This Draft chapter on Strategic Doing will be in an edited book that

Gisele Hamm and Norm Walzer are compiling:

Community Visioning Programs: Processes and Outcomes.

Moving from Strategic Planning to Strategic Doing

Ed Morrison
Economic Policy Advisor
Purdue Center for Regional Development
edmorrison@purdue.edu

Any effective strategy answers just two questions: “Where we going?” and “How will we

get there?” It seems simple enough. Yet, nothing is quite so muddled as the process of strategic

planning for economic, workforce and community development.

Few people who have gone through the process of trying to build a strategy for a local or

regional economy would want to repeat it. Typically, the process is long and exhausting. What is

worse, most strategies, it seems, do not work. They sit, gathering dust, not implemented. Not

surprisingly, a great deal of skepticism swirls around the effectiveness of strategy in building

prosperous economies.

Frustration and doubt is showing up at a bad time. We are facing rising complexity and un-

certainty that is outstripping our abilities to adjust. The future is coming at us faster than ever

before demanding higher levels of ingenuity (Homer-Dixon 2000). At the same time, deep shifts

are underway in the way in which wealth is created within our economy. These shifts have un-

dercut the effectiveness of traditional approaches to how we plan for the future: strategic plan-

ning.

As we shall see, we need new approaches to strategy to keep up with the fast and complex

changes sweeping across communities and regions. These new strategy disciplines will help us

adapt to the fast moving world of open networks that now characterize our economies. The good
Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 1
news: After years of experimentation, the core disciplines to guide strategy in loosely joined

networks -- the type of networks that drive prosperity in local and regional economies -- is

emerging. This chapter explores where we stand with these new approaches.

How did we get here?

Our concepts of strategy for economic and workforce development come directly from

business. Strategic planning as a management discipline emerged from the remarkable logistical

achievements of the U.S. military in World War II. In the 1950s, corporations began applying

strategic planning to manage the challenge of allocating capital investment across multiple orga-

nizational units. Out of these early efforts a traditional strategic planning process evolved. In

1962, a Harvard business school professor, Arthur Chandler argued that developing a strategy

represented a core discipline of management: companies could achieve superior competitive per-

formance by designing their organization to implement critical strategic decisions (Chandler

1962).

Chandler’s work provided the foundation for continued academic exploration of strategic

planning. At about the same time, a management consulting firm, the Boston Consulting Group

(BCG), moved these concepts into the marketplace aggressively (Stern and Deimler 2006).

BCG’s success led to a growth explosion for corporate strategy consulting firms, such as Bain &

Co., McKinsey, and Booz Allen. Over time, corporations and their consultants evolved different

formal processes to implement strategic planning. New concepts emerged, but the basic idea

remained the same: a corporation could achieve superior financial performance, if its top man-

agement focused on developing and implementing a strategic plan.

2
 Several key features define the process of traditional corporate strategic planning.

• First, thinking and doing are separated. A small group of top managers define the

strategic plan. Others lower in the organization execute it. Traditional strategic

planning reinforces the hierarchical, "command-and-control" organization chart.

• Second, the process is linear and stable. It assumes that the management team logi-

cally completes each step before moving on the next.

• Third, the process assumes that strategic plans, once drawn, can be reliable guides

for years into the future. In other words, markets are relatively stable.

• Fourth, analysis must be completed before decisions are made. Developing the

planning base -- gathering all the facts -- represents a critical early step to deter-

mine the quality of the plan. Without a thorough understanding of opportunities and

threats or strengths and weaknesses, management cannot make sensible strategic

choices. Gather facts first; make decisions later.

• Fifth, vision and mission are fixed. Once set, they are immutable. They need only

be translated into specific strategic goals.

As we shall see, all of these features undercut the effectiveness of traditional strategic

planning in the dynamic markets we confront today. Before we turn to the future, we should look

back to see how the standard model of strategic planning migrated to the world of economic de-

velopment.

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 3
Applying strategic planning to economic development

Beginning in the early 1980's, economic development consultants began applying business

strategy concepts to the challenges of local economic development. It is easy to see why. The

1970s was decade of economic dislocation. An oil embargo in 1973 triggered a global recession.

A prolonged period of "stagflation" followed which combined both high unemployment and high

inflation. The 1970s ended with yet another oil crisis. The decade saw the worst economic per-

formance from industrialized countries since the Great Depression. At the same time, the export-

led growth of the "Asian tigers" –– Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan –– signaled

a rapid economic transformation taking place across the globe. To economic commentators and

policy analysts, it was clear that fundamental changes were sweeping the U.S. economy. Accord-

ing to many analysts, our pre-eminent competitive position was eroding (Magaziner and Reich

2001).

