Rothenberg - 2000 - Beneath The Surface - Critical Essays in The Philosophy of Deep Ecology - MIT Press PDF

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title: Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in the Philosophy of

Deep Ecology
author: Katz, Eric
publisher: MIT Press
isbn10 | asin: 026261149X
print isbn13: 9780262611497
ebook isbn13: 9780585324319
language: English
subject Deep ecology--Philosophy, Human ecology--Philosophy.
publication date: 2000
lcc: GE195.B463 2000eb
ddc: 179/.1
subject: Deep ecology--Philosophy, Human ecology--Philosophy.
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Beneath the Surface

Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology
edited by Eric Katz,

Andrew Light,
and David Rothenberg
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©2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means
(including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the
publisher.
Chapters 1, 7, 8, 12, and 13 of this book are revised and/or expanded versions of articles from a special issue of
Inquiry, volume 39, number 2, June 1996, edited by Andrew Light and David Rothenberg, reprinted by permission
of Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, Norway.
This book was set in Sabon by Crane Composition, Inc., and was printed and bound in the United States of
America. Printed on recycled paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Beneath the surface : critical essays in the philosophy of deep ecology / edited by Eric
Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-61149-X (alk. paper)
1. Deep ecologyPhilosophy. 2. Human ecologyPhilosophy.
I. Katz, Eric, 1952 . II. Light, Andrew, 1966
III. Rothenberg, David, 1962
GE195.B463 2000
179'.1dc21 99-41517
CIP
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INTRODUCTION:
DEEP ECOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY
Eric Katz,
Andrew Light,
and David Rothenberg
Why a deep ecology? Perhaps there is a more basic question: What is deep ecology? The Norwegian philosopher
Arne Naess, who coined the term in 1972, originally emphasized a contrast between deep ecology and "shallow
ecology"or what was later termed "reform environmentalism." 1 Reformist environmental policies are concerned
mainly with problems, such as resource depletion and pollution, that have adverse effects on the wellbeing and
affluence of the human populations in the developed world. These shallow policies attempt to reform human
activity regarding the environment without instigating a systematic change in human behavior, attitudes, or
institutions. Deep ecology, on the other hand, offers a normative critique of human activity and institutions, and
seeks a fundamental change in the dominant worldview and social structure of modernity. According to Naess,
"The aim of supporters of the deep ecology movement is not a slight reform of our present society, but a
substantial reorientation of our whole civilization."²2
Naess, though a philosopher, has often stressed that he is more interested in deep ecology as a political and social
movement than as a philosophy. As a movement, it is a call to various forms of ecoactivism that may cover the
entire spectrum of legal and extralegal activity, and may overlap with other forms of "radical" environmentalism,
such as social ecology, ecofeminism, and bioregionalism. Thus the deep ecology movement advocates, among
other actions, constituent pressure on elected officials; formation of Green political parties; educational workshops
for schools and communities; community recycling programs; protests and boycotts against antiecological
industries; and even ecosabotage. These wide-ranging environmentalist activities are not in themselves the deep
ecology movement, but they are compatible with the deep ecology movement because of the attitude or orientation
that motivates the activists. In short, these environmentally oriented political and social actions are the
manifestations, at least among some activists, of deep ecological principles.
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CONTENTS
About the Contributors vii

Introduction: Deep Ecology as Philosophy
Eric Katz, Andrew Light, And David Rothenberg ix
I
Deep Ecology and Its Critics 1
1
How Wide Is Deep Ecology?
John Clark 3
2
Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism
Eric Katz 17
3
A Critique of Deep Green Theory
William Grey 43
4
Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems: A Feminist Ecosocialist Analysis
Val Plumwood 59
5
Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology: Evading the Moral Questions?
Mathew Humphrey 85
6
In Defense of Deep Ecology: An Ecofeminist Response to a Liberal Critique
Ariel Salleh 107
7
Callicott and Naess on Pluralism
Andrew Light 125
II
New Horizons for Deep Ecology 149
8
No World but in Things: The Poetry of Naess's Concrete Contents
David Rothenberg 151
9
Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity
Michael E. Zimmerman 169
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10
The Postmodernism of Deep Ecology, the Deep Ecology of Postmodernism, and
Grand Narratives
Arran Gare 195
11
Deep Ecology and Desire: On Naess and the Problem of Consumption
Jonathan Maskit 215
12
Bhagavadgita * Ecosophy T, and Deep Ecology
Knut A. Jacobsen 231
13
A State of Mind Like Water: Ecosophy T and the Buddhist Traditions
Deane Curtin 253
14
Deep Ecology And Its Social Philosophy: A Critique
Bron Taylor 269
Bibliography 301
Index 321
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

John Clark is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University, New Orleans, and also teaches in the Environmental
Studies Program. He is the author of several books, including The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin
(1977); The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, Nature and Power (1984); and La Pensée Sociale d'Elisée
Reclus: Géographe Anarchiste (1996). He has edited or coedited Renewing the Earth: The Promise of Social
Ecology (1990); Les Français des États-Unis: D'Hier à Aujourd'hui (1994); and Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology (2nd ed., 1998).
Deane Curtin is Raymond and Florence Sponberg Chair of Ethics at Gustavus Adolphus College. He is the author
of Chinnagounder's Challenge: The Question of Ecological Citizenship (1999) and coeditor of Cooking, Eating,
Thinking: Transformative Philosophies of Food (1992).
Arran Gare is Senior Lecturer, Swinburne University, Australia. He is the author of several books, including
Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis (1995) and Nihilism Inc.: Environmental Destruction and the
Metaphysics of Sustainability (1996), and the coeditor of Environmental Philosophy (1983).
William Grey is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, Australia.
Mathew Humphrey is Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom.
Knut A. Jacobsen is Associate Professor in the Department of the History of Religions, University of Bergen,
Norway. He is the author of Prakrti in Samkhya-Yoga: Material Principle, Religious Experience, Ethical
Implications (1999).
Eric Katz is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program at
the New Jersey Institute of Technology. He is the author of Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural
Community (1997) and the coeditor (with Andrew Light) of Environmental Pragmatism (1996).
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Andrew Light is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the State University of New
York, Binghamton, and Resident Fellow at the International Center for Advanced Studies at New York University.
He has edited or coedited eight books, including Environmental Pragmatism (1996) and Social Ecology After
Bookchin (1998). He coedits the journal Philosophy and Geography.
Jonathan Maskit is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Denison University.
Val Plumwood is currently an Australian Research Council Fellow at the University of Sydney. She is the author of
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (1993), and coauthor (as Val Routley, with Richard Routley) of The Fight for
the Forests (1973) and (as Val Routley, with Richard Routley, R. K. Meyer, and Ross T. Brady) of Relevant Logics
and Their Rivals (1982). Her forthcoming book is entitled Environmental Culture.
David Rothenberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, and author of Is
It Painful to Think? Conversations with Arne Naess (1992) and Hand's End: Technology and the Limits of Nature
(1993). He has edited or coedited several collections, including A Parliament of Minds (1999) and The New Earth
Reader (1999).
Ariel Salleh is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Social Inquiry at the University of Western Sydney,
Hawkesbury, Australia. She is the author of Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern (1997).
Bron Taylor is Oshkosh Foundation Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, and Director of Environmental
Studies, at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh. He is the editor of Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global
Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism (1995) and author of Affirmative Action at Work and the
forthcoming On Sacred Ground: Earth First! and Environmental Ethics.
Michael E. Zimmerman is Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University and the author of Eclipse of the Self: The
Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity (1981), Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity (1990),
and Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (1994).
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To consider the basic principles, motivations, and justifications of the deep ecology movement is, in essence, to
examine the philosophy of deep ecology. It is the purpose of this volume to bring together a wide variety of essays
that address this task. These essays examine philosophical issues and problems in deep ecology, not issues and
problems in the environmental policies of the deep ecology political movement. Of course the distinction between
philosophy and policy is somewhat arbitrary, especially in an area of thought that can be called "applied" or
"practical" philosophy. Nevertheless, we have tried to maintain the distinction in selecting the essays for this
volume. Rather than focus on the practical ramifications of deep ecological principles on actual environmental
policy situations (e.g., ecological restoration, preservation of biodiversity, environmental racism), we have chosen
essays that consider essential philosophical issues in the meaning of deep ecology, such as the nature of value, the
connections between ontology and ethics, and the coherence and consistency of a deep ecology worldview.
This in-depth examination of the philosophy of deep ecology follows from a project began in 1984 by Naess and
the American philosopher and supporter of deep ecology George Sessions. Naess and Sessions wrote the Platform
of Deep Ecology, now the most widely known exposition of the central ideas of the deep ecology movement. They
had two goals: (1) to explain the essence of the deep ecology position and (2) to encourage people from different
religious and philosophical backgrounds to forge a consensus concerning political activity in concrete situations
regarding the environment. This platform has the virtue of being short, direct, and free of arcane technical
language. It is a platform for the deep ecology movement, not a summary of the philosophy of deep ecology. In
most published versions it is followed by a series of remarks that augment and clarify the basic propositionsand
these additional remarks can (and do) change over time. But the basic platform has remained virtually unchanged
since its original development in 1984, although statements 4 and 5 are often reversed. Here is the platform as it
appears in Naess's Ecology, Community and Lifestyle:
(1) The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of non-human life forms
is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes.
(2) Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and
non-human life on Earth.
(3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
(4) Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
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(5) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population.
The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
(6) Significant change of life conditions for the better requires change in policies. These affect basic economic,
technological, and ideological structures.
(7) The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of intrinsic value)
rather than adhering to a high standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big
and great.
(8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the
attempt to implement the necessary changes. 3
This political platform can be considered a statement of the basic principles of the deep ecology movement. But
what is the connection between these eight principles for action and a philosophical position? What is the
philosophy of deep ecology? It is this question that brings together the essays in this collection.
From its initial formulation, deep ecology was conceived as both a call to ecological activism and a normative
worldview. It is a philosophical understanding and analysis of humanity and its relationship to the natural
environment. We can call deep ecology a form of ecophilosophy, a field of study where problems in ecology and
philosophy, in environmental policy and ethics, intersect. But for Naess deep ecology is not merely theoreticalit is
a practical ecophilosophy that is capable of asserting normative priorities, value principles, and substantive policies
that will enable us to come to grips with the environmental crisis.
Central to the philosophy of deep ecology is the formation of what Naess calls a "total view" of the place of
human beings in the world. A total viewwhat philosophers traditionally have termed a worldviewcombines our
scientific understanding of reality with a valuation and emotional content, experience, or commitment. Naess
writes that there are "two inescapable components" of deep ecology, the first being "valuation and emotion in
thinking and experience of reality," and the second being "how they [valuation and emotion] lead to the ability of a
mature, integrated human personality to act on the basis of a total view."4 The total view, then, is essentially a
normative description of reality, an understanding of the world that merges objective empirical observations
(scientific description) and personal values. More specifically, a deep ecological total view would address the
human relationship to the non-human natural world and connect this normative understanding directly to action; an
individual's total view should be the basis of all decisions regarding his or her life.
A commitment to developing and living by a total view is, perhaps, the essential characteristic of deep ecology as
it is positively differentiated from a
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shallow or reform environmentalism. Shallow environmentalism is labeled ''shallow" precisely because it does not
seek to work out a total view. "The limitation of the shallow movement is not due to weak or unethical
philosophy"since it is often based on systematic utilitarian thinking and extensive economic cost-benefit
analyses"but due to a lack of explicit concern with ultimate aims, goals, and norms." 5 Shallow environmentalism
is characterized by decisions and policies that reflect merely partial understandings of reality and the human place
in the natural world.
One of the limitations of shallow reformist environmentalism is that it does not take seriously the concerns,
interests, or value of the nonhuman natural world. A deep ecological total view is not merely any type of total
philosophical worldview, but a philosophical worldview that includes the nonhuman natural world, that includes
the environment or the ecosphere in its normative understanding and value commitments. Because of the inclusion
of the "ecosphere," a deep ecological worldview can be called an "ecosophy," a philosophical position or point of
view that concentrates on the human relationship with the natural world.6
We speak here of "a" deep ecological view and not "the" deep ecological view. There can be many different
ecosophies, many different ultimate worldviews regarding human activity and life in the environment. As we noted
above, one reason for the existence of the platform of the deep ecology movement is to provide common ground in
the realm of practical activity for a wide variety of personal philosophical positions. The development of a
philosophical worldview is the result of a personal commitment and individual thought and experience. Each
individual must develop his or her own total view, a personal ecosophy to understand his or her place in the world.
Each individual's ecosophy serves as the personal justification for principles of action in the environmentand a
deep ecological total view will incorporate the principles embodied in the deep ecology platform. Indeed, the
development of each individual's ecosophy may be the principal goal of the philosophy of deep ecology.7
But the development of deep ecological total views is, by itself, primarily a methodological or formal
characterization of the philosophy of deep ecology. Deep ecology must also be defined by the substantive content
of the basic ideas and values that constitute the wide variety of deep ecological total views. What is the essential
content of the philosophy of deep ecology? Although each ecosophy is a personally developed total view, what is
common to all justifiable deep ecology positions? Perhaps these six points:
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1. The rejection of strong anthropocentrism. (Anthropocentrism is the idea that human life is the center of all
value). The philosophy of deep ecology calls into question this dominant idea of the Western ethical tradition.
2. A consideration of ecocentrism as a replacement for anthropocentrism. Ecocentrism is the idea that the ecosphere
and ecological systems are the focus of value. It is a holistic view of value, for entire systems are thought to be
valuable, rather than individual humans or individual natural entities (such as animals).
3. Identification with all forms of life. An individual who identifies with all forms of life in the system of nature
has an appreciation that the interests of all other living beings are intimately connected to his or her own interests.
4. The sense that caring for the environment is part of individual human self-realization. The interests of nature
should not be seen as opposed to the interests of humanity. We expand our concern outward to embrace a greater
part of the natural world, and thus we become more fully realized beings.
5. A critique of instrumental rationality (the mode of thinking that makes efficiency and quantifiable results the
goal of all human activity). The philosophy of deep ecology, on the other hand, emphasizes alternative modes of
thinking, such as spiritual enlightenment or artistic expression, that emphasize life-enhancing qualitative values.
6. Personal development of a total worldview. Deep ecology is not primarily a social philosophy. It usually
assumes that there is an individual human being doing the thinking for himself or herself, trying to determine an
honest and personal way of assessing how to conceive of a way in which nature can matter to each of us, one at a
time. Social action comes later, when individuals, with their own ecosophies, get together to change things.
If we return to the platform of the deep ecology movement, we can see these philosophical ideas elaborated in the
context of environmental policy prescriptionsfor the platform was meant to express the common practical side of a
wide variety of individually developed deep ecological worldviews. Thus the platform calls for the respect and
intrinsic valuation of all forms of life, an attitude of noninterference with natural processes and systems, a
deemphasis on the primary significance of human life and institutions, the restructuring of human society to be in
harmony with natural processes, and a reexamination of the ends of human life, replacing the ceaseless pursuit of
material abundance with a heightened quality of life experience. This family of related ideas and general policy
prescriptions constitutes the fundamental substantive ideas of the philosophy of deep ecology.
However, it must be emphasized that for us the philosophical position of deep ecology primarily concerns
questions of ontology, that is, questions about
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the fundamental nature of things. For us, deep ecology is a philosophy about the nature of the world and the human
place in this world, or the human relation to the world (e.g., either as part of it or apart from it). It is a philosophy
that focuses on the fundamental ontological interrelatedness and identification of all life forms, natural objects, and
ecosystems. The ethics and politics of deep ecologythose ideas most clearly expressed in its platformare secondary;
they are derived from the basic ontological commitments of a deep ecological worldview.
Deep ecology is thus not simply a position in the discipline of environmental ethics, although it is often perceived
to be. Deep ecology is not one of many different environmental ethical theories, such as biocentric individualism or
animal rights theory. It is, instead, a position in environmental philosophy, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy
of human ecologyit is a cosmology or a worldview, and that may be the source of its depth. The advocates of deep
ecology claim that the most important task is to understand the world in the right way; given the correct
understanding, the ethical choices will be obvious. Naess argues that environmental disagreements are largely the
result of different perceptions of reality. The developers of a forest see the forest differently than those who wish to
preserve it. "The difference between the antagonists is one rather of ontology than ethics." 8 To solve real-world
environmental problems, then, requires not the development of a new ethical theory but a new worldview, a new
philosophy of the relationship between humanity and nature.
Of course Naess is not the only advocate of deep ecology. Although he coined the term in 1972, his major work,
Ecology, Community and Lifestyle was not available in English until 1989. Deep ecology owes much of its
popularity to the work of several philosophers in America, Canada, and Australia: George Sessions, Bill Devall,
Alan Drengson, the late Richard Sylvan (formerly called Routley), Warwick Fox, Freya Mathews, Andrew
McLaughlin, and David Rothenberg (one of the editors of this volume)as well as environmental activists and
teachers such as John Seed and Dolores LaChappelle, and the poet Gary Snyder.9 More recent writers who have
continued to develop possible directions for deep ecology, though sometimes using different terminology, include
David Abram and Jack Turner.10
Nevertheless, the essays in this volume emphasize, with a few exceptions, the philosophy of deep ecology as
formulated by Naess. In part, the reason for this is practical. This collection began as a special issue of the journal
Inquiry (Vol. 39, No. 2, June 1996), "Arne Naess's Environmental Thought," edited by Andrew Light and David
Rothenberg. But there is also a more philosophical reason. Naess originated the terminology of "deep ecology,"
and thus his view of deep ecology is often interpreted as the definitive statement of the philosophy
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gests that Naess's pluralism can sustain a form of pragmatic weak anthropocentrism.
Part II of the collection, "New Horizons for Deep Ecology," moves forward to discuss the aspects of deep ecology
that are not shared by most other schools of environmental thought. This is a crucial move to make in any fair
assessment of the philosophy of deep ecology, because to ignore, for example, the Eastern roots of the philosophy
is possibly to ignore one of the most important facets of this form of environmental thought. But unlike many
assessments of the alternative forms of philosophy in deep ecology, the essays in this section use the unique
components of the theory as a tool for further criticism and reconsideration. All of these essays in one way or
another move forward from the cultural pluralist issues raised at the end of Light's contribution in part I.
This part begins with David Rothenberg's "No World but in Things: The Poetry of Naess's Concrete Contents."
Rothenberg investigates the implications of Naess's substantive phenomenology of "concrete contents." With this
idea, Naess argues that secondary qualities are as much a part of the world as primary qualities, an idea that has
greatly influenced deep ecology's unique development as a metaphysical system. Rothenberg argues that this
position leads Naess to expand his definition of philosophy itself, and thus suggests to us new ways of describing
the world. Rothenberg shows how this device in Naess's system offers us a way of seeing the connection between
deep ecology and forms of literature, music, and other artistic expressions that go well beyond conventional
Western notions of environmental philosophy.
Next, Michael Zimmerman, in "Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity," opens up the discussion of
the political implications of forms of Earth-based religion that may be derivable from a deep ecological view. In a
very helpful essay for those who have followed his earlier explorations of the possible connections between
Heidegger's work and deep ecology, Zimmerman here takes us through the problem of the formation of Earth-
based forms of religion that may set aside the transcendental in favor of a premodern materialist conception of the
self in relation to the world. At the heart of the essay is a discussion and reconstructive critique of the work of
transcendental psychologist Ken Wilber. As he has elsewhere, Zimmerman guides us through a reading of Wilber
that may help us to resolve conflicts between the postmodern and the modern in environmental thought.
Picking up on some of the themes raised in Zimmerman's essay, Arran Gare, in "The Postmodernism of Deep
Ecology, the Deep Ecology of Postmodernism, and Grand Narratives," takes a close look at the connection
between postmod-
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of the deep ecological movement. Despite Naess's intention that each individual develop his or her own ecosophical
total view, most advocates of deep ecology accept the fundamental ideas of Naessidentification and Self-
realization-as being crucial to the meaning of deep ecology. For better or worse, deep ecology is inextricably
associated with the ideas of Arne Naess.
In Beneath the Surface we have expanded from the original collection of essays in the Inquiry issue to provide a
broad overview and a detailed analysis of the philosophy of deep ecology. Here we present a critical response to
the philosophical ideas of deep ecology that is meant to show both its strengths and its weaknesses as a conceptual
framework for understanding the environmental crisis. Most writing about deep ecology concerns the deep ecology
movement and the concrete practical proposals derived from a deep ecological worldview; but this collection, as
we noted above, will concentrate on the philosophical aspects of deep ecology and not its implications for
environmental policy.
We have divided the book into two sections. Although the distinction may be thought somewhat arbitrary, the
essays in part I consider the philosophy of deep ecology in a narrow sense, as a reaction to issues in mainstream
environmental philosophyquestions of value, ethics, and politics regarding human action in the natural world. Thus
part I, "Deep Ecology and Its Critics," contains seven papers evaluating deep ecology's impact on important issues
in contemporary environmental philosophy, such as the meaning of intrinsic value, moral pluralism,
anthropocentrism, and ethical and political decision-making. The essays in part II are broader in scope: here the
philosophy of deep ecology is conceived as a general philosophical worldview with connections to other
worldviews, including non-Western religious traditions. Thus, part II, "New Horizons for Deep Ecology," contains
seven papers that expand the reach of the philosophical principles of deep ecology. The goal is to examine deep
ecology as a systematic worldview, a comprehensive philosophy for the understanding of reality and the human
place in the universe.
Part I begins with John Clark's "How Wide Is Deep Ecology?" Clark questions the insistence, particularly by Arne
Naess, that deep ecology contains all other radical environmental philosophies, and suggests ways in which Naess
might refine his responses to debates in the field. At the same time, however, Clark investigates how attempts to
define deep ecology as a radically different form of environmental philosophy may hamper its founder's pluralistic
impulses. As with many essays in this collection, while the thrust of Clark's paper is critical, it is also
reconstructive. Clark offers suggestions for how deep ecologists can retool their philosophical arguments to better
meet their policy programs.
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Questioning the self-image of deep ecology is also the task of Eric Katz's "Against the Inevitability of
Anthropocentrism." In particular, Katz takes on the almost universally accepted assumption that deep ecology
represents a form of nonanthropocentric environmental philosophy. After a thorough survey of the philosophical
positions espoused by representatives of the field, Katz argues that the core of the philosophy of deep ecology is
found in three ideas: the identification of the self with the natural world, the goal of Self-realization (in order to
develop a wider notion of the Self with which humans can identify), and a relational and holistic ontology. He
states that all three of these foundational components of the philosophy of deep ecology are at bottom
anthropocentric, thus undermining one of the key descriptions by which deep ecologists have identified themselves
in relation to other environmental theorists.
In part, Katz draws on the work of the late Richard Sylvan in generating his critique of deep ecology. It is Sylvan's
critical environmental philosophy that is the subject of William Grey's "A Critique of Deep Green Theory." For
some time Sylvan's work was considered to be compatible with much of deep ecology. But, as Grey reminds us,
Sylvan developed a thoroughgoing critique of deep ecology while using it as a launching point for developing his
own views, which he termed "Deep Green theory." Grey takes us on a brief tour of the development of Sylvan's
work and offers the beginnings of a critique of Deep Green theory. However, this criticism of a critic of deep
ecology is not offered as an attempt to resuscitate the legacy of deep ecology from Sylvan's attacks. Rather, by the
end of the essay we have an important picture of a strong, yet flawed, critic of deep ecology.
Beginning with the fourth paper in the sectionVal Plumwood's "Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems:
A Feminist Ecosocialist Analysis"we have a series of three papers that assess, challenge, and sometimes offer
alternatives to the deep ecological notion of human ontology. As was noted earlier, most interpreters of deep
ecology suggest that the view endorses an idea that humans are indistinguishable from other forms of nature. If
humans come to recognize that they are an indistinguishable part of nature as the kind of being that they are, then,
so most versions of the theory go, our ethical obligations to nature will become clearer. On these views, humans
are a part of nature, so caring for nature is in some sense an extension of care for the self. While many competing
versions of this view are offered by different deep ecologists, all deep ecologists generally agree that part of the
description of the cause of environmental problems today must necessarily include a description of the human
disconnectionin ontological termsfrom nature.
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Plumwood's paper steps into the literature on the deep ecological view of the self by first looking at a little-
discussed debate on the idea of the self between Naess and the late Peter Reed, an American student of Naess who
died in an ice-climbing accident in Norway in 1987. 11 While Naess endorsed something akin to the
indistinguishability thesis of human ontology sketched above, Reed argued that the basis of respect for nonhuman
nature was to be found in recognizing its difference from us rather than its identity with us. Plumwood cuts a path
between these views, arguing that the difference and the identity of nature with humans must be recognized in a
more complex ontology than is found in either Naess's or Reed's view. The goal of any revisioning of human
ontology, however, must be to form bonds of solidarity with nature that are not reducible to anthropocentrism. But
using deep ecology as a starting point for building a solidarity account with nature is complicated by the trend in
deep ecology to try to work within a liberal, capitalist-dominated political system with respect to policy formation.
As a different alternative, Plumwood builds a case for reconstructing a sense of solidarity with nature as a
foundation for a new description of human ontology in relation to nature that does not rely on treating nature as
property.
In "Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology: Evading the Moral Questions?," Mathew Humphrey takes up
questions similar to those at the beginning of Plumwood's paper but winds up in a very different place. He
carefully articulates the varieties of notions of the self in deep ecology before going on to critique these notions
through a highly creative comparison of the deep ecology view with the "integral nationalism" of French novelist
and political activist Maurice Barrès. This approach gives Humphrey a surprisingly strong foundation from which
to criticize the focus on "self-realization" in deep ecology and to show how this focus weakens the moral view of
the system as a whole. In Humphrey's account the common focus among deep ecologists on the development of an
ontology of self-realization evades the important moral questions that environmental philosophy must confront.
Deep ecologists would do well to follow the lead of philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Joseph Raz, who
acknowledge the importance of reforming the self in order to generate right action, but who do not replace a robust
ethics with an ontology. So, contra Plumwood, Humphrey finds that the ontology of deep ecology places it farther
afield from contemporary liberal accounts of morality rather than closer to them.
In turn, in "In Defense of Deep Ecology: An Ecofeminist Response to a Liberal Critique," Ariel Salleh takes on
Humphrey's critique of deep ecology's
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ethical stance, specifically the liberalism that she finds at the heart of his view. Jumping off from the ecofeminist
critique of deep ecology, and the ensuing ecofeminism-deep ecology debate of the 1980s, Salleh suggests that if
deep ecology embraced what she calls an epistemology and moral theory grounded in an "embodied materialism,"
it could answer the challenges put to it by liberal critics like Humphrey. An embodied materialism builds "on
Marx's profound understanding of the dialectic between our practical actions in the world and the form that our
thought processes take" (p. 108), which Salleh claims will bring the act of doing philosophy closer to the materiel
conditions that make it possible. For Salleh, if deep ecology focused its sense of the self on how the self is
embodied in everyday practicetaking into account the differences between selves (e.g., gender, race, class, etc.)then
it could more effectively ground its moral stance. Salleh uses the idea of embodied materialism to criticize the
liberal foundations utilized by Humphrey as supposedly separating questions of ontology and personal identity
from ethics.
It should be noted, however, that Humphrey had no warning that his paper would be offered for critique by Salleh
for this volume (it was a contingent circumstance of the referring process for the book that led to the focus of
Salleh's paper), and that, unfortunately, the editing schedule of the book prevented Humphrey from having the
opportunity to respond to Salleh's critique. Many will no doubt find the description of Humphrey's position by
Salleh curious and provocative. We look forward to an eventual reply from Humphrey to Salleh's paper in another
forum.
In the final essay of part I, "Callicott and Naess on Pluralism," Andrew Light takes up the place of deep ecology in
the monism-pluralism debate in environmental ethics through a critical comparison of the positions of J. Baird
Callicott and Arne Naess on the possibility of pluralism in environmental thought. If it turns out that Naess's work,
and consequently much of deep ecology, is grounded in a nonrelative pluralism, then many of the questions raised
by Humphrey and criticized by Salleh would be moot. For if deep ecology is pluralist with respect to the
foundations of morality, then it may be the case that many different views of the self can consistently serve as
foundations for embracing a deep ecological view, perhaps even a liberal view of the self that eschews a strong
ontology. Light argues that Callicotta Leopoldian moral monisthas mistakenly attributed an inescapable relativism
to the positions of moral pluralists in environmental ethics. An alternative to this view is found in Naess's work,
though it is an alternative that raises additional questions about the validity of cross-cultural comparisons in
environmental thought. Light sug-
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ernism and deep ecology. Echoing his Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, Gare opens with a reminder
of the similarities between the antimodernism of deep ecology and postmodernism. Through a brief analysis of the
work of enlightenment historian Johann Herder, he argues that in a strong sense the main currents of
postmodernism represent a form of deep ecology. Reminding us of Zimmerman's worries about the antimodernism
of deep ecology, he takes up the question of whether a postmodern deep ecology can sustain a politics that can
oppose the organized antienvironmentalism of industrial society. Challenging some of Zimmerman's conclusions
on this question, Gare calls for the development of a new grand narrative of the environment. He is careful,
however, to reject a monological narrative, such as those produced by nationalists, capitalists, and orthodox
Marxists, in favor of a polyphonic, pluralist narrative that could direct a postmodern deep ecology in a political
struggle for environmental viability.
The theme of pluralism raised in Light's chapter and at issue in the last two chapters is continued in the next essay,
"Deep Ecology and Desire: On Naess and the Problem of Consumption." Here Jonathan Maskit considers the
problem of a pluralistic metaphysical foundation in the philosophy of Arne Naess. Maskit suggests that, contra
most philosophical schools of thought in the twentieth century, which have eschewed metaphysics, deep ecology
remains squarely committed to the pursuit and explanation of a robust metaphysics. Naess has consistently
maintained over the years that the platform of deep ecology (the eight points devised by Naess and George
Sessions) can be embraced from a wide variety of metaphysical foundations. In his famous "apron diagram," for
example, Naess suggests that one can come to an endorsement of the eight points from Christian, Buddhist, and
"Spinozistic" foundations. Thus Naess is adamant that his own philosophical system, Ecosophy T, is only an
example of a philosophical view that can embrace and enact the eight points. He does not require that all deep
ecologists, or even all agreeing with the eight points, necessarily endorse Ecosophy T.
Maskit challenges this claim. Through a novel comparison with Kant's critical philosophy, he argues that Naess's
metaphysics may in fact require Ecosophy T as a component of deep ecology rather than only serving as Naess's
particular example of how a philosophical view can be produced out of the plural premises of deep ecology. The
fulcrum that Maskit uses to get this argument off the ground is the underdeveloped concept of desire in deep
ecology. According to Maskit, if deep ecology rests on an assumption of a change in everyday practices of
consumption as part of an endorsement of the eight
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points, then it must be able to provide an explanation for how humans will give up their desire to consume. But
only Ecosophy T provides an explanation for how desire could be transformed. Thus, the relation of deep ecology
to Ecosophy T may be closer than Naess has admitted.
In the next two papers in this section we move to more specific claims concerning the historical sources on which
deep ecology has been based, the Asian roots of deep ecology. Knut Jacobsen, in "Bhagavadgita * Ecosophy T,
and Deep Ecology," considers the connection between deep ecology and Hinduism. He finds particular links to the
philosophy of deep ecology in the Bhagavadgita*as one would expect, given Naess's devotion to the textbut goes
on to provide a historical comparison of different readings of a crucial passage of the Bhagavadgita* necessary to
make the supposed Eastern influence of Hinduism on deep ecology salient.
Next, in "A State of Mind Like Water: Ecosophy T and the Buddhist Traditions," Deane Curtin turns to another
Eastern tradition explicitly articulated as a part of deep ecology, and finds key connections in Buddhism to the
formation of self-realization and intrinsic value in deep ecology. Curtin argues that both of these ideas are
challenged significantly if they are to be connected to Buddhist ideas, thus presenting problems to the philosophy
of deep ecology that would not be found in the more conventional analysis of these components of the theory in
part I. Together, these two essays provide excellent specific studies of some of the general worries concerning the
foundations of deep ecology raised by previous contributions.
In the final essay, "Deep Ecology and Its Social Philosophy: A Critique," Bron Taylor examines the concrete
manifestation of deep ecology philosophy "on the ground" as it shapes grassroots environmental movements.
Taylor's essay is a fitting finale for this volume, since it clearly demonstrates the importance of our project: the
analysis of the philosophy of deep ecology as a necessary corollary to the deep ecology movement. Taylor argues
that although it is often unarticulated, deep ecology does have a de facto social philosophy: the Green ideology
known as "bioregionalism." But theorists of deep ecology rarely take the process of social analysis seriously.
Looking at environmental movements both in the United States and in the non-Western world, Taylor offers an
analysis and a critique of deep ecology as a social philosophy, focusing on three main points: (1) its reliance on a
nonanthropocentric or biocentric value system; (2) its faith in non-Western and/or indigenous religious traditions as
the source of a new environmental consciousness; and (3) its failure to present an adequate account of political
power for bioregional entities that exist
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within and/or outside of national borders. Taylor thus envisions a new ''pragmatic" bioregionalism for deep
ecology, one that is open to the possibility of anthropocentric arguments for environmental protection; the
"greening" of traditional Western religions; and the use of national and international political agreements to enforce
environmental policies.
We view this collection of essays as a starting point for the in-depth discussion of the philosophy of deep ecology.
It is not meant as a comprehensive analysis. It is an attempt to get beneath the surface of the deep ecology
platform, to clarify and to elaborate the philosophical aspects of deep ecology. As a mere collection of distinct
authors, it cannot hope to be a complete survey of all the issues pertaining to the philosophy of deep ecology. We
do not consider all aspects of deep ecologyin particular, we have avoided essays on specific policy issues, such as
population control, wilderness preservation, sustainable development, and the economic imperialism of
international environmental programs. We have not included essays that focus on deep ecology's criticism of the
economic materialism of contemporary life, its call for a revision of human lifestyles. Nor have we included essays
on deep ecology's critique of nonsustainable forms of technological development. All of these issues have been,
and will continue to be, crucial to a full understanding of the philosophy of deep ecologybut our purpose here is
limited. We hope that this collection is merely the first of many such works to examine critically the philosophy of
deep ecology. 12 A deeper understanding of deep ecology can help to revolutionize the human relationship to the
natural world, and thus to engage the environmental crisis that surrounds us.
Notes
1. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973):
95 100. The term "reformist environmentalism" was coined by Bill Devall. See William Devall, "Reformist
Environmentalism," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 6:2 (Spring 1979): 129 158; and Bill Devall and George
Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985), pp. 51 61.
2. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, translated and edited by David Rothenberg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 45 (italics in original). However, the predominance of the critique of
institutions and social structures in deep ecology can be called into question. Andrew Light distinguishes forms of
political ecology as either environmental materialist or environmental ontologist. He argues that environmental
ontologists rely more on a reform of the self than a reform of institutions as a necessary precursor for
environmental renewal. See Light's "Rethinking Bookchin and Marcuse as Environmental Materialists: Toward an
Evolving Social Ecology," in Social
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Ecology After Bookchin, edited by Andrew Light (New York: Guilford Publishers, 1998), pp. 343 383. Naess
has acknowledged the lack of sufficient attention by deep ecologists thus far to reform of social and economic
structures. See Andrew Light, "Deep Socialism?: An Interview with Arne Naess," Capitalism, Nature,
Socialism 8:1 (March 1997): 69 85.
3. Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 29.
4. Ibid., p. 32.
5. Ibid., p. 33.
6. Ibid., pp. 36 37.
7. Ibid., pp. 5, 38.
8. Ibid., p. 66.
9. A partial list of major titles of books and articles in deep ecology (other than the work of Arne Naess) would
include Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (see note 1); and George
Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the 21st Century (Boston: Shambhala, 1995). See also Bill Devall, Simple in
Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1988); Alan Drengson, Beyond
Environmental Crisis: From Technocrat to Planetary Person (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Richard Routley, "Is
There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?" in Proceedings of the 15th World Congress of Philosophy
(Varna, Bulgaria: 1973), pp. 205 210; Richard Routley and Val Routley, "Against the Inevitability of Human
Chauvinism," in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, edited by K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1979), pp. 36 59; Richard Sylvan and David Bennett, The Greening of
Ethics: From Anthropocentrism to Deep Green Theory (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1994); Warwick Fox,
Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala,
1990); Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991); Andrew McLaughlin, Regarding Nature:
Industrialism and Deep Ecology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993); David Rothenberg, Is It Painful to Think?
Conversations with Arne Naess (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat
Fleming, and Arne Naess, Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings (Philadelphia: New Society,
1988); Dolores LaChappelle, Sacred Land, Sacred SexRapture of the Deep: Concerning Deep Ecologyand
Celebrating Life (Silverton, Co: Finn Hill Arts, 1988); Michael Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology (San Diego: Avant,
1985). Also, the journal The Trumpeter, edited by Alan Drengson and published from 1983 until 1998, focused
exclusively on the deep ecology movement (ecosophy@islandnet.com); Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild
(San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990).
10. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World (New York:
Pantheon, 1996); and Jack Turner, The Abstract Wild (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1996).
11. Just before Peter Reed died, he and David Rothenberg had completed an anthology on the Norwegian roots of
deep ecology, Wisdom in the Open Air (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
12. Three other recent collections are Nina Witoszek, ed., Rethinking Deep Ecology
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(Oslo: University of Oslo, Center for Environment and Development, 1996); Alan Drengson and Yuichi
Inouye, eds., The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books,
1995); Nina Witoszek and Andrew Brennan, eds., Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of
Ecophilosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
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I
DEEP ECOLOGY AND ITS CRITICS
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1
How Wide Is Deep Ecology?
John Clark
Toward Ecophilosophical Unity-in-Diversity

In a discussion of the "rules of Gandhian nonviolence," Arne Naess proposes a number of hypotheses and norms
that are highly relevant to recent debates in ecophilosophy. For example, he suggests that the "character of the
means used in group struggle determines the character of the results," and that one should "choose that personal
action or attitude which most probably reduces the tendency towards violence of all parties in a struggle." One
should not, he says, "act as a mere functionary, a representative of an institution or an underling, but always as an
autonomous, fully responsible person." Mistrust, he suggests, ''stems from misjudgment, especially of the
disposition of [one's] opponent to answer trust with trust, mistrust with mistrust." One should "fight antagonisms,
not antagonists," and "formulate the essential interests which [one] and [one's] opponent share and try to cooperate
upon this basis." Furthermore, one should not "humiliate or provoke [an] opponent," or "judge [an] opponent
harder than [one]self." 1 These proposals are not intended to be taken as legalistic commandments, but rather as
general guidelines for action. As such they are very much in accord with an ecological perspective that values
richness and diversity wherever they occur, and that practices universal respect based on a recognition that the
maximum self-realization of the whole comes through the greatest possible flourishing of all the parts.
Furthermore, while the rules may have been formulated with "opponents" such as corporations, governmental
bodies, and antiecological interest groups in mind, they may very usefully be applied to recent debates between
proponents of such contending ecological viewpoints as deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism.
It may seem strange to conceive of those who espouse various ecological perspectives and who seek to overcome
ecological crisis as "opponents" of one another. Indeed, many ecophilosophers were in fact surprised when they
first
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found the various "radical ecologies" depicted as mutually exclusive alternatives. Once they were defined in this
manner, however, many of the attitudes that Naess cautions against became quite prevalent. Aggressive attacks
were met with even more aggressive responses. Advocates of theories became uncritically defensive of their
chosen ecophilosophies. Mistrust and antagonism became widespread. Commonalties were ignored and
cooperation often became impossible. Theorists applied quite different standards to their own ideas and to those of
opponents. For a number of years a "war of the ecologies" raged. It would of course be naïve to deny that
advocates of various ecophilosophies do in fact hold opposing views on important issues, and the issues at stake
should not be glossed over or obscured in any way. Yet these differences can coexist with a respect for one's
opponents, an openness to the views of others, and a commitment to cooperation in the pursuit of mutually held
goals. Naess's norms are helpful in reminding us of the preconditions for such a nondefensive, nondogmatic
approach.
As originally formulated, the deep ecology platform seemed aimed at making just such an approach the basis for
ecological practice. It was designed to facilitate cooperation between all those who accept an ecological view of
reality (sometimes called ecocentrism) and who share the goal of changing society's direction from an ecocidal one
to an ecologically sound one. Within this general orientation there is room for a variety of positions on specific
issues, and for opposition and debate. The present discussion raises certain questions about the scope of deep
ecology in the light of Naess's nonideological, "deep questioning" approach. First, I ask whether an expanded
consideration of the social institutional implications of deep ecology would not increase its depth, relevance, and
appeal to proponents of other ecologies. Second, I pose the question of whether certain tendencies to define deep
ecology in stark opposition to other ecophilosophies has not impeded the original aims of the movement. And,
finally, I suggest that possible answers to these questions are implicit in Arne Naess's ecophilosophy.
Deep Ecology and Social Change

Naess defines deep ecology as a movement rather than a specific view of reality, indeed stating that it "is not a
philosophy in any proper academic sense, nor is it institutionalized as a religion or an ideology." 2 Because of its
emphasis on expressing widespread agreement on fundamental points of theory and practice, its statements are
formulated in very general, and often rather vague, terms, as is the case, most notably, in the deep ecology
platform. This allows the points in
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the platform to be derived from many more ultimate presuppositions of diverse kinds. Such an approach has great
appeal, especially in view of the gravity of the ecological crisis and the need for coordinated action in defense of
the Earth. However, it also produces problems.
Harold Glasser points out that in many contexts, Naess has deliberately sought to maintain a certain vagueness in
the concepts and principles of deep ecology. Glasser claims that this "methodological vagueness" is "a
sophisticated semantical device for facilitating the acceptance and agreement of statements and notions by
emphasizing the positive aspect of ambiguity that is sometimes associated with a high level of generalization." 3
Yet he notes that this vagueness "can introduce a tension between parallel efforts designed to isolate and clarify
fundamental conflicts (deep questioning).''4 In effect, wideness is gained at the expense of depth.
An example of a problem resulting from such vagueness concerns the statement in the platform that ecological
richness and diversity should be reduced only to satisfy "vital needs." Unfortunately, there is a danger that an
ecological analysis will lack critical force, and can be more easily compromised, without further elaboration on the
nature of such "vital needs." Some indication of the cultural relativity of needs, the means by which dominant
institutions shape them, and the possibilities for a critical and conscious transformation of the self and its structure
of needs is essential if we are to move from the level of edifying morality to that of effective ethical and political
practice.
Naess, in his own philosophical analyses, recognizes the complexity of this question. He sometimes gives
examples of "vital" and "nonvital" needs, and he mentions that things which might well be "vital" in a poor
country are often "nonvital" in a rich one. In Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, for example, he says that variables
like "differences in climate and related factors, together with differences in the structures of societies as they now
exist, need to be considered."5 He gives the example of whaling not being (or, perhaps more accurately, as not
being necessary to fulfill) a vital need in a rich country, although it may be absolutely essential in a poor society.
References to this social context of needs were present in early discussions of the nature of deep ecology. For
example, in his famous 1973 article "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements," Naess
suggested that deep ecology implies an "anti-class posture" and "local autonomy and decentralization,"6 ideas that
would give some kind of content to the call for sweeping social change. However, these points were dropped in the
platform. Yet, if political, economic, and technological propositions are now excluded from the platform (other
than to state that changes are necessary in these areas), will not the concept of "vital" or
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"basic" needs risk becoming a misleading abstraction, since commonsense, noncritical, noncontextualized
conceptions of needs are not in principle excluded? Once again, deep ecology might thus achieve a wider appeal
(since it would be less challenging), but it would lose depth of analysis and efficacy of practice.
Thus, it would seem that while the platform validly points out the need for "ideological" change in which "quality
of life" replaces "increased standard of living," the institutional correlates of these changes need to be mentioned, if
only in general terms, as Naess has done in some of his discussions. The platform quite correctly suggests that we
forsake the meretricious attractions of a "higher standard of living" in favor of the deeper satisfactions of
"situations of inherent value.'' Yet this concept is much more applicable for the more affluent minority in our world
than for the disinherited majority. There are certainly innumerable cases in which a person in a poor country
chooses an ecologically unsound optionfor example, using an inconvenient and highly polluting form of
transportation to get to a stressful, laborious, and low-paying jobnot because he or she thinks that it promises a
"higher standard of living" than the more traditional way of life that has often been cruelly destroyed. Rather, it is
because he or she has no effective choice in the matter. There are thus billions of people who are de facto reducing
ecological richness and diversity in order to "satisfy" what are, without question, "vital needs." They are, according
to point 3 of the platform, beyond reproach. And it is to the credit of Arne Naess that he explicitly rejects the idea
of morally blaming the people of poor countries for what they are compelled to do.
However, there is obviously still an ecological and moral problem in such situations, and some hints about its
nature are certainly desirable in a statement of what is basic to an ecological movement. The institutional aspects of
the problem can be recognized without denying the centrality of ideological, moral, and spiritual transformation in
the process of creating an ecological society. On the other hand, to ignore or bracket these aspects (as Naess does
not in his discussions of his own ecosophy, but as the platform does) will render deep ecology superficial to those
who see reflection on the specific nature of human social institutions (beyond the human social institution of
ideology) and on the institutionalized roots of ecological crisis as fundamental to the ecological problematic. Of
course, if these issues are not fundamental, then they have no place in the platform. My position is, of course, that
they are indeed basic, and that deep ecology would be broadened and deepened if this centrality were recognized.
The careful theoretical analysis of whether or not they are central has not yet taken place, since most of the
discussion of related questions has fo-
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cused on the nature of ideal societies (that are nonanthropocentric, nonpatriarchal, or nondominating) rather than
on the "the necessary changes" that are the concern of the platform. 7
Two Concepts of Deep Ecology?

Arne Naess's conception of deep ecology presupposes the importance of open, constructive dialogue and learning
from diverse views. This seems to conflict in some ways with a perspective that has been encouraged by George
Sessions, the main American interpreter and historian of deep ecology. While Sessions has explicitly expressed his
complete agreement with Naess's position, and is well known as the coauthor with Naess of the deep ecology
platform, there seems to be an underlying divergence between the two theorists in methodology and sensibility.
Sessions seems to conceive of deep ecology more as a completed theoretical edifice to be defended than a practical
basis for cooperation between those with deep ecological concerns. He often presents deep ecology as presently
formulated as being fundamentally beyond reproach, and implies that any questions raised about its adequacy
result from either ignorance or malice on the part of the critics. His standpoint toward contending ecological
viewpoints does not seem to reflect Naess's concern with minimizing antagonisms and engagement in open
dialogue. Sessions seems particularly concerned to depict ecofeminists and social ecologists as being in sharp
contradiction with the basic ideas of deep ecology. Yet many ecofeminists, social ecologists, and others who take
issue with certain positions that Sessions sees as basic to deep ecology would, I believe, have little difficulty
accepting all the points of the deep ecology platform.
A consideration of Naess's "rules of nonviolence" might help remind us that our various ecophilosophies have
overlapping aspects, that they are in some ways complementary, and that our presumed goal is to improve our
ecological thinking and practice rather than to defend successfully the tenets of our preferred ecophilosophy.
Accepting a nonsectarian approach does not, of course, mean that we hesitate to express our philosophical views in
the strongest of terms, nor that we refrain from careful critique of other views even as we engage in equally careful
self-critique of our own ideas and practice. In fact, we might even begin to question the very concept of our "own"
ideas. After all, ideas are not artifacts that we consciously decide to produce, and they are certainly not something
we can hold on to, no matter how hard we try. Naess's reflections on the need to overcome identification with the
narrow ego, and to achieve identification with larger realities, might usefully be applied to this
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problem. If we do so, we might be more successful in avoiding our natural tendency to fall into what might be
called "the arrogance of humans with-isms," a malady that has gravely afflicted participants in recent ecological
disputes.
We might therefore consider how ecological principles apply to the process of ecological scholarship. These
principles imply that we must always look at ideas holistically, relating them to their larger context. It means
patiently looking at the whole of any person's thought, and noting the connections between all its aspects. It means
recognizing that ideas are always in a process of development, and that this development has more than one
possible path. It means discovering how value (whether in nature or in theories and ideas) is widely dispersed, yet
can be seen to contribute to a larger, developing good. In short, ecological scholarship reflects the respect for the
organic and for unity-in-diversity exhibited by ecological thinking in general. It would seem that such scholarship
would also be guided by Naess's "rules of nonviolence," insofar as they describe a nondominating outlook that
allows organic growth and development to take place.
While Sessions's recent deep ecology anthology is in most ways an excellent book, and includes many examples of
outstanding work in ecophilosophy, it sometimes exhibits exactly such a sectarian and defensive approach as has
been described. In fact, few of the writers included in the book adhere to such a narrow view, and many of them
expand the concept of deep ecology in areas that show it to be highly complementary to other ecological
perspectives. Yet in his editorial introductions and his own articles, Sessions emphasizes the divisions between
these viewpoints and dismisses all questions about deep ecology raised by other ecophilosophies. This is clear as
early as the Preface, in which criticisms of deep ecology by social ecologists and ecofeminists are reduced to
"misrepresentations" that "have resulted in considerable misunderstanding and confusion concerning what deep
ecology actually is and what it stands for." 8
It is indeed true that there have been many misrepresentations. For example, while Bookchin has posed some
challenging questions for deep ecologists, he has also attributed to the movement as a whole views held by only a
small minority of its proponents. He has also systematically refrained from recognizing the work of deep ecologists
who have done the most sophisticated theoretical work or who have explored areas that he himself recognizes as
important. In view of the lack of respect for others and the inaccuracy in depicting their views exhibited in his
attacks, they can be questioned not only on intellectual grounds but also on moral ones.9 Yet Bookchin's
unsympathetic and indeed blatantly unfair approach does not justify the parody of his views and of social ecology
in general presented in Sessions's commentary. Furthermore, it has only served
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to make deep ecology less appealing to those who are familiar with Bookchin's work, and especially with his real
contributions to ecological thought.
Sessions interprets not only Bookchin, but social ecologists in general, as being "concerned primarily with issues
of human social justice," implying that somehow this means they have no central concern for ecological problems.
Yet social ecologists believe social and ecological problems to be entirely inseparable, since they hold a dialectical,
holistic position that sees human beings as an inseparable part of nature and social problems as ecological
problems. Elsewhere, Sessions complains that they "see ecological problems as essentially political." 10 This
statement is true, but it does not, as he implies, mean that they see these problems as being any less ecological. For
example, all social ecologists must recognize that the reduction of biodiversity on a massive scale is a major
ecological problem. And, indeed, the destruction of this diversity and the imposition of an ecologically degrading
global monoculture has been an enduring theme for social ecologists. However, these theorists point out that if we
want to understand the basis for this ecodestruction, we would do well to investigate carefully the operation of the
world economy, the policies of nation-states, the nature of poverty in the South, systems of land tenure, economic
inequalities, the policies of the World Bank, international debt, and many other political and economic questions. It
is encouraging that some biodiversity experts like Peter Raven are now presenting exactly such a social ecological
analysis with a background of scientific sophistication available to few ecophilosophy theorists (and that some
selections in Sessions's anthology move in a similar direction). There are also numerous suggestions in Naess's
work that these issues are of considerable ecological importance.11
Sessions is rather hasty in dismissing the ideas of social ecologists, and he does not discuss why their social
analyses should not be considered directly relevant to ecology. For example, the challenging perspective of the
Indian sociologist and historian Ramachandra Guha (a "social ecologist" in the broad sense) is reduced to "a rather
narrow anthropocentric 'social justice' perspective."12 Guha contends that Indian nature preserves are based on an
elitist model, in view of the fact that they are designed not to protect "nature," but rather the large mammals which
are of interest to rich tourists, and because they are often created through displacement of peasants and
domesticated animals.13 Guha expresses exactly the kinds of concerns that Western ecophilosophers need to hear
(through Guhawho rather uses terms like ''management" and "sustainability" uncriticallyhas much to learn from
deep ecologists also). His analysis is especially enlightening to Western deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and (not
least of all) social ecologists who often make "global"
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pronouncements relating to fundamental economic, political, and cultural issues that have quite different
implications, depending on which part of the globe is affected.
At one point, Sessions questions Michael Zimmerman's attempts "to bring together the very different views of
Deep Ecology and Social Ecology." 14 Yet isn't the task of the philosopher, and especially the ecophilosopher, to
bring together what is "different," and to show, as an early ecologist put it, "that the way up and the way down are
one and the same way''?15 I think that Zimmerman (whose important work is notably missing from Session's deep
ecology anthology) presents a quite balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both deep and social
ecology in his carefully considered work Contesting Earth's Future,16 and he constructively points out ways in
which the two traditions can learn from each other and come to terms with some of their own inadequacies. He
also points out how both might benefit not only from ecofeminist analyses but also from the remarkable insights on
the evolution of consciousness of a thinker such as Ken Wilber.17 It seems to me that such a critical but
conciliatory approach is exactly the one needed to advance ecological thought, and is very much in accord with
Naess's norms of trust, nonantagonism, and cooperation.
Deep Ecology, Peace, and Justice

In "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," Naess discusses the four levels of his "apron
diagram," showing the relation between the deep ecology platform and other beliefs and principles. According to
the diagram, there are, at level 1, "ultimate premises and ecosophies," at level 2, "the 8-point deep ecology
platform or principles," at level 3, "general normative consequences and 'factual' hypotheses," and, finally, at level
4, "particular rules or decisions adapted to particular situations."18 While Naess says that views such as Buddhism,
Christianity, or Spinozist or Whiteheadian philosophy can all be placed at level 1, he recognizes that some
outlooks, such as Buddhism and Taoism, fit much better than others, including most forms of Christianity.19 He
also says that some ecophilosophers who are not considered deep ecologists, for example, Skolimowski, support the
principles at level 2, but assume that they do not because of the way these principles have been interpreted.20 It
would seem that the ecophilosophies which Sessions depicts as in opposition to deep ecology (social ecology and
ecofeminism) can be reconciled with the platform at least as well as some of the views Naess mentions. I will
focus on social ecology, with which I am more familiar, and leave consideration of the other half of the hypothesis
to ecofeminist theorists.
file:///C|/...e%20Surface%20-%20Critical%20Essays%20in%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Deep%20Ecology/files/page_10.html[9.6.2010 23:03:23]
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It seems clear that any nondogmatic social ecologist could accept all the points of the deep ecology platform.
While the idea of "intrinsic value" (point 1) has been expressed at times by social ecologists in terms of "good,"
''self-realization," or other concepts, the concern for intrinsic or inherent value is implicit. Richness and diversity
(point 2) are also consistently emphasized in social ecological analyses. Furthermore, the social ecological critique
is often directed at the evil of ecologically destructive activities in pursuit of nonessential goals (point 3). Other
points in the platform, such as the idea that policies must change significantly (point 6), that quality of life must be
stressed instead of material standard of living (point 7), and that people have an obligation to act for change (point
8), are easily found in the social ecology literature.
The two points that might be thought most likely to be areas of conflict are points 4 and 5. However, I cannot
imagine any social ecologist who would reject the idea that human life could flourish with a smaller human
population. Rothenberg's citation of "the latest version" of the program contains only this statement, which seems
noncontroversial from a social ecological perspective. 21 However, the version found in Naess's 1986 article and
elsewhere also includes the statement that "the flourishing of nonhuman life requires a smaller human
population."22 It might be possible to argue that a truly ecological global society could support over 5.8 billion
people while permitting the flourishing of nonhuman life. Whether the case is convincing is another matter.
However, it would seem difficult to argue, using a social ecological analysis, that at any time in the foreseeable
future such a population would not be detrimental to such flourishing. Thus, I would take possible disagreements
on this point to be of the "semantical" type that Naess mentions.23 The case with point number 5 is similar. Social
ecologists conclude that human society is at present having a highly detrimental effect on life on Earth. Some might
question whether the term human "interference with the nonhuman world" is adequate (and nondualistic), since it
might imply that humans could somehow withdraw from interaction with the rest of nature, as opposed to
interacting in more ecologically responsible ways with other parts of the larger natural whole. Yet the general
principle embodied in the point is entirely in accord with social ecology's view that disordered human institutions
are reversing the course of evolutionary development on the planet. I would therefore conclude that consistent
social ecologists might, and in fact implicitly do, support the deep ecology platform.
Furthermore, deep ecologists can consistently support a social ecological perspective, and I would argue that the
most basic principles of the movement point toward the need for developing such an approach (as is already being
done in some cases). In fact, according to Alan Drengson, "Arne Naess says that he is a supporter of the
ecofeminist, social ecology, social justice, bioregional,
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and peace movements." 24 While Naess does not always make such support explicit in his discussion of such
movements, there is nothing in his thought that contradicts such a position. In addition, he makes certain statements
which imply that social institutional principles can be rooted in the deep ecology platform itself. Naess notes in
"The Deep Ecology 'Eight Points' Revisited" (written as recently as 1993, according to Sessions) that "any social or
political trends of the fascist or Nazi kind [contradict] the requirement of full ecological sustainability" in view of
the implications of points 1 and 2, which require respect for the value of cultural differences.25 But if these
political implications can be deduced from the eight points, why cannot conclusions concerning, for example, the
effects of economic class systems, highly centralized political power, or technological megamachines be seen to
follow also? A similar rejection of, for example, class systems and their ideologies would be justified if such
institutions can be shown to reduce cultural diversity, and if they encourage a lack of respect for the intrinsic value
of some human beings, or entail practices exhibiting such a lack (not to mention if they can be shown to have
destructive ecological consequences). Naess seems to draw the conclusion that they do have such effects when he
discusses his own ecosophy, but he has refrained from doing so in his statements of the deep ecology platform.
Some might suspect that I am trying to invoke Naess's ideas in a one-sided way in defense of what has sometimes
been described (usually negatively) as a "convergence thesis" concerning ecophilosophies. However, I am
attempting merely to pose the possibility of such convergence on certain issues, rather than predicting to what
degree such a convergence is possible. (In doing so, I accept Naess's principle that we aim at maximizing
cooperation when the limits to it are not clear.) It is true that Naess also makes statements such as "Some think that
deep ecology should encompass questions of peace and social justice, whereas I think we should be careful to
distinguish the differences between these movements, and not spread [ourselves] too thin."26 However, elsewhere
he recognizes all three of these movements as integral parts of a larger Green Movement, which he looks upon
with considerable admiration. It is not clear, then, why from the standpoint of deep ecology one should see the
three areas as distinct rather than inseparable. I suspect that Naess would not assert that Green activists who
consciously choose to work in all three areas are necessarily taking the wrong path. Furthermore, it would seem that
if we accept either the ultimate norm of universal self-realization (in Ecosophy T) or the recognition of intrinsic
value of other living beings (as in deep ecology and other ecophilosophies), we would be led to conclusions about
ecology, peace, and justice that would be difficult to separate (after all, ecological damage harms
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humans, nonhumans, and ecosystems; war is war on people, other species, and ecosystems; possessive, egotistic
attitudes lead to unjust treatment of humans, nonhumans, and ecosystems; etc.).
Whether or not the two tendencies will ever converge, there is much more common ground between deep ecology
and social ecology both on the basic theoretical level and in the practical sphere than most observers have seemed
to notice. Indeed, Naess's "top norm" and "ultimate goal" in his own ecosophy is very similar to what is seen as
ultimate in some versions of social ecology (for example, my own). The norm of "self-realization," he says,
"includes personal and community self-realization, but is conceived also to refer to an unfolding of reality as a
totality.'' 27 This formulation is similar to social ecology's dialectical holism, which sees the developing good of
the whole as inseparable from the realization of the good by all the internally related parts of that whole. As has
been mentioned, Naess deduces from such a norm such values as local self-sufficiency, cooperation, self-
determination, and the elimination of exploitation, subjection, and class societies.28 Thus, some of the social
implications Naess draws out from his general outlook also parallel social ecological themes.
A Deeper Ecology
Arne Naess has at times said that he does not think anyone should be called a "deep ecologist." While this
statement is in part a rejection of the indelicacy of implying that most people are "more shallow" than oneself, it
also seems to reveal his hope that deep ecology not become another ideology that restricts people's ability to think,
perceive, and feel in an open, flexible way. It is indeed painful to think, and ideologies are one way of deadening
ourselves to that pain. But as certain philosophers discovered long ago, this pain is the creative agony of giving
birth to something new, living, and growing. The deep ecology platform is a commendable attempt to unite
ecologists (whether we call them "deep" or merely "consistent") in the pursuit of their most pressing goal of
protecting the threatened Earth.
Yet some of Naess's own more specific ecosophical principles will, I think, contribute much more toward that goal
than the rather generic formulations of the platform (even if it were expanded in the ways I have suggested). His
own ecosophy reflects well the principles of nonattachment (liberation from the narrowness of egoism) and
compassion (identification with the good of all beings), and there are no more direct paths to an ecological world
than these, if they are rigorously put into practice. Furthermore, these are principles that could unite
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all the radical ecologies that sometimes seem in conflict. For they are equally at the core of social ecology's critique
of domination, its dialectical view of a self-transforming reality, and its concern for unity-in-diversity, and of
ecofeminism's critique of patriarchal power, the objectification of woman and nature, and its concern for an
expanded ethic of care. Perhaps a reflection on these principles will bring us a step closer to realizing our
responsibilities as the awakened mind and creative imagination of the Earth.
Notes
1. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, edited by David Rothenberg
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 148 150. Naess states each point as an imperative, and avoids
terms such as "should" and "ought" in most cases. The principles embodied in the rules are found throughout
Naess's work, but as collected in this lengthy "systematic account,'' they present an impressive image of what an
ethic of nondomination might mean in practice.
2. Arne Naess, "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," in Deep Ecology for the 21st
Century, edited by George Sessions, (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), p. 71.
3. Harold Glasser, "Deep Ecology Clarified," The Trumpeter 12 (1995): 71.
4. Ibid.
6. Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements," in Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st
Century, pp. 152 154.
7. It is important to recognize that while in the polemics between contending ecologies, the definition of deep
ecology discussed here has usually remained a given, the living phenomena have, as usual, defied static definition.
Within the deep ecology tradition a lively debate has emerged over exactly the kind of social institutional
questions that are emphasized here. The most notable contributions so far have been Andrew McLaughlin's
Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993) and Robyn Eckersley's
Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992).
8. Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, p. xiii.
9. Bookchin has paid a considerable price for his crusade against deep ecology. While his viewpoint has gained
increased recognition in the ecophilosophy literature, it has become identified with his most superficial, loosely
argued, and often spiteful polemics rather than with his stronger theoretical works, such as his classic The Ecology
of Freedom (Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books, 1982). In addition, the quality of his work has declined as he has
become increasingly strident, dogmatic, and irrational. As a result, many of his colleagues have been alienated
from him, and he has threatened the credibility of the theoretical outlook that he did so much to develop.
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10. Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, p. 266.
11. In fact, Sessions does not seem far from recognizing the central importance of such issues. For example, he has
recently stated that "[w]hat the 'new world order' (proclaimed by some to be emerging) amounts to is the
intertwined octopus of an international corporate power elite, together with interlocking international economic
markets and bureaucracy, and having no allegiance to any country or nation as the working classes of America and
the world are now beginning to realize to their dismay" (George Sessions, "Deep Ecology as World View,"
Bucknell Review 37:2 [1993] p. 208.). It is only a small step from this view to a consideration of how the most
well-intentioned choices within such an irrational order can lead to ecological consequences that are in drastic
contradiction to the best intentions of individual agents.
12. Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, p. xvi.
13. See Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World
Critique," Environmental Ethics 11 (Spring 1989): 71 83.
15. Heraclitus Fragment 60.
16. Michael Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
17. See Ken Wilber, Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1981)
and A Brief History of Everything (Boston: Shambhala, 1996).
19. Ibid., p. 79.
20. Ibid., p. 69.
21. David Rothenberg, Is It Painful to Think? Conversations with Arne Naess (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 127.
23. Ibid.
24. Alan Drengson, "The Deep Ecology Movement," The Trumpeter 12 (1995): 144.
25. Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, pp. 219 220.
26. Rothenberg, Is It Painful to Think?, p. 148.
28. Ibid., pp. 206 207. It is true that both Naess and Eckersley support a mixture of decentralization and
centralization, rather than extreme decentralization (although Naess seems to be relatively more decentralist). Their
positions are not inherently in conflict with social ecology, unless that ecophilosophy is identified with all the
views of Murray Bookchin, including his municipalist politics. While I would argue for radical decentralism, I do
not see how a dialectical perspective could foreclose debate on an empirical, historical question such as the degree
of decentralization optimal in any given social and ecological context.
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2
Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism
Eric Katz
This essay is dedicated to the memory of Richard Sylvan

