Ireland and Central Asia

Working Paper

By Rob Kevlihan1

1
Acknowledgements: The author wishes to thanks Donnacha O‟Beacháin, John Doyle, Brian McElduff
and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The idea for this
paper germinated while the author taught for a semester at the Kazakhstan Institute for Management and
Strategic Research (KIMEP), Almaty, Kazakhstan in early 2005.
 “The former USSR itself has split into a mosaic of different countries,

including the Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and

those new states to the east of the Caspian Sea”2

Abstract

This paper reviews the extent of Ireland‟s engagement with Central Asia, asking why

the region has played such a marginal role in the Irish government‟s engagement with

the Asian continent as a whole. The paper argues that Ireland has, in contrast with its

relations with the rest of Asia, viewed Central Asia primarily through a Euro-centric

lens. This Euro-centric perspective is largely as a consequence of the existing

configuration of international institutions with which Ireland engages that relate to the

region. This approach has had tangible implications: it has meant that Central Asia has

been ignored in the development of trade strategies related to the Asian continent and

it has reduced the potential scope of Irish aid engagement with the poorer countries of

the region. Given the increased profile of Asia in Irish economic and aid policy, and

the new proximity of Central Asia to the EU with its recent expansion eastwards, the

article concludes that greater attention should be paid to the region by Ireland and

offers some suggestions for future Irish government engagement.

Introduction

In recent years there has been a growing recognition within international studies that

big is not always best, resulting in increased attention on small state policy making,

and the role of small states in the international system. 3 Literature on international

institutions, for example, while tending to emphasize the continued dominance of

stronger countries within international regimes, accepts that such regimes can serve all

2
Development Co-operation Ireland, “Eastern Europe –overview”, available at www.dci.gov.ie (3rd
March 2005).
3
Smith, N., Pace, M. & Lee. D., “Size Matters: Small States and International Studies” in International
Studies Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 3, August 2005, pp 395-397.

2
states interests, both large and small, in reducing transaction costs, providing important

transactional information and hence facilitating the mechanics of international

interactions.4 For small states such as Ireland, international institutions such as the

United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provide important vehicles for engaging with states

outside its core foreign policy priorities without the need to commit extensive

resources that may be better utilized elsewhere. Cost-benefit concerns have been a key

issue in the development of the Irish foreign service since its inception at

independence in 1922.5 As a consequence multi-lateral organizations have provided

important vehicles for Ireland‟s engagement with the wider world at relatively low

transactional cost. However, with such transactional benefits come other potential

costs. One possible consequence is that Irish foreign policy, in the absence of bilateral

engagement, will largely echo that of these larger institutions (and by extension those

larger states most influential within these bodies) and as a consequence be somewhat

passive in policy formulation and execution. This paper argues that this has in fact

occurred with respect to Ireland‟s engagement with Central Asia when compared to

Ireland‟s bilateral engagement with Asia as a whole. As a result, Ireland has largely

engaged with the region through a Euro-centric lens, driven in the main by EU and

OSCE related obligations and structures. This has had some benefits – it has provided

a relatively low-cost mechanism for some Irish engagement; but it has come with some

costs – chiefly neglect by the Irish government of the strategic trade potential of the

region, and the marginalisation of the poorer states of the region from an aid

perspective in favour of areas within the eastern Europe / CIS zone considered to be of

greater geo-strategic importance.

4
For a seminal book in this area, cf Keohane, R., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (Princeton, 1984).
5
Patrick Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy (Dublin, 1974).

3
Newly independent states of Central Asia

The Central Asian region comprises five states of the former USSR including

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and is strategically

placed between Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan. The region comprises a

combined population of just over 59 million people, with Uzbekistan the largest in

population terms (population: 26.85 million, comprising 45% of the region‟s total

population), followed by Kazakhstan (population: 15.19 million, 26%), Tajikistan

(population 7.16 million, 12%), Kyrgyzstan (population 5.15 million, 9%) and

Turkmenistan (population 4.95 million, 8%). However, in terms of size, Kazakhstan

dwarfs its neighbors, followed by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan.6 Since independence in 1991 the experience of each of these states has

varied. Kazakhstan has perhaps faired best of the five Central Asian states. Significant

oil and gas reserves and astute management of its relations with foreign governments

and oil companies has left it in a relatively strong position, with the country described

as the „new oil Dorado‟ by one commentator writing on the region.7 Oil production has

expanded considerably since independence, reaching a post independence peak of over

1bn barrels per day in 2003 and 2004.8 The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan

Nazarbayev, was the party boss during the communist era, and has governed the

country since. He was recently re-elected in December 2005 in an election that in the

opinion of an international monitoring team (that included OSCE, Council of Europe

and European Parliament observers), was adjudged did not meet international

standards, despite some improvements on the previous election.9

6
Central Intelligence Agency, „The World Factbook‟, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (19th January 2006). All population estimates
at July 2005.
7
Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game, Blood and Oil in Central Asia, (New York, 2003), 74.
8
Economist Intelligence Unit, Kazakhstan, Country Profile, 2005, (London, 2005), 27.
9
International Election Monitoring Mission, „Presidential Election, Republic of Kazakhstan, Statement
of Preliminary Findings and Results‟, press release, 5 December 2005, available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/12/17232_en.pdf (20 January 2006)

4
 Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan continues to be ruled by a former party boss from

the Soviet era - President Islam Karimov. In recent years his regime has effectively

denied any possibility for meaningful political opposition and has been severely

criticized for its human rights records, particularly in the wake of the Andijan incident

in May 2005. During this incident, Uzbek government troops opened fire on

demonstrators, in what Human Rights Watch described as a „massacre‟. The Uzbek

government claims 173 people were killed, while HRW estimated the number dead at

between 300 and 400.10

Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan offer more mixed pictures than

Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan was governed in megalomaniacal fashion by Saparmurat

Niyazov, self proclaimed Turkmenbashi (Father of All Turks) until his unexpected

death in December 2006, and is now in a state of flux, though newly elected President

Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov appears to be moving quickly to institute reforms.11

Turkmenistan is an important producer of natural gas, some of which makes its way to

European markets and has come to increased prominence recently as an alternative

source of natural gas to Russia for some EU states.12

Kyrgyzstan is currently going through a period of political uncertainty, with the

former President since independence, Askar Akaev, having been removed from office

in 2005 through a contentious phase of street protests, and replaced by Kurmanbek

Bakiev. Since then, the capital city has been affected by periodic bouts of street

demonstrations as various factions vie to impose their will through direct action.

Despite such disturbances in the capital, however, for the time being the general

situation in Kyrgyzstan is reasonably stable, though it remains unclear what the long-
10
Human Rights Watch, “Bullets Were Falling Like Rain”, The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005,
(London, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/ (accessed 05 Feb 2006).
11
Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan: New Predident Appears to be fulfilling campaign pledges”, Radio
Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 28th February 2007, available at
http://www.rferl.org/features/2007/2/9146AOFB-DFBE-4A89-86D-CA273DFF62DD.html [accessed
4th May 2007].
12
Chivers, C.J. & Khalip, N., “Intrigue Follows Death of a President for Life” in The New York Times,
22nd December 2006, p23.

5
term prospects for improved governance are. Tajikistan remains under the leadership

of President Imomali Rahmon.13 Rahmon came to prominence in late 1992, while

Tajikistan was in the middle of a civil war. In one of the worst civil conflicts in the

former Soviet Union in the 1990s, between 60,000 and 100,000 people were killed,

approximately 600,000 – one tenth of the population, were internally displaced, and

another 80,000 fled the country.14 Since the signature of a peace agreement in 1997 the

country has stabilized considerably, though power remains focused around the

President and his supporters, with only limited scope for political competition.