Within the U.S., some regional economies fared better than others. Distressed regions, es-

pecially in the industrial Northeast and Midwest emerged from the 1970’s as "the Rust Belt." At

the same time, states of the South and Southwest -- the “Sunbelt” -- experienced continued popu-

lation growth throughout the decade.

Most important, the strong economic performance of some "high technology" regions, in-

cluding Silicon Valley and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina, suggested that collabora-

tion among universities, government and the private sector could successfully promote higher

growth, high technology development. The message to regional leaders became clear: By repli-

cating the lessons of Silicon Valley, regions could become globally competitive (Office of Tech-

nology Assessment 1984). The right strategy, it seemed, could push a region to the forefront of

global economies.

4
 Not surprisingly, Rhode Island -- a state devastated by the migration of its textile industry

to the South beginning in the 1950’s -- launched one of the first large-scale efforts to apply cor-

porate strategy concepts to economic development. In 1984, the Rhode Island Strategic Devel-

opment Commission undertook an ambitious plan to developing a statewide investment strategy

to spur high-technology growth. A former consultant from the Boston Consulting Group led a

team that produced -- after a year’s work -- a strategy report of nearly 1,000 pages.

The analysis provided exhaustive detail on virtually every dimension of the state economy

from the business climate and infrastructure to industries and education. Consistent with its am-

bitions, the Commission, led by the private sector, developed a bold approach to guiding both

public and private investment to high-value sectors of the economy. The Commission’s sophisti-

cated understanding of wealth creation guided the process. The key: boost productivity, as meas-

ured by value-added per worker (Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission 1985, Vol-

ume 1, 5).

The Commission’s strategy relied heavily on the advice and guidance of its consulting

team. The consultants recommended a bold investment program of nearly $200 million in an ef-

fort to jolt the state economy out of long-term economic doldrums. Not surprisingly, the strategy

provoked a fierce, polarizing debate within the state. Critics called the Commission’s work a

state-level version of a national industrial policy. The criticism hit home. Statewide, the initiative

designed to fund the strategy failed in a referendum 4 to 1 (Feldman 1984).

As a member of the consulting team for the Rhode Island Commission, I learned several

important lessons:

• Successful economic development requires broad-based support, and this support

depends only partially on facts. Emotions –– how people feel about their future ––

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 5
 play an equally important role. Leaders cannot generate these positive emotions by

facts alone.

• If public money is part of the strategy, it ultimately depends on voters; business

leaders may have ideas and money, but they rarely have votes. Therefore, the

process –– how an economic development strategy is developed –– is as important,

if not more so, than the final recommendations. Again, the facts alone do not gov-

ern the process.

• The need for public consultation is ongoing through the process; it is not an

event, summit, a hearing or a forum. Public support emerges gradually and can

disappear quickly. Therefore, the strategy process for economic development can-

not easily be streamlined. Taking shortcuts with civic engagement is risky. It takes

time to build a political consensus behind each strategic initiative.

• The political consensus supporting each initiative is different. The "top-down"

model of strategic planning that operates efficiently in a corporate environment

does not translate well to the civic environment of economic development in which

there are no hierarchies. Bluntly put, nobody can tell anybody what to do.

Soon after the failure of the Rhode Island Greenhouse Compact, I had the opportunity to

apply these lessons in a strategy for Shreveport, LA and Northwest Louisiana. The Shreveport

strategy – which won the first Arthur D. Little Award for Economic Development Excellence --

demonstrated that we could apply corporate strategy models to economic development, but only

with extensive modifications. We needed both time and money –– nearly 2 years and over

$150,000 –– to design and launch a successful strategy using this traditional strategic planning

approach (Morrison 1987).

6
Strategic planning for economic development: The standard model

In the years since these early experiments, a small consulting industry has emerged to pro-

vide strategic planning services to civic leaders in local and regional economies. The standard

economic development strategy model mirrors the traditional, linear approach to strategic plan-

ning. The process starts with designing a "plan for the plan". Much of this early pulls together a

planning team capable of guiding the strategic planning process. This pre-planning phase out-

lines the steps that will guide the planning process.

Typically, the planning process launches by defining a vision and mission (purpose) to

frame the planning process. The next step focuses on building an extensive base of facts from

which to design a strategy. Most commonly, benchmarking and some form of SWOT analysis

(Strengths, Weaknesses

Opportunities and Threats) helps

to organize facts, put them into a

competitive context, and

translate data into insights and

strategic issues. At this stage, the

public is often invited to

contribute ideas through forums

or, more recently, a project

website. The planning process

then moves to developing a

portfolio of strategic initiatives.

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 7
The next step involves developing budgets and implementation plans. Finally, the strategy typi-

cally proposes some form of evaluation and monitoring.

