day reinforcement
of national consciousness which is so crucial to the maintenance of national
regimes: ‘All over the world, nations display their flags, day after day. Unlike
the flags on the great days, these flags are largely unwaved, unsaluted,
unnoticed. Indeed, it seems strange to suppose that occasional events,
bracketed off from ordinary life, are sufficient to sustain a continuingly
remembered national identity. It would seem more likely that identity is part
of a more banal way of life in the nation-state’ (Billig 1995: 46).
Similarly, the ‘sense of community’, which Deutsch et al. saw as a
prerequisite for integration, did not imply a wholesale shift to a ‘sense of
Europeanness’ or even the preeminence of a European Union identity. Rather
it required simply the existence of a shared belief that ‘common social
problems can and must be resolved by processes of ‘‘peaceful change’’’, that
is, ‘the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized proce-
dures, without resort to large scale physical force’ (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5).
Meanwhile, Deutsch’s (1966: 97) functional definition of nationality consisted
‘in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of
subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders’. Three factors
in particular, he argued, provided the primary basis for an alignment of
preferences to occur:
 ‘complementarity of communication habits’;
 ‘complementarity of acquired social and economic preferences which
involve mobility of goods or persons’; and
 ‘the need for security and success in a changing environment’ (Deutsch
1966: 101).

As well as identifying the need for the daily reproduction of nationalism,

Renan (1990: 11) also emphasised the importance of the collective forgetting
of inconvenient pasts for the maintenance of contemporary national identi-
ties. As Anderson (1991: 201) reminds us: ‘A vast pedagogical industry works
ceaselessly to oblige young Americans to remember/forget the hostilities of
1861–5 as a great ‘civil’ war between ‘brothers’ rather than between – as they

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114 Laura Cram

briefly were – two sovereign nation-states.’ Weber (1977: 486), likewise,

argued that the transformation of ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ emerged only
through the expansion of universal education, military service and improved
communications. In similar vein, Billig (1995: 38) argues that ‘the nation
which celebrates its antiquity, forgets its historical recency’. Part of the raison
d’être of the EU was to create lasting habits of peaceful co-operation between
previously warring nations and to tie Germany irrevocably into a Union with
its European neighbours. In many respects, the collective forgetting of these
relatively recent past hostilities has been highly successful. To some extent,
this collective forgetting takes place through the normalisation or domestica-
tion of previously unfamiliar practices. Thus, as patterns of behaviour shift,
what at first appeared ‘new’ gradually becomes unremarkable. In Billig’s
terms, then, the EU has become enhabited as individuals ‘forget to remember’
that the current situation is not how things always were.
Billig (1995: 42), building on Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus, calls the
process of collective forgetting enhabitation and argues that this constitutes a
key aspect of nationalism: ‘Patterns of social life become habitual or routine,
and in so doing embody the past. One might describe this process of routine-
formation as enhabitation: thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned
into routine habits and, thus, they become enhabited. The result is that the
past is enhabited in the present in a dialectic of forgotten remembrance’ (Billig
1995: 42). This argument strikes a clear chord with Deutsch’s arguments
concerning the process of social learning through which shifts in identification
might be reinforced: ‘And as with all learning processes, they need not merely
use this new information for the guidance of their behaviour in the light of the
preferences, memories and goals which they have had thus far, but they may
also use them to learn, that is, to modify this very inner structure of their
preferences, goals and patterns of behaviour’ (Deutsch 1966: 117). Indeed, the
notion of enhabitation is highly reminiscent of the learning of ‘integrative
habits’ as a result of prior cooperation, emphasised by Mitrany (1943),
Deutsch (1953, 1957, 1966) and Haas (1958) who saw these as vital aspects
of regional integration. It is precisely these routines and habits which, by
acting as daily reminders of belonging, Billig argues (1995: 43), ‘serve to turn
background space into homeland space’.