The overall socio-economic development levels of most of these states (with

the possible exceptions of Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan), place

them close to the category of less developed states. A review of the Human

Development Report from 2006 shows Tajikistan (ranked 122 of 177 countries

ranked), Uzbekistan (ranked 113) and Kyrgyzstan (ranked 110) to be the worst off in

the region. Kazakhstan, the best off, has a Human Development Index Ranking (HDI)

of 79; next is Turkmenistan at 105.15 This places all states in the region in UNDP‟s

medium human development category. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

comprise three of the four lowest ranked states (along with Moldova, ranked 114) from

the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the HDI index. Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan, unlike their neighbors, do not have access to significant wealth from

natural resources; both are extremely mountainous, and as a result, are the source of

much of the water used for irrigated agriculture (particularly cotton) downstream in the

other three states. Tajikistan situation is exacerbated by its over-reliance on cotton

13
Formerly known as Rahmanov, the President recently changed his name abandoning the Slavic style
“ov” , calling on his compatriots to do the same – see Najibullah, F. “Central Asia: Name Debate
Reflects Region‟s Mixed History” published by RFE/RL, 4th April, 2007 available at
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/4/6B1BE677-0544-4460-AC96-81A9D399A403.html
(accessed 4th May 2007).
14
International Crisis Group, “Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace”, (Dushanbe and Brussels, 2001), 2.
15
UNDP, Human Development Report, (New York, 2006) available at
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics (12th May 2007). Note that, with the exception of Kazakhstan, all
rankings have either stayed constant or worsened when compared to 2005 rankings.

6
production on its limited arable land, and extensive exploitation of cotton labor.16

While Tajikistan‟s situation has improved somewhat in recent years, the situation

during the war was so bad that in 1994, the Tajik government asked to U.N. to

consider granting it the status of a least-developed country.17

One legacy of the Soviet system is continued high levels of economic inter-

dependence between Central Asian states, and with other states of the former USSR.

However, the break-up of the Soviet Union has allowed these states to begin to engage

once more with the rest of Asia. Despite large Muslim populations throughout the

region, much of this engagement has been with the Far East, rather than the Middle

East. Second and third generation ethnic Korean populations in parts of Central Asia (a

legacy of Stalin‟s re-location policies), particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,

have facilitated the development of contacts with South Korea, for example.18

Institutionally, the Shanghai Co-operation organization was established in 1991

between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to

facilitate diplomatic, security and trade links between states in the region.19

Ireland and Asia – an overview

While Ireland‟s bilateral engagement with prominent Asian states dates back to the

establishment of its first embassy on the continent in India in 1964, 20 it is only in the

last ten years that a strategic plan has been developed to act as a road map for

engagement over the longer term. This in part reflects the relative novelty of structured

public strategic planning in Irish foreign policy in general, and also, to some extent,

16
International Crisis Group, “The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia‟s Destructive Monoculture”,
(Dushanbe and Brussels, 2005), 9-10.
17
Aziz Niyazi, “Tajikistan I: The Regional Dimension of the Conflict” in Michael Waller, Bruno
Coppieters and Alexei Malaskenko (eds), Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and
Eurasia, (London, 1998), 145.
18
James Critchlow, “The Ethnic Factor in Central Asian Foreign Policy” in Roman Szporluk (ed.),
National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (London: 1994), pp269-270.
19
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, Shanghai Co-operation Organization,
01 June 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm (26 January 2006)
20
Keating, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, 112.

7
the relatively low priority accorded to Ireland-Asia relations. Given limited resources,

tools available for bilateral engagement in Asia have been relatively limited, and can

be characterized in terms of economic relations, development co-operation and

humanitarian aid, with Ireland also engaging to a lesser extent on human rights

issues.21 As we shall see, bilateral engagement with respect to trade has in recent years

tended to focus on high value Pacific Rim countries, while Ireland‟s aid and human

rights engagement has often been driven by domestic connections – through Irish

NGOs, missionaries or (in the case of Timor Leste and Burma) Irish advocacy groups.

On the political and economic front, comparisons of the Celtic Tiger and the

East Asian Tigers notwithstanding, it was not until 1998 that Ireland developed its

„Asia Strategy‟.22 The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), in its strategy statement

for the period 2005 to 2007, states that the DFA will „broaden and strengthen Ireland‟s

political relations with countries in the Asian region, and contribute to the

strengthening of multi-lateral processes in the Asian region‟. Ireland now has eleven

embassies in Asia, including The Peoples Republic of China, India, Iran, Israel, Japan,

Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, with a new embassy recently

opened in 2005 in Vietnam. In addition, two other embassies – in Egypt and Russia,

21
Consideration of Ireland‟s engagement with Asia as whole through multi-lateral institutions such as
the UN, ASEAN, the Non-aligned Movement etc., are outside of the scope of this article; the point is to
highlight the degree to which Ireland has had significant bilateral, as opposed to multilateral
engagement with the region though Irish government multilateral engagement with Central Asia will be
considered because of it‟s significance to this piece. However, it is to be noted that Ireland has made a
significant contribution to peacekeeping in the region, most notably in Lebanon (for 23 years, ending
2001 and recommencing in late 2006), but also shorter deployments to a number of locations, including
Israel / Palestine (from 1958 onwards), and in the Sinai desert (1973), India / Pakistan (1965-66; 1987-
1992), in Iran (prior to 1978) and on the Iran / Iraq border (from 1988 – 1991), Afghanistan (1988-90,
1994-96, 1996-99), Kuwait (since 1991), in Indonesia / Irian Jaya (1962), Cambodia (1991-1993) and in
Timor Leste (1999 onwards). A small number of Irish army personnel were also deployed to Sri Lanka
to assist with tsunami relief operations in January 2005. For further details see: The Irish Defense
Forces, „Overseas service‟ available at http://www.military.ie/overseas/asia.htm (accessed 05 February
2006).
22
For consideration of Ireland‟s political and trade engagement with the Middle East since the 1950s,
see Rory Miller, “The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland‟s Evolving Relationship with the
Muslim Middle East” in Irish Studies in International Affairs, Volume 15, 2004, 123-146.

8
represent Irish interests in some Asian countries.23 Ireland also has representative

offices in the Palestine and Timor Leste. 24 A look at the geographical dispersion of the

embassies shows a cluster in South Asia and the Pacific Rim – China, India, Japan,

Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, reflecting Ireland‟s strategic focus on these

regions. This closely mirrors priority countries set out in the Asia strategy, which

include China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.25

This is understandable, given the size of the economies, levels of economic

development, potential markets (both for the export of Irish goods, and for the

provision of services by Irish organizations, including lucrative higher education

provided to students from these regions in universities in Ireland), not to mention

possibilities of inward investment from these countries to Ireland. Enterprise Ireland

takes an even narrower view, with its new First Flight Five Stages Programme

(launched in 2005) targeting China, Korea, India and Japan as key target markets with

opportunities for Irish businesses.26 Ireland‟s commitment to these areas has been

highlighted by recent high-level Irish government visits to both China and India.

Ireland‟s role in Asia with respect to aid has been relatively limited reflecting

Ireland‟s consistent focus on Africa as the main target for development aid and

humanitarian assistance.27 As late as 1996, Ireland‟s development assistance to Asia

was described as „meagre‟ by one commentator, who noted the increased priority

being given to Asia within the EU, but a relatively low key Irish response. 28 Low key

it may have been, but the Irish government has nonetheless maintained a fairly

23
The Irish embassy in Cairo represents Irish interests in Jordan and Lebanon, while the embassy in
Moscow Irish interests in most of Central Asia (see below).
24
Ireland also honorary consuls in India (as well as an honorary consul general), Indonesia, Jordan,
Korea, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Turkey.
25
Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, A Decade of the Asia Strategy, 1999 – 2009,
(Dublin, 2005), 3.
26
Enterprise Ireland, „First Flight Five Stages‟, available at http://www.enterprise-
ireland.com/Exports/First+Flight+Five+Stages.htm (27 January 2006)
27
See, for example, Development Co-operation Ireland, “Africa remains the focus of Government‟s Aid
Programme”, press release, 18 January 2005, available at www.apso.ie (01 January 2005].
28
David Shanks, „Few Eastern Promises‟, Developing World: Changing Irish Priorities, An
International Report with The Irish Times, 13th November, 1996, 3.