There are some inherent limitations in this approach. The standard model – as the examples

in Rhode Island and Shreveport demonstrate -- is long and expensive in time and money. Many

communities and regions cannot afford to hire an outside consultant to facilitate the process. In

most places, the pool of civic leaders is relatively thin. After a year or so of guiding a strategic

planning process, many civic leaders are tired. The challenge of developing successors to the ini-

tial leadership team poses a major challenge. With so much effort being focused on the planning

process, implementation and execution often become difficult to sustain.

Other weaknesses emerge in practice. The first step in developing a vision statement is nei-

ther simple nor straightforward. Opening the process with this complex task often absorbs more

energy than it is worth. Extensive consultations can yield surprisingly little to focus a strategy.

The presumption that a small group of leaders can design and implement a strategy also

does not hold in most places. Economic development strategies take place in the "civic space"

outside the four walls of any one organization. As we saw in Rhode Island, implementation be-

comes difficult when no one can tell anyone else what to do.

Despite these weaknesses, the standard model of strategic planning provides a framework

for identifying opportunities for the cooperative investments at the heart of economic develop-

ment (Economic Development Administration 2001). Yet, because the process itself is sophisti-

cated, costly and complex, the standard model remains very difficult to apply in practice.

More worrisome, by the late 1990s, it was becoming clear that a deeper economic trans-

formation is taking place in the U. S. economy. This shift, which continues today, is making the

standard model of strategic planning obsolete.

8
Where are we heading? The emergence of networks

In the early 1990s, economic commentators understood that a major transformation was

underway in the U.S. economy (Drucker 1992; Thurow 1994). Knowledge was becoming a ma-

jor source of new wealth. The shift most clearly appeared in the growing income gap between

educated and low skilled workers. At about the same time, Michael Porter, a professor at the

Harvard Business School, drew the attention of policymakers to the importance of clusters as a

key driver of regional prosperity (Porter 1990: 1998). Porter emphasized how clusters provided

firms with competitive advantages through streamlined access to knowledge, including inside

market information and the specialized skills of experienced employees.

In economics, Brian Arthur pointed to the emergence of increasing returns in markets char-

acterized by knowledge-based products (Arthur 1996). Arthur explained that markets with in-

creasing returns generate instability, not equilibrium, as predicted by classical economic theory.

These markets are characterized by multiple potential outcomes. It is not always true that the best

mousetrap wins, and markets do not necessarily clear in a single equilibrium point.

Further, knowledge within markets is constantly changing as new information is generated,

new insights emerge, and new experiences are incorporated. Because the competitive conse-

quences of new knowledge are dynamic and uncertain, businesses compete differently. They

look for new waves of increasing returns, and in order to do so, they collaborate to compete

(Kelly 1998; Logan and Stokes 2004).

In this market environment, clusters have become an increasingly important strategy for

regional economic development with good reason. Clusters enable firms to leverage the opportu-

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 9
nities and manage the risks of rapidly shifting markets driven by knowledge and continuous in-

novation.

All of these factors disrupt the standard model of strategic planning. In 1994, Henry

Mintzberg, a management professor at McGill University and noted authority on corporate strat-

egy, voiced serious doubts about the standard model. He underscored a number of different falla-

cies that made the standard approach to strategic planning unworkable (Mintzberg 1994). To

Mintzberg, strategic planning is different than strategic thinking. While strategic planning is

primarily analytic, strategic thinking combines analysis with creativity, intuition and synthesis.

This approach to strategy is more flexible and informal, more in line with the rapidly shifting

dynamics of markets driven by knowledge.

As Mintzberg was writing in 1994, Netscape launched the first beta version of the web

browser. The explosion of popularity for the Internet that followed further undermined the stan-

dard model of strategic planning. The Internet, our first interactive mass medium, has enabled

companies to build more sophisticated networks with their suppliers and customers. With these

networked business models, market information has become more immediate and dynamic. As

the speed of market information has accelerated, the slow, linear process of traditional strategic

planning falls increasingly out of step.

Not surprisingly, other business school professors have taken up Mintzberg’s call for new

approaches to strategy (Pietersen 2002; Ackerman and Brown 2005; Duggan 2007). As Peterson

notes,

In an age when everyone has instant access to infinite information, sense-making –– the
ability to turn flows of information in real knowledge –– has become today’s scarcest and
most valuable resource and the key leverage point for value creation. The company’s pri-
mary source of wealth is therefore derived from its insights, knowledge, and ideas. Its suc-
cess depends on how it leverages its intellectual capital (Pietersen 2002, 12).

10
 This world is quite different from the economy that gave rise to the standard model of stra-

tegic planning. The standard model emerged in the 1960s as a way for corporations to allocate

capital across business units operating in relatively stable markets. In these markets, cost struc-

tures driven by scarcity and diminishing returns determined the contours of competition. The

standard model reinforced hierarchical, command and control organizations capable of managing

a long, detailed and costly strategic planning process.