Banal Europeanism: diversity as a source of integration

European integration need not lead to a convergence of national identities or

to the development of a homogeneous European Union identity which
challenges or competes with existing national loyalties. This does not mean
that European Union identity may never threaten existing identities or will
always facilitate the articulation of particular territorial identities, but simply
that this need not be, and is not always, the case. European integration has fed
into domestic discourses on territorial identity in different contexts in a

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Identity and European integration 115

number of very different ways that are often overlooked by scholars focusing
only on national-state identities versus a ‘European Union’ identity. Exam-
ples from existing member states, stateless nations, extra-territorial nations,
nationless states and a divided territory are drawn upon here to highlight the
wide range of ways in which the European Union as both a context and as a
political resource has shaped or facilitated particular ‘imaginings’ or articula-
tions of territorial identity within its borders. Necessarily, the mechanisms
through which change is evidenced in these very different contexts are also
multiple and varied.
First, it is argued that European integration may in fact reinforce or
become integral to rather than undermine national identities even within
existing member states. Second, the EU impacts upon the dominant political
discourse at a sub-national level and the negotiation of national identity in
territories known as stateless nations (e.g., Scotland, Catalonia and Wales) in
which national identity is contested. Third, integration in the EU allows for
the ‘virtual reunification’ of kin-nationals at supra-state level (e.g., Hungary’s
extra-territorial nationals) and the realisation of a nationhood which trans-
cends national-state boundaries. Fourth, EU membership can facilitate the
emergence of new conceptions of national identity, for example, in divided
territories (such as, Cyprus). Finally, the realities of EU membership may even
mobilise a national identity which previously had no clear focus (e.g., in
Malta).
From these examples, the EU can be seen to have encouraged or facilitated
the emergence or flourishing of a diverse range of territorial identities. Most of
these do not fit into traditional national-state-based analyses of identity. Each of
the ‘imaginings’ of the territorial identities highlighted is, to some extent, reliant
upon the existence of the EU. The ‘waved’ flags of territorial identity are, thus,
underpinned by the ‘unwaved’ (cf. Billig 1995) flag of ‘banal Europeanism’. To
this extent, diverse identities, far from undermining the process of European
integration may provide a dynamic for further integration.

Member states
‘The European Rescue of the Nation State’ (Milward 1984) is well established
in the historiography of the European Union. Founding member states, and
subsequent acceding states, joined the EU because it was in their interest to do
so. Whether this was for economic, political or symbolic purposes, member-
ship of the EU allowed its member states to achieve something which they
could not achieve alone.
What has been less examined is the long-term effect that this interdepen-
dent relationship has had on national self-perceptions and how these may
have shifted over time.
To what extent, then, can the EU be said to be having a ‘transformative
effect’ on national identities and to be facilitating the emergence of a
European identity (Christiansen et al. 1999)? Risse (2003, 2005), building on

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116 Laura Cram

the work of Deutsch and Haas, who both recognised the possibility of the
coexistence of multiple identities, has suggested that identity in existing
member states might best be understood through a ‘marble cake model’ in
which identity components may ‘influence each other, mesh and blend into
each other’ (Risse 2005: 296). From this perspective, self-understanding as, for
example, a German may inherently contain aspects of Europeanness. Given
the powerful symbolic motivations for Germany’s willingness to subjugate
national aspirations and to pool its efforts at a European level, it is not
surprising that the imagining of shared or mutually reinforcing identities of
Germanness and Europeanness have long been a feature of public and
academic understanding of German identity. Since German reunification,
however, some observers have begun to identify increasing differentiation
between these two elements, allowing for a more distinctive German position
to emerge in relation to the European Union (Minkenberg 2005: 51). To this
extent, a German-European identity may be both contingent, on the costs and
benefits of membership, and contextual, in relation to domestic and interna-
tional opportunities and constraints.
Diez Medrano and Guttierez (2001) have noted the emergence of what they
have described as ‘nested identities’ in relation to Spain and Europe. It has
been further argued that far from representing a conflict of Spanish and
European Union identities, the Spanish case demonstrates how ‘the European
integration process can contribute to strengthen national identities and
nation-states themselves’ (Jauregui and Ruiz-Jimenez 2005: 85). In particular,
the role played by the European Union in facilitating the ‘collective forgetting’
of historical schisms has been recognised:
. . . it is precisely the notion of una Espana europea (a European Spain) which played a
crucial symbolic role in the construction of a cohesive national identity in the
aftermath of the Franco dictatorship. Since the notion of Europeanization became
synonymous in Spain with the values of modernity, democracy, tolerance and
dialogue, this became a key component of the national self-image that helped to
heal the polarized oppositions of the past between the ‘two Spains’ that clashed in the
Civil War (Jauregui and Ruiz-Jimenez 2005: 85).
It has similarly been argued that integration into the European Union has
served a number of functions with regard to Italian identity. The EU has
provided a model of civic community, facilitated a positive identity in the
international community and helped resolve internal regional disputes by
providing access points at EU level for regions independently of the member
state. Thus, in a country where ‘nation formation has remained incomplete,
unifying national symbols are even nowadays hard to find and the nation
appears fragmented and even divided within’, the EU acts as ‘a resource for
national identity’ (Triandafyllidou 2005: 101–2).
The picture which emerges in these member states is not always that of
competition between national and European Union identities, but one of
shifting self-perceptions at national level in relation to which the EU acts as
both a framing context and even as a resource for some national identities.5