9
consistent stream of low-level assistance to Asian states with bilateral aid gaining

increased prominence in recent years. The main institutional vehicles on the aid side

for this engagement have been direct country-to-country assistance through the

bilateral aid programme, and assistance to non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

through project co-financing and humanitarian assistance.29

Ireland first began its bilateral aid programme soon after accession to the EEC

in 1973. Five countries were selected as priority countries for Irish government

assistance, four in Africa and one in Asia – they were Sudan, Lesotho, Zambia,

Tanzania and India. India, however, did not feature prominently as a recipient of Irish

bilateral aid, despite its initial status as a priority country, receiving only 1% of total

aid disbursed to the five countries in 1978, the first year for which country by country

statistics are available.30 The India programme, having failed to take off in the initial

set up period of the other bilateral programmes, was subsequently dropped as a priority

country, leaving Ireland‟s bilateral assistance entirely focused on African states. This

pattern continued through to the 1990s with the additions of Mozambique, Ethiopia

and Uganda (and the demotion of Sudan) as priority countries for bilateral assistance,

though the Occupied Territories did occupy a special position, receiving consistent

Irish government support from 1986 onwards.31 Ireland‟s engagement with Asian

states subsequently expanded in the late 1990s, principally through Ireland‟s

involvement with Timor Leste and Vietnam – to the extent that by 2005, some 10.2%

of total Irish bilateral aid was spent in “Asia”, with an additional 1.3% spent in the

Middle East / Gulf.32 Irish engagement has been driven by both humanitarian and

29
This ignores DCI funding under Block Grants and the Multi-Annual Programme Scheme as country
allocation decisions rest primarily with the NGO in receipt of the funds, rather than with DCI. That said,
DCI funding has been channeled through these two mechanisms to Asian countries where recipient
NGOs (including GOAL, Concern, Trócaire, World Vision and Oxfam) have operations.
30
As calculated from statistical annex available in Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland’s Bilateral
Programme, (Dublin: 1979), 39.
31
Department of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid: Consolidation and Growth, A Strategy Plan, (Dublin,
1993), 26.
32
DFA, Irish Aid Annual Report 2005, 109.

10
development assistance (both bilateral and through NGOs); Timor Leste became

something of a cause celebre in the 1990s, culminating in its designation as a priority

aid country in March 2003.33 This has been rapidly followed by a decision to establish

Vietnam as Ireland‟s eighth priority aid country. This programme is also expected to

direct some bilateral assistance towards the neighbouring states of Laos and

Cambodia.34 It is to be noted that Vietnam‟s Human Development Index ranking of

109 in 2006, is something of an outlier among Ireland‟s bilateral aid countries. It is

comparable in terms of ranking with two Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan and considerably better off than Tajikistan.35 It is also unusual in that

Vietnam is listed as a priority country for increased trade relations in Ireland‟s Asia

Strategy. This combined strategy is innovative for Ireland‟s Aid programme in that it

mixes trade promotion and aid – something that reflects current development advocacy

at the international level, but at the same time is somewhat inconsistent with the

overall trust of Ireland‟s aid strategy, which is to focus on the poorest states. This issue

has been recognized, to some extent, in the Irish Aid White paper, which states that

Irish assistance to Vietnam will be time bound because of economic growth in the

country, and the Irish Aid presence there will be used to facilitate a regional

programme targeting Cambodia and Laos, both of which are considerably worse off.36

The extent of this time limitation is not clear, however. In the past Ireland has been

slow to close down a priority country, and has done so in only two cases – India in the

33
Development Co-operation Ireland, Annual Report, 2003, (Dublin, 2004), 43.
34
Development Co-operation Ireland, “Irish Government announces huge increase in Overseas Aid”,
press release, 18 November 2004, available at http://www.dci.gov.ie/latest_news.asp?article=474 (26
January 2006).
35
The Occupied Territories are ranked 100 but are not classified as a priority country; Timor Leste is
ranked 142. Countries with a ranking of 147 or lower were considered to be in the “Low Human
Development‟ on the 2006 HDI index, the lowest ranking being Niger, ranked 177. With the exception
of Yemen (ranked 150), all „Low Human Development” countries are located in Africa. Given the
selection of Vietnam as a priority country is interesting to note those Asian states that receive a lower
rank, and hence, on a needs basis, it could be argued, were more in need than Vietnam. Timor Leste is
the lowest ranked Asian state, followed by Papua New Guinea (139), Nepal (138), Bangladesh (137),
Bhutan (135), Pakistan (134), Laos (133), Myanmar (130), Cambodia (129), India (126), Tajikistan
(122), Mongolia (116), Uzbekistan (113), Kyrgyztan (110) and Vietnam (109).
36
Department of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Irish Aid, (Dublin, 2006), 90.

11
1970s, which never really got going, and Sudan, a country programme which was

initially „de-prioritized‟ in 1993 and subsequently closed in 1998.37 This relatively

recent extension of bilateral aid to Vietnam would appear to represent the extent of

growth in bilateral assistance to Asia for the time being, with West Africa now being

considered for other possible bilateral aid countries.38

The other two major funding mechanisms for Irish bilateral engagement in

Asia relate primarily to the funding of NGOs working in the region, through co-

financing of projects and humanitarian assistance.39 Throughout the 1980s, and into

the mid 1990s, the NGO co-financing scheme represented the most important

mechanism for Irish government support to NGO development projects in Asia.

However, patterns of disbursement depended heavily on the presence of (usually) Irish

based partners – typically NGOs and missionaries, and the quality of proposals

received in any given funding cycle.40 Nonetheless, a review of Irish Aid annual

reports shows that three countries have received relatively consistent levels of support

throughout - India (where the principal Irish contacts were GOAL, GORTA, Christian

Aid, Trócaire and missionaries), Bangladesh (principally through Concern, and to a

lesser extent, Trócaire) and from the early 1990s onwards, Cambodia (again through

Concern, Trócaire and to a lesser extent, GOAL). The later focus on Cambodia

reflected the changed political circumstances there and the consequent return of

37
Rob Kevlihan, “Irish Bilateral Aid to Sudan – From Modernization to Conditionality: Lessons
Learned and Future Prospects” in Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 15, 2004, 147-166.
38
Interestingly, the Shanks piece from 1996 (see reference above) mentions that „although about four
years ago commercial voices urged the inclusion of a bi-lateral aid relationship with at least one Asian
country…it was decided that Irish policy should not be ruled by pure self-interest.‟ Vietnam is referred
to as one country that was considered. Amongst Irish semi state organizations that might have sought to
exercise some influence, the ESB in particular, has been active in Vietnam. Domestic considerations in
the selection of Vietnam as a priority country at a time when it is more prosperous than it was in the
early 1990s cannot, therefore, be ruled out.
39
One has to be careful here with terminology. Irish Aid refers to country-to-country aid as „bilateral
aid‟. However if one is looking at bilateral engagement, than, in my view, it is appropriate to consider
the extent to which Irish Aid allocated funding to a particular country, irrespective of whether it was
channeled through the local government or NGOs operational on the ground.
40
Per interview conducted with Irish Aid official responsible for the co-financing scheme, Dublin, 1999.

12
refugees from neighbouring countries.41 However, assistance was by no means

confined to a handful of countries. The range of projects in other countries supported

through this scheme can be seen by a simple listing of the countries in which projects

were supported over a fifteen year period from 1982 to 1997 – they include:

Afghanistan, Burma, China, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal,

Occupied Territories of Palestine, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and

Vietnam.42 Humanitarian aid or „disaster relief expenditure‟ as it was described until

1992, also followed a similar disbursement pattern, again, at least until the late 1990s,

apparently heavily biased towards the presence of operational Irish NGOs, and of

course, the occurrence of prominent natural or man-made disasters. Recipient

countries in Asia have ranged widely: countries assisted over the period 1982 to 1997

for example, included Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India,

Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, North Korea, Pakistan, the

Occupied Territories, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.43 Patterning of

humanitarian assistance also largely depends on the scale of humanitarian disasters –

and related international response to those disasters, in any given year. Ireland‟s

response in 2005 in Asia is particularly noteworthy – an unprecedented Euro 28.3m, or

40% of all humanitarian assistance disbursed was allocated to Asia in that year, in

large part because of two large humanitarian disasters – the Asian tsunami and the

South Asian earthquake.44

Irish engagement on human rights issues in Asia has been moderated, in some

instances, by trade interests (particularly with respect to China). Nonetheless, Ireland

41
Tony Farmar, Believing in Action, Concern, The First Thirty Years, 1968 – 98, (Dublin, 2002), 169.
42
Based on review of DCI Annual reports from 1982 until 1997.
43
Ibid.
44
Percentage calculated based on figures presented in DFA, Irish Aid Annual Report 2005, p36. These
represent amounts allocated by the Irish government only. Irish Aid estimates that an additional Euro
100m was raised by Irish NGOs, making Ireland the fifth largest contributor to the tsunami response
worldwide (ibid, p4-5). The scale of Ireland‟s response, both public and private, is an indication of the
growing international importance of Irish development and humanitarian assistance, supported by the
Irish government‟s drive to increase its aid budget, together with increased public prosperity and, as a
consequence, generosity, in Ireland more generally.