As we have seen, in the 1980s, economic development practitioners and consultants began

applying this model -- with mixed success -- to the challenges of building local and regional

economies. While the standard model provides some useful frameworks for organizing informa-

tion and generating insights, it is unable to keep up with increasingly dynamic markets.

We can see more clearly now than a decade ago that economies operate as a set of open

networks embedded in other open networks. Eric Beinhocker in his book, Origin of Wealth pro-

vides the clearest and most comprehensive perspective on markets as networks. Economies are

open networks of interactions that continuously adjust. “Economies are not just metaphorically

like open systems. They literally and physically are a member of the universal class of open sys-

tems” (Beinhocker 2006, 71).

To build prosperity in local and regional economies, we need a new strategy process capa-

ble of adjusting quickly to more dynamic, knowledge–based markets. In particular, this process

needs to be geared toward developing clusters of higher growth, knowledge-based businesses.

The standard model of strategic planning, invented for another era, has seen its day.

We are left with important questions. What will replace the standard model of strategic

planning? If local and regional economies consist of interconnected networks, can we guide

these networks strategically? Is strategy even possible in a fast-moving world of open systems?

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 11
 Fortunately, we have a path forward. In studying how managers develop strategy and dy-

namic markets, Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull came to an important insight. Successful

strategies in chaotic markets emerge from following simple rules (Eisenhardt and Sull 2001). To

capture opportunities from fast-moving markets, Eisenhardt and Sull found that companies large

and small can benefit from deploying a set of simple rules to guide their strategies. This ap-

proach to strategy is disciplined. Otherwise, companies would become quickly confused and

paralyzed by the swiftly moving markets around them.

Using this insight, we can see that the search for an alternative to the standard model

should focus on simple frameworks and disciplines. Simple rules can guide members of the

network toward transformative outcomes in the midst of shifting markets and opportunities. As

we have seen, the complexities of the standard model do not perform well in local or regional

economic development. The model does not easily support fast-moving knowledge-based com-

panies or innovative regional clusters. We cannot layer a complex process on top of complex

markets and expect to accomplish much.

Recall that an effective strategy answers two questions: “Where we going?” and “How

will we get there?” Following this logic, a new model for guiding strategy in open networks and

regional clusters will have two core components. First, we need a simple strategy map that can

orient us to where we stand and where we are going. Next, we need a simple process or disci-

pline that can guide us on how we will get there.

A simple strategy map (and a theory of transformation)

In the concept of a strategy map is useful to sort out complexities (Kaplan and Norton

2004). Within an organization, a strategy map explains how an organization creates value from a

12
variety of different perspectives. The map outlines the strategic goals pursued by an organization

and how they are linked together. The same idea can be applied to local and regional economies,

as well as regional innovation clusters.

A strategy map for an economy or cluster consists of five components or focus areas, each

representing a critical dimensions of investment for a prosperous economy:

• building brainpower;

• providing supports for innovation and entrepreneurship;

• developing quality, connected places;

• creating new narratives and networks; and

• strengthening col-

laborations.

As we explore these different

dimensions, we will see how

they are linked together in a

theory explaining how econo-

mies and clusters transform to-

ward higher levels of productiv-

ity.

Brainpower: As Lester

Thurow noted nearly 15 years

ago, the global integration of

markets places a premium on brainpower. "With everything else dropping out of the competitive

equation, knowledge has become the only source of long–run sustainable competitive advantage,

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 13
but knowledge can only be employed through the skills of individuals" (Thurow 1996, 74). In

order to be competitive in the 21st century, regions, clusters and companies must start with peo-

ple who have 21st century skills. Higher levels of educational attainment are closely associated

with higher levels of income (Gottlieb and Fogarty 2003). Brainpower investments include

workforce development, improvements in STEM (science, technology, engineering and math)

education, and the development of career pathways that connect high school to postsecondary

education.

Innovation and entrepreneurship supports: Prosperous economies support innovative firms

and entrepreneurs with a wide range of interconnected initiatives. With responsive networks,

these economies translate brainpower into wealth quickly by identifying and supporting high-

growth companies. These economies are also more resilient; as market circumstances change,

companies and individuals use these networks to move assets toward more productive uses (Sax-

enian 1996). Innovation and entrepreneurship supports include investments such as incubators,

technology commercialization initiatives, and angel capital works.

Quality, connected places: Smart people and innovative companies can locate anywhere.

They will choose places that are secure, healthy and connected. “Place making" includes the

basket of activities that civic leaders undertake to remake the places in which they live and work.

With place making investments, communities and regions can remake themselves to attract and

retain the brainpower and innovative businesses needed to power an economy forward. Invest-

ments in quality, connected places include physical development, such as expansions of

broadband, mixed-use development in downtown districts and around university campuses, and

the development of connected public spaces such as parks and libraries. These investments also

include activities designed to promote healthy, safe and creative places to live and work.