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Identity and European integration 117

Evidently, a degree of ‘banal Europeanism’ is intrinsic to a range of very

different national identities each of which is developed in different historical
and cultural contexts and each of which is predicated upon quite different
imaginings of the role and utility of the EU. In turn, the enhabitation of the
EU, however ‘imagined’ in national self-perceptions, has implications for the
process of European integration.

Stateless nations
The study of this category of nations, which includes, for example, Scotland,
Wales and Catalonia, is well developed within EU studies (Guibernau 1998;
Keating 1988; Keating 1998). Scholars working from a multi-level governance
perspective (Hooghe and Marks 2002; Marks 1992) have long argued that
sub-state actors have an important role to play in the integration process and
that the EU has afforded invaluable opportunities to these actors in the
accretion of their powers in relation to the nation-state. Marks (1999: 86) has,
however, argued that identity need not be viewed as a ‘trade-off among
loyalties at different territorial levels’. For stateless nations, the new state-
order (of which the EU is a key component) ‘provides opportunities for
multiple identities to develop and receive expression. In some cases, it may
ease the transition to independence, when accommodation within the state
proves impossible’ (Keating 2001: 40).
The UK is perhaps the most obvious outlier or ‘odd one out’ of the existing
member states with its low levels of identification with Europe. This has been
interpreted in one study on European Union identity as being the result of
particularly strong nationalism, meaning ‘exclusive identification with one’s
nation-state’ in Britain which mitigates against the emergence of a European
Union identity (Risse 2003: 497). However, great care should be taken in the
analysis of UK politics. The concept of a ‘British’ people is something of a
misnomer, and ‘Englishness’ should not be taken as proxy for ‘Britishness’.
More nuanced studies of the interplay between national-state, sub-state and
supra-state identities note, for example, that: ‘Those identifying themselves as
English, the dominant nationality, in the UK are less supportive of the EU
than those identifying with the minority identities. This suggests that the
English resist the threat the EU poses to their identity, whereas the Scottish,
Welsh and Irish perhaps see the EU as a positive force for the expression of
theirs’ (Carey 2002: 406).
Within stateless nations, a key aspect of the political discourse concerning
the articulation of a national identity centres around the dominant nationalist
movement. The relationship between Scottish and Welsh nationalist move-
ments and the European Union has been portrayed as highly instrumental.
Haesly (2004: 97), for example, has argued that ‘the Scottish National Party
and Plaid Cymru advocate ‘instrumental’ support for the European Union by
encouraging them to view the EU as the means by which independence
becomes feasible’. The relationship is, however, more complex than emphasis