13
has been prominent in some high profile initiatives, including activism on Timor

Leste. Collier also highlights Irish activism on Burma from the mid 1990s, initially

under the aegis as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Dick Spring, with domestic actors –

notably Burma Action Ireland acting as catalysts for Irish government action from

1996 onwards.45

To conclude, Ireland has been active on a number of bilateral fronts with Asian

states – both economically and through aid interventions and, to a lesser extent, human

rights activism. It is to be noted, however, that (with the exception of some

humanitarian assistance to Tajikistan), Central Asia does not feature in this account of

bilateral initiatives. Upon closer inspection we shall see that Ireland has engaged with

this region, but not to any great extent on a bilateral basis; rather it has been driven by

existing multi-lateral agencies and their institutional mandates and structures.

Ireland and Central Asia

Compared to Ireland‟s overall engagement in Asian states described above, Ireland‟s

engagement with Central Asia has been relatively small scale. What activity that has

occurred has been dominated by multi-lateral institutional mechanisms, and has been

largely Euro-centric, rather than Asia-centric in focus, with past membership of the

USSR being the key reference point for continued current engagement. The main

vehicles for this engagement have been multilateral organizations with an interest or

mandate in the region – principally the EU and the OSCE, together with some smaller

scale engagement through UN agencies. This reliance on multilateral structures has

largely provided the Euro-centric lens through which Ireland views Central Asia; as a

consequence, Central Asia, when compared with more pressing Irish concerns in the

45
Niamh Collier, “Human Rights in Irish Foreign Policy: Ireland and Burma”, in Irish Studies in
International Affairs, Vol. 14, 2003, 117-121.

14
Balkans and to a lesser extent in the Caucasus region, has been left in a relatively

marginalized position.

Central Asia in Irish foreign policy strategy statements

Ireland‟s relatively low level of engagement in both foreign policy and aid terms with

Central Asia is clear from “Challenges and Opportunities Abroad”, Ireland‟s first

attempt to develop an explicit statement of Ireland‟s interests and engagement with the

rest of the world. The white paper has only two pages devoted to the states of the

former Soviet Union as a whole and barely refers to Central Asia, focusing instead

(understandably given the limited space) on Russia and Ukraine. However, section

3.1.20 of the document does recognize that „Ireland, together with its EU partners, has

a clear interest in continuing its support for the consolidation of democracy, economic

reform and the strengthening of political and economic freedoms in Russia and in the

other members of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)‟.46

This continued classification of the region as part of the former Soviet Union

continues to the present day, both at strategic and operational levels. DFA‟s Strategy

statement for the period 2005 – 2007 echoes the 1986 White Paper, focusing on

developing relations with states in the Central Asian region to promote stability,

democracy, human rights and economic progress, in a separate section from that

devoted to the Asia strategy, 47 while the 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid follows the

same line.48 Operationally, bilateral relations with four of the five Central Asian states

(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but not Turkmenistan) fall to the

46
Department of Foreign Affairs, Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, White Paper on Foreign
Policy, (Dublin, 1996), 87.
47
It is noteworthy that stability has been added as an Irish concern to the original list of democracy,
human rights and economic reform / growth, perhaps reflecting Irish government concerns regarding
possible instability in the region because of Islamic extremism post 9/11.
48
Department of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Irish Aid, (Dublin, 2006), 93. The author made a
submission as part of the White paper consultation process suggesting a change in tack on the part of
Irish Aid with respect to Central Asia. However, the White Paper is quite explicit in its continued focus
on the Balkans region.

15
Irish Ambassador and his staff based in Moscow, whose additional responsibilities

include the Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus and Georgia.49 The Irish diplomatic

presence in Moscow dates to the Soviet era – full diplomatic relations were established

between Ireland and the USSR in 1973, though even after the establishment of the

Irish presence there, trade relations between Ireland and the USSR remained at very

low levels.50 In recent times, it would appear that Central Asia is of less concern to the

Moscow embassy than relations with the south Caucasus region – the Department of

Foreign Affairs website, for instance distinguishes between the latter region (where the

political section of DFA liaises closely with the Moscow embassy) and Central Asia,

where relations are framed in the context of EU and OSCE membership, and are

monitored directly by the political section without the same mention of „close work‟

with the Moscow embassy.51 As is so often the case with parts of the world that are

peripheral to Ireland‟s core interests, diplomatic coverage is thin on the ground, which

in and of itself places constraints on what can be done.

Irish aid to Central Asia – the limits of bilateral engagement

Given the relative marginality of Central Asia in Irish foreign policy concerns,

bilateral engagement with the countries of the region has been relatively insignificant,

largely confined to small amounts of Irish humanitarian and development assistance,

delivered from the 1990s onwards. The Irish government did not deliver any assistance

or aid to Central Asia prior to the 1990s. This in large part reflects political realities,

particularly during the Cold War. As constituent parts of the Soviet Union, these areas

49
Department of Foreign Affairs, “Minister for Foreign Affairs announces new Ambassadorial
Appointments”, press release, 02 May 2003, available at
www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_releases/20030502/1172.htm (24 February 2005). The DFA website
http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/embassies/default.asp?m=e does not list Turkmenistan as a country with
which Ireland has diplomatic representation (26 January 2006), a point confirmed in correspondence by
the author with the Irish embassy in Moscow (March 2006).
50
Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance, Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, (Dublin, 1984), 94.
51
DFA, “Ireland and Eastern Europe”, available at http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=308
(accessed 12th May 2007).

16
were largely inaccessible to outsiders. Western NGOs and missionaries (including

Irish organizations) would not have been permitted to work in these areas during much

of the Cold War, and, as a result, given the Irish government‟s predilection for

responding almost exclusively to proposals from Irish based organizations during this

time, there was little or no scope for Irish activities in the region. A review of available

information from Irish Aid annual reports shows only one grant disbursed to support

activities within the USSR – a donation of IRP 100,000 for humanitarian assistance to

the Irish Red Cross to support earthquake relief in Armenia in 1988. 52 The break-up of

the Soviet Union provided new opportunities – and needs, for the delivery of

assistance throughout the former USSR and Eastern Europe. Despite this, Irish

involvement in the region remained relatively low-key. This was driven by three

factors – a concentration of limited aid resources on Eastern Europe and regions of the

former USSR closer to what was then the EU‟s border, a scarcity of Irish NGOs in the

region that might have pulled in Irish government funding, and by the continued

consideration of the Central Asian region under the „former Soviet‟ rubric, with a

resultant emphasis on economic reform, democratization, human rights and transition

generally – none of which match with Ireland‟s trade and aid related engagements in

Asia more generally.

Ireland‟s Eurocentric approach to Central Asia is reflected in the primary Irish

funding mechanism established to allow of delivery of assistance to the region - a

Balkans and CIS funding scheme. Because of Ireland‟s focus on other parts of the

world, particularly Africa, total funds allocated to the Balkans and CIS have

traditionally been limited to approximately 2% of total assistance, at least until 2004.53

However, neither the 2005 Annual Report nor the recent White Paper on Irish

Assistance mentions this limit, indicating possible shifting in the Irish government

52
Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland’s Official Development Assistance, 1988, (Dublin, 1989), 41.
53
Development Co-operation Ireland, Annual Report, 2004, (Dublin, 2005), 28.