14
 New narratives and networks: To transform an economy, civic leaders need new narratives

and networks to guide the transformation. Command and control management styles do not work

effectively in the "civic space". On the other hand, stories and networks of "influencers" can

move loosely joined networks in new directions. These networks can be explicitly designed and

guided (Rosen 2000; Gladwell 2002; Denning 2005). New networks and narratives involve ini-

tiatives that create alliances across organizational and political boundaries, such as new cluster

organizations or new collaborations among local government entities. New narratives represent

stories that promote the

transformations that

civic leaders would

like to see.

Collaboration:

Effective collaboration

requires new leader-

ship skills. Guiding a

complex project

among a loose network

of people requires skill

to inspire participation,

sharing and commit-

ment (Crislip 2002).

As these skills develop and become more widely shared, the capacity of the network to take on

more complex tasks grows. Initiatives to build collaboration skills involve learning experiences

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 15
in which leaders can improve their collaboration skills. We developed strategic doing, a disci-

pline to guide strategy within networks, to meet the need for building collaborative skills among

leaders. We will explore strategic doing in the next section.

This framework represents a straightforward theory of change. Prosperity depends fore-

most on brainpower with 21st-century skills and the capacity to translate this brainpower into

wealth through innovation and entrepreneurship. Successful economies retain and attract brain-

power, entrepreneurs and innovative companies with investments in quality, connected places.

To guide these strategies, civic leaders need new narratives and networks, as well as the collabo-

rative skills to translate complex ideas into action within these networks.

With a strategy map in hand, we can identify the major organizations, initiatives and in-

vestments within a region. Mapping assets in this way opens the door to some important strategic

questions: How well are different organizations connected and aligned? What outcomes are dif-

ferent organizations pursuing? How are these outcomes measured? Are there opportunities to

"link and leverage" assets across organizational boundaries to pursue similar outcomes? Are

there significant gaps in our portfolio of initiatives? What are the most serious gaps in our in-

vestment strategy? Do our actual investments reflect our strategic priorities? What is the appro-

priate balance of investment across our portfolio?

16
 Here’s an example of mapping regional assets. In October, 2010, Brevard County, Florida

faced a major challenge with the shutdown of NASA shuttle operations. Over 9,000 workers lost

their positions with NASA and its contractors. To make sense of this dislocation, civic leaders

began to map their assets. As they did, the strategic challenge facing them became very clear.

How do they coordinate local initiatives with federal investments? Further, how they link and

leverage their assets across organizational boundaries to focus on a handful of strategic priori-

ties?

A simple, repeatable process for guiding open networks: strategic doing

Strategic doing meets the need of regional leaders facing the same types of challenges as

Brevard County. As we have seen, the strategic disciplines designed for hierarchical organiza-

tions (strategic planning) do not work well in managing the strategic challenges of open net-

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 17
works. Strategic doing represents a separate set of disciplines designed for strategies in these

open networks. The discipline involves answering four simple (but not easy) questions:

• What could we do?

• What should we do?

• What will we do?

• When will we come back together?

The first question, "What could we do?" focuses participants on the tangible and intangible

assets that are embedded in their network. These assets might be facilities, money, people, expe-

rience, knowledge or pas-

sions. In exploring “What

could we do?”, participants

first listen to each other and

learn about the assets that

could form the basis of new

collaborations. In this way,

they begin to map the assets

within their emerging net-

work.

Simply listing or map-

ping assets is not enough,

however. Opportunities

emerge when participants link these assets together. So, for example, when a region links a re-

search university with a community college, it can dramatically expand the capacity to develop

18
and distribute technical courses. When a chamber of commerce links to a library, regional lead-

ers can dramatically expand the support provided to small business entrepreneurs. In exploring

this first question, participants in the network begin to see the contours of the new economy in

which collaboration can generate greater returns. These positive returns represent a distinguish-

ing characteristic of the knowledge economy (Arthur 1996).

Strategy involves making choices, and the next question of strategic doing – "What should

we do?" – converts one particular opportunity into a shared outcome. In traditional strategic

planning, the concept of a "vision" played this role. Unfortunately, in most cases, a vision is not

sufficiently practical or compelling to move people in an open network. Combining visions, as

many strategic planning processes attempt to do, push most vision statements to bland generali-

ties in a search for consensus. People in a network need to have a very clear picture in their mind

of where they’re going before they will commit to moving (Black and Gregersen 2002, 77-78).

Answering the question, "What should we do?" Involves defining a very clear outcome

with measurable characteristics. It would seem that as a network of people work together to de-

fine an outcome in specific terms, the probability that they would reach agreement would go

down. In fact, the likelihood of agreement goes up. A strategic outcome represents a complex

reality with a variety of different important dimensions. As members of the network define these

dimensions and determine how to measure them, they come to understand that the characteristics

of their outcome are not mutually exclusive.