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118 Laura Cram

on this one facet implies. As Wyn Jones (2009, this volume) points out, the
journey between the historic ‘imagining’ by Welsh nationalists of Europe as a
space that would allow Wales the ‘freedom’ to articulate itself in a post-
sovereign environment, to the current state-dominated perception of the
European Union as a structure within which Plaid Cymru’s recent decision
to adopt ‘independence’ as a formal goal of the movement was felt necessary,
has been long and winding.
Similarly, the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) understanding of the
optimal relationship between Europe and Scotland has ebbed and flowed.
As early as the 1950s, support for European integration was being presented
as a ‘Safeguard for Small Nations’ and as ‘very different from that of
subjection to a single and much greater nation’ (Scot’s Independent April 23
1955, cited in Mitchell 1996: 193). However, by the mid-1970s, as in Wales for
Plaid Cymru, the goals of the EEC seemed to chime much less well with the
‘progressive politics’ with which the SNP had become associated (Mitchell
and MacPhail 2007: 16). Mitchell and MacPhail have described the relation-
ship between the SNP and Europe as progressing through a number of stages:
‘from early support for a nebulous idea of a ‘united Europe’, to scepticism
over what was considered a centralising and exclusive economic club,
culminating in a widespread acceptance of the advantages of membership
of the EU for small independent states’. The SNP has responded, they argue,
to changing contexts with which have come ‘changing political opportunities
for the SNP’ (Mitchell and MacPhail 2007: 16). Both the Welsh and the
Scottish cases demonstrate the contextual nature of the ‘imaginings’ of
Europe and the EU; as shifts in domestic and international opportunity
structures emerged, national movements adapted their attitude to the Eur-
opean Union accordingly. It is now largely accepted that any calls for
‘independence’ will be made within the context of membership of the
European Union.6
The relationship between Catalonia and, first Europe, then the EU is
similarly long and complex (see Llobera 2005). Laitin has argued, for
example, that Europe has served a number of purposes in Catalanist ideology.
First, a commitment to Europe prevents accusations of the provincialism of
the Catalans. Second, recognition of the authority of the EU as a body which
is not a state allows the articulation of demands for a growth in Catalan
governmental authority despite the lack of its formal designation as a state.
Finally, Europe, conceived of as a multi-national body which transcends
defunct ‘nation-state’ boundaries, fits well with the Catalan conception of
‘one region many identities’ (Laitin 2001: 100–3). To some extent, it could be
argued that the presence of Europe has now become taken for granted or
banal within Catalan discourse. This is well evidenced by Laitin and
Rodriguez’s (in Laitin 2001: 100) analysis of the Catalan language press
from 1984–85 in which they found that two leading Barcelona newspapers
used the term ‘Europe’ most, followed by the term ‘Catalonia’. Undoubtedly,
the everyday reference to Europe as ‘home news’ is an important indicator of

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Identity and European integration 119

the extent to which the EU has shifted from ‘background’ to ‘homeland’ space
(Billig 1995: 43) in Catalan self-perceptions.

Extra-territorial nations
Declarations of European identity and of a shared European history and
culture characterised Hungary’s embrace of the enlargement process. How-
ever, simple tests of the extent to which Hungarians feel ‘European’ cannot
capture the complex and contradictory motivations which drive the relation-
ship between Hungarian nationals and the EU.
On the one hand, ‘taming ethnos’ (Priban 2005) has been a key factor
motivating support for the European Union. From this perspective, the role
of the EU in allowing the reinvention of Hungarian national identity in a non-
threatening form was key: ‘Europe’s symbolic value was given by its temporal
orientation. It was always a future oriented political goal for politicians and
populations of postcommunist countries which helped to contain political
myths of the national past threatening to reinvent nationalist politics based on
historical and ethnic claims of ‘‘blood and soil’’’ (Priban 2005).
On the other hand, a strong irredentist strand also characterises Hungarian
national politics. The status of ethnic Hungarians, or kin-nationals, living
outside Hungary is a key concern within Hungarian politics (Schopflin 2000).
The legacy of the Trianon Treaty has resulted in a situation in which
Hungarians constitute approximately ten per cent of Slovakia’s population,
seven per cent of Romania’s, and 3.3 per cent of Yugoslavia’s (East European
Constitutional Review 2001). How to respond to the plight of kin-nationals in
neighbouring countries is a dilemma for the Hungarian authorities. The
constitutional commitment to support kin-nationals has serious implications
for Hungarian governments in economic, political and social terms. It has
been argued, for example, that:
A worst-case scenario for Hungary would be the hypothetical case where Romania
agreed to return Transylvania. The problems of economic, political and social
integration would be insurmountable . . . Indeed it has been suggested by Budapest
wits that if Hungary’s neighbours wanted to ruin Hungary for good, they should
simply return all the Hungarian inhabited areas to Budapest’s jurisdiction (Schopflin
1993: 7).
While the Hungarian authorities have never sought to close cross-border
movement altogether, the 2001 ‘Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring
Countries’ (Status Law) was aimed, at least in part, at discouraging kin-
nationals from living and working illegally in Hungary (Butler 2007: 1126–7).
For many, the EU is viewed as a potential solution to the kin-national
dilemma and as a means of ensuring the ‘virtual reunification’ of the
Hungarian nation (Butler 2007: 1130). Leading political and cultural com-
mentators ‘regard the integration of all neighbouring countries to the EU
within the close future as a main step ahead in resolving these problems. Then
dividing borders would not separate Hungarians from each other’ (Kiss and