Man is the measure of all thing
Protagoras
I
To what extent can an environmental ethic escape the perspective of human-centered value? Since only humans
are moral agents, and since only humans develop and discuss ethical theories and norms, is it inevitable that moral
value be understood from the standpoint of anthropocentrism?
The pervasiveness of anthropocentrism is not generally thought to be a problem for philosophical analysis. If one
considers questions in epistemology, for example, the centrality of human knowing seems a straightforward focus
of concern. Theories of knowledge concern the ways in which human beingsor the human project of science and
technologyorganize, understand, and validate claims about the world. Aesthetics, as another example, is about the
human perception, appreciation, and validation of the beautifulhere anthropocentrism is perfectly justifiable. Even
in ethics, a focus on human value, on human benefits and harms, seems highly appropriate. Most ethical discussion,
analysis, and justification concerns human agents, and the actions among human beings and human institutions.
The field of environmental ethics is, of course, a notable exceptionfor in environmental ethics we intentionally
consider the possible value of nonhuman entities, and the effects of human actions on nonhuman naturebut here the
exception proves the rule: environmental ethics may be the only field of philosophy that even considers the
possibility of moving beyond the perspective of anthropocentrism.
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But environmental ethics is not the only discipline that deals with the human relationship to the nonhuman world.
Consider the philosophy of nature, a traditional subdiscipline of metaphysics. In the development of a theory that
describes the nature of the natural world, should we be limited by a human-centered understanding? Must our
understanding of nature be limitedbiased, reallyby the anthropocentric content and structure of our ideas? Is it
possible to understand nature from the perspective of nature itself? Does this last question even make sense?
This problemthe possibility of escaping anthropocentrismhas fundamental importance for any attempt to address the
contemporary environmental crisis. Environmental policy, if it is to be morally defensible, must be connected in
some way to a plausible theory of environmental ethics. But a plausible theory of environmental ethics must, in
turn, be based on an adequate philosophy of naturea valid physical and metaphysical description of the way the
world is. Is any of this philosophical analysispolicy, ethics, metaphysicspossible from the limited horizon of
anthropocentrism?
The philosophy of deep ecology is a test case for these issues. The advocates of deep ecology claim, in part, that
their position addresses environmental issues from a wider perspective than traditional anthropocentrism. In
considering the intrinsic value of nonhuman life forms, in the process of identification with nonhuman natural
entities and systems, and in the development of policies of action that stress noninterference and the harmony of
human life and nature, deep ecologists claim to transcend anthropocentrism and adopt a perspective of ecocentrism.
In this essay, I examine this claim. I do not believe that deep ecology escapes the bias of anthropocentric thought.
In order to validate my criticism, I will first present a thorough and careful reading of the philosophy of deep
ecology. I will argue that the three core ideas of deep ecologythe process of identification with the natural world,
the goal of Self-realization, and a relational holistic ontologyare all anthropocentric in character.
II
Whether or not deep ecology is anthropocentric will depend on how deep ecology is defined. The meaning of deep
ecology as a philosophical position is not always clear. Arne Naess, the Norwegian philosopher who coined the
distinction between shallow environmentalism and deep ecology, is deliberately ambiguous when it comes to
delineating the fundamental ideas of deep ecology. Because deep ecology is primarily a social and political
movement, the advocates of the position do not want to alienate potential supporters with a narrow
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or technical ideology. 1 Naess has emphasized repeatedly that there are many different deep ecology positionseach
person is free to develop his or her own deep ecosophical total viewand he has used his "apron diagram" with its
various levels to show that different philosophical and religious positions can be used to derive and justify the
platform of the deep ecology movement.2 To borrow a phrase from the Republican Party in the United States, deep
ecology claims to be a "big tent" within which many different fundamental philosophical perspectives can feel at
home.
One way to characterize the central ideas of the philosophy of deep ecology would be to look carefully at the
philosophical content of the deep ecology political platform, for the platform represents the central common
ground occupied by all advocates of the deep ecology movement. Indeed, Andrew McLaughlin claims that the deep
ecology platform is the "heart" of deep ecology, for deep ecology is "an ecocentric movement for radical social
change,3 and not a theoretical or foundational philosophical system. The platform, as the "common ground" of
deep ecology, expresses the basic ideas of the position, regardless of the differing paths taken to arrive at, derive, or
justify these basic ideas. McLaughlin claims that "the point" of the platform "is to define the Deep Ecology
movement, create clarity within the Movement, and make clear where real disagreement might exist.''4
The central philosophical ideas of the platform involve the proper human relationship to the nonhuman natural
world. Of primary importance is a notion of "intrinsic value" for all living beings, human and nonhuman. This
notion is not technically precise; that is, it does not necessarily conform to any positions in ethics or value theory.
Debates within academic philosophy and environmental ethics about the difference between "inherent" value and
"intrinsic" value are almost completely irrelevant to an understanding of the philosophy of deep ecology as
expressed in the platform. The original platform (written by Naess and the American deep ecologist George
Sessions)5 used the terminology of "intrinsic value" to emphasize a critique of anthropocentric instrumental
reasoning and valuation regarding nonhuman natural life forms. In a more recent formulation, McLaughlin writes
that "the well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life . . . have value in themselves."6 The key point is
really a negative one: we are not to evaluate nonhuman or human life according to its "usefulness" for "human
purposes."
It is also clear from the clarifications that follow the platform that life per se is not the crucial locus of value. Deep
ecology is not equivalent to the position that environmental philosophy terms "biocentrism"a theory of value that
centers all value on living beings. For deep ecology, nonliving entities and
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systemsrivers, watersheds, landscapes, ecosystemsare to be valued for their inherent value, not merely for their
usefulness to humanity.
Richness and diversity are also important values in the deep ecology platform, and here again these are thought to
be valuable in themselves, and not merely as they contribute to human well-being. Naess and Rothenberg claim
that an ecologically complex world is better than one that is less complex. "Complexity" is contrasted with
"complication" 7it implies a unified diversity in nature, what Rothenberg calls ''the virtue and perfection of nature."
Mere complication, on the other hand, is a chaotic "manifold" of alternative possibilities, built on false dualisms
and dilemmas, with no overall purpose, plan, or unified structure. Rothenberg contrasts the development of natural
entities and systems with the operations of machines to illustrate the distinction between complexity and
complication. Human technology is complicated, but nature is complex, and it is this complexityits richness and
diversitythat ought to be preserved and valued for itself.
Given these primary concernsthe value of living beings and natural systems and the preservation of a rich and
diverse natural worldit is obvious that a policy of noninterference in the natural world is advocated by the deep
ecology platform. The human noninterference in the flourishing of natural systems is, of course, only an
idealhuman activities and institutions constantly interfere in the natural world in some way. But the supporters of
deep ecology seek to minimize this interference, to preserve the unfolding of natural processes in all of their rich
and diverse complexity. To maintain this policy of minimal interference, human society may have to be
restructuredthus deep ecology's controversial claims about the reduction of human population levelsbut the basic
changes will come in the economic, technological, social, and philosophical bases of human civilization. Most
important, perhaps, is a fundamental reexamination of the ends of human life, replacing the ceaseless pursuit of
material abundance with a new sense of the quality of life experience. Thus we arrive at the simple, practical
maxim of deep ecology: "simple in means, rich in ends."
Absent from the platform, but part of the original 1972 formulation of deep ecology by Naess, is the idea of
holism. Naess first characterized the deep ecology movement as rejecting the idea of "man-in-the-environment"
and replacing it with an image of a "relational, total-field" in which organisms would be "knots in the field of
intrinsic relations."8 This emphasis on holistic relations is not explicitly mentioned in the various current
formulations of the platform, but perhaps it is embedded in the dominant idea of the platform: respect for the
intrinsic value of all natural life and of nonliving natural systems.
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In a similar fashion, the other central characteristic of the 1972 formulation"biospherical egalitarianismin
principle"is no longer mentioned anywhere in the list of deep ecology principles. Clearly, the idea of equality
among all living thingsif taken literallyleads to too many practical problems in the implementation of policies of
action; and if the idea is not taken literally, it at the very least causes misunderstandings among both supporters and
critics of deep ecology. Indeed, it appears that the vagueness and comprehensiveness of the first two platform
principlesconcerning intrinsic value and diversityare meant to introduce a new terminology that captures the spirit
of the 1972 formulation.
Rothenberg and Sessions thus each claim that "ecocentrism" is the appropriate terminological label for a
description of deep ecology. Rothenberg writes: "The whole designation 'ecocentrism' is closer to an equivalent for
what Naess means by 'deep ecology': centering on the ecosphere." 9 And Sessions sees ecocentrism as the essential
point of the platform: "The philosophy of the Deep Ecology movement is characterized essentially by ecocentrism,
as outlined in the 1984 Deep Ecology platform."10
Deep ecology values the ecospherethe ecological systems and the natural entities that comprise the living and
developing natural world. Deep ecology values the ecosphere in itself, not merely for human purposes. Its chief
practical concern is for the ecosphere to continue to develop and flourish with a minimal amount of human
interference, degradation, and destruction. To accomplish this task, human social institutionseconomics, technology
and science, politics, education, philosophy, and religionmust be reoriented so that they can exist in harmony with
the developing processes and life-forms of the natural world.
III
If this is the philosophy of deep ecology, then it appears to be a denial of anthropocentrism, an attempt to develop
an environmental philosophy that explains the human relationship to the natural world with an emphasis on the
value of nature and natural processesan environmental philosophy that is not focused on human life and human
institutions. McLaughlin could not be clearer on this: he states that the first principle in the deep ecology
platformthe concern for intrinsic valueis "essentially . . . a rejection of anthropocentrism."11 So why isn't it? Why
does deep ecology fail to escape an anthropocentric perspective?
First, we must see that although deep ecology is an ecocentric position in environmental philosophy, not all
ecocentric positions are expressions of deep
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ecology. Deep ecology is not equivalent to ecocentrism. For example, one of the most comprehensive ecocentric
positions in environmental philosophy has been developed by Holmes Rolston, but Rolston is not a deep ecologist.
Rolston is a disciple of Aldo Leopold. He takes Leopold's notion of a land ethic based on respect for ecological
community and refines it in light of contemporary philosophy, ethics, and science. 12
Rolston begins by emphasizing the ecological context of living organisms. The struggle of the living organism is a
struggle within a system, an environmental situation. "We are not dealing simply with another individual defending
its solitary life but with an individual having situated fitness in an ecosystem it inhabits."13 Using an elephant as
an example, Rolston writes:
The elephant fits the savannas just as much as its heart fits its liver; within and without there is equal fitness
in amount but not in kind. . . . Savannas and forests are as necessary to elephants as hearts and livers. In the
complete picture, the outside is as vital as the inside. The more satisfactory picture is of elephants pushing
to fit into a system that provides and imposes sufficient containment. . . . The ecosystem supplies
coordinates through which the elephant moves. The elephant cannot really be mapped or located outside
these coordinates.14
Indeed, the description of what an elephant is, the meaning of "elephant," is dependent on the situated fitness of the
organism to the environment. "Elephants are what they are because they are where they are."15
This fitness of the organism to an environment provides not only the meaning of the organism but also both an
ecological and an ethical definition for the notion of community as the basis of a holistic environmental ethic. It is
in the emphasis on the normative community of the natural ecosystem that Rolston's thought can be traced to its
roots in the work of Leopold. Ecocentric holism takes seriously the claim made by Leopold that "a land ethic
changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It
implies respect for his fellow-members and also respect for the community as such."16 An adequate ecocentric
holism fuses two types of moral concern: respect for the individuals that comprise the system or community and
respect for the system or community itself. Rolston correctly notes that not every collection is a community;
communities require an ecology, literally a logic or set of rules for the home or place.17 The science of ecology
describes the events that occur in an ecosystem and how the community operates as an organizational systembut
this knowledge also reveals the value of the functions of the system, and thus it is both descriptive and
normative.18
Value and moral obligation are thus communitarian, holistic, not centered on the individual organism in isolation
from the system. Dependence on the system is the one inescapable truth that ecology teaches us, and we must use
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this truth as the basis of moral judgments concerning living organisms and nature. Rolston concludes:
The appropriate unit for moral concern is the fundamental unit of development and survival. Loving lions
and hating jungles is misplaced affection. An ecologically informed society must love lions-in-jungles,
organisms-in-ecosystems, or else fail in vision and courage. 19
An ecologically informed environmental policy must focus on the context and community of natural entities.
This brief summary of some essential elements in the environmental philosophy of Rolston is not meant as an
exhaustive analysis. Much of Rolston's philosophy has been omitted. My purpose in introducing Rolston here is to
show that an ecocentric environmental philosophy need not be a representative of the philosophy of deep ecology.
And of course Rolston is not the only example. J. Baird Callicott is another disciple of Leopold's who has
developed a holistic ecocentric environmental ethic. Callicott advocates a version of Leopold's land ethic based on
a Darwinian and Humean theory of the development of ethicsbut central to his vision is the worldview of
ecocentric holism.20 Andrew Brennan also advocates an environmental holism. Brennan's "ecological humanism"
is a holistic environmental philosophy based on one simple core ecological idea: "what something is and does
depends in part on where it is."21 Brennan's view "involves the recognition that all human life is lived within some
natural context and that it is in terms of that context that the identities of very different human lives are forged. "22
All human policies of action, all human ethical and political decisions, must be made in terms of the natural
context; thus all human thought and action, if it is to be adequate to the real world, must adopt an ecocentric
perspective.
In sum, there is no shortage of holistic and ecocentric environmental philosophies. But not all ecocentric positions
are expressions of deep ecology. Ecocentrism is not equivalent to deep ecology, and deep ecology is not equivalent
to ecocentrism. What, then, is distinctive about the philosophy of deep ecology? The lack of equivalence between
deep ecology and ecocentrism, and the subsequent need for a further distinguishing characteristic, or set of
characteristics, for deep ecology has profound implications for deep ecology's alleged rejection of
anthropocentrism.
IV
So why is deep ecology a distinctive position in environmental philosophy? Why is it deep, fundamental, and
different from the philosophies that underlie
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reformist or shallow environmentalism? On my reading of the deep ecology texts, there are three basic features of
the philosophical position that distinguish it from all other positions in environmental philosophy and ethics: (1)
identification with the nonhuman natural world; (2) the preeminent value of Self-realization; and (3) a relational
holistic ontology as the basis of normative values and decisions. All three of these ideas contribute to a continuing
anthropocentric bias in the development of deep ecology.
First, it should be noted that my interpretation of the basic ideas of the philosophy of deep ecology is not
uncontroversial, and it is heavily influenced by Naess's personal version of deep ecology, what he calls Ecosophy
T. None of these three ideasidentification, Self-realization, and holistic ontologyis featured in the platform,
probably because they are too technical and theoretical for a document meant to achieve political consensus in the
movement. But all three are presentat least as suggestionsin Naess's original 1972 formulation of the deep ecology
position. Their subsequent deemphasis in the attempt to achieve ideological consensus must not blind us to the fact
that these are crucial features of the deep ecology position as it appears in almost all published discussions.
It is precisely these features of deep ecologyidentification, Self-realization, and holistic ontologythat serve to
distinguish it from all other forms of ecocentric and nonanthropocentric holistic environmental ethics and
philosophy. It is only these ideas that distinguish deep ecology from positions held by Rolston, Callicott, Brennan,
and Leopold. Furthermore, it is only these ideas that clearly distinguish deep ecology from similar "radical"
environmental philosophiessuch as bioregionalism and social ecology.
The chief objection to the use of these ideas as definitive of the deep ecology position is their association with
Naess's own version of deep ecology. Naess claims that deep ecology is a personal statement of a total view. Each
individual must develop his or her own total view regarding the value of the environment and the human
relationship to the natural world. 23 Each individual total view, each personal ecosophy, begins with the
individual's basic values, which may be, and probably are, different from the values of other individuals working
on their own ecosophical total views. What ties these varying and disparate total views together into a coherent
position called "deep ecology" is, first, the platform of deep ecological political principles, and second, the method
of developing a total view of the human relationship to the natural world as a response to the ecological crisis.
Thus it would be incorrect to generalize any particular individual's basic values as the core idea of deep ecology.
Since "Self-realization" is the ultimate value of Naess's version of deep ecology (Ecosophy T), it would
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be a mistake to use this value as fundamental and distinctive to the overall philosophy of deep ecology. It would be
a similar mistake (perhaps) to use the ideas of "identification" and "holistic ontology" as defining characteristics.
This objection has merit, and its main pointthat the development of an individual total view is the main purpose of
deep ecologyshould always be kept in mind in any discussion of the philosophy of deep ecology. Nevertheless,
there are two good reasons for rejecting the objection and using "Self-realization," "identification," and "holistic
ontology" as three distinctive characteristics of the philosophy of deep ecology. First, the standard texts in deep
ecology belie Naess's claim that Ecosophy T is merely a personal statement of his vision of deep ecology; virtually
all discussions of deep ecology use these ideas as core doctrines. And second, virtually all serious deep ecological
thinkers (and by "serious" I mean those who discuss the philosophyand not just the political activismof deep
ecology) agree to versions of Naess's key ideas. Warwick Fox, for example, uses the notion of identification with
the rest of the natural world, an identification fueled by an ''expansion" of the sense of self, as the key distinctive
feature of the deep ecology approach. (Indeed, he places so much emphasis on the idea of the Self-realization of an
expanded self identifying with the natural world that he changes the name of deep ecology to "transpersonal
ecology.") But Fox does not believe that his version of deep ecology is unique; he claims that all other "main
writers on deep ecology" share Naess's belief in the realization of an expanded self through identification. 24
Two other deep ecology theorists help to demonstrate this point. Freya Mathews uses all three notionsSelf-
realization, identification, and a holistic metaphysicsto provide a detailed justification for the ethical and
philosophical principles of deep ecology.25 Using one specific interpretation of the general theory of relativity, she
argues for the unity of all substance as "spacetime," the only real physical substrate of the universe, a continuum of
which all individual entities are merely parts.26 She combines this Einsteinian and Spinozistic metaphysics with
the idea that the universe itselfas well as some individuals and systemsis a self, what she calls the "ecocosm,"
striving toward its own realization.27 For Mathews, this cosmology provides us with the justification for seeing
our physical unity with the universe, as well as a reason, a meaning, for the respect of the self-realizing universe.
David Rothenberg also advocates the core ideas derived from Naess. In his variation of the deep ecology platform,
which was meant to demonstrate the possibility (and the necessity?) for each individual to create his or her own
ecosophical total view, Rothenberg uses the ideas of Self-realization and identification as fundamental to the
explanation and praxis of deep ecology: "If one
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takes the notion of realization and expansion of the Self seriously, it involves considering more and more of nature
and one's environment as an essential part of one's identity." 28 Rothenberg even includes the idea of Self-
realization in the platform itself, within the idea that we should seek a higher quality of life (through Self-
realization) rather than an increase in material wealth.29
Thus there does not seem to be any reason not to use these three core ideasidentification, Self-realization, and a
holistic ontologyas fundamental concepts in the explanation and evaluation of the philosophy of deep ecology.
V
What do these core concepts of deep ecology mean? How do they add to or alter the basic meaning of an
ecocentric environmental ethic? First, consider the notion of "identification." This concept means that each
individual human agent develops some form of empathy, understanding, or commonality with the other individuals,
entities, and systems in the environment. Naess contrasts identification with the narrower idea of "solidarity,"
which may be based only on an "abstract idea of moral justice." Identification, in contrast, internalizes ''the
essential sense of common interests" between the individuals involved, so that a felt unity is comprehended and
experienced spontaneously, as matter of lived experience.30 Or, in a less technical version: "Identification is a
spontaneous, non-rational, but not irrational, process through which the interest or interests of another being are
reacted to as our own interest or interests."31 Fox stresses the notion of "commonality" as fundamental to the idea
of identificationand that "identification" does not mean "identity": we understand that we have common interests
with all other life-forms and systems in the natural world, but we do not believe that we literally are other entities
in the natural world.32 I am Eric Katz; I may identify with the deer sitting in the bushes out-side my window, in
that I recognize our common interests in the maintenance of this habitat, but I am not the deer.
Perhaps the most crucial way in which we identify with other living beings is through our recognition that all living
beings have some type of intrinsic or inherent value, and that their individual flourishing is good for them, not
necessarily for human beings and human institutionsas stated in the first principle of the deep ecology platform.
Identification is thus the recognition that other life forms have value in themselves, just as we do, and that their
lives are meaningful to them. But identification can also be linked to the core process of the expansion of the self,
a process that eventually leads to Self-realization, the fundamental norm of Naess's version of deep ecology.
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The connection between identification, expansion of the self, and Self-realization cannot be overemphasizedit is
the point around which all the ideas of deep ecology coalesce. By itself, Self-realization means the process by
which a being "realizes inherent potentialities" within itself and its situation. 33 But if we seriously identify with
other living beings, we engage in the process of expanding our narrow egoistic "self" into a larger "Self'' that
encompasses all those other beings with which we experience a commonality of interests. We cannot simply
develop our own personal potentialities; true Self-realization means participating in the developing potentialities,
the Self-realization, of all other beings.
Naess often states that Self-realization is a process that comes with maturityas we grow and develop as individuals,
we gradually expand our empathy, understanding, and identification with the rest of the natural world. "Increasing
maturity activates more of the personality in relation to more of the milieu [i.e., the environment]."34 We become
part of the process of Self-realization, where Self is capitalized to indicate a greater being than the individual
egoistic self of the human subject. Naess again: "By identifying with greater wholes, we partake in the creation
and maintenance of this whole. We thereby share in its greatness."35 This is the complete process of Self-
realizationthe development of the full potential of all living beings, experienced as part of our own development
and Self-realization through the process of identification.
For Naess, the full process of Self-realization eliminates the need for a system of moral obligation. Naess
advocates the notion, derived from Kant, of the beautiful actionthe harmonious fusion of self-interest and right
action, not commanded or directed by a sense of moral law.36 With a mature Self-realization, we defend the planet
in self-defense, we preserve natural processes and entities as an expression of our shared interests with the rest of
creation. By developing our capacity for Self-interestwith an emphasis on the capital "S" Selfwe transcend the need
for an appropriate ethics for the human treatment of the natural world.
It is thus clear that the deep ecological expansion of the self, through the process of identification, toward the goal
of Self-realization is quite different from the moral extensionism that can be attributed (on some interpretations) to
the land ethic of Leopold and to similar positions (such as Rolston's) in environmental ethics. Leopold's land ethic
can be read as a simple extension of moral consideration to ever wider groups and kinds of entities; thus we extend
our moral consciousness outward from the self to the family to society as a whole to animals, plants, and,
eventually, to the natural system itself, what Leopold calls the "land."37 In philosophical language, we extend the
range of entities capable of possessing moral valueindeed, we might even call this
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intrinsic or inherent value. But in the deep ecological expansion of the self, it is not our consideration of moral
value that is extended, it is our identificationour empathy, our commonality of intereststhat is extended. We extend
ourselves; we see ourselves more and more connected to the rest of the natural world. We take seriously the
ecological idea that all entities within natural systemsincluding human beingsare interconnected. The extensionism
of environmental ethics is thus an expansion of moral value; but the expansion of the deep ecological self is an
expansion of ontological commitments.
From two directions, then, we have arrived at the third core idea of the philosophy of deep ecology: a holistic
metaphysics or ontology. First, we have Naess's denial of ethics being the primary focal point of deep ecology. The
supremacy of ontology is demonstrated by the identification of interests and the expansion of the self as the
sources of beautiful actions regarding the preservation of nature. Second, the expansion of self and the goal of
Self-realization are seen to be components of an ontological claim about the interconnection of humans and nature,
and indeed about all entities and systems in the world. As Fox explains:
Transpersonal ecologists [i.e., advocates of deep ecology] claim that ecology, and modern science in
general, provides a compelling account of our interconnectedness with the world. . . . Their analysis of the
self is such that they consider that if one has a deep understanding of the way things are (i.e., if one
emphatically incorporates the fact that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality)
then one will . . . naturally be inclined to care for the unfolding of the world in all its aspects. . . . This is
why one finds transpersonal ecologists making statements to the effect that they are more concerned with
ontology or cosmology . . . than with ethics." 38
The advocates of deep ecology, in other words, are primarily concerned with developing the proper deep
understanding of the interconnection of all entities in the natural world. Any ethical principles or programs of
actionany environmental policywill be derivative of the fundamental ontological position. As Naess writes, "What I
am suggesting is the supremacy of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics."39
What, then, is the ontological position of the philosophy of deep ecology? What is meant by a "holistic
metaphysics?" The interconnection of all entities is clearly the key idea. As Naess writes in the original shorthand
1972 formulation, the deep ecology position is characterized by "rejection of the man-in-environment image in
favor of the relational, total-field image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic
relations."40 Deep ecology rejects an individualistic and atomistic metaphysics, in which all entities are separate
from each other. An individualistic and atomistic metaphysics would conceive of a human being as a separate
individual standing alone, free, and un-
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connected to all other entities within the environmentthe image of man-in-environment. From the perspective of
deep ecology, just the opposite is true: all entities are related, and they are constituted by their relationships with
other entities. The human individual exists and is defined by the relationships it has to other entities and processes
in the environment. The individual is constituted and defined by its relationships to the wholethis is the essence of
holism. The holistic interconnection of all entities in the natural world is the basic ontological commitment of the
philosophy of deep ecology.
Of course, this basic holistic ontology is explained, justified, and developed differently by different philosophers of
deep ecologybut the different explanations should not prevent us from seeing the same fundamental ontological
position throughout the many formulations of deep ecology. The science of ecology serves initially as a crucial
source for this ontological perspective, for the science of ecology explains and discovers the relationships that exist
between and among organisms and the physical environment. Of course this philosophy is called "deep ecology"
because of the original influence of ecological thinking on Naess and others. In the 1972 formulation, Naess uses
the perceptions of "the ecological field-worker" in support of the notion that all life is worthy of respectone of the
main ideas of the platform of deep ecology. 41
But ecology as a science is not the main source of the philosophy of deep ecology, for many other environmental
philosophers are inspired by the discoveries and worldview of ecological science. Rolston, discussed above, is a
clear example, as are Callicott and Brennan, among the ecocentric and holistic environmental philosophers who are
not considered members of the deep ecology movement. Even Paul Taylor, who bases his theory of environmental
ethics on the respect for individual living beingsand thus is not an ecocentric holistuses basic ecological factswhat
he calls "the great lesson" of the science of ecologyas a fundamental principle of his "biocentric worldview." The
second component of the appropriate biocentric worldview is this: "the belief that the human species and all other
species are part of an interdependent system, and that the survival and well-being of each living thing rests on both
the physical environment and the relations among other things."42 And Bryan Norton, who advocates a modified
anthropocentrism, bases his version of environmental ethics on the discoveries of ecology. In criticizing the
dominant materialistic culture of the contemporary world, Norton argues that we must adopt a "rational and
realistic worldview'' based on the science of ecologyso that we develop a value system based on a sense of humility
regarding human power and a goal of "harmony" with natural processes.43 In his more recent pragmatic work,
Norton claims that "environmentalists' emerging consensus . . . is based
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more on scientific principles [those of ecology] than on shared metaphysical and moral axioms." 44
It is easy to conclude, I think, that all serious environmental philosopherswhether or not they advocate deep
ecologymust find a central place for the science of ecology in the development of their thought. To deny the truths
of ecologyparticularly the facts of the interdependence and systematic relationships of organisms and
environmentwould immediately discredit the philosophical position as naive and out of touch with reality. An
environmental philosophy that did not recognize ecological science would be unacceptable, irrelevant to the
environmental crisis that surrounds us.
It is important to note, however, that Naess warns against an excessive use of ecological science in developing an
appropriate worldview and environmental philosophy. "Ecology may comprise a great deal, but it should never be
considered a universal science." To consider ecological theories and concepts as universal would be to distort
philosophyin particular, theories of knowledge and behavior, and the derivation of values. Thus Naess warns
against "ecologism," the universal use of ecological concepts in areas of human thought and endeavor where it is
not appropriate.45 This clear restriction on the use of ecological science is another indication that deep ecology's
metaphysical basis lies in a particular philosophical worldviewa particular picture of the structure of the worldand
not in the mere enunciation of ecological facts and theories.
So what are the foundation and justification of the metaphysical and ontological interdependence that is the third
core idea of deep ecology? Naess's position is based on his relational epistemology and gestalt ontology, as
explained in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle.46 Naess first argues that all qualities and characteristics of objects
in the world are relational, dependent on the perspective and location of the observer, and indeed on the observer's
"conception of the world. "47 This relational understanding of the world is, however, more than an epistemological
necessity: it is an ontological commitment. Naess returns to the views of Heraclitus: "We must strive for greater
familiarity with an understanding closer to that of Heraclitus: everything flows. We must abandon fixed, solid
points, retaining the relatively straightforward, persistent relations of interdependence."48 Interdependence and
relations even require Naess to redefine the idea of matter. ''Instead of matter, I will speak of the relational field . . .
[which] . . . refers to the totality of our interrelated experience. . . . Things of the order 'material things' are
conceived of as junctions within the field."49 And finally: "Relationalism has ecosophical value, because it makes
it easy to undermine the belief in organisms and persons as something which can be isolated from their milieux
[i.e., their environment]."50
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Naess considers the idea of the relational field as a "refinement" of the ideas of matter and its qualities originally
put forth by Protagoras, in which matter actually possesses the qualities we perceive and attribute to it, even when
these are contradictory. Calling Protagoras's view "both-and theory," he states that it "admits sensory reality with
[having a] sterling ontological status." 51 Secondary and tertiary qualities are real in the relational field, as real as
the ideal and abstract primary qualities of mathematical and physical relations. In fact, secondary and tertiary
qualities are, in one sense, more real than the abstract mathematical qualities of objects, for the abstract structures
are "not [the] contents of reality," while secondary and tertiary qualities are the actual "concrete contents'' of the
relational field.52
For Naess, the "concrete content" of the relational field can be explained only through an understanding of
"gestalts" and "gestalt thinking." A gestalt is a spontaneous experience of a whole, and it is at once comprehensive
and complex. The gestalt is the basic and immediate form of understanding and perceptiononly later do we analyze
our gestalts into parts, into separate objects and qualities. Gestalt thinking explains how the various contents of our
experience in the relational field "hang together." In speaking of a piece of music, Naess explains how we will
experience the first few notes differently if we are familiar with the piece. But more than that:
The gestalt of a complex piece of music is subordinate to the experience in a particular situation. The piece
may be played in the open or in a beautiful or an ugly building. If we have a particular companion, our
relation to the companion in that situation influences the experience of the music. No part of the experience
stands entirely alone.53
Naess uses gestalt thinking to "bind together" the rational and emotional levels of reality. Our experience of reality
is at the immediate level a normative and valuational experience, and this will have profound implications for
environmental ethics and environmental policy. People have different worldviewsdifferent people see and
understand the world differently. "But one's ethics in environmental questions are based largely on how one sees
reality."54 As an example, Naess discusses the clash between those who wish to develop a forest and those who
wish to preserve it. "Confrontations between developers and conservers reveal difficulties in experiencing what is
real. What a conservationist sees and experiences as reality, the developer typically does not seeand vice versa."
The environmentalist sees a reality of a forest that is a unified whole, filled with emotional content: joyous flowers,
singing streams, or laughing birches. The developer merely sees trees for lumber, land for homes or farms. Thus
both the developers and the preservationists may share ethical views, but they do not share the same reality in
which to apply these views.
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Naess concludes: "The difference between the antagonists is one rather of ontology than ethics. " 55
Thus we see that a sophisticated ontological position underlies the core deep ecological idea of the interdependence
between the entities and systems of the natural world. There is more to this view of natural interrelationships than
the mere scientific facts of ecology. Indeed, the importance of ontological and metaphysical principles in the
philosophy of deep ecology is given much support by Freya Mathewswhose work I noted above in support of my
claim that the core idea of Self-realization is a basic principle of deep ecology. In perhaps the most explicitly
metaphysical version of the philosophy of deep ecology, Mathews develops a cosmology in which the universe
itselfas well as some individuals and systemsis a self, an ecocosm, striving toward its own realization. Mathews
uses theoretical physics and the philosophy of Spinozanot the principles and facts of ecologyto ground and explain
the physical (and metaphysical) unity of the universe. It will be this cosmology that provides us with the ethical
vision to respect and care for the natural world, a self-realizing ecocosm or Self. Mathews claims that her entire
argument is simply "that the right cosmology will dispose us towards a benign pattern of interaction with the
environment."56
For Mathews, however, the right cosmology is a significant extension of the gestalt ontology of Naess. She argues
that Naess's view of identification and Self-realization corresponds, in her metaphysical framework, "to a
recognition of our . . . interconnectedness with the universal substance, and a consequent expansion of our self-
love to embrace it."57 We love and protect the world because we expand our identity to include the world; we love
the world as we love our own bodies.58 For Mathews, this does not go far enoughin addition to viewing the
universe as a substance of which we are part, we also must view the universe as a self whose Self-realization we
also participate in. Only if we view the universe as a self, striving to achieve its own potentialities through Self-
realization, is there a reason for us to identify with it and to preserve it.59
I am not interested in debating or justifying Mathews's version of the cosmology and ontology of deep ecologyand
even less inclined to enter into any potential debate between the supporters of Naess and those of Mathews. What
is important here, for my critical argument in the next section, is the clear place that specific ontological
commitments have in the development of the philosophy of deep ecology. The philosophy of deep ecology is what
it is, in part, because of its relational and holistic ontology, as demonstrated by the arguments presented by Naess
and Mathews, among others.60
To summarize this section: the philosophy of deep ecology is characterized by three core ideas that serve to
differentiate it from the direct and basic eco-
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centric holism prevalent in much environmental ethics. These ideas are (1) the identification of the self with the
entire natural world; (2) the goal of Self-realization, acting so as to further the development of the wider Self (the
natural world) with which we come to identify; and (3) a relational and holistic ontology, which tends to provide a
metaphysical foundation for the process of identification, the goal of Self-realization, and the development of an
appropriate environmental ethic.
VI
Why do these ideas of deep ecology fail to escape the bias of anthropocentrism? I believe that the answer to this
critical question is obvious. All three of the core distinguishing ideas of deep ecologyidentification, Self-
realization, and holistic ontologyare deeply embedded in a human-centered worldview. All three core ideas are
based on human categories of thought and human notions of value. Since deep ecology is a philosophical position
developed by human beings, this anthropocentric perspective is, of course, not surprisingbut since the advocates of
deep ecology claim that their philosophical position transcends anthropocentrism, it is important to emphasize the
problems, so that we are not misled in the attempt to develop an adequate philosophical response to the
environmental crisis.
The process of identification, first of all, is by its very structure anthropocentric in character. We are asked to
identify our interests with the interests of the nonhuman natural world and, indeed, with all other living beings. We
are to identify, through a process of empathy, with the interests of other beings. Although we are not supposed to
think of ourselves as identical to other beings, we come to see that we share a commonality of interests. The key
idea here is that we recognize that other living beingsincluding those in the nonhuman natural worldshare our
human interests, so that in thwarting their interests, we thwart our own. In harming them, we harm ourselves.
The anthropocentrism of the process of identification is fundamentally connected to the anthropocentric character
of the entire process of Self-realization andat least in Naess's formulationthe advocacy of the Kantian notion of
"beautiful" actions, which fuse together ethical obligation and the pursuit of personal interests. As noted above,
Naess often claims that once a person has an adequate ecosophical worldview, the need for a system of ethical
obligation regarding the proper treatment of the natural environment would be irrelevant. By developing our
Selfour increased recognition of our connections to the rest of the environmentwe will act to preserve the natural
environment because of "traits of human nature"that is, through our expanded notion of
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our self-interest as connected to the larger Self of the natural word and Its interest. 61
To put this more simply, Naess is arguing that humans ought to preserve the natural environment because it is in
the human interest to do soindeed, it is in the individual's interest to preserve the natural world because it will
further the interests of the individual. Of course the interests of the individual from within the deep ecological
perspective will not be the narrow egoistic interests of ordinary human life. Human interests will be expanded
through a process of identification with the nonhuman world, and human interests (according to the platform of
deep ecology) should focus more on the quality of life experiences than on the mere increase in material goods.
Nevertheless, the focus and goal of the preservation of natural processes is the maximization of human interests.
The identification and expansion of the Self are clearly anthropocentric in character, structure, and goal.
Consider also Mathews's argument that the universal substance which comprises the world must be understood not
only as a physical substance but also a universal Self in the process of Self-realization. As discussed in the
previous section, Mathews claims that if the identification process in deep ecology is restricted to the notion of
substancethat is, we merely identify with the physical nature of the universethen there will be no reason beyond
self-interestthe preservation of our bodies and livesto preserve the nonhuman world. Mathews seeks to find
intrinsic value in the universe itself, so that our identification with the nonhuman natural world and our desire to
preserve it go beyond a simple belief in physical interconnectedness. Mathews seeks the meaningfulness of the
universe, for without some inherent meaning in that with which we identify, we are reduced to a mere "extension
of ourselves."62
Mathews's solution, as mentioned above, is to conceive of our identification with the universe not merely as a
physical substance but also as a Selfthe ecocosma universal self-realizing system.63 Since I recognize myself as a
self, my recognition of the universe as a self-realizing systema Selfprovides a more meaningful process of
identification than mere physical interconnectedness.64 But the notion of a self-realizing universe as that which
gives meaning to the preservation of the nonhuman natural world is blatantly and obviously anthropocentric.
Mathews is claiming that it is not enough for us to identify with the physical interconnectedness of the universewe
must also identify with a universe that is, like ourselves, a self-realizing system. Mere physical identification is not
enough because, according to Mathews, humans are different from most of the rest of the physical universe!
"Being human is different from being amoebic, or being a rock or a gas or a region of spacetime, in so far as we
alone
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amongst these entities can grasp our unity with the greater whole." 65 True enough. Yet it seems highly suspect
for an argument that is meant to transcend anthropocentrism to use the idea of human self-awareness as a
characteristic feature of the nonhuman universe with which we are meant to identify. Identifying with the universe
as a self is an obvious product of anthropocentric thought.
It seems clear, as the late Richard Sylvan pointed out in his criticism of deep ecology, that we should be wary of
the entire notion of self-realization, for it has an anthropocentric history and pedigree.66 The goal of self-
realization "emerges direct from the humanistic Enlightenment; it is linked to the modern celebration of the
individual human, freed from service to higher demands, and also typically from ecological constraints." Sylvan
reminds us that the concept involves the maximization of egos, individual selves, or, at best, the privileged class of
humanlike selves. Even the attempt to escape egoism, with the notion of a capital "S" Self as a holistically
extended super-self, succeeds only because we are identifying ourselves with the universe through an
anthropocentric notion, a comparison to ourselves as individual human beings.
The goal of Self-realization is biased toward human value in two other ways. First, as Sylvan argues, a goal of self-
realization leads to "inegalitarianism" and human chauvinism, for it forces the advocates of deep ecology to make a
distinction between different living beings. Which living things are selves? And which of these selves have the
capability to expand into a Selfthat is, which individuals have the capability to recognize their interconnections
with the larger universe?67 Clearly, it is primarily humans who have this capabilityand probably not all humans at
that.
Moreover, the entire goal of Self-realization is too psychological, too much based on the experience of the subject.
"It renders value a feature of those who experience value," as if color were merely an aspect of human experience
and not based, at least in part, on the composition of objects and things that are colored.68 Thus the goal of
"maximizing" Self-realization appears to be equivalent to the goal of maximizing situations in which (human)
selves experience value. This is clearly anthropocentric.69
The anthropocentric character of the goal of Self-realization is actually only one version of a more general problem
in the methodology of environmental ethics, a problem originally discussed by John Rodman but elaborated by
Sylvan.70 In the attempt to ascribe value to entities in the universe, we human evaluators select features of these
entities, and generalize these features as the standard or the criterion for possessing value, or being in the class of
morally considerable entities. But "no simple species or subspecies, such as humans or
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superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a base class, for
determining moral relevance and other ethical dimensions." Any such feature we select is "arbitrary" and
"loaded"that is, it is inherently biased toward characteristics possessed by the elite human class. A truly unbiased
environmental ethic must be based on a notion of ''eco-impartiality" in which none of the characteristics of any
particular class of entities is used as the sole determining factor of moral value. 71 Deep ecology, with its emphasis
on Self-realizationand to a lesser extent, the goal of all living entities to flourish and blossomfails this test.72
The third core idea of deep ecologyits holistic ontologycan also be criticized for its anthropocentrism. The
anthropocentric bias in a metaphysical doctrine may be less obvious than in the ideas of identification and Self-
realization, but it is present nevertheless. Recall that Naess considers his relational ontology a refinement of the
theories of Protagoras. The most famous of Protagorean fragmentswhich serves as the epigraph for this essayis
perhaps the most positive and concise statement of the anthropocentric bias of human epistemology, ontology,
aesthetics, and ethicsindeed, of all philosophy and human endeavor. I am not merely accusing Naess (and all of
deep ecology) of guilt by associationbut given its Protagorean roots, we must be highly suspicious of the
objectivity and impartiality of a relational holistic ontology. A relational ontology must begin with the immediate
experiences of the individual subject. Naess himself argues that "simple 'holism"' is not by itself adequate as a
response to the mechanistic and atomistic ontology of the dominant worldview. The deep ecological ontological
worldview "must refer to experience, and spontaneous experience [i.e., the basis of gestalt perception] in
particular."73 Given this emphasis on the gestalt experience of the human subject, it is difficult to see how the
relational holistic ontology of deep ecology can avoid an anthropocentric biashuman beings cannot escape the
anthropocentric character of their relational experiences.
Evidence of this bias can be seen in one of Naess's more poetic essays, "Metaphysics of the Treeline."74 Naess
describes the experiential gestalts of the mountain treeline, the altitude on high mountain peaks at which trees cease
to be found. In analyzing the "symbolic value" of the treeline, Naess offers three perspectives on its metaphysical
aspect, each by a different kind of human philosopher: the homocentrist (i.e., the anthropocentrist), the idealist
philosopher, and the ecosopher (i.e., a follower of the philosophy of deep ecology). In the mind of the ecosopher,
Naess puts the following thoughts:
The richness and fecundity of reality! How overwhelming! The treeline's abstract geographical structure
points to a seemingly infinite variety of concrete contents [i.e., the
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substance of experience]! More is open to the human ecological self than can be experienced by any other
living being. 75
It is difficult to interpret this last statement in a nonanthropocentric way. Here the three core ideas of the
philosophy of deep ecology coalesce into the goal of maximizing the positive human experience of value in a
universe identified with one's own self.
Perhaps deep ecology has lost its true direction. Such is the final criticism by Sylvan, an original supporter of deep
ecology who early on rejected it in favor of an alternative he called Deep Green theory. (William Grey discusses
Deep Green theory in his essay in this volume.) For Sylvan, Deep Green theorywhat deep ecology ought to have
become-remains primarily focused on axiology and ethics, not on ontology.76 A Deep Green axiology can avoid
anthropocentrism by focusing on the intrinsic features of environmental entities, not those features which "emerge"
from the experiences of certain valuersthat is, humans.77 A relational holistic ontology, with the process of
identification as the basis for the goal of Self-realization, obscures the proper nonanthropocentric direction of an
environmental ethic. The proper course for environmental philosophy can not be an ecosophy, an ontologically
based worldview; the proper course can only be an environmental ethic, with all that the term implies for the
development and clarification of practical action in the policy arena.
VII
To conclude this analysis, it is necessary to examine Naess's own discussion of the anthropocentrism of deep
ecology. In his book-length interview with Naess, David Rothenberg questions Naess about the place of human
interests and values in the goals of the deep ecology movement. Naess's answers are at best ambiguous, for he
leaves open the possibility that deep ecology activism is the result of the maximization of human interests.78
Rothenberg suggests the possibility that for many people the deep ecology movement means a concern for
nonhuman nature "apart from concern for people." Naess responds simply: "I deplore this. There need never be
such an opposition."79 But Rothenberg presses the issue, and outlines two paradigmatic ways of arguing for the
preservation of wild areas of nature: first, because the preservation of nature enlarges each of us as a person by
increasing Self-realization through the process of identification; or, second, because the Earth, nonhuman nature, is
important in itself, and we should preserve it for itself. Clearly, the first alternative is based on a human-interest
notion of Self-realization; it is the kind of anthropocentrically biased form of argument that
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I have criticized in this essay. Can Naess avoid this interpretation of deep ecology?
His first answer is that he does not see the two arguments as being incompatible, which is logically correct but not
helpful in deciding the issue. But he explains his comment by offering examples of when it is justifiable to kill the
last member of an endangered species or burn the last area of rain forest, and these justifications are based on
personal human survival: it is permissible for a father to perform these destructive acts to feed his starving child.
This anthropocentric justification is softened only by Naess claiming that nature should not be harmed "without
good reason."
Rothenberg continues to press Naess for a clearer response. He wants to know if it is wrong to harm nature for its
own sake or if it is wrong because, with the proper understanding (the proper worldview), we would understand
that nature is part of us. Rothenberg: "Self-realization as a norm suggests . . . that you're doing it for yourself."
Naess replies: "Yes, like Gandhi would say. When he was asked, 'How do you do these altruistic things all year
long?' he said, 'I am not doing something altruistic at all. I am trying to improve in Self-realization.'" 80
Naess continues with the claim that we must conceive the possibility of the human ego being "enlarged and
deepened," so that there is no "cleavage" between the self and the world. Nevertheless, the interview demonstrates
that within the core ideas of deep ecology there is a systematic ambiguity about the proper place of human interests
in the justification of environmental action. As with the Kantian notion of beautiful actions that Naess cites so
often, there is a conflation of personal and altruistic interests. The preservation of nature is justified, within deep
ecology, because it furthers the process of Self-realization, a process that includes the further realization of the
narrow self of the human ego. Nature is preserved not for its own sake but for the sake of everything (the
expansive, universal Self), and nature can be harmed for the ''good reason" of personal human survival.
VIII
Finally, two comments. As noted above, my interpretation of the philosophy of deep ecology rests heavily on core
ideas in Naess's version: identification, Self-realization, and a relational holistic ontology. I believe strongly that
these are the key ideas which separate deep ecology from other forms of ecocentric environmental ethics.
However, I could be wrong: advocates of the deep ecology position may be able to convince me that there are
other key notions which bet-
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ter characterize this philosophy. Nevertheless, my criticisms of these three core ideas still hold, whether or not they
are the essential ideas of deep ecology. At the very least I have demonstrated that Naess's version of deep ecology
is heavily influenced by anthropocentric ideas. If need be, I can rest content with that limited conclusion.
Second, this analysis shows the overwhelming pervasiveness of an anthropocentric bias in human thought, for even
an environmental philosophy consciously developed to transcend anthropocentrism falls victim to its influence. We
must struggle against the inevitability of anthropocentrism in human frameworks of thought and human-created
systems of value. I agree with Richard Sylvan that we must construct an environmental ethic and an environmental
axiology that deemphasize human-centered categories of value. We must attempt to find a metaphysics and a
philosophy of nature that are not biased in favor of a human worldview. In sum, we must develop an
environmental philosophy that is truly impartial in its consideration of all entities and systems in the natural and
human world.
Notes
1. The first published formulation of the deep/shallow distinction was Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep,
Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95 100. Naess often expresses reluctance to do
academic philosophy, for he is more concerned with the political and social movement of deep ecology. Thus
David Rothenberg claims that Naess left his post as Professor of Philosophy in 1969 to concentrate on the
ecological crisis (see Rothenberg, "Introduction," in Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, translated and
edited by David Rothenberg [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 1). For an example of many
Naess comments, see "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," in Deep Ecology for the
21st Century, edited by George Sessions, (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), p. 71: "'Deep ecology' is not a philosophy in
any proper acedemic sense.''
2. For two versions of the derivational "apron diagram," see Naess, "The Deep Ecological Movement," in Sessions,
21st Century, p. 77; and "Ecosophy T," in Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, Bill Devall and George
Sessions (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985), p. 226.
3. Andrew McLaughlin, "The Heart of Deep Ecology," in Sessions, 21st Century, p. 90.
4. Ibid., p. 91.
5. One of the earliest versions of the platform appears in Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology, p. 70. It also appears
in Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pp. 29ff.
6. McLaughlin, "Heart of Deep Ecology," p. 86.
7. Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pp. 199 203. See also David Rothenberg, "A Platform of Deep
Ecology." The Environmentalist 7:3 (1987): 186 187.
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8. Naess, "Shallow and Deep," p. 95.
9. Rothenberg, "Introduction," p. 15.
10. Sessions, 21st Century, p. xiii.
11. McLaughlin, "Heart of Deep Ecology," p. 86.
12. Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1988). For the work of Leopold, see Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York:
Ballantine, 1970; rpt. from Oxford University Press, 1949).
13. Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 100.
14. Ibid., p. 164.
15. Ibid.
16. Leopold, Sand County Almanac, p. 240.
17. Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 172.
18. Ibid., p. 173.
19. Ibid., p. 176.
20. J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).
21. Andrew Brennan, Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of Nature, Value, and Ecology (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1988), p. 117.
22. Ibid., p. 184.
24. Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston:
Shambhala, 1990), p. 224.
25. Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991).
26. Ibid., pp. 59 70.
27. Ibid., pp. 147 163.
28. Rothenberg, "A Platform," p. 190.
29. Ibid., pp. 186, 188.
31. Arne Naess, "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes," in Deep Ecology, edited by Michael
Tobias, (San Diego: Avant Books, 1985), p. 261 (italics in original).
32. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, p. 231.
33. Arne Naess, "Self-realizationAn Ecological approach to Being in the World," in Sessions, 21st Century, p. 229.
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35. Ibid., p. 173 (italics in original).

36. The Kantian notion of beautiful action is a frequent theme throughout Naess's writings on environmental issues
and deep ecology. See Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 86; and "Self-Realization," in Sessions, 21st
Century, p. 236.
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37. See Leopold, Sand County Almanac, pp. 238 239.
38. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, pp. 246 247.
39. Naess, "Self-Realization," in Sessions, 21st Century, p. 236.
40. Naess, "Shallow and Deep," p. 95.
41. Ibid., pp. 95 96.
42. Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), pp. 99 100. Taylor mentions the "great lesson" of ecology in an earlier essay that formed the basis of his
book. See "The Ethics of Respect for Nature," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 197 218, quotation on 205.
43. Bryan G. Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 203 207.
44. Bryan G. Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 92.
45. Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pp. 39 40.
46. Ibid., pp. 47 67.
47. Ibid., pp. 48 49.
48. Ibid., p. 50.
49. Ibid., p. 55.
50. Ibid., p. 56.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 57.
53. Ibid., p. 58.
54. Ibid., p. 66.
55. Ibid. (italics in original).
56. Mathews, Ecological Self, p. 141.
57. Ibid., pp. 150 151. Emphasis added.
58. Ibid., p. 149.
59. Ibid., p. 151.
60. Fox also relies heavily on a holistic ontology.
62. Mathews, Ecological Self, p. 151.
63. Ibid., p. 147.
64. Ibid., p. 149.
65. Ibid.
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66. Richard Sylvan and David Bennett, The Greening of Ethics (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1994), p.
154. Although this volume is coauthored, it is clear that most of the criticisms of deep ecology derive from the
work of Sylvan. Most of the arguments critical of deep ecology in this book are taken from Sylvan's 1985 essay "A
Critique of Deep Ecology," Radical Philosophy 40 (Summer 1985): 2 11 and 41 (Autumn 1985):
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10 22. With apologies to David Bennett, I will throughout this essay refer only to Sylvan when I discuss these
arguments. Another important criticism of deep ecology can be found in William Grey, "Anthropocentrism and
Deep Ecology," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:4 (December 1993): 463 475.
67. Sylvan and Bennett, Greening, p. 108.
68. Sylvan, "A Critique," part I, p. 11; and Sylvan and Bennett, Greening, p. 110.
70. See John Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?" Inquiry 20 (1977): 83 131; and Sylvan and Bennett, Greening,
pp. 140ff.
72. For more, see Sylvan's criticism of biocentrism in "A Critique," part I, pp. 8 10.
73. Arne Naess, "Ecosophy and Gestalt Ontology," The Trumpeter 6:4 (Fall 1989): 136. Reprinted in Sessions, 21st
Century, p. 245.
74. Arne Naess, "Metaphysics of the Treeline," in Sessions, 21st Century, pp. 246 248.
75. Ibid., p. 248. Emphasis added.
76. Sylvan and Bennett, Greening, pp. 137 146, 157 158.
77. Ibid., p. 142.
Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 139 42.
79. Ibid., p. 139.
80. Ibid., p. 141.
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3
A Critique of Deep Green Theory
William Grey
The death of Richard Sylvan (formerly Richard Routley) in Bali, Indonesia, in June 1996 deprived environmental
philosophy of one of its most vigorous, radical, and prolific champions. In this essay I explore some aspects of
Sylvan's ambitious and detailed research program in environmental philosophy. In doing so, I revisit and extend
themes that I have addressed elsewhere. 1
Sylvan's program reached a lot further than the ambit of environmental philosophy as conceived by the majority of
writers in this area. It is systematically and extensively linked with Sylvan's (and others') work in metaphysics,
semantics, logic, and value theory. Sylvan also linked it with work outside mainstream Australasian and Anglo-
American philosophical inquiry, as well as with work in Taoism, Buddhism, nihilism, cosmology, demography,
politics, economicsand more.2
Over the last twenty years within Australasia, and beyond, Sylvan was responsible, individually and in
collaboration, for substantial and seminal developments in environmental philosophy. He was also responsible for
provoking a number of significant alternative articulations of the issues, which he addressed in a characteristically
robust style. In this essay I touch only a few fragments of the mosaic.
There are problems in trying to survey the whole of Sylvan's oeuvre, parts of which are technical and parts of
which arise from his idiosyncrasies in presentation and publishing. His work deserves to be more widely known.3
Environmental Philosophy
Environmental philosophy began as a research program in Australasian (and Anglo-American) academic
philosophy as a result of a perceived dissatisfaction with the adequacy of received views about the value of
nonhuman nature and permissible actions with respect to natural items, such as organisms and
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ecosystems, that belong to and constitute the nonhuman world. In fact, the dissatisfaction was deeper than a
dissatisfaction with the adequacy of moral theories and injunctions: concerns were repeatedly expressed that the
conceptual framework(s) were not adequate to the task of the inquiry. To quote one thinker, not widely renowned
for his radical revisionary views:
Sometimes words fail us; usage defeats us. There is a distinction we want to make. It is reasonably clear in
our mind and we believe it to be important. There are two words at our disposal which, given their past
history, we should like to use in order to make the distinction. Unfortunately, however, they are often used
as synonyms, or in some context which goes right against the usage we should like to introduce.
Seventeenth century writers had this problem when they wanted to distinguish between what we now call
"enthusiasm" and what we now call "fanaticism." They were often used as synonyms and in many contexts
"enthusiasm'' had been the preferred word where we should now write "fanaticism." It took more than a
century before a writer could use "enthusiasm" in its modern sense without running a serious risk of being
misunderstood.
My position is very similar. Feeling the need to distinguish between two kinds of human action, I should
like to label them, respectively, "conservation" and " 4
The starting point of environmental philosophy is a critique of assumptions, ordinarily taken for granted, that help
to shape our perception of ourselves and our world, and to guide our behavior. The "self-evident" assumption that
is the main target of environmental philosophy concerns the legitimacy of anthropocentrism, which is, according to
Sylvanas well as to many other writers in this areaboth a central component of our received moral attitudes and
fundamentally flawed.
The sort of predicament outlined in John Passmore's lament, quoted above, is manifested very keenly in
environmental philosophy. It has generated several unfortunate consequences. First, it has fostered a variety of
competing proposals for conceptual revision, such as the Augean stable of deep ecology that Sylvan attempted to
cleanse. Perhaps in its inchoate state of development it is not surprising to find a certain amount of fumbling and
confusion. Second, it has engendered a plethora of unfortunate neologisms. We find Sylvan forging his own
deplorable examples ("non-jective," "gre-een," "extranalities," "expiricism," "intraneous," "extitution"). After a
while one starts to yearn for a bit of Hegelian or postmodernist precision and clarity.
The parts of Sylvan's environmental philosophy I want to examine are his account of value, his espousal of a
pluralistic environmental philosophy, and some features of his articulation of what he came to call "Deep Green
theory."5 In the course of this I will comment on the confusion surrounding the notion of anthropocentrism. I will
concentrate on points of disagreement and hope that this will not mask the very high regard I hold for Sylvan's
work.
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Sylvan's papers fall into two broad groups. First there are the constructive essays, whose intent is to develop what
he eventually labeled "Deep Green" philosophy. While these papers are mostly expository, they also contain
critical material, directed mainly at defenders of the status quo and other reactionaries. 6 Second there are the
predominantly critical papers directed mainly at fellow toilers in the vineyards of environmental philosophy, which
are presented in an often bruising "bare knuckles" style.7 I will consider some of the things he had to say in
writings from each of these categories. Also, I make no attempt to identify authorial responsibility in the case of
jointly authored papers. For my purposes "Sylvan" is the name of a mereological aggregate that includes various
Routley, Plumwood, and Bennett stages.
An environmental ethic, we are told, "involves a reconceptualization of appropriate and inappropriate behavior
towards the environment, by humans, and applications of ethics directly to the environment."8 Why should we take
account of environmental items, or parts of nonhuman nature? Let us put aside for the time being the question of
whether it is possible to introduce criteria of value that don't presuppose human standards.
One reason is that human activities and interests have extended progressively to different levels of organization
within the world. For example, human activities have come to be more disruptive at chemical and global levels,
and consequently have generated a need for regulation and constraint that formerly did not exist, or at least whose
need was formerly not obvious. While we deal with organized complexity at many levels, from an agent-centered
perspective the social level is the most basic and immediate. The social level of organization of the world is of
course the domain of classical moral theory. And one of the standard objections to environmental ethics is that it
makes no sense to apply the vocabulary of ethics beyond the domain of human (or, on some extensionist views,
sentient) society.
One way of articulating the concerns of environmental ethics is to say that moral considerations have come to
manifest themselves on other levels as well. One influential development of this idea is Aldo Leopold's "Land
Ethic," which proposes that we extend the notion of community to include "soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively: the land."9 The way that biological systems are organized and the way that we may act toward them
(the range of permissible treatment) is open to the same sorts of consideration that obtained in classical ethics.
However, there are limits to how far the sense of a moral community can be extended. There is plenty of
significant organization and structure at microscopic and cosmic levels, but there is no plausible sense of
community that includes quarks and quasars. This point is relevant to the task of determining the appropriate scale
for human concern, to which I will return.
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Green ethics, Sylvan suggests, is not just a branch of applied ethics: it does not seek to add another domain of
practical concern to the philosophical agenda, but to radically change "ethics itself." 10 That is, whereas applied
ethics seek to apply principles and values (as happens in medical ethics, business ethics, sexual ethics, etc.), Green
ethics is concerned to question the adequacy of the "tried and tested . . . old (anthropocentric) values.11 Let us
therefore consider some aspects of Sylvan's account of values.
Values
Sylvan recommends a Meinongian account of values.12 He argues that while values "do not fit easily or at all into
over-simple scientific views of the world,"13 we can nevertheless satisfy the demand for a naturalistic account of
value. A primitive model "adapted from behavioral psychology" construes value as that which nature rewards and
punishes.14
This approach is not promising. First, it construes nature as an agent, though not necessarily a person. How else
are we to understand the claim that nature can "punish" and "reward"? Second, there is vagueness about just what
"nature" refers to and who is to be conceived as the beneficiary of the reward. Are beneficiaries individuals, or
populations, or systems, or any of these? Without the help of some expository detail, it is hard to see how the
model is to be applied. Third, there is a question of what time parameters are relevant for determining the reward.
Short-term pain may be long-term gain. While these may all be points of detail that can be tidied up, there is the
more serious worry of how this application of a partial modeling account can avoid circularity, for it is not clear
how one can provide an account of reward that does not incorporate the notion of value.
However, I don't think that this reward-and-punishment model is fundamental to Sylvan's analysis, so I will not
develop further any misgivings that depend on worries about this model. What I want to examine is the claim that
it makes sense to speak of values existing independently of valuers. Sylvan argues that what makes items good or
valuable is independent of the existence of any particular kinds of valuers, such as human beings. However, he
also maintains the stronger thesis that values exist independently of any (actual) valuers at all.15
There are difficulties with this. Sylvan argues that values are independent of all valuers, yet also that they are
culturally variablethat is, values depend on and vary between cultures.16 Cultural pluralism, according to which
"there is no uniquely determined correct value system,"17 is, however, at odds with his naturalistic and quasi-
realist account of values, which holds that value dis-
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course is truth-apt. Sylvan claims that value judgments "are genuine assertions; they are propositional, and can be
applied or contradicted, known or not, true or not, etc." 18 What is known to be true in one culture may be known
to be false in another!
This relativism is less disturbing on a noncognitivist account of values. Different cultures may provide different
contexts of assessment for judgments of value, which in turn may provide determinate and incompatible answers to
questions of what is permissible. Hunting perhaps is permissible if it serves the vital needs of a subsistence culture,
but may be impermissible in an affluent culture. However, Sylvan defends a cognitivist account of value, and the
relativity of evaluative judgments for him is therefore problematic.
The difficulties faced by Sylvan's account are manifest in his discussion of the judgement A "This forest is
worthless," referring to an apparently stunted, twisted, and deformed, but in fact climax elfin forest. Consider an
evaluation from the framework of a forester concerned with wood production and of a conservationist.
Is A true or false? It's false, we [environmentalists] say. But the forestry people say it's true; and then we
say they're wrong and criticise their wood-production framework. But is it false absolutely or not? Yes,
from where we stand, and also in a way no, because of the competing forestry stance; but strictly there are
no absolutes here.19
It is hard not to feel uneasy about the instability of this position. Sylvan attempts to ease the discomfort by
comparing the case variability of value frames to the localization and relativization of secondary quality claims
imposed by classical physics and the localization of primary quality claims by the theory of relativity. But Sylvan's
predicament is more serious than these cases. Relativity provides frame-independent descriptions for primary
qualities, and we can appeal to "normal" perceivers and "normal" observation conditions to provide (reasonable)
stability for secondary quality judgments. But the shifting sands of cultural variability provide no foundation for
quasi-realism about value.
The situation was less serious for Alexius Meinong, whose account of values Sylvan has appropriated and
extended. Value for Meinong was a nonsubjective character that is grasped through emotional presentation. But
Meinong also accepted culturally invariant emotional responses, which Sylvan rejects, so for Meinong, but not for
Sylvan, values can be construed along the same lines as secondary qualities.
There are problems, then, with Sylvan's account of values, and it is not clear how his pluralism does not collapse
into relativismdespite his denial of this consequence.20 The strong thesis that values can exist in worlds without
(actual) valuers is a difficult position to defend, and is, moreover, a position which
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becomes extremely unstable when combined with the claim that values are subject to cultural variability.
What about the weaker thesis that what is good, valuable, worthwhile, and so on depends in no way on
characteristics that are specific to any particular species, such as Homo sapiens. This is a thesis that Sylvan also
defends independently, and it is one that is much more plausible. Values can exist in a world without human
valuers. Perhaps we recognize the category of humans as morally considerable in virtue of possessing certain
characteristics (such as being preference-havers with the capacity for reflective rational choice, or whatever), but
this is a contingent fact. Morally relevant characteristics have nothing to do with species membership.
Values depend on the existence of choice-making preference-havers. However, while our species characteristics
are sufficient for having the capacity to choose, they are not necessary. Values are tied to the notion of agency,
because without the capacity to choose and to act, there can be no coherent preference-ordering. The domain of
actionthat is, the domain in which we have the causal power to effect changesimposes limits on the kind and the
scale of states of affairs about which we can coherently entertain preferences. That is, it imposes limits on the
domain of praxis.
These limits can be illustrated by considering alternative spatial and temporal perspectives. From a remote
temporal perspective or a remote spatial perspective, what happens here and now is of little consequence. 21 Such
perspectives are, in general, not relevant to choice. Similarly, from a subatomic level much of the practically
relevant structure of the world disappears. That is not to say it is without interest. Moral questions are not the only
interesting questions. But we do not inhabit cosmic or subatomic levels of organization, and the structure and
organization at those levels are not relevant to praxis; they lie beyond the boundaries of community. Sylvan's
account of values nowhere acknowledges the existence of such limits.
The realm of practical reason is the zone of middle dimensions. In our sort of lives, billions of years and
nanoseconds are irrelevant for structuring our preferences and choices. Human scaleor rather, the scale appropriate
for choice-making preference-havers who hereabouts happen to be humandoes, however, matter. Meaningful
deliberation must conform to the range of powers and opportunities that creatures such as ourselves possess.22
Deep Ecology
"Deep ecology" is a label coined by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess for a set of concerns that Sylvan (then
Routley) was also addressing.23 The basic in-
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tuition which Naess articulated is that the dominant Western tradition of moral thought does not provide a
satisfactory basis for an ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. Genuinely moral concern, Naess
argued, and not just prudential concern or enlightened self-interest, needs to be extended beyond the traditional
domain of human affairs to provide guidance and constraints with respect to nonhuman individuals, wilderness
areas, and perhaps even to the biosphere as whole. Moral concern is thus to be extended across time and across
species. Just how far this concern extends depends, of course, on the rationale for the extended concern.
Naess's initial formulation of deep ecology was challenged as vague and unsatisfactory. His original articulation
was based on an appeal to what he claimed to be "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom:" 24 biospheric
egalitarianism, which affirms ("in principle") the equal value of all life. However, the principle is one that many
found neither obvious nor intuitively clear. A fundamental difficulty is that we have to deal with antagonism and
conflict withinand concerningliving systems, and that often involves invidious choices. A principle that affirms all
living things are of equal value is of no help in establishing preference rankings, and so provides no guidance for
choice and action. Sylvan provided an extended critique of Naess as well as other formulations of deep ecology,25
especially those of Bill Devall and George Sessions and of Warwick Fox.26 In many cases, it must be said, his
interpretations are fairly uncharitable. While Sylvan takes the enthusiastic overstatement of others very literally and
trenchantly attacks their metaphors, he is quite relaxed and comfortable about using hyperbole and colorful
metaphors of his own.
Thus Sylvan mounted a vigorous attack on what he called "Wild Western deep ecology," which adopts self-
realization as a basic goal. This particular manifestation of deep ecology offended Sylvan's sensibilities, especially
when its concerns are transformed into concerns about ecological consciousness. Deep ecology, Sylvan
complained, was supposed to be a corrective to the fundamental vice of anthropocentrism. Curiously, the main
project (according to one reading of Devall and Sessions) seems to involve focusing on the well-being of the
self.27 Sylvan remarked:
Ecology, deep or shallow or systematic, is not an ego-tripping or a personal thing. Granted those who do
have and share certain attitudes and feelings to natural environments are much more likely to become active
supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt a deeper ecological stance, even so such states as self-
realisation or ecological consciousness are neither necessary nor sufficient for this.28
A more sympathetic interpreter would reply that self-realization has nothing to do with egoistic gratification, as
Sylvan's uncharitable interpretation clearly suggests. However, Sylvan would still have objected to what he
perceived as
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a mystical or quasi-spiritual element in this and other articulations of deep ecology.
Another problematic component of the deep ecology package that Sylvan attacked is a holistic intuition about the
interconnectedness of everything. 29 Certainly scientific discoveries in biologyand indeed physicshave revealed a
multiplicity of causal connections and interdependencies that are as surprising as they are ubiquitous. But holism
becomes self-defeating when it leads to a denial of the existence of the components whose nature and relationships
it is trying to explain.30
Sylvan complained about the "murkiness" of deep ecology, which he also described as a "conceptual bog" whose
doctrines have appeared in a "confusing myriad of formulations."31 Deep ecology suffers from vagueness,
confusion, the unsatisfactoriness of its principles of biospecies impartiality and extreme holism, and the positing of
self-realization as a fundamental goal. But that's not all. Deep ecology also frequently assumes a religious or
spiritual mode of expression, about which Sylvan had reservations, and it also has a penchant for consorting with
such bad company as ecosophy, pantheism, Christianity, and Buddhism, all of which are theoretical frameworks
that "do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain rather intermediate positions."32 Also, the
shallow/deep dichotomy is simplistic and does not make sufficient allowance for a number of intermediate
positions.
Sylvan's Deep Green Alternative

Let us leave the bog of deep ecology and turn to the Sylvan pastures of Deep Green theory.33 What separates so-
called deep positions from shallow positions is the claim that human beings and human interests are not the sole
items of value in the world. Defenders of "deep" positions in general maintain that there are nonhuman individuals
and interests, and perhaps even nonsentient individuals, that have irreducible value, which imposes constraints on
the moral agents.34 Sylvan proposes a fourfold classification shown in figure 3.1.35
This replaces Naess's vaguely stated dichotomy with a more precise classification. The unrestrained position
regards short-term human interests as the only ones that count, and Sylvan argues that because it fails to pay due
regard to clearly identifiable human interests, this does not even qualify as a moral position. Shallow
environmental concern is concern that takes into consideration the interests of future generations of humansfor
example, species destruction and profligate resource depletionwhich are sufficient to justify constraints on a
number of activities that despoil and degrade items of value.
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The watershed principle that divides shallow from deep positions is what Sylvan calls the sole value assumption.
Western views, he claims, assume that only humans have irreducible or intrinsic value. The value of everything
else is to be explained, directly or indirectly, in terms of human interests and values. The prevalence of this
assumption in Western traditions has been variously attributed to Cartesian metaphysics and Judeo-Christian
religious doctrines. Christian sympathies for the environment have tended to be limited, perhaps because moral
obligations are directed up the Great Chain of Being toward God and the heavenly host, rather than downward
toward the brutes. Environmental sensibility should, however, extend concern downward, even to bacteria,
prokaryotes, and viruses.
Sylvan suggestsquite plausiblythat there will be a graded response relative to an organism's biotic distance:
"Whatever rights simpler living organisms, especially ones such as bacteria and viruses have to live and blossom,
they have heavily qualified and much attenuated ones." 36
It is not clear, however, on what grounds Sylvan thinks our concerns should become thus attenuated and qualified.
Various reasons might be offered. One reason is that complex systems should be favored over simple ones, though
that would be a risky principle for Sylvan to accept, since by many measures of complexity, that could favor
humans over other species, and that would run counter to a core element of Sylvan's environmental philosophy. It
might be suggested that complex systems are less fragile. But why should we deplore fragility or value robustness?
Moral extensionists, who usually rely on criteria such as sentience, will of course cut off their concern well before
reaching the level of simple life-forms like viruses and bacteria.
There is, however, a simpler reason why Sylvan's conclusion can be accepted, which is that single-celled
organisms are so flexible, adaptive, and ubiquitous
Figure 3.1
Shallow and deep: positions and principles.
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thatapart from special cases like smallpoxthere is not much we can do to seriously compromise their interests.
Since we cannot be obliged to do what is not possible, there is no reason to extend consideration or concern to
beings whose survival and flourishing is assured.
Some Problems with Deep Green Theory