A simple example explains the point. Assume a friend and you have had a long-held dream

to buy a cabin in the woods that you could share for family vacations. You like to fish, so you

want a cabin that is close to a river or stream. Your friend, on the other hand, imagines a cabin

with enough room so that he can hide away to write his Great American novel. Your spouse,

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 19
concerned about having enough room for the extended family, wants at least one bedroom big

enough for multiple bunk beds. Finally, your friend’s spouse loves to cook, and he wants a large

kitchen and eating area. You can see from this simple example that by exploring a potential out-

come in detail, members of a network can become more clear and committed in their own minds

to collaborating in order to achieve a shared outcome.

Too often, sadly, our civic discussions that surround economic development are not very

disciplined or focused. Vision statements are too often so vague that they cannot motivate any-

one to action. Our conventional civic conversations represent a series of monologues, loosely

strung together. Groups are not fully engaged in the deep thinking required to define compelling,

shared outcomes. To break this cycle, a disciplined conversation to define at least one shared

outcome becomes a critical step in aligning a network with "link and leverage" strategies.

Now to the third question of strategic doing: “What will we do?” Translating ideas into ac-

tion requires an initiative and an action plan. An initiative is a project that can lead participants to

their outcome. Members of a network may (and probably will) launch multiple projects to

achieve their outcome, but they must start with one. Next, they need to translate the initiative to

an action plan that explains who does what by when.

In strategic doing, an action plan serves three important purposes. First, it makes commit-

ments transparent. This transparency helps members of the network learn who is reliable. Trans-

parency helps build trust. Second, the action plan underscores the importance of shared, not

delegated, responsibility. In an open network, the responsibility for translating ideas into action

falls to each member of the network. In this way, members of the network align their actions to

shared outcomes. Finally, a written action plan enables members of the network to quickly make

adjustments as circumstances change.

20
 Finally, we reach the fourth question of strategic doing: "When will we get back to-

gether?" This question, although the simplest to answer, is the most often neglected. Entering

the first three questions generates all the components of a strategic action plan. Entering the last

question acknowledges that strategy is never done.

Especially in today’s world, strategy is a continuous process of adaptation and refinement.

It is a pocess of learning by doing. Launching small experiments to figure out what works can

lead to transformative

change with initiatives

that are scalable,

replicable and

sustainable. Ordinarily,

in the early stages of a

strategic doing process,

members of the network

need to get back together within 30 to 60 days. Deciding when to reconvene also opens the door

to connecting over the Internet. Collaboration online expands the productivity of the network.

Strategic doing in practice

Here are some examples of how groups around the country have been using strategic doing

to accelerate their collaborations.

In the 14 counties surrounding Purdue University, a regional workforce initiative received

$15 million from the federal government to accelerate innovation in workforce development. Af-

ter forming a core group to guide the process, civic leaders focused their efforts in four areas:

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 21
talent development, entrepreneurship development, cluster development, and regional leadership.

In three years, the strategic doing process led to over 60 initiatives in these four focus areas. The

core group rated each proposed initiative on important dimensions of transformation: Was the

proposed initiative likely to be replicable, scalable and sustainable? Only the highest rated ideas

received funding.

Remarkably, over 80% of the initiatives continued past the initial funding. The U.S. De-

partment of Labor established ambitious goals for its investment, and the core group exceeded

these goals by a factor of two and a half. Each of the 60 initiatives operated with individual met-

rics that enabled the core team to make quick judgments as to whether different initiatives were

working. Finally, strategic doing enabled the vast network of partners to operate with almost no

administrative overhead. Only one full-time person was in charge of compiling all of the re-

quired reports to the state and federal government.

In southeast Wisconsin, economic and workforce development professionals used strategic

doing to help

launch a fresh

water technology

cluster. In July,

2008, the

Milwaukee Water

Council conducted

a strategic doing

workshop to

identify

22
opportunities to become a global leader in fresh water technologies. The workshop enabled par-

ticipants from business, higher education and government to come together and identify four fo-

cus areas within which to launch strategic initiatives. Within three months, the University of

Wisconsin–Milwaukee produced a map of the growing network of connections within this water

cluster. The opportunities outlined in the center of their map emerged from connecting the assets

across organizations and sectors.

Kokomo, Indiana represents an important manufacturing hub for Chrysler. As the company

went through bankruptcy and subsequent contraction, Delphi Electronics announced in August

2008 that it would be terminating 600 electronics engineers and technicians. A layoff of this

magnitude threatened to swamp the public workforce system.

Using a strategic doing process, civic leaders quickly mobilized to create a new network

support technology-based businesses that could be spun out of Delphi Electronics. Using con-

cepts of a "re-engagement network", civic leaders established series of overlapping networks to

support these businesses. Within 14 months, 10 new businesses launched with financing and an

equal number of businesses were coming through the pipeline.