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120 Laura Cram

Hunyady 2005: 133). The Hungarian ‘Renewed Nation Policy’ issued in 2005
explicitly states that ‘the central idea of the nation policy of the Government
includes the reunification of the Hungarian nation in a European Union
perspective . . .’ (cited in Butler 2007: 1130). To some extent, this reunification
is becoming a reality at EU level. Since the accession of Slovakia and
Romania to the EU, for example, ethnic Hungarian MEPs from these
countries can use their mother tongue in Strasbourg, something which they
cannot do in their domestic legislatures.7 In the case of Hungarian kin-
nationals, the EU, rather than encouraging convergence around a single
homogeneous European Union identity, can be seen to be facilitating the
flourishing of a national identity which does not conform to traditional
national-state models. Meanwhile, the multiple ‘imaginings’ of Europe and
how they relate to Hungarian self-perceptions may have important implica-
tions for the process of European integration.

Divided territories

. . . the dominant bicommunal framework that is the colonial legacy of the island has
bequeathed an aporia to the bearer of Cypriot identity; an aporia that requires
sustained critical attention and reflection.
The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or a
Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably
hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek-Turkish axis. Being simply and
singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility (RoC Constitution, Article 2)(Con-
stantinou 2007: 248).

Loizides (2007: 185), drawing on Laitin’s (1998) analysis, argues that the ‘case
of Cyprus supports scholarly perspectives that see identities as constructed
and reconstructed as political factors and opportunities change’. From this
perspective, Cypriot identity is both contingent and contextual. The dom-
inance of Greek-Cypriot irredentist nationalism, or ‘motherland nationalism’,
was effectively rejected with the events of 1974, and the division of Cyprus
into Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. In particular, the
‘abandonment’ of Cyprus to Turkey had a profound effect on Greek-Cypriot
perception of their relationship with Greece. After 1974, with reunification of
the island as the main political priority, the previously dominant ‘motherland
identities’ of both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots were challenged by the rise of
‘Cypriotism’: ‘Cypriotism refers to the idea that Cyprus has its own sui generis
character and, thus, must be viewed as an entity which is independent from
both the motherlands of the two main communities of the island, that is,
Greece and Turkey’ (Mavratsas 1997: 4). However, the ascendancy of
‘Cypriotism’ was short-lived. As democratisation emerged in Greece, and
Andreas Papandreou came to power, Greek-Cypriots identified a ‘new
Greece, different from the Greece which had ‘betrayed’ its own child’, a
Greece with which ‘Greek Cypriots could again proudly identify without
enosis’ (Mavratsas 1997: 10).