One of the advantages that Sylvan claims for Deep Green theory over deep ecology is that instead of "looseness,
sloganization, [and] departure formulations," we have a "tight, detailed theory, aiming for precise stable
formulation." 37 However, this promises more than is delivered. Apart from the worries already aired about how
tight and stable a pluralist theory can be, there are problems with the core principles of Deep Green theory. First
consider the basic deontic principle Sylvan labels as DN:
One is free to act as one wishes provided (i) one does not unwarrantedly interfere with other preference-
havers, and (ii) one does not ill-treat or devalue anything of value.38
Second, consider the "powerful" Deep Green improvement on the unsatisfactory principle of biospheric
egalitarianism, the principle of eco-impartiality:
There should be no substantially differential treatment of items outside any favored class or species of a
discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient justification.39
Or the obligation principles, which can be paraphrased as follows:
1. Do not put other preference-havers into a dispreferred state for no good reason.40
2. Do not jeopardize the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason.41
3. Do not damage or destroy items that can have their value eroded or impaired.42
The problem with these principles is that it is not clear how to read the hedging. What constitutes warranted
interference, or substantial differential treatment, or sufficient justification? The worry is that these principles
might be quite acceptable even to the most perfidious architects of environmental destruction. Until the problem
about how to interpret the qualifications is addressed, there is a worry that Sylvan's critical misgivings about deep
ecology"there is little or nothing which stands firm about deep ecology; it is not just excessively vague, it ceases to
be well-defined"43might be extended equally to Deep Green theory.
There is some further guidance on the intended interpretation, however, that can be gleaned from the
accompanying argument. Consider the following Deep
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Green criticism of shallow positions, which helps to motivate the Deep Green alternative:
The anthropocentric argumentappealing to human survival and so onis weak. By the time a long-term
perspective has overcome short-term interests it will be too late . . .. conservation is a long-term group
issue, but most humans live on a short-term individualistic perspective . . . Passmore's own sketchy chain-
of-interests ethics is . . . unsatisfactory; it does not allow properly for long-term and group assessments. 44
What is identified here and elsewhere as the major defect of the shallow views is not their anthropocentrism, but
the fact that they are short-term, narrow, and self-regarding. But misgivings about the moral deficiencies of short-
term, narrow, and self-regarding views can be endorsed by anthropocentrists, although it should be stressed that
Sylvan's argument for rejecting an account of value which links it to species membership is nevertheless
compelling. Homo sapiens is used merely to fix the reference for important value-giving characteristics. In fact,
many of the reasons advanced by Sylvan in support of his Deep Green values can be supported by defenders of
intermediateand perhaps even "shallow"positions.
There are many instances in which Sylvan's rejection of intermediate positions makes extensive use of dependency
arguments:
It is not until humans accept their dependency on nature and put themselves in place as part of it, not until
then do humans put humans first (and if they have really seen what is involved they won't always).45
There may be some infelicitous expression here. Certainly an unsympathetic reading suggests that Deep Green
theory should be adopted because it provides the right way of putting humans first. That does not square at all well
with the central precepts of Deep Green theory.
The pivotal issue for Deep Green theory is the greater value assumption. Human interests, though always
important, do not necessarily always win out. This is a source of serious concern when there is a "shift in the frame
of reference for ethical consideration from humans to the biotic community."46 This shift generates perhaps the
most disturbing worry about abandoning anthropocentrism, which is the threat of misanthropy or "ecofascism."
Dave Foreman, for example, has made more or less explicit what some fear is implicit in value systems that sever
themselves completely from their anthropocentric bearings.47 Sylvan tries to defuse this charge: "Human survival
is no less an ethical concern than it ever was, but the preservation of humans is through and not at the expense of
the preservation of the ecological community."48 However, if human interests were paramount once, but no longer
are, then surely they must be of diminished concern.
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This may, however, be an artificial problem created by the greater value assumption. Sylvan's formulation of this
principle suggests that there is a precise and well-defined transition between intermediate and deep value issues.
However, I suspect this is misleading; it is more plausible to suppose that there is a range of cases which reveal
that the transition is not as sharply defined as the principle suggests.
Another worry raised by some of Sylvan's articulations of Deep Green theory concerns his claim that inanimate
items possess intrinsic value. 49 Sylvan believes that rivers, rocks, and landforms, for example, have irreducible
value.50 Refusal to admit this and to ascribe to all inanimate items mere instrumental value would constitute an
objectionable biochauvinism.
Sylvan's claims about the values of inanimate formations are also supported by some of his remarks about
terraforming.51 This is an issue on which Sylvan's intuitions and my own part company. Appropriating from Hume
it seems to me that 'tis no way contrary to reason (nor to moral intuitions) to prefer the destruction of a wholly and
unchangeably inanimate world to the scratching of my little finger.52 Dumping junk in space and on neighboring
planets and the moon is very likely an act of monumental human folly not because the Martian or lunar landscape
is being degraded but rather because it is an unwise allocation of terrestrial resources. Likewise, underground
nuclear tests are certainly objectionable, but not because of subterranean rock formations that are thereby
destroyed. Community does not extend from the biosphere to the lithospherethough recent evidence suggests that
the biosphere extends a lot closer to the lithosphere than was formerly supposed.53 The surface effects of
subterranean nuclear tests that do impinge on the biotic community, such as the radioactive contamination of
groundwater, are of course quite another matter.
By Sylvan's lights, terraforming is impermissible. While I do not dispute that such adventurism is ill-advised,
almost certainly for economic reasons alone,54 I do not see any justification for the view that it would be
destroying items of value. Suppose Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe are right about panspermia, and
suppose furthermore that life on Earth is the result of terra-forming.55 Would that affect the value we attach to the
world? I believe it would not, though according to Deep Green theory, it would.
Conclusion
I have focused criticism on a few key elements of Sylvan's extensive, eclectic, and detailed program of inquiry in
environmental philosophy. His program could be called ''life, the universe, everything, and much more besides." It
am-
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bitiously attempts to synthesize an extensive range of issues in a way I believe deserves to be more widely known.
Because I have concentrated selectively on areas of disagreement, it may appear that my views and sympathies are
more distant from Sylvan's than they in fact are. Although the resolution through the lens of Deep Green theory is
sometimes blurred, I owe a large debt to what Sylvan's prolific research helped to clarify and illuminate.
Notes
1. In particular, William Grey, "A Critique of Deep Ecology," Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1986): 211 216,
reprinted in Readings in Applied Philosophy, edited by B. Almond and D. Hill (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1991), pp. 45 50; "Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:4 (December
1993): 463 475; and "Environmental Value and Anthropocentrism,'' Ethics and the Environment 3:1 (1998):
97 103.
2. There are also lifestyle aspects about which (so far as I know) Sylvan has not written that I will not pursue.
3. It is a difficult scholarly challenge to survey Sylvan's writings comprehensively, and it is a matter of regret that
Sylvan did not adopt a more conventional approach to publication and also to textual referencing and footnotes.
There is a two-stage problem: finding what you want to look at and, having established that, locating it. There is a
proposal to produce a collection of some of his main writings in three or four volumes, perhaps including a volume
of his writings on environmental philosophy.
4. John Passmore, "The Preservationist Syndrome," Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (1995): 1.
5. Deep Green theory received its first sustained exposition (though not under that label) in Richard Routley and
Val Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Philosophy, edited by D. S.
Mannison, M. McRobbie, and R. Routley (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1980), pp. 96 189.
6. Richard Routley and Val Routley, "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism," in Ethics and Problems of
the 21st Century, edited by K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press,
1979), pp. 36 59; Richard Sylvan, Three Essays on Deeper Environmental Ethics, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy, Green Series no. 13 (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, 1986); Richard Sylvan and David H. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics (Cambridge: The White
Horse Press, 1994).
7. Richard Sylvan, "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part I," Radical Philosophy no. 40 (Summer 1985): 2 12; "A
Critique of Deep Ecology, Part II," Radical Philosophy no. 41 (Autumn 1985): 10 22; In Defence of Deep
Environmental Ethics, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, Green Series no. 18 (Canberra: Research
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1990); Richard Sylvan, Against the
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Main Stream: Critical Environmental Essays, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, Green Series
no. 20 (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1994).
8. Sylvan and Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, p. 9.
9. Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in in his A Sand County Almanac, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1966), p. 219.
11. Ibid., p. 28.
12. "The Way of Values," in Sylvan, Three Essays on Deeper Environmental Ethics, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy, Green Series no. 13 (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, 1986).
13. Ibid., p. 4.
14. Ibid.
15. This is part of Sylvan's doctrine of "noneism," according to which values existing independently of valuers are
neither objective nor subjective: they simply are.
16. In Sylvan, "The Way of Values," pp. 12 16.
17. Ibid., p. 13.
18. Ibid., p. 23.
19. Ibid., p. 14.
20. Ibid., p. 13. I am nevertheless sympathetic to the suggestion, defended by both Sylvan and Meinong, that there
are systematic parallels between secondary qualities and values. An analysis of values that may provide a way of
articulating this conception is the response-dependent approach, recommended to me in discussion by Peter
Menzies and Philip Pettit. See Peter Menzies, ed., Response-Dependent Concepts, Working Papers in Philosophy
no. 1 (Canberra: Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1991).
The problem is also addressed in Richard Sylvan, Transcendental Metaphysics (Cambridge: White Horse Press,
1998).
21. William Grey, "Evolution and the Meaning of Life," Zygon 22:4 (1987): 479 496.
22. As Collingwood noted: "The natural world which human scientists can study by observation and experiment is
an anthropocentric world; it consists only of those natural processes whose time-phase and space-range are within
the limits of our observation" (R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945], p. 24).
These themes are addressed in more detail in Grey, "Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology" and "Environmental
Value and Anthropocentrism.''
23. The locus classicus is Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement," Inquiry 16
(1973): 95 100. A contemporaneous seminal paper by Richard Routley was "Is There a Need for a New, an
Environmental Ethic?" in Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 1 (Varna, Bulgaria: 1973),
pp. 205 210. This paper prefigured central themes developed at greater length (in collaboration with Val
Plumwood, then Val Routley), notably in Routley and Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics."
24. Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement," p. 96.
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25. Especially in "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part I" and "Part II."
26. Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston: Shambhala, 1990).
27. Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985).
28. Sylvan, "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part II," pp. 11 12.
29. Freya Mathews articulates a fairly expansive holism in The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991).
30. Sylvan, "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part II," section 5, addresses the distinction between moderate holism
and extreme holism.
31. Ibid., "Part I," pp. 2 3.
32. Ibid., p. 5.
33. Regarding this terminology, it is of interest to note that although Sylvan ("A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part
II," p. 17) said that the "vague," "amorphous," "self-congratulatory" metaphor ''deep" should be abandoned, he
continued to use it extensively. The rhetorical attraction of "deep" proved irresistible, and Sylvan used it not only
as a metaphor of color hue (deep/pale) but also as a metaphor of spatial depth (deep/shallow).
34. In Kant's terminology they are "something whose existence has in itself an absolute value, something which as
an end in itself could be a ground of . . . practical law." Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
[1785], translated as The Moral Law by H. J. Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1948), p. 90.
35. Sylvan, "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part I," p. 5.
36. Ibid., p. 8.
37. Sylvan and Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, p. 139, figure 5.1.
38. Routley and Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," p. 174.
40. Routley and Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," p. 104.
41. Ibid., p. 107.
42. Ibid., p. 109.
44. Ibid., p. 74.
45. Ibid., p. 80.
46. Ibid., p. 81.
47. Dave Foreman, "Second Thoughts of an Eco-Warrior," in Defending the Earth, edited by Steve Chase (Boston:
South End Press, 1991), pp. 107 119.
49. Another problematic category he mentions concerns the way that present practices discriminate against
nonexistents, such as "mere future existents" who are "despite their presently unfavourable ontological status . . .
are entitled to fair and decent treatment" (Richard Sylvan, Universal Purpose, Terrestrial Greenhouse and
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Biological
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Evolution, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, no. 4 [Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1990], p. 34). See also Richard Routley and Val Routley, "Nuclear Energy and
Obligations to the Future," Inquiry 21 (1978): 133 179. Sylvan argued that "what doesn't exist can also be
valuable" ("A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part I", p. 9) and that the value assignments of deep ecology are far
too thisworldly. I address these issues in "Possible Persons and the Problems of Posterity," Environmental
Values, 5:2 (1996), pp. 161 179.
50. Sylvan, "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part II," p. 20.
52. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p.
416.
53. P. C. W. Davies, Fifth Miracle: Search for the Origins of Life (London: Allen Lane, 1998).
54. While interplanetary adventurism is probably wasteful and futile, it may be that the wonderful photographs of
Earth from space have helped to facilitate a new environmental consciousness and thereby redeemed the billions of
dollars spent on the Apollo program.
55. Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, Evolution from Space (London: Dent, 1981) and Cosmic Life-Force
(London: Dent, 1988).
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4
Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems:
A Feminist Ecosocialist Analysis
Val Plumwood
The politics of deep ecology has gone astray at the philosophical level mainly because of its interpretation of the
leading concept of solidarity in terms of a unity of interests model that fails to allow adequately for difference, is
unable to give it institutional representation, and is unable to distinguish oppressive from nonoppressive concepts
of unity. Elsewhere I have discussed the effect of the unity interpretation of solidarity on Naess's treatment of
ethics, which is strongly influenced by his positivist background and requires more development to show that a
nonextensionist and nonhierarchical ethics is possible. Here I argue that this unity model of solidarity is as
problematic in the sphere of politics as it is in the sphere of ethics, and that it has led to the seduction of deep
ecology at the political level by the Man of Property and the ascendency of associated politically conservative
"deep pocket" strategies of coverture. Deep ecology has some alternative resources and strategies available, but
their insights lead in an ecosocialist rather than a conservative political direction, and suggest major modifications
to dominant models of property.
Arne Naess and Deep Ecology

Deep ecology emerged initially from the thinking of Arne Naess, a man of the peace movement and of deep
practical commitment to nature, who sought a philosophical basis for that commitment and for developing a
historic shift in human consciousness away from the dominant instrumental relationship and toward one based on
respect and communicative virtues. 1 Naess's work helped broaden the academic issues beyond the poorly
contextualized rationalistic academic argument over whether humanist ethical and value principles could somehow
be stretched to extend to nonhumans. Because Naess, for what I will suggest are both good and not-so-good
reasons, wanted to demote abstract
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ethics (as usually understood), his account helped shift the discussion of environmental philosophy toward activist-
inspired issues of how we can account for and develop our capacity for solidarity with nonhuman nature, and also
toward the broader and more philosophically productive ethico-ontological issues of the analysis of human identity,
alienation, and difference from nature.
Naess's work opens up some of the deeper questions about how we have misconceived our human identity as well
as that of nature, and how these misconceptions have foreclosed our options for responsible and ethical relationship
with the more-than-human, or, as he would put it, for mutual self-realization. This does not mean that the answers
Naess gave to these deeper questions are the best possible answers, and that we should not pursue others. Naess
allowed for the possibility of plural approaches in his account of Ecosophy T and its relationship to the deep
ecology platform, conceiving of his own as only one among a number of possibilities that were consistent with
agreement on the basic platform. Although political philosophy was a significant omission from Naess's
philosophical concerns, this omission has been remedied in recent years by others associated with deep ecology
whose work I discuss in the last parts of this essay. But because of the political theory gap in Naess's work, the
platform remained a politically undeveloped area.
It has always seemed to me that there is a strong resemblance between Naess's acceptance of diversity over and
above the platform and fellow Vienna Circle member Rudolf Carnap's methodological "Principle of Tolerance,"
which stated that diversity in nonempirical theoretical constructions was of no real concern, provided there was
agreement about "the facts"empirical data, which to positivism was what really mattered. 2 While the word
"tolerance" is apt to generate lots of warm, fuzzy feelings, an abstract embrace of tolerance principles is no
substitute for the development of real theoretical and stand-point diversity, and here deep ecology is deeply
lacking. The effect of the original underdevelopment of political thinking in the platform, plus the recent
appearance of a conservative brand of deep political theory, plus the Naess Carnap abstract tolerance for diversity
beyond the agreement on the politically underdeveloped "platform," is to make deep ecology today potentially
subject to capture by the right. The choice principles of the real world differ significantly, however, from the ideal
world of Ecosophy T. Choices between left and right political developments of the Ecosophy T position and
platform cannot be avoided indefinitely by appeals to abstract tolerance, since, as I argue in this essay, some of the
political alliances and directions deep ecology can take up are strongly incompatible with others.
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The Basis of SolidarityIdentity or Difference?

One useful route into exploring the diverse answers available to the question of how to ground solidarity with and
respect for the value of nature is the debate between Arne Naess and fellow mountaineer Peter Reed. Despite their
commonalities in the search for a ground for a new (for the humanist West) ethic of respect, Reed and Naess
differed profoundly on the question of whether the abstract foundation for the desired new relationship will be
found in human unity with and embeddedness within the natural order, or in the "existential gulf," our
discontinuity and difference from nature. Naess proposed foundations formulated basically in terms of identity and
unity: Reed's counteradvocacy, in a powerful essay published posthumously, of basing respect not on sameness but
on difference, could hardly have presented a stronger contrast. I argue in this section that the criticisms which each
disputant makes of the other are valid, which points to resolution via a third position that would allow us to
combine elements of both continuity and difference, self and other, in dynamic tension.
Naess, focusing on human alienation from nature, elects for identification with nature and the realization of the
Self based on the totality of this identification as the foundation for respect for and defense of nature. This position
created a useful alliance with those forms of Buddhist thought which cast the sense of personal separateness as the
ultimate illusion, contributing in no small measure to the political success of Naess's version of deep ecology.
"Identification," used in examples as synonymous variously with sympathy, loyalty, and solidarity, is given a
technical gloss by Naess, in his reply to Reed, in terms of interest fusion or identity, "the process by which the
supposed interests of another being are spontaneously reacted to as our own interests." 3 The position, in spite of
the careful qualifications in terms of interests Naess gave it, ultimately draws on sameness and identity as the basis
of the respect relationship. As Reed saw it, respect could be based only on the very existential gulf Naess's work
sought to remove. It is, Reed argued, "our very separateness from the Earth, the gulf between the human and the
natural, that makes us want to do right by the earth."4 There was an alternative to Naess's account, Reed argued,
based on taking the other-nature-and not the human self to be basic: "One approach sees humans as part of nature,
the other sees nature as part of humans."5
Relying on Martin Buber's theory of "I Thou" relationship, Reed declares the other that is nature to be not part of
the self but "a self-sufficient being of whom we have an inkling." It is "the Wholly Other," "a total stranger,"
''radically apart."6 In the right spirit, we can meet this other, but only as "two ships that pass in the night," since the
"I" and the "Thou" do not depend on one
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another. Naess is certainly right to criticize Reed's dualism and failure to address the problem of alienation. Reed
does not merely stress difference, he retains the existential gulf of the dominant dualistic tradition in its full form.
This gulf yawns between humans and nature, according to Reed, because all we humans have in common with it,
our merely physical nature, is an inessential and accidental element of our identities. Reed's absence from the
present debate seems to me to undermine this view of the physical as an unimportant element in human identity.
Reed's reaffirmation of the existential gulf, a key and especially problematic part of the Western tradition, leads
him to treat physical nature in a deeply ambivalent way: physical nature is both "mere" (in the human case) and the
object of what amounts almost to worship (in the case of the other). We are left wondering why the supposed
radical difference of the other should be a basis for awe and wonder in the one case and something like disdain or
indifference in the other.
Reed's account is strongly oriented to wilderness. In contrast to Naess, who often focuses on mixed communities,
Reed plainly believes that only the "pure" landscape of human absence represents nature. It is not only the
otherness but also the huge scale and indifference of wilderness landscapes that evoke awe, and lead to revelations
of intrinsic value in nature. When nature is terribly dominant, says Reed, we have a sense of fear and wonder that
is missing in contexts too familiar and humanized. Nature is related both to us and to other, but it is difference
alone, it seems, that is the basis of the intuition of value. It is hard to see how this kind of orientation to "the
Wholly Other" can provide a basis for consideration of nature in the large number of situations where it is less
impressive and more vulnerableprecisely the kind of context, one would have thought, where we especially need a
respect ethic. In contrast to Naess's position and its politically useful alliances with the perennial philosophy and
with Buddhist thought, the austerity, almost self-revulsion, of Reed's account, with its stress on human
insignificance and final, frankly misanthropic, suggestion that the world might be a better place without human
beings, seems unlikely to generate widespread appeal.
Nevertheless, Reed's critique of Naess points up some important problems and tensions in the use of identity as the
foundation for an environmental ethic. On first glance, Naess's account does not seem to appeal either to fusion or
to egoismsince we are supposed to defend not the self but the big Self as "the totality of our identifications." But,
says Reed, there seem to be inconsistent requirements hidden here: we are supposed to retain a sense of our
individuality as we work to save the big Self from destructionbut at the same time we are supposed to lose interest
in our individuality as we cultivate our identification
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with the big Self. 7 We are required to be egoists and also not egoists, to retain the intensity and defense drive of
egoism, but also to abandon certain key differentiations between ourselves and others, in order to establish that
equivalence between self and other which enables a transfer of our self-regarding motives. Naess's position, on
closer inspection, ultimately is based on a kind of self-interest and upon a form of fusion or expulsion of
differencetaking the form, as Naess explains in his reply, of identity of interests. "Identification" writes Naess, is a
process "through which the supposed interests of another being are spontaneously reacted to as our own interests."8
Selves may not be fused, but interests are, and the other is included ethically to the extent that a kind of
equivalence to self is established through identification.
But analysis in terms of interest identity won't enable us to dispense with difference. We may identify in solidarity
with an animal, say a wombat, expressing our solidarity by being willing to undertake political action on its behalf
(working to remove it from "vermin" status, for example), but we do not thereby acquire identical specific
interestsin eating grass, for example. Although we may (as relational selves) assume the overarching interest of the
other's general well-being and react to that as bound up with our own, it is crucial to our being able to defend that
well-being that we retain a clear sense of the other as distinct beings with different, perhaps entirely different,
interests from ours. We must attain solidarity with the other in their difference, and despite the ambiguity of the
term "identification," solidarity here cannot be interpreted as identity; solidarity and respect cannot be understood
as processes of overcoming or eliminating otherness or difference, and neither ethics nor motivation can be derived
from establishing ethical equivalence to self or from extending egoism to a wider class of big Selves.
Even though Reed goes on to develop his account of otherness in ways that turn out to be rather problematic, he is,
I think, importantly right on what I take to be his main point: that an account based entirely on unity and
identification with Self provides a problematic basis for respect for the nonhuman world, and one particularly
inadequate for those issues, such as wilderness, where the otherness of nature is particularly salient and striking.
It is tempting to conclude that both Naess and Reed remain within the "solipsistic omnipotence of the single
psyche."9 Reed's pure other-based account is a reversal of Naess's pure self-based one, but both seem to miss the
importance of relational dynamics, the precarious balance of sameness and difference, of self and other involved in
experiencing sameness without obliterating difference. Reed's positing of self and other as utterly disconnected, as
"ships that pass in the night," misses the conceptual and material dependence
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of self on other: if the other plays an active part in the creation and maintaining of self, there can be no "pure
other" and no "pure self." Reed reaffirms the Western tradition of denying nature and the radical distancing
between humans and nature that an environmental ethic must aim to counter. Naess is right to reject this picture as
reproducing a key part of the problem. However, the pure self/pure other choice presented by Naess and Reed and
the underlying metaphysical choice of Same/Different is a false dichotomy: both continuity with and difference
from self can be sources of value and consideration, and both usually play a role.
Some of the problems that Naess's and Reed's mutual critiques of one another's work point up can be resolved in a
larger critical framework employing resources from feminist theory and postcolonial theory. 10 To deal with the
problems of identity that the present form of human colonization of nature generates, an adequate environmental
ethic needs to provide a (usually sequenced) affirmation of both continuity and difference between humans and
nature, as appropriate to the context. In the Western tradition especially, there is a need to stress continuity between
self and other, human and nature, in response to the existential gulf created by the hyperseparated (radically
distanced) and alienated models of nature and of human identity that remain dominant. These models define the
truly human as (normatively) outside of nature and in opposition to the body and the material world, and conceive
nature itself in alienated and mechanistic terms, as having no elements of mind. The drive to hyperseparation is part
of the colonizing conceptual dynamic that places the human colonizer radically apart from, and above, those he
conceives as part of the subordinated realm of nature.
But we also need to stress the difference and divergent agency of the other in order to defeat that further part of the
colonizing dynamic that seeks to assimilate and instrumentalize the other, recognizing and valuing them only as a
part of self, alike to self, or as means to self's ends. What makes it possible to combine this joint affirmation of
continuity and difference consistently is the distinction between hyperseparation and difference (where
hyperseparation is an extreme or emphatic form of separation that denies continuity). This distinction is reflected in
a corresponding distinction between continuity and identity which enables us to say that although we have
historically denied our continuity with nature, affirming that continuity does not require any simple assumption of
identity.11
Neither Reed nor Naess distinguishes sufficiently between difference and normative hyperseparation, an emphatic
form of differentiation associated especially with the view of the other as inferior. The outcome is that Reed treats
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difference, on his account the basis of the other's value and of their ethical recognition, as implying the denial of
likeness and the maintenance of the existential gulf, while Naess treats removing the existential gulf as meaning the
expulsion of difference and the basing of value on forms of identity or equivalence to self. We need a concept of
the other as interconnected with self, but also as a separate being in their own right, accepting the "uncontrollable,
tenaciousness otherness" of the world as a condition of freedom and identity for both self and other. 12 Feminist
theory especially has developed logical and philosophical frameworks based on maintaining the tension between
Same and Different rather than generally eliminating difference in favor of sameness or vice versa.
Solidarity and Oppressive Concepts of Unity

The choice these two frameworks offer us, of valuing nature either as Same or as Different, is ultimately an
anthropocentric one, since to base value exclusively on either sameness with or difference from the human
implicitly construes the human as the center and pivot of valueeither as the positive (same) or as the negative
(different) source of value and recognition. A framework bringing all value and recognition of the other back to
identity with or difference from the human self still conceives the human as hegemonic center, and presents only a
variant on the moral extensionism that is now a standard part of the contemporary neo-Cartesian consensus in
philosophy. We need an alternative basis for ecological action that recognizes the other's incommensurability and
does not define the other's worth in hegemonic terms that always relate it back to the human as conceptual
center.13
Naess's formulation of this basis in terms of the concept of unity or fusion of interests makes the fundamental
ethical form implicit in deep ecology essentially a one-place relationship.14 This makes it unsuitable as a basis for
ethical models, such as those of communication and negotiation, that require explicit recognition of at least two
places in the human/nature relationship. Such an ethic cannot address the other as a communicative or potentially
communicative subject, and hence is particularly unsuitable for animals. Since, as John Dryzek, among others, has
urged, the communication model offers a potentially powerful new image and mutualistic model to replace those of
the dominant mechanistic worldview, we have to forgo rather a lot in the interests of maintaining an account based
on unity.15
The popular interpretation, based on Naess's account, of the central concept by which we relate ethically to nature
as that of sameness or unityand of psychological and self unity as the central meaning of "identification"creates a
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number of serious problems of merger and boundary recognition. Vague concepts of unity and identity provide
very imprecise and inadequate correctives to our historical denial of continuity with and dependency on nature.
Ethical theories based on unity cannot provide a good model of mutual adjustment, communication, and negotiation
between different parties and interests, and are unhelpful in the key areas where we need to construct multiparty,
mutualistic ethical relationships. Recovering multiplicity and difference requires a dual project of rejecting
hyperseparation and of affirming difference, as responses to different parts of the logic of the One and the Other
and to the Othering of nature. Affirming continuity counters the construction of human identity as emphatically
separate from an homogenized passive nature whose works are similarly hyperseparate. But the confusion of
continuity with identity and the construction of unity as the basis of relationship prevent us from combining this
countering of hyperseparation with the recognition of difference and of the other as a distinct center of needs and
projects.
Naess's formulation of the basis of activism in terms of the ambiguous concept of "identification" obscures the fact
that the basic concept required for an appropriate ethic of environmental activism is not that of identity or unity (or
of its reversal in difference) but that of solidaritystanding with the other in a supportive relationship in the political
sense. But there are multiple possible bases for solidarity, and the politics of solidarity is different from the politics
of unity. Solidarity requires not just the affirmation of difference but also sensitivity to the difference between
positioning oneself with the other and positioning oneself as the other, and this requires in turn the recognition and
rejection of oppressive concepts and projects of unity or merger. "Identification" has also made it easy for some
transpersonal ecologists to import into the concept of solidarity various problematic themes of egoism, self-
expansion, and self-defense, along with a masculinist agenda of inferiorizing particular emotional attachments and
advocating a version of emotional detachment. 16
One of the main difficulties with interpreting solidarity in terms of vaguely specified concepts of unity is that this
interpretation does not theoretically rule out some possibilities that ought to be ruled out. Oppressive projects of
unity abound in the human case, especially in the case of hegemonic relationships of colonization. To the
colonizing mentality, these projects of unity often appear in quite a different light than they appear to the
subordinated group; what appear to the colonizer as improvements or as support appear as imposition and cultural
destruction to the colonized. Recent Australian culture has provided many examples, in the literary and artistic
frauds perpetrated by people of settler culture pretending to be Aboriginal, of assimilating or incorporating pro-
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jects of unity that deny the indigenous other's difference or transgress the other's boundaries. Some of those who
adopt these oppressive projects of unity lay claim to Aboriginal identity, culture, and knowledge on the basis of
alleged empathy, while others appear to regard indigenous culture as a free good, available to all, and others still
are clearly intent upon harm. But even where the motivation is sympathetic, the oppressive and transgressive
character of these projects of unity is fully evident to the indigenous people concerned.
Similarly, colonial history in Australia and elsewhere abounds in projects of cultural assimilation of indigenous
peoples that followed the attempt at genocide and that had as their aim an oppressive form of unity, namely
incorporation, in which the subordinated party is produced as an inferiorized version of the dominant party or is
denied any voice of its own. The incorporative self uses unity in a hegemonic fashion to absorb the other or re-
create them as a version of the self. To the extent the colonizing project is one of self-imposition and appropriation
(literally "making self"), the incorporative self of the colonizing mind is insensitive to the other's independence and
boundaries, denying the other's right to define their own reality, name their own history, and establish their own
identity. 17 This insensitivity extends to include the other's epistemic boundaries; it often assumes that the other is
transparentthat they can be grasped and known as readily as the selfor that they are too simple for anything to be
hidden, to outrun the colonizer's knowledge. To the incorporative self, the other can be taken (appropriated) for a
benefit expressed exclusively in terms of the self, of the one, about whose beginning and end we are encouraged to
be unclear. These examples show us that respect for the other requires recognizing their difference and
boundariesnot claiming to be them or to encompass them. Oppressive projects of unity like this can arise from the
failure to distinguish unity (positioning the self as the other) from solidarity (positioning the self with or in support
of the other).
Now I am not saying here, as some supporters of deep ecology seem to think, that all deep ecologists or others who
have theorized the basis of solidarity in terms of unity are selfish male chauvinist pigs, that they all wish to
incorporate nature into the self, or are all megalomaniacs aiming at control who take their own interests to be those
of nature or the universe at large18 (although in fact there are some who hold doctrines of unity who doone could
argue that Walt Whitman in his later stages was a good example, and there may be others attracted to this kind of
theorization). Nor am I insisting that we must treat deep ecology according to its worst possible interpretation, as
the incorporative self.
What I am saying is that assumptions of unity of interest are especially liable to hegemonic interpretations, and that
in the absence of a critical analysis of
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power, they are open to co-optation by existing dominance orders and by the dominant Lockean account and
incorporative self upon which capitalism is based. And I think it can be given this development in terms of
elaborating more carefully a concept of solidarity with nature that does not confuse solidarity with unity, the
relational with the incorporative self. 19 Replacing the concept of unity with that of solidarity would no doubt
displease some deep disciples and displace some alliances, but potential for a different set of alliances opens up as
those with others are deemphasized.20 Deep ecologists can learn much from feminist theory and anticolonial
theory about how to undertake the theoretical task of rejecting hyperseparation and elaborating a concept and
ground for solidarity with nature distinct from unity, one that at the same time allows us to affirm continuity and to
respect nature's difference.
There are, I have suggested, multiple bases for critical solidarity with nature. One important critical basis can be an
understanding that certain human societies position humans as oppressors of nonhuman nature, treating humans as
a privileged group that defines the nonhuman in terms of roles that closely parallel our own roles as recipients of
oppression within human dominance orders.21 Our grasp of these parallels may be based upon imaginative or
narrative transpositions into positions which closely parallel that of the oppressed nonhuman other: artistic
representation has an important place in helping us make such transpositions. Literature has often played such a
transposing role historically, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in relation to the class
system, slavery, women's oppression, and animal oppression. In recent decades science fiction narratives that
imaginatively position humans as colonized or exploited reductively as food by alien invaders have provided very
powerful vehicles for such imaginative transpositions into a place which parallels that of the nonhuman food
animal.22 So have cartoons by Gary Larson, whose "absurd" humor often depends upon exploiting parallels in the
condition of the human and nonhuman oppressed. A chicken coming from a human house carrying a baby passes a
woman coming from a chicken coop carrying a basket of eggs, for example.23 A Larson elephant is outraged when
he notices the ivory keys on a piano keyboard at a mixed-species party and makes the connection to the fate of his
own kind.
The leap of recognition that is often described and explained in terms of an unanalyzed and capricious emotion of
"empathy" or "sympathy"24 is often better understood in terms of a concept of solidarity that is based on an
intellectual and emotional grasp of the parallels in the logic of the One and the Other. Since most people suffer
from some form of oppression within some dominance order or other, there is a widespread basis for the
recognition that we are positioned multiply as oppressors or colonizers just as we are positioned multiply
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as oppressed and colonized. This recognition that one is an oppressor as well as an oppressed can be developed in
certain circumstances to become the basis for the critical "traitorous identity" that analyzes, opposes, and actively
works against those structures of one's own culture or group which keep the Other in an oppressed position. 25
Traitorous kinds of human identity involve a revised conception of the self and its relation to the nonhuman other,
opposition to oppressive practices, and the relinquishment and critique of cultural allegiances to the dominance of
the human species and its bonding against nonhumans, in the same way that male feminism requires abandonment
and critique of male bonding as the kind of male solidarity which defines itself in opposition to the feminine or to
women, and of the ideology of male supremacy. These "traitorous identities" that enable some men to be male
feminists in active opposition to androcentric culture, some whites to be actively in opposition to white
supremacism and ethnocentric culture, also enable some humans to be critical of "human supremacism" and in
active opposition to anthropocentric culture. "Traitorous" identities do not appear by chance, but are usually
considerable political and personal achievements in integrating reason and emotion; they speak of the traitor's own
painful self-reflection as well as of efforts of understanding that do not flinch from contact with the pain of
oppressed others.
What makes such traitorous identities possible is precisely the fact that the relationship between the oppressed and
the "traitor" is not one of identity, that the traitor is critical of his or her own "oppressor" group as someone from
within that group who has some knowledge of its workings and its effects on the life of the oppressed group. It
depends on the traitor being someone with a view from both sides, able to adopt multiple perspectives and
locations that enable an understanding of how he or she is situated in the relationship with the other from the
perspective of both kinds of lives, the life of the One and the life of the Other.26 Being a human who takes
responsibility for your interspecies location in this way requires avoiding both the arrogance of reading your own
location and perspective as that of the other, and the arrogance of assuming that you can "read as the Other," know
their lives as they do, and in that sense speak or see as the other. Such a concept of solidarity as involving multiple
positioning and perspectives can exploit the logic of the gap between contradictory positions and narratives that
standpoint theory appeals to.27
The traitorous identity implies a certain kind of ethics of support relations that is quite distinct from the ethics
involved in claiming unity. It stresses a number of counterhegemonic virtues, ethical stances that can help to
minimize the influence of the oppressive ideologies of domination and self-imposition which have formed our
conceptions of both the other and ourselves. Important
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among these virtues are listening and attentiveness to the other, a stance that can help to counter the backgrounding
which obscures and denies what the nonhuman other contributes to our lives and collaborative ventures. They also
include philosophical strategies and methodologies that maximize our sensitivity to other members of our
ecological communities and openness to them as ethically considerable beings in their own right, rather than ones
that minimize ethical recognition or that adopt a dualistic stance of ethical closure which insists on sharp moral
boundaries and denies the continuity of planetary life. Openness and attentiveness include giving the other's needs
and agency more attention, being open to unanticipated possibilities and aspects of the other, reconceiving and
reencountering the other as a potentially communicative and agentic being, as well as "an independent center of
value, and an originator of projects that demand my respect." 28 A closely allied stance, as Anthony Weston points
out, is that of invitation, which risks an offering of relationship to the other in a more or less open-ended way.29
These counterhegemonic virtues help us to resist the reductionism of dominant mechanistic conceptions of the
nonhuman world, and to revise both our epistemic objectives of prediction and control and our denial of nonhuman
others as active presences and ecological collaborators in our lives.
There is a considerable convergence here between the counterhegemonic virtues of solidarity and mutuality and the
kinds of virtues of openness that Naess's form of deep ecology has recommended. Deep ecology, however, has
tended to stress recognizing value rather than agency: valuing nature can be the stance of someone looking at
nature, whereas the stance of recognizing agency is important for all collaborative, communicative, and mutualistic
projects. Although the term "virtue" would probably not be acceptable to deep ecologists who have followed Naess
in treating ethics as unnecessary, authoritarian, and passé, it is, as I have argued, clear that the theory of deep
ecology has not succeeded in eliminating ethics, but rather in disguising its ethical assumptions as psychological
assumptions.30 The ethics of solidarity provides an alternative basis for many deep ecological insights that avoids
the implicit positivism of the "no-ethics" approach, enables the development of stronger connections to human
liberation movements, and avoids the difficulties of the unity interpretation.
The Political Theory of Deep Ecology and the Man of Property

Similarly, in the area of political theory, deep ecology has the possibility of different routes of development that
are allied with divergent political choices.
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Again, it is in part a question of deciding whose company you want to keepa choice that deep ecology cannot now
say ''pass" to, as it did in the early days, especially as questions of political organization are coming so much to the
fore in contemporary discussion of environmental theory and are getting quite sophisticated. Since virtually every
political position now claims to be green (or has a green-dyed form; sometimes the dye will clearly come out in
the first wash), the question can't be avoided via some version of a Principle of Tolerance, which is the method
Naess's work suggests for dealing with it, or by appeal to individual consciousness change. Deep ecology's political
thinking in response to this problem has so far been strikingly shallow: initially, it employed the concept of unity
between person-place and person-community to embrace bioregionalism and small-scale communitarianism,
without any clear indication (beyond individual consciousness change) of how this was to be achieved or what
political structure would maintain it or guarantee its ecological character. This early fantasy phase of unity has now
been succeeded by theoretical developments I discuss belowalso based on unitythat are more explicitly
accommodating to existing power structures.
In the earlier sections we noted how the theoretical possibilities associated with unity and individual consciousness
change have assumed a privileged role over the solidarity and structural analysis allied with feminist-postcolonial
theory and other politically radical movements. Just as deep ecology failed to provide alternatives to an ethical
theory based on unity, so it has failed to provide political alternatives to political theory based on unity. This
pattern in the political area provides the basis for the seduction of deep ecological political theory by a conservative
paradigm endorsing capitalism, private property, and small government, and by a notably shallow and elite-
accommodating "deep pocket" strategy that seeks the ecological enlightenment of the Man of Property as its main
objective. 31 The unity interpretation, which has the potential to provide support for both totalitarian and capitalist
positions, once again provides the means by which this hegemonic accommodation is constructed.
Several recent theorists have pointed to the ecological history of Nazism to argue that deep ecology has a certain
potential to support Nazism and fascism. This danger is variously attributed to deep ecology's tendency to question
modernity and humanism, to display elements of romanticism, and to undermine private property and
individualism.32 I shall argue that these arguments rest on shallow analyses of fascism and Nazism, as well as of
what is politically relevant today. While it is important to acknowledge the potential of environmentalism in
general, and of deep ecology in particular, to support undemocratic forms of politics, these arguments misidentify
the ways in which this
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potential arises. The main danger comes from a different direction: not so much from its alleged romanticism and
critique of humanism, or from its holistic understanding of ecology, as through the potential of the unity
interpretation to support the idea of community as a unity or fusion of interests, and the associated idea of a pure
home devoid of alien elements. 33 The unity interpretation at the institutional level involves the attempt to seek the
political, along with the ethical, inclusion of nonhuman nature in terms of the Naessian concept of unity of
interests, expressed at the level of political theory by concepts of coverture and community.
Luc Ferry is one of a group of recent critics of deep ecology's authoritarian potential.34 Ferry identifies "shallow"
forms of ecology with humanism and a progressive affirmation of modernism, and blackens any deeper form of
ecological thought that tries to challenge the human/nature dualism in a more thoroughgoing way, through the
alleged association of deep ecology with Romanticism, antimodernism, antihumanism, and even Nazism. But the
crudeness of such an analysis is apparent when we consider that all these positions have multiple faces which must
render all such simple equations suspect. The analysis ignores the oppressive and problematic aspects of
modernism and humanism, especially where humanism defines itself against or in opposition to the nonhuman, and
relies on the dubious assumption that more ethical consideration for nonhumans necessarily means less for
humans.35 While it is important to note that those forms of Romanticism corrupted by the desire for unity and
other oppressive forces played a role in supporting fascism, any analysis that puts all its stress on this factor
ignores the diversity and liberatory aspects of Romanticism,36 as well as the well-documented complicity of the
worst aspects of Nazism with modernism and rationalism.37 At present the danger from deep ecology's political
naïveté comes from quite a different direction, from capture by the liberal right rather than the fascist right.
Michael Zimmerman reaches perverse conclusions from his interrogation of Nazi ecologism because he, too,
adopts oversimplified accounts of fascism and Nazism. Zimmerman favors the "irrationality" explanation that
overlooks the ambiguity of the Nazi relationship to modernity and casts it as the evil throwback to mindless
collectivity and blood-and-soil tribalism, the dark opposite of the White Knights of individualism, private property,
liberalism and Enlightenment rationality. However, as recent critical theorists have shown, this portrait of Nazism
as an irruption of "premodern irrationalism" obscures as much as it illuminates. Zimmerman's binary account
assumes that the Nazi form of fascism remains the chief political danger we still have to fear, and that it is in the
Nazis' critique of modernity that we should seek the primary source of their horrors.
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But this, too, overlooks analyses such as Zygmunt Bauman's, which suggest that the extermination programs were
in many respects an extreme expression of modernity and its rational capacity to scapegoat, marginalize, and
eliminate; both the programs and Nazi thinking in general involved strong modernist elements of human/animal
dualism, instrumental/bureaucratic order, and hyper-rationalism. 38 It was less the fledgling science of ecology, as
Zimmerman claims,39 than the very well-established modern science of biology, in which Germany led the world,
that helped to supply the intellectual foundations for Nazi racist practice and the biological rationalism that
underlay the extermination programs.40 But Zimmerman's shallow analysis also fails to note that Nazi doctrines of
racial purity were in many ways an intensification of the "normal" doctrines of white racial superiority that had
accompanied the colonizing and "civilizing" process undertaken in the Americas, in Asia, Africa, and
Australiadoctrines that provided the justification for dominant global property-formation regimes.41
Zimmerman's analysis not only misidentifies the political problem in deep ecology and offers a mistaken analysis
of where it lies, it also uses the mistake to promote solutions for ecological problems in line with the conservative
paradigm of strengthened private property and "small government." Thus Zimmerman argues that deep ecology is
in danger of providing support for Nazism and fascism, and that environmentalism will avoid this to the extent it
avoids any critical engagement with private property and does not call for government intervention or support
institutional arrangements which require it. Zimmerman's identification of individualism, private property, and
small government as the most important bulwarks against the fascist potential he discerns in deep ecology
demonstrates the narrow range of his political focus.
Nazism is an important test for any theory (although, given its contested interpretation, hardly a neutral and
unambiguous one), but for a relevant and widely informed political ecology, it would surely be advisable to plot a
few more points on the political map, as well as to fix them more accurately. Plotting more points would show that
individuality (or the liberal-capitalist form that Zimmerman equates with it) and associated private property in its
liberal-capitalist form have their own burden of human (and nonhuman) death and suffering to answer for. If
Zimmerman's narrow focus on and shallow interpretation of Nazism allow a stress on collectivism/individuality as
the major relevant axis along which we should judge fascist potential, a broader focus would note the liberatory
ambiguities of individualism and suggest placement on a unity/difference axis as a more reliable index of
authoritarian potential.
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In a number of recent contributions, another political theorist associated with deep ecology, Gus diZerega, provides
a very useful account of individuals as members of multiple intersecting communities or relationships of mutual
interestincluding the political sphere, the family, and the ecological community, all of which should respect their
members, who should never count for nothing. 42 This model of community membership is developed in
illuminating ways to show the problems of instrumentalism and rights theory, but what is of concern is diZerega's
suggestion that the family, and by implication the ecological sphere, can ideally be envisaged not as a community
of multiple and mutual interests, but as a community of natural harmony or unity of interests, governed not by
considerations of justice but by those of love. DiZerega aims to develop a liberal Green Jeffersonianism that lauds
the market but hopes to keep what is valuable beyond its reach; despite its splendid efficiency, we wouldn't want
anything of real value, such as family relationships or magnificent natural areas, to be subject to it.
Zimmerman and diZerega diverge, however, on the question of institutional modification to property, with
diZerega opting for more accountable forms of public and private property,43 and Zimmerman for a future
liberalism that evolves into an ecologically benign form in which, through consciousness change, ecologically
enlightened individuals who have unified their interests with those of nature participate in the market without
commodifying nature.
As feminist political theorists such as Susan Moller Okin and Carole Pateman have shown in the case of women,
models of a community such as the family as a natural unity or harmony of interests are hegemonic, allowing the
weaker elements in that community to be dominated without recourse by the more powerfulnormally the husband.
And, in the event of justice conflicts, they tend to throw the ideological and economic burden of introducing "dis-
harmony" onto the wife and other weaker members.44 Without institutional modification to recognize the multiple
and potentially conflicting interests involved and to protect equality structurally, we have what is in effect a form
of coverture.
The political equivalent of coverture for nature seems to be what is being advocated in Zimmerman's
thinkingnature's interests will be "covered" not by "big government" public institutions but by the property owner,
who safe-guards its interests through fusion when enlightenedjust as the husband, as enlightened household head,
was assumed to include and safeguard the interest of the wife under coverture. This is like emphasizing that wives
are loved and provided for in marriage instead of recognizing the wife as a separate political and economic actor
whose interests require acknowledgement as an equal in
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institutional arrangements. The property form advocated by Zimmerman appears, similarly, to decline institutional
modification; he envisages instead a form of capitalism in which ecologically enlightened individuals who have
changed their consciousness according to the prescriptions of deep ecology unify or fuse their interests as property
owners with those of nature, and show the way to an ecologically benign capitalist marketplace.
In the present climate of stingy government, many environmental groups are obliged to find wealthy private
donors, a source of funding that is tapped with varying degrees of reluctance but is always a potent threat to their
democratic vision and political integrity. 45 Some groups with allegiance to deep ecology have specialized very
strongly in courting the "deep pocket," the wealthy individual who can be converted to the ecological cause and
whose generosity finances campaigns and protects "special" lands from the much-praised efficiencies of the
market. Reliance on this strategy has a demonstrated potential to defuse or blunt opposition to and engagement
with the general system of nature commodification and property formation that capitalism represents, but most
groups see it as a temporary expedient justified by their sense of urgency and desire to save as much as possible
within the existing framework, rather than as an ideal situation.
But a deeper and more systematic ideological commitment to this and other elite-supporting strategies seems to be
emerging in the political theory of "evolutionary liberalism," based upon deep ecology's dominant unity
interpretation and its narrow focus on individual consciousness change. This is a commitment to defending
capitalism and refusing any critique or systematic modification of the institutions of property that have
commodified the Earth in favor of accepting the political coverture of nature and strategies aimed at the ecological
enlightenment of the Man of Property. Thus the final pages of Zimmerman's Contesting Earth's Future reach the
conclusion that the best the ecologically challenged can legitimately hope for, given the political constraints of
supporting "individuality" his argument defends, is some eventual development toward Atman consciousness on the
part of a few rare and privileged individuals (who, if they are going to be able to make a difference in the real
world of ecological destruction, will need to be not only ecologically enlightened but powerful as well).
Those deep ecology theorists who employ the unity interpretation in this way are developing an account that is in
deep complicity with the system of commodification of nature and its founding fathers. If Zimmerman explicitly
deplores any casting of ecological aspersions on the sanctity of private property and holds out as the best hope for
ecological salvation the conversion of more
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billionaires to deep ecology, diZerega's Green Jeffersonian model of the ecologically enlightened family landholder
is in danger of offering a Jeffersonian solution in the fullest sense. The ecologically enlightened Man of Property
seems to be envisaged on the model of Thomas Jefferson the slave master. For those familiar with Jefferson the
rhetorician of republican freedom and revolutionary equality, it is an everlasting irony that, although he may have
been a better master than most, 46 Jefferson nevertheless resisted freeing his slaves and never gave up the
institutional power to abuse, despite his strictures on the effect of such power on the slave master's character.47 In
such a "Jeffersonian" model, nature would occupy a position in the ecologically enlarged household of the Man of
Property similar to the wife, the slave, or the indentured servant. The enlightened landholder will take care of the
interests of the land as part of a sphere of familial harmony, protected, like the family, from the necessary if
distasteful drama of capitalism going on outside the boundaries of the estate. A more realistic account would
recognize that individual enlightenment and goodwill are not enough; that nature, as well as women and slaves,
requires institutional protection and guarantees which involve major modifications to the concept, formation, and
distribution of property itself.
Is There an Ecosocialist Deep Ecology?