In October 2010, civic leaders in Brevard County, Florida civic leaders confronted the

termination of the NASA shuttle program. To develop a strategy for transformation, leaders

turned to a series of strategic doing workshops as a way to identify "re-engagement networks".

Like Kokomo, the dislocations arising from changes taking place at NASA swamp the capacity

of the public workforce system to adjust. Developing new re-engagement networks enabled civic

leaders to realign quickly and move toward new opportunities. Out of these strategic doing

workshops, a new cluster of clean energy companies formed.

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 23
 In eastern North Carolina, an alliance of eight workforce investment boards uses strategic

doing to define a set of priorities on which they can work across their region. They meet every

90 days or so to refocus their strategic agenda and set priorities for the next 90 days. The alli-

ance, Vision East, selected four focus areas on which to work initially: youth opportunities, ca-

reer readiness certificates, military–community connections; and Web 2.0 platforms. In each of

these areas, they then selected specific initiatives to test and, if successful, expand across their

region.

How regions evolve toward open innovation

A clear pattern is emerging. The transformation of regions takes place as they across five

horizons.

In the first horizon, the critical mass of civic leaders begins to move forward with new

conversations about collaboration. In many communities and regions, the civic conversations are

stuck on old topics that lead nowhere. Transformation begins when enough people decide to

change the prevailing conversations. So, for example, young professionals in Youngstown, Ohio

24
began new series of conversations about the future of their industrial city. To punctuate the

move, they requested the city’s business leaders to stop talking about steel mills closing down.

In the second horizon, civic leaders reshape their thinking from hierarchies to networks.

They move their attention from vertical relationships to horizontal connections. In doing so, they

discover different hidden assets that are embedded in networks within their community or region.

They learn the importance of intentionally building relationships in order to strengthen their net-

works and connect these assets.

Network thinking differs from hierarchical thinking in some fundamental ways. A strong

network has a dense core of relationships and porous boundaries. The dense core enables the

network to accomplish complex tasks. The porous boundaries encourage new members to join

and learning to continue. A porous boundary enables a network to adapt to new circumstances.

In contrast, in hierarchies, leaders spend much of their time marking and defending their bounda-

ries.

In the third horizon, civic leaders develop the skills to guide their networks strategically.

As they master the disciplines of strategic doing, they learn to guide conversations by asking for

critical strategic questions. The learn that answering these questions generates all the compo-

nents of their network’s strategic action plan. They experience strategy in networks as a fast, it-

erative process, in contrast to ponderous strategic planning.

In the fourth horizon, civic leaders begin the search for pilot projects that can be transfor-

mative. In this search, they apply a simple, but rigorous process to identify initiatives that induce

new investment, “link and leverage” assets, and offer the promise of transformation. Only initia-

tives that are replicable, scalable and sustainable hold the potential for transforming a community

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 25
or regional economy. Finally, in the fifth horizon, civic leaders focus on expanding the success-

ful pilot projects they have identified.

Where we are heading: some predictions

Developing new models of strategy appropriate for open networks represents a new fron-

tier. In the years ahead, we will see the practices of strategic doing both spread and develop.

Here is what we are likely to see:

1. A growing number of colleges and universities will embrace strategic doing as part of

their engagement mission. Higher education is built around three core missions: research, teach-

ing and engagement. With a move toward a more open, network-based economy, the engage-

ment mission offers colleges and universities exciting new roles to play in regional economic

transformation. Strategic doing provides a convenient, simple platform for higher education to

convene and develop more extensive networks within their regional economy.

2. Communities and regions will use strategic doing to adapt promising practices in eco-

nomic development. For number of years, researchers have been compiling promising best prac-

tices in economic development. The challenge comes in adapting these best practices to different

circumstances. A case study is of limited value to a region. Trying to use a case study without

modifying it the local conditions is like trying to plant cut flowers. Strategic doing provides a

convenient, low cost approach to adapting promising practices to local circumstances.

3. The lines among economic, workforce, community and rural development will con-

tinue to blur. In strategic doing, the network is what matters. Participants volunteer their assets

to the network and then work to define new opportunities by linking and leveraging these assets

with others. Boundaries do not disappear, but they become more porous and less controlling.

26
 4. Civic leaders in communities and regions will intentionally develop their "civic

spaces". A democracy demands complex thinking among its citizens. Yet, we have let our civic

spaces deteriorate to the point where most communities and regions do not have established

places and routines for addressing the complex challenges of economic transformation. A civic

space is an open physical location bounded by clear rules of behavior. Strategic doing takes place

in the civic spaces. In the years ahead, we will likely see civic leaders understanding the strategic

importance of maintaining these civic spaces in colleges and universities, libraries, community

centers, and other locations where people can feel safe to have complex conversations.