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Identity and European integration 121

In the wake of Cypriotism, however, the Greek-Cypriotism which emerged

was of a new order. The new Greek-Cypriot nationalism ‘discarded its
irredentist orientation’ (Mavratsas 1997: 11). Loizides has suggested that the
reassertion of attachment to the ethnic community in the form of Greek-
Cypriotism or Turkish-Cypriotism is more than simply a middle ground
between ‘motherland nationalism’ and ‘Cypriotism’. Although these appro-
priate symbols and rhetoric from both mainland nationalism and from
Cypriotism, they pay ‘more attention to the aspirations of the ethnic commu-
nity in the island than to the interest of the ‘national centers’ or Cyprus as a
whole. Thus, Greek Cypriotism and Turkish Cypriotism take ascendancy in
two respective frequently oppositional camps’ (Loizides 2007: 173).
Although the Annan plan which proposed the reunification of the island
was rejected in 2004, Eurobarometer studies at the same time indicated a rise
in the number of Cypriots from both communities identifying themselves as
only Cypriot (Eurobarometer 2004: 1). Loizides (2007: 185) has argued,
meanwhile, that the response to Tassos Papodopoulos’s speech on 7 April
2004, urging the ‘Greek Cypriot people’ to vote NO to the referendum,
marked a turning point in Greek-Cypriot self-perception: ‘Thus, while all
other ‘glorious moments’ in Greek Cypriot history were celebrated with
Greek flags, at the end of Papadopoulos’s speech, individuals spontaneously
rushed to the presidential palace waving Cypriot flags, appropriating those as
a symbol of Greek Cypriot identity . . .’
Although it was expected by many that Europeanisation would be asso-
ciated with the emergence of ‘a viable unifying Cypriot identity’, the joining on
1 May 2004 of only the Republic of Cyprus signalled an end to such ambitions
(Mavratsas 2007: 1). However, it has been argued that ‘Cyprus accession to the
European Union inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Greek-
Cypriotism and the breakdown of hegemonic beliefs emphasizing cooperation
with other parties for the settlement of the Cyprus problem’ (Loizides 2007:
184). Membership of the EU, while not producing a unifying Cypriot identity,
has had a transformative effect at least on Greek-Cypriotism by facilitating the
imagining of a Greek-Cypriot identity which is distinct from that of Greece.

Nationless states
Irredentist movements, partisan politics and the role of the Catholic Church
are key features of life in Malta but it has been argued that ‘national symbols
remain significant in their absence’ (Baldacchino 2002: 198). This is so,
Baldacchino (2009, this volume) argues, because although ‘Malta may have
been a politically distinct state for centuries’, nevertheless its people ‘find
enormous difficulties in projecting or imagining themselves as a nation, except
in a vague and distant cultural sense’. While for Abela (2005–6: 24–5) the
Maltese, ‘in continuation with the past, hold a strong sense of national
identity’ albeit one which is in transition from ‘an essentially local toward a

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122 Laura Cram

more regional, European and Mediterranean sense of belonging’, for Baldac-

chino (2002) Malta is best described as a ‘nationless state’.
Maltese political life is dominated by a polarised political system, in which
allegiance to either the Nationalist Party (PN) or the Labour Party (MLP) is
central to the identity of most citizens. As the two main parties derive their
key referents from different periods of Maltese history, consensus as to which
symbols and images best represent the meaning of Malta is not easily
achieved. The lack of shared Maltese self-perception is exemplified, for
example, by the recent difficulties experienced in identifying appropriate
Maltese icons to represent Malta on the new Euro-coins (Baldacchino
2007). Baldacchino (2009) also points out the difficulties faced by the Maltese
Government in 1988 when attempting to identify a widely acceptable
National Day for Malta.: ‘. . . the Government ended up recognising the
dilemma and opted for no less than five national days, a sad reflection of the
absence of consensus on what is salient in recent Maltese history’.
This polarised political context has dominated the Maltese ‘imaginings’ of the
EU, as evidenced in the dominance of the two main political parties in the
debate over accession to the EU (Cini 2004). Malta was the accession state with
the strongest popular anti-EU sentiment in which the debate was divided
between the traditionalists and the modernisers who saw EU membership as a
means of ‘moving forward’ in Maltese politics (Mitchell 2001: 43). However, the
sceptical position of the Maltese citizenry in relation to EU membership, the
extensive debate over the costs and benefits to Malta, and even of the potential
threat to ‘Maltese identity’, may to some extent have provoked the emergence of
a shared ‘Maltese’ perspective: ‘one may argue that it is precisely in relation to
the EU that the historically elusive, external ‘other’ – a precondition for nascent
Maltese nationalism – may suddenly have appeared’ (Baldacchino 2002: 201).
The extent to which the emergence of a ‘nascent nationalism’ (Baldacchino
2009) has been facilitated by the process of European integration is an important
question. According to Eurobarometer and European Values Study data, most
Maltese now hold a ‘national-European identity over and above an exclusively
national identity’ (Abela 2005–6: 10). How the EU is ‘imagined’ by Maltese
citizens is, therefore, a key question. Indeed, in his recent work, Baldacchino (2009)
has raised concerns that the identification of Malta as the EU’s southernmost
bulwark rather than as a sovereign state may fuel anti-EU sentiment unless the
issue of undocumented migrants using Malta as a gateway to the EU is addressed.
On the other hand, the perception of undocumented migrants as a ‘European
problem requiring a European solution’ (Baldacchino 2007) places the EU at the
very heart of definitions of the us and them of what constitutes a Maltese identity.

