1) DENR VS DARAMAN

G.R. No. 125797 February 15, 2002

DENr, 
VS. GREGORIO DARAMAN

Facts:

This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio
Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal
pieces of lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral Services.
Here, the respondents alleged without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had
no permit to transport lumber although they
that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the two to bring also some pieces of wood to his
house located near the funeral’s location.
DENR employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber and
issued an order of forfeiture. The court granted bond and released the funeral car and lumber
because it was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and
lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.

Issue: WON the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A

Held:

Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to
those who transport lumber without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no
permit to transport lumber although they were only asked to bring the lumber to the house of
one Asan.

The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power
to confiscate the property in favor of the state/government. The release of this property
defeated the purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore, SC granted the petition of
DENR, RTC’s decision was reversed and set aside.

2) VILLARIN VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN et.al ,Petitioners, . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent

.Issue:
Whether mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and
regulations makes one automatically liable even criminal intent in violation of Section68, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705,as amended.

Facts:
In a Criminal Complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City
by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria
(Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac),
were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The
respondents were guilty of gathering and possessing sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes
belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six
(4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Ruling:
Yes, As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,criminal intent is not
an essential element. There is no dispute that petitioners were inconstructive possession
of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally
involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any
competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’
contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of
said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

3) Special People Inc. Foundation vs. Nestor Canda, et al (G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013)

Facts:
Special People Inc. Foundation (SPIF) was a proponent of a water-resource development and
utilization project in Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc
River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities.
SPIF applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR, Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586. Upon evaluating the
nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB
in Bohol, rendered his findings that the project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial
Environmental Examination is required. SPIF appealed Canda’s findings to EMB RD Lipayon,
claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay
waterworks project of the DPWH that had recently been issued a CNC. RD Lipayon notified SPIF that
its documents substantially complied with the procedural aspects of the EMB’s review, and Later on,
RD Lipayon informed the SPIF that an Initial Environmental Examination documents was required for
the project due to its significant impact in the area to determine whether the project was within an
environmentally critical area or not, one of which is a Certification from PHIVOLCS that the area was
not subjected to earthquakes of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent during the
period of 1949 until the year 2001 to which the SPIF complied. However, due to the tenor of the
certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon declared that the project was within an environmentally
critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC. SPIF filed a petition for mandamus
and damages in the RTC in Loay, Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right
after having complied with the certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC
to the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same area. The trial court dismissed the petition
for mandamus ruling that the RTC would not interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB to
review the merits of the petitioner’s application for the CNC. Hence, this appeal brought directly to the
Court via petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the RTC was proper?
2. Whether or not the petition for mandamus was the correct recourse?

Rulings:
1.Petitioner’s appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court. This appeal by certiorari is being taken
under Rule 45, Rules of Court, whose Section 1 expressly requires that the petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Yet, the petitioner hereby raises a question of fact
whose resolution is decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns whether or not the petitioner
established that its project was not located in an environmentally critical area. For this reason, the Court
is constrained to deny due course to the petition for review. It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the
exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.

2. Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the recourse
because the SPIF failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, and because it failed to show
that it was legally entitled to demand the performance of the act by the respondents.

Held: The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to
one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.

4) MMDA VS Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

Facts:
Respondents:
 Respondents, Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them the petitioners,
for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
 Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

Petitioners:
 Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the
amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90
prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the “SB” level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4
 Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to
reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project
 The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated
waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.

RTC- ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

The CA sustained the RTC. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do
tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.7

Issues:
1. Whether or not sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general
2. Whether or not the cleaning or rehabilitation of the manila bay is not a ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

FIRST ISSUE:
Yes, the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners:
 - maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation
and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned.
- argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking
feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents:
- counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion.
- Said that the petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain

Supreme Court Ruling:

We agree with respondents. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law
or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. The MMDA’s duty to put up an
adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty
being a statutory imposition.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one
that “allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform.”
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

5) HENARES VS LTFRB

HENARES VS LTFRB & DOTC

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Asserting their right to clean air pursuant to the RA8749, their Constitutional right, and the principle of "inter-
generational responsibility", Henares et al filed a petition to issue a WRIT OF MANDAMUS commanding LTFRB and DOTC
to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG) as alternative fuel.

To present a compelling case for this judicial action, Henares cited the high growth and low turnover in vehicle
ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their emission
of air pollutants, as the cause of air pollution and other related environmental hazards. Due to the continuing high demand for
motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions.

Petitioners allege that the complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets emitted into the air from various
engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life.
Some of the effects of the fuel emissions when they react to other pollutants are the formation of smog, acid rain, and nitric
acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. Also, when carbon monoxide
(CO) has not been completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in
blood which, in the long run, affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.

To counter the said detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. CNG is a
natural gas comprised mostly of methane. It is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel. Compared to
coal and petroleum, CNG produces much less pollutants. CNG produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and
diesel fuel. It reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half. It emits 60 percent less
particulate matters and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. The only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one
of the gases blamed for global warming.

LTFRB and DOTC explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to
command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, according to Henares, these agencies possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by
R8749. LTFRB and DOTC cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and failure to compel its
use by PUVs as alternative fuel is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty.
 LTFRB and DOTC contend that nothing in RA 8749 prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor
vehicles. RA8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel. Also, it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement RA 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. It is likewise argued that it is the Department of Energy (DOE) that is
required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved
efficiency and reduced emissions. DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and LTFRB
and DOTC cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards.

ISSUE: WON the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel

HELD: NO. As to the petitioners' standing, there is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before the
Court since what is being assailed here is the right to clean air. The right to clean air is an issue of paramount importance for
it concerns the air they breathe. It is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the effects of a neglected
environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. However, the plain, speedy
and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing.

Mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty
already imposed.

Here, petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on LTFRB and DOTC that will
justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It was proven that the DOTC’s
duty is to implement the emission standards and set the maximum limit for the emission of motor vehicles set pursuant to and
as provided in RA8749. The LTFRB has been tasked "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience
(CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious
reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from the Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that sufficient time and leeway be given for the coequal branches to address by
themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. The legislature should provide first the specific statutory
remedy to the complex environmental problems before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

6) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary AngeloReyes

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, G.R.
No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-
46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to
conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon
Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second
petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along
with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The
petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX
and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration
activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case
was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is
“not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Id., p. 12. Due
to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention
the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the
merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.

Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down to
two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case; and
2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical
persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead,
the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws.” Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the
contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president
and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary,
and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in
protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be
performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that
JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful.
Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of
energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because
Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no energy
exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.

7) Central Visayas Fisherfolk vs Sec. Reyes

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait (Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises and other Cetacean Species) represented by Atty. Osorio and Estenzo-Ramos v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes
G.R. No. 181527
April 21, 2015

Facts:

This is a consolidated petition filed by two different petitioners. This is an original petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the validity of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which
allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a
narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. SC-46 originated from a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) entered by DOE with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface
geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE,
also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
 JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since
the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait
was declared a protected seascape in 1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact
Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586. This was approved by the
Protected Area Management Board12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait), and an ECC was
subsequently released to JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. From
16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth of 3,150 meters
near Pinamungajan town. Being adversely affected by the activities, this petition was filed.

Parties:

The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the waters in and
around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as
their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a
non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal
fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.

The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L. Atienza, DENR
Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB;
JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent
of JAPEX.

Arguments:

Petitioners:

- A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch
by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef (from 15-20
kls. per day to 1-2 kls.).
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public consultations
and discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction

FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the
point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in
the Initial Environmental Examination

Respondents:

- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.
ISSUES

1. WON Petitioners have a legal standing

 2. WON President Arroyo may be impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner.
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional

RULING:

1. YES. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit
any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our environmental laws on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature:

“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including

minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action
and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest
to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff
may publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”

Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may
be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations
yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce
our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition
and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.c (in
a way, wala gyud ni rule ang Court if tagaan ba legal standing ang animals).

2. NO. Under the Rules, if the consent of a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she shall be impleaded
as a defendant. In this case, we cannot implead the president as defendant because her
functions as President need her full devotion. This will put the unwilling party under the
jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and
consent, as such would be a denial of due process. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners
Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to
implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the
public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also
 demands undivided attention.

3. YES. Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60
Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial
assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same provision. It is petitioner’s
position that service contracts involving foreign corporations or entities have been banned by the
1987 Constitution. The Court went back to discuss the case of La Bugal, and explained that par.4
of Sec.2 Article XII of the Constitution is the exception to the general rule in par.1 of the same
provision (in short, pwede ra mo enter into service contracts subject to certain conditions).

The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:chanroblesvirt

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.

- The Court finds that there was a law. PD 87 (The Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972). This law has not been repealed, and so is an existing valid law governing oil
explorations. But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87
may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration
and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.

- Not met. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46
appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

o Cannot fall under the alter-ego doctrine, because in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the alter ego doctrine cannot apply.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had
any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of
then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as
the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is
embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These
service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our
natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations.
Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are
meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily
penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.69cralawlawlibrary

- Not complied as well.

Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

The Tanon Strait

The Strait is considered as a protected area under the NIPAS Act. Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a
protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological
significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation. Under
Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a
protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such
activity on its ecological system. It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without
exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is
allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement
to undergo an EIA under Section 12. Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an
exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for
additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.

While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon
Strait is a NIPAS area.106Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction
in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected
seascape.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46
is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential Decree No. 1586.

8) Bangus Fried Fisherfolk vs Judge Manzanas

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK ET AL., VS. JUDGE LANZANAS ET AL.

G . R . N o . 1 3 1 4 4 2 July 10, 2003P o n e n t e : C a r p i o

FACTS:
DENR Regional Executive Director Principe issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in
favor of Napocor, authorizing the corporation to construct a temporary mooring facility in the Minolo
Cove in Puerto Galera. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. The mooring facility would
serve as the temporary docking site of Napocor's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its
former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove.
The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of
Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30
June 1999.The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, Puerto Galera, sought
reconsideration of the ECC issuance, which was denied by the DENR. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk then
filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila for the cancellation of the ECC, for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility, and further prayed for the demolition of
mooring structures that has already been built. Bythis time, the provincial government of Mindoro
manifested that it was the one undertaking the construction ofthe mooring facility.The Provincial
Government of Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint for the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action, and that Manila RTC had no jurisdiction as
the mooring facility is outside its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies since there was no appeal before the DENR Secretary prior to
filingthe case with the trial court. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk contend that they are exempt from filing
an appeal withthe DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was a patent violation of existing
laws and regulations,one of which was Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N Manila RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
–NO.

2. Whether the Bangus Fry Fisherfolks violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies
–YES.

3. Whether the issuance of the ECC violated PD No. 1605.

–NO.

RATIO:Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by
theallegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
reliefs sought.On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is
limited to acts committed
or about to be committed within their judicial region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (“PD No.
1818”)
prohibited courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the
mooring facility
in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (“RA No. 8975”), which took effect on 26 November 2000,
superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the
power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation.
Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop
the construction of the mooring facility.Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under
RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint
considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic

9) Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
 1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged
that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of
the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development,
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.