17
position on this issue, though actual assistance disbursed in 2005 was well under 2% of

total Irish Official Development Assistance.54 The states of Central Asia fall within

this funding constraint as members of the CIS.55 Central Asia is marginalized even

within this 2% framework, despite at least three of the Central Asian states

(Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) being among the worst off in the former

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (see HDI rankings above). A review of the most

recently available Annual Reports for 2005 and 2004 shows that Ireland spent

(between multilateral and bilateral assistance) a total of Euro 6.528m (2004: 6.2m) on

the Balkans and CIS, including both multi-lateral and bilateral expenditure,

representing a 5% increase on the previous year.56 Of this, only Euro 336,100 (2004:

114,000) was spent in Central Asian countries, with the bulk of the expenditure, Euro

3m, (2004: 3.2m) being allocated to the Balkans.57 This reflects a consistent pattern

that has prioritized assistance to the Balkans over assistance to other parts of Eastern

Europe or the CIS. Initially, this focus was expected to last until at least 2006, with

Irish Aid at one point appeared making a commitment to focus on CIS / Caucasus /

Central Asia as additional resources become available thereafter.58 However, in the

2006 White Paper this commitment appears to have been abandoned in favour of

54
Total amounts disbursed under the Balkans and CIS scheme totaled Euro 6.528m; total Irish ODA
totaled 578.46m, resulting in 1.13% of total ODA being spent through the Balkans and CIS fund
(figures sourced from DFA, Irish Aid Annual Report 2005 (Dublin, 2006).
55
Though Turkmenistan‟s recent (August 2005) downgrading of its engagement with the CIS from full
member to associate member might, theoretically, exclude it from this category. However, given the
almost complete lack of engagement by Ireland with Turkmenistan, it seems unlikely that this will
become an issue in the near future.
56
This increase is relatively modest, but should be set against a 12% increase in funding in the previous
year (per calculations based on figures cited in Irish Aid Annual Reports, 2005 and 2004).
57
Based on figures provided in Development Co-operation Ireland / Irish Aid Annual Reports from
2004 (cf page 28) and 2005 (cf page 26). Note, however, that the detailed statistical annex for 2005 (cf
2005 Annual Report, page 77) lists only two Central Asia projects, one to UNDP for capacity building
of the electoral administration in Kyrgyzstan (Euro 220,000) and a smaller OSCE grant for media
conferences in the region (Euro 10,000).
58
Development Co-operation Ireland, Balkans and CIS Funding Scheme, Guidelines and Application
Form, (Dublin, 2004) i.

18
continued prioritization of the „West Balkans,‟ apparently because of concerns with

maintaining security and stability in a region much closer to home than Central Asia.59

Continued low levels of Irish assistance to Central Asia after the end of the

Cold War are also at least partially explicable by the absence of Irish non-

governmental organizations there. Indeed, the former Soviet Union as a whole did not

attract large-scale interventions from Irish NGOs, despite significant humanitarian

needs in Tajikistan, and Chechnya, amongst other places. To the extent that the Irish

government did disburse humanitarian aid in the former Soviet Union in the 1990s,

with the exception of assistance channeled through the Red Cross, it is noteworthy that

much of it was allocated to non-traditional (and non-Irish) NGO partners, such as

Médicins Sans Frontières, Save the Children-US, Halo Trust and inter-governmental

organizations such as the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization and

the International Organization for Migration.60 Irish government assistance to Central

Asia in this context has been limited to relatively small amounts of humanitarian

assistance (both cash and in kind) in Tajikistan.61 This lack of engagement by the

larger Irish NGO‟s in the former Soviet Union as a whole remains unexplained, though

competing priorities in other regions, not least Africa, a succession of other priorities

(Somalia, The Great Lakes, The Balkans, East Timor, Hurricane Mitch etc), and

difficult and unfamiliar security and operational environments may in part explain it.

The operational patterns of the „big three‟ Irish NGOs (GOAL, Concern and Trócaire)

also tended to mirror previous Irish missionary involvement, particularly in the 1980s

and early 1990s, reflecting to some extent their early reliance on networks established

by Irish religious, despite the non-denominational character of two of these three

59
DFA, Irish Aid White Paper, 93.
60
Some smaller Irish NGOs do work in the former Soviet Union, including the Chernobyl Children‟s
Appeal in Belarus and From Russia With Love in Russia. The Christina Noble Children‟s foundation
should also be mentioned because of its focus on activities in two Asian states, both heavily influenced
by the USSR – Mongolia and Vietnam.
61
Provided in 1996 and 1997 to the International Federation of the Red Cross and ICRC. Irish
government contributions were also made the World Food Programme to respond to droughts in
Tajikistan in 2000 and 2001.

19
organizations. The only major engagement these larger Irish NGOs have had with

Central Asia to date was the use of states bordering Afghanistan as logistical hubs

(particularly Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) by organizations such as GOAL and

Concern to support humanitarian operations into Afghanistan for brief periods, notably

during the post 9/11 Northern Alliance push south to take Kabul, relocating operations

inside Afghanistan once stability allowed.62 63

However, at least one smaller Irish

NGO, the Chernobyl Orphans‟ Fund, has been involved in bringing small numbers of

children to Ireland for medical treatment for chronic medical conditions brought about

as a result of Soviet nuclear testing conducted in the country.64

Ireland and the OSCE – sporadic engagement

As the leading regional inter-governmental organization that includes western

European and former Soviet sphere states as members, the OSCE has taken an active

role in the region. However, Ireland‟s participation in OSCE activities in the Central

Asian region has been relatively restrained. One of the more noteworthy engagements

in recent times was the participation of a small team of Irish election observers to in

OSCE election monitoring of the Kazakhstan presidential election in December 2005 –

elections that the OSCE concluded were not free and fair. 65 The importance of this

election to the OSCE was heightened because of Kazakhstan‟s recently expressed

interest in taking over the Chairmanship of the organization. This is itself unusual in

62
Per discussions with aid workers involved in these operations.
63
Tajikistan also acted as a safe haven in case of emergencies in Northern Afghanistan for Irish aid
workers both before the earlier advances of Taliban forces into the north of the country: see for
example, Paul Cullen, “Concern pair escape by raft to Tajikistan” in The Irish Times, 24 th August 1998,
available at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/1998/0824/archive.989824.html (accessed 10th
May 2007), and in more recent post US invasion times, cf Denis McClean, “Concern pulls out of
Afghanistan” in The Irish Times, 8th October, 2004, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/2004/1008/364763559FR08MCCLEAN.html (Accessed 10th
May 2007).
64
Katie Donovan, “Children of the bomb” in The Irish Times, 16th February 2000, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspapers/features/2000/0216/archive.00021600096.html (accessed 10th May
2007).
65
The author also participated as a locally recruited OSCE election observer in Almaty, Kazakhstan in
these elections.

20
that country‟s do not usually announce their intention to accede to the chairmanship,

putting Kazakhstan in a situation where it has placed considerable international

prestige at risk should it be unsuccessful in its candidacy. Ireland‟s small role in this

election received almost no attention domestically in Ireland, though a subsequent

RTE report served to further highlight the distance Kazakhstan still has to go to be

considered an open and truly democratic society.66 As far as Kazakhstan‟s bid for the

OSCE Presidency goes, Ireland decided not to take a public position early on,67

reflecting a general wait and see attitude by OSCE member states as a whole.68

Other Irish engagements with the region through the OSCE appear to have

been sporadic, often being no more than side meetings between Ministers at OSCE

meetings,69 or very occasional visits by Irish officials as a result of multilateral

commitments. An example of the latter was Ambassador Brendan Moran‟s (Ireland‟s

then Ambassador to the OSCE) visit to Almaty, Kazakhstan, in May 2003 as part of

the OSCE delegation, in part because of Ireland‟s upcoming Presidency of the EU. In

this context, he emphasized the importance of the Central Asian region for the EU,

highlighting the importance of democratic reforms, human rights, political freedom

and independent mass media.70 Ireland has also financed some OSCE activities in the

region, though in general Irish assistance, constrained by the classification of Central

Asia within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) zone, has taken a back

seat to Irish interests in the Balkans. Ireland‟s limited funding has included

66
Margaret Ward, Report from the Eurasian Media Forum, 29 th April 2006, available on-line (audio
version) at http://dynamic.rte.ie/av/worldreport/2136258.smil (accessed May 2006).
67
Per email correspondence with DFA official, March 2006.
68
RFE/RL, “OSCE Chairman in Office Urges Political Reform in Kazakhstan,” Newsline, Vol. 11, No.
66, Part 1\I, 11, April 2007.
69
For example, a meeting by Irish Foreign Minister David Andrews in 1998 (ref: DFA, “Minister
Andrews says OSCE will help stabilize Kosovo”, Press Release, available at
http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/imdex.aspx?id=26894 (accessed 13th May 2007) and a meeting by
Minster of State Treacy in late 2005 (ref. Department of Foreign Affairs, “Minister of State Treacy calls
for a Strengthening of the Role of the OSCE”, press release, 5 th December 2005, available at
www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_Releases/20051205/1929.htm (Accessed 3rd February 2006)).
70
Justin Burke, “OSCE‟s office in Almaty holds press conference”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty,
05 May 2003, available at www.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200305/0006.shtml (5
May 2005).