Identity and European integration: unity in diversity?

For scholars of European integration, issues of diffuse and specific support

(Easton 1975), processes of learning and adaptation, and the thorny question

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Identity and European integration 123

of what constitutes a European Union identity, through what mechanisms it

emerges and how and in what ways it contributes to our understanding of
European integration are becoming increasingly important. Students of the
EU want to know not only ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell 1936)
but also ‘who learns what, to whose benefit and how’ (Adler and Haas 1992)
and, perhaps most importantly, how the process of learning relates to the
process of bargaining. In short, how the EU is imagined, how it becomes
enhabited and how these processes relate to the bargains struck by national
executives are central to any explanation of European integration.
Authors dealing with the issues of nationalism and national identity have
long had to grapple with the complex nature of identity, incorporating both
instrumental and socio-psychological elements. As Deutsch (1969) noted in
the quote at the start of this paper, integration is the result of a cost–benefit
analysis concerning the capacities of the integrated body but it is also a
reflection of the perceptions of the capacity of the body and the experience of
those affected by that body. Deutsch ([1953]1966: 170) argued, moreover, that
communications and symbols were central to an understanding of the
emergence of a ‘national consciousness’. Thus, ‘a person, an organization,
or a social group – such as a people – can do more than merely steer some of
its behaviour by balancing its current experiences with its recalled traditions.
It can achieve consciousness by attaching secondary symbols – that is symbols
about symbols – to certain items in its current intake of outside information,
and to certain items recalled from memory’ (Deutsch ([1953]1966: 170).
European Union identity should be understood as a process which is banal,
contingent and contextual. To fully understand the instrumental and socio-
psychological elements which underpin the self-perceptions of the European
people(s), the role played by the EU in the emergence of those identities and
the implications of these for the study of European Union identity and
European integration, a more nuanced political sociology of the EU is
required (see Cram 2001; Favell 2006). Deutsch was a pioneer in the social
scientific study of national identity, seeking to make this intangible phenom-
enon subject to quantitative analysis and argued that a detailed mapping
exercise was required (Deutsch 1966: 172–3). Still today an analysis of the
extent to which secondary symbols, carrying implicit messages about Eur-
opean Union identity, become attached to daily events and patterns of
communication amongst the various European people(s) is required.
Billig (1995: 175), for example, suggested: ‘Taxonomies of flaggings could
be constructed to list the different genres and their customary rhetorical
strategies; and the extent of flaggings in different domains, and in different
nations, could be calculated. Above all, the lives of citizens in established
nations need to be profiled, in order to document the nature and number of
flaggings which the average person might encounter in the course of a typical
day.’ This is very much in tune with Deutsch’s suggested mapping of
communication patterns and how they are experienced by individuals:
‘How wide is the range of interests and the volume of communications and