A Feminist Ecosocialist Analysis
The systematic "deep pocket" solution of the ecological enlightenment of the Man of Property discloses a nest of
contradictions upon exposure and analysis. Is there not a contradiction (or two) between ecological enlightenment
and the amassing of property? Is it not more likely that this source of funding will tend primarily to support wise
use or groups that aim to undermine or destroy green efforts? Although diZerega recognizes that the market can be
a destructive and instrumentalizing form, his aim is to keep certain special areas of land away from it as
exceptions, rather than undertaking any general modification of it in a more universally applicable way. (It would
therefore represent an intensification of the current North American solutionwhich also does not work very well.)
Where the means to protect special areas is obtained by the commodification of other areas, only exceptional areas
can be protected. The area protected by coverture in this way is like the protected wife of the Man of Propertyher
enhanced security and comfort are obtained at the expense of increased impoverishment and vulnerability for a
large group of subordinated others. The protection for the spaces and places of the Man of Property depends upon
the degradation of places of less powerful others somewhere else.
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The "deep pocket" solution ignores at the spiritual level the corrupting influence of power, and at the ecological
level neglects the way the ecological health of "special" lands depends on the health of other lands that are subject
to normal commodification and that cannot be protected in a similar way if the economic system of
commodification is to function normally. But the ecological health of the special lands is interdependent with that
of the ''ordinary" land that is commodified. We are already seeing the effects of this interdependence in the
ecological decline of many areas like the Great Smoky Mountains National Park and other "protected" lands that
are showing signs of degradation because of a general decline of ecological conditions and in the health of
surrounding lands. 48 The outcome of systematic "deep pocket" strategies is likely to be a hegemonic form of
protectionbetter protection for some lands under coverture near the main centers of wealth, but the progressive
degradation of lands remote from centers of wealth, which may well be the places that have the greatest need for
ecological protection. Finally, the solution is one in which, for the sake of a consolation prize, we forgo the
opportunity to tackle the main critical problem: we give up the search to reimagine our relationship to the
nonhuman and to seek change in the main system of commodification that is destroying the Earth.
In certain ways, as I have argued, this conservative political development within deep ecology has grown out of a
set of historical circumstances that has provided key intellectual elements for it. Some of it is implicit in the
dominant theoretical direction and characteristic theses of deep ecology; the stress on unity or fusion of interests,
as we have seen, goes back to Naess. Other elements, including the strong emphasis on individual consciousness
change and weak emphasis on institutional change, have been encouraged by political alliances with other groups,
such as Eastern spirituality and the human potentials movement, that must have seemed like a good idea at the
time. Yet none of these problematic political developments follow from the basic ideas of deep ecology about the
need to radically transform our concepts in ways that include nature ethically and politically; in this respect the
developments I have objected to are contingent to deep ecology, and are in some conflict with certain of its basic
insights. So deep ecology as a fundamental position is multiple and has the potential to develop much more radical
answers to some of these questions, some of which I will explore briefly now.
The main question thrown up by the idea of Zimmerman and diZerega's "evolutionary liberal" analysis seems to
me to be: how can respecting nature be compatible with owning it? Individual consciousnesses may change, but the
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problem lies in the institution of private property, which entitles owners to do anything they like to the piece of
nature they own, just as the "kind" Jeffersonian slave master was entitled to do what he liked to the slaves he
owned. Don't respect and consideration for nature require a different conception of property? Don't they require an
institutional framework not based on coverture, one that recognizes and represents all the "nonowner" interests
involved in propertyincluding those of nature itself, as the invisible (or, rather, conceptually disappeared)
collaborator, and those of the denied social others who have contributed to it both directly and indirectly? And
doesn't the idea of respecting nature require that it be recognized as an active presence and agent which contributes
in myriad ways to our daily livesits recognition as ''an independent center of value, as an originator of projects that
demand my respect" ? 49 These ingredients can provide deep ecology with the basis for a radical critique of
dominant concepts of property.
The task for a Green Jeffersonianism is to clarify its intentions regarding unity and coverture, showing how it can
escape its Jeffersonian heritage and the alliance with the Lockean model of property, with its inbuilt assumptions
of coverture for nature. The Lockean model of acquisition provides a major basis for the recipe for property
formation that is the foundation of contemporary capitalism. In the context of the "new world," it also provided, as
Vine Deloria notes, the basis for the erasure of the ownership of indigenous people and the appropriation of their
lands.50 Locke's recipe for property formation allows the colonist to appropriate that into which he has mixed his
own labor, as part of the self, transferring his ownership of self to what is labored on, on condition that it falls
under the category of "nature," not under prior ownership. But since the colonist was either not able or not
disposed to recognize either the prior ownership of indigenous others or their different expression of labor and
agency, the formula enabled large-scale appropriation of indigenous lands by those who could visit upon them
highly transforming and destructive European-style agricultural labor.
Applying the formula retrospectively led to a regress, a failure to recognize as conferring ownership any
indigenous hunting and gathering activities that did not transform the land significantly in ways European colonists
recognized as sufficient "labor" to qualify for past or present property ownership. (Even until very recently, as
Deloria notes, it was held that the failure of indigenous people to make properly individualistic and maximally
transformative use of their land was a sufficient reason why it should be taken away from them.) To the extent that
indigenous people were seen as "nature," "nomads," or "parasites on nature" who were incapable of effective
ecological agency or the kind of agri-
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cultural labor that was held, on the European model, to be the true mark of humanity, the Lockean formula helped
erase their claim to prior ownership.
But it is not only the erasure of indigenous people that is expressed and sanctioned in the Lockean concept of
private property; it is also, in a similar way, the erasure of nature. Deep ecology, to the extent that it can advocate
countering this erasure and recognizing nature as presence, agent, and collaborator in our lives, could also provide
the foundation for a deep questioning of the Lockean form of property and for envisaging a different institutional
form. Implicit in Locke's recipe for annexing New World "nature" as European property is an assumption of the
emptiness and nullity of nature itself, which also serves as the foundation for the erasures of those human others
counted as nature. For if nature and the land are active presence and agent, "independent center of value . . .
originator of projects that demand my respect," the whole basis for the Lockean formula's use to support capitalism
collapses.
The outcome of working the land must be seen as the product of at least two (kinds of) agencies and interests, and
not of a single one (the human one) who is entitled to appropriate the land in accordance with the capitalist
interpretation of Locke's formula. For if, as Locke's formula concedes for the human case, the outcome of "mixing
labor" in the land is the product of more than one agency and interest, it cannot be placed entirely at the disposal of
just one of these agents, the human one, any more than a single agent is able to appropriate other joint products in
which his or her labor is mixed with those of other human agents. 51 Once the agency of nature has been
recognized, this placement can only appear either as unjustified seizure or as a form of coverture, the assumption
of unity or fusion of interest that we identified above and that is subject to the same kinds of objections. If our
dominant concept of property formation is one that at bottom treats nature as a nullity, it is small wonder that the
outcome of its enormous growth and progress as a force for remaking the Earth is a progressive nullification and
decline of nature.
In short, once we take the prior presence and agency of nature seriously, the most the Lockean formula can really
support is a mutualistic or guardianship concept of property, as an institution that is of mutual benefit to both the
human "partner" and to the other human and nonhuman "partners" in any collaborative product, which must
include the land itself. The seizure by one of these collaborative partners of the whole product, without any regard
for the interests of the others, is as unjustified in the case of nonhuman partners as it is in the case of human ones.
But this seizure was what the capitalist interpretation of the Lockean formula in practice justified by treating nature
as a mere productive potentiality rather than an independent center of needs, by denying
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nature's prior agency as an originator of ecological projects in the land that demand our respect, and by
backgrounding and nullifying the ecological labors of nature on which we depend for all we do.
Similarly unjustified is the concept of "improvement" or "progress" in the transformation of land where this is an
''improvement" from the perspective of and for the benefit and well-being of only one of the partners, a human
one. Damage to other partners, including nature, would have to be compensatedfor example, by the provision of
other benefits to that partner elsewhere. Property would have to be treated as very much more of a mutualistic
partnership, to be used for the benefit of both nature and the human guardian(s) of the land, and would have to
recognize and provide benefits for a much wider range of interests and collaborators, including nature. To the
extent that a similar case can be made for the institutional recognition of denied human others in the property
relationship, collective forms of property formation are also broadly indicated. Furthermore, it is not only in the
area of landownership that the Lockean formula delivers pernicious results for nature, and not just a question of
decoupling some types of land tenure from the market, as diZerega seems to imply. 52 To the extent that we can
read a similar erasure of nonhuman agency in other property-formation systems based on the Lockean formula,
there is a potential for nature and other denied agents to be similarly damaged, and property formation requires a
thorough and general rethinking. For example, the legal award of ownership of genetic materials to individual
patentees similarly employs the Lockean formula to effect a similar erasure of nonhuman (and some human)
agency.
In the case of land, the outcome would no doubt be different in local contexts, depending on factors like political
institutions, size, and the cultural representation of the nonhuman.53 Where size is small, the deep outcome might
look more like those limited and joint indigenous land tenure systems which until recently accounted for much of
the world, thus allowing a high level of accountability in ownership, spiritual land relationship, community
decision and responsibility, and reduced possibilities for transfer and accumulation. In some larger contexts, the
kind of institutional structure which taking nature's agency seriously would suggest might be more like that of the
land trust arrangement, whereby particular individuals have use title for certain limited purposes, subject to
conditions of respect for other interests (which would include those of nature and the land itself); basic decision
power regarding the land could be vested much more broadly in larger continuing publics, who might represent
nature politically via a system of accountability to trustees and to speakers for particular places and for larger
ecological systems, including biospheric nature. Although forms of representation would vary, no responsible
system could af-
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ford to leave these denied partners of property out of account in the way the dominant Lockean system of property
formation does.
The Lockean formula was of course not the cause of the maldevelopment of property-formation systems along
capitalist lines; rather, it provided a useful institutional model and intellectual basis for a strong individualizing and
colonizing movement already under way. Perhaps the denaturalization of the Lockean formula which a politically
radical form of deep ecology is capable of supporting could play a similar but reverse role in strengthening
movements (such as those of the Zapatistas) already under way to displace the model of global property formation
that bears such a large responsibility for commodifying and destroying the Earth.
Notes
1. See Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary" Inquiry 16:1
(1973): 95 100.
2. See Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).
3. Arne Naess, "'Man Apart' and Deep Ecology: A Reply to Reed," Environmental Ethics 12 (1990): 187.
4. Peter Reed, "Man Apart: An Alternative to the Self-Realisation Approach," Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 56.
5. Ibid., p. 54.
6. Ibid., p. 57.
7. Ibid., p. 67.
8. Naess, "'Man Apart' and Deep Ecology," p. 187.
9. See Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of Domination (London:
Virago, 1990), p. 46.
10. Defined by During as "that thought which refuses to turn the Other into the Same." See Simon During,
"Postmodernism or Postcolonialism Today," Textual Practice 1:1 (1987): 32 47.
11. For an elaboration of this distinction, see Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London:
Routledge, 1993).
12. Benjamin, Bonds of Love, p. 48.
13. See Val Plumwood, "Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism: Parallels and Politics," Ethics and the Environment
1:2 (Fall 1996): 119 152.
14. On this point see the discussion in Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, chapter 7.
15. See John Dryzek, "Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere," Environmental Ethics 12 (1990):
195 210; and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
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16. See Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
17. See bell hooks, Talking Back (Boston: South End Press, 1989), p. 42.
18. See Michael E. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994); and Charlene Spretnak, "Radical Nonduality in Ecofeminist Philosophy," in
Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature, edited by Karen J. Warren and Nivran Erkal (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997), pp. 425 436.
19. On some of the problems of ideals of unity and community in politics, see especially Iris Marion Young, "The
Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference," in Feminism/Postmodernism, edited by Linda J. Nicholson
(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 300 323.
20. The stress deep ecology has placed on the concept of unity is highly functional for some positions, such as
transpersonalism, and associated concepts of impartiality, devaluation of particular attachments, and transcendence
of self/relationships, are functional for masculinist agendas. Some feminists have detected similar problems in
Buddhist frameworks of unity, and stress on these concepts is often the site of an internal struggle between men
and women in Buddhism. See Rita M. Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993).
21. I have attempted to provide such a thicker account of oppression in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature and
in "Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism: Parallels and Politics"; the latter discusses a group of parallels based on
the common underlying logic of the One and the Other that forms the basis of many forms of oppression. The logic
of colonization operates as a perceptual filter and conceptual framework that make domination seem natural and
inevitable.
22. For a brilliant example see Terry Bisson, "Meat in Space," Omni (April 1995): 35 36.
23. For a discussion of some of these techniques for constructing a double perspective from above and below in
Gary Larson, see Charles D. Minahen, "Humanimals and Anihumans in Gary Larson's Gallery of the Absurd" in
Animal Acts: Configuring the Human in Western History, edited by Jennifer Ham and Mathew Senior (London:
Routledge, 1997), pp. 231 251.
24. This attitude trades on the reason/emotion dualism, and also benefits the status quo of dominance. Such
"irrational" emotions are not "capricious" but can be taught and developed, or blocked, in certain social contexts.
25. See Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 288.
26. On these points see ibid., p. 283.
27. See Sandra Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is Strong Objectivity?" in Feminist
Epistemologies, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 49 82. The logic of
colonization is also the logic of the gap between the standpoint of the One and that of the Other. Understanding the
logic of colonization explains why the colonizer does not see oppression for what it is. From underneath, the
oppressed imbibes the colonizer's conceptual framework because it is
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hegemonic and pervasive in the culture; but once a certain incongruity with experience is noticed, this can
provide the basis for a critical edge and the dominant framework may stand revealed as a means of naturalizing
oppression. But to the extent that you can discern the same kind of logic at work in an analogous situation
where you are on the top rather than on the bottom, you can use the logic of oppression to come to see your
own position (and subsequently that of your dominant group or culture) as that of the oppressor. Traitorous
identities can provide some useful vantage points on the limitations of dominant perspectives. The traitorous
standpoint, as well as the perspective from below, may see how the perspective from above distorts what is
happening, and may be able to see some of what the perspective from above doesn't see, as well as that it
doesn't see. But no such recognition comes automatically to the oppressedit is a major and difficult
achievement often precipitated by a certain incongruence between oppressed experience and hegemonic
perspectives.
28. G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 239.
29. See Anthony Weston, "Self-Validating Reduction: Toward a Theory of Environmental Devaluation,"
Environmental Ethics 18 (1996): 115 132.
30. See Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
31. See Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future.
32. See Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, translated by Carol Volk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995); Michael Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future and "Ecofascism: A Threat to American
Environmentalism," Social Theory and Practice 21:2 (1995): 207 238.
33. See Iris Marion Young, "House and Home: Feminist Variations on a Theme," in her book Intersecting Voices:
Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 134 164.
34. Others include Zimmerman, "Ecofascism: A Threat to American Environmentalism"; and Peter Singer, "Ethics
Across the Species Boundary," in Global Ethics and Environment, edited by Nicholas Low (London: Routledge,
1999), pp. 146 157.
35. Not only is no such trade-off necessary, but there are numerous respects in which consideration for nonhumans
and consideration for humans augment one another. See Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1983); and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
36. See Charlene Spretnak, The Resurgence of the Real: Body, Nature and Place in a Hypermodern World
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997).
37. See Zygmunt Baumann, Modernity and the Holocaust (London: Verso, 1989); and Robert Proctor, "Nazi
Medicine and the Politics of Knowledge," in The Racial Economy of Science, edited by Sandra Harding
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 344 358.
38. On the parallels and contradictions of the relationship between the Nazi treatment of animals and that of
people, see Arnold Arluke and Boria Sax, "The Nazi Treatment of Animals and People," in Reinventing Biology,
edited by Linda Birke and Ruth Hubbard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp 228 260. Critics of the
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blurring of the human/animal boundary (e.g., Ferry) have failed to note that there are importantly different
directions from which this boundary breakdown can come: we can extend the consideration reserved for
humans to nonhumans (which need to carry no implication of diminishing the former) or extend the lack of
consideration, control, and technical manipulation characteristically applied to animals to humans. The Nazis
seem to have done both, but it is the second form that is implicated in their atrocities, and the first that is
characteristic of animal and ecology movements today.
39. See Zimmerman, "Ecofascism," p. 248.
40. See Proctor, "Nazi Medicine and the Politics of Knowledge."
41. See Ronald T. Takaki, Iron Cages (New York: Knopf, 1979).
42. Gus diZerega, "Individuality, Human and Natural Communities, and the Foundations of Ethics,"
Environmental Ethics 17:2 (1995): 23 37.
43. Gus diZerega, "Towards an Ecocentric Political Economy," The Trumpeter 13:4 (Fall 1996): 173 182.
However, just how private property would be made more accountable or exceptions selected is not explained.
44. See Susan Moller Okin, Gender, Justice and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Carole Pateman,
The Disorder of Women (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1989).
45. For a discussion of an alternative democratic approach to funding community groups more like the erstwhile
Australian system of public funding, see Dryzek, "Green Reason."
46. Although, as Takaki, Iron Cages, notes, Jefferson had errant slaves flogged and engaged in other abuses.
47. See Takaki, Iron Cages.
48. See Arturo Gomez-Pompa and Andrea Kaus, "Taming the Wilderness Myth," BioScience 42:4 (1992):
271 279.
49. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, p. 239.
50. Vine Deloria, We Talk, You Listen (New York: Macmillan, 1970).
51. The recognition of nature as active presence and agent, which I think is very much part of the kind of change in
consciousness that deep ecology should strive for, is blocked at the cultural level by the logic of colonization and
domination in anthropocentric cultures, just as it is for indigenous peoples in Eurocentric cultures. See Plumwood,
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature and "Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism."
52. See Vandana Shiva, "The Seeds and the Earth," in Close to Home: Women Reconnect Ecology, Health and
Development, edited by Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies (London: Earthscan, 1994):128 143.
53. These have often been asserted historically. See Val Plumwood, "Feminism, Privacy, and Radical Democracy,"
Anarchist Studies 3 (1995): 97-120.
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5
Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology:
Evading the Moral Questions?
Mathew Humphrey
It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are
that do it.
J. S. Mill
A significant amount of deep ecology literature deals with "Self-realization." 1 This concerns the expansion of the
sense of "self" associated with traditional egotistical Western philosophical and political traditions, such as
liberalism, to a sense of "Self"2 that extends beyond the bounds of the individual's body to incorporate something
larger than the individual, isolated human being. With a conception of a mature, expanded Self comes a story about
the development of this Self growing out of earlier, less fully formed notions of selfhood. This developmental story
plays an important part in the relationship between a conception of Self and human ways of acting in the world
that have been suggested by deep ecologists. I argue that the deep ecological Self-realization sense of Selfhood,
when combined with arguments concerning the desirability of a sense of rootedness in bioregional place and a
privileging of ''beautiful" action over "moral" action, forms a particular ideational constellation which leaves deep
ecologists defending an ethically worrying ontological basis for human action. Here deep ecologists have
something to learn from the ethics of a particular form of liberalism.
My argument compares deep ecological notions of Selfhood and theory of the development of a transpersonal Self
with structurally similar notions developed by the French novelist, integral nationalist, and political activist
Maurice Barrès.3 This comparison will help us begin to delineate the limitations and lacunae that render the deep
ecological conception of humanity, as propounded in the Self-realization thesis, problematic. I want to suggest that
deep ecologists not only should care about agents' attitudes and practices, they also should care about people's
reasons for acting. It is not enough that people act in the
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right way; we also should be concerned that they act in the right way for the right reasons. Ultimately the only
consistently defensible reasons for action are reasoned ethical ones, based upon thought and reflection as to the
nature of the right or the good, not those based upon an understanding of the self. We should privilege the "moral"
over the "beautiful," and not vice versa. 4
I
My concern here is with the actions that people take which are directly intended to affect the relationship between
human and nonhuman nature, ergo environmental actions, and with theories as to how these actions are affected by
conceptions of self (and, relatedly, place) held by individuals and groups. That such conceptions do, or are
commonly held to, have a bearing on environmental actions is illustrated by the character of a number of
contemporary environmental campaigns. To take one example, there is the opposition in the Welsh valleys to the
development there of opencast mining, which has involved some cooperation between Earth First! activists,
members of a direct action group inspired by the principles of deep ecology, and local residents concerned with
protecting what they see as the environmental integrity of their locale. The most interesting aspect of this example,
in respect to political ideas and their use at the popular level, is the manner in which the environmentalists have
sought to mobilize resistance to proposals for opencast mining among the local population.
The activists (both local and international) stressed that the opencast mining proposals were put forward by, and
would serve to benefit, large companies (and implicitly, it seems, English companies). They claimed that these
proposals were about far more than the scars that would be left on the South Wales countryside by the mining
activity, more than the bronchial diseases they forecast the local population would suffer from the pervasive dust,
more, even, than the apparent irony of coal-mining men being thrown out of work because there was allegedly no
market for coal, only to see others come in and extract the same coal with a fraction of the workforce (which
would be nonlocal). No, this was fundamentally about the centuries-long colonial domination of the Welsh.
Without an appreciation of this, the true significance of the opencast mining proposals could not be grasped.
Through years of industrial life spent in the service of other (English-dominated) industrial concerns, the
inhabitants of South Wales had lost their sense of Welsh nationhood. What was needed in order to foster the
necessary consciousness of resistance was a "retribalization" of the Welsh people in the south, a rediscovery that
they were members of a
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people who had long resisted English colonialism and should, as well as could, continue to do so. Daniel Zapata, a
Hopi Indian whose own tribal lands in Arizona are being damaged by opencast mining, told a meeting of villagers,
"You, the Cymru are suffering the same mental and physical traumas as indigenous peoples everywhere. You have
been treated as slaves, providing manual labour for their mines. You have forgotten your own spirit." 5
This mode of argument connects personal understandings of self and place with environmental action. It has
theoretical underpinnings in the works of the philosophers of deep ecology and bioregionalism, in particular Arne
Naess but also George Sessions, Bill Devall, Kirkpatrick Sale, and others.6 Here I compare the way these writers
use the concepts of place, consciousness, and psychological development with those of an earlier writer who
developed his own ideas about a transpersonal sense of identity and a concept of rootedness: the French ideological
novelist Maurice Barrès.7
Comparisons of this kind are never unproblematic, for one has to show more than a mere similarity of language.
Through an application of the morphological approach to the comparison of ideological ideational systems,8 we
can demonstrate a particular structural similarity in the ideational constellations of both deep ecology and Barrès's
integral nationalism. The morphological method gives us a way to map the conceptual structures of ideologies in
an open, flexible manner, without having to impose an essentialist mode of ideological labeling. We can
empirically ascertain, initially through a process of self-definition, certain commonalities in conceptual
structures"family resemblances" such that, contingently and subject to revision, we can assert these particular
political concepts form the core cluster of ideological family x.
An ideology, Michael Freeden tells us, is "none other than the macroscopic structural arrangement that attributes
meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts."9 Ideologies are structured through particular
configurations of political conceptsfreedom, justice, sovereignty, human nature, nationality, environment, and so
on. These concepts may be praised or dispraised, accepted or rejected, but they will almost certainly be there, even
if only by default (i.e., in order to be dismissed). Thus ideology a may decontest freedom in one way, ideology b in
another; ideology a may value nationhood and nationality, ideology b may dispraise it (a cause of war) or deny
nationhood any substantive existence (a mere fiction). Most important, when discussing ideological structure,
nationhood may be at the core of ideology a (empirically central to the vast majority of accepted examples of
discourse within this ideology, and a component against which other, more peripheral notions are defined) yet
adjacent, or peripheral, to ideology b. Here I do not attempt to map out the complete
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conceptual content of either deep ecology or integral nationalism. I analyze particular core concepts present in both
of these ideologies, and look at these concepts' relationship and interdependent decontestations in order to elucidate
certain structural similarities.
My comparison of deep ecology and Barrèsian integral nationalism will show that the particular conceptions of self
and place within these ideologies are decontested and structured in such a way as to generate significantly similar
motives for political action. I argue that these modes of decontestation and utilization point both deep ecologists
and Barrès toward a form of ontological determinism such that "Self acts (should act) as Self is," and I claim that
this constitutes an inadequate basis upon which to ground environmental action. Inadequate because it envisages a
basis for action that takes insufficient account (despite the label "Self-realization") of the potential, and possible
need, of humans to develop well-rounded and mature moral personalities. First, however, we need to examine the
relevant aspects of these two ideologies.
II
Arne Naess, in his Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, 10 has a section titled "Gestalts and Gestalt Thinking" in
which he seeks to justify the holistic dimension of his philosophy.11 He argues that our understandings of
complete structures and interrelationships are such that we cannot achieve the same level of understanding through
an analysis of their component parts. The supervenient characteristics that go to make up a perceptual experience in
its entirety are such that it is qualitatively different from the understanding achieved through the study of only the
individual parts that go to make up that whole.
This is one version of a fairly standard argument of deep ecologists against what they take to be the claims of a
dominant, Newtonian mechanomorphic and reductionist mainstream science that dominates conventional popular
understandings of the world. Naess envisages a hierarchy of gestalts, and developmentally we move toward ever
larger gestalts encompassing all the relationships that constitute "lesser" gestalts, the lesser being what he calls
"fragments" of the larger. It is important here to understand that "higher" gestalts can, for Naess, be combinations
of "fragments" from the different areas of sensory perception and understanding, and what he calls an apperceptive
gestalt combines fragments from a sensory area and a normative and/or assertive area. Unless, he tells us, we
deliberately focus only upon the perceptual gestalts; then all experience is apperceptive. That is, all experience
combines both sensory and evaluative elements simultaneously. He says, ''The distinction between 'facts'
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and 'values' only emerges from gestalts through the activity of abstract thinking. 12
This distinction between fact and value is not useful if what we are trying to do is describe the world in which we
live. Why not? Because our gestalts of our surroundings are of a very complex character, and "are easily destroyed
by attempts to analyse fragments of them consciously." Gestalt understandings bind the "I and the not-I together in
a whole," but "the glorification of conventional 'scientific' thought leads to the ridicule of such creations. It tears
gestalts asunder." "Mythic'' thought (i.e., understandings of reality inherently imbued with normative overtones) is
gestalt thought, and its presence indicates a thriving cultural understanding of place. Verbal deterioration of
gestaltsa habit of removing additional, mythic components from our understandings of the names things
have"implies a deterioration of the culture."13 Naess then goes on to apply this understanding to the importance of
people's possessing a particular sense of place.
In non-nomadic cultures, especially agrarian ones, a geographical sense of belonging is crucial. More
specifically rooms, interiors, stairs, farmyards, gardens, nearby trees, bushesall these things become, on the
whole unconsciously, a part of that which is ours, a powerful kind of gestalt. The geographic relationships
are of great importance in an appraisal of urbanization and design and its penetrating transformation of
personality.
When a child grows up, the higher order gestalts of the home change gradually. Certain things which were
threatening cease to be so as one becomes larger and stronger. Some things which were more distant or
mystical become nearer because of the improved ability to cross distances. The essence which remains
constitutes the character of belonging, of being at home, an interwoven gestalt diversity with extremely
potent symbolic value. . . .
A description of the home milieu with the evaluative predicates beautiful, good, boring, safe, familiar etc.,
sounds artificial to people who haven't been away for a longer period of time, as the milieu gestalts
themselves comprise evaluations. A neutral, name-giving description sounds more correct. The point is
important as it to some extent explains why many people who live in, and are well adapted to, a locality do
not find it natural to praise nature or the environment. It smacks of tautologythe beauty is "in", not to be
found or talked about.14
Naess goes on to consider people living in a Norwegian rockslide area, clearly a potentially dangerous place to
live. Such people might ask themselves:
"Should we move, or should we stay here where we belong, at home?" Home as a positive, value-weighted
place can be defined here in part as the relations with nature. . . . To move from the slide area implies the
loss of an appreciable part of one's self-loss of gestalts which comprise "one's roots," "my surroundings,"
"our surroundings." New gestalts must be built up at the new location, but after the developmental years it
is not possible to re-create the most fundamental gestalts and symbols. One remains a stranger
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towards or in oneself; or one preserves the old associations, and a self which belongs somewhere else, an
emigrant. 15
Naess then uses this platform to critique urbanization, industrialization, and the increasing geographical mobility of
human beings in the contemporary world. All this, he says, leads to individuals feeling a rising degree of
meaninglessness, which is partially due to "an indifference to symbols," that is, to the symbolic elements of
understanding which reflect the interpenetration of appraisal and description characteristic of "mythic," gestalt
thinking.
Naess uses the most interesting and evocative language in his account of the importance of a sense of place to
individual psychological health, but he is far from unique among the ranks of deep ecology writers. The central
idea behind Kirkpatrick Sale's writing on bioregionalism lies in the importance of a sense of place in the task of
maintaining an ecologically sustainable lifestyle. People have to become what he calls "dwellers in the land," to
"come to know the earth, [in which] the crucial and perhaps only and all encompassing task is to understand the
place, the immediate specific place, where we live."16 Bioregionalism seeks to replace Enlightenment universalism
with a "place-dominated vision of a sustainable future,"17 and it "advocates a new ecological politics of place,"
which, despite criticism, ''offers a program of change toward a sustainable way of life."18
Robyn Eckersley notes approvingly that bioregionalism places emphasis upon "protecting, and rehabilitating if
necessary, the characteristic diversity of native ecosystems. This is manifested in its concern to develop a sense of
rootedness that is . . . 'biotic, not merely ethnic.'"19 Bill Devall more than once discusses his identification with the
Siskiyou-Klamath region in the western United States, and argues that "The recent emergence of bioregional
movements in North America demonstrates the ties we have to home place, even in an age of mass society."20
Andrew McLaughlin tells us that industrialization has eroded ties to place: "Work has also been severed from the
local community. . . . People no longer expect to live out their lives where they were born. It has become normal
for people to move away for education and employment. Friendship and ties to family and place have lessened.
Some corporations regularly transfer their higher level employees to ensure that their primary loyalties are to the
company, rather than to the place they live."21 By contrast, "It is care for other life forms, engendered by an
identification with place, that is one of the reasons for the affinity between deep ecology and bioregionalism. One
can truly love what one knows."22
Alan Drengson tells us that "Ecosophy is the wisdom of dwelling in a place and it is also the wisdom to dwell in a
place harmoniously."23 For Freya
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Mathews, the process of forging a personal identity in relation to the natural world, composed of concentric circles
from the immediate self, entails that "My identification with the more immediate circles of self, viz., ecosystem
and biosphere, thus requires that I defend and maintain them, and this self-defence argument is not nullified by
identification with a cosmic whole that is tolerant of destruction at the level of particulars."² 24 David Rothenberg
explains that a Naessian response to the suggestion that a part of deep ecology consists in "biorights: the rights of
unique landscapes to remain untouched" would be "not 'unique', not 'rights', but thinking of the landscape first,
before human needs, and then devising technologies, and management, that stem from a rootedness in place and
nature. ''25 Finally, George Sessions notes: "It seems clear that many individuals and societies throughout history
have developed an intuitive and mystical sense of interpenetration with the landscape, and an abiding and all-
pervading 'sense of place'."26
Why is so much stress put upon the importance of developing this intuitive sense of place in the deep ecology
literature? The answer is that it is seen as an integral part of an "ecological consciousness." This is the form of
consciousness deep ecologists want to see people develop in order to provide them with a psychological basis for
taking environmental actions. As we come to literally identify with our surroundings,27 we cease to separate the I
from the not-I, and thus attacks on our surroundings become attacks upon us, and forms of direct action in defense
of our "place" become a form of self-defense. It therefore becomes something that is axiomatically justified,
requiring no rational form of explanationa right to self-defense is considered self-evident. As Andrew McLaughlin
writes, "'Thou shalt not destroy the biosphere' is as silly as 'don't burn your hand' once one feels embedded in
nature."28
III
One might call Naess's writings on apperceptive experience and the importance of a "home place" a form of
philosophy of developmental psychology. It has both a descriptive and a semiexplicit normative aspect. Our most
fundamental gestalt is "home," and this apparently is best constructed during one's developmental years. Beyond
these years, although gestalts of a new place can be constructed, they do not have the same depth and character.
One will either "become a stranger to oneself" if the attempt is made to assimilate to one's new environment, or one
will remain true to oneself by retaining one's old association with the home; but one then remains "a self who
belongs somewhere else, an emigrant." It is important to understand that Naess sees the self as extending
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from the "inside" outward during the process of normal human development, from the narrowly selfish ego of the
child, to family and close friends, to an identification with life generally. He says, "The gradual maturing of a
person inevitably widens and deepens the self through the process of identification. There is no need for altruism
toward those with whom we identify." 29
Nonetheless, even though there is no anthropocentric limit ("all-round maturity among humans inevitably fosters a
high level of identification with all life-forms"30), there seems to be a sense of gradation to the expanse of
identification that can be fostered by the truly well-developed Self (the most intimate identification being with the
"home place"), which I think can help explain why the most explicitly political manifestation of deep ecology has
been bioregionalism. In addition to this there isif we refer back to the extended quote from Naess aboveclearly a
sense of a decline in, or loss of, the ability to spontaneously generate gestalt images as one matures. The normative
implications are clear. We are faced with a choice that is essentially little choice at all if the individual wants to
maintain psychic health. Who would want to be a stranger to himself when he could be true to himself and know
himself? And who would want to be a "self who belongs somewhere else,'' and thus leading a life with which,
surely, one cannot fully identify, when one could be truly at home, without having suffered this loss of an
"appreciable part" of the self? Why settle for existence as a damaged self? The normative message is clear, in the
declamatory style of Naess: Don't emigrate! Stay rooted! Be true to your Self!
How does this compare with Barrès's use of the concept of enracinement? Barrès also argued that it is necessary to
cultivate a sense of Self that goes beyond the confines of the immediate individual human body. Two of the
principal themes of the Culte du moi trilogy are "the desire to transcend the painful separation of the Self and the
world in an exaltation of consciousness [and] the search for the unity of the Self in harmony with its world, the
extension of self-love to universal compassion."31 For Barrès both a sense of place and an awareness of history, of
the ancestry of one's region, were essential to give an individual the sense of rootedness necessary for psychic
health. The Self was a product of one's geographical roots. This was a highly deterministic account of
developmental psychology. Barrès, with his stress on the transcendent Self which finds more than an echo in deep
ecology, holds that "The rootedness of our Self enables us to transcend the limits of individualism" and achieve "a
larger and a larger experience."
In Un Homme libre, Philippe, the protagonist, having failed to find satisfaction in the attempt to cultivate a
radically individualist conception of self, learns that what "is required now is no longer detachment, but
identification
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with something outside the Self. The change of orientation in his thought occurs around the idea of instinct and the
unconscious, which Barrès tends more and more to associate with a transpersonal collective life accessible to the
individual as a continuation of his own limited existence." 32
For Barrès, however, rootedness, also entails the acceptance of environmental determinism. We are what our
surroundings make us. "Nationalism," says Barrès, "is the acceptance of a particular kind of determinism."33
''Even thought is not free. I can live only in relation to my dead. They, and the earth of my country, command me
to a particular way of life."34 This determinism makes the knowledge of other cultures irrelevant in terms of self-
development: "Travel might make one more aware of the roots of others, but they remain the roots of others rather
than one's own."35 Furthermore, there is a definite sense, in Barrès work, of the loss of selfhood that he believed
an individual suffers when he tears himself away from his roots. Other places, such as Venice or the Near East, are
seductive and alluring to the Frenchman, but in separating the individual from his roots, they break the connection
with sustenance and, vampirelike, draw the elan vital from one's being.
Thus, both Naess and Barrès have a keen sense of a supposed intimate relationship between that which surrounds
us in our developmental years and the nature of our mature transpersonal Self. Do they, however, conceive of this
relationship in the same way, both in terms of precisely what is held to determine the nature of the self and in the
account of how the deterministic mechanism works? There certainly are disparities. In particular, Naess's idea of
the importance of geographical location is based upon an identification with the nonhuman environment,36 but
Barrès, while giving the landscape of his home region of Lorraine more than passing consideration, identifies his
roots and his sense of transpersonal Self as being with the people, and in this respect the emphasis of the two
writers is clearly different.
Naess stresses attachment to one's natural, living surroundings. One's understanding of what the world is, how the
world "works," and patterns of thinking are crucially shaped by the natural environment in which one grows up; it
patterns one's developmental gestalts. Barrès, on the other hand, says of Lorraine that in his early years of traveling
in an attempt to, as it were, "construct" his self, he had thought it plain and uninteresting. Upon his conversion to
rootedness, however, he came to appreciate and expound upon how the landscape and nature of Lorraine had
shaped his own Self. Nonetheless, Barrès places more emphasis on his kinship with the people of Lorraine. In his
conception of "the earth and the dead," he appears to place more emphasis on the latter: "My being enchants me as
I catch sight of it through the centuries . . . the
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soul which lives in me today is comprised of the residues which have survived thousands of deaths, and this sum,
enlarged with the best of myself, will survive me even as I lose all memory of it." 37
Thus, one might well argue that the primary component of rootedness is different for the two authors: for Barrès it
is about the interconnectedness of people across generations within a geographically confined space, whereas for
Naess it is about the development of a Self that incorporates relationships with one's "home environment." But is
this difference substantive when we come to examine the way these concepts are played out politically? Is it
actually possible, at this level, to maintain a separation between a sense of rootedness based on kinship with a
people from a similar sentiment based upon an attachment to one's natural environment?
If we recall the case of opencast mining, Daniel Zapata, and Welsh tribalism, the Welsh were being told to see
themselves as a people, a people who had been oppressed for generations. Clearly this form of environmentalism
entails possibilities for certain affinities with Welsh nationalism, a point not lost on supporters of the latter. To
quote the Welsh nationalist Ned Thomas, "What distinguishes the protests in Wales from those in some parts of
England to conserve the environment [is] that they converge on a special kind of consciousness, which is a national
consciousness. All the threats are threats to the Welsh tradition, the protest is a protest in the name of a shared
past."38 And "In Wales, we are still, miraculously, able to love the bit of the earth on which we live and feel our
continuity with the truly heroic struggles of our forebears more than our differences with them."39
Similarly, Barrès wanted the people of Lorraine to rediscover their own historical identity and throw off German
rule. It may be logically necessary that place and people run together where this particular argument about
developmental psychology is expounded, simply because the undamaged Self is a Self that remains at home.
Generational continuity, the formation of something that can be recognized as a "people," must go hand in hand
with psychologically healthy individuals who possess a deep concern for their environment. We arrive at a
particular vision of a good society as a community having a strong sense of its interrelationship with the place in
which it exists.
This idea of the interpenetration of place and people is reflected in a final quote from Ned Thomas.
People everywhere in industrialized countries have realized after two centuries of ruthlessly exploiting
nature that the time has come to conserve it. But how limited the view of conservation usually is. If the
people have gone, and the memories have gone, and the literature that records the interaction of the people
with the landscape has gone, and we
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come and place plastic litter sacks on the sterilized green slopes, how can we talk of conservation? 40
Here again we have the argument that people and place are substantively interdependent. Part of a "landscape" is
the culture and memories of its traditional inhabitants.
IV
In what way do the concepts of Self and place fit into the larger conceptual universe that forms the ideologies of
deep ecology and Barrèsian integral nationalism? For Naess and the other deep ecologists, the sense of place forms
an integral part of a cluster of concepts that support a presumption of man's "non-interference" with nonhuman
nature. The core components of deep ecology include both the ecocentric rejection of the idea of an value-
imparting ontological divide between humanity and the rest of nature, and a conception of the individual and of
individual development as a "Self-realizer." These two aspects of deep ecology constitute the idea of the
attainment of the ''expansive" sense of Self referred to above.
What are the consequences of cleaving to this "ecological consciousness" or "ecological Selfhood"? This Self is
one whose relationships with nonhuman nature are such that they become a constitutive part of it. The
conventional, individualistic liberal conception of the self is rejected in favor of an I that is an all-encompassing I
incorporating one's environment. Why should this sense of self be important to a political ecologist? What has my
sense of self to do with protecting the natural world? Well, as Andrew Brennan says:
However much metaphysical nonsense may be thought to be involved in all this, there is certainly one good
thing to be said for such a metaphysics. It does overcome the old problem of how to find value outside of
the valuing subject. For by building in the subject's environment, by breaking down the divide between the
self and the other, we have a simple solution to the problem of value in nature. Provided I am valuable,
then so is my extended self, the natural world. A wrong to it is a wrong to me.41
Thus "defense" of the nonhuman natural world now becomes a form of Self-defense, something that is easily
understood and is taken to carry within itself its own moral justification. This is apparent in Bill Devall's work
when he says that "My right42 to defend the integrity and beauty of the Siskiyou-Klamath region is based upon my
understanding of ecological principles and on my identification with that region which has become part of my
body."43 Devall is not idiosyncratic here. Consider the following:
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An appropriate metaphysics for the emerging ecological perennial philosophy would provide a structural
account of the basic unity and interrelatedness of the universe, while at the same time accounting for the
importance and uniqueness of living beings. Similarly, this metaphysics of interrelatedness helps us realize
that the natural world and other species are inextricably part of us, and us [sic] of them (a mutual
reciprocity). The truly active person will take direct action to help preserve the natural world, for in a
profound and mature sense, one sees such preservation is in one's self/Self interest. 44
Also, according to Freya Mathews, "If we destroy our environment, we destroy what is in fact our larger self. We
commit this mistake because we are suffering from a maladaptation in the form of a faulty belief system that
misrepresents our identity to us."45 And Warwick Fox puts it thus: "I can also experience this larger, but still
entirely personal, sense of self as part of a still more expansive, transpersonal sense of self that includes my family
and friends, other animals, physical objects, the region in which I live and so on. When this happens, I experience
physical or symbolic violations of the integrity of these entities as violations of my self, and I am moved to defend
these entities accordingly."46 So, along with notions of identity and a right to liberty expressed as self-defense, we
get adjacent concepts of "direct action" (derived from the freedom to self-defend, which encodes within it notions
of urgency and immediacy. If my Self is threatened, I do not have time to rely upon cumbersome legal procedures
in order to defend myself; I have to act now), and, I would argue, the notion of "rootedness" (my expanded Self
may be in some sense universal, but I cannot act in all places at this time. Ergo I become, to all practical intent,
this place, my bioregion, the Siskiyou-Klamath region. Here I can act, this is where I can manifest my right to
defend myself). Here again, as Deep Green ideology bridges the realms of thought and action, a ''right to self-
defense" is decoded as nonviolent direct action in defense of my Self, which is rooted in this place.
What work does the concept of rootedness perform in Barrès's writings to support his larger project of integral
nationalism? If this relationship comes out clearly anywhere, it is in his novel The Uprooted.47 Here the hero,
François Sturel, is faced with a difficult "ethical" choice. A close friend, Astiné Aravian, a beautiful Armenian
woman who was formerly his lover, is brutally murderedmurdered, he discovers, by two fellow Lorrainers, Honoré
Racadot and Antoine Mouchefrin. Sturel then sees himself as placed in (what is presented as) a moral dilemma. He
knows that only his testimony can break Mouchefrin's alibi, yet Mouchefrin is a compatriot. His former lover's
murder demands justice, but she was, ultimately, an outsider; and the perpetrators, whatever their individual
character, are fellow Lorrainers. Although this dilemma is claimed to be ethical, it is resolved to Sturel's
satisfaction through
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reference to feelings that in themselves have no ethical basis. His feelings of national solidarity, which determine
his decision, are not based on ethics; they are based on the psychological determinism of the development of the
Self. As Sturel ponders his course of action, a public event enables him to see that
Through his acts, each of these men [Racadot and Mouchefrin] belongs to the isolated life, and perhaps to a
strongly villainous life. But through his life force [lit. sap] each one belongs to the common life. . . . There
are ignoble instants, but their sum makes a noble eternity. Hugo makes me sense it with too much spirit for
me to know passion, disgust, contempt; just in time, his work and this crowd brought back to me, strongly,
the mysterious unity of all life's manifestations. Let us accept our role and the roles our neighbors play. 48
C. Stewart Doty comments on this passage: "Sturel's banding together of the seven Lorrainers was but the first
halting step of the 'instinct of the sick' to heal a disunited France. Entire regions and the entire nation must band
together in cultural rootedness, even with the Racadots and the Mouchefrins. They must unite against those foreign
to the fatherland or to the achievement of one's self-hood."49 Sturel does not testify against Racadot and
Mouchefrin because he is a Lorrainer and they are. Justice is sacrificed to identity. In the same way that the I of
deep ecology cannot but defend nature, so Sturel ultimately makes his decision not to turn Mouchefrin in on the
basis of what he is, not what he thinks. This is, if one will, ontological nationalism, not something "chosen."
Thus I believe that when we examine the relationship between these concepts and the larger patterns of political
thought with which they are associated by both deep ecologists and Barrès, we see another very important
similarity emerging. Both use this conceptualization of Self in order to bypass difficult ethical decisions. Once the
Self is correctly understood, then what the Self does is determined by what the Self is. The connection is drawn
between an ontology and an intuitionist epistemological framework, and from this, action is derived directly. In the
novel Astiné was murdered so that the jewels she wore could be sold to raise money. Sturel is presented as
knowing what justice would demand, what morality would demand (would not we all?), but he ultimately finds that
he does not have to refer to morality in order to know what to do.
We have a good example of this structure of relating identity to action in the following quote from Naess:
"Through the wider self every living being is connected intimately, and from this intimacy follows the capacity for
identification and, as its natural consequence, the practice of non-violence. No moralizing is needed, just as we
need no morals to make us breathe."50
So nonviolence here follows not because we believe it to be morally wrong to try to further our political beliefs by
violent means, but because of our understanding of what we are. Ultimately, I believe that the conception of the
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ecological Self put forward by deep ecologists is unattractive precisely because it is a Self that acts upon the basis
of what it is, not because of what it believes, values, understands, or weighs in the balance of moral and other
considerations. At least, to the extent that the ecological Self acts upon beliefs and understandings, these are merely
"internal." That is, they appertain only to understandings of the nature of the Self. This can be contrasted with
conventional ethical discourse, which relies upon some sort of conceptualizing and understanding of the "other."
V
This idea of the place (or rather non-place) of ethics in deep ecology is expressed by its proponents in one of two
ways: ethics is held to be either (a) superfluous, for once one has one's sense of identity fully formulated, ethical
imperatives are simply not required, or (b) present but fully determined by ontology (i.e., once one gets the
ontology "right," the ethics will fall into place). On this the proponents of deep ecology are clear enough: "[T]he
transpersonal ecology conception of self . . . has the highly interesting, even startling consequence that ethics
(conceived as being concerned with moral 'oughts') is rendered superfluous! [Because] one will naturally (i.e.
spontaneously) protect the natural (spontaneous) unfolding of this expansive self." 51 Andrew McLaughlin informs
us that we need to go ''Beyond Ethics to Deep Ecology."52
And in an approving nod to Fox, Eckersley says, "Transpersonal ecology explicitly rejects approaches that issue in
moral injunctions and advances instead an approach that seeks 'to invite and inspire others to realize, in a this-
worldly sense, as expansive a sense of the self as possible.' "53 Finally, Rothenberg reminds us that Naess's
ecophilosophy is "an environmental ontology, not an environmental ethic."54 Or, as Rothenberg writes in his
introduction to Naess's book: "Naess offers in this book the basis of a new ontology which posits humanity as
inseparable from nature. If this ontology is fully understood, it will no longer be possible for us to injure nature
wantonly, as this would mean injuring an integral part of ourselves. From this ontological beginning, ethics and
practical action are to fall into place."55
This "ecological Self" is a Green version of Sturel. He, in shielding his fellow Lorrainers from the demands of
justice, is acting not in order to defend them (he sees them as in many ways beneath contempt) but in order to
defend himself. His Self is taken to be the cumulative product of generations of fellow Lorrainers; to betray the
murderers is to betray this heritage, and to betray that is to betray himself. Likewise, to allow damage to the
nonhuman nature that
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has been incorporated into the ecological Self is to allow harm to the Self, and this conception of the Self sets up a
dynamic in favor of the same amoral basis for action as that of the Barrèsian Self. This brings us to the heart of the
problem. After much agonizing, Sturel hits upon what would be the "beautiful action" (i.e., the spontaneous,
natural action) for a truly "rooted" Lorrainer. This would have reflected the ''instinctual wisdom" of the masses, the
unconscious acting out of regional, transpersonal identity, that Barrès praised so often.
Because Sturel has left his roots, lived in Paris, and opened himself up to foreign influence, the beautiful action
does not come spontaneously to him; only intense meditation, along with the inspiration of Victor Hugo's funeral,
inspires him to discover it. Crucially, what he is discovering is the true nature of his Self in Barrèsian terms. Once
he comes to know his transpersonal Self, rooted in the history and soil of Lorraine, he will know how to act in the
world. Similarly, once our potential deep ecologists get their understanding of Self right, they will commit
"beautiful" actions, nonviolent acts of environmental protection, so that, for example, "to propose unpopular
regulations based on ecological considerations is the only and the completely natural thing to do." 56
Naess tells us: "In short, there is little understanding that fostering inclination is essential in every aspect of
socialization and acculturation, and therefore also in the global ecological crisis. Moralizing is too narrow, too
patronizing and too open to the question, 'Who are you? What is the relation of your preaching and your life?"'57 I
want to suggest that, on the contrary, reliance upon the internalization of norms constitutes the more patronizing
approach, resonant as it is with conservative and nationalist ideological appeals to the inculcation of culture and
tradition. It conjures up the image of an elite of deep ecologists who have the wherewithal to fully understand the
nature of the ecological crisis, overthrow existing norms, and substitute for them the ontology of deep ecology that
the masses can internalizethus "spontaneously" carrying out actions on behalf of the environment based on
understandings into which they have been "socialized and acculturated."
The problems with this conception of human action are clear if we contrast it with the view of the good life for
humans put forward by "perfectionist" liberals such as John Stuart Mill in On Liberty and by present-day writers
such as Joseph Raz.58 What these writers offer us is a theory of self-development rather than one of self-
realization.59 For Mill it is not enough that people act in the "right" way; it also matters that they act for the right
reasons. Human moral personality (and the human faculties generally) is held here to best develop through the
questioning of ingrained habits and traditions, as people come to construct and act upon their own conceptions of
the good; and to live accord-
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ing to one's own conception of the good is to lead a moral (or at least morally chosen) life. Mill writes: "He who
chooses his plan [of life] for himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and
judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided,
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decisions." 60
Of course this self-development thesis entails a conception of what it is to be human. However, it is relatively open
to individual interpretations, and the concept of "development" is open ended; it does not hold up an ideal end state
(such as an ontological sense of unity with nature) to be "realized."61 On this account people should be educated in
order to be equipped for the autonomous life, and if they are so equipped, the deep ecologist can hope that they
will be cognizant of environmental problems and act accordingly. However, one must accept that it has to be
"possible" for us to harm nature if we are to lead fully human lives. Thus, to choose deep ecological principles
autonomously, not follow them on account of norms internalized in our early years, would be seen as the requisite
basis for truly human environmental action. The "moral act [that] glides into a beautiful act''62 is one thing; the
beautiful act as socialized and acculturated habit is quite another. This line of criticism of self-realization is also
suggested by Raz:
The autonomous person is the one who makes his own life and he may choose the path of self-realization
or reject it. Nor is autonomy a precondition of self-realization, for one can stumble into a life of self-
realization or be manipulated into it or reach it in some other way which is inconsistent with autonomy. One
cannot deny this last claim on the ground that one of the capacities one has to develop is that of choosing
one's own life. For this and any other capacity can be developed by simulation and deceit, i.e. by
misleading the person to believe that he controls his own destiny. . . . One is not autonomous if one cannot
choose a life of self-realization, nor is one autonomous if one cannot reject this ideal.63
This critique of Self-realization may appear to prejudge the value of the autonomous life for the human individual,
and there certainly is not space for a detailed defense of the idea here. Nonetheless, one does not have to be
committed to the ideal of autonomy to share intuitive qualms about the value of human beings living a life of self-
realization into which they have "stumbled" or have been "manipulated."
What of the charge that morality-based edicts are open to the question "Who are you?" I can only say that if this
charge undermines moral acts, what does it do for acts founded upon conceptions of the Self? If my actions are
based upon my understandings of who and what I am, and you tell me these are wrong, why can I not say "Who are
you?" Who are you to tell me that my understand-
file:///C|/...%20Surface%20-%20Critical%20Essays%20in%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Deep%20Ecology/files/page_100.html[9.6.2010 23:05:11]
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ing of my self is at fault? Here lies a substantive difficulty for the self-realization approach. In an unfortunately
obscure book, Rudolf Bahro hits upon what I believe to be an important truth.
In the new age scene it is customary to reassure ourselves that we are one with the clouds, the trees, the
rocks and the animals. Correct, we are all parts of the trees and the trees are part of us. But it is equally
important for us to recogniseaccording to the same logic!that we are also part of the Megamachine, and the
Megamachine is part of us. Today's adepts drive the Monte Verita in automobiles they identify with more
strongly than they do with trees. 64
These automobiles are, moreover, a recognizably human creation. Who are we to tell other human beings that they
should not "identify" with the products of human effort and ingenuity which have traditionally been interpreted as
signs of humanity's development as a species? Of course a turn here to ethical appeals based upon notions of
values, rights, duties, and so on is far from unproblematic. Nonetheless, in terms of agents who are or become
committed to carrying out environmental actions, the argument that these actions should be based upon beautiful
action, which in turn is based upon an understanding of the Self, contains a crippling ethical limitation. It lacks a
conception of a fully rounded human moral personality. An ecophilosophy that imports the liberal notion of the
value of living the self-defined conception of the good life would have, by contrast, a structural inclination toward
stressing the moral.
VI
I have not argued that people's conception of self, in particular an awareness of an interdependency with the
nonhuman natural world, and perhaps a sense of rootedness in place, is unimportant if we are trying to change
attitudes toward environmental protection. Socialization and acculturation always have a role to play in
maintaining the behavioral norms of any society. My claim is that such an understanding of the Self does not, in
and of itself, constitute a reasonable basis for engaging in environmental action. It does not "render ethics
superfluous," nor does it follow that ethics will happily fall into place once the ontology is right.
If we return to the Barrèsian hero Sturel, he denies Astiné justice because of his transpersonal existence as both
Lorrainer and Frenchman. This Self consists in all its parts, good and bad, and to "betray" any of these parts is to
damage his Self. How would we seek to persuade him otherwise? Tell him it is illogical that his sense of Self
should stop at the borders of France? But, as stressed above, who are we, especially if we do not share his "roots,"
to tell him this?
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What role does logic play in a conception of Self? 65 Surely we could only tell Sturel that the grounds for his
decision are the wrong ones, that the moral demand for justice transcends any need to maintain the perfect
transpersonal Self-realization. The character of Sturel gives a clear illustration of the amoral basis for action that a
motivational sense of selfhood provides. The environmental actions of the ecological self may not be as morally
difficult, but they share the same inadequate foundations.
Contemporary environmental problems present humanity with a range of both difficult and important dilemmas.
The claims of currently existing human populations to a materially decent life, with security from poverty and
disease, the "claims" of other species for living space and a continued existence, and our consideration of the
interests of future generations in having a livable environment, not only in terms of resources but also in terms of
having a recognizably "natural" environment in which to develop are all serious problems. Coping with these
problems is doubtless one of the most important challenges facing late twentieth-century humanity. How to act
rightly in the face of such great difficulties? The Self-realization thesis appears to offer a relatively easy solution to
this question. Understand your Self, and the right actions will come to you. Although an attractive proposition if
true, such an approach risks shutting all doors to reason. We cannot bypass the intense difficulty of these problems
via an ontological shortcut that assumes a fixed end state to human development. In seeking to find tentative,
reasoned solutions to these problems, individuals can continuously develop their moral and intellectual capacities
as they seek to negotiate problematic interaction between conflicting goals. This may prove to be a difficult, or
even impossible, task, but it would seem to be the only human game in town.
Notes
I would like to thank Roger Eatwell, Cecile Fabre, Michael Freeden, Eric Katz, Noel O'Sullivan, Yannis
Stavrakakis, and Marc Stears for comments upon and help with earlier drafts of this essay. Also, participants in
seminars at Bath and Oxford, the members of the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop "Green Politics in the New
Europe," Oslo, March 29 April 3, 1996, and members of the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop for incisive
comments and criticisms.
1. See, as good examples, Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Totnes: Green Books, 1995); Freya
Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991); and Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle,
trans. and ed. David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Fox takes Self-realization to be
the core conceptual component of deep ecology. For a counterargument, see Harold Glasser, "On Warwick Fox's
Assessment of Deep Ecology," Environmental Ethics 19 (1997): 69 85.
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2. I will follow Naess's convention of using "Self" to indicate the transpersonal conception of selfhood, and "self"
for the ''atomistic" conception, or when the term does not apply to either specific version of the concept.
3. All Barrès's novels were political. He called them "ideological" novels and, as Doty notes, "Every novel led to
new political action or was written to convert readers to his politics of the moment." C. Stewart Doty, From
Cultural Rebellion to Counter-revolution: The Politics of Maurice Barrès (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1976),
p. 3.
4. On moral and beautiful action in this context, see Arne Naess, "Beautiful Action: Its Function in the Ecological
Crisis," Environmental Values 2 (1993): 67 71. I use the terms "moral" and "ethical" interchangeably in this essay
to indicate actions based upon a sense of the "right" or the "good," as opposed to actions based upon a sense of
identity.
5. John Vidal, "No Welcome in the Valleys," The Guardian, August 5, 1995, p. 23. See also Kirkpatrick Sale's
comments on "retribalization" in his "BioregionalismA New Way to Treat the Land," The Ecologist 14 (1984):
167 173. The historical problems with viewing the current inhabitants of the South Wales coal-mining belt as "the
indigenous people of Wales" are obvious, but from the perspective of this essay, this is far from being the issue.
An "imagined" identity can be as politically effective as a "real" one if enough people are prepared to act upon it,
and anyway it is far from clear that such a distinction has meaning. What I am interested in is the mode of
argument being employed by environmental activists in order to foster the desired environmental consciousness in
the local people. Similar modes of argument are being employed in campaigns to save "native" species such as the
red squirrel in the United Kingdom. See The Guardian, August 7, 1996, "Society" supp., p. 3. Also, on campaigns
to reintroduce native species to the United Kingdom, The Independent, March 1, 1997, sec. 2, p. 18. For an
eloquent analysis of the connections between national and natural history, see Simon Schama, Landscape and
Memory (London: HarperCollins, 1995).
6. Whether Daniel Zapata, who has his own ideational inheritance to draw on, was influenced by these authors is
not the point here. The example is merely intended to illustrate that the arguments which follow have some
relevance to contemporary environmental protests and debates. Furthermore, I take the view that bioregionalism
constitutes a political doctrine closely related to the ecophilosophy of deep ecology. There is not space here to
engage in a detailed defense of this interpretation.
7. I use Barrès as a particularly apposite example for the illustration of the pitfalls of basing motivation upon
identity. I am not seeking to draw wider parallels with nationalist ideology.
8. For a full exposition of this approach, see Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), chs. 1 3.
9. Ibid., p. 141. Emphasis added.
10. Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pp. 57 63.
11. Naess claims to prefer "gestalt" terminology to "holistic" terminology because "it induces people to think more
strenuously about the relations between wholes and parts." Ibid., p. 58.
12. Ibid., p. 60.
13. Quotes in this paragraph, ibid., pp. 60 61.
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14. Ibid., pp. 61 62.
15. Ibid., p. 62.
16. Sale, "Bioregionalism," p. 168.
17. Adrian Atkinson, The Principles of Political Ecology (London: Bellhaven Press, 1991), p. 182.
18. Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 222
19. Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach (London: UCL
Press, 1992), p. 168.
20. Bill Devall, Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology (London: Green Print, 1988), p. 59.
21. Andrew McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), pp.
72 73.
22. Ibid., pp. 207 208. Emphasis added.
23. In Bill Devall, "Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism," Society and Natural Resources 4 (1991): 249.
24. Freya Mathews, "Conservation and Self-Realization: A Deep Ecology Perspective," Environmental Ethics 10
(1988): 353. First emphasis added, second in original.
25. David Rothenberg, "Introduction," in Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 15. Emphasis added.
26. George Sessions, in Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake
City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985), p. 241.
27. I do not believe that when deep ecologists write of an "identity," they mean it in the strict sense of "A is B," as
suggested by the late Richard Sylvan ("A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part II," Radical Philosophy 41 [Autumn
1985]:10 22). This would indeed result in an ''all is one" metaphysics from which it would be impossible for us to
open up any space in which we could think about acting in relation to something outside of ourselves. Rather,
deep ecologists use "identity" in the sense of identifying with something that along with our "atomistic" self forms
part of a larger whole.
28. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature, p. 180.
29. Naess, in ibid., pp. 194 195. Emphasis in original.
30. Ibid., p. 195.
31. Gordon Shenton, The Fictions of the Self: The Early Works of Maurice Barrès (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 18.
32. Ibid., p. 70.
33. Maurice Barrès, "Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme," In The French Right: From de Maistre to Maurras,
edited by J. S. McClelland (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 159.
34. Ibid., p. 161. References to "the dead" are essentially references to history. The truth is to be found through the
study of the history of one's home region, not through the abstract theorizing of philosophy.
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35. Robert Soucy, Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1972), p. 76.
36. This is not to suggest that Naess regards interhuman relations with friends and family as unimportant; it is,
rather, a question of emphasis.
37. Barrès, in Soucy, Fascism in France, p. 111.
38. Ned Thomas, The Welsh Extremist (Lalybont, Wales: Y Lolfa Tyf, 1991), p. 12.
39. Ibid., pp. 28 29.
40. Ibid., p. 132.
41. Andrew Brennan, Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of Nature, Value and Ecology (London: Routledge,
1988), p. 143.
42. The assertion of a "right" to self-defense in this discourse is problematic because it combines ethics and
identity in the motivational account. It appears to reintroduce morality into the picture insofar as this right to act in
defense of the expanded Self now has to be shown to exist prior to the taking of that action. The alternative
approach, based on sentiment and identity rather than morality, is expressed in the quote from Warwick Fox, on p.
96. According to Fox, we are moved to act in such a way as to defend the Self, and because this sense of Self has
expanded, we will act to defend nature. This latter version has the stronger affinities with the ideological structure
of Barrèsian nationalism.
43. Devall, Simple in Means, p. 59.
44. Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology, p. 82.
45. Mathews, "Conservation and Self-Realization," p. 354.
46. Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, p. 217.
47. Maurice Barrès, Les Déracinés, 2 vols. (Paris: Plont, 1922).
48. Ibid. "Chacun de ces hommes, se disait-il, appartient à la vie isolée, et peut-être à une vie fort canaille, par ses
actes, mais à la vie en commun par sa sève . . . . Il y a des instants ignobles, mais leurs somme fait une éternité
noble. Hugo me le fait sentir avec trop de vivacité pour que je connaisse la colère, le dégoût, le mépris; son oeuvre
et cette foule me rappellent fort à point l'unité mystérieuse de toutes les manifestations de la vie. Acceptons notre
rôle et les rôles que jouent nos voisins." Vol. 2, pp. 221 222. Sturel has seen Victor Hugo's funeral procession, and
has been moved by the crowd's sentimental reaction. This reawakens in him his sense of oneness with the people
of France. Astiné was of course an outsider in this regard. (Doty translates a crucial section as "Hugo made me
sense it with so much spirit so that I knew passion, disgust, and contempt." This is not only misleading, it
undercuts Barrès's whole position. Barrès is trying to tell us that when Sturel experiences this sense of common life
in a sufficiently strong way, his feelings of repugnance for Mouchefrin and Racadot are overcome, not created).
49. Doty, From Cultural Rebellion to Counterrevolution, p. 157.
50. Naess, in McLaughlin, Regarding Nature, p. 195. First and third emphases added.
51 Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, p. 217.
52. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature, ch. 9.
53. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, p. 62.
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54. David Rothenberg, "No World but in Things: The Poetry of Naess's Concrete Contents," Inquiry 39 (1996):
261.
55. Rothenberg, "Introduction," in Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 2. Emphasis added.
56. Naess, "Beautiful Action," p. 71. Emphasis added.
57. Ibid.
58. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
59. This is not an uncontroversial claim. See John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,
1996), for an argument that Mill is interested in the self-realization of individuals. However, what is important
from our perspective is that even then, Gray takes Mill to argue that each individual has a unique form of self-
realization, and that there is no fixed end state to which individuals develop. Thus Gray's interpretation does not
impact upon the substance of my argument.
60. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1910).
61. There is a question here as to whether it is possible to cleave to a broadly "middle" position, by which one
could still cleave to the "Self-realization" thesis, yet hold that for the good of the development of moral personality
in human beings, it is essential that people achieve Self-realization autonomously. Self-realization can be of value
only if achieved in this way; thus it is harnessed to a positive appraisal of autonomy. Such a position would be
problematic. If one has a perfectionist account of the good human life, how can it be treating people as morally
considerable individuals to allow them to fail to achieve such a life through their own weaknesses or
misconceptions? One would surely have to value autonomy over Self-realization to hold this position, and be
prepared to accept the ecological and social consequences of a widespread failure to achieve Self-realization. This
would be quite removed from the position of deep ecologists such as Naess.
62. Naess, "Beautiful Actions," p. 69.
63. Raz, Morality of Freedom, pp. 375 376. Raz is not referring here to the specific deep ecological version of the
Self-realization thesis, but his comments are as applicable to it as to any other version.
64. Rudolf Bahro, Avoiding Social and Ecological Disaster: The Politics of World Transformation (Bath, UK:
Gateway Books, 1994), pp. 14 15. The "Megamachine" is essentially Bahro's shorthand for industrial society.
65. Barrès's epistemology with regard to this was intuitionist; one cannot come to "know" one's Self at the merely
rational level. Deep ecology literature is redolent with the same assumption.
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6
In Defense of Deep Ecology:
An Ecofeminist Response to a Liberal Critique
Ariel Salleh
Context
It is curious to reflect on the growth of gender awareness in deep ecology now, fifteen years after the "Deeper Than
Deep Ecology" challenge. Innocent of the academic microscope that would be applied to it, that blithe little
rhetorical nudge to our deep ecological brothers led first to uproar, then to debate between ecofeminists and deep
ecologists lasting over a decade. In the meantime, while the feuding parties have made personal peace, I am not
sure that the political message of "the ecofeminist connection" has been fully received. 1
This chapter will revisit the ecofeminist call for deep ecological consciousness-raising. But it will do so
tangentially, by way of philosopher Mathew Humphrey's liberal argument that the deep ecologists' "identification
with nature" fails to meet requirements of an adequate moral theory.2 In response to Humphrey's critique, I will
suggest that if deep ecological concerns were reformulated in terms of an embodied materialism, this ecofeminist
approach might deepen the ethic of deep ecology and its epistemology while helping to keep liberal critics at bay.
Philosophy as Social Practice

As I noted in "Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate" (see note 1), the
conservative character of some deep ecological theory very likely reflects its social origins. Professional
philosophy is arguably an elitist pursuit, removed from the menial world. It depends on the presence of a social
underclass of other humans who labor in the realms of necessityproductive and reproductive. Without a historically
established division between mental and manual labor, the conditions for formal philosophic production would not
exist.
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Unwittingly, philosophers may perpetuate materially oppressive social relations marked by class, race, and gender
differencesan ethical dilemma that touches the discipline at its very core. This in turn gives rise to an
epistemological problem if the language of philosophy continues to reflect the sociological positioning of a
particular grouping. By default, that language may be counter-productive to the search for truth. Words as tools
lose their incisive edge when terminology becomes a self-referential idealism, removed from the daily materiality
of most people's lives.
As an applied endeavor, ecophilosophy is a step in the right direction; deep ecology that would undo the traditional
schism between Humanity and Nature is another. An ecofeminist standpoint can ground philosophical reason even
further, because the women of our generation, struggling to be heard beyond the sphere of reproduction, have been
doing a great deal of thinking about what it is that links the internal relations of Humanity and Naturethe body.
My own writing has focused on what can be called an embodied materialism. 3 This builds on Marx's profound
understanding of the dialectic between our practical actions in the world and the form that our thought processes
take. However, Marx's model was too much centered on the production of things"men's work," as distinct from
women's socially given reproductive activities. So, as an ecofeminist, I have come to deconstruct the gaps in that
historical materialismthe philosophical silence on Women and Nature, marginalized subjects in an otherwise
radical analysis.
Now, the term "social reproduction" means to be engaged in nurturing living processes by enhancing our human
interchange with nature. Domestic work still has this function inasmuch as women cook and clean, tend young and
old, and engage in sexual and reproductive activities. Subsistence farming and hunter-gathering by men can also be
said to be reproductive labor. Obviously, women and men caught up in urban consumer societies have less give-
and-take with external nature than cottage-dwelling folk once did. But in the international division of labor, the
domestic functions of indigenous peoples and Third World farmers are still bound up in care for earthly cycles,
albeit increasingly compromised by the spread of maldevelopment from the West.
In conventional Marxism, where production is the privileged category, the reproduction of daily needs and the
reproduction of future generations is a taken-for-granted background "condition of production." But my point here
is that these socially reproductive laborswhether by mothers, wives, black housekeepers, or slavesare just as much a
condition of philosophic production as of factory production. At further remove in the global economic gestalt, we
can acknowledge colonized others, whose labors or lands generate the re-
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source surplus from which First World citizens draw affluent lifestyles and leisured hours.
These facts about the unethical framework in which the philosophical enterprise takes place are well known.
Among deep ecologists, Arne Naess's account in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle is full of illustrative instances
of the 20:80 thesis. 4 But what I want to attend to here is the discursive positioning and reflexivity of deep
ecology, liberalism, and ecofeminism within this global context. I will propose that when philosophy externalizes
its own social framework from the exercise of reason, it may lapse into a form of idealism, thereby undermining
the integrity and accuracy of analysis. Therefore, in striving for ethical and epistemological adequacy, both liberal
philosophers and deep ecologists might benefit from using an embodied materialism.
Identification with Nature and the Liberal Critique

My observation is that most ecophilosophical writing is still formulated in idealist terms as distinct from speaking
in a way that reflects our material engagement with, and embodiment in, nature. Nevertheless, Naess and other
deep ecologists have moved significantly toward materialism by making sensory experience of habitat and "self-
realization" based on rootedness in place prerequisite to right ecological action. In this philosophy, an expansive
identification with nature breaks down the divide between I and not-I, creating an intuitive sense of rightness that
some call "beautiful action." The ethic takes form as "Self should act as self is." Desire for embodiment in deep
ecological reason is plain in Naess's assertion that ecodefense is self-defense, and also in Bill Devall's description
of the ecosystem as "part of my body." Andrew McLaughlin is another who sees "care for other life forms,
engendered by an identification with place. ''5
Naess's ontology embraces reality as a relational net, an apperceptive hierarchy of gestalts combining sensory and
evaluative elements simultaneously. Thus deep ecology is implicitly normative and rejects the conventional
opposition of fact and value as an artifact of abstract thinking. Naess departs from the "spectral" mathematized
tradition of science, favoring "mythic" forms of narrative culturally imbued with a sense of place. With their notion
of "dwellers in the land," bioregionalists like Kirkpatrick Sale join deep ecologists, urging that belongingness and
psychological health are shattered by urbanization and industrial development.6 By this logic, identification of
Human self with Natural milieu provides an axiomatic or self-evident basis for actions that are environmentally
moral.
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Mathew Humphrey develops an interesting critique of deep ecology around what he sees as its ontological
determinism and associated evasion of moral questions. 7 Followers of deep ecology maintain that there is no need
to lay down moral imperatives if the self is fully realized in desiring survival of the wider biotic community. But
Humphrey rejects this stance as environmentally determinist: to assume that we are what our surroundings make us
and to assume that beautiful, self-authentic acts are a sufficient guide, is to fall well short of a morally informed
attitude.
Humphrey argues that the deep ecologists' goal of personal maturation toward identification with nature is a closed,
totalitarian concept of self-realization, and by implication manipulative. A developmental psychology must be
open-ended, he maintains, if it is to properly equip us for an autonomous life. For the Gesellschaft rather than
Gemeinschaft man, individual autonomy and freedom of choice are paramount considerations.
It follows in the liberal schema that a deliberative weighing of options will be an essential part of taking moral
action. And this in turn must entail the possibility of risking all, or choosing to act unethically. Finally, Humphrey
believes that a deep ecological ethic of intuitive identification fails as moral discourse because by definition ethics
must involve negotiation with "an other." In a related vein, Humphrey points out that beautiful actions framed by
parochial sentiments are lacking because they demand no capacity for self-detachment and reflexive awareness on
the part of the moral agent.
Some Ecofeminist Reflections on Idealism

It should be noted that each of Humphrey's criticisms of the ethical basis of deep ecology focuses on
anthropocentric or human concerns. In other words, regardless of the rightness or wrongness of his case, it does not
deal with the extent to which deep ecology might be an adequate ethic for nature beyond the human. Making the
same point in ecofeminist shorthand, I would say that Humphrey's scoping is pre-ecological; it is couched in the
prevailing ideology that sets men over and above nature and womenMan/Woman=Nature.8 That Humphrey's
position on nature is a traditional one is clear from his tendency to treat it at one remove: as "landscape,"
"surroundings," "nonhuman environment.''
Despite old tensions over gender awareness in deep ecology, most ecofeminists endorse its insight into our human
identity with nature and the ethic of care that stems from this. Few ecofeminists will feel comfortable about
describing this attachment as symbolic, though. Too often, deep ecologists seem to
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lapse into abstract, psychological, or spiritual terms to describe "transpersonal" reconnection or material
embeddedness. Their new Man=Nature attitudes are redolent with passively specular images of men "waking up,"
"suddenly seeing," or "admiring" nature, revealing a residual idealism in deep ecological thought.
Sometimes deep ecology reads as endorsing a narrative of a world spirit suddenly entering a man's mind and
providing insight. Yet most of Naess's writing is quite materialist. Consider his relative prioritization of the sphere
of natural necessity over that of human freedom, or his practical perception that we come to understand the value
of energy resources through gathering wood to keep warm. Moreover, in political communication, Naess is ever
the gentle pragmatist, gauging the psychological limits of his opponents' capacity for the deep ecological challenge.
Again, Naess rejects the idealism or naive positivism of Western science and its static worldview in which "a stone
is a stone" and nothing else. He fears that this loss of relational comprehension, a "verbal deterioration of gestalts,"
must inevitably lead to a deterioration of culture. Unlike Humphrey's characterization of the gestalt as totalizing,
ingrained, and habit-forming, Naess sees gestalt constellations as experientially created ways of tilting at expected,
culturally idealized boundaries. Naess's relational ontology, with its acknowledgment of the both/and logic of
contradiction, converges with a dialectical apprehension of the world. The weft that is missing from the weave of
deep ecology is a gendered perspective. I shall return to this later.
In the meantime, a liberal critique of the deep ecological ethic will reveal a variety of cultural idealism through its
unexamined dualisms. The liberal ontology adopts a split between self and other while its epistemology splits fact
and value. This is no coincidence, for, as sociologists of knowledge observe, the fractured thought style replicates
the context of its ideological production in the economic division between mental and manual labor. Similarly, an
ego psychology reflects a competitive social structure that is not safe, and where the healthy condition is
exemplified by an individual with strong defenses against the other.
Let us stay with the background conditions of liberalism for a moment. One can make a case that this political
philosophy was generated historically as capitalist patriarchal discourse premised on a life that is "nasty, brutish,
and short," one in which competition between men is essential to survival. In this avowedly "evolutionary"
struggle for emancipation and progress, a class-based division of labor was part of the natural order of things. For
one class of humans to enjoy a status as fully cultured, rational selves, its opposite number
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would labor as a class in the realm of necessity. Compared with the fully fledged ethical citizen, these
othersmothers, wives, housekeepers, workers, or slaveswere "closer to nature." "Human resources" is the word
today. Nevertheless, the promise of liberalism was that given the innate competitiveness of human beings,
achievement of life's rewards was open to all, at least in principle.
The weft that is missing from the weave of liberalism is more multistranded than the one missing from deep
ecology. It is an acknowledgment of the culturally imbued power of a privileged minority to define, impose, and
manipulate class, race, gender, and species differences. Humphrey's presentation of Naess's deep ecology as based
on "internalized norms" turns its back on the internalized norms that determine and prop up Western liberalism: a
predilection for individual autonomy and free choiceliterally at any cost. And we know who has historically borne
the cost, whether it be counted in labor, time, or pollution. Most "others" in contemporary capitalist patriarchal
societies are menial workers: women, indigenous peoples, and other species. I am not suggesting that Humphrey
accepts this status quo; what I am saying is that these facts need to be kept up front when we argue about moral
questions in the context of liberalism.
Humphrey is right in wanting people to have an opportunity to consider their reasons for acting as they do. I am
just not convinced that his own position is as reflexive as it might be. As things stand, the material power relation
that may exist between self and other is protected by a positivist separation of fact and value which keeps historical
context clear of the discourse on ethics. In light of this, I find an ironic moment in Humphrey's dismissal of deep
ecology as solipsistic: if right action is an expression of the self as is, then it depends on "who you are." Humphrey
insists that in philosophy, motive can not be derived from identity, but my own sense is that the liberal notion of
morality is highly self-referential. Consider the line that the urbane citizen properly weighs his moral judgment,
whereas the indigenous ecologist acts out of a nondeliberative oral tradition. Surely such a thesis depends entirely
for its plausibility on "who you are."
The liberal standpoint is arguably an environmentally determined ideology designed to reinforce the objectives of a
particular Western economic system. On this basis, can it really be claimed to be less manipulative than Naess's
theory of identification with nature is? Moreover, in a rapidly globalizing world, arguments about place are very
salient with neocolonial struggles coming to the fore. Yet the implication of Humphrey's critique of deep ecology is
that culturally embedded mythic narratives which may shape the ecological acts of some indigenous peoples are
nonreflexive, and thus nonmoral. Here, I feel that
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Humphrey's stance ceases to offer open-ended dialogue with the other. What is needed at this juncture are
reconciliatory moves to foster international tolerance and grassroots participatory democracy.
Liberal morality is not only class-based, it is raced or Eurocentric in its bias, and it is also gendered. As Carole
Pateman points out, while liberalism is premised on a social contract negotiated between free and equal citizens,
this moral foundation of Enlightenment society was in fact contracted only between fellow citizens. 9 So when
Humphrey criticizes Naess's primitive intuitionism and says that his ethical position sacrifices justice to identity,
the double standard comes very close. What remains under cover here is the extent to which the liberal political
stance is itself of mythic origin, socially determined and intuitively plausible to middle-class men of the so-called
developed world.
Vis-à-vis nature and "other" species, Humphrey reminds us that liberalism is characterized by the strategic calculus
and deliberative optimization, including a right to choose unethical action. What follows from this freewheeling
morality is the risking of resources as an essential component of a life well lived. Humphrey goes on to amplify his
critique of deep ecology with a quote from Rudolf Bahro: "Correct, we are all part of the trees and the trees are
part of us. But it is equally important to recognise . . . that we are also part of the Megamachine, and the
Megamachine is part of us." I feel this quote works against Humphrey as much as it works for him, for as Larry
Lohmann has noted:
Only by atomizing tasks, redefining women as unproductive and separating workers from the moral
authority, crafts and natural surroundings created by their communities, has it been possible to transform
people into modern universal individuals.10
In other words, liberalism, despite the best intentions of its founding fathers, is implicated in material
circumstances that are socially unjust and ecologically destructive. In contradistinction to this failed political
formula, ecofeminists ask that we take note of a global class uncompromised by the rewards of the Megamachine.
Whether subsistence farmers, hunter-gatherers, or domestics, these meta-industrial workers have hands-on
knowledge of sustaining labors in a joint metabolism with nature. Moreover, if democracy still counts for anything,
this class constitutes a statistical majority globally. So in the search for an epistemology and ethic that is both
practical and just, it makes sense to heed its voice.
In making my case for an embodied materialism experientially grounded in meta-industrial nurture, I want to point
out that we are all environmentally determinedto a degreebut also that we daily remake the conditions of our
existence. This is to endorse Humphrey's openness thesis and his objection to any
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"ontological shortcut which assumes a fixed 'end state' to human development." The dialectical notion of praxis
does imply a continuousculturally mediatedphysical conversation between our bodies and their milieu. Labor in its
various forms provides the possibility of grounded solidarity in our identity with nature. This is not a self-
realization to be thought up or intuited in pure idealist fashion, nor, following the deep ecological imagination, will
it necessarily come with an individual's maturation in the world.
An Embodied Materialism
As I argue in my book Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Post-modern, it is usually grassroots
housewives, as opposed to so-called emancipated feminists, who are the strongest fighters for ecology. 11 In the
Third World, subsistence farmers and indigenous hunter-gatherers come to environmental politics with clarity and
a materially grounded conviction gained in their communities. Each of these groups also has a moral sensibility
finely honed by experiences of exploitation and suffering in a global economic system that is designed primarily to
benefit metropolitan, middle-class men.
Now I want to explore the possibility that the deep ecological sense of place might be more usefully formulated as
a theory of working in/with nature. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the word "indigenous" means
"native, belonging naturally, to soil." So women's reproductive labors almost universally mediate nature for men. In
a sense, women within nature and nature within women have coevolved reciprocal practices over centuries. This
nature-woman-labor nexus certainly supports a proposition that ecofeminist insights constitute an indigenous
knowledge informed by hands-on experiences that are marginalized and devalued by urban industrial productivist
economics.
Among housewives, the nexus includes the sensuality of birthing and suckling labors; historically assigned
household chores; gardening or making goods; creating and implanting meanings in the next generation. Similarly,
peasant and indigenous men and women are organically and discursively implicated in the material rhythms of
enduring time, and like domestic workers, they develop practical expertise grounded in that materiality. Good
farmers foster the earth to metabolize these connections; women give up their bodies as alchemists to make life.
The enduring time horizons of these meta-industrial workers are not compatible with the truncated time sense of a
profit-driven free market. Nor do they find the controlling, analytic, and linear character of the scientific method
appropriate to the maintenance of living things. Remember, too, that Western
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science with its idealized separations of subject and object, fact and value developed historically by elective
affinity with liberalism. In contrast to the self-interested maximizations known as "best practice," sustaining labors
involve following through on long-term goals in complex relational systems. In contrast to planning with crude
statistical indicators, the indigenous labor process knows its material intimately.
A finely reasoned account of vernacular labors "immersed in details of the physical world" can be found in
philosopher Sara Ruddick's book Maternal Thinking. 12 As Ruddick reminds the reader, maintaining a household
requires harmonizing a complex of subsystems, as well as considerable decision-making and diplomatic skills. To
reappraise social reproduction this way is thus not to argue from victimhood, that oppressed women have a
monopoly on good behavior; nor is it to fall back into unreconstructed masculinist readings of some innate,
essential "naturalness" or pro-family assertions about moral superiority of the female sex.
Nor is this a case of what Humphrey criticizes in deep ecology, an extraction of motive from identity. Rather, the
argument makes a materialist epistemological claim about those who work with head and hand in a self-directed
way, and the accuracy of their cognitive capacities and skills. This unique consciousness is discouraged under the
capitalist patriarchal division of labor. Thus, while I agree with Humphrey that flexibility is a most precious
"resource," when it is practiced as an embodied materialism, it is the antithesis of the liberal trend to labor
specialization. The latter only leads to alienation and entropyin physical and philosophic systems.
Holding as Epistemology and Ethic