21
contributions for human rights and democratization in Central Asia through the OSCE

from 1999 onwards.71 This support was made to assist OSCE missions in all five states

„to promote respect for human rights and to assist in the development of legal and

democratic political institutions and processes, through strengthening of the

indigenous NGO sector and of relevant governmental and non-governmental

institutions‟.72 DCI has also provided on-going support for an OSCE Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Officer (ODIHR) responsible for

promoting freedom of religion and tolerance, part of whose work impinges on Central

Asia.73

Ireland and the EU – human rights and health initiatives

Ireland‟s membership of the EU has also resulted in some engagement with the region,

principally with respect to human rights issues and HIV/AIDS policy development.

The EU itself has been relatively slow in developing a strategic approach to Central

Asia, finally beginning to develop a Central Asia strategy only in 2007. The new

strategy will intensify co-operation on rule of law, human rights and democratization,

education, energy and transport, environment, trade and economic development co-

operation, and regional security challenges (such as border management, drug

trafficking and organized crime).74 Given the tardiness of a coherent EU response to

71
DCI, 1999, “O‟Donnell funds human rights projects in third world”, DCI Press Release, 04 June
1999, available at www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_Releases/19990604/450.htm [24.02.2005]
72
Department of Foreign Affairs, „O‟Donnell funds human rights projects in Third World‟, press
release, 04 June 1999, available at www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_Releases/19990604/450.htm (24
February 2005).
73
Development Co-operation Ireland, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
available at www.apso.ie/print.asp (24 February 2005).
74
Council of the European Union, Press Release, “Council Conclusion on Central Asia, 2796 th External
Relations Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 23rd April, 2007”, (EU: 2007) available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/93790.pdf (accessed 6th
May 2007).

22
Central Asia, it is unsurprising that Ireland‟s engagement through EU membership has

also been patchy.75

Ireland‟s engagement with respect to human rights in Central Asia is

noteworthy because it shows the potential that membership of larger international

institutions can have for smaller states (and indeed pressure groups within small

states), as well as the responsibilities inherent in membership. It also illustrates the

apparent limitations of small state influence. First to the responsibilities: Statutory

Instruments 901 and 902 of 2005 applying sanctions against Uzbekistan in response to

the Andijan incident have been issued by Minister for Finance Brian Cowen in

accordance with EU policy, resulting in trade and financial sanctions against the

Uzbek state, though this is hardly contrary to Irish interests, given Ireland‟s negligible

trading relationship with Uzbekistan.76 Ireland‟s initial response to the Andijan deaths

was relatively cautious, with Minister Ahern confining his remarks to saying that the

„credible reports‟ on the deaths of civilians were „extremely disturbing‟. 77 However a

subsequent press release claimed that Ireland had been „forthright‟ in its criticism of

the Uzbek regime for the events of 2005 in Andijan, and was active in looking for an

75
This tardiness was somewhat understandable when the EU eastern borders in northern Europe
extended no further east than Germany. However, the expansion in EU membership in Eastern Europe
has meant that Central Asia is now a region of greater salience to EU members states.
76
A search of the Irish Times archive elicited only two trade references connecting Ireland and
Uzbekistan – one a reference to the Uzbekistan business interests of London quoted mining PLC,
Minco, which has zinc mining interests in Ireland (Irish Times, “Minco raises funds for drilling”, 27 th
December, 2003, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/2003/1227/2698663144BZSHORTS.html (accessed 6th
May 2007) and the second a report from 1996 on the success of ESB International in securing a contract
with two EU partners to review electrical systems in a number of CIS states, including Uzbekistan (Irish
Times, “ESB wins Russian review contract”, 29 th January, 1996, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/1996/0129/archive.96012900094.html (accessed 6th May
2007).
77
DFA, “Statement by the Minister Dermot Ahern on events in Uzbekistan”, Press Release, available at
http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=25535 (accessed 13th May 2007).

23
EU response to the incident.78 Ireland‟s Minister of State, Noel Treacy, also raised the

issue at an OSCE Ministerial conference held in December 2005.79

The potential for small states – and by extension, relatively small advocacy

organizations within those states, to mobilize broader institutional support for issues of

concern was illustrated in 2004. In that year the Irish Human Rights NGO, Frontline,

successfully mobilized the Irish government to pressure the EU to issue a statement in

defense of Kyrgyz human rights defender Tursunbek Akunov, who disappeared after

organising a petition for the resignation of the then Kyrgyz president. A few days later,

after direct pressure from Frontline to senior Kyrgyz officials and the EU statement,

Akunov was freed by the government-backed militia that had taken him captive.80

However, there appears to be limits to Ireland‟s ability or willingness to

exercise influence in this respect. The case of Uzbek human rights activist Mukhtabar

Tojibaeva illustrates this point. Ms Tojibaeva was arrested in 2005 in Uzbekistan the

day before she was due to travel to Dublin to attend the third Platform for the

Protection of Human Rights organized by Frontline.81 Tojibaeva was subsequently

sentenced to eight years imprisonment in March 2006, a sentence that was confirmed

in May 2006.82 83
At time of writing (May 2007), Tojibaeva, along with other human

rights defenders, remains in prison in Tashkent. Since her incarceration she reportedly

spent some time consigned to the prison‟s psychiatric ward for a period in the summer

78
Department of Foreign Affairs, “Minister Ahern‟s Statement to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on
European Affairs”, press release, 29 September 2005, available at
www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_Releases/20050929/1855.htm (accessed 3rd February 2006).
79
Department of Foreign Affairs, “Minister of State Treacy calls for a Strengthening of the Role of the
OSCE”, press release, 5th December 2005, available at
www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_Releases/20051205/1929.htm (Accessed 3rd February 2006).
80
Joe Humphreys, “The Advocates,” The Irish Times, 11th December, 2004, accessed online at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/magazine/2004/1211/339547856MG1112ADVOCS.html [12 July
2006].
81
Frontline, “La publication d‟un rapport révèle que les défenseurs des droits humans en Ouzbékistan
sont victims de repression, novembre 2005”, press release, available at
www.frontlinedefenders.org/francais/communiqies/2193 (accessed 3rd February 2006).
82
Frontline, “Uzbek court sentences human rights defender to eight years”, press release, 8th March
2006, available at www.frontlinedefenders.org/news.2505 [accessed at 9th March 2006].
83
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Uzbek Court Upholds Sentence Against Rights Activist”, Vol.
10, No. 98, Part I, 31 May 2006.

24
of 2006, has been denied access to her lawyer for over six months, has been denied

regular family visits and has been locked in a punishment cell.84 Curiously since

Tojibaeva‟s arrest in late 2005, the Irish government, at least in its public

pronouncements, has been relatively quiet about this incident, a stance which stands in

contrast to more strenuous efforts made by them with respect to a Sudanese human

rights activist detained in 2005 prior to his planned trip to Dublin for another Frontline

conference. Frontline has taken an active interest in human rights issues in the Central

Asian region for a number of years and has had various Central Asian participants at

events in Dublin since 2001. The organization continues to keep Uzbekistan in its

sights through the announcement of the presentation of an award to another Uzbek

human rights activist, Ahmadjon Madmuarov, in June 2006.85 Mr. Madmuarov, who

is also resident in Uzbekistan, traveled to Ireland surreptiously while on a trip to

neighbouring Kyrgyzstan.86 Given the success of previous organizations such as Tom

Hyland‟s activism in support of East Timor, and the activities of the Burma Action

Group, in championing particular causes with the Irish government, Frontline‟s current

stance may see increased engagement by the Irish government on the issue of human

rights in Uzbekistan.