5. The next generation of federal economic and workforce development policies will be

more open and flexible. The federal government will move toward a more uniform approach of

investing in open innovation networks within communities and regions. We already have a well-

established model from which to build the next generation of federal policies. The Small Busi-

ness Innovation Research (SBIR) initiative creates a simple, disciplined process for the federal

government to co-invest with innovating communities and regions. The old generation of eco-

nomic and workforce development tools are simply too rigid to be of much use.

6. Strategic doing will lead to a tighter integration of online and in person experiences.

We are still at the early stages in our understanding of the power of the Internet. As people be-

come more comfortable with the interactive and collaborative tools available, we will see a mi-

gration of collaborative economic development activity towards the Web. This migration will, in

turn, create opportunities for communities and regions to connect far beyond their borders. The

organizational and political boundaries that so carefully define the current scope of economic

and workforce development activity will become less relevant.

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 27
 7. Organizational forms will shift. Virtually every economic and workforce development

organization follows the organizational form of a tight hierarchy: a board directors a staff that is

organized and functional departments. Increasingly, we will see new organizational forms that

will blend hierarchy with network-based organization and more flexible teams.

8. All of these developments will lead to new forms of collaborative leadership. The lead-

ership of open networks is shared and circular. Responsibilities and roles shift as circumstances

change. Exploring collaborative leadership will take us to an understanding that each of us

should be prepared to be both a leader and a follower. Our journey will deliver us a deeper un-

derstanding of how our democracy can innovate to meet the challenges ahead.

28
References

Ackermann, F., Eden, C. & Brown, I., 2005. The Practice of Making Strategy. London: SAGE.

Arthur, W.B. , 1996. Increasing Returns and the New World of Business. Harvard Business Re-
view, 74 (4 ), p. 100-109.

Beinhocker, E. D., 2006. The Origin of Wealth. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.

Black, J. S. & Gregersen, H. B., 2002. Leading Strategic Change. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Prentice Hall.

Chandler, A. D., 1990. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enter-
prise /. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.

Chrislip, D. D., 2002. The Collaborative Leadership Fieldbook. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Denning, S., 2005. The Leader's Guide to Storytelling. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass/A Wiley Im-
print.

Drucker, P. F., 1992. The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society . New
Brunswick (U.S.A.): Transaction Pubs.

Duggan, W. R., 2007. Strategic Intuition. New York: Columbia Business School Pub.

Economic Development Administration , 2001. Strategic Planning in the Technology– Driven

World: a Guidebook for Innovation–Led Development. Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Eisenhardt, K., & Sull, D., 2001. Strategy as Simple Rules. Harvard Business Review, 79 (1 ), p.
106-116.

Feldman, A, 1984. Rhode Island: Sunset for Industrial Policy. Policy Review, (30), p. 84-86.

Gladwell, M., 2000. The Tipping Point. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown.

Gottlieb, P. & Forgarty, M., 2003. Educational attainment and metropolitan growth. Economic
Development Quarterly , 17 (4), p. 325-336.

Homer-Dixon, T. F., 2000. The Ingenuity Gap. 1st ed. New York: Knopf.

Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P., 2004. Strategy Maps. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Kelly, K., 1998. New Rules for the New Economy. New York, N.Y.: Viking.

Logan, R. K. & Stokes, L. W., 2004. Collaborate to Compete. Etobicoke, Ont.: Wiley.

Draft: Please do not copy or cite. Submit your comments to Ed Morrison at edmorrison@purdue.edu 29
Magaziner, I. C. & Reich, R. B., 1982. Minding America's Business: The Decline and Rise of the
American Economy /. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books.

Mintzberg, H., 1994. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: Free Press.

Morrison, E, 1987. Cities in a Global Economy. Issues in Science and Technology, III (4), p.
42-51.

Office of Technology Assessment, 1984. Technology, Innovation, and Regional Econmic Devel-
opment. NTIS order #PB85-150894 ed. Washington: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office.

Pietersen, W., 2002. Reinventing Strategy. New York: J. Wiley and Sons.

Porter, M. E., 1998. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press.

Porter, M.E., 1998. Clusters and the New Economnics of Competition. Harvard Business Re-
view, 76 (6 ), p. 77-90.

Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission, 1984. The Greenhouse Compact: Cultivating
Rhode Island's Fourth Economy Providence, RI.

Rosen, 2000. The Anatomy of Buzz. New York: Doubleday.

Saxenian, A., 1994. Regional Advantage. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Stern, C. W., Deimler, M. S., Boston Consulting Group. & Boston Consulting Group., 2006. The
Boston Consulting Group on Strategy. 2nd ed. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons.

Thurow, L. C., 1996. The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomor-
row's World. 1st ed. New York: W. Morrow.

30