Ruddick's concept of "holding" is especially relevant to an ecofeminist defense of deep ecology against liberalism.
"To hold means to minimize risk and to reconcile differences rather than to sharply accentuate them. Holding is a
way of seeing with an eye toward maintaining the minimal harmony, material resources, and skills necessary for
sustaining a child in safety. It is the attitude elicited by 'world protection, world-preservation, world repair . . . the
invisible weaving of a frayed and threadbare family life.'"13
Paradoxically, while minimizing risk, holding is the ultimate expression of adaptability. As opposed to the
physicist's separation of space-time, interconnectedness is commonsense in the mater/reality of those who hold
things together. With ecofeminism, this precautionary principle comes to be applied beyond home and
neighborhood to moral action in society at large.
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But holding practice is more than a human morality; it is the quintessential work of resisting environmental
entropy. Australian indigenous workers traditionally practice a kind of holding, and this, too, nurtures
sustainability. 14 Unlike the liberal man of property, Aboriginal peoples do not package land with neat little titles
for fear of losing it; rather, they move through country in the knowledge that nature will replenish and provide for
them when they return. Self-managed Aboriginal provisioning richly meets many needs at once: subsistence,
learning, participation, innovation, ritual, identity and belonging, freedom, partnership with habitat.15 On the other
hand, the engineered satisfiers of modern industrial societies, like bureaucracies or cars, cost great effort and
frequently end up sabotaging the very convenience they were designed for.
Reproductive labors are embedded in a matrix of social relations that in turn are sustained by subsistence activities
embedded in cycles of biological time. In the caregiving labor that Ruddick names "mothering practice," a woman
(or man) has no choice but to deal with material before her (him). Unlike the physicist or social scientist, she
cannot invent categories to deny what is natural. What characterizes her understanding is reciprocity with what
nature provides. Nancy Hartsock has noted how this gentle labor by mediation distinguishes enduring work from
proletarian labor, which under the liberal's free-market growth ethic must break nature's back at the master's
command. Evelyn Fox Keller's notion of a nongendered science repeats the theme of subject-object collaboration.
Nature is known as a subject with a heart of its own, a heart that pulses through our own body cells.16
Humphrey would probably be in agreement with political theorist Mary Dietz's claim that an ethic of care is
undemocratic because it privileges qualities of a particular group.17 But the learned qualities of holding labors are
open to any group that chooses to work at the socially constructed margin where culture meets nature. The
ecofeminist respect for enduring time is profoundly democratic. It challenges all existing political stratifications,
including the split between men's and women's traditional labor roles, as much as the speciesist split between
Humanity and other Nature.
The temporal structuration of common household activities and environmental exchanges are each, in part,
independent of discourse, persisting as "complex orders of causality." I believe that Naess's and other deep
ecologists' celebration of place can be deepened by taking such reproductive labors seriously, not only because on
equity grounds it is morally desirable to respect what women and indigenous peoples do, but also because the time
frame of these interactions exists beyond that which directs the sphere of public decision-
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making. In other words, there are epistemological benefits to be gleaned from understanding social reproduction.
Living things are joined across time as well as space; this is an indwelling structure invisible to positivist science,
which prioritizes sight over all other senses. Seemingly oblivious to the pulse of life, Western reason and its
instruments cut across nature's intricate score. Consider agroforestry, mining, nuclear weapons, road transport,
genetic engineering, where the plan is management but complex metabolic rhythms are disrupted and ecological
disintegration results. The dis/located approach of professional expertism generates merely an illusion of human
choice and control. But the mythology is protected by naming its unanticipated consequences "accidents."
Some ecofeminists use web imagery for the cycles of wholeness and decay, entropy and growth. I imagine these
organic, self-feeding transformations following a holographic complex of Möbius loops. Alongside the one-
dimensional reasoning of liberal philosophy, ego psychology, and the engineering mind-set that furnishes it, many
more people globally access another conceptual space, one that is very apposite to ecological thinking. This
relational logic takes in its goal by concentric rather than direct scan; the object is experienced from several
tangential points, kaleidoscopically. Knowledge rests not on mere appearance, formal visual properties, but is
derived from touch, or from the even more diffuse kinesthetic modality that responds to pulse. The effect is an
empathic, reflexive logic without incisive categorical boundaries between the knowing subject-in-process, the
object-in-process, and its representation. 18
Identity/Nonidentity
This account of ecofeminist epistemology circles back to the ontology of internal relations. Naess's position has
been made more explicit since his 1989 book, and it is now clear how this approach to deep ecology might marry
with an embodied materialism.19 The convergence is underscored by deep ecological use of the gestalt
constellation and the both/and logic of identity/nonidentity. Unfortunately, not all deep ecologists adopt this
approach. And even Naess's formulation continues at variance with ecofeminist reasoning because it elides the
implications of gender difference. A fully embodied materialism will address the masculinist dualisms of
Man/Woman, History/Nature, signifier/signified, replacing these with a metabolism of subject-in-field, the very
body of the noun being dissolved in the liquid realism of nonidentity.
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As ecofeminists discover, the Western privileging of solid land over liquid water and the suppressed temporality of
ecological systems by modern economics and science have served to delete both feminine difference and nature's
diversity. For just as political "difference" can be defined by the life-affirming practices and labor in enduring time
that men but mostly women do, so "diversity" is integral to orchestrating life. And here I come to the nub of long-
standing ecofeminist grievances about the hypocritical moment in deep ecology. To quote Vandana Shiva on
capitalist patriarchal Eurocentrism generally: "The construction of women as 'the second sex' is linked to the same
inability to cope with difference as is the development paradigm that leads to the displacement and extinction of
diversity in the biological world." 20
The Eurocentric and patriarchal plausibility structures of both liberalism and deep ecology, each in its own way,
are marred by this failure to cope with difference. The liberal addresses the human subject as rational citizen, but
tacitly a masculine one. And while deep ecologists genuinely reach out for knowledge of the body as nature, this
communion remains constrained by the conventional Man/Woman=Nature ideology. Liberalism and deep ecology
both effectively bypass "the body" as material bridge between thought and habitat. The body has traditionally been
constructed in the West as women's sphere, and so by definition not a topic for philosophy or politics.21 Here we
encounter another liberal dualismthe ostensibly universal public/private divide, which protects the public face of
mastery from acknowledging its private substrate.
Given all this, where will Woman=Nature stand in a scheme of justice based on shared parochial identity? In this
respect, Humphrey's test of the deep ecologists' ethic of place resonates with ecofeminist concerns. He asks if this
empathic morality would allow the brutal murder of a woman to be passed over for the sake of preserving "local
loyalties." As most ecofeminists will acknowledge, were it not for the emergence of abstract Enlightenment
principles like human equality, women today would not have their voices heard, let alone be in a position to
demand justice for abused sisters. Recently, feminists have managed to bring rape onto the international agenda as
a war crime, but such is the force of liberal morality that this violence remains common practice in metropolitan
and peripheral cultures alike. We urgently need a politics informed by deeper understandings, libidinal ones.
Humphrey's idealism and Naess's ungendered identity perspective are both silent on the highly problematic
character of self-realization and autonomous development for women inside the master society and for indigenous
people outside of it. Here I shall use the feminine experience as ideal typical marginality, but the indigenous
experience of identity/nonidentity takes a parallel form
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structurally. The point is that the phenomenon of identification with nature and place seems to be conceptualized by
deep ecologists in a naively positivist, one-dimensional way, whereas Western culture is constructed with two
gender forms Man/Woman.
To restate the ecofeminist case: the Eurocentric dualism is maintained by a discourse promoting two parallel
"realities":
man, culture, subject, mind, public, positive, identity
woman, nature, object, body, private, negative, nonidentity
If a man identifies with nature, this will challenge the hegemonic conception of masculinity that normally accords
his gender group power "over and above women and nature." In Ecofeminism as Politics, I use the mock formula
Man/Woman=Nature to represent this popular ontology. The identification of deep ecological men with nature is
thus a straightforwardly radical step that breaks with the M/W=N determination, at least in part. The part that still
seems to be intact is that women remain silenced by the /.
Returning to Humphrey's ethical exemplar involving the local murder of a woman, his text moves between an
argument about a man's regional identification and one about identity with local cronies. In my view, it is more
convincingly a story of "mateship," as we call it Down Under: bonding between brothers, Man to Man.
Conversely, the identification with place urged by deep ecologists describes a Man=Nature bond. As such, it is
structurally quite dissimilar from Humphrey's case and the M/W=N pattern of liberalism. Moreover, deep
ecologists do not need to cover for nature in the way that regular guys do for each other, because nature does not
commit crimes upon us.
As remarked earlier, men's self-realization by expanded self does nothing to alter the ongoing invisibility and
"nonidentity" of Woman=Nature. This was why my "Deeper Than Deep Ecology" essay was called for in the first
placehalf of humanity had been left out of the "total field." Against the rather disembodied and idealized
transpersonal liberation of deep ecological men, women have a much less easy time of it. Ever strangers in cultural
schemes evolved at men's convenience, women are now thrown into acute personal conflict by the ecological crisis.
This is because the liberal feminist principle of equality offers women an option to become emancipated, but only
by positioning themselves over and above nature as men do. Women choosing this way will find any argument for
ecofeminism as an indigenous knowledge very unpalatable indeed. Third World elite women who believe
themselves emancipated by high-tech gadgetry also will object to it. Thus, while a man's decision to identify with
nature is clearly a
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radical move, when a woman affirms her identity with nature, she risks reinforcing her traditionally oppressed
position, since W=N is outside the full human status enjoyed by men. 22
Nevertheless, for ecofeministsafter much deliberationthere is no doubt that our relational choice to identify with
nature is in itself ''a right reason" and "holding" is the form that self-realization takes. But younger women can find
the pull between conflicting liberal and ecofeminist standpoints very problematic. A grounded awareness of the
critically privileged nonidentity of belonging in/with nature seems to come easier to women experienced in
sustaining labors. Or perhaps it is the reflexive practice of holding that enables women to resolve these
contradictory tensions.
Going back to the relational web and its logic of identity/nonidentity: epistemologically speaking, women get to be
experts in thinking about nonidentical things. And this may be why men so often charge them with being unable to
"make up their minds"; everything is both this/and that. Caring for sick infants and aging parents puts women in
touch with permeability and contamination. Bodies on the margin of nature dribble, smell, ooze, flake, even decay
before our eyes. Women have the patriarchally accorded privilege of holding together the fragments of human
nonidentity in the mesh of enduring time. Men bleed, urinate, ejaculate, too, but the discourse of mastery forces
them to be contemptuous of bodily flows. Capitalist patriarchal languages and institutions offer men an armory of
externalizing, idealizing gestures to bolster their separateness from matter. And what they get from it is
desensitization, a false sense of individualism, crippling loneliness, and destructive compensatory drives.
Different ways of living and knowing yield different approaches to ethics. For example, holding practices open
people to a self-consciousness quite at odds with the cogito of the masculine unitary subject. Women, says Carol
Gilligan, are inclined to work out their ethical responsibilities by integrating thought, feeling, and relational
context. An ecofeminist ethic calls us away from strategic calculation of optimizations and abstract formulas like
rights, into an extrapolation of caring experience.23 Holding, as epistemology and ethic, is based neither on
separation and control of others nor on some ephemeral cosmic fusion, but on practical deferral. It exemplifies a
strong and flexible decentered subjectivity.
Against the liberal critique of empathic identification, I want to argue that moral action does not derive from
idealized discursive constructs alone. Lohmann approaches this opinion when he says:
People seeking anti-global alliances are likely simply to have to drop the idea that there are going to be any
interesting neutral criteria of rationality or democracy . . . [and] in-
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stead content themselves with adopting certain ethnocentric virtues of inquiry: watchfulness, curiosity,
tolerance, patience, humour and open mindedness. 24
As Marti Kheel observes, whether the fraternity of philosophers admits it or not, action based on rights is quietly
prompted by an ethic of care.25 The problem has been that practices such as watchfulness, patience, humor are
qualities that characterize the material practices of social reproduction, the very background conditions that remain
peripheral to the philosophic vision. Even Lohmann's statement seems to harbor an unexamined assumption based
on the liberal private/public divide, that holding virtues are somehow "ethnocentric" and not "universal."
An embodied materialism connotes the enfoldment of time in pleasure and suffering, hardiness and commitment,
stability and security. These ways of being are the qualities of engagement that marginalized meta-industrial
workers, women, and subsistence dwellers bring to their dialogue with nature. In contrast to the profoundly
alienated proletariat of Marx's urban economic vision, such people carry an alternative way of knowing and doing,
one that is sorely needed to build an Earth democracy. Today, when so many are dependent on a global division of
labor to meet their daily needs, the liberal goal of autonomy is all but impossible. Substantively, Humphrey's
meaning might be better served by words like "self-reliance" and "self-sufficiency."
An ecofeminist transvaluation of the mode of reproduction coincides with development critic Wolfgang Sachs's
respect for "societies which live graciously within their means, and for social changes which take their inspiration
from indigenous ideas of the good and proper life."26 This does not mean going backward in history, as liberals,
mainstream feminists, and other Western fundamentalists sometimes claim. It means questioning ingrained habits
of thought and being more fully conscious of what we are about.
Conclusion
What is hopeful for a future symbiosis of deep ecology and ecofeminism is their shared theory of internal relations.
Every one of my criticisms of deep ecology can be met if the logic of identity/nonidentity is carefully applied. So
this essay is an invitation to both deep ecologists and their liberal critics to join ecofeminist endeavors. In valuing
the embodied materialist practices and consciousness of people at the interface of Humanity and Nature, we
encounter new truths about ourselves and unexpected ethical and epistemological insights. Furthermore, by any
criterion, it is moral to give voice to those we presently resource as objects.
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Notes
1. Ariel Salleh, "Deeper Than Deep Ecology: The Ecofeminist Connection," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984):
339 345. The paper was one of three that I read at the Environment Ethics and Ecology Conference, Australian
National University, August 26 28, 1983. The other two papers were published as Ariel Salleh, "The Growth of
Ecofeminism," Chain Reaction 36 (1984): 26 28, and "From Feminism to Ecology," Social Alternatives 4 (1984):
8 12. My ecofeminist critique of deep ecology addressed two texts: Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long
Range Ecology Movement,'' Inquiry 16:1 (1973): 95 100; and Bill Devall, "The Deep Ecology Movement,"
Natural Resources Journal 20 (1980): 299 322. Writings in the debates among deep ecology, ecofeminism, and
social ecology include the following: Alan Wittbecker, "Deep Anthropology, Ecology, and Human Order,"
Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 261 270; Donald Davis, "The Seduction of Sophia," Environmental Ethics 8
(1986): 151 162; Michael E. Zimmerman, "Feminism, Deep Ecology and Environmental Ethics," Environmental
Ethics 9 (1987): 21 44; Janet Biehl, "It's Deep but Is It Broad?" Kick It Over (Winter 1987): 2A 4A; Kirkpatrick
Sale, "Ecofeminism: A New Perspective," The Nation (September 26, 1987): 302 305; Ynestra King, "What Is
Ecofeminism?" The Nation (December 12, 1987): 702, 730 731; Jim Cheney, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology,"
Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 115 145; Kirkpatrick Sale, "Deep Ecology and Its Critics," The Nation (May 14,
1988): 670 675; Murray Bookchin, "Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology," Socialist Review 18 (1988): 9 29; Tim
Luke, "The Dreams of Deep Ecology," Telos 76 (1988): 65 92; Marti Kheel, 'Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology:
Reflections on Identity and Difference," in Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, edited by Irene
Diamond and Gloria Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1999), 128 137; Warwick Fox, "The Deep Ecology-
Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels," Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 5 25; Sharon Doubiago, "Mama Coyote
Talks to the Boys," in Healing the Wounds, edited by Judith Plant (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1989),
40 44; George Bradford, How Deep Is Deep Ecology? (Ojal, CA: Times Change Press, 1989); Ariel Salleh, "The
Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate: A Reply to Patriarchal Reason," Environmental Ethics 14 (1992): 195 215;
Ariel Salleh, "Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate," Environmental
Ethics 15 (1993): 225 244; Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993);
Deborah Slicer, "Is There an Ecofeminism-Deep Ecology Debate?" Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 151 169.
2. Mathew Humphrey, "Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology: Evading the Moral Questions?" chapter 5 in
this volume.
3. My interest in an embodied materialism, critical theory, and logic of identity/non-identity has evolved through
various articles since the early 1980s. These are cited in Ariel Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and
the Postmodern (London: Zed; New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).
4. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, edited and translated by David Rothenberg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989). The 20:80 thesis encapsu-
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lates the fact that 20 percent of the global population uses 80 percent of global resources, while 80 percent of
the global population uses 20 percent of global resources.
5. Ibid.; Bill Devall, Simple in Means, Rich in Ends (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith, 1988), p. 59; Andrew
McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1993), pp. 207 208.
6. Kirkpatrick Sale, Dwellers in the Land (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1985).
7. Humphrey, "Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology."
8. The Man/Woman=Nature formula and its "1/0: body logic" are discussed in Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics,
chapters 3 and 4.
9. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).
10. Larry Lohmann, "Resisting Green Globalism," in Global Ecology, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, (London: Zed,
1994), p. 158.
11. The argument that follows is adapted from Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics, chapter 9.
12. Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon, 1989). See also Gregory
Bateson, Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind (St. Albans Herts, UK: Paladin, 1973), p. 437.
13. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 79. Her reference here is to Adrienne Rich, Lies, Secrets, and Silence (New York:
Norton, 1979), p. 205.
14. Deborah Bird Rose, Nourishing Terrains: Australian Aboriginal Views of Landscape and Wilderness
(Canberra: Australian Heritage Commission, 1996).
15. Manfred Max-Neef et al., Human Scale Development (New York: Apex, 1991).
16. Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985); Evelyn Fox Keller, A
Feeling for the Organism (San Francisco: Freeman, 1983).
17. Mary Dietz, "Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The problem with Maternal Thinking," Political Theory 13
(1985): 87.
18. Ariel Salleh, "Contribution to the Critique of Political Epistemology," Thesis Eleven 8 (1984): 33.
19. In my "Deeper than Deep Ecology," I criticized Naess's language for its instrumentalism. The criticism still
applies to the essay in question, but needless to say, after a decade of debate, all of us choose our words more
cautiously now.
20. Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (London: Zed, 1993), p. 164.
21. However, the new social movementsfeminist, gay, and indigenousare now instating the body in politics.
22. This paradox was explored in Salleh, "Contribution to the Critique of Political Epistemology," but glossed over
in "Deeper than Deep Ecology," so as not to overload a piece written for an activist conference. Nevertheless,
"Contribution . . .'' was cited in "Deeper . . ." for scholars wanting to pursue more theoretical aspects of the
ecofeminist case. Unfortunately, few of my American sisters took the trouble. The resultant "critiques" of my
supposed essentialism can be read in Karen Warren, ed., Ecological Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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23. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); Nel Noddings,
Caring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
24. Lohmann, "Resisting Green Globalism," p. 167. Italics added.
25. Marti Kheel, "The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 139 149.
26. Wolfgang Sachs, ed., Global Ecology (London: Zed, 1994), p. 4.
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7
Callicott and Naess on Pluralism
Andrew Light
As environmental ethics approaches its third decade it finds itself at a curious crossroads. On the one hand it has
produced a plurality of positions and theories answering the call for a ground from which to extend moral
consideration to nonhumans. 1 On the other hand, the discipline is also marked heavily by a predisposition to
suppose that there are certain definite approaches in the field which are necessarily more promising than others,
and perhaps even that these approaches are the only ones which could possibly be true. We are told by some
theorists that we must assume that an adequate and workable environmental ethics must embrace a restricted set of
properties: nonanthropocentrism, holism, moral monism, and, perhaps, a commitment to some form of intrinsic
value.
But given the relative age of environmental philosophy as a recognizable sub-discipline in its own right, how do
we account for the presupposition that we have settled into agreement, as a community of scholars, on the right
path to environmental foundations? Are we prepared to defend as an uncontroversial intuition J. Baird Callicott's
claim that until Christopher Stone's book on pluralism in environmental ethics came along in 1988 (Earth and
Other Ethics), he was prepared for the discipline (meaning right-thinking nonanthropocentrists) to "begin to work
toward the creation of an intellectual federation and try to put an end to the balkanization of nonanthropocentric
moral philosophy"?2 Callicott presumed, in other words, that it was settled that monistic nonanthropocentrism was
the agreed-upon direction for environmental ethics, and he was thus prepared to move ahead unencumbered. Surely
it is not odd for philosophers to think they have the right answers, but it should give us pause that in a field so
young it is already the considered opinion of a critical mass of scholars that anyone who is still questioning which
sides they will take on the anthropocentrism-nonanthropocentrism, holism-individualism, intrinsic-instrumental
value, and monism pluralism debates is just being unnecessarily obfuscatory.
In this essay I want to revisit one of the prejudices of contemporary environmental ethics, moral monism, and take
up the debate currently in progress
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about the alternative, moral pluralism. Monists in environmental ethics generally argue that a single moral
philosophy or ethical theory is required to generate our correct duties and obligations toward the environment.
Pluralists, again generally speaking, argue that this cannot be the case because the sources of value in nature are too
heterogeneous, and because the multitude of contexts in which we find ourselves in different kinds of ethical
relationships demands a diverse set of approaches for fulfilling our moral obligations. On Callicott's account,
however, a commitment to monism is one of the strongest stances that must be maintained in environmental ethics.
In one of his most important contributions to the monism pluralism debate, Callicott, in offering a brief refutation
of the suggestion that Holmes Rolston is not a monist, remarks: "Given that even Rolston is not really a pluralist
after all, one begins to wonder why our best, most systematic, and thoroughgoing environmental philosophers cling
to moral monism." 3 Obviously, many very well-respected theorists in this field may have some disagreement with
such a claim. In fact, aside from Stone, Andrew Brennan, Gary Varner, Peter Wenz, Anthony Weston, Eugene
Hargrove, and many other systematic and "thoroughgoing" theorists have come out on the pluralist side of the
debate.4
In investigating this issue further, I will proceed by taking up the monism pluralism debate as it has been further
advanced by Callicott in the Journal of Philosophical Research. From there, however, I will take a different turn
from the normal discussion of this issue. Specifically, I will take up the question of where Arne Naess's
environmental philosophy fits into the monist pluralist divide. In the discussions of the monism pluralism debate
there is little or no mention at all of Naess's work, even though he may have worked out some of the most
sophisticated versions of pluralism in environmental thought. Unfortunately, Naess's work has generally been
relegated to the historical background to debates like this, rather than being read as an active voice in the field. But
Naess has always been very straightforward that the premises of the eight points of the deep ecology platform
possibly are derivable from a variety of competing traditions.5 Is it the case, then, that his work already embodies
some of the virtues of pluralism which have been defended by various Anglo-American environmental ethicists
against Callicott?
My argument will be that Naess does indeed articulate, or at least suggest, a pluralist form of environmental
philosophy which avoids the foibles of pluralism that Callicott fears: the descentor headlong rush, ratherfrom
pluralism to moral relativism and deconstructive postmodernism. I will also argue that the best frame within which
to evaluate arguments for moral pluralism is to pay attention to what embracing such a position does for bridging
the gap between
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environmental theory and practice, rather than to what such a turn to pluralism means in a more abstract sense.
Callicott's Theoretical Monism

Calls for the reassessment of the prejudices of the direction of environmental ethics ought to carry some weight,
given the object of our study: the troubling state of the environment and the complicity of humans in the creation
of these hazardous conditionshazardous to humans, nonhumans, future generations of both, and the biosphere itself.
6 Environmental philosophy is the attempt to bring the traditions, history, and skills of philosophy to bear on the
questions of how to maintain the long-term sustainability of life on this planet. Not to be presumptuous, but if
philosophers can contribute anything to the reconciliation of more stable human-nature relationships, then
clarifying the direction of the discipline may be one of our most important theoretical enterprises.
The call for caution in thinking we have settled on how to work toward one definite kind of environmental
philosophy is fueled by an argument voiced by Anthony Weston that, given the early, or "originary," stages of our
field of inquiry, we should assume that our field should be less settled on the right avenue for proceeding, rather
than more settled. Weston suggests, partly in response to the claims cited earlier by Callicott:
At the original stage we should . . . expect a variety of fairly incompatible outlines coupled with a wide
range of proto-practices, even social experiments of various sorts, all contributing to a kind of cultural
working-through of a new set of possibilities. . . . [O]riginary stages [should not] speak with one voice.
Once a set of values is culturally consolidated, it may well be possible, perhaps even necessary, to reduce
them to some kind of consistency. But environmental values are unlikely to be in such a position for a very
long time. The necessary period of ferment, cultural experimentation, and thus multi-vocality is only
beginning.7
Thus, the burden of proof, given the moment we are in, is on those who would wish to restrict the field to one right
path for the construction of normative theories of our treatment of nature, rather than on those who resist the trends
to narrow environmental philosophy.
Callicott has legitimately replied to such sentiments that those same demands which make reevaluation of the
discipline important also make stabilization on a narrow path of work equally important. Given the environmental
crisis we face, how could we afford the sorts of delays seemingly implicit in talk of "social experiments"? Moral
pluralism, the specific target of Callicott's earlier worries over the pollution in environmental axiology, at times
sounds dangerously close to the abject relativism associated with deconstructive postmodernism.
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And relativism is something that we may agree, with Callicott, ought to be avoided when the point of our inquiry is
to respond to the deepening environmental crisis. 8
But assuming for the moment that we can answer the relativist charge against pluralism (a point I will return to
later), what are our options if we want to avoid the prejudices of moral monism? Callicott has suggested an
alternative to pluralism in environmental ethics that he believes gets the advantages of pluralism without its
problems. In "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended," he negotiates the criticisms of various pluralists
(Wenz, Varner, Brennan, Weston, and Hargrove) by describing his approach to environmental ethics as a form of
"communitarianism," where "all our dutiesto people, to animals, to natureare expressible in a common vocabulary
of community,'' and so "may be weighed and compared in commensurable terms."9 Before criticizing this view, I
will unpack Callicott's justification for this claim and outline how he thinks it is a good alternative to pluralism.
Callicott begins the article with a summary of his now familiar objections to the pluralism of Christopher Stone.
The argument is that Stone's form of pluralismtermed by Callicott intrapersonal pluralismwhich supposes that an
agent can adopt different moral principles for determining either forms of value or grounds for action, depending
on the object under consideration, is ultimately facile and incoherent. Our many moral concerns as
environmentalistsfor fellow humans, other animals, and the larger environmentthough difficult to negotiate under
the terms of one moral theory, cannot be resolved simply by accepting the apparent necessity of the need to move
from one moral theory to another, depending on the sort of problem that needs to be solved. According to Callicott:
When an agent adopts an ethical theory, an ethical "intellectual framework" as Stone defines his neologism,
he or she adopts a moral psychology, a notion of the supreme good, a criterion of moral considerability,
among other foundational ideas. Facilely becoming a utilitarian for this purpose, a deontologist for that, an
Aristotelian for another, and so on, implies either that the pluralist simultaneously hold all the contradictory
foundational ideas supporting each theory, or first affirm one set, then reject it in favor of another, and then
reject that set for yet another, only to return to the first later, back and forth, round and round. A mature
moral agent, I submit, wants a coherent outlookthe one that seems true. He or she cannot comfortably live
in a state of self-contradiction or as the philosophical equivalent of an individual with a multiple
personality disorder.10
Instead of Stone's pluralism, Callicott offers his communitarian alternative. Since we are all members of different
communitiesfamilies, regions, nations, and so onit follows that each membership generates "peculiar" duties and
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obligations. Therefore, says Callicott, "We can hold a single moral philosophy and a univocal ethical theory, but
one that provides for a multiplicity of community memberships, each with its peculiar ethic." 11 Therefore, when
faced with the infamous choice between spotted owls and the livelihood of Pacific Northwest logging communities,
we have to realize that we are connected to both of these communities, with each membership resulting in different
obligations. Still, realizing that our membership in the "larger biotic community generates duties to preserve the
old-growth forest ecosystem and the endangered species . . . that depend on it," we have to decide between
"temporarily preserving a human life-system that is doomed in any event and preserving in perpetuity an
ecosystem and the species that depend upon it."12 On Callicott's account, our duties to the ecosystem outweigh our
duties to the loggers even though we are members of communities that encompass both as sources of value.
Balancing our obligations to the various communities in which we belong is therefore a key to Callicott's solution
to the problem of how we balance moral concerns to different subjects without resorting to pluralism.
The question that immediately springs to mind is whether Callicott's communitarianism really answers the original
questions raised by the pluralists in environmental ethics. If Callicott's communitarianism is enough to get us an
answer to the problem of valuing all types of things in an environment, then why did the pluralists advocate
intrapersonal pluralism in the first place? The answer may be that the original concern of pluralists was more over
the relationship between our theory-making in environmental ethics and our practice, rather than over the issues
Callicott is concerned with. Two sorts of problems are cited in the literature on pluralism in environmental
philosophy. One concerns the issue of the complexity of the subject of our theoretical enterprise, the environment
as a whole, which includes many more kinds of entities than normally found in traditional moral inquiry. The
second problem concerns finding a practical solution to disagreements over forms of valuation among theorists and
practitioners. Andrew Brennan, defending a form of pluralism even more extreme than Stone's, puts it in this way:
By adopting the pluralist stance, we not only start to do justice to the complexity of real situations, but we
also can start to look for ways by which environmental ethics can be linked up with other modes of valuing
and ways of responding to our surroundings. Utilitarianism and its rivals need not be abandoned, but can be
considered as partial accounts of the moral life. There is scope, for example, for developing notions such as
attention, humility and selflessness in our dealings with nature as part of the story of what makes a
worthwhile human life. These notions should not be thought of as the truth about moralityany more than
utilitarianism is. Rather they provide greater depth in characterizing our situation. Abandoning reductive
monism about values and valuing
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makes even more sense once the force of moral pluralism in this latest form is recognized. 13
It is not clear from Callicott's account that his communitarianism actually gets the results sought by Brennan and
other pluralists. How is it that simply recognizing that we are parts of different moral communitiessomething
Callicott has been arguing for quite some timegets us the compatibility with seemingly rival forms of valuing as
articulated through the pragmatic intuitions of someone like Brennan?
It is this notion of pluralism as a kind of compatibilism, embraced by Brennan, that I think is the most interesting
issue in the literature on pluralism in environmental philosophy. And, to his credit, Callicott does acknowledge that
at least in one sense he is something like a pluralist in this respect, albeit what he calls an "interpersonal pluralist."
By this he means that he upholds "everyone else's right to explore or to adopt a moral philosophy and ethical
theory that seems persuasive to them."14 Along with this commitment to the "flourishing of philosophy" is a
commitment to reasoned persuasion: "Intelligent people of good will should eventually reach agreement if they take
the time to thrash out their initial differences."15 But surely this form of pluralism is insufficient to get the
compatibilism among forms of evaluation that is argued for by Brennan. Toleration of the act of theorizing of
different views does not get us the kind of cooperation among theorists that Brennan seems to have in mind.
Brennan's pluralist would not only acknowledge the other forms of theory-making but also go on to set aside her
possible prejudices for now of the falsity of those other forms of valuing. As long as those forms of valuation are
geared toward the same end, we can ignore for the time being the issue of the truth about which scheme of
valuation is actually right for the purpose of understanding our situation, as Brennan puts it, in greater "depth.'' To
me, the depth of our situation will ultimately be realized in part through an acknowledgment of how the ends of
moral discourse must be given priority in environmental philosophy. Normally our end is to better the
environment, and so we must be concerned at least as much with creating agreement on those policies we all
support as with finding the truth of how to value nature. This is not to advocate, as Callicott puts it, "deconstructive
postmodern différance," but instead simply to acknowledge that the environmental situation we face requires us to
adopt certain compatibilist rules for theory-making, even if we are at heart moral realists.
But perhaps it is the case that Callicott is not really concerned with this question of the relationship between theory
and practice. Since his original target was Stone's argument that one can adopt different schemes of valuing for dif-
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ferent kinds of things in nature, maybe the issue of how intertheoretic compatibilism is to be encouraged among
theorists and practitioners is not really a concern for him. There does not appear to be anything explicit in
Callicott's account that would prohibit him from consenting to something like Bryan Norton's convergence
hypothesis, allowing for an agreement on ends among, for example, anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists. 16
In this sense, there seems to be no objection in Callicott's argument to the motivation behind the pluralist stance as
embraced by Brennan, only to the way in which pluralism is instantiated intrapersonally by various theorists. Let
us then say that Callicott appears to reject Stone's theory, which I will call a kind of theoretical pluralism, while he
may assent to the metatheoretical pluralism of Brennan or Norton. Metatheoretical pluralism then is simply an
acknowledgment of the need for divergent ethical theories to work together in a single moral enterprise despite
their theoretical differences.
In fact, even though Callicott does not take up the issue of Brennan's meta-theoretical pluralism in this argument,
he does acknowledge the accusation of Anthony Weston that he (Callicott) is trying "prematurely . . . [to] shut off
further discussion and development of the field."17 Callicott objects that Weston has confused his rejection of
intrapersonal pluralism with his position on interpersonal pluralism. Callicott emphasizes again that he does not
want to close off discussion in environmental ethics, but rather to "keep the interpersonal debate going." One might
suppose that this is enough of an answer to the concern over how Callicott falls out on metatheoretical pluralism. If
Callicott tolerates the existence of competing forms of valuation, then surely he must tolerate the idea of divergent
theories working together in a common enterprise, be they monist, pluralist, or some other variation. If
metatheoretical pluralism really is the interesting issue raised by the pluralists, then given what we can determine is
Callicott's tacit agreement to it, perhaps his communitarianism (combined with his "interpersonalism") is sufficient
as a substitute for pluralism after all.
But here I think we must be cautious. There is actually no reason to believe that Callicott would make the turn
from toleration of different theory formation (which is the heart of his interpersonal stance) to embracing
compatible cooperation among theories of the sort advocated by Brennan. Since Callicott uses an allusion to
communitarianism to clarify his argument, I will do the same. Suppose that two human communities exist which
both embrace some form of an acknowledgment of the right to free expression. Suppose next that they differ in
respect to the reasons they both value something else outside their self-defined political community, though
common to bothfor example, a
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common ecosystem. One of these groups may value the ecosystem on some scheme of intrinsic value while the
other may value it for its instrumental value for the human community only. Now finally suppose that an
opportunity arises such that both groups could cooperate to increase the overall welfare of the ecosystem, perhaps
because of some situation where the boundaries of the ecosystem cross into both communities' territories. It does
not follow merely on the basis of the fact that both communities embrace a right of free expression of ideas (which
is relevantly similar to Callicott's interpersonal pluralism) that they will then proceed to cooperate to increase the
welfare of their common ecosystem. The group holding the intrinsic value theory of how to value an ecosystem
could find too repugnant the instrumental valuation of the other community. Cooperating with the instrumentalists
might amount to some form of revisionism, or worse. Or perhaps the intrinsic value community would not
participate with the instrumentalists for fear that the instrumentalists would eventually renege on their commitment
to the welfare of the shared ecosystem, since after all they are instrumentalists. On the other side, the
instrumentalists might simply rank too low, on their priorities for public projects, the sort of cooperation scheme
required in the case. Or maybe they, too, find cooperating with people who have such obviously false views
distasteful. The point, however, is that a pluralism with respect to theory formation either inside or outside any
community does not necessarily culminate in a commitment to thinking or acting in such a way that convergence is
considered an end of inquiry or action.
In previous work I argued for what I now call methodological pragmatism (my earlier term was the inelegant
"metaphilosophical pragmatism"), intended in part to get at the sort of metatheoretical pluralism embraced by
Brennan. 18 I will not review this argument in full here, but only reiterate that methodological environmental
pragmatism is compatible with any form of environmental philosophy; it requires only new "rules for the game" of
how to do environmental philosophy, rules that will promote greater compatibility in the relationship between good
theorizing and effective environmental practices. Methodological pragmatism provides a litmus test against which
competing modes of ethical evaluation can be weighed. So the "extreme pluralism" criticized throughout this essay
by Callicott (the idea that one would adopt Aristotle's theory on one occasion, Kant's on another, etc.) is not what I
have in mind as metatheoretical pluralism. My pluralist (and, I think, Weston's, Norton's, and Brennan's), in
acknowledging distinct bases for value, would at least be consistent in the application of the best (all things
considered) moral theory to a particular type of object of valuation, and not change theories with the evaluation of
each token. In other words, my metatheoretical pluralist is
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not an ethical situationalist, and presumably, since he or she is a competent philosopher, would not apply theories
willy-nilly in a self-defeating manner (as Callicott, at the end of this essay, hints an extreme pluralist would). But
most important, and hence distinct from Callicott's view, my methodological pragmatist would not simply tolerate
interpersonal pluralism but would advocate multiple overlapping arguments for environmental valuation when
endorsing environmental policies, in order to generate as broad a basis of support as possible for the proposed
action. Even though my theorist's scheme of valuation would be consistent, such normative consistency would not
be required across the board for all those embracing any given policy.
Callicott characterizes Weston's project in "Before Environmental Ethics" as an attempt to radically refocus the
goal of environmental philosophy. But this is not what I am up to here. I still think, along with Callicott, that what
we should be doing is "systematic environmental philosophy." But systematic environmental philosophy cannot be
systematic philosophy in a vacuum. Not to sound too vulgar (especially since I have a great admiration for people
who do modal logic), but our object of concern is not the question of the spatiotemporal existence of other possible
worlds but the future of the one world we are confident we do inhabit. Surely our method of interacting as
philosophers must push the envelope of Callicott's interpersonal pluralism beyond what we would expect it to be
for any well-trained philosopher working on any topic. Any philosopher who thought it appropriate to censure the
work of his colleagues only because it is different from his own, or failed to give it a fair hearing, would simply be
a bad philosopher. We need not theorize about varieties of pluralism to get to that conclusion. The most interesting
question concerning pluralism in environmental ethics is perhaps a question different from the one Callicott has
taken up, since he never really addresses the issue of what I am calling metatheoretical pluralism. Again Andrew
Brennan provides a valuable insight:
If we accept moral pluralism as a philosophical position, the project of environmental ethics can be seen in
a new light. The challenge of non-anthropocentric ethics to the western, human-centered tradition need not
be described as an attempt to supplant one set of principles . . . with some new overarching set that embrace
not only human concerns but also the interests, whatever they are, of other natural things. . . .
[E]nvironmental ethics is less a competitor for a certain moral position, but an investigation of a more
sophisticated turn that moral philosophy has taken. Embarking upon it is a partial recognition of the
complexity of our moral situation. Note, once more, that the complexity in question is intrinsic to the
business of being moral. Moral pluralism is a philosophical, not a moral, thesis. 19
If we follow Brennan's line of reasoning, an argument that I think is both crucial to and lost in discussions of
pluralism in this literature, then we can easily
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grant Callicott's arguments against Stone. But we should not stop there. We must also argue that Callicott, and
many others who consider these questions, rethink what is at stake in the pluralism-monism debate in
environmental ethics. 20 As I said at the beginning, environmental ethics does seem to be marked with certain
prejudices in the field, not the least of which is how we have constructed some of the defining debates in the
discipline. We need to ask whether the way we approach the practice of doing philosophy (which I agree with
Callicott is still what we are up to here) meets the needs of the object of our concern.
Naess's Metatheoretical Pluralism

I would add one caveat to Brennan's claim that moral pluralism is a philosophical rather than a moral thesis. I think
that, more accurately stated, it is a practical philosophical thesis, meaning that it is not simply a claim about how to
do philosophy but rather how to do philosophy in response to a certain set of problems. Bryan Norton has argued
for a distinction between practical and applied philosophy that explains this comment. On Norton's account,
applied philosophy is the imposition of a philosophical scheme on top of a problem in the world, while practical
philosophy, in contrast, "is problem-oriented; it treats theories as tools of the understanding, tools that are
developed in the process of addressing specific policy controversies." Practical philosophers therefore do not
assume that "theoretical issues can be resolved in isolation to real problems." While the practical philosopher can
certainly work toward developing a "unified vision of environmental goals and objectives," in the meantime,
theoretical differences can be set aside provided all disputants can ''agree on important management principles
. . . despite disagreement on ultimate values."21
Given this distinction, Norton argues that the difference between monism and pluralism is actually much more
profound than may at first be assumed. These are two entirely different ways of doing philosophy in the context of
its relationship to practice. Approvingly citing Weston's remarks on this subject, Norton characterizes monists as
those who do not want to muck up the activity of theory formation with the "details of everyday environmental
management practice." Somewhat hyperbolically, Norton puts it this way:
As applied philosophers, they [monists] hope to resolve environmental problems by throwing fully formed
theories and principles over the edge of the ivory tower, to be used as intellectual armaments by the
currently outgunned environmental activists, to aid them against the economic philistines in the political
street wars that determine the
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fate of natural environments. This heroic version of applied philosophy's role in the policy process will only
be realized if environmental ethicists, laboring in the tower, can agree on which theory to throw down to
the street fighters. 22
We may wish to shrug off such a description as being a bit unfair to the monists, but even so, the point remains
that the activity of philosophy as described by some pluralists is very different from an even more charitable
description of the monist's project. Norton goes on in the rest of his article to criticize Callicott's monism further,
toward the claim that nonanthropocentrism itself, surely thought of as the bulwark of environmental ethics, should
be challenged along with its monistic ground. If we are going to be pluralists (either theoretical or metatheoretical),
we have to accept lots of kinds of value formation, not just what has traditionally passed for the range of positions
in nonanthropocentric value theory.
But I do not want to take this argument in that direction. I do not wish to shore up Norton's criticisms of Callicott
here (even though I think they are very serious), or turn what I take to be the approach to pluralism that I share
with Norton, Brennan, and perhaps Weston into a criticism of another ethical monist. Instead, I want to turn this
discussion toward a more positive extension of this general pluralist approach to another theorist.23 If we are going
to reshape the debate between monism and pluralism along metatheoretical lines, then we also need to reassess
what theories have normally been placed on which side of the dividing line. In particular, I think that this turn to a
new terrain for the monism pluralism debate demands that we bring into this conversation the work of Arne Naess.
It is probably true that many monists would consider Naess's formal philosophical system (his "Ecosophy T") to be
a paradigm case of moral monism, since it seems to emanate from a single source: the argument for the intuitive
and innate connection between humans and the world around them. Since deep ecologists like Warwick Fox have
argued for some time that the point of deep ecology is that there is no ontological divide which can be made
between humans and nonhumans, that claim could be argued as the monistic principle from which our duties to
each other and the environment could be derived.24
But Naess's formal system is best interpreted as theoretically pluralist, and his comments on how to do
environmental philosophy point out that he is a metatheoretical pluralist as well. Since I think that the
metatheoretical argument is the more interesting ground for the monism pluralism debate, I will spend most of my
time on that part of Naess's view. Perhaps Norton would be surprised that I should consider Naess in this way,
especially since Norton has famously argued that there is a distinct lack of pluralistic impulses among deep
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ecologists, and that the entire deep ecology shallow ecology distinction did more to interrupt convergence on
environmental policies among theorists and activists than almost any other distinction in the literature. 25 But
Naess, perhaps more than any other deep ecologist, has worked to foster a form of meta-theoretical pluralism both
inside and outside deep ecology circles. And since Naess never really got involved in the old monism pluralism
debate as its ground was defined by Callicott and others, we can safely say that for Naess the issue of pluralism in
environmental philosophy has always been the question of how to do philosophy, rather than an argument over the
specific content of our ethical evaluations of different things in the world.26
Naess has pointed out specifically that behind the eight points (or principles) of deep ecology are the nonexclusive
overlapping sources of deep ecological thought which constitute the multiple foundations for the theory.27 The
foundations are Christiansome people will argue there are strong intrinsic value presuppositions even in the
stewardship view from Genesis; Buddhistprimarily, according to Naess, as found in the work of Dogen;28 and
philosophicalspecifically from Whitehead's process philosophy and from Naess's readings of Spinoza on the
connectedness of mind and matter. We need not go into the details of how the foundations inform the principles
here, but only note that Naess is very careful to argue that one may get to the principles of deep ecology from any
of the foundations. As far as theoretical pluralism goes, this should be enough to get us at least the "moderate
moral pluralism" endorsed by Peter Wenz, where a single ethical theory is pluralistic insofar as it "contains a
variety of independent principles, principles that cannot all be reduced to or derived from a single master
principle."29 On Naess's account, the pluralistic relationship is between foundations and principles, rather than
principles and principles, but the argument is still the same: the principles of deep ecology are derivable from
distinct but overlapping foundations, and one need not assent to even the coherence of any one of the foundations
in order to derive the principles out of another of the foundations.30 We can test this approach as a form of
pluralism by comparing it with the previously established example of moral monism. Callicott argues persuasively
that his form of monism is at the level of theory but not of principle. But, regardless of this argument, it is still the
case that the idea of the importance of belonging to different communities, which he derives from Leopold, is still
the foundation for the different principles that we can assume would emerge from our different obligations to
different communities in which we participate.31 So all principles are monistically derived. Naess, on the other
hand, does not find the rationale for his multiple principles in one source or even a specific collection of sources. It
is crucial for Naess that one
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can come to the principles of deep ecology from a variety of foundations. Different people will assent to the
principles of deep ecology for different reasons, hopefully building a broader movement around the policies
endorsed by deep ecologists. 32
The most important article that Naess has written on the issue of metatheoretical pluralism is "The Encouraging
Richness and Diversity of Ultimate Premises in Environmental Philosophy."33 In this largely unknown piece
(outside deep ecology circles), Naess acknowledges early on that the style of his approach to the issue of pluralism
belongs to "a somewhat different tradition of metaethical discussion and methodology than the chief participants of
the ethical monism/pluralism debate."34 His first premise is that one of the central tasks of environmental
philosophers is "to study different positions but not to try to reduce the ultimate differences" between those
positions.35 Such a view certainly is in line with the metatheoretical pluralism I am advocating, and may even go
beyond it. What Naess has in mind here is a principle of respect for different cultural approaches to environmental
problems. In fact, he embraces an explicitly cultural form of pluralism. I will return to the question of the cultural
pluralism at work in this piece later, and compare it with Callicott's similar argument taking up this same
challenge. But for now I want to suggest that the argument Naess works out in this article is not restricted to issues
of cultural pluralism and is consistent with the positions previously outlined by Brennan and Norton. Naess may
even be more explicit in his embrace of metatheoretical pluralism than any of the theorists cited so far.
Naess's first reason for advocating an extreme form of compatibilism among theories and theorists is found in his
intuition that a uniformity in views on valuing nature would indicate a stagnation rather than a strength of
environmental ethics. Going beyond Callicott's embrace of interpersonal pluralism, Naess sees not only a potential
for fruitful philosophical argument in a diversity of views, but also something of a basis for a claim to the strength
of environmental thought in general based on that diversity. Like Weston's remarks about how we ought to find any
discipline at its ordinary stages, Naess suggests that the cultural richness and diversity that we may think are part of
a good environmental philosophy cannot be sustained "under conditions of increasing similarity of ultimate
views."36 According to Naess, even if it could be shown that we could have a unified theory of all of reality, "it
does not follow that adequate, verbal accounts of this oneness should or must converge or be practically
translatable into each other."37
Now some may be troubled by this claim since it seems to value diversity as a primitive rather than as a means to
an end, namely the end of coming up with
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a rich and robust environmental philosophy that helps in the formulation of environmental policies. But for Naess,
since we can expect that diversity of forms of valuing is proof of the thickness of the subject of valuations, it
follows that a diversity of views is the norm for environmental philosophy. If we are worried about the limits to our
toleration of other views, then, Naess argues (in a passage very similar to Norton's argument concerning the
compatibility of different views for purposes of policy formation), there are certain restrictions we can assume:
"The only reason to attack a religious or philosophical ultimate premise seems to be the assumption that a
particular environmentally unacceptable position follows with necessity from it." 38
In some respects we can say that Naess is really addressing the variety of positions between different members, or
even factions, of what is loosely thought of as the deep ecology movement. In a passage similar to the ones cited at
the beginning of this discussion concerning how we must not imperil different ultimate premises, Naess remarks:
"Most deep ecologists have fundamental differences from each other, and speak in a variety of terminologies.
Questioning one's motives leads inevitably to philosophical positions and from there back to practice."39 While
some may consider this concern with one group of activists and philosophers a limitation in Naess's
metatheoretical pluralism, I think instead that it is a sign of why we environmental ethicists should heed his advice
more keenly than that of others. Naess is one of the few environmental philosophers in the world who can claim to
have directly and determinately affected a movement of practitioners, and possibly even some policy makers. His
desire to forge some sort of ground for agreement among them is a practical, not an applied or even theoretical,
problem. When Naess asks deep ecologists around the world to respect each other's ultimate premises toward a
goal of some form of metatheoretical pluralism, he is not simply engaging in a theoretical dispute with a colleague,
but trying to forge better links between thousands of on the ground environmental activists. We can be assured,
then, that his motivations are practical in Norton's sense, and consistent with Brennan's worry about how to rethink
the task of philosophy, given the challenge of environmental problems.
A second reason for metatheoretical pluralism in the "Encouraging Richness" article is found in Naess's distinction
between what we implicitly assume in the way we theorize our moral views, and what we explicitly say in ethical
conflicts. The two need not be the same. Naess is in principle skeptical that there can be any systematically
articulated total view of environmental ethics, consisting in a coherent set of premises and conclusions, which
would be logically complete.40 But setting aside the objections that those of us who embrace some
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form of moral realism might have to this claim, we can turn our attention to the part of this argument concerning
our responsibility for what we say in ethical conflicts. For Naess, a good environmental philosopher needs to be
something of a practical anthropologist, with a good understanding of moral customs such that cooperation among
environmentalists is not only considered possible, but is made the goal of the theoretical enterprise. With the
implicit/explicit distinction Naess is able to outline two goals for environmental philosophy that may appear
incompatible, but that are entirely consistent, given the context in which he places environmental theory: on the
one hand we should aim toward perfecting our theoriesmonist, theoretically pluralist, or whateverand on the other
we are obliged to work with the assumptions, principles, and theories of those with whom we must work to see
environmental reform, even if we disagree with those views. For Naess, the subject of environmental philosophy,
and the need to respond to the crisis of the environment, drive this possible bifurcation of the goals of the field,
rather than something intrinsic to the generic practice of philosophy. As a good practical philosopher, Naess sees
this strategy as called for by the particular situation we are in with respect to environmental philosophy. Again,
Naess uses an intramural example to make his point: "The supporters of the deep ecology movement cooperate in
the fight to implement decisions on the level of concrete situations with everybody who sincerely supports a
decision." 41
Now it is generally regarded that the limits to Naess's acknowledged compatibilism would include drawing the line
at cooperation with "shallow" or reform-oriented ecologists and environmentalists. Like the relationship between
Callicott's interpersonal pluralism and some form of metatheoretical pluralism, we could assume that there is no
reason why the structure of Naess's comments regarding the need for intramural cooperation between different
schools of deep ecologists would necessarily translate into reasons for broader forms of convergence. Like
Callicott, we would need Naess to extend his claims about pluralism explicitly to the shallow ecologists, since we
can assume, given some of Naess's previous work, that he would be skeptical about such claims for convergence.
But in the very next sentence after the one quoted in the previous paragraph, arguing for an explicit form of
metatheoretical pluralism among deep ecologists, Naess sets these worries to rest. Naess asks the rhetorical
question: "What could the supporters [of the deep ecology movement] achieve without cooperation with people
whose general argumentation pattern for instance in terms of premise/conclusion relations, is shallow or merely
concerned with reforms?"42 Presumably, very little. The striking thing about this passage is that it brings Naess
much closer to Norton's convergence thesis than
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might initially be thought. Perhaps one could maintain that Naess still thinks there is a sharper divide between deep
and shallow ecologists than Norton is ready to admit. But surely those differences dissolve, given the observation
that the point of both Naess's and Norton's metatheoretical pluralism is convergence on policies in order to achieve
environmental reform. Certainly other deep ecologists might disagree with how far Naess is willing to take his
pluralism, but we may be encouraged here that at least one deep ecologist, and a very important one at that, does
not in principle see any formal reason why deep ecologists cannot embrace something like Norton's convergence
thesis.
Naess ends this article with perhaps one of the most succinct and elegant statements for the need for
metatheoretical compatibilism, which again points to the need to revisit Naess's work in the context of a recast
monism pluralism debate: "The richness and diversity of philosophical and religious ultimate premises suitable for
action in the ecological crisis may be in itself considered part of the richness and diversity of life forms on Earth."
43 Metatheoretical pluralism is thus the activity of environmental philosophers who wish to emulate the patterns of
the objects of their concern.
Conclusions
Before closing, there are two issues I want to take up that could be important in the reintroduction of Naess's work
into a reformed monism pluralism debate, fulfilling two promissory notes given before. First there is the question of
the role of cultural pluralism in this debate, which at times is the issue on which Naess hangs his comments on
pluralism. Second, there is the remaining issue of whether Callicott's worries concerning the relationship between
pluralism and relativism still hold for the form of pluralism I am attributing to Brennan, Norton, and now Naess.
It is not at all uncommon these days to hear environmental philosophers talking about cultural pluralism. Still
smarting a bit from the critiques of theorists like Ramachandra Guha and Vandana Shiva, that much of
environmental philosophy is almost exclusively First World in its orientation and expectations, environmental
ethicists of almost all schools of thought have begun thinking seriously about the issue of cultural pluralism.44 The
subject of the first part of this essay, J. Baird Callicott, has been no exception. Callicott has demonstrated a clear
commitment to cultural pluralism, as evidenced by his book, Earth's Insights.45 In some ways this book is more
thorough than anything Naess has written to bring about an understanding of how a variety of world cultural
traditions can inform a robust environmental ethic.
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In this book Callicott provides a very helpful survey of the environmental philosophies at work in a plethora of
intellectual traditions from around the world. The details of this account are not important here, only the unique
structure of Callicott's argument. 46 Callicott not only surveys these various traditions but also uses his
understanding of the very different environmental theories derivable from different philosophical and religious
traditions to reinforce his commitment to a Leopoldian, nonanthropocentric, holistic monism. It is the
demonstration of this last commitment that shows how Naess's metatheoretical pluralism causes his approach to
cultural pluralism to differ from that embraced by Callicott.
The penultimate chapter of Earth's Insights argues that Leopold's work provides Callicott with a "reconstructive
postmodern" environmental ethic which will be "firmly ground in ecology and buttressed by the new physics."
Such an ethic is the "one" in what Callicott calls the ''one many problem," or the need to have a single cross-
cultural environmental ethic based on the science of ecology and the new physics, while at the same time
acknowledging the importance of a multiplicity of "traditional cultural environmental ethics, resonant with such an
international, scientifically grounded environmental ethic and helping to articulate it."47 The "one" and the "many"
represent, respectively, our quality of being one species facing a worldwide crisis and the historical reality that we
are many people from many cultures and different places. These two aspects of the human experience are not at
odds for Callicott; each will be a part of the emerging world ecological consciousness.
Callicott's move toward cultural pluralism clearly is not metatheoretically pluralist. All these competing world
systems in Callicott's work are read through the lens of his nonanthropocentric holistic version of Leopold's land
ethic. Leopold's view became for Callicott what he calls the "Rosetta stone of environmental philosophy," needed
to "translate one indigenous environmental ethic into another, if we are to avoid balkanizing environmental
philosophy."48 But using the version of nonanthropocentric holism that Callicott distills from Leopold's work as a
yardstick for all environmental philosophy (not to mention all indigenous environmental traditions) draws more
lines toward balkanization than does a metatheoretical tolerance of a multiplicity of approaches. For example,
Callicott's appraisals of different environmental ethics embedded in various global traditions are often based on the
degree to which they do or do not compare favorably with a nonanthropocentric, ecologically based ethic (such as
Leopold's). But if we may call into question the singular vision of this kind of ethic, then we may also call into
question some of Callicott's appraisals of these other systems. We can challenge conclusions like "Africa looms as
a big
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blank spot on the world map of indigenous environmental ethics." 49 Why would Callicott make such a claim?
Because African environmental thought tends to be anthropocentric in contrast to Callicott's nonanthropocentric,
Leopoldian ethic.
What Callicott is doing here certainly is an example of just what Naess warns against in the opening of his article
analyzed in the last section. Callicott has judged (and sometimes denigrated) the ultimate premises of different
world-environmental systems by holding them up to the yardstick of a Leopoldian view. But still, Callicott is only
trying to demonstrate through his one many comparison how different world-environmental systems may support
the principles derivable from a Leopoldian view. If that is his project, then why can't we describe Naess as doing
the same thing? After all, Naess argues that the foundations of different systemsChristianity, Buddhism, and some
schools of philosophyall provide a basis within which to derive the common principles of the deep ecology
platform. But Naess, unlike Callicott, does not evaluate different forms of thought on the basis of their amenability
to the deep ecology program. Naess only points out that these different schools of thought, and epistemological,
ontological, and metaphysical systems, can be used to derive common principles. Naess does not claim that all
forms of such systems need to be evaluated on that ground. He also suggests that while we can "infer traits of an
environmental ethic" from different world literatures, we cannot "pretend to be able to compare in a
methodologically neutral and adequate way meanings and validity of the ultimate premises of total views. "50
While he limits this comment to the problems of translating simple expressions into complex theoretical positions, I
think the point holds in general for his approach to divergent cultural-environmental positions. Therefore, pace the
exception of views from which we can derive antienvironmental conclusions, the goal of cultural pluralism in
environmental ethics, on Naess's view, is not necessarily evaluation of different worldviews, but a finding of
means for convergence of environmental policies, activities, and theories.
It is probably the case that some question still remains of whether Callicott's or Naess's approach to cultural
pluralism is preferable in environmental ethics. After all, there is something to be said for having some means for
evaluating competing worldviews on the environment.51 Because environmental problems are not restricted by
cultural borders, we will certainly find ourselves in situations of cross-cultural disagreement over a common
problem where some method of resolution of competing cultural bases for evaluating environmental problems is
necessary. Part of resolving the issue of which approach to cultural
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pluralism is right will necessarily involve some answer to the original question posed by Callicott, and cited at the
beginning of this essay: Does pluralism lead to a deconstructive, or more simply destructive, relativism?
Clearly, a theoretical or metatheoretical pluralism is at least not incommensurable with a workable, robust, and
critical environmental philosophy. Callicott is right in suggesting that there could be a tendency to move from
theoretical pluralism to relativism, but without an argument for their necessary connection (which has yet to be
made in this debate) it seems that each version of pluralism has to be individually evaluated. Callicott's strongest
case so far is therefore against Stone. 52 But I am not too concerned with theoretical pluralism here, and so finally
my answer to Callicott will have to be that his question needs to be rephrased against the metatheoretical pluralism
which I have identified. Metatheoretical pluralism, especially given the comments on its practical importance
derivable from Brennan, Norton, and Naess, may provide the foundations, or at least guidelines, for the types of
theory development needed at this stage in the growth of environmental philosophy. Since it is clear that we do not
need relativism in environmental philosophy, the development of metatheoretical pluralism can be brought along
with a healthy respect for avoiding the kinds of conclusions which mitigate the moral analysis of environmental
problems. If some framework is provided to prevent pluralism from lapsing into an indecisive form of relativism,
and if pluralism can be argued to be important for the health of environmental ethics, then the next question
becomes how we go about doing environmental philosophy so that we get the right sort of pluralism.
I have argued elsewhere that environmental pragmatism provides us with just the sort of framework we need to
temper pluralism toward these goals.53 But the question of whether this strategy, or an embrace of Naess's form of
deep ecology, or Norton's practical philosophy, or something else is best for this kind of theory development is
something of an empirical question. If theorists and practitioners followed our views to their logical conclusions,
and were able both to cooperate on ends and to avoid relativism (or even the unproductive debate about relativism
that seems to paralyze much of contemporary public discourse), then we could actually see which form of
pluralism best serves the broader goals of environmental philosophy. Of course, of all the views examined here,
only Naess's pluralism seems likely to be testable in this manner anytime soon. In this respect, a careful analysis of
the reception of Naess's pluralism in the deep ecology movement is one of the best next steps in advancing a
reformed monism pluralism debate.
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Notes
I am grateful to Avner de-Shalit, Alastair Hannay, Eric Katz, Zev Trachtenberg, Allan Carlson, and Arne Naess for
helpful comments on this essay.
1. J. Baird Callicott marks three types of nonanthropocentric theories: neo-Kantian (e.g., Paul Taylor, Robin
Attfield, Holmes Rolston), "Leopoldian" (Callicott, William Godfrey-Smith, Richard Sylvan, and Val Plumwood),
and Self-Realized (deep ecologists). See Callicott's "The Case Against Moral Pluralism," Environmental Ethics
12:2 (1990):101 102. In this article he gives an excellent genealogy of the development of these areas. One may
also include nonanthropocentric theories like those of animal liberationists Peter Singer and Tom Regan, as well as
the anthropocentric holism of Bryan Norton and Gary Varner's biocentric individualism, to name just a few
representative theorists.
2. Ibid., p. 102.
3. Ibid., p. 109. My emphasis.
4. Some of the most frequently cited papers on the pluralist side are Christopher D. Stone, "Moral Pluralism and
the Course of Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10:2 (1988):139 154; Gary E. Varner, "No Holism
Without Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 13:2 (1991):175 179; Andrew Brennan, "Moral Pluralism and the
Environment," Environmental Values 1:1 (1992):15 33; Peter Wenz, ''Minimal, Moderate, and Extreme Moral
Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 15:1 (1993):61 74; and two unpublished papers: Anthony Weston, "What Are
We Arguing About?" and Eugene Hargrove, "Callicott and Moral Pluralism," both presented at the Central
Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, April 24, 1993.
5. For reasons that may become apparent later, I count Naess's "environmental philosophy" as both his attempt to
characterize the deep ecology movement and his argument for a definite "total view," his Ecosophy T.
6. I will not recount the evidence for environmental problems here. There is a sufficient amount of literature on the
disastrous effects of humans on the environment to fill any reading list, and concern over the environment is one of
the primary reasons for the development of the field of environmental ethics in the first place.
7. Anthony Weston, "Before Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 14:4 (Winter 1992): 333.
8. Callicott, "The Case Against Moral Pluralism, pp. 116 120.
9. J. Baird Callicott, "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended," Journal of Philosophical Research 19
(1994): 53. I think there are problems with Callicott's designation of his views as "communitarian," problems that
unnecessarily confuse this argument with the communitarianism of Walzer, Sandel, Taylor, de-Shalit, and others. I
don't think that Callicott's work shares much with these other views, especially in light of the fact that most
communitarians include a substantial role for political and moral pluralism in their work. For a specific example of
a more robust, "environmental communitarianism," see Avner de-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters: Environmental
Policies and Future Generations (London Routledge, 1995). For de-Shalit, pluralism comes into play in
communitarianism in the way that communities open themselves to the values of
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other communities, regarding these other valuation schemes "as potential truths rather than as something
inimical" (p. 62). Ultimately, of course, this problem is not philosophically very serious for Callicott, only a bit
inelegant.
10. Ibid., p. 52.
11. Ibid., p. 53.
12. Ibid.
13. Brennan, "Moral Pluralism and the Environment," p. 30. Brennan's thesis is that "there is no single lens which
provides a privileged set of concepts, principles and structure in terms of which a situation is to be viewed" (p.
29).
14. Callicott, "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics," p. 54.
15. Ibid.
16. See Bryan Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp.
ch. 10.
17. Callicott, "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics," p. 56. Callicott is referring to Weston's remark that "J.
Baird Callicott . . .insists that we attempt to formulate, right now, a complete unified even 'closed' (his term) theory
of environmental ethics" (Weston, "Before Environmental Ethics," p. 333).
18. Andrew Light, "Materialists, Ontologists, and Environmental Pragmatists," Social Theory and Practice 21:2
(1995) : 315 333, and my contributions to Andrew Light and Eric Katz, eds., Environmental Pragmatism,
(London: Routledge, 1996).
19. Brennan, "Moral Pluralism and the Environment," p. 30.
20. I should point out, however, that I am not yet ready to grant Callicott's arguments against Stone, Varner,
Hargrove, and Brennan on theoretical moral pluralism, or what Callicott winds up calling "pluralism at the level of
theory." It seems that Callicott has made an interesting argument here that needs to be responded to by those
original proponents of theoretical pluralism. But I still have some worries about what exactly Callicott is
embracing. Even though he claims to be a pluralist with respect to principles, I'm not sure that really individuates
his theory at all. What realist in environmental ethics would argue that one single principle is sufficient to generate
all duties toward the environment? Who holds such a view? If no one, then we still have a monism pluralism
debate at the level of ethics that is at least philosophically interesting.
21. Bryan Norton, "Why I Am Not a Nonanthropocentrist," Environmental Ethics 17:4 (1995): 344. Also see
Norton's expanded version of this paper, "Integration or Reduction: Two Approaches to Environmental Values," in
Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism, pp. 105 138.
22. Ibid., p. 345.
23. I should also note that I would hesitate to too closely connect moral monism exclusively with the applied
philosophy program that Norton is criticizing. If practical philosophy is an improved way of doing philosophy,
then why couldn't a monist, at least in principle, do philosophy in that way? Surely again we are talking about the
difference between a way of doing philosophy and a methodological approach. Even as firmly grounded a monist
as Callicott could presumably embrace a metatheoretical form of
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pluralism based on an argument for the moral responsibility of how environmental philosophers should go
about doing things, even if we would expect his monism to lead him in the applied philosophy direction. In
support of this position, I note that for Norton, monism and applied philosophy only "tend" to go together. Ibid.
24. See Warwick Fox, Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology,
Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20 (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 1986).
25. See Norton's Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, and Harold Glasser's discussion of Norton's convergence
argument in his "Naess's Deep Ecology Approach and Environmental Policy," Inquiry 38 (1996): 157 87.
26. I feel obliged to point out that since I am not a deep ecologist, I don't really have anything at stake in proving
some form of inherent pluralism in deep ecology. But as a good environmental pragmatist, I am open both to
giving credit to good arguments where due and to learning from those arguments in order to further my particular
approach to environmental philosophy. This is, of course, consistent with my theoretical pluralism.
27. See Naess's diagram outlining this relationship in his contribution to Michael Zimmerman, ed., Environmental
Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993), p. 206.
28. The validity of this claim has been called into question most notably by Deane Curtin. See his contribution in
this volume.
29. Peter Wenz, "Minimal, Moderate, and Extreme Moral Pluralism," p. 69, quoted by Wenz in his Environmental
Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 313.
30. I suppose the one worry would be whether the principles of deep ecology are independent of each other, but
even though this issue is not taken up by Naess, it is clear, from the context in which they are introduced at times,
that he does not have their necessary interdependence in mind. He acknowledges the validity, for example, of the
derivation of a different set of deep ecological principles from the shallow deep distinction, and that the views of
the platform of deep ecology are "not basic in an absolute sense, but basic among the views that supporters [of
deep ecology] have in common" (Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, edited and translated by David
Rothenberg [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], pp. 28 29). Another objection could be raised that the
real foundation of the deep ecology principles is the set of intuitions behind the shallow deep distinction.
Accordingly, Naess has simply looked at various systems of ontology and identified an implicit agreement in those
systems with the rationale behind the distinction. If someone can prove this claim, then I will concede that, in this
sense at least, Naess's formal system is monistic. But I don't think that is a problem for Naess's metatheoretical
pluralism, which for me is the important issue.
31. For those unfamiliar with Callicott's work, Leopoldian, nonanthropocentric holism is the brand of
environmental philosophy Callicott has been consistently developing throughout his career. The root of this work
is in Callicott's interpretation of Aldo Leopold's "land ethic," as expressed in Leopold's Sand County Almanac
along a Humean/ Darwinian account of moral sentiments. For some of Callicott's more important papers
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tracking the development of this view, see J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in
Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
32. Of course the question remains as to whether Naess is correct that people with different philosophical or
theological foundations will embrace the principles of deep ecology. I think a case can be made that they already
have, but we can know this only empiracally, of course. I will return to the importance of empirical verification of
arguments for pluralism at the end of this essay.
33. The Trumpeter 9:2 (1992): 53 90. My thanks to Harold Glasser for calling my attention to this article.
34. Ibid., p. 54.
35. Ibid., p. 53. My emphasis.
36. Ibid., p. 55.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. I completely agree with this limitation by Naess on the compatibilism of metatheoretical pluralism. The
point of this pluralism is to strengthen "pro-environmental" claims. If this pluralism began covering "anti-
environmental" views, then it would violate its environmental predicate. I will leave for another paper a discussion
of the ramifications of this caveat.
40. Naess could find support in advancing this position from Wim J. van der Steen, who has embraced a kind of
default theoretical pluralism. Says van der Steen: "Although I opt for pluralism I do so in a qualified way. The
issue is whether we can elaborate a single, overarching theory for environmental ethics. In a sense we can if we
use the term theory for highly abstract, general guidelines that are far removed from practical applications.
However, if we use the term theory for the mundane entities that we come across in most disciplines, pluralism is
our only option. Modesty is my ultimate defense of pluralism. We should recognize our limitations, and we should
be aware of fundamental limitations of science and philosophy. Plain methodology alone suffices to show that the
search for grand theories that satisfy all the goals we may cherish is misguided" ("The Demise of Monism and
Pluralism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 17:2 [1995]: 218). Naess, too, bases some of his
arguments for pluralism on an analogy with science. Callicott argues explicitly in "Moral Monism in
Environmental Ethics" that this analogy does not follow. For Callicott, theoretical pluralism in science may be a
necessity, even a virtue, but in moral reasoning it may only be a sign of a fuzzy-headedness. Though I like van der
Steen's argument, I must admit that I share Callicott's worry that the analogy doesn't really do much philosophical
work. I don't, however, agree that pluralism in moral reasoning is fuzzy-headed. See, for example, Nicholas
Rescher's very unfuzzy Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
41. Naess, "Encouraging Richness and Diversity," p. 58. One could compare this implicit/explicit distinction with
Richard Rorty's public/private distinction for political discourse in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University
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Press, 1989). For an argument concerning the limited utility of Rorty's distinction for environmental pluralism
and pragmatism, see Andrew Light, "Materialists, Ontologists, and Environmental Pragmatists."
42. Naess, "Encouraging Richness and Diversity," p. 58. My emphasis.
43. Ibid., p. 60.
44. See, e.g., Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third
World Critique," Environmental Ethics 11 (Spring 1989): 71 83; and Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism
(London: Zed, 1993).
45. J. Baird Callicott, Earth's Insights: A Multicultural Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin
to the Australian Outback (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
46. I am in no position to evaluate the rigor of Callicott's comparative project, though from what little I do know
about world environmental traditions, his account seems good to me. Anyone interested in comparative
environmental philosophy or theology surely will benefit from Callicott's work.
47. Earth's Insights, p. 12.
48. Ibid., p. 186.
49. Ibid., p. 158.
50. Naess, "Encouraging Richness and Diversity," p. 60.
51. I should mention one overly simple answer to the question of how to evaluate world environmental views:
simply look and see which ones cause more harm to the environment. But here I agree with Callicott, who
explicitly refuses to make such an agrument, suggesting that such a criterion is not clear, and probably unfair as a
means of evaluation. See, e.g., Callicott's discussion of the relationship between Japan's intellectual heritage and its
current environmental situation. Earth's Insights, p. 106.
52. Though I must reserve judgment until some of the defenses of Stone's view have been answered by Callicott.
See Weston's remarks in this regard in his "What Are We Arguing About?," p. 4.
53. See Light, "Materialists, Ontologists, and Environmental Pragmatists."
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II
NEW HORIZONS FOR DEEP ECOLOGY
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8
No World but in Things:
The Poetry of Naess's Concrete Contents
David Rothenberg
From Movement to Philosophy

Most of the writing concerned with deep ecology tends to focus on the deep ecology movement, an international
assemblage of theorists and activists intent on using environmentalism as a basis for a fundamental change in the
way we live and understand the human place in nature. In this definition such a movement implicates people like
Murray Bookchin, David Brower, and Vice President Al Gore, whether they like it or not. As a movement, deep
ecology is an embracing, umbrella term to cover all those who believe ecological problems stand for deeper social,
political, and ethical problems.
But the philosophy of deep ecology is something altogether different. This is, I believe, something much more
specific than the movement, something less recognized, less well-understood. 1 Deep ecology as philosophy is the
attempt to articulate a new relationship between humanity and nature, one that does not accept familiar divisions
between the subjective and the objective, or between the natural and the human. It is a direction for ontology to
make progress on, not a perspective that has been fully or even tentatively outlined. Deep ecology as philosophy
suggests that humanity is not only part of nature, but intertwined with nature, as idea and fact, connected to our
surroundings in a way that our language is not prepared to let us speak of. Our language and categories of thought
are questioned in order that we may develop new ways to speak the world into existence (in Heidegger's words),
changing logic, syntax, and conception. This is the most radical kind of ecological thinking, and this is the hardest
to engage in or to explain.
Arne Naess's particular articulation of the philosophy of deep ecology depends on a human ability to apprehend the
qualities of nature directly. This borrows from phenomenology but does not use its terminology. In this essay I
intend to explore Naess's terminology of concrete contents, which builds on a
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rejection of Galileo's distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities and posits instead a way of
understanding where we apprehend the qualities of things only through their relation with each other. Naess rejects
the notion of "quality" and comes up instead with the word "contents," and calls these contents "concrete" because
they are directly apprehended reality, not structures invoked to explain reality.
Naess then sidesteps the phenomenological tradition, with its subject experiencing the world, and hints instead at a
world that as a whole experiences itself, with no primary subjects or objects, but instead a web of relations. I say
"hints" because the philosophy of deep ecology has always, in its radical break with tradition, seemed by nature to
be preliminary. 2 How to develop it further? I suggest that Naess is trying to push philosophy toward poetry. To
that end I use a series of resonating examples from Italian writer Italo Calvino, the music of the Kaluli people of
New Guinea, a film by John Sayles, and Swedish poet Tomas Tranströmer. To redefine itself, philosophy
sometimes needs to find inspiration outside its borders.
The Relational and the Real