Ireland‟s other noteworthy engagement (and possibly its most significant to

date from a policy perspective) on issues pertinent to Central Asia was the

organization of a conference in Dublin during Ireland‟s last Presidency of the EU. This

latter conference, entitled “Breaking the Barriers – Partnership to fight HIV/AIDS in

Europe and Central Asia” represented an important initiative by the Irish government

to highlight the growing problem of HIV/AIDS in the region and resulted in the
84
Human Rights Watch, Under Siege and Working for Justice, , Human Rights Defenders in
Uzbekistan, (New York: 2006), p6, available at http://hrw.org/campaigns/uzbekistan/portraits_0407.pdf
[Accessed 4th May 2007].
85
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Uzbek Human Rights Activist Receives Award”, Vol. 10, No.
111, Part I, 19th June 2006.
86
Kitty Holland, “Defending the enemies of the state”, in The Irish Times, 17 th June, 2006, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/newsfeatures/2006/0617/3293883683WK17HUMANRIGHTS.html
(accessed 6th May 2007).

25
Dublin Declaration on Partnership to fight HIV/AIDS in Europe and Central Asia,

adopted by 55 countries.87 The declaration commits signatories to strengthening their

response to HIV/AIDS, increasing inter-regional co-ordination on HIV/AIDS

initiatives and increased funding for prevention and, care and sustained treatment

initiatives.88 However, the marginality of Central Asia to the enterprise – despite the

title of the conference, was emphasized by Irish funding decisions in its wake. The

declaration was followed by the announcement by the Irish government of increased

assistance to HIV/AIDS prevention programmes in Central and Southeastern Europe –

but not to Central Asia.89

Ireland and the UN – more sporadic engagement

Finally, Ireland has also had some very minor engagement with the region through the

UN, principally on human rights, non-proliferation issues and peacekeeping. During its

tenure on the UN Commission for Human Rights, Ireland supported a resolution

expressing grave concern regarding the Turkmenistan government‟s crack down on the

opposition, with the Irish Ambassador, Mary Whelan, speaking on behalf of the EU on

the matter.90 Ireland had previously co-sponsored a General Assembly resolution on

Turkmenistan calling on the Turkmen administration to implement the findings of an

OCSE rapporteur and to support facilitate the work of UNHCR and ICRC.91

Significantly, given concerns over whether Irish economic interests might blunt human

rights advocacy, Ireland does actually have some business interests in Turkmenistan.
87
Development Co-operation Ireland, “55 countries adopt Dublin Declaration on Partnership to fight
HIV/AIDS in Europe and Central Asia”, press release, 24 February 2004, available at
http://www.dci.gov.ie/latest_news.asp?article=348 (accessed 19th January 2006).
88
Government of Ireland, Dublin Declaration on Partnership to fight HIV/AIDS in Europe and Central
Asia, (Dublin, 2005).
89
DCI, 2004. “Ireland increases assistance to fight HIVAIDS in Central and South East Europe –
Minister Kitt”, press release, 05 March 2004, available at
www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/Press_Releases/20040305/1458.htm (accessed 24th February 2005).
90
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “UN Commission Condemns Belarus, Turkmen Rights abuses‟,
Features and Analysis, 14 April 2004, available at www.rferl.org/reports/turkmen-report/2004/04/0-2--
404.asp (accessed 3 February 2006).
91
DFA, “Address by Minister Cowen to the 11th Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Maastricht, 1-2
Deember 2003” Press Release, available at http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=25894
(accessed 13th May 2007).

26
Irish registered oil and gas exploration company, Dragon Oil, has been operational in

Turkmenistan since 1999, and operates a joint venture with the Turkmen government

in the Cheleken field in the Caspian Sea.92 The company is Irish registered and quoted

on the Dublin and London stock exchanges, though the Dublin operation appears to be

something of a „brass plate‟ with the operational headquarters based in Dubai. A

majority stake in the company is held by the Emirates Oil Company. 93 In 2004, one

analyst noted that Dragon Oil was the biggest foreign oil producer among the joint

ventures in Turkmenistan, indicating the importance of the company in the

Turkmenistan energy sector.94 Private Irish company Emerol has also been doing

business in Turkmenistan since 1992 – primarily in the area of environmental

protection in oil, gas, chemical and petrochemical industries. Controversially, it was

one of approximately 30 companies that paid to have President Niyazovs‟ book,

Rukhnama (Book of Spirit) translated into various languages – the Irish company

paying for it to be translated into Lithuanian. The book, written by Niyazov, was part

of the cult of personality that surrounded his regime, and corporate sponsorship for

translating and printing of this nature by private companies was criticized by some

human rights groups.95 On non-proliferation issues, Ireland provided political support

in the UN through the New Agenda Coalition in 2002 for the Central Asia nuclear

92
Alexander Gas & Oil Connections, “Dragon‟s offshore LAM 220102 well comes onstream”,
Company News, Central Asia, Vol 7, Issue 5, March 06, 2002, available at
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnc13104.htm (Accessed 5th February 2006)
93
Irish Examiner, “Dragon Oil profits increase as shares rise by 10%”, 23 March, 2004, available at
www.archives.tem.ie/irishexaminer/2004/03/23/story531796099.asp (Accessed 6th February 2006).
94
APS, “Turkmenistan – The Oil Producers” in Review of Oil Markets Trends, Spetember 2004,
available at www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go1968/is_200409/ai_n6446375 (Accessed at 3rd
February 2006).
95
Peter Finn, “A Turkmen Tome Gets Foreign Aid”, Washington Post, 23rd February, 2005, pA13.

27
weapon free zone (CANWFZ) agreement.96 Irish Gardai have also served with

peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan during the transition to peace in the mid 1990s.97

Other connections

While by no means complete, the author has been able to trace some other passing

connections between Ireland and the Central Asian region. Ireland has had a trickle of

asylum seekers arriving from the region. A total of 169 people have applied for asylum

from the region over a three year period from 2002 to 2004, accounting for just under

0.7% of total asylum seekers. The majority came from Kazakhstan (117 applicants; 92

in 2002 and 25 in 2003), followed by Uzbekistan (41 total; 28 in 2002 and 13 in 2004)

and Kyrgyzstan (11 – all in 2002).98 Ireland has also deported eight people from the

region in the same period – seven from Kazakhstan and one from Uzbekistan.99

Another connection, other than the inevitable presence of Irish pubs (with at

least five in Kazakhstan, at the last count) is with Northern Ireland. It is would seem

noteworthy, given recent events in Kyrgyzstan (in particular the relatively restrained

role played by the police there in responding to civil strife in the wake of contested

elections that saw the change in leadership) that four mid-level police based in the

Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, including a police trainer at the Kyrgyz police academy, were

sent to Belfast for training in community policing by the OSCE, an activity described

by the OSCE programme manager as one of their most successful initiatives in

96
Scott Parrish, “Central Asian States Achieve Breakthrough on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”,
Monterrey Institute of International Studies Research paper, available at
www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020930.htm [14th March 2005].
97
Jim Cusack, “Garda „Silver Fox‟ picked for key UN Policing Role”, The Irish Times, 13th January
1996, available at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/1996/0113/archive.96011300007.html
[12th July 2006].
98
As calculated based on statistics released by Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Michael
McDowell, in response to a Dail question, per Dail Debates (Official Report – Unrevised), Vol. 597
No.4, Thursday 10 February 2005 available at
www.debates.oireachtas.ie/Ddebate.aspx?F=DAL20050210.xml&Dail=29&Ex=All&… [24 February
2005].
99
Ibid.

28
working with police in Kyrgyzstan for three years.100 The retrained response of the

Kyrgyz police stands in contrast to the events in Andijan in neighbouring Uzbekistan

noted above.101

Scope for greater Irish engagement

Despite the connections outlined above, Central Asia‟s status as a constituent region of

Asia and its geographical proximity to Europe, the bottom line is that the region has

been relatively marginal to Ireland and Irish foreign and aid policy concerns. Given

resource constraints within the Irish foreign service and other strategic priorities is this

a reasonable approach? This section considers some of the possible opportunities

offered by Central Asia in the event of future Irish engagement.