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124 Laura Cram

experiences among the members of a people? To what share of these have

national symbols become attached? How often are those national symbols
then found in circulation? What persons, things and institutions are devoted
to producing these secondary symbols, and how important is that portion of the
primary communications to which they have become attached?’ (Deutsch
([1953]1966: 172–3). In short, to begin to understand the emergence, role
and function of European Union identity and how it relates to the process of
European integration, it is necessary to establish the extent to which, the
mechanisms through which, and the reasons why, the EU has, or has not,
become enhabited in the self-perceptions of the European people(s).
As has been demonstrated above, the facilitating role which the EU plays
in allowing diverse identities, even those previously quashed or non-existent,
to flourish appears to encourage the development of a sense of banal as
opposed to heroic Europeanism. Membership of the EU increasingly becomes
the norm. In Billig’s (1995: 42) terms, the EU becomes enhabited in that
individuals ‘forget to remember’ that the current situation is not how things
always were. As has become clear, membership of the EU has allowed the
strengthening of a number of national identities and national movements for
which the existence of the EU is increasingly seen as a prerequisite. This
dependence upon the EU provides a source of dynamism for the integration
process. A degree of banal Europeanism may even, in some cases, emerge as
an integral element of the national conception of identity.

Conclusion

As MacCormick (1999: 309–10) notes, ‘. . . a ‘‘nation’’ not only in the personal

but also in the civic sense, is, through the self conceptions of members an
always evolving, always diversifying, always contestable, cultural commu-
nity’. Similarly, the nations, states and the nation-state structure upon which
the EU is predicated are not static entities but are constantly evolving. What
national executives represent in the bargaining process over European
integration is, therefore, constantly changing. By the same token, the various
‘imaginings’ of the European Union contribute to the shifting nature of the
EU as a body and to its capacity for influence upon the various collective
identities of the European people(s). Being part of the European Union has
not only allowed a range of diverse identities to flourish but by altering the
relative costs and benefits of particular courses of action may even have
encouraged the evolution of some national movements in the particular
direction that they have developed. As different understandings of nation
come to the fore within member states, or as national interests begin to
challenge existing state boundaries, traditional nation-state-centric ap-
proaches are faced with a number of challenges. This diversity, far from
challenging the process of community-building in the EU, provides a vital
source of dynamism for the integration process. The role of the EU as

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Identity and European integration 125

facilitator for diverse understandings of collective identities encourages the

enhabitation of the EU at an everyday level and the reinforcement of a sense of
banal Europeanism which is a crucial aspect of the European integration
process.

Notes

1 My sincere thanks are due to all of the participants in the workshop from which this article
emerged: Godfrey Baldacchino, Neil MacCormick; Eilidh MacPhail, Caesar Mavratsas, James
Mitchell, Jiri Priban and Richard Wyn Jones, as well as to the two anonymous referees. The
workshop was funded by the EU CONNEX Network of Excellence.
2 For an early elaboration of the concept of banal Europeanism upon which this article builds see
Cram 2001. ‘Imagining the Union: A Case of Banal Europeanism?’ in Wallace, Helen (ed)
Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration London: Palgrave.
3 It has been argued, for example, that Margaret Thatcher’s dismantling of the welfare state in
the UK may have fostered support for Scottish nationalism: ‘Defence of the welfare state had
priority and nationalism is contingent, hence many Scots in the 1980s argued that the best way of
defending this great British institution was by destroying Britain’ (Mitchell 1996: 54).
4 Unification nationalism, involving the ‘unification of a number of nominally sovereign states’
(Breuilly 1982: 65–89) (as occurred, for example, in Germany and Italy), is particularly
appropriate as a model for examining the European Union. Although these studies of states
and nations refer to an earlier, predemocratic era, there is still much to learn from students of
these phenomena.
5 Of course, the UK is usually seen to be an outlier in this context with a strong inclination
towards a UK identity. For the problems with this national-state-based analysis, see the section
below on stateless nations.
6 However, see Mitchell and MacPhail 2007 on the significance of the debate concerning
whether or not Scotland would automatically become a member of the EU on the achievement of
independence.
7 I am grateful to Gyorgy Schopflin MEP for this point.

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