Naess rides the train to the mountainshe sees birches smiling, firs weeping. He wants us to believe that these
smiles and tears come before we see trees themselves, and are not a projection from human moods or glances.
These emotional parts of reality he calls the concrete contents of reality. We see the world first as relations
between us and it. Smiles and cries are actually there, they are the fabric of the world, the threads of nature, and
the foundations of the universe. He doesn't want to call them human appearances but natural appearances. Not
human experience but simply experience, the world experiencing itself in surges of emotion, sparkles of light. We
need to wake up and perceive the world as alive, dancing upon itself, wondrous, and self-aware.
With this idea of the content of reality as concrete, Naess is reaching for a name to mark out an area of existence,
and giving it greater weight by saying it is real. In his drive to make up these phrases and hope they will stick, I see
him striving for a peculiar kind of logical poetry, trying out a metaphor to see if it will catch on, a gentle jab to
consider the pieces of experience and wonder what would happen if we were to put them back together another
way.
It is my intention here to investigate what it would mean to see the world in this other wayhow the primacy of all
qualities might make things recede and relations come into prominence, how it might be the birth of a less arrogant
way of placing human beings into an equally experiencing surrounding, also a sub-
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ject, not only an object. And the announcement that the emotions we sense there in nature are not mere projections,
or whims of different perspectives, but an actuality that can't be denied.
Leave your left hand out in the cold winter air, keep the right one cozy inside a mitten. Then stick both inside a
pot of room-temperature water. The left one feels warm. The right one feels cold. Is the water warm or cold?
Galileo says neither warm nor cold. These are secondary qualities, subjective, in the hand of the beholder. To be
distinguished from primary, objective qualities like volume and shape, what he would have called properties of the
water and the pot itself, wholly contained and clear in the object.
Pre-Socratic Protagoras has already disagreed, two thousand years earlier. According to Sextus Empiricus, he
would have said the water is both warm and cold. "Water has all kinds of qualities, but a sensitive being is only
able to experience a limited number of them." 3 We feel different aspects of the water in different relations to it,
but the water still contains these different aspects, since as water it is defined in terms of its relations with the
world. Naess goes on to find support for this view in the following ancient Sanskrit formula: sarvam dharmam
niksvabhavamevery element is without self-existence. Things exist only linked to each other, caught in the web of
the world.
But subjects and objects are primary categories in most of Western philosophy. When Naess tries to go beyond
these divisions, he is led, like other philosophers of the twentieth century, to create his own language to describe
the way he sees things. And all is not equal in his view: feelings of water as well as the rootedness of sense of
place are contents of reality, because they are there in the sea we swim in or the place with which we identify. But
there is a level of understanding that takes a step back from the immediacy of relating with the world: deciding
how much land is worth in monetary terms, or discovering the chemical formula that constitutes soil or the cell
pattern of wood. These are abstract structures, once removed from the concrete relational contents of the nature
that includes our ability to know it.
The implications of this view for tactical, pragmatic environmentalism are clear: if a defender of a mountain sees it
as beneficent, glorious, sublime, then that value is as primary as the value of the mineral deposit that might lie
beneath the summit, ready to be excavated and converted into cash, even though it is harder to quantify. Beauty in
nature is not subjective (used by the "rational" as a pejorative term), and therefore possible to dismiss as
sentimentalism. The full range of qualities latent in the Earth come from there, belong there, and we should ensure
that they stay there.
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Phenomenology Minus the Subject

What is different in this world of concrete contents from the world as described or wished for by the
phenomenologists? These are the philosophers, inspired by Husserl and Heidegger, who want to present to us
things as they are meant to be seen, before any forms of theory or explanation. While a promising goal, their
approach too often seems mired in obscure terminology, clearly representative of a very specific theory of just the
type they want to strip away. And it is always a human view that they see, not a world in itself or seen from the
things themselves. The things themselves are always seen from a human viewthey remain inside the bounds of
description, and phenomenology promises us that we will be able to explain things. It does not want to admit the
unknown, or the unknowable, which is the ridge crest always one range beyond the vantage of any philosophy.
The truest, purest phenomenology is an exact delight in the reverberations of the environment around us. It throws
its own terminology out the window, and instead might describe those who look at the sky and cannot help but
shout "Blue!" One who catches the afternoon winter light on a wall of a concrete building and is amazed by the
tactile surface of light: "Orange!" "Gold!" The names are nothingthey are symbols of the exclamations of wonder.
Let the Earth see us before we see it, and the encounter will shake us to the core. There will be no things in
themselves, only presences, light, shapes, movements now perceptible and strange.
To feel the freshness of the wind, the smile of the aspen, the tear of the willow, and not to denigrate these
discoveries in the name of narrow human imagination. The emotions are of this world! We are here first to see
them, and then to make sure they still will be seen for many generations to come. The philosopher of nature must
learn to be a witness for wonder, and to teach others what is necessary to keep this wonder visible and free.
Arne Naess comes to these problems from the guarded perspective of the analytic philosopher. He is an expert in
the invention and refinement of linguistic concepts, of names for the irascible and the fleeting. That leaf winked at
us, didn't you see? Rather than delve into this experience, it is enough for Naess to defend the fact that it is there.
This is the direction logic implores us to take. Argument leads to dialogues. Here is an excerpt from one of his
unpublished dialogues:
A: The birch is smiling!
B: Not really smiling.
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A: Yes, really smiling. I describe experienced reality as best as I can. I do not make inferences.
B: I propose a test. Ask why it smilesdoes it answer?
A: No. But from ''x is really smiling" it does not follow that "x answers or can answer questions." Reality is
not that simple. I describe contents, not abstract structures. 4
A did not imagine the smile, but considers it a concrete content of reality. Where Naess differs from the
phenomenologist is that he says not just a human reality, a human experience, but reality as a whole, the
experience of the world, a fact that contains value, ephemeral but essential to be marked and noticed for its worth.
The phenomenologist still perceives the world from an aspect, seeing from somewhere, grasping a part of the
universe, never a whole. Naess wants to claim something more: that the world-in-itself is attainable by the human
being who listens, watches, learns from the feelings sensed out there, beyond the mind's narrow confines. It is not a
mystic's oneness with the universe but a rousing sense of the Earth's importance, grasped by feeling its inanimate
parts to be as emotional and sensate as we are.
I climb a mountain in the fresh snow and try to grasp what this would mean. Ascending into the woods, in crisp
and cold morning sun, I see the branches straining to bear the weight of a cool but still heavy overnight snowfall.
Dare I say they suffer? The burden is clear, but does it hurt them? The insight is poetic, not commonsensical,
something Naess might not at first admit. The Romantic writes, "The birch laughed with the light easy laugh of all
birches." This quote is from the poet Henrik Wergeland, not from any scientist or systematizer. To avoid
anthropocentrism we must maintain that the trees' laugh is not a human laugh, though it is a laugh nonetheless.
This commonality is the kind of relation that keeps us tied to nature.
The kind of inspiration that Naess's world of concrete contents suggests to me is the notion that nature might be
primarily constituted out of categories other than those we presently admit. Why start with trees, then count them
up into a forest, and then see the whole hillside blanketed with snow? Instead start with laughter, and see it on the
sloping Earth everywhere, a first look before the objects coalesce apart from one another? Expression in the
growth and fall of the universe, before things are demarcated and named. Seeing the sparkle when the light hits the
white place, before we then decide it is a patch of new-fallen snow. The wind as a song before it moves through the
air, lifting flakes, forming clouds, transforming water into darkness and action.
The Earth is alive before we can stop it. Processes in the midst of change before we can freeze them. These
contents of experience come first, preceding
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humanization, first before anyone claims them or attaches them as qualities to things. This is no Platonic form of
"laughter," like a thing held invisibly behind the desert of the tactile. This is an emotion expressed not at the edge,
but out from the core of possibility, touching us not uniquely but in the same way any other being might choose to
grasp it.
You see it when you're out on a winter afternoon, the sun low, soon to disappear. Perhaps you're on a north slope
and already in the shadow, gazing across the valley to a glowing mountain or hill. The light comes first, the
reflective sheen of the Earth, before you see a mountain or a slope of trees. Why search to name, pick a piece of
land? Begin with light, grasp the particular hue, the crystal tone. We might call the winter light crisp, exact, hard-
edged, over-defined, precise like the extra-sharp world seen through amber sunglasses, the kind worn by hunters
and pilots to make sure their targets are clear. Whatever words we use to name this light seem like ways the hues
appear to us as we see them, just then, just there. But in the world of concrete contents, they are at least as real as
any calculations we may come up with to explain why winter light is so much tighter, noting down wavelengths,
showing the fine outlines produced by a sun low in the sky. The feel of the light is as primal as any other quality. It
is originary, initial, the first ray that strikes us as the planet turns toward the sun at the start of the day.
From Philosophy to Poetry

Phenomenology wants to get philosophy back to the things themselves, but it does so still from the view of the
subject. Naess wants to break qualities down to the relationships themselves. Whose terminology best suits the
task? It is almost as if the moment these things are named and given categories, their fluidity is lost. Our
philosophical language is so used to breaking things into parts that it is hard to use precise language to explain how
the world flows together, where "things" dissolve in a torrent of relationships in which we spin and are spun,
dashed downstream and upstream, through the rocks and into the mud.
Poet William Carlos Williams demanded "no ideas but in things!," wishing poetry to be concrete in the same way
Naess wants philosophy to be. But his disciple A. R. Ammons twisted the demands around, calling for "no things
but in ideas! No ideas but in ideas! No things but in things!" A true attentiveness to relationship must dissolve
demands into their opposites.
Must it as well dissolve philosophy into poetry? In general, I think not, but in the case of Arne Naess I believe
there is a yearning toward poetry that he has steadfastedly resisted all his life. Naess is an associative thinker; he
jumps from
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one rock to the next as nimbly as anyone as he tries to cross the stream of discourse en route to the other side:
reaching fact from value, skepticism from cynicism, joy from doubt. He has always stood up for intuition as the
foundation of his deep ecology, and prefers that the reader share his innate trust in a human place in nature rather
than provide elaborate justification for why nature has value in itself, apart from the service to humanity. His
ecophilosophy is an environmental ontology, not an environmental ethic.
Naess appeals to us to accept all perceived qualities in nature as concrete, but he doesn't always have the language
to do so. "There is a certain kind of poetic philosophizing," he has told me, "that I detest." Yet his finest examples
(like Kant's of the sublime: "bold, overhanging rocks, volcanoes, etc.") come from poetry, or expressive language
and metaphor. It is my belief that the vision of a world of concrete contents can best be strengthened by reference
to literature, art, music, and the poetic that may run through all of these. What follows is a series of examples that I
hope will enrich and explain the core of Naess's view with image, not argument. I believe this is the kind of
deepening of ecology that Naess would welcome, not reject.
First is a literary essay by the late Italian writer Italo Calvino, "From the Opaque," which is phenomenology in
action as an experiment with metaphors, placing the human observer at the edge of experience, poised between a
mountain of precipitous memory and a deep sea cliff of unknown chances:
Obviously to describe the shape of the world the first thing to do is to establish my position. I don't mean
my location but my orientation, because the world I am talking about differs from other possible worlds in
this sense: that whatever the time of day or night one always knows where east and west are, and thus I
shall begin by saying that I am looking southwards, which is the same as saying that I have my face towards
the sea, which is the same as saying that I have my back to the mountain, because this is the position in
which I usually surprise that self that dwells within myself, even when my external self is orientated in a
completely different fashion. 5
Naess is less concerned with this initial positioning, so sure is he that what he perceives of the natural world is
actually part of the world, not part of his relation to that world. Here he does not differ so very much from the
natural scientist, or at least from the traditional naturalist: observing living beings, drawing conclusions about them,
sure about the concrete (if not objective) aspects of what is seen, felt, and heard. There is a certain human hubris
he admits in ascertaining that he can know when the trees are smiling, the rocks crying, the birds conferring on the
future of the planet.
David Abram calls this an awareness of the "more than human world," and he finds it part of most oral cultures of
present and previous times.6 Many cultures identify themselves as being part of groups and gatherings named from
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the animal world. Still, to me it involves a certain arrogance. I can call myself a member of the turtle clan, but is it
fair if I haven't asked the turtles whether they'll accept me or not? I might want to be a turtle. I would like to be a
turtle. I see the world differently if I imagine myself a turtle, but it is as much human metaphor as any otherthis is
part of knowing nature that the phenomenologists want to stress, to show how a human view on things need not be
a human-centered view of things.
I remain divided on this point: it seems both arrogant and humble to feel that nature wants us. Is it more sensible,
then, to admit that nature does not care? In either case, it seems prudent to protect the world and its wildness,
rather than destroy it without knowing what we kill.
Yet it is the arrogance of humanism to imagine that we know how nature feels, that the wholes we observebe they
of living entities, inevitably mechanical "systems," or amorphous shapes of feeling that hold together in our field of
vieware parts of the world as it actually is, apart from the human gaze? Naess tells me in Is It Painful to Think?
that he is happy to speak of "experience" as long as the word "human" is not applied to it to narrow the word's
relevance. 7 This is a clear divergence from traditional phenomenology. The vision of a world of concrete contents
is as much a plea to step outside of the perspective that has been ''handed" us and take the chance that we could
actually see more.
The test, of course, is if this other way of seeing nature really looks different. I think Naess would smile at the
trouble Calvino has with being more than a spectator as he writes his explanation of a world unfurling from the
point where he can exactly reckon his geographical position, presumably anywhere on Earth. For how do we
participate in a world we are incessantly looking at, describing, trying to frame within a window or a proscenium
arch? Here's Calvino's struggle of nature with culture:
I've gone back to using metaphors that have to do with the theater. Although in my thoughts of that time I
couldn't have associated the theater and its velvets with that world of grasses and winds, and although even
now the image that the theater tends to bring to mind is of an interior that claims to contain within itself the
exterior world, the piazza the fête the garden the wood the pier the war, is the exact opposite of what I am
describing, that is an exterior that excludes every kind of interior.8
Calvino is after words out-of-doors, flung from the confines of paragraphs, streams of thought that first flutter in
the breezes and then alight in the bouyancy of the air. In subject matter there is no division here between the
natural and the human, but more between inside and outside, between the bounded conditions of literature, words
on a page, held down in a book, carefully con-
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sidered, bound and printed, and the open trace of philosophy, ideas on the world that cannot quite be set solidly in
words. The first step, then, in deepening deep ecological philosophy is perhaps instruction on how not to read it:
throw out the idea. Choose to imagine how the new conception would change the appearance of the world.
What about the easy romanticizing of the world through language? Naess, and especially Calvino, here look
beyond language's creating the world in order to say that it evokes the world in a powerful way different from
logic, different from representation. To say humanity constructs our world through language is not, as Joel Kovel
would have it, irrevocably to separate us from nature. 9 We live according to natural rhythms and constraints,
being born, surviving, eating, and dying not so very differently from other animals; but we also reflect, and admit
that only other humans reflect. So we are destined to understand only our own kind. This can be a relief, or a
sadness. Naess and Calvino take it as a challenge. They want to explore with words, and to look beyond the
despair.
Know that language cannot yet describe the world of concrete contents. Think what could happen if it could.
Perhaps the whole thing might look like this, the phrases that come out of Calvino when he discards the metaphors
of the theater once again:
[W]e are in a world that stretches and twists like a lizard so as to offer the largest possible surface area to
the sun, opening up the fan of its suction-cup feet on a wall that's growing wary, its tail retreating with
threadlike jerks from the imperceptible advance of the shade, eager to have the sunny coincide with the
existence of the world.10
This to me is a wise picture of the world of concrete contents in full force, an Earth becoming an animal, moving
slowly and methodically out into the light, as a place envisioned not as how it might look to a lizard, but as a
lizard, say, a huge land iguana on the Galapagos Island of Fernandina, a vast volcanic caldera that still erupts every
few years, where the large, ever smiling beasts have no shortage of sun to identify with as the world.11 The world
is doing the slithering, meandering, maneuvering itself toward the light, swishing, leaving a trace, adjusting its
angles into curves in this strange image, taking only the strange prisoners of memory and account, choosing to look
like this, to remember like this, to test out this lizard picture as a new alternative to the many others that abound.
It's not an obvious or clear picture, but it doesn't have to be, to be right. For the universe must be somewhat
opaque in order to catch our attention. And we ourselves are then caught in the midst of the opacity:
From the opaque, from the depths of the opaque I write, reconstructing the map of a sunniness that is only
an unverifiable postulate for the computations of the memory, the
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geometrical location of the ego, of a self which the self needs to know that it is itself, the ego whose only
function is that the world may continually receive news of the existence of the world, a contrivance at the
service of the world for knowing if it exists. 12
This is an interesting justification for having a self; Heideggerian in the sense that we humans are here on the
planet to "speak the Earth into Being." That is a literary calling, a purpose in the biosphere to speak up and give
names to things that otherwise would be voiceless. This opaque and beautifully articulated phenomenology of
Calvino's is convincing in that it does not hold on too tightly to the notion of a self; it does not sound subject-
centered, but genuinely searches for a voice of the world.
The notion of the self has always been problematic for deep ecology in general and for Arne Naess in particular.
Enough weight is laid on the concept for the whole philosophical perspective to have been criticized for being
individually centered, impossibly distant from the nets of relation that make up the world, far, far from the home
that tempers the hubris of individuals claiming their own paths through experience and into nature. The image of
the deep ecologist, only encouraged by the literature, is of a solitary traveler contemplating the wilderness,
identifying with the world of patterns she finds there, taking care not to feel part of the spectacular, but looking for
commonality with the tiny and the overlooked instances of life. We become closer to nature when we identify with
things radically nonhuman, far from our immediate and bodily scale of experience. The gestalts of nature welcome
us, for they are patterns that can include a human who cares to notice them.
But how far can the self go? Naess likes to use a capital "S" to imply a Self that is larger than the ego, still an
enveloping identity were individuality is not lost. There isn't much of a picture of shared reality, but rather the solo
participant in a world that embraces the thinker who also chooses to act and recognizes his part in the biological
and cultural ecology of relationships that defines us.
When Naess chooses to get more specific on just what counts as a gestalt and what does not, he unfortunately
reverts to the style of philosophical writing that he learned as a young man: "A definite waterfall at a definite time,
including its music with modifications due to winds, has gestalt character, but is neither a thing nor a state of
affairs. But we may say that the content of reality is all that is the case."13 This seems to be an allusion to
Wittgenstein's Tractatus factual world of all that is the case. Naess's world is instead a place of grouped
impressions, not an amalgamation of truths. There is a poetic quality to this observation, and that is why I have
endeavored to point out similar thoughts so colorfully explored by Calvino above and Tranströmer below. Walking
this
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way through nature, you will step through a series of patterns, not looping Venn diagrams of set theory but sets of
relations, ordered places in which the human traveler also has a location and a part. The truth is never only that
appearance which all who gaze on a natural gestalt can agree upon. The aspen quaking in the wind can be both
happy and sadwhat is important is that it contains within itself qualities that are both fleeting and deep. Poetry is
trueto be open to it, the rules of experience must constantly be questioned.
Wittgenstein did not think human beings could see a color called reddish-green. Indeed, our rules for how colors
are to be measured on the spectrum or mixed in the palette of paint or light seem to indicate that these hues do not
go gently together. Yet anyone who has walked through an autumn New England forest will know immediately
that the woods can shimmer with the bright changeling color of reddish-green. Simply hold up a transitory turning
maple or oak leaf, and you will see at once an image of green becoming red, and the leaf as a whole speaks of red
mixed with green more than anything else. It is a tone that exists clearly as a quality of something simple which we
uncertainly try to describe, tossing out a question to our rules of the spectrum, to our sense of how the eye tends to
demarcate such things. The content of this natural reality throws a monkey wrench into the neat theory of color
wavelengths and scales.
So what, then, of the human and more-than-human shapes that we see looming in the mountains and in rocks?
These must also be taken more seriously than as a simile:
In a famous painting by Kittelsen the mountain Andersnatten is presented as a huge troll. There are trees on
the top of the mountain and the same holds for the troll. The trees are the hair of the troll. Those who rally
find the presentation of the mountain as a troll meaningful and adequatesomehow. The conception of a troll
clarifies what they experience when looking at the mountain. Asked for a word characterizing the mountain
and connecting it with a troll, people offer expressions like uncanny, mysterious. 14
The mountain after the painting is seen in a new way. Is this way invented or discovered? There is a larger
richness to nature if the troll is found there, not invented. There is a more outward arcing sense of humanity if the
notion of "mountain" is a category of thought that includes the lean of ascent, the picture of trolls, as much as it
names a feature of the landscape.15 Perhaps the greatest richness is found not in saying the troll-mountain is out in
nature, or in humanity, but in some ineffable but most real and honest gestalt connecting the two.
True relational thinking will need to dissolve the poles of the entities doing the relating. There will no longer be a
humanity, or a nature, but a continuum of connection that is the primal asking force. In this way a particular mood
can
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cast a bright or dark shadow across an observation of a movement or yearning that seems to be nature's, seems to
be affected by ours, and is concretely belonging to no one, poised as it is as the link between who sees and who is
seen:
Suppose my pleasant work at a certain place requires me to repeatedly pass a mat of flowers of a certain
kind. I notice that they turn toward the sun, pointing in a different direction as the sun moves. The process
of identification with the flowers makes us see them as seeking and appreciating the rays and warmth of the
sun, and being at work to satisfy a vital need. Being myself pleasantly at work, the total situation is that of
working together.
But suppose my work is unpleasant and hard. The usual way of talking is to say that the mat of flowers as
part of reality is the same, but our subjective impressions and experiences are different because we feel
different under the strain of the unpleasant work. We never escape from our world of subjective feelings, it
is said, but science and common sense can teach us about objective reality, a reality where trees are neither
joyful nor sad! There is, I would say, both a common sense and a common lack of sense. 16
The flower is knowable only if we admit that it can be both joyful and sad, never a gray or colorless object. That
would not be a flower. The qualities are primary, long before the object has been set aside with the grace of a
name. For seeing, as the artist Robert Irwin has written, "is forgetting the name of the thing one sees."17 His work
consists of building sculptures in the environment that subtly change the way we experience the space around us.
His exhibit in New York18 consisted of a series of translucent cloth dividers, between which the public could
walk, seeing each other and the room through varying layers of half-invisible walls. The piece made visitors more
conscious of the way people walk through space, and the ways our world is divided in rectilinear ways. What is the
name of what we see? Not an object, not space itself, but the way we walk among these names and among each
other.
In the world of concrete contents our familiar ways of naming things will have little use. The qualities that present
things will be so immediate and vibrant that they will overshadow the identities of the objects that hold them.
What Naess is asking for here is something beyond altruism, far past caring about nature for its own sake. Is it a
sign of appreciation that we admit that the tree is really laughing? Not at allit is a conceptual choice. It is a
question of looking and thinking outward, not hoarding emotions for humanity or the sentient alone. It is about
drinking for the water, thinking for the spirit, laughing for those who already laugh but do not know it. The late
Emmanuel Levinas speaks of the same condition, with his own choice of language:
When one smells a flower, it is the smell that limits the finality of the act. To stroll is to enjoy the fresh air,
not for the health but for the air. These are the nourishments characteristic of our existence in the world. It
is an ecstatic existencebeing outside oneself.19
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This kind of phenomenology enjoys the world, potent with a jouissance of experience, not because the world
presents itself as being useful in a kind of Heideggerian tool presence, but because it is a place we can care about
by identifying with it, by loving it, by conjuring our language into its terms and its emotions into ours. Naess, like
Levinas, wants to loosen us into the world. Who, then, listens to the songs we sing of it?
Music and Image

All beings engaged should be listening to each other. Are there examples of this? I can think of the recording of
the music of the Kaluli people and their environment made by Steve Feld and Mickey Hart, available on Voices of
the Rainforest. This CD begins, like many other nature recordings, with lush sounds of a jungle environment. The
difference here is that humans enter the soundscape on the third trackthe people of this culture have developed an
entire kind of music to sing along with the sounds of water, wind, and treetop birds. Their language and phrasing
lilt up and around the tones of their avian neighbors. The Kaluli have an ecological musical concept of
organization, called "lift-up-over-sounding," that expresses an aural sense of connection between the living parts
of the surroundings. The human voices on the record sing with the animal voices and wind voices, not to them or in
imitation of them. The sounds of the human and more-than-human mingle together-they each make musical sense
to each other. These joyful and sad songs are emotional in the world, not in response to the world. The jumping
and falling of sound ties together the social and natural parts of this ecologythere is no need to divide it all up to
begin to understand. One listen to the sound world as it is recorded will convince you. These concrete contents
demand new words, new concepts and names. "Lift-up-over-sounding," dulugu ganalan, could be one phrase to
begin with. 20
There is a bouyancy in this recorded example that reveals its honesty and reality. Yet we are trained to be skeptical
of such beyond-human contacts and analogies. Look at how the ecophilospher Michael Zimmerman remembers his
childhood: "In my own fumbling way, I conversed with forest creatures and befriended them. Though perceiving a
kinship with these nonhuman creatures, I nevertheless realized that conversing with them was not fully satisfying; I
needed closer ties to and conversation with my own kind."21 True, envisioning a personal mythology of
connection to the natural world can be edifying but safe. No one will come to criticize the validity of what you
identify with in nature, as child or adult. The turtle will not speak up and say you can't be part of his clan. On the
other hand, the opposition between contact with humanity and
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contact with nature begs the questionthere is no reason for Zimmerman to think his relation to woodland creatures
is any more "projection" than relationships with other people. We must all learn the boundaries of our shells, and
be able genuinely to listen to the voices of others that cry out to us, from the usual and the most unexpected places.
Those blessed with an ability to hear the music and poetry of the world have a duty to transmit these messages,
these images, these hopes. Certainly, there is the lonely child, the absent father, the search for a looming,
comforting substitute out there. But nature always offers more than our selected images of it can ever mirror.
Or consider the remarkable film of Irish island life, The Secret of Roan Inish, directed by John Sayles. Known most
for his eclectic and socialist-inspired tales of the American working class, here Sayles tackles a delicate if
somewhat sentimental story of myth and magic by the blue waters of the Old Country. The frame of the story is
familiar: the new generation has had to move the family off the pristine, remote island home of Roan Inish, first to
the mainland, then to the city. Little Fiona, age seven or so, can't take Dublin life, so she is sent back to Grandma
and Grandpa, who dream of returning to the remote island, but can't imagine how to survive a life so hard. There is
also the family tragedy to reckon withFiona's little brother Jimmy was lost in a storm when his cradle, with him in
it, drifted wantonly out to sea.
Where is the magic of nature in this tale? It turns out the birds and the seals took little Jimmy away, as punishment
because the Kinnealy family had left the island. The animals wanted the people with them! They were angry that
their human kin were leaving, and had to conspire to bring them back. Why? Turns out the whole family is part
seal, as a great-great-grandmother was a silkiehalf woman, half seal. The yearning for the sea runs deep in the
family's blood. Every generation there is one dark one among the brothers and sisters. They are each a little distant,
a little fishy, a little too quick to dive into the foaming, icy waters and disappearfor hours, for days, for years.
The film is remarkable in the way we viewers are convinced that the animals are watching, that they, too, believe
the myths, that they yearn to be close to us and our world. And if the emotions of the more-than-human are told
and retold across generations, the world of concrete contents tells us not necessarily that we must be sure these
ancient tales are true, but that we need to realize the animals, too, need their storiesthey imagine a way closer to
humanity. Just as we talk to our dogs and cats, they try to talk to us, in their languages, understanding as much, or
as little, as we do.
The point is not getting the message across, but the reach outward and the grasp for interspecies understanding,
identifying with a smile, or a cry, wanting
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desperately to know what it means. The suspiciously intelligent whale song, and the chillingly human yelp of the
coyotewhat, then, is out there? Our selves, our images, or something radically different that we are actually able to
understand? The world of concrete contents suggests that the song comes first; the call linking howler and listener,
performer and audience, speaker and spoken to. This is how things are connected. This is how we reach out to the
mysteries that surround.
His Life and His Labyrinth

In the end, we witness the world as a real but changing foil to the way we see things. What about conflicts in
experience? I asked Naess about this in Is It Painful to Think?, and he maintains that the experience of a pristine
lake is better than zooming across the lake on a speedboat. Why? His answer does express a distaste for the noise
and the velocity in the still open country. 22 But some people do need the whoosh of the machine to feel they are
really living. How will Naess dissuade them? Their enjoyment and link to the place waste too much energy. They
destroy an inherent quality of the beautiful place as they enjoy. Naess has been chided often enough for dismissing
the existence of conflict between opposing views. I believe he would say that his way of sensing, naming, and
relating to nature is a view that is open to other forms of description and love, but only as long as those other
forms do not destroy the context they inhabit. What is concrete in that context are just those qualities that must be
recognized and preserved if the place is to retain any original identity at all. Perhaps that is why the birches are
smilingeven when we choose to look away.
The beauty is not simply out there, nor simply in us. T. L. S. Sprigge offered a related argument, responding to G.
E. Moore's notion that natural beauty without a human beholder has value, but not as much as when there is
something around to appreciate it.23 Sprigge thinks the experience of poetry offers a useful way of clarifying the
contrast:
A poem . . . appears as an object in the consciousness of one who reads or recites it to himself, or hears it as
recited by another, with the right kind of understanding, which of course demands not only knowledge of
the language in which it is written, but some involvement in the culture from which it emerged. The beauty
of this object is not a subjective response added to it by how one feels about it, but an essential part of that
total object. If one says that the beauty could not exist without the consciousness, that is because the poem
itself could not.24
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If nature is like Sprigge's poem, then he would agree that the beauty we find in it is not subjective. But could such
poetry of the Earth exist without our consciousness of it? Naess would probably say yes, and this is where his
empiricism splits with the phenomenology that his idea of concrete contents so closely approaches.
The concrete poetry of nature itself remains confusion. The rhythm and verse shift from moment to moment. But
we are never alone in determining the qualities of what we see. We want to see structure, and decide it is there.
When we're looking, the world offers order to us. We do not choose our habitat. It permits us to thrive inside it.
The end of Tomas Tranströmer's long poem "The Gallery" provides an image that may stand for Arne Naess
confronting the concrete world, looking for meaning with the step-by-step reframing of a mystical logic:
He stands full length in front of a mountain.
It's more a snail shell than a mountain.
It's more a house than a snail shell.
It isn't a house but has many rooms.
It's indistinct but overwhelming.
He grows from it and it from him.
It is his life, it is his labyrinth. 25
A character tries to explain the shape of his world. First it's something he appears before. Then it curves around us,
spiraling away. Then it seems like a home. Then it is no longer a home but has many parts, impossible to pin down.
Who belongs to whom when the world is finally understood? We'll never know.
Arne Naess has said that "the smaller we come to feel ourselves compared to the mountain, the nearer we come to
participating in its greatness."26 He follows this with the beautiful conclusion, "I do not know why this is so." Is it
fair for a philosopher to stop there? It is the only place he can stop. With that line, Naess most approaches the
poetry that is the key to the deepening of his philosophy. These aesthetic and moral reflections are the next place
for him to go. I predict more music, more joy, more art in the future works of Arne Naess as he continues to reflect
into the second half of his ninth decade.
Naess's brief published pieces on the notion of concrete contents have given us only hints on how to proceed. It's
hard to know just what he means by these contents! Perhaps they are better evoked than explained. The qualities
and ideas within things need more than words to make themselves manifest. The world of concrete contents can be
found only if we attune ourselves to the sheer richness of real qualities that define themselves through relations to
us. There will be no division between human and the nonhuman, because relations will be the first level of facts
that hold this world together. That's why it doesn't fall apart. That's why humanity is necessary to save it.
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Notes
Thanks to Andrew Light and Alastair Hannay for their helpful suggestions.
1. Michael Zimmerman's Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994) is the best recent book on this distinction.
2. In a letter to me (February 1996) Naess writes, "The eight points were never meant to describe the core of deep
ecology, only some fairly general views which supporters of the deep perspective have in common when we
contrast their general views with supporters of environmentalism in general. Unhappily, too much is expected from
such points." Thus the overemphasis on the eight points in the critical literature on deep ecology serves to weaken
its philosophical core, which is usually ignored in favor of vague political pronouncements. The eight points
should be considered a political rallying ground, and be judged as such: Do they motivate people? Do they provide
a platform upon which members of the movement readily agree?
3. As reported in Arne Naess, "The World of Concrete Contents," Inquiry 28 (1986): 418. This brief article is the
main source for Naess's views on the subject of concrete contents. Parts of this article have been revised by Naess
and included in his Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, edited and translated by David Rothenberg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 51 57.
4. Arne Naess, "Gestalt Ontology and Gestalt Thinking," unpublished manuscript (Center for Environment and
Development, University of Oslo, 1989), p. 4.
5. Italo Calvino, "From the Opaque," trans. Tim Parks, in Calvino's The Road to San Giovanni (New York:
Pantheon, 1993), p. 132 (italics added).
6. See David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New
York: Pantheon, 1996).
8. Calvino, "From the Opaque," p. 137 (italics added).
9. Joel Kovel, "The Marriage of Radical Ecologies," in Environmental Philosophy, edited by Michael Zimmerman
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993), p. 408.
11. Tui de Roy, "Where Vulcan Lizards Prosper," Natural History 104:1 (January 1995): 28 30.
13. Naess, "Gestalt Ontology and Gestalt Thinking," p. 3.
14. Ibid., p. 5.
15. See David Rothenberg, "Ways Toward Mountains," The Trumpeter 6:3 (1989): 71 75.
16. Naess, "Gestalt Ontology and Gestalt Thinking," p. 8.
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17. Lawrence Weschler, Seeing Is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One Sees: The Art of Robert Irwin (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982).
18. This exhibit ran at the Mary Boone Gallery, New York, in the fall of 1992.
19. Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, translated by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University
Press, 1987), p. 63.
20. Steve Feld and Mickey Hart, Voices of the Rainforest (Salem, MA: Rykodisc, 1992). And see Steve Feld,
Sound and Sentiment: Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1990).
21. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future, p. 31.
22. Rothenberg, Is It Painful to Think?, pp. 164 165.
23. See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 83 84, and the Sprigge
article cited in note 24.
24. T. L. S. Sprigge, ''Non-Human Rights: An Idealist Perspective," Inquiry 27 (1985): 453.
25. Tomas Tranströmer, "The Gallery," trans. Sam Charters, in Tranströmer's Selected Poems, 1954 1986, edited
by Robert Hass (New York: Ecco Press, 1987), p. 149.
26. Arne Naess, "Modesty and the Conquest of Mountains," in The Mountain Spirit, edited by Michael Tobias and
Harold Drasdo (New York: Overlook Press, 1979). Passage reprinted in Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle,
p. 3.
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9
Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity
Michael E. Zimmerman
Biblical monotheism, which celebrates a Divine that transcends Creation, was an extraordinary historical
development. By desacralizing Creation, Judaism and subsequently Christianity challenged animism and paganism,
which are intuitively more understandable religions, insofar as their gods are contained within the cosmos. Early
Christians cut down the sacred groves and chased the ancient gods from the temples, many of which became sites
for Christian churches. In early modern times, the nonsacred character of Creation was emphasized by Reformation
Christians, such as John Calvin, who encouraged Western "man" to "develop" Creation. 1 Despite the shocks
delivered to Christian anthropocentrism by the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions, and despite a significant
decline in the number of believing Christians, most contemporary Westerners continue to regard humans as morally
and intellectually superior to all other beings. In effect, Western man has taken over the creative role of the biblical
divinity. Unfortunately, because humans lack divine wisdom, they have developed weapons, economies, and
consumption patterns that are causing significant ecological damage.
To limit such damage, a number of radical environmentalistsincluding some deep ecologists and ecofeministscall
for Western man to end his arrogant attitude toward nature, embrace an ecofriendly spirituality, and become a
"plain citizen" of the sacred Earth community, the all-embracing "web of life." Radical environmentalists often
look to nonbiblical, neopagan religions for spiritual guidance in developing a nondomineering spiritual attitude
toward nature. Contemporary neopagans such as Starhawk, who recall Christianity's persecution of ancient
paganism and who are concerned about modern man's violence against nature, affirm that the divine is present in
all phenomena, rather than solely in a transcendent deity.
Because spiritual issues are so often found in the writings of deep ecologists, Bron Taylor maintains that deep
ecology has a broadly spiritual component.
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One leading deep ecologist, Bill Devall, however, has sharply criticized this claim. 2 Arne Naess maintains that the
basic premises for an "ecosophy" or ecological philosophy can be either philosophical or spiritual/religious. Hence,
a secular or nonspiritually oriented kind of deep ecology is possible in principle. Nevertheless, in fact, virtually all
of the prominent versions of deep ecology (including Devall's) do involve spiritual premises or at least a significan
spiritual component. In view of the strong case that Taylor makes for his account of deep ecology, and in view of
his obvious sympathy for it, Devall's reaction is puzzling. Perhaps he is concerned that overemphasizing the
spiritual dimension of deep ecology will make it less attractive to secular-minded people who care deeply about the
fate of the Earth. Or perhaps he has become uneasy about linking deep ecology too tightly in particular with an
Earth-based spirituality, in light of the concerns that I have raised elsewhere and will pursue in this essay.3
In recent decades, the Gaia hypothesis has given sustenance to neopagan visions of the Earth as a goddess, as the
divine, self-organizing ecosystem in which all things are born and into which they return at death. One
commentator writes:
Neopaganism capitalizes on the difficulty human beings have of conceiving of a God simultaneously
external to the universe and yet personal and present. Neopaganism finds it easier to see God, humanity,
and nature as a continuum. In [Alain] de Benoist's words . . . paganism assumes that the universe is alive. It
is a divine being, and this world-soul is the sole true beingthere is no other. It is imperishable, uncreated,
without beginning or end. This god or world-soul accomplishes itself in and through the world: the creature
is consubstantial with the creator. If there was anything that could be called a creation, it was certainly not a
creation in the Christian sense of the world. Rather it was nothing more than the beginning of a new cycle
in the world's history.4
Many modern people do not believe that terms like "the divine" and "the sacred" refer to anything. I myself take it
for granted, however, that talk about the divine is meaningful talk, and that renewing humanity's relationship with
the divine could play a significant role in resolving or at least in minimizing contemporary environmental and
social problems. In this essay, however, I voice my concern about the possible consequences of the fact that such
Earth-based religiosity tends to view the divine as wholly contained in or as immanent within the cosmos itself,
rather than as transcending the cosmos as well as being somehow present in it. Most neopagans and radical
environmentalists are insufficiently aware of the potentially dark side of such an immanentistic view of the divine.
One such sinister potentiality was realized in National Socialism, which can be understood in part as a perverted
religion of nature, which rejected Jewish and Christian otherworldliness as well as progressive political ideologies
(communism, socialism, liberalism) that are indebted to Christian
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ideas about divine purpose actualizing itself in history. Unhappily, National Socialism was in some respects a
Green movement. 5
I became cognizant of the Green side of the Nazi movement only a decade ago, in the process of coming to terms
with the Nazi affiliation of Martin Heidegger, whose work I had once used to inform and to promote the deep
ecology movement. Although the antimodern, anti-Enlightenment, anti-industrial, and nature-revering rhetoric of
the Nazis in the early 1930s was largely betrayed by their subsequent commitment to rearmament and industrial
productivity, the Nazi government passed environmental laws that were the most far-reaching in the developed
world at that time. In other words, Nazi reverence for and identification with nature were not merely opportunistic.
Affirming that humanity is but one strand in the great web of life, Nazi ideologues trumpeted the now infamous
slogan Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil), which may be understood as a racist version of bioregionalism. The Nazis
condemned Judaism and Christianity for being nature-hating, life-despising, and otherworldly. They were hardly
alone in exhibiting antimodernist, pro-nature, and even neopagan sentiments in the early twentieth century. The
Nazi movement's jingoist militarism, masculinist fantasies, and anti-Semitism help explain why Nazism made such
dreadful use of sentiments that were shared by people with no sympathy at all for National Socialism. In another
essay, I have described in more detail the ecofascist dimension of National Socialism.6
Some of my friends in the environmental movement have been dismayed by my recent excursions into the topic of
ecofascism. Indeed, because environmentalism is under attack from so many angles, my examination of this topic
may seem gratuitous. Obviously, I think the issue is important. Moreover, I believe that consideration of it should
come from within the ranks of people who call themselves environmentalists, as I do. In what follows, I do not
wish to say that fascist versions of environmentalism are an inevitable outcome of Earth-oriented religions, or that
people concerned about the sacred dimension of their own homelands are somehow crypto-Nazis. The loss of a
sense of place, as Wendell Berry has argued so eloquently, is one of the regrettable outcomes of modernity.7 As I
noted above, ecofascism involves militaristic and xenophobic dimensions that are not discernible in most forms of
bioregionalism, deep ecology, and ecofeminism. Indeed, because the United States is the world's most liberal
democracy and has the highest percentage of churchgoing Christians of any industrial nation, chances may seem
slim that something like a neopagan ecofascism could ever arise here.
My discussion of the possibility of ecofascism is more than a cautionary tale, however, since neofascist movements
are in fact on the rise again in Europe and constantly threaten to move Green political parties in a right-wing
direction, as
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Oliver Geden has made clear in his recent work, Rechte Oekologie: Umweltschutz zwischen Emanzipation und
Faschismus (Right-Wing Ecology: Environmental Protection Between Emancipation and Fascism). 8 Furthermore,
in the context of a social and ecological crisis in the United States, I can imagine the emergence of protofascist
forces that might appropriate and redefine ideas which are currently used rather innocently and naively by some
radical ecologists, neopagans, and New Agers. The writings of the neopagan, anti-Christian Friedrich Nietzsche
were put to use by the Nazis, despite Nietzsche's sharp criticism of anti-Semitic movements in his own time, a few
decades before the emergence of the Nazi Party. Anyone familiar with American political paranoia, especially after
the collapse of the external enemy of communism, must take seriously the prospect of collectivist movements
thatunder the misleading banner of "Christian individualism"would draw upon immanentistic ideas (for example,
"sacred blood" that must not be contaminated) to promote draconian solutions to environmental, political, and
economic problems supposedly caused by racial mixing and immigration.
In describing National Socialism as a Green version of neopaganism armed with Panzer tanks and inflamed by
anti-Semitism, my point is not to say that contemporary deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and neopagans are
protofascists. Were I to say this, I would be abetting criticisms made by such antienvironmental groups as the Wise
Use Movement, with which I have little sympathy. Moreover, contemporary radical ecologists and neopagans are
sufficiently variegated and at odds with one another, that they can be housed under one conceptual roof only by
ignoring important distinctions. My point is to remind people who do promote an immanentistic, Earth-based
religiosity that one version of such religiosity can be, and has been, put to appalling uses. Thus informed,
contemporary Earth-based religionists would be capable not only of anticipating and deflating the criticisms of
antienvironmental groups, but also of critically reexamining the adequacy of their own views about the
relationships among humankind, nature, and the divine.
For modernists, including liberal capitalists and communists alike, neopaganism or Earth-based religiosity is
problematic not least because of its cyclical view of history. Such religiosity, attuned as it is to the cycles of the
seasons and the movements of the planets, looks askance at the linear view of history that moderns have taken over
from the biblical tradition. Insofar as neopagan National Socialism explicitly rejected the linear-progressive
reading of history, liberals and Marxists have long been critical of neopaganism. If pre World War II reactionary
movements condemned progressive views about history, so, too, did postwar postmodern critics. Such critics argue
that a history which leads up
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to Auschwitz, the Gulag, H-bombs, and ecological devastation cannot be "progressive." Instead, so postmodern
theorists maintain, the idea of progress has been deeply ingrained in totalizing movements that have justified
political and social oppression.
Though I myself once drew similar conclusions, I am skeptical of them today. For one thing, even though National
Socialism made use of modern industry and technology, its social and cultural orientation were largely premodern.
Although the Nazis may have been influenced by the "totalizing" tendencies that emerged in the French
Revolution, they were clearly opposed to Enlightenment views of human progress, especially those views which
emphasized the sanctity and freedom of each individual person. Today, I defend a progressive reading of history,
although I also believe that such a reading must provide an adequate account of the political horrors and ecological
destruction of the twentieth century. In what follows, in the context of my discussion of the dangers of Earth-based
religiosity, I will examine such a progressive reading that contains a spiritual dimension, unlike the official
doctrines of modern secular ideologies. This spiritual dimension involves panentheism, which regards the divine as
being simultaneously present in the cosmos and transcendent of it.
Ecofeminist Christian theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether has demonstrated that spiritual reverence toward
creation or nature is compatible with panentheism, according to which the divine is simultaneously transcendent
and immanent. 9 By way of contrast, some kind of pantheism or animism has characterized many pagan, traditional
tribal, and neopagan religions, but the extent of such pantheism is not complete. Many traditional tribes, such as
the Lakota Sioux with Wakan Tanka, conceived of a transcendent divinity as the eternal source of all phenomena.
Moreover, some contemporary neopagans may best be described as panentheists rather than as pantheists.
Nevertheless, many neopagans or Earth-based religionists either renounce, or are tempted to renounce, the
transcendent dimension of divinity because they are so critical of the devastating ecological consequences that have
arisen in societies influenced by religions with an otherworldly orientation. Of course, many civilizations without a
transcendent divinity, including ancient China, were responsible for much ecological destruction. Nevertheless, a
theme found in much Earth-based religiosity is that a resacralization of nature and a rejection of the transcendental
God are needed in order to halt the ecologically suicidal activity of commercial civilization.
In my critical examination of Earth-based religiosity, I use two different lenses: Martin Heidegger's ontology and
Ken Wilber's transpersonal philosophy. As we shall see, even though Heidegger and Wilber sharply disagree about
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historical teleology and the merits of modernity, they agree that Earth-based religiosity risks adhering to a one-
dimensional or "flatland" ontology, the immanentistic or this-worldly orientation of which conceals the
transcendental dimension. Paradoxically, by giving so much credence to the naturalistic view that humankind is
merely one organic thread in the great web of life, some proponents of Earth-based religiosity end up affirming, or
at least drawing heavily upon, a version of scientific materialism, which was conceived by the very modernism of
which they are otherwise so often critical. In other words, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, modernists
have much in common with those radical environmentalists and neopagans who subscribe to an immanentistic
Earth-based religiosity. Despite Heidegger's critique of modernity's one-dimensional ontology, however, he can be
understood as neopagan, insofar as he abandons the transcendent concept of God and envisions the gods as
immanent within finite historical worlds.
The Heidegger Connection

One wing of the countercultural revolt that began in the 1960s sought to liberate oppressed Others of all sorts,
including blacks, Hispanics, women, animals, and even nature itself. Curiously, however, some counterculturalists
who used the vocabulary of revolution, liberation, emancipation, rights, and social progress did not take seriously
how much this vocabulary was rooted in modernity, which some counterculturalists sharply criticized for its
"domination" of nature. Indeed, to the consternation of historically informed liberals and socialists, some
counterculturalists believed that modernity was inherently flawed and thus would inevitably lead to social and
ecological catastrophe. For such counterculturalists, including a number of radical environmentalists, real liberation
meant not merely gaining voting rights for blacks or equal employment rights for women, but throwing off the
yoke imposed by the whole social, political, economic, industrial, and technological apparatus of modernity, in
order to generate lifestyles that would bring human beings into closer relationship to each other, to nature, and to
the sacred. I am personally familiar with this yearning for greater simplicity, for an end to the desecration of nature,
and for an alternative to mainstream churches that tend to ignore God's presence in and concern with extrahuman
aspects of Creation. Although appreciating the passion and concern exhibited by these sentiments, I now regard
some of them as rather confused and possibly dangerous.
For years, I published essays that condemned technological modernity, even though I simultaneously supported
various liberation movements that were
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manifestations of its most positive dimension, its drive to liberate humankind from the scourges of ignorance,
poverty, and political oppression. My fascination with Martin Heidegger's thought was crucial in my failure
adequately to use this positive aspect of modernity to offset my condemnation of its ecologically destructive
practices. Much of my critique of modernity was derived from Heidegger, whoby the early 1930s, when he became
affiliated with National Socialisminterpreted technological modernity, including modern science, as the nihilistic
culmination of twenty-five hundred years of cultural degeneration. Democracy, rationalism, socialism,
communism, capitalism, empiricism, universal human rightsall of these were, for Heidegger, not signs of human
progress but instead symptoms of Western humanity's decline, understood as an increasing loss of contact with
Being.
Ostensibly, this gradual loss led the West to be governed by a one-dimensional ontology that forces things to show
themselves only as raw materials for enhancing the power of the technological system, the primary goal of which
(despite talk of "improving" the human estate) is power for its own sake. According to Heidegger, the control
obsession that originated in Western thought has become a planetary destiny in the twentieth century. Under the
guise of movements promising human liberation and fulfillment, humankind has been reduced to the status of a
clever animal, as defined by thinkers like Darwin and Freud. Nature, in turn, has been reduced to the status of a
gasoline station for fueling ever more gargantuan industrial projects. Modern humanity has become blind to the fact
that our capacity for understanding what things are involves an openness to that which transcends all things: the
being of entities. 10
Although my environmental concerns led me to use Heidegger's thought to justify a radical ecological critique of
technological modernity, my interest in various civil rights movements forced me to downplay his strongly
antidemocratic views. Many other people, including the leading counterculturalist Herbert Marcuse, who studied
with Heidegger, shared this ambivalent attitude toward modernity. The 1987 disclosures about the extent and
duration of Heidegger's affiliation with National Socialism, however, forced me to make a more responsible and
internally coherent assessment of his (and thus my own) views about modernity. In doing so, I arrived at the
following two conclusions.
First, it was no accident that Heidegger could so readily interpret his own thought as being consistent with National
Socialism, for he agreed with its view that Western history involved a long decline from classical (especially
Greek) antiquity, that modernity was the culmination of that decline, and that the only remedy for it was a
revolution that involved the "complete transformation of our German Dasein [Heidegger's term for human
existence]."11 Second, despite
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enthusiastically supporting Hitler's movement, Heidegger criticized Nazi ideologues, becauseas their biological
racism demonstratedthey usually adhered to some variety of scientific naturalism. In Heidegger's view, naturalism
was itself another manifestation of modernity's one-dimensional ontology, and hence could not provide an
alternative to modernity. The material power of modernity was inversely related to its spiritual ignorance. Blind to
humanity's transcendent dimension, which differentiates humans from other beings, modern humans conclude that
they are nothing but animals involved in a struggle for survival in the face of the overpowering forces of nature. 12
From Heidegger's viewpoint, the Nazis' worship of natural forces and their celebration of the inchoate impulses of
"blood" kinship were not a recovery of ancient ways, at least not ancient Greek ways, since the latter were in touch
with the transcendent domain, even though they could not articulate it. According to Heidegger, the Greeks did not
worship nature understood in modern terms as material substances and processes, but rather celebrated nature
understood as physis, that is, as awe-inspiring presencing, appearing, or manifesting. This manifesting constitutes
what Heidegger calls the "being" of entities (Sein des Seienden), and what the ancient Greeks (supposedly)
experienced as the self-disclosure of entities, their entry into presence from concealment. Such presencing or being
is not experienced by nonhuman animals, which allegedly lack the ontological openness necessary for such
presencing to occur.
Influenced by German idealism, which distinguished between the natural and the historical domains, Heidegger
criticized Nazi ideologues for portraying humans merely as intelligent animals, governed by natural laws and
struggling for survival in competition with the rest of life on Earth. In the end, Heidegger concluded that the
historical reality of National Socialism was another dreary instance of modernity's naturalistic humanism, which
seeks to gain control of everything through science, technology, and industry. Many commentators have noted that
National Socialism contains two apparently contradictory elements: a fascination with nature worship, on the one
hand, and a commitment to industrial technology, on the other. Jeffrey Herf uses the term "reactionary modernism"
to describe this complex tension within Nazi ideology.13 According to Heidegger, however, the dominant ideology
of National Socialism was not reactionary, but modernist. Because Nazi efforts to resurrect pagan divinities like
Wotan and to restore blood ties to the land occurred within the context of a general commitment to some form of
modern materialism or naturalism, Heidegger believed that those efforts were hopelessly confused and incapable of
restoring Germany's relationship with the transcendent. In his view, humankind could establish an appropriate
relationship with nature only after
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discerning that nature, physis, involves a transcendent dimension that is overlooked by modern naturalism.
In the 1940s, Aldo Leopold would call humans "plain citizens" of the land, but in the 1930s Heidegger insisted that
humansfar from being "plain citizens"were unique. Humans exist as the opening in which things can manifest
themselves and in this sense "be." Scorning Nazi ideologues who promoted a materialistic religion of nature,
Heidegger encouraged the Nazis to put their conceptual and spiritual houses in order by adopting his own
philosophy, which emphasized the transcendent and nonnaturalistic dimension of human existence and "nature''
alike. For Heidegger, even though an eagle has far better eyesight than a human, the former cannot discern the
"beauty" of an entity or a landscape, for beauty (like meaning, intelligibility, and purpose) can be discerned only
by those who can comprehend the being of an entity (i.e., who can encounter the entity as entity). Being "is" not
itself an entity or a property of an entity, but rather names the ontological event in which an entity presents or
reveals itself. In a conclusion that is repellent to the modern sensibility, Heidegger asserted that humans cannot
adequately be defined as animals. He maintained that homage should be given neither to the complex processes
and forces of material nature, nor to the gods who supposedly correspond to those forces, but rather to transcendent
being, by virtue of whose radiance entities can appear as entities within a specific historical epoch.
Like Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, Heidegger maintained that human interaction with nature and the divine was
culturally and linguistically mediated. 14 Far more so than did Heidegger, however, the German idealists wrestled
with the issue of the relationship between a transcendent, eternal God and a finite, material nature. Indeed,
Heidegger renounced the transcendent biblical God, replacing Him with the gods sung by the neopagan poet
Hölderlin. Supposedly these gods help to found and orient the finite worlds opened up through human existence,
which is sustained by a transcendent ontological dimension that is not of human origin. My efforts to read
Heidegger as a forerunner of deep ecology were met with resistance by some deep ecologists, who regarded his
emphasis on human existence as a residual form of the anthropocentrism that is allegedly responsible for
modernity's destructive treatment of nature. Heidegger himself, however, would have been equally critical of
contemporary Earth-based religiosity, insofar as it is influenced by the same naturalism that discloses nature as
complex material systems and humans as clever animals.
Unfortunately, despite rejecting the biological racism that he regarded as central to the historical form actually
taken by National Socialism, Heidegger not only ardently supported the movement during the 1930s, but continued
to
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revere its "inner truth and greatness" long after the movement had led Germany to self-destruction and had
murdered millions of innocent people in the process. Attempting to make sense of all this, Jacques Derrida suggests
that Heidegger was guilty not of biological racism, but rather of metaphysical racism, according to which the
German languagemore than any otheris profoundly linked with ancient Greek. 15 From this perspective, the "inner
truth and greatness" of National Socialism meant nothing less than that Germany was capable of initiating a
historical epoch as great in its own way as the era established by the ancient Greeks. Heidegger's own aspiration
was to become the spiritual leader of the Nazi revolution, which could then carry out its true mission of awakening
German existence from its blindness to the transcendent being of entities. The sheer scale and awful consequences
of Heidegger's political misjudgment (not to mention his postwar silence about the Holocaust) have led many
people to conclude that his thought is little more than an apology for fascism.16
Though understanding the reasons for this conclusion, I cannot agree with it. Efforts must be made to identify those
aspects of Heidegger's thought which led him to support the Nazi movement, but efforts must also be made to
study aspects of his thought that retain their importance despite his politically perverted application of them. The
political problems with his thought can be traced to two major factors: first, his linguistic racism and nationalism;
second, his view that Western history involves ontological degeneration, which ends in the materialism and
naturalism that are essential to all modern political ideologies. During the past decade, I have looked for a way of
understanding human existence that, on the one hand, avoids nationalism and racism, but that retains what is valid
about Heidegger's idea of the transcendent dimension of human existence and nature; and, on the other hand,
affirms the progressive dimension of modernity, but that acknowledges its destructive attitude toward the natural
world and its dissociative attitude toward the human body, emotions, and the female. I have found that Ken
Wilber's writings accomplish much of this.17 Moreover, Wilber provides a more satisfying account of the divine
than does Heidegger.
The Wilber Connection

I read Ken Wilber's remarkable book Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution in the early 1980s,
when I was still seeing the world through the Heideggerian lens.18 The book was important to me for at least three
reasons. First, it demonstrated that the transcendent dimension of human existence could be explained not only in
Heidegger's terms but also in terms that
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were consistent with the "perennial wisdom," defined in part as the esoteric dimension of the great religious
traditions, about which Heidegger had little positive to say after about 1930. Second, the book showed me a way to
reconcile my critical view of modernity (as causing so much ecological destruction) with my positive view of
modernity (as promoting emancipation from ignorance, poverty, and political oppression). Finally, in contrast to
Heidegger's lack of interest in cosmology and his denial that human history is an evolutionary process by which
humankind is actualizing some hidden potential, Wilber's book offered a teleological view of the development of
consciousness, a view that took into account both neo-Hegelianism and modern cosmology.
Moreover, in several other books, but especially in his Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution, Wilber
acknowledges the problematic and destructive character of modernity's treatment of nature. He maintains, however,
that the solution to such treatment lies not in returning to premodern attitudes and beliefs, including neopaganism,
but instead in consolidating the positive gains of modernity and subsequently moving beyond its limits. 19 Like
Heidegger, Wilber holds that human existence involves a transcendent dimension which enables people to be free
and self-conscious, and thus to encounter entities as entities. As a neo-Hegelian, however, and thus unlike
Heidegger, Wilber reads human history as a broadly progressive process that moves from prepersonal to personal
and eventually to transpersonal modes of awareness. The transpersonal means the "personal plus," that is, states of
consciousness that include the personal or egoic, but go beyond the limitations of such consciousness, including its
strong attachment to its own perspective on matters. Wilber regards thinkers like Hegel as exhibiting a mode of
awareness that synthesizes various perspectives that may otherwise seem contradictory. Such aperspectival "vision-
logic," according to Wilber, opens the way for genuinely transpersonal modes of awareness.
Wilber maintains that modernity's democratic ideals and institutions do not represent a decline from some earlier
and preferable condition, but express and help to consolidate the personal mode of consciousness, which Wilber
regards as superior to the prepersonal mode. In the prepersonal mode, people are less capable of distinguishing
themselves either from their tribe or from the natural environment. Some followers of Earth-based religions praise
prepersonal existence as being "closer to nature," especially when contrasted with modernity's abstract, complex,
dualistic, and anthropocentric egoic consciousness. Wilber argues, however, that if neopagans have nostalgia for
the prepersonal past, they are misguided. Those who yearn to return either to the natural womb or to prepersonal
social relations not only promote regressive attitudes that fail to
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understand human consciousness and its teleological trajectory, but also refuse to assume the moral and historical
responsibility that belongs to beings who are self-conscious, historical, and thus capable of being aware of the
transcendent dimension of things.
Wilber warns against committing the "pre/trans fallacy," which involves confusing prepersonal states with
transpersonal states. 20 The pre/trans fallacy involves thinking that dualism in all its unhappy manifestations,
including the dualism between humanity and nature, can be overcome by returning to the state of innocence
characteristic of infancy, that is, by returning to Eden. Wilber maintains, however, that far from being the solution
to the problem of dualism, returning to the womb/infancy/Eden (that is, to prepersonal existence) amounts to an
error that is fatal psychologically and socially, no matter how attractive such a return might otherwise seem. Wilber
encourages people not to regress, but instead to progress toward more integrated states of awareness that embrace
what is valid about the prepersonal and personal levels of awareness, even while moving beyond their limitations.
The provocative title of his book, Up from Eden, emphasizes that development of self-consciousness in the Garden
of Eden was a fall "upward," even though it led to expulsion from the state of infantile innocence. Spiritual
development involves an evolutionary process that brings an end to infantile bliss, leads one into the increasingly
anxious and alienated states of individual personhood, and finally guides one toward transpersonal states that
integrate at a higher level the things that were separated in personal states of consciousness.
By criticizing "retro-romantic" or neopagan longings for an idyllic prepersonal way of life, and by emphasizing the
progressive evolution of consciousnessa development that must be supported by appropriate improvements in
material, social, political, and cultural arrangementsWilber might seem to be just another modernist who spurns the
supposedly apocalyptic fantasies of environmentalists. In fact, however, unlike many proponents of modernity, he
agrees that there is an ecological crisis, which is the leading symptom of modernity's self-destructive effort to
dominate the body, the emotions, the female, and "nature" in general. In Up from Eden, Wilber maintains that the
ecological crisis results from two interrelated trends of human evolution, especially as it has occurred in the West.
First, in the process of achieving a personal or individuated state of consciousness, modern Western "man"
increasingly dissociated himself from everything that he associated with the previous (thus ''lower") stage of
consciousness: nature, body, female, emotion. But such dissociation is not a necessary consequence of achieving
individuation, because a person can learn to differentiate himself/herself from the body, emotions, and
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nature without dissociating himself/herself from them. Second, the process of individuation brings with it an
increasing sense of mortality, which gives rise to ever more intense death anxiety. To some extent, Wilber
concludes, the Western project of "dominating" nature is a manifestation of a culturewide denial of death: by
controlling nature, Western man proposes to overcome mortality.
In Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, an enormous and complex work that cannot be summarized here, Wilber continues to
affirm that there is an ecological crisis, but deemphasizes the role played by death anxiety in the modern subject's
assault on nature. 21 Instead, he takes a somewhat different approach to explaining modernity's destructive
treatment of nature. This approach leads to a conclusion that has interesting parallels with how Heidegger, in the
1940s, criticized the "historical reality" of National Socialism. Just as Heidegger maintained that Nazis enamored
of nature adhered to their own version of modernity's metaphysical naturalism, so Wilber concludes that retro-
romantics adhere to their own version of modernity's metaphysical naturalism, the Great Mechanical World-
System, the "web of life" of which humankind is but a strand.
Other critics have noted that radical environmentalists often appeal to ecological science to support their views
even while otherwise condemning modern science for regarding nature as an object to be controlled and
exploited.22 Wilber, however, goes on to argue that most "retro-romantics" (including followers of Earth-based
religions) and modernists alike share a one-dimensional ontology, according to which the cosmos is composed of
complex material processes. (Arguably, however, neopagan divinities are not reducible to a one-dimensional
materialism, though they are usually immanent in the cosmos, not transcendent of it.)
In this respect, too, Wilber agrees with Heidegger's contention that National Socialism was metaphysically "the
same" as other modern political ideologies which adhere to a materialistic ontology that is incapable of recognizing
the domains which transcend the physical and the organic. Wilber differs from Heidegger, however, in affirming
that modernity achieved many of the social and political goals conducive to the development of personal
consciousness, which is the precondition for moving to a more integrated, transpersonal level of consciousness. For
Wilber, National Socialism differed from liberal democracys both by repudiating the ideals and constitutional
guarantees of individual liberty, and by denying that Western history involves an advance over earlier periods of
human history.
Wilber's progressive reading of natural evolution and human history leads to another important disagreement with
Heidegger. We recall that Wilber and
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Heidegger concur that human existence involves a transcendent dimension ignored by modern materialism. Most
moderns adhere to some version of such materialism, whether they be liberal democrats, communists, socialists,
fascists, or most kinds of radical environmentalists. But liberals, communists, and socialists all warn against
regressing to premodern forms of social organization, while Nazis celebrate tribal forms of organization in which a
homogeneous "folk" celebrate their blood ties with the sacred landscape. Liberals, socialists, and communists (at
least in principle) affirm that modernity has emancipatory aims which are important enough to justify the loss of
tribal forms of social organization. In the 1930s, however, Heidegger favored overthrowing democratic principles
and establishing an authoritarian regime, even though he criticized those Nazis who described this process as the
renewal of Aryan paganism. For Heidegger, democracy had to be pushed aside in order to make possible the
recovery of something truly primordial: not ancient blood ties but the German relation with being.
Some proponents of Earth-based religiosity, like many other people faced with the trials and tribulations of modern
life, yearn for a simplified tribal life in closer proximity to the land. Wilber, however, cautions against giving in to
such yearnings, since doing so would encourage the regression to prepersonal modes of awareness and the rise of
corresponding authoritarian social structures that would undermine the positive achievements of modernity,
including individuated personhood and constitutional democracy. Heidegger was anti-modern in being
antidemocratic and in denying a developmental view of history; moreover, he was neopagan in rejecting the
biblical tradition and in calling for the arrival of new gods to generate a new world to replace the non-world of
technological modernity. Nevertheless, in calling for the Germans to repeat ancient Greece's generation of a world,
he was asking them to prepare for a new encounter with the transcendent, that is, with the being of entities that
transcends even the gods.
Some Earth-based religionists might criticize Heidegger's view of the transcendent, just as some deep ecologists
criticize his infatuation with the Greeks, whose anthropocentrism and mind body dualism helped give rise to the
ecological crisis. From Wilber's perspective, however, Heidegger's view of the Greeks had the virtue of affirming
that they were in touch with the transcendent domain, though what he meant by "the transcendent" is not the
Absolute, which Wilber maintains is celebrated under various names by most of the world's great spiritual
traditions, with the exception of wholly immanentistic traditions. Many followers of Earth-based religions would
regard Heidegger's quasi transcendentalism as problematic, because it has too much in
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common with traditional transcendentalism, which so often promotes the contempt for nature that has helped to
justify modernity's ecologically destructive practices.
If Heidegger and Wilber disagree about the nature of the transcendent, they also differ with regard to the self-
understanding of modern humankind. Heidegger often writes that humankind elevates itself to the status of a titanic
subject which regards everything as an object for domination. Ostensibly, this virtual self-deification of the human
subject resulted from loss of contact with the transcendent domain on which human existence depends. Forgetting
that the human is not a "thing" at all, but rather the historical-temporal nothingness or openness in which things
can first reveal themselves and thus "be," modern humankind conceives of itself as one thing among others: a
clever animal. Seeking to deny its own mortality and finitude, the clever animal uses rationality as the instrument
both for guaranteeing its survival and for taking total possession of the planet and the universe beyond.
Although Wilber could agree with much of this explanation, in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality he adopts a rather
different approach to understanding the modern human subject and its world-conquering ambitions. Wilber
suggests that the apparent human arrogance which leads to an assault on nature is itself the symptom of moderns
who seek to compensate for the realization that the Great World System postulated by natural science (and adopted
in various ways by most modernists, environmentalists, and many Earth-based religionists) has no place for the
human subject. As Nietzsche remarks in The Genealogy of Morals, "Since Copernicus, man seems to have got
himself on an inclined planenow he is slipping faster and faster away from the center intowhat? into nothingness?
into a 'penetrating sense of his nothingness'?" 23 By unleashing the world-shaping power of his rationality,
Western "man" desperately attempts to demonstrate that he is not nothing, that he does exist, despite not having
any place in the world system described by the very same modern science which makes possible his efforts to
control nature.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, Wilber would contend that the ecological crisis and the crisis of modern
nihilism can be solved only by reestablishing a place for subjectivity in the cosmos. Without acknowledging his
own transcendent subjectivity, Western man will continue trying to "prove" himself through ever more extravagant
"conquests" that may prove fatal to the human species and very damaging to other life forms. To be sure, not all
Western men, much less all Western people, exhibit the aggressiveness, arrogance, and acquisitiveness of those
who run modern corporations and governments, but perhaps they feel most acutely the absence of their own
significance, and thus particularly
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strive to demonstrate it by being "successful," even if this involves undermining the biosphere on which human life
depends.
Many Earth-based religionists, by way of contrast, maintain that by affirming their allegedly transcendent
subjectivity, Westerners would simply reinstall the humanity nature dualism established by Greek philosophers and
Christians many centuries ago. Instead, modern people must adopt a more humble attitude and acknowledge that
they are merely one strand among many in the great web of life. In poetry favored by some deep ecologists,
Robinson Jeffers identifies himself with the "divine nature of things," where "divine" is understood as the great
organism or the organic whole. 24 Similarly, Wiccan author Starhawk writes:
Spirit, sacred, Goddess, Godwhatever you want to call itis not found outside the world somewhereit's in the
world; it is the world, and it is us. Our goal is not to get off the wheel of birth nor to be saved from
something. Our deepest experiences are experiences of connection with the Earth and with the world.25
Some ecofeminists, such as Charlene Spretnak, hold that a Goddess-oriented spirituality does not have to be
wholly immanentistic, but can also be transcendent in conceiving of the divine as "the sacred whole, or the infinite
complexity of the universe."26 This "infinite complexity" may mean much the same as the Great World System,
which for Wilber does not involve the transcendent dimension. Elsewhere, however, Spretnak speaks of the Divine
in a way that seems to include the transcendent dimension. Like Wilber, moreover, Spretnak believes that the
ecological crisis is in part the consequence of the "loss of meaning'' of modern life, including the loss of
subjectivity and interiority. Wilber makes clear, however, that portraying humans as simply one strand in the
cosmic web or as a function in the great cosmic system does nothing to solve this crisis of meaning, since
naturalistic science already portrays humankind in this way. This naturalistic self-interpretation has proven to be
unsatisfying to many people, includingif their behavior is any indicationthe aggressive industrialists and politicians
who are often held responsible for causing so much environmental damage.
Wilber is not alone in pointing out that many early modern people began turning their eyes away from Heaven and
toward Earth when they concluded that modern science might enable them to control their destiny by mastering the
forces of nature. Renouncing the aspiration of ascending to the transcendent world beyond, moderns increasingly
chose the path of descending to the material plane. Concluding that only the material world exists enabled them not
only to liberate themselves from the political constraints of otherworldly religions, but also to focus all available
energy on controlling the material world in order to improve human well-being. Anyone familiar with the hunger,
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disease, poverty, ignorance, and sectarian violence in early modern Europe can appreciate the enthusiasm with
which so many intelligent people greeted the emancipatory projects of modernity. Material abundance, military
power, and (relatively) democratic institutions alone, however, have not been able to satiate the human desire for
something nonmaterial (i.e., for the transcendent).
Wilber contends that many followers of Earth-based spirituality have also renounced the path of Ascent in favor of
the path of Descent, though for a somewhat different reason. They believe that an otherworldly orientation creates
a binary opposition in which the immaterial soul is regarded as superior to the material body. Ensouled "man"
thereby justifies his domineering treatment of body, woman, and nature. Despite having some validity, this
argument runs into difficulty when one takes into account the increasing agnosticism and atheism of modern elites
who controlled science, industry, banking, and technology. Far from being otherworldly, they were becoming
heavily invested in materialistic ideology. One might retort that they were motivated by the Protestant work ethic,
but this approach does not satisfactorily address the fact that modernists are materialists, not transcendentalists. By
adopting their own version of modern science's materialistic world system, many radical environmentalists with
neopagan leanings end up in partial metaphysical agreement with modernists. According to Wilber, however, if the
path of Ascent is denied and if the transcendent dimension is rejected, the only direction left for a materialistic
people is ever greater consumption of material goods (an infinite "ahead"), which can never satisfy the yearning for
the nonmaterial.
As a non-dualist, Wilber maintains that the divine is fully present in each phenomenon, but that the divine cannot
be exhausted by any such phenomenon. Transcendent subjectivity is neither a human product nor a possession, but
rather the emergence of a divine possibility that has been moving toward self-actualization in cosmic history.
Humans go astray, though understandably and perhaps unavoidably, by thinking that their own egos are identical
with transcendent subjectivity, that is, the mortal ego is God incarnate. For moderns who have renounced the
transcendent dimension, the mortal ego must strut about as what Freud called the "prosthetic god," decked out with
mechanical equipment that extends ordinary human capacities. For such a god, there is no genuine transcendence,
only ever greater material power. This desperate god, ignorant of its relationship to the transcendent divine, and yet
dissociated from body, nature, emotions, and the female, attempts to conquer the world, but risks destroying the
conditions needed for human life.
Reconciling corporeality with transcendent subjectivity has always been difficult for human beings, who are always
tempted to renounce such subjectivity in favor of a view of humankind and divine that is "closer to nature." If
Wilber
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is right, however, only an evolution of transpersonal consciousness will enable humankind to reintegrate that which
has been dissociatedbody, female, emotions, naturein the development of personal consciousness. And
transpersonal consciousness involves the recovery of the forgotten transcendent dimension. Hence, for Wilber,
efforts of Earth-based spiritualists to revivify pagan religions and tribal rituals are misguided, especially when such
efforts take place within the context of a materialist ("flatland") ontology. Using such rituals to encourage people to
come closer to nature, while defining nature as the "web of life," not only will fail to satisfy the widespread human
yearning for authentic transcendence, but also may encourage highly problematic regressive tendencies in the
psychological and social domains. A more satisfactory path, in Wilber's view and in my own, calls for the
reconciliation of Ascent and Descent, transcendence and immanent, spiritual and material.
In my opinion, Wilber achieves a great deal in his critical analysis of modernity, Earth-based religiosity, and the
ecological crisis. He manages to include much of what is worthwhile in Heidegger's views about the transcendent
domain while discarding the antimodernist sentiments that led Heidegger into such political trouble. Moreover,
Wilber's view of the transcendent includes important aspects of spiritual traditions that Heideggeras a modernist
despite himselfeither rejected or adopted only in limited ways. Also, Wilber's neo-Hegelian evolutionary
cosmology takes into account the fact that contemporary science seems to be pointing toward a recovery of the
transcendent, though about all this I have been able to comment only in passing. Wilber's contention that
modernists and radical environmentalists alike adopted the materialistic world system of an earlier phase of
modern science, and that this world system deprives many humans of a satisfactory sense of personal and group
significance, allows him to conclude that nothing good will come of well-meaning efforts to "resacralize" nature,
unless the transcendent dimension of nature, humankind, and the divine is first rediscovered and reaffirmed.
Critical Appraisal of Wilber's Approach