First, to trade. The wealthiest country in the region, Kazakhstan offers

possibilities as a market for Irish goods and services – particularly consumer goods,

third level education services and possibly work in the banking and financial services

sectors (Kazakhstan is the regional leader in financial services), together with direct

investment opportunities in the oil and gas and mining sectors. Third level education

may offer one of the least risky growth opportunities. The Kazakh government has a

scholarship programme known as “Bolashak” (болашак) to support study overseas by

Kazakh students. In 2006/07 the government planned financial support to 3,000

students to study overseas at third level. The Irish embassy in Moscow has expressed

and interest in this scheme and is seeking to promote the Irish third level sector with
102
the Kazakh government Irish companies have also done business in the financial

sector in Kazakhstan before – Bank of Ireland, for example, implemented a technical

assistance programme to 16 commercial banks through the Kazakh Institute of

100
Per interview with OSCE Programme Manager, Almaty, Kazakhstan, March 2005.
101
Though it would appear that the Uzbek military, rather than police, took a leading role in responding
during the Andijan incident.
102
Per email correspondence with DFA official in the Irish Embassy in Moscow, March 2006.

29
Bankers in the early 1990s with EU TACIS funding. 103 Irish based companies have
104
also been involved in the oil and gas, mining105 and media106 sectors, amongst

others. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan remains a difficult place to do business, with

dominance of sectors of the economy by Kazakh elites and general corruption levels

creating a difficult operational environment for investors, especially outside of the

energy sector. The other states in the region offer less in terms of trade, though both

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have significant energy sectors. However, Irish

involvement in Uzbekistan is currently subject to trade sanctions (see above).

However, the recent change in government in Turkmenistan signals a possibly

improved business environment there.

Outside of trade issues, the relatively marginal status of Central Asia,

particularly in aid terms, while perhaps justified in the past, now seems unwarranted

given general developmental conditions within the region and the proximity of the

region to Europe and the EU – particularly with the recent expansion eastwards of EU

states. While Kazakhstan is relatively well off, the other states in the region certainly

are not when compared to other regions and states in the Balkans and CIS. However,

determining the nature of any increased assistance and modalities of assistance

(multilateral, bilateral, through NGOs etc) will require more detailed analysis, given

103
Source: Bank of Ireland International Services, 1995 “New Markets, New Horizons.” This is a
„glossy‟ promotional brochure in the possession of the author.
104
Jamie Smyth, “Kentech clinches Euro19m oil and gas with Japanese firm” in The Irish Times, 18 th
November 2004, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/2004/1118/4191523784BZJAMIE2.html (accessed 6th May
2007).
105
See for example, “Celtic Resources wants to write off Euro8.3m, court told” in The Irish Times, 16th
December 2003, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/2003/1216/2135122260BZCELTIC.html (accessed 6th May
2007), Colm Ward, “Celtic resources gold mine production beats forecast” in The Irish Times, 1 st
March, 2003, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/2003/0301/1676034658BWCELTIC.html (accesed 6th May
2007), “Ennex posts pre-tax loss of Euro 259,000”, The Irish Times, 28 th September, 2002, available at
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/2002/0928/4247886282BZENNEX.html (accessed 6th May
2007).
106
Lorna Siggins, “Media executive sells major US shows from Galway” in The Irish Times, 5 th April
1999, available at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/1999/0405/archive.99040500010.html
(accessed 10th May 2007).

30
issues of poor governance and suspicion regarding foreign engagement in

democratization and human rights issues in the region. The Irish government‟s recent

commitment to HIV/AIDS prevention in the Dublin declaration may offer one obvious

sectoral area of focus. Central Asia as yet has relatively low HIV/AIDS prevalence

rates, but one of the fastest growing rates in the world – indicating that now is the time

engage on this issue in order to protect these populations from the disease and preserve

the human capital inherited from the Soviet era. Targeted assistance in social service

provision (particularly in the health sector) to poorer countries in the region – to

particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (both because of their relative need, and

because of somewhat more open governance arrangements there), could also be

considered. Tajikistan in particular is still struggling to recover from a civil war that

ended in 1997, and as a consequence has an extremely weak health system in need of

considerable assistance.107 In terms of international NGO actors, Tajikistan is the only

country in the region with a significant NGO presence operating in the provision of

social services (as opposed to health reform or other technical assistance), because of

the poor health system there and the legacy of the war. While Irish Aid tends to favor

channeling humanitarian aid through Irish based non-governmental partners (none of

which are currently working in Tajikistan), it has provided assistance to other NGOs –

including Médicins Sans Frontières, and Save the Children, which are operational in

Tajikistan, and indeed, in the past, has funded humanitarian aid activities in Tajikistan.

Irish Aid could consider making an approach to international NGOs working there,

and consider new humanitarian and / or development programmes to support. Any

significant aid investment in the region would have result in a revision to existing Irish

aid policy towards aid in this region – the 2% limit on total assistance to the Balkans

and CIS region places Central Asia at a severe disadvantage, especially given

107
Per interview with regional programme manager working for an NGO involved in health reform in
the Central Asian region, Almaty, Kazakhstan, March 2005.

31
European strategic concerns with respect to stability in the Balkans. One possible

solution to this dilemma would be to reformulate the 2% restriction to apply to Eastern

and Southern Europe only, allocating a separate tranche for poorer countries of the

former CIS (such as Moldova, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), or alternatively, including

Central Asian states in aid amounts allocated to Asia, rather than Europe and the CIS.

Finally, as highlighted in this article, multilateral actors such as the OSCE offer

an alternative and easily available channel for assistance to the region more generally.

Given the OSCE‟s previous engagement with community policing in Northern Ireland,

the Irish government might consider the possibility of a joint programme involving Na

Garda Síochàna and the Police Service of Northern Ireland in providing assistance to

police forces in the region - both in terms of community policing, and possibly cross

border co-operation between neighboring police forces. Cross border policing and

security remains a major challenge in the region. However, any engagement by the

Irish government must take account of the human rights records of the various

governments in the region – in particular with respect to the government of

Uzbekistan, with aid modalities designed to avoid supporting repressive governments

(by channeling funds through NGOs for example) and to support greater accountability

and protection of human rights. This is not without its risks – governments in the

region have expressed some suspicion of foreign agencies in the wake of recent regime

changes in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, requiring careful analysis of the types of

organizations and activities to be funded.

Conclusions

Irish government engagement with areas peripheral to its main foreign policy concerns

are bound to be somewhat fragmentary and to a large extent reliant on available multi-

lateral structures. This has certainly been a feature of Irish government involvement

32
with Central Asia to date, with other more prosperous and populous regions of Asia

being the focus of Irish economic policy and the Balkans receiving the lion‟s share of

available assistance.

However, even in relatively marginal regions, there remains scope for further

Irish bilateral engagement. In the case of Central Asia, Kazakhstan may have

something to offer Ireland in terms of trade relations. On the aid side, the on-going

bias in Irish government aid allocations to the Balkans, particularly in recent years as

the Balkans region has been relatively stable, would seem to reflect Irish self interest

rather than reflecting a needs based approach. Granted, the overall trust of Ireland‟s aid

programme – with its Africa focus - remains largely needs based. However, questions

can be asked about Irish priorities outside of Africa – notably in the Balkans, and

perhaps also, to some extent, in Vietnam.

Given the recent expansion of the EU eastwards, the consequent rise in the

importance of Central Asia and the on-going roll-out of the government‟s „Asia

Strategy,‟ more attention towards Central Asia on the part of the Irish government is

warranted. This will require something of a re-think by the Irish government. The

region‟s status as part of both Asia and the CIS is something the Irish government has

not yet got to grips with – either strategically, or operationally. Possible opportunities

for increased trade (particularly with Kazakhstan), and increased aid (especially in

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and / or around the issue of HIV / AIDS), would appear to

provide mechanisms for increased engagement. While other regions of the world –

particularly Africa, are quite properly the central focus of Irish assistance, if Ireland is

going to continue to target some assistance at Eastern Europe and the former CIS, the

focus of that assistance should be on the worst off areas – most of which are located in

Central Asia. Alternatively, Ireland might consider how best to fit Central Asia into its

Asia related operations, bearing in mind the relative absence of Irish based

33
organizations that Irish Aid has traditionally (though to a lesser extent in recent years)

relied on outside of bilateral aid countries. In many respects, Central Asia represents a

tabula rasa for Ireland in foreign policy terms, with plenty of opportunities for greater

engagement should Ireland seek them.

34