Wilber's work has attracted a number of criticisms, not least because of its feisty and sometimes acerbic style. 27
Here, I address three major complaints. The first concerns his contention that there is an "evolution" of
consciousness. Critics charge that this contention justifies a "totalizing" narrative which privileges the very
Western institutions that have justified destruction of natural areas and oppression of indigenous peoples. The
second complaint concerns a conclusion that Wilber draws from his notion of consciousness evolution: con-
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temporary efforts to regain contact with living nature and the divine by exploring shamanic practices and reviving
paganism are regressive and dangerous. Wilber draws this conclusion even though he himself once suggested that
shamans were the first to achieve transpersonal awareness. The third complaint is that Wilber's ontology does not
provide a place for divinities, demons, angels, souls, and spirits, at least some of which are included not only in
neopagan cosmology but also in the cosmology of most major religions. To the extent that such beings transcend
the material plane, and to the extent that neopagans acknowledge and worship some of these beings, it would seem
that there is a transcendent dimension to neopaganism. Hence, neopagans cannot easily be understood as agreeing
with moderns that the Great World System is no more than complex material processes.
Gus diZerega, a political theorist who seeks to synthesize neopagan spirituality with Hayekian evolutionary
liberalism, has offered the most probing ecologically oriented critique of Wilber's evolutionary transpersonalism.
28 DiZerega's critique is especially important in view of the fact that, like Wilber, he celebrates the positive social
achievements of modernity and affirms that the divine involves immanence and transcendence, but unlike Wilber
he is more receptive to the possibility that neopagan rituals and shamanic practices may involve authentic and
nonregressive encounters with the divine. DiZerega, a Wiccan elder who studies and practices shamanism,
maintains that Wilber is wrong to characterize virtually all neopagans (and, by association, deep ecologists and
ecofeminists) as promoting an immanentistic spirituality without any appreciation for or recognition of the
transcendent dimension. The issue at hand involves a question that can be decided only by empirical research,
which I am only beginning to undertake: What are the doctrines and beliefs of contemporary neopagans?
In his essay "Nature Religion and the Modern World," diZerega diagnoses the problem of modernity in terms
reminiscent of Wilber's diagnosis: "The modern world's spiritual crisis is not about misery but meaninglessness. . . .
What has taken [the place of salvation religions] is a belief in progress towards a secular paradise promising
unending material consumption."29 According to diZerega (and many other people), consumerism is a form of
idolatry that confuses having things with being in appropriate relation to the divine, which alone can provide
meaning to human life. Regarding the immanent-transcendent issue, diZerega points out that all English traditional
covens begin with the following blessing, ''The Dryghton":
In the name of Dryghton, the ancient Providence
Which was from the beginning and is for all eternity
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male and female, all-powerful, changeless, eternal.
In the name of Our Lady of the Moon
and the Lord of Death and Resurrection,
In the names of the Mighty Ones of the four quarters,
The Kings of the Elements:
Blessed Be this place and this time and they who are with us. 30
If Dryghton names a transcendent divine who is also present in nature, diZerega's form of neopaganism would be
more like panentheism than pantheism, although diZerega himself concedes that many neopagans are pantheistic.31
Moreover, in answer to the charge that neopaganism encourages personal or social regression, diZerega contends
that the neopagan revival proves attractive to well-educated, financially secure, and technologically proficient
people who cannot find satisfaction in mainstream religions, not least because such religions have still not
embraced a "creation-centered" spirituality in a version that can be reconciled with traditional "salvation-oriented"
spirituality.32 In certain natural settings and in connection with rituals designed to invoke divinities, many
neopagans report experiencing a powerful divine presence. Such presences are often understood to be important but
intermediary divinities, not the transcendent source of all phenomena. Wilber's ontology, however, does not seem
able (or willing) adequately to accommodate the spiritual entitiesgods and goddesses, angels and demonsthat are so
often encountered by spiritual adepts in various traditions. Moreover, in his interpretation of Plotinus, whom
Wilber regards as the greatest Western exemplar of the nondual vision that he himself promotes, Wilber tends to
overlook passages in which Plotinus refers to gods and spirits.
Curiously, insofar as Plotinus was the last great pagan philosopher, Wilber himself may be viewed as a neopagan
insofar as he celebrates Plotinus as the great Western representative of the non-dualism that Wilber himself
promotes. Christian theologians, despite their appreciation for Plotinus's spiritual insight, must finally reject his
view that Creation "emanates" from the Divine One, since emanationism does not properly address the doctrine of
divine transcendence, nor does it take into account the biblical doctrine according to which God chose to create the
world. Christian panentheism, then, would have to acknowledge that God is a divine Person who chose to generate
Creation, and that Creation is not itself divine, though it is a manifestation of divine goodness. What distinguishes
Wilber's Neoplatonism from more typical neopaganism, however, is his resolute insistence that the Absolute
radically transcends all phenomena, even though It is also present in them.
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For reasons mentioned above, many neopagans are wary of Wilber's notion of the evolution of consciousness, but
some practitioners are willing to take this notion seriously, so long as Wilber himself is willing to consider the
possibility that Wicca and shamanism are authentic efforts to "recover" important dimensions of sacred experience
that were unnecessarily repressed by the emergence of salvation religions. Is it possible that before taking a further
step in the evolution of consciousness, Western humankind needs to "loop back" to prior stages in order to
integrate what has been forgotten? This is an important question, one to which I have no ready answer.
A related question is worth considering: Given that mainstream religions are losing their strength in the Western
world, and given that they have helped contribute to problematic attitudes toward Creation or nature, is it not
appropriate and inevitable that, at this historical juncture, many spiritually thirsty Westerners would be exploring
non-Western and neopagan alternatives to Christianity and Judaism? That Wilber would answer this question
affirmatively is evidenced by his own exploration of various non-Western and neopagan traditions. In view of his
concerns about the possibility of social and psychological regression (in regard to the pre/trans fallacy), however,
he warns that exploration must constantly be on the lookout for the narcissistic temptation of moving toward
prepersonal states. Yet he must also resist those critics who, failing to distinguish between the transpersonal and
the prepersonal, conclude that Wilber's own pursuit of spiritual non-dualism amounts to a regression, a flight from
reason. In Up from Eden, we read:
[T]he New Age critics [i.e., proponents] often tend to confuse pre-egoic and trans-egoic and thus end up
championing not only truly trans-personal endeavors, which is admirable, but also the most grossly pre-
egoic movements, which is perfectly disastrous. And the orthodox critics, such as Christopher Lasch and
Peter Martin, champion the same confusion, but in a reverse way: after presenting excellent analyses of the
widespread present-day pre-egoic trends toward narcissistic absorption, they ruin their whole presentations
by lumping trans-personal endeavors with pre-personal pursuits. One is tempted to say, "A plague on both
their houses," except that both are partially correct, and their half-truths need to be brought together in a
comprehensive view. 33
I share Wilber's concerns about the possibility that some explorations of neopaganism might encourage regression
to prepersonal states, precisely at a moment when it is appropriate to encourage responsible personhood involving
mutual exchange of recognition and respect. I am more open than is Wilber, however, to the possibility that
exploring neopaganism and non-Western traditions may contribute to the overall goal of the development both of
more integrated modes of consciousness and of the corresponding social institutions. Moreover, despite my own
concerns about ecofascism, I concede
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that experimenting with neopaganism in the context of a traditionally liberal society does not pose the same kind of
threat posed by the anti-Semitic, völkisch, immanentistic religion of nature promoted by National Socialists in the
context of a traditionally illiberal society that, faced with an enormous political and economic crisis, also had to
contend with militant nationalism and anti-Semitism.
Like Wilber, however, I also believe that contemporary neopagans and other Earth-based spiritualists must
remember that neopaganism has been used for destructive political purposes in our century. For many Nazis,
socially reactionary policies based on Nazi neopaganism were perfectly compatible with high-tech industry and
weaponry. High educational attainments and favorable attitudes toward technology, then, are by no means a
guarantee that people will not succumb to the appeal of a nature-oriented religious movement that promises to
relieve them of the onerous moral responsibilities taken for granted by salvation religions, which emphasize that
humans cannot and should not follow the "laws of nature." As self-conscious historical agents who are both
embraced by nature and transcend it, humans are destined to play a different role on this planet than animals
lacking such historical self-consciousness.
In this century, many people have been attracted to totalitarian movements because they promise to relieve people
of the burden imposed by individual moral responsibility. Nazi "antiprogressivism" and Soviet "progressivism"
both proved to be authoritarian regimes that were completely opposed to Enlightenment modernity's celebration
and defense of the inalienable rights of persons. Insofar as the modern concept of the person finds its roots in
Christianity, which emphasizes that only humans were made in the image of the transcendent God; and insofar as
the modern person can and must act in ways that irrevocably shape linear history, a concept that is also rooted in
the biblical faiths, one can well understand why modern liberals are even more suspicious of neopaganism than
they are of Christianity. Arguably, neopaganism undermines the notion of human specialness and discards the idea
that history is progressive. Even if they concede all this, however, neopagans could reply that it was the
Renaissance revival of classical paganism that eventually broke the power of the church dogmatism, opened the
way for the renewal of scientific investigation, reaffirmed the worth of individuals in their earthly lives, and helped
to pave the way for modern democracies.
Agnostic liberal humanists, moreover, would contest Wilber's notion that cosmic and human history are somehow
the manifestation or actualization of a Divine potential. Although insisting that the Divine is somehow present in
history, Wilber makes the following concession to the liberal humanist: the great-
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est revolution possible today would be the global institutionalization and consolidation of the modern ideal of the
rights of persons. According to Wilber, were the great majority of people to act as free adults, willingly
acknowledging the personhood, rights, and responsibilities of everyone else, this would constitute a major step
toward solving the ecological crisis, much of which is explicable in terms of militarism, nationalism, and
inhumane/illegal economic practices. The next step, however, would be the emergence of transpersonal modes of
being, in which the needed work of reintegration could begin taking place. Since both diZerega and Wilber are
both respecters of persons, and since both are working to accomplish the necessary reintegration, though in
somewhat different ways, I regret that they often seem to talk past one another.
Although I appreciate the motivation behind and force of many of the criticisms made of Wilber's work, I remain
convinced that he has made an enormous contribution to the contemporary discussion of the divine, nature, and
humanity. Wilber makes clear that modernity's crisis of meaning can be solved neither by a spasm of life-denying
transcendentalism and otherworldly yearning, nor by a renewal of immanentistic nature religiosity, but rather by
developing a multidimensional, nondual ontology that allows room for experiencing the transcendental and
subjective domains that have for so long been neglected. Human awareness makes possible discernment of
dimensions hidden from the view of the most far-seeing bird and unnoticeable by even the most sharp-nosed
hound. Such discernment enables people to realize that material nature, however incredible its beauty, organization,
and complexity may be, is only one manifestation of a divine with infinite dimensions. A truly deep spirituality
acknowledges the absolute depth of reality, a depth certainly not discernible in the world system of modern
materialism ("the web of life"), and not adequately discernible in the cosmic world soul of neopaganism.
Notes
My thanks to Gus diZerega, Ken Wilber, and Bron Taylor for helpful suggestions that improved this essay.
1. In this essay, whenever I use the term "man" or "man's," I do so to emphasize that I have in mind human males
under patriarchy, not the human species in general.
2. See Bron Taylor, "Resacralizing Earth: Pagan Environmentalism and the Restoration of Turtle Island," in
American Scared Space, edited by David Chidester and Edward T. Linenthal (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1995); Bill Devall, "How Radical and How Deep the Resistance" (a review of Bron Taylor, ed., Ecological
Resistance Movements), The Trumpeter 12:4 (Fall 1995): 201 203; Bron Taylor, "Ecological Resistance
Movements: Not Always Deep but if Deep, Religious: Reply to Devall,'' The
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Trumpeter 13:2 (Spring 1996): 98 103; Bill Devall, "Response to Bron Taylor's Criticisms of My Review of
Ecological Resistance Movements," The Trumpeter 13:3 (Summer 1996): 147 150. Bron Taylor has written
another insightful essay, "Earth and Nature-Based Spirituality: From Radical Environmentalism to Scientific
Paganism" (1998), unpublished.
3. Michael E. Zimmerman, "Ecofascism: A Threat to American Environmentalism?" in The Ecological
Community, edited by Roger S. Gottlieb (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.229 254.
4. Thomas Molar, The Pagan Temptation (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1987), p. 125.
5. See Robert Pois, National Socialism and the Religion of Nature (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986). On
the other hand, James M. Rhodes, in The Hitler Movement (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980),
interprets National Socialism not as an instance of perverted neopaganism, but rather as the latest outbreak of a
millennarian, apocalyptic, Gnostic revolution influenced by the Book of Revelation and the writings of Joachim di
Fiore.
In "Ruralism or Environmentalism?" Environmental Values 5 (1996): 47 58, Avner de-Shalit distinguishes
between a nostalgic, antimodernist, right-wing movement that he describes as "ruralism," and a future-oriented,
progressive, ecologically informed, anti-speciesistic movement that he calls "environmentalism." In de-Shalit's
view, National Socialismespecially as described by Anna Bramwell in Ecology in the 20th Century (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989)was a variety of ruralism, not of environmentalism proper. Although
there is some truth to de-Shalit's position, the situation is more complex than he proposes. For example, some
National Socialist idealogues condemned anthropocentrism for failing to understand that humans are only one
aspect of the great system of life. Moreover, a number of contemporary environmentalists are simultaneously
well-informed about ecological science and are antianthropocentric, but share elements of ruralism. Today's
environmentalists want to portray their movement as progressive. Thanks to Andrew Light for bringing this
essay to my attention.
6. Zimmerman, "Ecofascism: A Threat to American Environmentalism?"
7. See Wendell Berry, The Unsettling of America (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1977) and The Gift of Good Land
(San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981).
8. Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1996. See also Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier, Eco-fascism: Lessons from the
German Experience (San Francisco: AK Press, 1995).
9. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing (San Francisco: Harper
San Francisco, 1992).
10. See Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1990).
11. Quoted in Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger (Bern: Buchdruckerei AG, 1962), p. 150.
12. See Michael E. Zimmerman, "Ontical Craving vs. Ontological Desire," in From Phenomenology to Thought,
Errancy, and Desire, edited by Babette E. Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), pp. 501 523.
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13. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). It is difficult to estimate the importance of this book.
14. See Steven Vogel, "Habermas and the Ethics of Nature," in The Ecological Community, edited by Roger
Gottlieb (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 175 192, for a helpful articulation of the theme that "nature" is always
encountered within a social world. See also Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
15. Jacques Derrida, De l'Esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris: Editions Gallilé, 1987), p. 119.
16. See Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, eds., Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust (Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus, 1997). On Heidegger's relationship with National Socialism, see Michael E. Zimmerman, "The Thorn
in Heidegger's Side: The Question of National Socialism," The Philosophical Forum 20:4 (Summer 1989):
326 365.
17. For an earlier assessment of Wilber's views on the ecological crisis, see Michael E. Zimmerman, "A
Transpersonal Diagnosis of the Ecological Crisis," ReVision 18:4 (Spring 1996): 38 48.
18. Ken Wilber, Up from Eden (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1981).
19. Ken Wilber, Sex, Ecology and Spirituality (Boston: Shambhala, 1995). See also Wilber, A Brief History of
Everything (Boston: Shambhala, 1996).
20. See Ken Wilber, "The Pre/Trans Fallacy," in Eye to Eye: The Quest for the New Paradigm (Boston:
Shambhala, 1996), pp. 198 243. In his first book, No Boundary (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1979), Wilber himself
commits this fallacy by suggesting that the nondual awareness to which so many spiritual seekers aspire is
achieved by reuniting with the ground from which all things emerge.
21. Fortunately, Roger Walsh has provided an excellent summary of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality in his essay
"Developmental and Evolutionary Synthesis in the Recent Writings of Ken Wilber," ReVision 18:4 (Spring 1996):
9 24.
22. On the other hand, many environmentalists criticize the mechanistic and abstract outlook of ecosystem ecology.
23. Friedrich Nietzche, The Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufmann in Basic Writings of Nietzche
(New York: Modern Library, 1968), p. 591.
24. Robinson Jeffers, as quoted in George Sessions, "Spinoza and Jeffers on Man in Nature," Inquiry 20 (1977):
481 528. Quoted material is on 512. For further discussion of Sessions and Jeffers, see Michael E. Zimmerman,
Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994),
pp.210 212.
25. Starhawk, "Power, Authority, and Mystery: Ecofeminism and Earth-Based Spirituality," in Reweaving the
World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, edited by Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (San Francisco:
Sierra Club, 1990), pp. 73 86. Quoted passage is on p. 73.
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26. Charlene Spretnak, States of Grace: The Recovery of Meaning in the Postmodern Age (San Francisco:
HarperCollins, 1991), p. 136. For further discussion of this issue see Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future, pp.
233 275.
27. See Ken Wilber and the Future of Transpersonal Inquiry: A Spectrum of Views, edited by Donald Rothberg
and Sean M. Kelly, ReVision 18:4 (Spring 1996); 19:1 (Summer 1996); 19:2 (Fall 1996). The ReVision articles
have been collected as Donald Rothberg and Sean M. Kelly, eds., Ken Wilber in Dialogue (Wheaton, IL: Quest
Books, 1998). In his The Eye of Spirit: An Integral Vision for a World Gone Slightly Mad (Boston: Shambhala,
1997), Wilber reprints his "reply to critics" that appeared in ReVision 19:2, and adds a number of essays, including
some that answer criticism made elsewhere.
28. Gus diZerega, "A Critique of Ken Wilber's Account of Deep Ecology and Nature Religions," The Trumpeter
13:2 (Spring 1996): 52 71; "Social Ecology, Deep Ecology, and Liberalism," Critical Review 6:2 3
(Spring Summer 1992): 305-370; "Towards an Ecocentric Political Economy," The Trumpeter 13:4 (Fall 1996):
173 182; "Deep Ecology and Liberalism: The Greener Implications of Evolutionary Liberal Theory," Review of
Politics 58:4 (Fall 1996): 699 734.
Along with D. H. Frew, diZerega has raised disturbing questions about Wilber's scholarly practices in Sex,
Ecology, Spirituality, including interpolating (without indication in the text) a sentence from Emerson's Nature
and quoting a line from Plotinus without providing the source of the quotation. The problem here is that the
quotation doesn't square with the translation of the Enneads (by Inge) on which Wilber says he relied in
interpreting Plotinus. On these issues, see diZerega, "Accuracy, Honesty, Spirituality: A Response to Ken
Wilber" (unpublished manuscript). Also see D. H. Frew, "The Whole and the Parts: Ken Wilber's Treatment of
Plotinus in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality" (Internet: alexandria@world.std.com). During 1999, Wilber, diZerega,
and Frew engaged in productive discussions which resolved the major conceptual issues that previously divided
them. A summary of those discussions is in the Reading Room section of The World of Ken Wilber,
http://people.a2000.nl/fvisser/wilber/readingroom.html.
29. Gus diZerega, "Nature Religion and the Modern World" (unpublished manuscript), p. 8.
30. This prayer was shared with me by diZerega, who is a third-degree Gardnerian Elder in the Wiccan tradition.
Because this prayer has been made public, diZerega informs me that I may reprint it here (personal communication,
February 24, 1997).
31. In an unpublished book manuscript, "Pagans and Christians in the New Millenium," diZerega emphasizes even
more strongly that neopaganism acknowledges a transcendent dimension.
32. On creation-centered spirituality, see Matthew Fox, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ (San Francisco: Harper
& Row, 1988). Although appreciative of what Fox is trying to achieve, ecofeminist theologian Rosemary Radford
Ruether has expressed concern that Fox does not adequately take into account the insights of the soteriological
(and thus transcendent-oriented) message of Christianity.
33. Wilber, Up from Eden, pp. 327 328.
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10
The Postmodernism of Deep Ecology, the Deep Ecology of Postmodernism, and Grand Narratives
Arran Gare
Deep ecology as developed by Arne Naess and others has much in common with postmodernist philosophy, and
postmodernists for the most part are sympathetic to radical environmentalism. This confluence suggests that deep
ecology and postmodernism might have common roots and so could provide resources for one another, but also
that problems of one could also be problems of the other. Noting the congruence of Heidegger's philosophy (a
major source of inspiration for postmodernists) with deep ecology, Michael Zimmerman has suggested that there
are antimodernist elements within deep ecology which could have dangerous political consequences. He proposes a
new synthesis of ideas from deep ecology, modernism, and postmodernism to obviate these anti-modernist
elements while preserving the virtues of each philosophical perspective. What is the relationship between deep
ecology, modernism, and postmodernism? Are there dangerous political tendencies in deep ecology? And if so, has
Zimmerman provided a synthesis that resolves all the problems in, and unites the best features of, deep ecology,
modernism, and postmodernism?
The Postmodernism of Deep Ecology

Deep ecology is clearly a radical philosophy, but just how radical is obscured by the way it has been received. It
has been taken to be a division within environmental philosophy, first in opposition to "shallow" ecology, and later
in relation to social ecology and ecofeminism, rather than in opposition to the dominant culture. Although no one
doubts this opposition, it is only when seen in relation to the dominant culture that the full measure of its radicality
becomes evident.
The simplest and most revealing way to characterize the dominant culture is as the "culture of modernity." Though
this culture has a number of competing strands, these strands share common assumptions. Modernity has its origins
in
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the Reformation, the rise of capitalism and the corresponding dissolution of feudalism, and the philosophical,
scientific, and political revolutions of the seventeenth century. It was elaborated through the Enlightenment
philosophies and political revolutions of the eighteenth century, and gained further impetus with the industrial
revolutions of the nineteenth century. Throughout, it has been associated with the triumph of European civilization
over all other civilizations and cultures.
The concept which unifies the different strands of modernity is that of "progress": progress in knowledge, in the
rationality of beliefs and institutions, and in the ability to control nature and society. Progress is equated with the
emancipation of humanity from drudgery, disease, irrational beliefs, political oppression, and, in its more radical
forms, economic necessity. The modernist notion of "progress" originated with the secularization and reformulation
of Christian eschatology and gained a cosmic dimension with theories of evolution. In the second half of the
twentieth century the notion of progress was reformulated as "development," defined in opposition to
"underdeveloped." All societies and cultures were seen and evaluated according to their state of development; that
is, according to how closely they approximated "advanced'' Western societies.
The culture of modernity has always had its problems and its critics. To begin with, it emerged through a series of
ideological struggles both among its advocates and against supporters of the old theocratic feudal order. The
Counter-Reformation inspired the revival of Thomist philosophy, the proponents of which have continued up to
the present to criticize modernity. Later, the social fragmentation, violence, and impoverishment generated by
modernity, particularly associated with imperialism and industrialization, stimulated major reformulations of the
culture of modernity, engendering the revolutionary modernism of socialism (calling for a transcendence of
capitalism), social Darwinism (justifying further imperialism, wars, class divisions, and poverty as necessary
conditions for further progress), and a number of reformist positions lying between these two extremes. Modernity
has also stimulated more radical critics who have questioned its fundamental assumptions, including the linear
conception of history of Christian eschatology from which this culture emerged. The most significant of these
antimodernist critics have been Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744 1803), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 1900), and
Martin Heidegger (1889 1976), philosophers who rejected the assumption that the history of European civilization
and its expansion can be identified with progress.
In many ways Herder can be regarded as the most profound of these critics, having originated many of the central
themes developed by Nietzsche and
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Heidegger. 1 Herder argued against the primacy attributed by Enlightenment philosophers to universal principles
and abstractions, and defended the concrete, the particular, sense experience, quality over quantity, and diversity
against the pressures within modernity toward uniformity. He saw tendencies to justify suffering in the name of
abstractionsthe human species, civilization, progressas cruel and sinister. Correspondingly, he rejected the
mechanistic view of nature, representing nature as active and purposeful, a unity in which dynamic, purpose-
seeking forces flow into each other, clash, combine, and coalesce. He argued that people are essentially
sociocultural beings, largely formed by their particular language. In opposition to atomistic, utilitarian thinking he
promulgated an ethics of self-expression or self-realization, calling on peoples and individuals to express the
potentialities unique to them. Herder argued that different cultures have incommensurable but equally defensible
values and ideals. He held that all "cultures" (the plural term was coined by him), both in the past and in the
present, are significant in their own right and equally valuable, although he expressed considerable hostility to
Europeans for their greed and aggression.
Where does Arne Naess's work stand in this context? In 1973, when Naess drew a distinction between "the
shallow" and "the deep, long-range ecology movement," he characterized deep ecology as "rejection of the man-
in-environment image in favor of a relational, total-field image in which all organisms are seen as knots in the
biospheric field of intrinsic relations,''2 and as committed to biospherical egalitarianism in which all forms of life
are accorded a deep respect. Deep ecology was presented as defending the complexity of ecosystems, economies,
and ways of life, the decentralization of power, and local autonomy, and as opposed to elitism, either within or
between nations. Naess has defended pluralism and an ethics of self-realization-taking "self-realization as top
norm" and equating it with identification and unity with the whole of nature.3 To elaborate his position, Naess has
invoked the philosophy of Spinoza and Asian traditions of thought. However, Naess's interpretations of Spinoza
and Asian philosophies involve projecting onto them concepts deriving from Herder. Almost all Naess's ideas are
echoes or developments of Herder's ideas. Naess's deep ecology is part of the tradition of anti-modernism begun by
Herder.
What, then, is the relationship between Naess's work and postmodernism? Postmodernism is essentially the form
the antimodernist tradition has taken subsequent to the almost complete domination of the world by the culture of
modernity. Deep ecology is a form of postmodernism.
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The Deep Ecology of Postmodernism

Many of those who have identified themselves as postmodernists have merely rejected some small feature of
modernity, such as modernist architecture or modernist literature. More significant are those who, disillusioned by
socialist, particularly Marxist, forms of modernism, have attacked the whole of modernity. Such thinkers have been
preeminently concerned to reveal the fractures and weaknesses in the culture of modernity, even to "celebrate"
these fractures. They have been particularly concerned to avoid any move in response to these fractures toward a
new totalizing perspective, a move that would simply promote a new phase of modernity. Consequently, they have
embraced the work of the poststructuralists, the French philosophers who have developed the ideas of the
antimodernist philosophers Nietzsche and Heidegger. 4
The most important of these philosophers are Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles
Deleuze, and Félix Guattari. Lyotard immediately commands attention because he has explicitly aligned himself
with the postmodernists. The most important sign of the disintegration of modernity, he argues, is "the incredulity
towards metanarratives"5; that is, the incredulity toward any metadiscourse appealing to some grand narrativesuch
as the emancipation of the rational, the liberation of the exploited, or the creation of wealthwhich could legitimate
all particular claims to knowledge. What does this mean? The loss of credibility of grand narratives means that
people no longer believe in progress. Correspondingly, society is disintegrating into a plurality of heterogeneous
language games.
Decision makers attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, on the assumption
that their elements are commensurable and the whole is determinable; but this is not the case. Not even scientific
ideas are commensurable with each other, and scientific research therefore cannot be managed in this way. Science
advances by "inventing" counterexamples, what is unintelligible from the perspective of received knowledge.
Furthermore, science is revealing the world itself to be unpredictable. As Lyotard put it: "Post-modern scienceby
concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by
incomplete information, "fracta," catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxesis theorizing its own evolution as
discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical."6 This clearly destroys efforts to justify science in
terms of performance maximization.
Lyotard also defends difference over identity and the sensuous over the abstract, and attempts to chart a new kind
of politics. However, these ideas are more fully developed by other poststructuralist philosophers. Celebrating dif-
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ference, Derrida has carried on in a more radical form the work of Heidegger, the "destruktion" or, as Derrida put
it, the "deconstruction" of the history of European metaphysics to overcome its oppressive effects. According to
Derrida, the deepest desire of the Western philosophical tradition is to find some fixed, permanent center, a
transcendental signifier that will give meaning to all other signs. To reveal what is being denied and to expose the
arbitrary nature of all such efforts, Derrida argued that a binary opposition is assumed, one term of which is taken
to be prior to and superior to the other. 7 The second term is made out to be derivative, accidental, and unimportant
in relation to the first, which is taken either as an ideal limit or as the central concept of a metaphysical system.
The second term is then either effaced or repressed.
In this way metaphysics establishes ethical-ontological hierarchies based on subordination. Derrida's
deconstructions involve showing how what is excluded as secondary and derivative is in fact at least as primordial
and general as the metaphysical original. "Transcendental essences" that have been taken as absolute points of
reference are shown to be arbitrary signifiers taken and then frozen from the chain of signifiers and privileged, or
made to seem "natural," thereby freezing the play of differences and imposing a fixed structure and hierarchy on
society. By subverting the fixation of meaning that legitimizes exclusive, powerful groups, deconstruction enables
those who have been suppressed and marginalized by Western civilizationthe colonized, women, those outside the
academiesto be heard.
Derrida's work begins and ends with semiotics, although he has attempted to show its political relevance. Deleuze,
like Derrida, defended the primacy of difference over identity but, following Foucault, treated semiosis as practice,
as one force among others in a field of power. And, in opposition to other poststructuralists, he embraced
Nietzsche's physicalism. Difference was seen not simply in relation to signs but also within the world. To elaborate
a Nietzschean philosophy of nature, Deleuze drew on the ideas of the Stoics; on the philosophies of Lucretius,
Spinoza, and Bergson; and on various developments within science and mathematics. Henri Bergson, with his
defense of intuition, different orders of duration, multiplicity, and creative becoming, was the most important
source for developing this elaboration, and Deleuze called for a return to Bergson, for "a renewal or an extension
of his project today, in relation to the transformations of life and society, in parallel with the transformations of
science."8
Deleuze, along with Guattari, strove to develop a new way of writing and a new kind of politics free from old
organizational forms. Rather than the "arborescent" system that has dominated Western thought, the kind of system
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conforming to the model of a tree in which all branches stem from a central trunk (that is, where all truths are
ultimately derived from a single principle), Deleuze and Guattari organized their work as a "rhizome" system,
comparable to the root systems of bulbs and tubers, in which any point can be connected to any other point. This
rhizomic organization of their thought was joined with a call for a new kind of politics, a "nomadic politics," in
place of "the politics of the sedentary."
Deleuze and Guattari strove to free politics from totalizing paranoia, to withdraw allegiance from the old
categories of the negative and to affirm what is positive: "difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile
arrangements over systems"; to develop "action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and
disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization." 9 Accordingly, they formulated a conception of
political action based on the metaphor of grass: "Of all the imaginary existences we attribute to plant, beast and star
the weed leads the most satisfactory life of all. True, the weed produces no lilies, no battleships, no Sermons on the
Mount . . .. Eventually the weed gets the upper hand. Eventually things fall back into a state of China. This
condition is usually referred to by historians as the Dark Age. Grass is the only way out."10
The poststructuralists, in extending the antimodernist ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger, have brought more
fundamentally into question the central notions not only of modernity but of the whole of European civilization.
Nietzsche and Heidegger have already been recognized as of central importance to deep ecology,11 and insofar as
the poststructuralists are continuing their work, they also free us from the assumptions that have justified the
reduction of nature to a mere instrument. They have attacked the grand narratives that identified progress with the
total domination and control of the nonhuman world. They have celebrated new developments in science that focus
on undecidables, the limits of precise control, catastrophes and pragmatic paradoxes, undermining at the very core
of Western culture the ideal of total control through the advance of knowledge. And they have brought into
question the hierarchies that allowed us to treat non-European civilizations, the uncivilized, and the realm of nature
as the deficient Others in relation to the rise of European culture and civilization.
While such work does not lead immediately to an appreciation of the intrinsic significance of nature, the dynamic
physicalism that is required to account for the indeterminacy, unpredictabilty, and uncontrollability revealed by
postmodern sciencethe physicalism of Nietzsche and Bergson promoted by Deleuze and Guattarimakes this
difficult to avoid.12 This, essentially, is the
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conclusion of Guattari. The revolution in mentalities that he calls for is required to "give back to humanityif it ever
had ita sense of responsibility, not only for animal and vegetable species, likewise for incorporeal species such as
music, the arts, cinema, the relation with time, love and compassion for others, the feeling of fusion at the heart of
the cosmos." 13 And, Guattari argues, it is the Greens who have realized the possibilities of the new nomadic
politics. As he suggested in an interview: "There is, perhaps, a new alliance in the process of formation among
those who refuse to see the forests destroyed, immigrants treated as cattle, huge amounts of money devoured by
military budgets, which is to say, among the Greens. . . . In my opinion, it is the only hope of escaping the present
impasse."14 Although Guattari is the only poststructuralist to have fully embraced the environmental movement,
he has shown that poststructuralist postmodernism is implicitly a form of deep ecology.15
Integrating Deep Ecology and Postmodernism

Once the connection between deep ecology and poststructuralist postmodernism is understood, these traditions of
thought can provide support for one another in their confrontation with the culture of modernity. Environmentalists,
and particularly deep ecologists, are losing political ground. With nation-states in permanent economic crisis, with
the growing impoverishment and economic insecurity of vast numbers of people in all zones of the world
economy, and with transnational corporations mobilized to neutralize whatever gains the environmentalists have
made in the past,16 environmental issues are increasingly being pushed off the political and economic agenda.
Deep ecologists and other radical environmentalists now appear to be little more than one pressure group among
others, or utopian idealists who can be bracketed out when it comes to making the really important economic and
political decisions. Radical environmentalist political philosophies like Naess's, though inspiring to supporters, lack
teeth. Poststructuralists, who have grappled with issues of power, how it is maintained, and how it can be
undermined, provide a crucial resource to environmentalists.
Conversely, postmodernists are looking increasingly irrelevant as the market, like a rhizome or a weed, is
penetrating and taking over the most remote corners of the world and the most intimate facets of everyday life.
Modernity has been revamping itself on a global scale, and a new, vibrant modernism, in the form of economic
rationalism underpinned by a refurbished social Darwinismpromoted by transnational corporations, financiers, and
media baronsnow prevails almost everywhere. This has reinstated the grand narrative of economic
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growth through increasing instrumental efficiency and the domination of nature in a more vigorous form than ever.
Postmodernists can no longer assume that modernity will disintegrate by itself and hope that simply promoting this
disintegration will pave the way for a less oppressive society. Only the risks associated with environmental
destruction provide an insurmountable problem for the culture of modernity. And, as Guattari noted, it is the
environmentalists who are making a constructive response to the present situation.
Zimmerman's Critique of Deep Ecology

However, it is not only the positive aspects of the relationship between post-modernism and deep ecology that are
of importance. Also of significance are the dangers that become apparent when postmodernism and deep ecology
are seen in relation to one another as parallel developments of antimodernism.
The dangers of antimodernism have become the central concern of Michael Zimmerman. In his book Contesting
Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, Zimmerman posed a problem: "Having once read Heidegger's
thought as partly compatible with deep ecology, I now ask whether deep ecology in particular and radical ecology
in general are in fact compatible with a reactionary type of anti-modernism." 17 Zimmerman initially championed
Heidegger to deep ecologists, but came to see Heidegger's philosophy as inextricably linked to Nazism. He now
sees deep ecology as capable of fostering a reactionary type of antimodernism that could inspire a similar and
equally disastrous political upheaval.
Of course this could be regarded as ascribing guilt to Naess and deep ecology by association. Naess himself is far
too subtle a thinker to say anything that could give sustenance to reactionary antimodernism. His own thinking is
strongly influenced by the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus, and he has distanced himself from the more fervent
views of Warwick Fox and George Sessions. And all deep ecological thought is suffused with pacifism. But it is
not the avowed beliefs of philosophers that must be judged, or even the immediate logical implications of their
ideas, but what is the effect of embracing them. As Zimmerman put it: "Though deep ecologists are not ecofascists,
I can imagine howin the context of perceived ecological and economic emergencyideas drawn from their writings
could be used to support neofascist programs. Today, reactionary politicians still condemn the 'over-population' of
inferior races, decry racial 'mongrelization,' and criticize industrial pollution for contaminating the soil that
nourishes the 'blood' of the people. Though rejecting such racist views,
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deep ecologistslike Rousseau before themoften appeal to 'nature' as a standard by which to criticize modern
societies." 18
While Zimmerman does not consider the ideas of Herder, Herder's philosophy with its defense of nationalism has
also been criticized for feeding into Nazi ideology (despite Herder's pacifism), along with Nietzsche's elitist ethics
of the Übermensch and his apologetics for the cruelty of ancient ruling classes. In fact the whole tradition of
antimodernism was a major component of Nazi ideologywhich, in accordance with it, celebrated nature and was
centrally concerned with environmental issues. It was a "religion of nature."19 Hitler denounced the evils of
modernity and called for renewed contact with elemental forces and the restoration of folk customs, traditions, and
attitudes. Zimmerman's contention is supported by situating Herder, Nietzsche, Heidegger, elements of Nazism,
and deep ecology within and as part of the tradition of antimodernism.
What is it about the antimodernist tradition that gives it its explosively destructive potential? Zimmerman suggests
that it has a tendency to cater to "the widely shared desire to surrender one's separate-self sense and to be absorbed
in a larger Whole."20 If this is the case, then poststructuralist thought provides a corrective to deep ecology by
opposing all essentialist and foundationalist tendencies.21 For instance, in developing his concept of Self-
realization, Naess brings together four sets of opposing terms: identification and alienation, oneness and plurality,
wholeness and fragmentarity, and Self-realization and Self-abnegation.22 In each case one term of a binary
opposition is privileged, and it is through this that the norm of Self-realization as identification and unity with the
whole of nature, in the unfolding of one's own potentialities, is defined in a way which tends to privilege it as a
transcendental essence through which all else can be judged. It is this binary opposition that could be used to
undermine the separate self-sense, despite Naess's intentions. "Deconstructing" it subverts the tendency to
essentialism by showing how "alienation," "plurality," "fragmentarity,'' and "Self-abnegation" are the condition for,
and are required for, Naess's privileged terms having any meaning. Appreciating that these notions acquire their
meaning only through the terms they are defined in opposition to, and must endlessly be redefined in this way,
provides support for Naess's skepticism.
However, there are other problems with antimodernism that poststructuralist thinking exacerbates. Antimodernism
threatens the notion of the progressive emancipation of humanity that, in Zimmerman's view, has been responsible
for vast improvements in political and social life. In this, Zimmerman joins forces with Jürgen Habermas. But
there are significant and illuminating differences
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between the two. Habermas is concerned to reconstruct the notion of emancipation by developing and defending
the notion of communicative rationality as more primordial than instrumental rationality, in order to justify the
notion of emancipation without recourse to metaphysics. The antimodernist tradition, by undermining the power of
reason to bring into question existing practices and institutions, is then seen by him as the main threat to the notion
of the progressive emancipation of humanity. Zimmerman, by contrast, opts for a direct defense of the traditional
notion of the progressive emancipation of humanity (and nature) as an inherent tendency within history. He
defends Ken Wilber's Neoplatonist or neo-Hegelian characterization of history as a process of evolving
consciousnessfirst as a means of reconciling deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism, and second as a way
of defending modernist (mental egoic) forms of consciousnessas a necessary stage toward nondual (playfully
aware) forms of consciousness.
What this means is that whereas Habermas is hostile to the poststructuralists for continuing Nietzsche's and
Heidegger's attacks on Western rationality, 23 Zimmerman embraces and incorporates the poststructuralist
opposition to absolutes into an expanded modernist vision of history as progress toward emancipation. While
Habermas criticizes Derrida for fragmenting discourse and thereby undermining rationality, Zimmerman shows
some sympathy for Derrida for subverting the quest for absolute foundations; although he expresses concern that
the limited notion of self-realization Derrida allows cannot give a place to ecological concerns.
At the conclusion of Contesting Earth's Future, Zimmerman places Donna Haraway's postmodernist cyborgism at
the center of the stage to illustrate what a higher form of consciousness would be. Opposing both the
hyperproductivism of Western rationalism, which refuses to acknowledge any actor but One, and the
transcendental naturalism of some radical ecologists, which settles on a sameness that only pretends to difference,
Haraway calls on us to stop clinging to our gendered, organic, human identities and to participate in the dangerous,
boundary-crossing, technological play that is our destiny. As Zimmerman approvingly describes her work:
"Haraway seeks not to save nature in walled-off reserves, but rather to generate a politics of 'social nature,' that is,
'of a different organization of land and people, where the practice of justice restructures the concept of nature.'"24
Zimmerman argues that despite her abandonment of progressive narratives, Haraway's reference to the ideas of
social justice shows her commitment to the progressive discourse of Enlightenment modernity and her
compatibility with a more robust modernism. However, in opposition to Haraway, Zimmerman is "unwilling to
abandon the idea that
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there is some direction to cosmic history, including human affairs"; rather, he suggests that "nondual awareness
[exemplified by Haraway] plays the role of what Whitehead called a metaphysical lure that draws the universe
forward in the process of generating ever more complex forms of awareness." 25
Though Zimmerman offers good reasons to be concerned about the possible explosive political consequences of
deep ecological thought, how adequate is his proposed solution? What Zimmerman's analysis of deep ecology
shows to be required is some means of accepting the antimodernist critique of the domineering and oppressive
tendencies of modernity without embracing its tendency to antihumanism or abandoning the emancipatory project
of modernity. Ken Wilber's psychologized Neoplatonist historicism, focusing centrally on the problem of coming to
terms with death, does not just ignore some of the greatest achievements of the Neoplatonist tradition (notably the
Hegelian historical analysis of institutions). It also upholds a notion of cosmic progress that is difficult to defend in
the current intellectual climate and does not break away from the Neoplatonist tendency to instrumentalize the
present to a mere stage on the way to a higher endarguably the root of its oppressive tendencies.26 Haraway's
suggestion that we revision the world "as a coding trickster with whom we must learn to converse"27giving up the
quest for mastery and searching for fidelity, knowing that we will be hoodwinkedsuggests the lighthearted attitude
of a domesticated postmodernism that has ceased to challenge the existing order.
The synthesis of these two thinkers does unite aspects of modernism and postmodernism, but it is questionable
whether these are the most important aspects to unite. It embraces one of the most dubious feature of modernism,
the belief in cosmic purpose, while offering nothing comparable to Habermas's attempt to restore the power of
reason to judge existing social institutions. This, in my view, is symptomatic of the weakness of this synthesis as a
basis for appropriating the achievements of both modernity and antimodernity while transcending their limitations.
It does not yet provide a strong enough basis for confronting the destructive imperatives and current crises of the
existing global economic, social, and political system.
The Significance of Narratives

What alternative is there? My contention is that Lyotard, by focusing on narratives in general and grand narratives
in particular, has identified a vital dimension of culture, a dimension that facilitates a fuller understanding of both
the constructive and destructive aspects of modernity. While it makes possible a
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deeper appreciation of the force of antimodernist (including deep ecologist and postmodernist) arguments against
modernity, an understanding of the nature of narratives in general and grand narratives in particular points the way
to overcoming the oppressive effects of modernity without abandoning its emancipatory project.
Since its origin in ancient Greece there has been a debate within European philosophy between those who have
taken abstract thought as the way to the one, true reality, and those who in reaction to this have defended the
senses, the particular, becoming, emotion, difference, the perspectival nature of knowledge, conflict, and action.
Platonism in its many forms has defended abstractions as the true reality, and the culture of modernity can be
regarded as a permutation of Platonism. Antimodernist philosophies, including postmodernism and
poststructuralism, continue the tradition of anti-Platonism. Generally, they have defended the particular and the
primacy of sense experience over universal abstractions, and becoming over being. Correspondingly they have
extolled emotion or feeling against abstract principles, art against science, and practice (or praxis) against theory,
arguing that all knowledge is perspectival.
Narratives occupy a peculiar middle ground between the particular and the universal, between sense experience
and abstractions, between emotion and principles, between art and science, and between practice and theory; they
also allow a diversity of perspectives to be represented and related to each other. Narratives, whether mythical,
historical, or fictional, are preeminently concerned to grasp particulars and conflicts between different forces and
projects; and they evoke emotions and orient people for action. But in doing so, they can deploy concepts at many
levels of abstraction and have a significance that transcends their immediate reference.
These qualities of narrative are most clearly revealed by the phenomenological narratology of Paul Ricoeur and
David Carr. 28 Although they differ in details, Ricoeur and Carr see people as already living out inchoate
narratives that prefigure explicitly formulated narratives. It is this prefiguration that enables them to understand and
construct new emplotments to configure a diversity of events and actions into a narrative unity. Such constructed
narratives create quasi worlds of characters and events that distance people from their worlds and the lives they are
living, allowing them to embrace the new narrative emplotments and refigure their worlds and their lives. This
refiguration can be of their lives as individuals or as members of groups, and narratives can refigure the lives of a
diversity of individuals to form effective groups, ranging from informal small groups to communities, armies,
nations, or civilizations. Carr in
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particular makes the point that narrative structures are essentially action structures of both individuals and groups,
articulating large-scale actions into hierarchies of smaller actions. To be living out a narrative is to be striving to
realize a complex of interrelated projects.
Narratives do not merely represent or construe actions of one individual or collective agent, and need not be
confined to human agents. Narratives almost always portray conflicts between forces, agents, and goals and the
perspectives associated with these where the outcome is not predetermined. And as V. N. Volosinov (and M. M.
Bakhtin) pointed out, narratives can do more than present and highlight conflicts of perspectives; through
narratives, perspectives can be brought into dialogue with one another. 29 In this way narratives, both those which
are being lived out and those which merely have been constructed, can be contrasted, questioned, criticized,
evaluated, and reformulated. This possibility provides the basis for an alternative to Habermas's reconceptualization
of communicative rationality, and the basis for extending the scope of this rationality.
To begin with, narratives are central to all intellectual inquiry, enabling abstract ideas to be put into perspective
and judgedsomething that cannot be achieved through abstract ideas alone. People entering fields of abstract
inquiry such as logic, mathematics, or theoretical physics are able to situate themselves within the field, to
appreciate what has been achieved in the past and the problems that now must be addressed, and their significance,
by grasping the historical narrative of the field. Narratives also enable people to evaluate opposing ideas. As
Alasdair MacIntyre noted, major advances in science, advances that break all the old criteria of what counts as
science, such as Galilean or Einsteinian physics, can be appreciated as such only through the new narratives of past
science which they facilitate.30 Such narrative evaluations at the same time orient people for further research
efforts. Even ideas from radically different traditions in different cultures can be brought into relationship and
judged through narratives.31
Similarly, narratives provide the basis for judging between rival construals of situations associated with practical
engagements, for choosing between ways of living and between rival narratives. To judge between ways of living
is to judge between narrative figurations through which people are construing their world and living out their lives.
Judgment requires the elaboration of one of the narratives already being lived out or the configuration of a new
narrative to encompass and reveal both the achievements and the limitations of inconsistent alternatives. Such
narrative configurations can then refigure both the worlds and the actions of people in their everyday lives.
Narratives elaborated in this
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way, which provide people with an orientation to life, evoke their emotions, and provide them with goals to strive
for, are constructions that can always be brought into question. But they are not arbitrary constructions, and
choosing between them is a rational affair able to justify and elicit provisional commitment.
While narratives have the resources to orient people for both theoretical and practical engagements, relate
abstractions to particular situations, bring a diversity of perspectives into dialogue, and allow judgments to be
made between them, they do not always do so. Epic narratives, for instance, distance characters' actions and lives
from the lives of normal people and presuppose the unquestionable validity of one perspective. Epics are, to use
Bakhtin's terminology, "monologic." 32 And as Bakhtin wrote of monologism: "With a monologic approach (in its
extreme or pure form) another person remains wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another
consciousness. . . . Monologue manages without the other, and therefore to some degree materializes all reality.
Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word."33 The narrative of Christian redemption, while allowing that
ordinary people can have a significant place within it, also presupposes the unquestionable validity of one
perspective, taking this as an absolute truth and treating every person who does not share this narrative as an
obstacle to or an enemy of the one true goal.
The culture of modernity, based on the secularization of this Christian narrative, shares its monologic structure.
There is an assumption that there is one true perspective above all particular perspectives, and it also postulates one
true goal. This assumption is shared by every modernist, whether Catholic, Protestant, or scientific materialist,
social Darwinist, orthodox Marxist, or economic rationalist. It is also characteristic of the narratives defining most
nations and most modern ethnic groups. Such narratives are based on "identity" thinking, taking for granted that the
actors and their values have an absolute and immutable status in their own rightwhether the actors be the chosen
people, Christendom, humanity, the working class, or whatever. This provides an alternative diagnosis of the
problems of modernity. It is the monologic nature of the grand narratives of modernity that has entrenched
arborescent thinking and that has made modernity so oppressive to everything and everyone but the elect few.
If this is the case, then what is required to oppose the destructive tendencies of modernity is not the dissolution of
grand narratives and the fragmentation of discourses, nor the embracing of a monologic grand narrative that
culminates in a playful openness, but the creation of a "polyphonic" grand narrative which gives a place to rival
perspectives; a grand polyphonic narrative to re-
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place the existing monologic grand narratives. And given the power and resilience of grand narrativesas illustrated
by the revival by economic rationalists (or, more accurately, market fundamentalists) of the grand narrative of
global economic progressit would appear that the only way to counter the dominant grand narrative is by proposing
such an alternative capable of displacing it. A polyphonic grand narrative would have all the virtues of a
conception of history as a struggle for both human and animal emancipationwithout having to make any dubious
claims for cosmic purpose and a teleology preexisting history. Thereby it would avoid the tendency to reduce the
past and present, other life forms and other people, particularly those who do not share the grand narrative, to
instruments of the final project.
Toward a Reconstructive Postmodernist Deep Ecology

If such a grand narrative could be created, its potential would be enormous. This is evident from the success of
grand narratives in the past. The triumph of Christianity in Europe, the triumph of the Enlightenment in France and
the United States, and the triumph of Marxism in Russia and Chinaand the power of these movements
elsewherecan be fully understood only in terms of the grand narratives they proffered that oriented people and
organizations to the world and to each other, gave meaning and direction to people's lives, and evoked immense
efforts from people as participants in upholding the values and realizing the goals they projected. Only through
these grand narratives is it possible to understand how scattered, small groups of people were able eventually to
engender major cultural, social, and political movements that transformed civilizations. And this is what the deep
ecologists must strive, for the sake of humanity and for all life, to achieve in the present.
Constructing a polyphonic rather than a monologic grand narrative would have several virtues. It would address
simultaneously the arguments of poststructuralists against identity thinking, foundationalism, and the homogenizing
effects of modernity; provide the basis for overcoming the dualism between culture and nature; justify the
significance of diverse forms of life; and address the arguments of social ecologists, Habermas, and Zimmerman
against the tendency of antimodernists to abandon the emancipatory quest of modernity. It would then allow the
ideas of the poststructuralist postmodernists and the deep ecologists to be combined into a more effective political
force.
What would it mean to forge a new grand narrative? Developing a new grand narrative would not be just a matter
of formulating a story of the world with a new set of ultimate goals in terms of which all other goals and claims to
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knowledge could be evaluated. A grand narrative, to be successful, is a contender for integrating civilization and,
ultimately, the whole of humanity. To be successful, it must be embraced, and to be embraced, it must be believed.
To begin with, a grand narrative is a history of the past that must prove itself by being more accurate and more
profound than its rivals. Mainstream Western culture, celebrating the triumph of market mechanisms, economic
individualism, science, and technology, on the one hand, and Marxism, seeing the present and the ideas dominating
it as the outcome of class struggle, on the other, have competed ferociously over their alternative construals of the
past in their efforts to demonstrate the greater credibility of each grand narrative and associated images of the
future. Environmental historians along with antimodernist historians have made great strides in reconstruing the
past of the world, highlighting the effects of the rise of agricultural societies, then civilizations and finally
European civilization, capitalism and industrialization, on ecosystems and other species and on subjugated females,
societies, cultures, and civilizations. 34
Even the perspectives of nonhuman organisms are being granted a place in such narratives.35 There is no reason
why the agents of narratives cannot be nonhuman or even inanimate; there can be natural histories as well as
histories of human actors, and all living beings as actors can be represented as having their own perspectives on
the world. Conceiving living beings in such terms inevitably changes our attitude toward them. The real force of
Aldo Leopold's writings, which have continued to elicit concern for all living beings, is their capacity to evoke the
perspectives of different animals.36 It is at least partly through appreciating perspectives of other cultures and
other organisms that their intrinsic significance is coming to be recognized and appreciated.
Such histories, by revealing the blindness of previous histories and rediscovering and revealing the force of
previously suppressed ideas, facilitate a new understanding of the present and, along with this, provide the
foundation for projecting an alternative vision of the future worth striving for: a civilization that, while promoting
human welfare, would allow ecosystems and diverse species, societies, and cultures to flourish. For such a vision
to be adopted by people, a vast number of more specific narratives would have to be reformulated to accord with it.
The most important of these would be narratives defining nations, their pasts and futures, and narratives defining
the research traditions of philosophy, history, and the natural and human sciences. However, more specific and
more local narratives would also need to be reformulated to enable individuals to relate their particular lives to this
new complex of narratives and to the new grand narrative.
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A polyphonic grand narrative would transcend the opposition between objectivism and relativism. While
monologic grand narratives presuppose the existence of and access to an absolute perspective, and construct
identities from this perspective as immutablewhich identities in turn provide support to the absolute
perspectivepolyphonic narratives accept that all claims to knowledge are perspectival. But as we have seen, instead
of drawing relativist conclusions from this, polyphonic narratives represent diverse, self-developing perspectives
and bring these into relationship. In so doing, they are able to move toward less limited perspectives. A polyphonic
grand narrative would have a rhizome structure and represent a great diversity of perspectives, allowing all these to
challenge each other so that whichever one was taken to be the most promising, would be taken so only
provisionally, on the assumption that it would be open to further challenges in the future. It also would be assumed
that people in their everyday lives would be included as participants in this narrative and would be free to
challenge it and participate in its reformulation. A narrative of world history constructed on polyphonic lines would
strive not merely to evaluate the past from a favored perspective of the present, but also to comprehend the world,
including the present, from the perspectives of past cultures and traditions of research as well as the perspectives
of existing rival cultures and traditions of thought, and to recognize the challenge of these to the favored
perspective.
The tendencies toward domination and homogenization of monologic grand narratives would be opposed by a
polyphonic grand narrative that, by acknowledging its own limitations and the claims of other points of view,
would promote the development of diverse local perspectives in order to reveal its own blind spots, and then
encourage challenges to it from these perspectives. This encouragement of diversity would not imply that local
perspectives, claims to knowledge, and narratives could not be criticized and even attacked from the broader
perspective of the grand narrative. A polyphonic grand narrative would encourage cultural diversity, then strive to
bring this diversity of perspectives into dialogue. 37
This would involve acknowledging what has been achieved by modernity as well as criticizing it. Rationality would
then not be attenuated but reformulated as relational or "dialogical," and thereby strengthened. The cultivation of
participation in the criticism and reformulation of received narratives would be a major goal of a polyphonic grand
narrative and, along with providing people with the means to live out the narratives they have subsequently
committed themselves to, should be regarded as an essential component of the quest to emancipate people from
irrationality.38
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The identities constituted by such a grand narrative and its subnarratives, including the narratives of nations,
communities, and individual lives, would always be recognized as relational and provisional, as identities in
process of becoming, always acknowledging their inevitable limitations and subject to perpetual questioning and
reformulation. 39 Rather than "self-realization," implying a preexisting immutable "self" (of an individual,
community, nation, civilization, or whatever) that is to be realized, what is called for by polyphonic narratives is a
creative response by socially situated individuals, groups, institutions, and societies to the uniqueness of their
situations and their potentialities by continually reformulating, through dialogue, their narratives. Such narratives
call for self-creation of individuals, organizations, societies, and civilizations to become semiautonomous
participants in the becoming of the world.
However, more is required of a new, polyphonic grand narrative than to overcome the deficiencies of modernism
and antimodernism, and to reconcile and support poststructuralist and deep ecologist perspectives. It should also
make opponents of the dominant grand narrative more politically effective. As I have suggested, merely linking
deep ecology and postmodernism could strengthen both. The environmental crisis manifest in the increasing risks
that individuals and organizations have to confront in everyday life is undermining the legitimacy of existing
institutions. When the ideas of the poststructuralists are seen as a response to this situation, their work can be
appreciated for exposing the way the existing social order has been reproduced, overcoming the frozen dualisms of
the culture of modernity and revealing what kinds of political action can be taken that will not reproduce or
strengthen the existing order. What is required, as Deleuze and Guattari have suggested, is a nomadic politics. This
concurs with the kind of political action called for by Arne Naess. However, such action could easily end up
dissipating into almost powerless pressure group politics without some coherence and longer-term vision by its
agentsand this appears increasingly likely within the new globalized economy coordinated by a reinvigorated grand
narrative of economic growth. For this reason, such politics needs to be coordinated by an alternative polyphonic
grand narrative projecting an alternative vision of the future of the whole of humanity and of nature.
Notes
1. An excellent short summary of Herder's ideas is Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of
Ideas (London: Chatto and Windus, 1980). On Herder's con-
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ception of nature, see H. B. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science (Cambridge: Modern
Humanities Research Association, 1970).
2. Arne Naess, ''The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary," Inquiry 16:1 (1973):
95 100.
3. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, translated and edited by David Rothenberg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 84.
4. This is analyzed in Arran E. Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis (London and New York:
Routledge, 1995), chapter 2.
5. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by Geoff Bennington and
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxvi.
6. Ibid., p. 60.
7. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., edited by Gerald Graff (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.
93.
8. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberiam (New York: Zone Books,
1991), p. 115. This statement is made in an afterword written in 1988.
9. Ibid., p. xiii.
10. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 18f.
11. See Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, pp. 86ff.
12. This is argued in Arran E. Gare, Nihilism Inc. (Sydney: Eco-Logical Press, 1996), chapter 16.
13. Félix Guattrai, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, translated by Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 200.
14. From an interview with Jacques Pain in The Guattari Reader, edited by Gary Genosko (Oxford: Blackwell,
1996), p. 132.
15 It should be noted at this point that, of those French philosophers designated as poststructuralists, only Lyotard
has aligned himself with the postmodernists, and Guattari, identifying postmodernism with Lyotard's philosophy,
has attacked it. See Pierre-Félix Guattari, "The Postmodern Impasse," in The Guattari Reader, pp. 109 113.
16. The extent of this is revealed by Andrew Rowell in Green Backlash: Global Subversion of the Environment
Movement (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
17. Michael E. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1994), p. 6.
18. Ibid., p. 180.
19. On this, see Robert A. Pois, National Socialism and the Religion of Nature (London and Sydney: Croom Helm,
1986).
20. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future, pp. 181f.
21. See Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, chapter 2.
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22. Ibid., pp. 171ff.
23. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1987).
24. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future, p. 365, citing Donna Haraway, "The Promises of Monsters," in
Cultural Studies, edited by Lawrence Grossberg et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 296 (italics in original).
25. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future, p. 373.
26. On this theme, see Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol. 1; The Founders, translated by P. S.
Falla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
27. Haraway, "The Promises of Monsters", p. 298, quoted by Zimmerman in Contesting Earth's Future, p. 365.
28. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 vols., translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellaver (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984 1985); and David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991).
29. V. N. Volosinov analyzed the way utterances report the utterances of others in part III of Marxism and the
Philosophy of Language ([1929] Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). M. M. Bakhtin developed his
concept of the "polyphonic" narrative in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, edited and translated by Caryl Emerson
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
30. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science," Monist 60
(1977): 459 460, 467.
31. On this, see Arran E. Gare, "Understanding Oriental Cultures," Philosophy East and West 45:3 (1995):
308 328.
32. See M. M. Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel," In his The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, translated by Caryl
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
33. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, pp. 292f.
34. There are now too many works contributing to this to be listed.
35. A fictional narrative of human history from the perspective of a rat has been offered by Günter Grass in The
Rat, translated by Ralph Manheim (London: Pan Books, 1988).
36. See Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949).
37. As Bakhtin argued for in "Response to a Question from Novy Mir," in his Speech Genres and Other Late
Essays, translated by Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), p. 7.
38. This idea is developed more fully in Gare, Nihilism Inc., chapter 16, where it is shown to connect with notions
of justice, duty, and integrity, and is elaborated as a political philosophy.
39. The distinction between narrative identity of this sort and the identity of an immutable substance, the kind of
identity attacked by poststructuralists, is analyzed by Paul Ricoeur in "The Self and Narrative Identity," in his
Oneself as Another, translated by Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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11
Deep Ecology and Desire:
On Naess and the Problem of Consumption
Jonathan Maskit
In what follows I do not try to prove anything.
Arne Naess 1
Philosophy in the twentieth century has undergone a number of shifts and transformations. Diverse as these
movements have been, what unites almost all of them is their character, whether explicitly stated or not, as post-or
antimetaphysical. We need think only of phenomenology's embrace of embodiment, the logical positivists' (and
their followers) analysis of logic and language, Marxism's emphasis on materiality, the various strains of
postmetaphysical thinking ushered in by Nietzsche and, in his footsteps, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida,
Richard Rorty's revival of pragmatism, or Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics. The roots of much of this
transformation lie in Kant's critical philosophy, where he demarcated a set of questions about which we should not
ask (for they cannot be answered philosophically but only by faith). These four cosmological questionsthe
existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the creation of the world, and the freedom of the willconstitute the
core of the "Dialectic of Pure Reason," and each has an antinomy dedicated to it. We might add to these four, two
further contributions Kant makes to the "completion" of metaphysics. First, he sets aside questions of the ultimate
nature of reality by positing the split between phenomena and noumena. Second, he radically reconfigures our
understanding of human consciousness, replacing the Cartesian trope of subject as substance with a new idea of
subject as process (or set of processes). Whatever the virtues or faults of Kant's particular philosophical views, one
thing can be said with certainty: The Copernican turn transformed philosophy for good. "Metaphysics," after Kant,
is something of a dirty word.
Is deep ecology postmetaphysical? Does it refrain from making ultimate claims about the nature of the self and that
of the universe? Hardly. In 1989 Jim Cheney accused deep ecology, primarily in its versions developed by
Warwick
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Fox and Bill Devall and George Sessions, of being metaphysical in general and Stoic in particular. 2 He argued
that the neo-Stoicism of radical environmentalism lies in its dependence on a particular notion of the self and the
development of that self through processes of identification with the greater universe. It is not my concern here to
investigate Cheney's claim (although I think it not without merit), but to engage with deep ecology, particularly as
developed in the work of Arne Naess, at the level of a different sort of Stoicism and a different sort of
metaphysics. What my argument has in common with Cheney's is that both take place at the level of the self.
Unlike Cheney, however, I am concerned with the problem of desire in deep ecology. For a philosophical
movement which takes its primary goal to be the transformation of human practice, it would seem that the role of
desire would play a central role. And yet, discussions of desire seem to be entirely lacking in Naess's writings.
In what follows, I begin with a discussion of economics and consumption in Naess's work. I here introduce the
importance of desire and begin to draw out some of the connections between reduction of consumption and Naess's
views on subjectivity. The role of subjectivity is important because it is on this terrain that the philosophical debate
between reason and desire has traditionally been fought. Reduction of desire is a necessary, if not a sufficient,
condition for reduction of consumption, especially if such reduction in consumption is to be something other than a
hardship (and Naess clearly sees the change he envisions as not even pleasure-neutral but joyful). It is here that
Kant, perhaps the thinker who dedicated the most thought to the relationship between reason and desire, is first
brought into play. I then turn to several investigations of the relationships between consumption, desire, and reason,
first in the "Platform of Deep Ecology" and then in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. It is here that the
connections between the "Platform" and Ecosophy T are seen to be more abiding than Naess sometimes thinks.
The final section suggests a Kantian solution by invoking politics as a mediator between reason and desire.
Economics and Consumption

Fundamental to deep ecology, from Naess's earliest elucidation of it in 1973, is the idea that deep ecology, unlike
shallow or reform environmentalism, is concerned with the entirety of the Earth's human population (as well as the
biosphere as a whole) and is not narrowly focused on preserving the "affluence of people in the developed
countries."3 There are only two possible implications of this. One is that deep ecology is concerned with the
affluence of all people. The other is a rejection of material affluence as a good worth preserving. It is clear from
Naess's later work that he meant the latter.
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The "Platform Principles of the Deep Ecology Movement" (commonly known as the eight points), which Naess
developed with George Sessions, indicates this quite clearly. 4 Those principles assert that among those things
which must be changed are "ideological structures." Naess and Sessions elaborate as follows: "The ideological
change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to
an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and
great." In their comments on the principles, they remark that "Some economists criticize the term 'quality of life'
because it is supposed to be vague. But on closer inspection, what they consider to be vague is actually the non-
quantitative nature of the term. One cannot quantify adequately what is important for the quality of life as
discussed here, and there is no need to do so." It is clear why Naess and Sessions refrain from elaborating on what
is meant by quality of life: Naess is a kind of pluralist who has no great desire to dictate to others either what their
philosophy should be or what their lifestyle should be. Of course, this pluralism has its limits: Once one has
accepted the eight points, there will necessarily be limits on one's lifestyle (and perhaps on one's philosophical
views as well). Those limits are to be brought about through one's reasoned acceptance of the eight points.
In his most comprehensive work on deep ecology, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Naess devotes a good
amount of time to discussing two issues often left out of accounts by other deep ecologists: economics and
consumption. He describes our environmental predicament concisely: "A synopsis of what it is which makes the
situation so critical could read: An exponentially increasing, and partially or totally irreversible environmental
deterioration or devastation perpetuated through firmly established ways of production and consumption and a
lack of adequate policies regarding human population increase."5 The human environmental crisis (and let us be
clear that this is a human problem, at least in the sense that humans are the only ones worrying about it or capable
of doing anything about it) is, Naess claims, primarily one of population and economics. In other words, this is
first and foremost a political problem. As we will see later, the political is linked with the personal for Naess in a
way for which he sometimes does not fully account.
Naess's critique of economics is linked with the question of the nature of progress in industrial civilization. It is
further linked to questions of politics and policy, since so much of political life today is given over to maintaining
the economic status quo. Politics and policy will be discussed at greater length below. For the moment, the focus
will remain on economics (although always with the awareness that economics and politics are not separable even
if disciplinary lines might lead us to think otherwise).
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If we accept that an ever-increasing standard of living, measured in consumption of goods and services, is the sole
criterion of the good life, then it follows that criticism of such consumption must result in a form of denial. If
consuming more is what makes life good, then consuming less (denying oneself things one needs for the good life)
must be bad. It is for this reason that Naess desires to bring to the fore the question of the status of the modifier
"good" in phrases like "the good life": "What seems to better the material prerequisites for 'the good life' is given
priority without asking if life is experienced as good." 6 This ideology of production and consumption is not, Naess
claims, simply a reflection of the way people are. What pass for needs are the result of much hard work on the part
of, among others, the advertising business: "A great deal of available mental energy within economic life is used to
create new so-called needs and entice new customers to increase their material consumption. If it were not,
economic crisis and unemployment would soon be upon us, or so it is said."7 (I will have more to say about
advertising and desire-formation more generally below.)
From the standpoint of traditional economicsthe standpoint of growth in both production and consumptionNaess's
call for rethinking priorities can only sound threatening (a fact of which he is well aware). What is clear to the
economic apologist is that certain things cannot be changed; it is equally clear to the environmentalist that some of
those very same things must be changed: "Within such a well-oiled system, a revision of value standards in favour
of all-round experiential values, life quality rather than standard of living, must sound like a dangerous proposition.
We have 'progressed' to the point where the objectives of the good life must be considered threatening; we are
intricately implicated in a system which guarantees short-term well-being in a small part of the world through
destructive increases in material affluence."8 For Naess this dispute between the economy and ecology must be
settled on the side of ecology.9 But how is this to be accomplished?
Rather than seeing the situation as one of conflict (although he acknowledges that this is real), Naess sees our
current environmental situation as an opportunity for real social change. Such opportunities, if not seen for what
they are, slip by ungrasped. Naess's ecophilosophical and exhortatory texts are designed (a) to make this situation
clear, (b) to move us to grasp this opportunity, and (c) to give us reason to do so. Insofar as most of his readers are
already convinced of the need for change, the first task is not so difficult. The second and third are where
difficulties arise. The second task is accomplished in texts like the "Platform of Deep Ecology," "Intrinsic Value:
Will the Defenders of Nature Please Rise," and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle.10 The third task is to be
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accomplished by the various developments of Ecosophy T. What interests me here is the relationship between tasks
(b) and (c) in regard to the issues of consumption and desire.
Consumption for Naess is something to be reduced. Of course! The problem is how. There are places in Naess's
work where reducing consumption is claimed to be straightforward. In fact, it sounds easy: "What is ecosophically
'best' for somebody relates to their [sic] total view. If a camera is said to be much better than yours, it may
nevertheless be much worse for you. It may not be sensible to buy it, and the ecosopher will then not feel any
regret at not possessing it." 11 I will return to this below, for I believe it evidences a certain understanding of the
relationship between reason and desire that, even if well-grounded in much of the history of philosophy, is not so
clearly right. This understanding of the relation of reason and desire echoes that commonly attributed to Plato (and
at least implied by the Meno's discussion of virtue as a form of knowledge): to know the good is to do the good.
One way to frame the central question of this essay is whether this is true in general and, more important, whether
it is true in the case of desire for material goods.
If at some times Naess makes reduction of consumption sound easy, at others he seems to acknowledge that
changing established patterns of consumption and production is a monumental task. Even with ecological
knowledge, environmentalists "have not been able, and partly not even willing, to change the ways of production
and consumption. These are secured by the inertia of dominant ideas of growth, progress, and standard of living.
These ideas manifest as firm attitudes and habits, are powerful agencies preventing large-scale, long-range
changes."12 These attitudes and habits are manifestations of economic ideology within psychological structures of
desire. As the history of Marxism makes clear, unmasking structures of ideology at the societal level is ineffective
if the manifestations of those structures at the level of the psyche remain untouched. Put simply, rational
"unmasking" seems to be peculiarly ineffective in the face of psychic life.13
I take it that restructuring psychic life so that it more closely accords with the truth of the world is part of the goal
of the process of Self-realization as outlined in Ecosophy T.14 In other words, the goal of realizing one's place as
merely part of the world-Self is both to unmask structures of ideology (the myth of the self-subsistent individual,
the ideology of economic progress, the mechanistic worldview, etc.) and to rationally restructure one's psychic
manifestation so that these ideologies are no longer operative from "within" one. The problem for Naess seems to
be one of simply asserting our (rational?) wills, of removing the imprimatur we have tacitly or otherwise given to
the status quo. The whole
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structure of Ecosophy T thus rests on a metaphysics of the subject (about which Naess is quite open). This
metaphysics of the subject may explain why, while Naess has a fair amount to say about consumption, nowhere in
his work (as far as I am aware) does the word desire even appear. 15 Within Ecosophy T, the processes of Self-
realization simply lead to a withering away of desire altogether. The problem pointed to here simply cannot arise.
When presented with an account of the subject such as that found in Ecosophy T, it is not unreasonable to ask
whether it is true or not. In other words, has Naess given us a true (or at least believable) account of what it is to
be a human being? I shall challenge the picture he presents by taking up the (quite traditional) question about the
relationship between reason and desire. A second set of questions may arise here as well, but only after the first
objection has been satisfactorily met. Unlike the first, theoretical, question, the second is practical: How should one
(we) go about achieving the transition from selves to aware parts of the world-Self? Obviously, if the first question
is answered negatively (i.e., if the account of the self is found to be insufficient), the second never arises. I shall
here attempt only to give a provisional answer to the first question and will leave the practical question aside.
Trying to figure out the proper relationship between reason and desire has a long philosophical tradition. In general
the problem for philosophy (as well as for much of Western theology, which is, of course, linked to philosophy)
has been to demonstrate how it is possible or even necessary for desire to succumb to reason's demands (usually as
evidenced in the rational will). Plato's claim that to know the good is to do the good (a claim that immediately
effaces the problem) has been met with differing degrees of incredulity over the years. While it is not my purpose
here to investigate the validity of Plato's claim, it stands as an interesting illustration of how easily we can dismiss
what others (e.g., Nietzsche) have seen as a dogged problem. Kant, while fundamentally in agreement with Plato
that reason ought to control desire, does not see things as nearly as straightforward as Plato had.
For Kant, actions motivated pathologically (from desire) can never be pure moral actions, yet they nevertheless
form the great bulk of what we do. Critique of Practical Reason sought to demonstrate the reality of the free
(rational) will, while Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Metaphysics of Morals both seek to show the
will's superiority over desire. Despite having demonstrated the real possibility of moral action (i.e., of the rational
will reining in desire), Kant knew that there could not remain a strict disjuncture between reason and desire. If
morality (reason) and happiness (desire) remain disjunct, then there is no grounds for even hoping morality could
become real in the world. Kant thus proposes, in Critique of Judgment, to close the gap and to show how,
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at least some good part of the time, rational moral actions can lead to happiness. In other words, Kant sets out to
demonstrate that, at least theoretically, there is a way to make the satisfaction of desire compatible with the
demands of rational morality.
Even if he believed he had demonstrated the real possibility of overcoming the problem of reason and desire at the
level of transcendental philosophy, the same problem remained at a different level for Kant. The picture of
morality presented in the critical philosophy is, at best, a rational reconstruction. It is not how morality is, but
merely how it ought to be (and is, in this sense at least, a sort of metaethics). Even if the critical philosophy is
often taken to be the crowning achievement of the German Enlightenment, Kant himself remained sanguine about
the possibility of making real the picture of moral action he himself had developed. He famously remarks in Idea
for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View that "From such crooked wood as man is made of,
nothing perfectly straight can be built." 16 What sense can be made of this but that the bridging of the gap between
reason and desire is not something that can be accomplished? Nevertheless, we must work toward closing the gap.
The problem thus becomes one of enlightenment: How can we help people to attain the autonomy in reality that we
know in principle they (ought to) have? Kant's answer was straightforward: In the interests of autonomy the state
ought to make people act as they would if they really were autonomous. I will have more to say about Kant and
deep ecology below.
The question here is what the relationship between reason and desire is for Naess and deep ecology. In some sense
Naess is a pseudo Platonist: from Self-realization will (necessarily) flow transformed action. The fundamental
difference between Plato and Naess is that the former saw the cultivation of reason as the practice which will curb
desire, while the latter sees the development of self as leading to a transformation, perhaps even a withering away,
of desire. For Plato desire is reined in but never eradicated; for Naess it seems simply to go away. But the Naessian
reconfiguration of the strife between reason and desire is more complex still. The entire program of Self-realization
calls into question where the boundaries of self lie, so that in a sense the withering away of desire that
accompanies Self-realization can present itself as a new form of ethical egoism. When I come to see that there is
more to me than I had previously believed, I will come to care for all parts of my Self.17 Naessian deep ecology
becomes not care of the other (which we find in Gilligan's ethic of care as developed in ecofeminism) but care of
the self.18
Ecosophy T, the detailed development of the intuition "Self-realization!" into a complete deep ecological system,
seems to me to be metaphysical to the core and dependent upon a notion of self, acceptance of which requires a
leap
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of faith. As such it cannot form the basis for a widely accepted philosophical position. None of this would be a
great problem if it were simple to heed Naess's oft-repeated advice: Ecosophy T is his way of developing the basic
insights of deep ecology (all of which can be found, he insists, in the eight points) and should not be taken as the
only or even the best way of developing those basic insights. But what I will argue below is that Ecosophy T is not
so easily separated from the eight points. In fact, it is hard to see how they are separable at all.
Consumption and Desire

The eight points (basic principles, "Platform of Deep Ecology") are by now well-known and well-circulated. That
they are thoroughly read or often discussed is not so clear. Given Naess's insistence that it is these eight points
which form the core of deep ecology, they warrant scrutiny. 19 While a detailed exegesis of the principles would
take a good amount of time, it is worth noting that the principles are couched in terms of value and of rights.
Beginning with an assertion of the intrinsic value of both human and other life, they pass through the rights that
follow from this value, through the duties that are implied by those rights, and end up with both a politics and an
ethics (in the rich sense of practice) which reflect these rights, duties, and values. Consumption appears only in a
masked form. Principle 3 claims that "Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity [of life] except to
satisfy vital needs." Principle 7 runs thus: "The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There
will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great." Finally, principle 8 claims that "Those who
subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary
changes."
Here we see clearly, without any of the mechanisms of Ecosophy T or Self-realization, that an awareness of the
intrinsic value of all life leads to (or is claimed to lead to) our having a duty to respect the right to a continued
existence of all creatures which contribute to this value (unless we have vital needs to fulfill). We see further that
not only do we not have the right to interfere, we must undertake a transformation of our lifestyles to ones which
are not dependent upon consumption in the same way. That is what I take the transition from "standard of living"
to "quality of life" to signify. Finally, we have a political and personal program that entails changing who we are
and how things are structured at both societal and individual levels.
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Nowhere in the eight points do we find any discussion of Self-realization. What is clearest from the eight points is
that deep ecology is fundamentally a political and economic theory which necessitates an ethics. The primary
action deduced from the principle of intrinsic value is a transformation of policy grounded in a change in ideology.
What Ecology, Community and Lifestyle makes clear is that the transformations in policy and consciousness (which
is what I take the transformation in ideology to come down to) happen together. One cannot happen without the
other, and neither can happen first. What this means is that, pace Naess, something like Ecosophy T, if not
Ecosophy T itself, is a necessary component of deep ecology. 20 Put simply, while changing policies may be the
true practical core of deep ecology (and the great amount of time dedicated to it in Ecology, Community, and
Lifestyle suggests that it is), it is nevertheless essential that there be transformations of consciousness as well.21
Desire and Self-Realization

As suggested above, the metaphysics of the subject found in Ecosophy T is an attempt to rewrite the philosophical
problematic of reason and desire. While the gap between what we want to do and what we believe we ought to do
may be neatly narrowed (or perhaps sidestepped) by Ecosophy T, it isn't clear that this is ultimately successful
without paying a rather high metaphysical price. The basic norm of Ecosophy T, Self-realization, is in some real
sense ungroundable (that's what it means to be a basic norm). One either shares the basic insightthat the ego-self is
but a part of the world-Selfor one does not. For those who do not share this intuitionand I number among them the
vast majority of people living in the West todaywhat is needed is something like a conversion experience. Through
the right sorts of activities one will come to see the truth of this position.22
Leaving aside the obvious (practical) difficulties of bringing this about, there remain two related difficulties with
this claim. The first asks whether this is a true account of subjectivity.23 We might take this to be a theoretical
problem. The second difficulty asks whether the relationship between reason and desire presented here is right. In
effect it asks whether it is so clear that transformations in our understanding of who we are and how we are related
to the rest of the world will lead to alterations in practice (leaving aside the claim that they will lead to the ''right"
changes in practice). This seems to be more of a practical difficulty.
As for the first difficulty, there are sufficiently many alternative accounts of selfhood or subjectivity in the history
of human thought to give us pause before
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accepting any one as right. The burden of proof is on the deep ecologist to show that, appearances notwithstanding,
the self really is part of a larger whole and that what it means to realize the self is to come to see the connections
between the narrow ego-self and the larger world-Self. To be fair, it is hard to see what would count as evidence
here, since there are no obvious "facts" to be appealed to; testimonials are, as ever, suspect; and the sorts of
arguments offered for the rightness of this view must (apparently) begin with the assumption of that which is to be
shown. 24 Perhaps what this means is that we, as philosophers, choose our accounts of selfhood largely (or even
entirely) for pragmatic reasons: What account of selfhood can serve to authorize the sort of practical changes we
envision?25
Because it is the second difficulty that interests me more, I am willing to grant the first point (albeit with one
caveat). I accept for the sake of argument that the principle of Self-realization and the understanding of Self it
relies upon are a true description of the world. The caveat is this: Between selves as we know them and Self
understood as the end point of Self-realization, there must be some process of making real what has only been
potential (i.e., realization). The importance of this caveat is that it makes explicit what is at best only implicit in
much deep ecological literature. It is not simply a question of realizing that one is part of a larger Self and
thenboom!one's practices are transformed. The process of Self-realization is presumably a slow, gradual, and messy
one, replete with backsliding, failures to achieve in practice what seemed to be already done cognitively, and so on.
The task of coming to be oneself ison almost any understanding of the selfnot a quick and simple one.26
Granting (for the moment, at least) that Self-realization is a messy affair, what light does this shed on the problem
at hand? Presumably this: The evidence for progress in Self-realization is to be found in transformations in
practice. Without transformations in practice, of course, Self-realization is ecologically ineffective. But it is not
inconceivable that we might find ourselves stuck partway down the path of Self-realization. We might think of the
many people today who describe themselves as environmentalists (even deep ecologists) who drive (often very
short distances) to work, continue to eat mass-produced food-stuffs, and so on. It is one thing to see that one is
engaged in self-destructive behavior (and many of our practices are self-destructive on almost any understanding
of the self); it is quite another to be able to change those behaviors.27 In other words, the practical effects of Self-
realization may lag behind the transformations in a way that Naess does not acknowledge. And, even worse, it is
conceivable that the practical effects of Self-realization might never occur for those who proceed far enough to see
interconnectedness but not to the point of the withering away of the ego-self.
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I left Kant aside with a promise to return to him. I do so now because I believe the good Königsberger can come to
our assistance here. It is often thought that Kant's ethics is a straightforward affair: We must simply know what is
right, and then we will do it (it is in this sense that Kant is thought to be an ethical Neoplatonist). The truth of the
matter is, as always, more complicated. Kant's ethical theory is an idealized, rational reconstruction of what ethics
would look like if human beings really were the sorts of rational beings that they are capable (in some sense) of
being. Humanity, Kant well knew, was not yet and would never be (fully) rational. His philosophy of history and
his occasional pieces on politics make it clear that the progress of history (if such progress there be) is a making
real of reason. 28
Kantian philosophy also is a form of self-realization (albeit quite different from Naess's). What Kant provides,
which Naess does not, is a worked-out bridge principle between a world in which reason is not yet real and one in
which it is. The role of the state, for Kant, is to force us to act as we would voluntarily if we really were rational
beings. And here we might wish to hesitate, since most of us, myself included, would not be willing to embrace
autocratic decision-making procedures to accomplish our goals. It matters how government comes to the policies
that shape behavior. Nevertheless, Kant's basic insight can help us make sense of Naess's intuition that political
change and change at the level of the self must occur simultaneously.
But the need for simultaneity is even stronger than Naess lets on. Policy changes are not simply for those who have
not yet undergone (or at least gotten under way with) the process of Self-realization. As I have argued,
transformations of self are, if real at all, likely to be gradual and messy. Policy changes are therefore needed to
force even those who "know better" to behave in a way commensurate with their beliefs. Without policy changes
we are unlikely to succeed in modifying our behaviors. Returning emphasis to politicswhich is, as mentioned
above, the real heart of Naess's deep ecologyhas a second advantage. It no longer makes the solution to
environmental problems appear as the responsibility of each individual by himself or herself. Collective action has
much to recommend it, not least of which is its ability to shift the burden of responsibility onto the collectivity. If
we leave policy aside, we will find people in the situation of having to resist their desires, and thus denying
themselves things that they really want (though not needed for physical happiness, such things may indeed be
essential for psychic well-being). This situation can be ameliorated through policies that act as an externalized will.
Standing in for the will that we don't have, they force us to act as we would if we were fully realized beings (i.e.,
beings capable not only of knowing better but also of acting on that knowledge).
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Part of the problem here is the increasingly pervasive presence of advertising in our culture. It is hard to imagine
that our desires for material possessions are in any sense "natural." Of course, it is not fair to blame advertising
alone for our desires. Peer pressure, our general media culture, and other forces surely play a role. And we should
be honest in admitting that desire for some material goods is certainly justified; central heating and indoor
plumbing are things it seems perfectly reasonable to desire. I focus on advertising not because it is solely
responsible for desire formation but because its whole raison d'être is desire formation. What Naess perhaps does
not see is that advertising does not simply work on us; it works in us. Who we are, in large part because more of us
are exposed to more advertising at earlier ages, is shaped by ads. The desires we have for newer, faster, and more
stuff are psychically real.
If deep ecology is to transform the world, and to do so in a way that is joyful rather than destructive, it must
address the reality of these desires and seek to work with them. It is not sufficient simply to claim that the desires
will wither away or will fall under the control of reason. We must pursue two avenues at once: we must address the
structures of desire formation (which is part of subject formation, after all) and we must work with the subjects we
know who struggle with the desires with which they find themselves. The great risk is that we serve to reinscribe
the sorts of subjects we are into new generations. We must address the structures of desire formation if we are to
move forward with the deep ecological program. And addressing this problem is clearly political. Individuals
cannot single-handedly face down the forces that make them who they are (although there is certainly room for
overcoming what one is to some degree). What is needed is an alteration of those forces themselves. 29
The political emphasis here has yet another advantage. Even if it turns out that Naess's metaphysics of the subject is
untrue, it can function as a foundational mythology: "Given that I am nowhere near a realized Self, but believing
that it would be better if the theory of Self-realization were true, I can support policies which make me act as if I
were a realized being." This, it seems to me, is far more in line with Naess's understanding of the role of Ecosophy
T as well. While he clearly believes the view of the subject propounded therein, as I pointed out above, he stresses
repeatedly that this is his way of doing things and that it forms no necessary component of deep ecology. If my
arguments have been convincing, this is not quite true. There must be some account of subject formation in order
to make sense of the politics of deep ecology (that is, personal change and political change always happen together
for Naess). Nevertheless, the current suggestion is that Ecosophy T and its guiding norm of Self-realization can
function not as the foundation of deep ecological practice but as a mythology which can help motivate people to
fight for policies they might not other-
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wise support. And those policies can function, at least in part, to change behaviors in ways that we can support,
even if we cannot change our own behaviors without the policy changes.
The open question that remains here, and this is one which will need to be addressed more and more, is as follows:
If the metaphysics of the self presented in Ecosophy T is not true, can the mythological presentation of this
metaphysics continue to function to guide policy over time? Assuming the right sorts of policy changes are
implemented, will the political will remain to keep them in place as they begin to take effect? We can well imagine
human population dropping, levels of consumption doing likewise, and so on, and this leading to an inability to
continue seeing environmental problems as serious. 30 What then? As the political will to address these problems
subsides (as it must if the metaphysics of the self is not true, and therefore Self-realization does not take place), we
can well imagine that the problems, or ones like them, will resurface. We can then imagine humanity having to
invent the ecological wheel repeatedly. It behooves us to give this issue some thought even if it is, at this point,
only a chimera.
Notes
I benefited greatly from conversations about this material with Steven Vogel and Barbara Fultner, the latter of
whom also provided invaluable feedback on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. Arne Naess, "Spinoza and Ecology," Philosophia (Israel) 7 (1977): 45.
2. Jim Cheney, "The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism," Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 293 325.
3. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary," Inquiry 16:1 (1973):
95.
4. Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith,
1985), pp. 69 73.
5. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, translated and edited by David
Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 23. Italics in original. (Hereafter cited as ECL.)
6. Ibid., pp. 24 25.
7. Ibid., p. 25.
8. Ibid.
9. An interesting philosophico-etymological analysis could be done here. "Ecology," of nineteenth-century origin
(and apparently coined independently in both Germany and the United States much as "ecofeminism" was coined
in both France and the United States in the early 1970s), was formed by combining the Greek words for home
(oikos) and for story or explanation (logos) yielding a term similar in structure to "biology" or
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"physiology." "Economy" is much older, actually rooted in the Greek oikonomos or household manager.
Oikonomos comes from oikos and nemein (to distribute or regulate). Nemein also yields nomos (law), which
signifies the elevation or codification of ordering in a regular structure. Although it is most likely that nemein
did not pass through nomos on the way to oikonomos, and the Greeks would likely not have heard law in
oikonomos, they would have heard regulation or ordering. While we speak highly of matters economical, for
the Greeks they were below the law (and certainly not worthy of logos). Indeed, an oikonomos was almost
certainly a slave. (My thanks to the classicist Timothy Hofmeister for his etymological and historical
assistance.)
10. Arne Naess, "Intrinsic Value: Will the Defenders of Nature Please Rise," in Wisdom in the Open Air: The
Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology, edited by Peter Reed and David Rothenberg (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 70 81.
11. ECL, p. 88.
12. ECL, pp. 87 88 (italics in original).
13. One could object that the two passages cited clearly operate at different levels. The first seems to show that
reduction of desire is easy at the personal level, whereas the second details the difficulty of doing so at the societal
level. This is not at all clear, for advertising and other large-scale economic manipulations clearly function at the
level of the psyche and make difficult exactly what had appeared to be easy there.
14. I follow Naess in distinguishing between "self" and "Self," where the former is the narrowly understood ego
and the latter is the greater whole of which the narrow ego is but a part. Naess sometimes illustrates this by
appealing to Spinoza, at others by reference to Gandhi and the notion of Atman. I sometimes will call "Self" the
"world-Self" in order to emphasize its difference from the ''self."
15. Even a postmodern ecophilosopher such as Arran Gare mentions desire only once in his Postmodernism and
the Environmental Crisis. But that one reference appears in an elucidation of Lacan; desire never resurfaces in the
discussion of Lacan and environmentalism. Arran E. Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis (London
and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 61.
16. In Immanuel Kant, On History, edited by Lewis White Beck, translated by Lewis White Beck, Robert E.
Anchor, and Emil L. Fackenheim (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 17 18.
17. I leave out of the discussion here the various pathologies of Self that might have to be dealt with. For example,
could one have made progress down the path of Self-realization yet engaged in Self-destructive behavior? I trust
not, but only because the Naessian structure of Self-realization carries with it a tacit understanding of health that
precludes, from the outset, any such pathology.
18. On ecofeminism and the ethic of care, see Deane Curtin, "Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care" and Roger J.
H. King, "Caring About Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment," both in Ecological Feminist Philosophies,
edited by Karen J. Warren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 66 81 and 82 96, respectively.
19. He makes this claim most recently in an interview. Andrew Light, "Deep Socialism?: An Interview with Arne
Naess," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 8:1 (March 1997): 69 85.
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20. It is not inconceivable that a large enough reduction in population would allow continued consumption at
present, perhaps even increasing, levels. However, insofar as we accept the principle of intrinsic value, even
radically reduced levels of human population could still choose between lifestyles that have greater or lesser
impacts on the lives of other beings.
21. I take this point to be uncontroversial. The essence of all social change takes place at both the level of the self
and the level of the group. What makes Ecosophy T different is that in some sense, it blurs this distinction.
Nevertheless, when Ecosophy T is asked to describe what social change looks like in practice, it turns out to look
very much like traditional bilevel transformation.
22. Much of the work by Devall and Sessions, as well as by Dolores LaChappelle, Warwick Fox, and David
Abram, is supposed to help people along the path to seeing things aright. But such seeing aright cannot be brought
about through argument; it must arise from experience. However, experience itself is a notoriously difficult thing to
appeal to, for it, too, depends on cultural presuppositions. The failure of most people to see the "truth" of deep
ecology's claim about the world is simply that they don't see it. When told that they need help with their vision
(which may be true independently), it is not unreasonable for them to ask why the vision of the deep ecologist is
better or truer than their own. See David Abram, "Merleau-Ponty and the Voice of the Earth," Environmental
Ethics 10 (1988): 101 120 and The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World
(New York: Pantheon, 1996); Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston: Shambhala, 1990);
Dolores LaChapelle, Earth Wisdom (Los Angeles: Guild of Tutors Press, 1978).
23. Alternative accounts are those offered by Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, and Michael Zimmerman, Contesting
Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) and "Possible
Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity" (in this volume).
24. Just as arguments against it apparently must begin with the assumption that the self is otherwise than is claimed
by Ecosophy T.
25. This is the view most commonly associated with Richard Rorty in, for example, his Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
26. If it were, there would be no need for philosophical ethics, psychotherapists, or any of a host of other practices
and institutions.
27. The various sorts of seemingly minor pathologies Freud pointed to as evidence of the death drive are
illustrative. Biting one's fingernails is a minor form of self-destruction. Nail-biters often want to stop but cannot.
The traditional philosophical explanation of such a phenomenon is weakness of the will. What I am suggesting is
that it is more like will-lessness than weakness of a present will. On the death drive, see Sigmund Freud, Beyond
the Pleasure Principle, translated by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989).
28. In this way Kant already sketches out the entire program of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The most
important of Kant's essays on this topic are collected in his On History. See especially "What Is Enlightenment?"
(pp. 3 10), "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (pp. 11 26), and "Perpetual Peace''
(pp.
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85 136). For a recent collection on the contemporary importance of Kant's work on history, progress, and
enlightenment, see James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds., Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's
Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
29. The growing presence of advertising in schools and the continuing commercialization of culture are worrisome.
At a recent performance by Opera Columbus, the audience was asked to applaud the bank that had underwritten the
production. They dutifully did so. Did no one notice the irony, since the opera was Faust?
30. Given that so many fail to see them as serious today, this should not take even a moderate stretch of the
imagination.
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12
Bhagavadgita *, Ecosophy T, and Deep Ecology
Knut A. Jacobsen
Ecosophy and the Hindu Religious Traditions

It is intriguing for anyone with some knowledge of the religious traditions constituting Hinduism to find that the
interconnected concepts of non-injury (ahimsa)* the oneness of all living beings (advaita), the self (atman*,
purusa*), and self-realization (moksa*) have become part of the vocabulary of environmental thought in Europe
and North America. These concepts were originally related to the attempt of the Hindu ascetics to free the self
from bondage to the material world, an effort that to some degree is the very opposite of the effort to integrate
humans into the natural world and to preserve the biotic communities which is being made by contemporary
environmental thinkers. The fact that there is a significant influence from the Hindu traditions of religion and
philosophy on the ecosophy of Arne Naess often goes unnoticed.1
The religious aspect of the ultimate premises of deep ecology (i.e., religious ecosophy) has been identified as
belonging to Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, and Native American religion, with no mention of Hinduism.2 It has,
however, been shown that there is a close connection between the ecosophy of Arne Naess and the idea of self-
realization as conceived by Mohandas K. Gandhi, about whom Naess has published several books.3 One of the
systems of Hindu religious thought, the Advaita Vedanta*, has also been mentioned as a significant Hindu
influence.4 In addition, Naess several times quotes the most popular religious text of Hinduism, the nonsectarian
Bhagavadgita (BhG), in support of deep ecology.
Most Hindus are followers of the traditions of devotion (bhakti) to a divine being, and many of these traditions are
heavily influenced by the BhG.5 The BhG has at times been read by Europeans and Americans somewhat
independent from its Hindu context, but Naess's lineage of Hindu authoritative teachers (guru-parampara*) starts
probably with Gandhi, for whom the BhG was the
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religious central text and "an infallible guide of conduct." 6 Naess quotes a verse from the BhG several times in his
texts about deep ecology. This verse is, according to Naess, "the most notable" of "several central statements" of
the BhG, "which can be considered to be the common denominator for large sections of Indian philosophy."7 The
verse (6.29) reads:
sarva-bhuta*-stham atmanam* sarva-bhutani catman*
iksate* yoga-yuktatma* sarvatra samadarsanah*.8
He who has yoked himself in discipline sees the same everywhere, he sees himself as in all beings and all
beings in himself.9
That he quotes the BhG shows both that this text is considered especially authoritative for Naess's ecosophy and
that this version of ecosophy considers itself to have ancient roots, perhaps even in Hinduism.10
Hindu systematic religious thought often expressed itself as commentaries on texts considered to contain
comprehensive and authoritative statements of the systems of thought, and there is a long tradition of commentaries
on the BhG. This essay investigates how these commentaries understood BhG 6.29 and compares their
understanding with the environmental interpretation. The classical commentaries were often composed by members
of religious, often monastic, orders who were occupied with the religious goal of liberation from rebirth (moksa*),
and they understood the text to teach the realization of freedom from the world. Meditation and asceticism were
seen as the means to self-realization.
During the Indian struggle for independence from colonial rule, the BhG became a textbook in political action, and
persons active in politics composed commentaries. For the politicians, liberation also meant realization within the
political and social order, of the goal of national independence and social justice. For Gandhi, the most famous
representative of this tradition, self-realization was attained in a combination of political action and asceticism. But
environmentalism teaches neither liberation from the world nor the ultimate value of the social order. On the
contrary, it has samsara* the world of the natural processes of birth, flourishing of life, decay, and death as
ultimate concern. How, therefore, can the Hindu scripture, the BhG, be called on in support of environmentalism?
What is the religious meaning of BhG 6.29, and how does it relate to ecosophy?
Bhagavadgita*
BhG constitutes chapters 23 40 of the Bhismaparvan* of the Mahabharata* but has long been treated as a separate
work. It recounts the dialogue between the
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god Krsna * and one of the Pandava* brothers, Arjuna, just before the beginning of the battle of Kuruksetra*
between the Pandavas and Kauravas. Arjuna was a ksatriya* (belonging to the warrior class), and it was therefore
his duty to fight wars. At the moment the BhG begins, he has a breakdown and wants to withdraw from the battle
because he feels that killing other humans would be wrong and would destroy the social order (dharma). The task
of Krsna in the text is to convince Arjuna that there is a higher order. This higher dharma is the knowledge of the
self as really a passive witness to the transformations of the material principle (prakrti*); the duty to perform the
activities pertaining to one's class (varna*), that is, the special duties of the brahmana* (ritual specialist), the
ksatriya (warrior), the vaisya* (trader, farmer, artisan, etc.), and the sudra* (servant); and the worship of Krsna.
The unique message of the BhG is that if one's duties are performed without attachment to the fruits of action (i.e.
without egoism), one is not bound to the world of rebirth (samsara*).
BhG, chapter 6, from which Naess quotes, is about disciplined meditation (yoga) as a means to self-realization.
Self-realization is the ultimate value or the most basic norm in Ecosophy T.11 BhG, chapter 6, combines self-
realization, non-duality, and restraint, and therefore reveals an affinity between the BhG and Ecosophy T, even
though environmentalism is not, of course, the purpose of the teaching of Krsna in the BhG. It describes the
disciplined person who realizes the self, merges with brahman and sees brahman in all beings by means of a
discipline (yoga) of sameness, indifference, or treating everyone alike (samya), that is, a certain type of self-
control.
The person possessed of such a discipline is said to be immovable, with subdued senses, the same in cold and heat,
unmoved by pleasure and pain. For him stones and gold, good and evil persons, are the same. He abides, solitary,
in a secret place and performs yoga exercises, such as fixing his thoughts on a single object, sitting (asana*),
gazing at the tip of the nose, fixing his thought organ on the self, thinking of nothing at all, and causes all thought
to come to rest. He realizes the peace of nirvana, the self, and becomes one with brahman or attains the touch of
brahman; sees himself in all beings and all beings in himself; and sees the same in all things. He sees Krsna in all
things and sees all things in Krsna, and adopts the belief of oneness. He sees that pleasure and pain of others are
the same in himself.
The chapter ends by saying that of all the disciplined persons (yogins), those who worship (bhajate) Krsna with
faith, are the most disciplined. This disciplined person bears a resemblance to the man of stabilized mentality
(sthitaprajña) described in chapter 2.54 72, the verses that Gandhi held contained the essence of the BhG. The
passage describes a person performing disciplined
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meditation with attention totally directed inward, a person who attains a state of meditation in which everything
has come to a standstill and all differentiation has disappeared.
Some Commentaries On Bhagavadgita * 6.29

Sankara*
The oldest Indian commentary now available on the BhG is Sankara's Advaitabhasya* The philosophy of Sankara
(ca. 700 750), called advaita (non-dual), is one of the systematic expressions of the tendency toward monism in
Hinduism. Among the six systems of Hindu philosophy, three are pluralist (Nyaya*, Vaisesika*, Purva* Mimarsa*)
and two are dualist (Samkhya*, Yoga). Several of the theological systems associated with Vedanta* believe in a
plurality of selves. Monism is therefore only one of the views, and should not be identified with Hindu systematic
thought as such. The basic statement of Hindu monism is that the self is identical with brahman, the substratum of
the world and ultimate reality. All beings share the same self. Everything is brahman in the sense that nothing can
exist apart from this principle. The plural world is understood as maya* an appearance, created by the lower
brahman (saguna* brahman, isvara*), who is not ultimately real, although he is real for all practical purposes. An
important implication for environmentalism of this advaita concept is, according to the ecosophy of Naess, that one
can identify with all beings because one's true identity is the same as theirs.12
However, since Naess both quotes Sankara and is said to be inspired by the Vedanta doctrine on non-duality, the
fact that some see Sankara's* Advaita Vedanta in particular as an expression of a radical devaluation of the natural
world has to be discussed. Advaita Vedanta and deep ecology have quite different intentions. Advaita Vedanta in
its origin and throughout its history was a system of religious thought aiming at liberating the self from bondage to
samsara* the cycle of life, death, and rebirth. One author claims that "in the Advaitic liberation experience, the
world is not reverenced but rather tolerated until it passes completely away."13
He gives the following example of the person who has reached the highest form of unity in brahman: He
has no cognition of difference whatsoever (sarvatha bheda-darsdabhdva*). Rather he is constantly and
completely identified with the Self (sarvada* tanmaya). Thus the highest attainment is one in which the
saint is totally cut off from empirical experience. Only when he has no awareness of the world at all does
he rise above the perception of difference.14
The supreme bliss is the cessation of the world, and thus the end of plurality and change. All beings share the same
self, but the body and mind belong to a
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hierarchical, painful, and disharmonious world generated on the basis of the individual's karman, and are ultimately
unreal. The true identity of beings is not in the empirical realm (i.e., in society or in nature), but beyond plurality
and change.
For Sanikara *, reality has several levels. The vyavahdrika* level corresponds to the ordinary reality, the world
with which environmentalism is concerned. This proves to lack real existence when the highest level, the
paramarthika* is realized. According to this view, there is only one Self, and plurality does not really exist. For
Sankara, self-realization meant realizing that the self was really identical with the permanent and unchangeable
source of the world (brahman). According to Sankara, to identify oneself with the things around us as a plurality
that is real is to fall victim to an illusion. This interpretation is confirmed by the historian of Indian philosophy
Surendranath Dasgupta, who writes that, according to Advaita Vedanta*, when the comprehension of the self as
the ultimate truth arises, "our cognition of world appearances will automatically cease."15 Advaita Vedanta held
that the world "has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination which lasts till the moment when true
knowledge is acquired."16 When one realizes the self, "all our illusory perceptions representing the world as a
field of experience cease."17 There is therefore a great divergence between advaita in Sankara and advaita in
Ecosophy T.
Sankara glosses "all beings" in BhG 6.29 with brahmadini* stamba-paryantdni* beings from Brahma to grass (i.e.,
all living beings).18 What is common to these beings is that they all share the same self, which is identical with the
unchangeable source of the world, brahman. Their empirical existence is unreal from the ultimate point of view,
since empirical reality is able to be sublated by a higher experience. As the snake on the road disappears when I
realize that it was only a rope which looked like a snake, and I thereafter realize that it never existed except as a
mistaken perception of a rope, so this world as a plurality disappears when we realize that only atman*-brahman
exists. In Advaita Vedanta self-realization is a soteriological experience of contentless consciousness, not a
celebration of natural processes.19
Sankara's comment on BhG 6.32 is, however, about empathy or non-injury. Here he writes that he who sees that
what is painful and pleasant to himself is painful and pleasant to all creatures, will cause no living beings pain, and
that he who is noninjurious is the foremost of yogins.20 Non-injury in traditional Hinduism is combined with the
attempt to separate or liberate the self from samsara* It is especially to be practiced by renunciants (samnyasin-
s*) The context here is meditation, non-action, and liberation from samsara. Keeping this limitation in mind, these
comments harmonize with some aspects of Ecosophy
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T, because here the triad of self-realization, non-injury, and unity of all beings is expressed in interdependence.
But Sankara's * explanation of BhG 6.29 reads: "Now is shown the result of yoga which is the realization of
oneness of Brahman and which is the cause of the cessation of the whole world of rebirth (samsara*)."21 Here
self-realization, the realization that all living beings share one self, is the cause of the cessation of the world, not
the celebration of diversity and complexity. Sankara* relates this verse to ultimate reality (paramarthika*) and not
to the world of flourishing biological life (vyavaharika*). The preservation of the natural world is a concern of
everyday reality, and this concern is ultimately irrelevant for the renunciant. The goal of the Advaita renunciant
was to leave the world, not to preserve it. According to Hinduism, life has four goals (purusartha-s*): power and
wealth (artha), aesthetic and erotic enjoyment (kama*), ethics and conventional religious life (dharma) and
liberation from rebirth (moksa*). The first three goals are concerned with the world; the fourth is about freedom
from the world.
According to Hinduism, it is as much the ideas of karman and rebirth as that of a single self shared by all, called
brahman, that ties all living beings together in an interdependent universe. The Hindu systems that believed in
multiple selves, such as Samkhya* and Samkhya-Yoga, also believed in the world as an interdependent whole, and
that non-injury concerned all living beings and not only humans. The idea of karman and rebirth is an axiom of
most South Asian religions. The Hindu concept of rebirth involves all living beings in the same flow of life. Injury
of any living being, not just a human, is considered wrong and a cause for karmic retribution. From beginningless
time, living beings are continually reborn in destinies determined by previous acts until release from rebirth is
realized. Since animals might be reborn as humans and humans reborn as animals, there cannot be any hiatus
between them. One's identity is not really as a human, but as a subtle body in association with a permanent self
who has always existed and becomes associated with all kinds of species. What is unique with the principle of
ahimsa* in South Asia is not the emphasis on non-injury, since non-injury is the preferred way of human
interaction in most societies and an injunction in most religions, but its extension to include all living beings, not
only humans. This is due to the belief that all beings have selves and to the principle of karman and rebirth.
Calling upon both Advaita Vedanta and the BhG, Eliot Deutsch has attempted a metaphysical grounding of
environmental ethics on the combination of the ideas of brahman and karman.22 The idea of brahman signifies
that there is a radical discontinuity between reality (brahman) and everything else in ex-
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perience, while the law of karman binds humans into the strongest continuity with the natural processes. According
to Deutsch, freedom associated with the realization of brahman makes possible a disinterestedness in everyday
action, and humans can act in harmony with nature without destructive concerns. He believes the karmayogin of
the BhG exemplifies freedom in action and quotes BhG 4.18: "He who sees inaction in action and action in
inaction, he is wise among men, he does all action harmoniously." 23 The self is always a passive witness, a
knower of the field (ksetrajña*), whereas all action is performed by the material principle, the field (ksetra*).
Knowledge of these two principles gives awareness of non-attachment and freedom. Because the self is always
free, one can act unattached and without destructive concerns. Deutsch concludes that "paradoxically, when nature
is seen to be valueless in the most radical way, it can be made valuable with us in creative play."24 Diversity can
be valued, it seems, exactly because of the existence of atman*-brahman, which is one and always free from the
world.
It is now obvious that the use of Advaita Vedanta concepts in Ecosophy T and the citing of Sankara* in support,
does not mean acceptance of any of the tenets of this system of religious thought in its classical form. The unity
experience that, in Ecosophy T, is the individual's self-realization, Naess calls "a mystic unity with the whole,"
which suggests that "all beings are one."25 However, this does not imply the reduction of plurality into singularity
(atman-brahman), as in Advaita Vedanta*, but rather a consciousness about an organic unity of interdependent
parts that is nondifferent from oneself. Fox noted that Naess "unencumbered by subscription to the metaphysics of
Advaita Vedanta (but nevertheless sympathetic to this metaphysics), defends the ontological validity of the
empirical world. "26
For Ecosophy T, the true self is the natural world. Unity therefore implies a wish for the flourishing of all beings in
their natural environments. Their flourishing is identical with the flourishing of oneself; their self-realization and
my self-realization are identical. The unity of all beings relates, according to Advaita Vedanta, also to the highest
reality (paramarthika*) But from that level the everyday world of living beings (vydvaharika*) no longer appears,
because plurality disappears when oneness is realized. Self-realization for Naess is an expansion of one's identity,
but its perfection does not coincide with the experience of the cessation of the world's manifestation, as in Sankara
and Advaita Vedanta. Naess has written that Self-realization does not postulate "an eternal or permanent Self" and
"to 'realize oneself' . . . does not correspond to a Hindu idea of realizing the absolute atman."27 It is explicitly
denied that the individual egos dissolve like drops in the ocean, a beloved Vedanta metaphor.28
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Ramanuja *, Madhva, and Abhinavagupta

Since BhG 6.29 has been taken to show that the ecosophy of Naess has ancient roots in the Hindu religious
traditions, other commentators on the verse have to be analyzed in order to see if there was indeed any agreement
in the tradition on a reading of the verse that could be creatively reinterpreted in the environmentalist context. A
good orthodox Hindu interpretation of the BhG is found in the commentary by the Sri-Vaisnava* theologian and
philosopher Ramanuja (d. 1137), the foremost thinker of Visistadvaita* Vedanta*. Ramanuja accepted a qualified
(saguna*) Brahman and a difference among the three ultimate principles god, selves, and matter. Commenting on
the verses 6.29 32, Ramanuja says that at the highest stage of yoga there are four degrees, but that 6.29 illustrates
the lowest degree. It shows that the atman* of all creatures is equal when their proper form is separated from
matter (prakrti*).29 Inequality belongs to prakrti.30 This means that the living beings of the empirical world, such
as cats, birds, humans, are ordered hierarchically and are different and unequal because they are products of matter.
Similarity applies to the selves only, and the selves are totally different from matter.
The yogin, in other words, sees the similarity of all selves when they have been separated from the natural world.
Living beings do not share one self, but the selves of beings are similar. Thus, when one knows one's own self, one
knows that all other atmans* have the same form. The verse does not speak at all about self-realization as
identification with the natural world. On the second level the yogin sees God in all atmans and all atmans in God.
God's true form (svarupa*) is similar to all beings who have been released from good and evil.31 On the third
level, the yogin becomes one with all beings, because all have the same unrestricted knowledge; he renounces the
difference due to prakrti and devotes himself steadfastly to God. He sees that God and the atman of all beings are
similar in that they are all free from karman.32 On the fourth level, the yogin perceives no difference between the
suffering and happiness of his atman and the atmans of others because all atmans are equal and have no relations.
In other words, as pain and pleasure do not really affect one's self, so one knows that pain and pleasure do not
affect the selves of others. This yogin is unaffected by the pleasure, pain, happiness, and grief of others. This is the
stage of release.33 Ramanuja gives a purely religious interpretation of these verses. According to Ramanuja , the
world is part of God and totally dependent on him, but it is a mistake to identify the self with the body and the
natural processes.
Madhva (1238 1317 or 1199 1278), the founder of Dvaita Vedanta and together with Sankara* and Ramanuja
considered to constitute the three classical
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Vedanta * interpreters, reads verse 6.29 not as monism but as monotheism. Madhva understands atmanam* and
atmani* in the verse to mean a personal god (paramesvara*) God controls everything. Thus the first part of the
verse means ''He sees God in all beings and all beings in God."34 This is in harmony with BhG 6.31, where Krsna*
says he abides in all beings.
The great Kashmir Saivite* Abhinavagupta (ca. 1000), in his summary on the content of the BhG, understands BhG
6.29 to talk about omniscience. He comments that one should identify the atman with all beings insofar as the
atman* (consciousness) enters them as the perceiver (i.e., the subject).35 One should unite all beings within the
atman through the knowledge of their being the perceived (i.e., the object).36 The subject and the object are really
Siva*. According to the monism of Kashmir Saivism*, ignorance means, on the one hand, the illusory separation
of the individual selves from Siva, whereas they really are non-different from him, and, on the other hand, the
illusory separation of the world from Siva, whereas the world is really identical with him.
These commentators gave different interpretations of BhG 6.29, but in general they saw the verse as having to do
with seeing the real identity of the self and its relationship with all other beings. Sankara* saw the self as identical
with an impersonal, unchangeable substratum, brahman; Ramanuja* saw the self as similar to the selves of all
beings but without their sharing the same self; Madhva saw the selves of all beings as similarly dependent on a
personal God; and Abhinavagupta saw both the self and all beings as identical with Siva. The variety in
interpretation is great. None of these interpretations follow the meaning this verse has been given by Ecosophy T,
but that does not mean that these theologies could not be creatively reinterpreted to support the deep ecology
platform.37
Gandhi and Radhakrishnan

The monastic tradition of commentary has continued up to this day and will go on into the future. Its focus was
liberation from the world. But, possibly due to contact with a socially conscious Christianity, a new interpretation
of the BhG arose as a call to remedy the social ills of Hindu society.38 The interest of this new tradition of
commentators was in liberation as well as the improvement of the world. These commentators gave new meanings
to the concepts of non-injury, self-realization, and unity of all beings. Self-realization and unity of all beings
became associated with political activity and social ideals; non-injury (ahimsa*) was no longer only abstaining
from injuring other living beings as part of the purification of the individual, but became, under the guidance of
Gandhi, a method of nonviolent resistance to promote political
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change. This understanding is radically different from the classical commentators who interpreted the BhG as a
science of salvation and for whom "salvation meant realization of the self, or God-realization." 39 For them,
"There was no movement of thought from this central theme of individual salvation towards dharma, the social
duty of the individual."40 B. G. Tilak was the first Indian writer on the BhG to depart from the traditional
pattern.41 For him, as for Gandhi, the text became a political instrument. For Tilak the key of the BhG was the
emphasis on the warrior's fighting.
For Gandhi, the BhG combined Hindu ascetic and contemplative ideas with a program for political action. While
the classical commentaries were interested mainly in moksa*, Gandhi thought moksa was inseparably related to
one's social duty (dharma), something one attains through dharma.42 For Gandhi the essence of the BhG was
contained in the last eighteen verses of chapter 2 (2.55 2.72). These verses describe the sthitaprajña, the person of
stabilized mentality, whom Gandhi calls the satyagrahi.43 He is the person who has control of himself, the
disciplined person, the person who remains unmoved, the person who has complete mastery over himself. He has
abandoned all desires and is indifferent to sorrow and joy. He has withdrawn his senses from all objects as a
tortoise withdraws her limbs. This is the person in perfect mental control. For the BhG, self-control prepares the
person for devotion to Krsna*; for Gandhi, self-control is the goal.44 For Gandhi, religion referred not to the
worship of God, but to the mental attitude of complete control over the senses, desires, and attachments, a mastery
over the body that brings about peace and equanimity.45 Religion, for Gandhi, was about moral action performed
with perfect self-control. He did not doubt that self-realization was the subject of the BhG, and that it taught the
most excellent way to self-realization.46 Gandhi held that all his "ventures in the political field" were directed
toward attaining moksa.47 Political action, not just knowledge and meditation, was now understood as the way to
self-realization.
For none of the representatives of the monastic tradition was the BhG their primary religious text. Gandhi,
however, understood the BhG as the sacred scripture. He wrote:
To me the Gita became an infallible guide of conduct. It became my dictionary of daily reference. Just as I
turned to the English dictionary for the meanings of English words that I did not understand, I turned to this
dictionary of conduct for a ready solution of all my troubles and trials.48
Gandhi learned Sanskrit to read the BhG in the original and memorized the first thirteen chapters, quite an
accomplishment. The BhG was, he states, "not only my Bible or my Quran; it is more than thatit is my Mother."49
It was a
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guide for daily behavior as well as a means for religious realization. The BhG was also a direct cause of liberation,
because "If with [the Gita verses] on your lips, you receive the final summons and deliver up your spirit, you will
attain Brahma-Nirvanathe Final Liberation." 50
According to the interpretation of Gandhi written by his secretary Mahadev Desai, BhG 6.29 illustrates the
expansion of the circle of ethics.51 One starts by seeing oneself in his neighbor, then in distant neighbors, then in
still more distant humanity, and ends in seeing himself in all, seeing oneself in the other and loving the other.52
"This is the same as seeing other beings in one's Self,"53 and represents "progressive steps in yogic experience."54
It can be compared with the statement on self-realization by Naess:
The decrease of egocentricity is inevitably linked to an increase of identification and care for others. Which
"others"? One good answer is to draw circles of interest and care, corresponding to stages of development:
family, clan, tribe, humanity.55
Gandhi said further, "So long as 'self' subsists, the Supreme Self is absent; when 'self' is extinguished, the Supreme
Self is seen everywhere.56 This corresponds to Naess's distinction between ego and Self.57 For Gandhi, one who
has realized the Supreme Self is in constant service to others and overcomes all his likes and dislikes, whereas
ordinary beings are active for selfish reasons. Here classical Hindu ideas of liberation of the self (moksa*) which
belonged to the fourth stage of life, where activity for the sake of preservation of the world (lokasamgraha*) had
been abandoned, are reinterpreted and joined with contemporary political ideas.58
Gandhi says in his autobiography that the word samabhava* (equability) gripped him in his first encounter with the
BhG. Samabhava is similar to samadarsana* in BhG 6.29. Gandhi's interpretation of this is clear:
How to cultivate and preserve that equability was the question. How was one to treat alike insulting,
insolent and corrupt officials, co-workers of yesterday raising meaningless opposition, and men who had
always been good to one?59
Gandhi combined values from the Hindu tradition of monastic and contemplative life with political activity, and
understood the values of the contemplative tradition to be realized in politics. Naess mentions Gandhi among those
who in historical times have been preeminent in approaching Self-realization.60 For Naess, Gandhi seems more
than anyone else to represent a personification of the Ecosophy T principles of oneness, self-realization, and non-
injury. Writes Naess:
Gandhi recognized a basic, common right to live and blossom, to self-realization applicable to any being
having interests or needs. Gandhi made manifest the internal relation
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between self-realization, non-violence and what is sometimes called biospherical egalitarianism. 61
The first principle in Gandhi's teaching, according to Naess's conceptual reconstruction, is the same as in Ecosophy
T: "N1 Seek complete self-realization."62 The ecosophical idea of the development of higher levels of self-
realization as the expansion of the self to include all living beings, so that their well-being is seen as identical with
one's own, is expressed by Gandhi regarding BhG 6.29. The belief in self-realization, nonviolent action, and
oneness of all living beings is as fundamental to Gandhi as it is to Ecosophy T.63
Another representative of this twentieth-century tradition of interpretation was the Indian statesman and
philosopher Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, whose version of Advaita Vedanta* also seems to have some similarity to
Naess's ecosophy. Radhakrishnan comments on BhG 6.29:
Though, in the process of attaining the vision of Self, we had to retreat from outward things and separate
the Self from the world, when the vision is attained the world is drawn into the Self. On the ethical plane,
this means that there should grow a detachment from the world and when it is attained, a return to it,
through love, suffering and sacrifice for it. The sense of a separate finite self with its hopes and fears, its
likes and dislikes is destroyed.64
This can be compared with a statement by Naess:
According to the philosophies of oneness, the path goes first inwards only to lead out again to everything.
The path of action (karmamarga*) leads an action-yogi (karmayogi) into contact with all creatures.65
This expresses Ecosophy T's recommendation of human restraint in interaction with the natural world, and the aim
of identifying with all living beings as our true self. Radhakrishnan's contemporary form of Advaita Vedanta
represents a blend of Hinduism and Christianity, and Ecosophy T seems to have a relationship to this form of
Vedanta that combines monism and social activism.
Ecosophy T
It is due to Gandhi and other twentieth-century Hindu interpreters, it seems, that Ecosophy T considers the BhG as
representing scriptural authority. Naess refers to BhG 6.29 in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, "Ecosophy T:
Deep Versus Shallow Ecology," and In Sceptical Wonder. The verse is also quoted in full, including the Sanskrit
text and various translations.66 Naess does not quote the BhG to recommend the attainment of cessation of the
manifestation of the world, nor the worship (bhakti) of Krsna*, but to recommend deep ecological action. In
Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, he uses the BhG to illus-
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trate the historically close association with "the ways of non-violence and the philosophies of wholeness and
oneness." 67 He also quotes from the commentary by Sankara on BhG 6.32: "When humanity understands that all
creatures feel the same joy and pain as ourselves, we will harm no creature."68 This is the principle of empathy,
and here the close relationship between similarity and non-injury (ahimsa*) is stressed. Naess goes on to say that
the capital S in "Self-realization" "insinuates a philosophy of oneness as does chapter 6, verse 29 of the Gita."69
Thus the verse is connected to the three interdependent terms oneness, non-injury and self-realization.
In the article "Ecosophy T: Deep Versus Shallow Ecology," Naess quotes the Sanskrit text of BhG 6.29, and also
includes translations by Radhakrishnan, Deutsch, Mascaro, and Gandhi.70 Naess comments: "Self-realization in its
absolute maximum is, as I see it, the mature experience of oneness in diversity depicted in the above verse."71 The
verse therefore expresses the ultimate as perceived by Ecosophy T. This is in disagreement with the monastic
commentators. Ramanuja*, for example, considered the verse to express the lowest of four degrees of Yoga. But
there are also other differences. Naess wants to give the atman* a nonreligious meaning. He writes: "In Hinduism
there has been a tendency to absolutize this Self in its teaching of atman, but the essential traits of the notion do
not imply more than we can formulate in psychology and social science in terms of maturity, and the development
of a social self that ultimately comprises the society of all living beings."72 This interpretation is in sharp contrast
to the understanding of the BhG in the Hindu monastic tradition and in Hindu philosophy in general.
Naess argues that the self-realization described in the BhG should not necessarily be conceived as a mystical or
meditational state. He has thus removed his interpretation to a great degree from the Hindu religious context. The
verse is freed from any connection to Hindu metaphysics and comes closer to the modern political idea of empathy
and solidarity with all humans, though it is expanded to include all nonhuman living beings as well.
Naess also refers to BhG 6.29 in his comments in In Sceptical Wonder and repeats that three expressions play a
fundamental role in his ethical views: self-realization, solidarity with all living beings, and non-violence. He
continues: "Strengthening solidarity and non-violence depends upon strengthening and widening the process of
identification."73 This process of identification is the ability to "see the greater Self everywhere."74 This language
has Advaita Vedanta and Hindu affinities, but the meaning is different. Naess does not mean that we should see the
single unchangeable substratum (atman-brahman) everywhere. Naess has removed himself from Hindu religious
metaphysics.
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In Advaita Vedanta the realization of the identity of atman * and brahman is the supreme salvific experience to be
attained by meditation. But according to deep ecology, it seems, self-realization (moksa*), oneness (advaita) and
non-injury (ahimsa*) express a theoretical position that accepts pluralism and is combined with political action for
the sake of the preservation of the world (lokasamgraha*). In Naess's Ecosophy T, the use of Sanskrit words
(atman, jiva*, advaita, svamarga, karmamarga*, karmayogi, ahimsa) and words common in Hindu texts in
English, but reinterpreted (self, self-realization, non-violence) and in Hindu sacred texts (BhG, Sankara's
commentary on BhG) represent the heritage from Gandhi.
Even if Naess has removed the self to be realized from the classical Hindu religious context, but is still inspired by
representatives of twentieth-century Hinduism such as Radhakrishnan and Gandhi, the question remains whether
the self-realization of Ecosophy T implies a religious experience. For Gandhi political action was both a method to
improve the world and a method for attaining brahma-nirvana* Gandhi wrote:
What I want to achievewhat I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty yearsis self-realization,
to see God face to face, to attain Moksha. I live and have my being in pursuit of that goal.75
That self-realization in Ecosophy T is related to the experience of oneness which has many similarities to religious
experience, seems to be suggested by the following:
But if you hear a phrase like, "All life is fundamentally one," you should be open to tasting this, before
asking immediately, "What does this mean?" There is a kind of deep yes to nature that is central to my
philosophy.76
People ask me, "What's the Maximum of Self-realization?" and I then offer them some kind of mystical
sentence, a mystic's unity with the whole, but it doesn't appeal to me to try to find out what I mean by that.
Or, I say that ultimately or fundamentally, all living beings are one, but what could the full consequences of
this be? But I stick to such a formulation. There's something there that disappears if you try to be more
precise. Something elusive . . . .77
The S [in Self-realization] insinuates that if the widening and deepening of the self goes on ad infinitum the
selves will realize themselves by realizing the same, whatever that is.78
The elusiveness of the experience of oneness accords with the heritage from Gandhi, Radhakrishnan, and Hindu
mysticism. Self-realization, according to Hindu religious thought, is a religious experience that transcends language
and thought, and can be properly described only by remaining silent.
Ecosophy T attempts to combine reinterpretations of the mysticism of Advaita Vedanta (Sankara's non-dualism of
one self shared by all, reinterpreted by rep-
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resentatives of twentieth-century Hinduism such as Gandhi and Radhakrishnan), reinterpretations of Indian
asceticism (the political activist asceticism of Gandhi), and the belief in the natural world as the ultimate concern.
79 The meaning given to the Hindu concepts discussed, insofar as they are recognizable as Hindu, is to a large
degree Gandhian.80 The concepts of non-injury, non-duality, and self-realization are used in Gandhian ways, and
there is no interest in giving a historical, authentic interpretation of the meaning the concepts had in classical
Indian philosophy. Ecosophy T is indifferent to Advaita Vedanta or other Hindu dogmatics, but the realization that
all beings share the same self and the ethics of non-injury as the natural consequence of this realization are a
source for deep ecological reflection. Self-realization is accepted as the ultimate goal, but something totally
different is meant by self-realization than in classical Advaita Vedanta*, the system of Hindu religious thought that
has been associated with Ecosophy T. The unity of all does not mean that all beings share the same self. Naess
states: "At any level of realization of potentials, the individual egos remain separate."81 The notion of self-
realization functions more as a critique of egoism and speciesism.82
The Hindu ideas of oneness of all beings, non-injury, and self-realization have contributed to ecosophy and,
according to Ecosophy T, these three ideas are expressed in BhG 6.29. Aspects of Hindu religion as reinterpreted
by some representatives of twentieth-century Hinduism, such as Radhakrishnan and Gandhi, have been applied to a
new problem: how to convince humans that nonhuman life has the right to flourish to its full potential on this
planet and, in addition, that this flourishing of nonhuman life is part of the self-realization of humans. A
comparison of the Hindu monastic interpretation with the political-environmental interpretation of BhG 6.29 has
shown that the political-environmental interpretation in many ways is the opposite of the monastic.
Self-realization (moksa*) for the Hindu monastic tradition meant freedom from samsara*, whereas for the
environmental interpretation, self-realization meant merging oneself with samsara and the preservation of
samsara. In the experience of oneness, plurality disappears, according to some monastic traditions, whereas for the
environmentalists self-realization means the realization of the non-difference of oneself and the processes of the
natural world, without sacrificing plurality. The experience of self-realization in the monastic tradition has freedom
from rebirth in the world as its consequence, whereas for environmentalism the consequence is political activity in
the world.83 In environmentalism, preservation of samsara, and not liberation from it, has become the ultimate
goal. The preservation of samsara is seen as identical to the realization of oneself.
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Whereas in the monastic tradition self-realization meant ultimately to be free from the biological cycle of life and
death, in environmentalism self-realization means flourishing of biological life. Environmentalism values samsara
* as ultimate reality, not a changeless substratum. Self-realization is nothing else than samsara, and the realization
of samsara (i.e., to identify oneself fully with the natural processes) is moksa. The context is not liberation of the
self from samsara but the liberation of the natural world from the suffering caused by human beings ignorant of
the true identity of the self.
The unity of all beings does not mean that all beings share the same self, as in Advaita Vedanta, nor the oneness of
humanity, as is often stated in political interpretations, but organic wholeness, interdependence, the experience of
sharing the joy and suffering of all living beings, looking at their self-realization as one's own. The definition
chosen by Ecosophy T for living beings is the Hindu definition: beings capable of self-realization (i.e., those
sharing or possessing an atman* or purusa*).84
According to the Hindu idea of karman, all living beings are bound together in a moral cause-effect relationship.
Not only human acts toward other humans but also human acts toward all living beings are ruled by ethics. In
addition, all living beings, and not only humans, possess a self that can be realized, and the realization of the self is
identical with liberation. Non-injury concerns the treatment not only of humans but of all living beings. It is an
axiom in Hinduism that ethics and soteriology concern all living beings and not only humans. This is an important
contribution of the Hindu religious traditions to the contemporary reinterpretation of the relationship of human
beings to nature.
Notes
The author thanks David Rothenberg for valuable suggestions.
1. Deep ecology is distinguished from ecosophy. The program of deep ecology is formulated in the platform of
eight points first set forth by Naess and Sessions in 1984. The rejection of one or more of these points would make
a person a nonsupporter of deep ecology. These eight points express the agreement of a social movement. The first
point says that "The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life on Earth have value in themselves
(synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human
world for human purposes." Underlying these eight points "there are still more basic positions and norms which
reside in philosophical systems and in various world religions." Arne Naess, "The Deep Ecology Movement: Some
Philosophical Aspects," Philosophical Inquiry 8 (1986): 23. The deep ecology platform can be supported by
persons with different ecosophies or "total views inspired in part by reactions to the ecological crisis." Arne Naess,
''The Deep Ecology 'Eight Points' Revisited," in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, edited by George Sessions
(Boston: Shambhala, 1995), p. 215. Naess's ecosophy is Ecosophy T.
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2. Arne Naess, "The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," pp. 25 26. Naess writes: "The deep
movement connects rationality with a set of philosophical and religious foundations. Those engaged in the deep
movement have so far revealed their philosophical or religious homes mainly to be in Christianity, Buddhism,
Taoism, or philosophy. The top level of the derivational pyramid [Level 1: Ultimate premises] can therefore be
made up of normative and descriptive principles which belong to forms of Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, and
various philosophical creeds."
The reprint of the article, in Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, pp. 64 84, contains several changes.
In this article Baha'i is added among the religions. In the original article Naess refers to the distinction between
individual selves and the comprehensive Self that is so fundamental to his ecosophy, calling the individual
selves jiva *-s and the comprehensive Self atman*. Jiva and atman are Sanskrit words, and the distinction
referred to is a doctrine of Hinduism. But Naess perhaps does not want the reader to associate it with
Hinduism, and instead of giving Hinduism as the source, refers to "certain Eastern traditions" (p. 28). To
further remove it from its origin in Hinduism, he says in the footnote that this atman is in fact consistent with
the Buddhist anatman* (not-self) doctrine because the atman in his ecosophy is not "a permanent indestructible
soul" (p. 31). Bill Devall and George Sessions, ''Deep Ecology," in Environmental Ethics, edited by Louis P.
Pojman (Boston: Jones and Barlett, 1994), p. 113, link deep ecology to "Christianity, Taoism, Buddhism and
Native American rituals" but do not mention Hinduism.
3. Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston:
Shambhala, 1990), pp. 107 114.
4. J. Baird Callicott has argued that Naess "was inspired by the Vedantic doctrine of non-duality to make
cultivation of the experience of oneness with nature the core practice of Deep Ecology." J. Baird Callicott,
"International Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Ethics: Discourses, and Cultural Traditions, A Festschrift
to Arne Naess, edited by Rana B. Singh (Varanasi: National Geographical Society of India, 1993), p. 30. Naess has
argued convincingly that the experience of oneness is not implied in accepting the eight principles of deep ecology
but belongs to ecosophy. "The Deep Ecology 'Eight Points' Revisited," p. 215. See also Fox, Toward a
Transpersonal Ecology, p. 111.
5 J. L. Brockington, The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its Continuity and Diversity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1981), p. 56, writes: "To Vaisnavas* and indeed to most Hindus the BhG is their main religious
text and the real source of many of their beliefs."
6. Klostermaier has noted that Gandhi, after reading Tolstoy's The Kingdom of God Is Within You, adopted Tostoy's
way of interpreting the Bible and thereafter considered Tolstoy his guru. He notes that Gandhi's other key book
was John Ruskin's Unto This Last. This book taught Gandhi that the well-being of the individual was contained in
the well-being of all. See Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism, 2nd ed. (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1994), pp. 450 451.
7. Arne Naess, Ecology Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, translated and edited by David
Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 194. For a good translation of BhG, see The
Bhagavad Gita* translated and interpreted by Franklin Edgerton (repr. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1975).
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8. The Mahabharata * edited by Vishnu S. Suktanker et al., 19 vols. (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute, 1993 1959), 6.28.29 (volume 6, chapter 28, verse 29)
9. My translation. Naess, in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, reproduces the translation of Sarvapalli
Radhakrishnan, although no reference to this translation is found: "He whose self is harmonised by yoga seeth the
Self abiding in all beings and all beings in the Self." The last words of the verse in Radhakrishnan's translation,
"everywhere he sees the same," are absent. The Bhagavadgita* translated by Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 204.
10. David Kinsley, Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 187, writes that the principle of self-realization "for Naess is not something new. For
him, the view is expressed quite clearly in the Bhagavada-gita."
11. See Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pp. 196 210, which gives a model of a system logically derived from
Self-realization. The most basic norms are Nl: Self-realization!; N2: Self-realization for all living beings!; H1: The
higher the Self-realization attained by anyone, the broader and deeper the identification with others. See also pp.
85 86.
12. The implication for environmental ethics is that "through broader identification, [humans] may come to see
their own interest served by environmental protection, through genuine self-love, love of a widened and deepened
self." Arne Naess, "Self Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World," in Thinking Like a
Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings, John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess (Philadelphia:
New Society, 1988), p. 24.
13. Lance E. Nelson, "Reverence for Nature or the Irrelevance of Nature? Advaita Vedanta* and Ecological
Concern," Journal of Dharma 16 (1991): 285.
14. Ibid., p. 297.
15. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922
reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), p. 439.
16. Ibid., p. 440.
17. Ibid.
18. The Bhagavad-gita* with Eleven Commentaries, edited by Shastri Gajanana Shambhu Sadhale, 3 vols. (Dehli:
Parimal Publications, 1985), p. 565. Living beings are usually divided into eight types of divinities, humans, and
five types of animals, plants, etc.
19. Karl H. Potter writes that "the consciousness that is Brahman is not a relational consciousness between knower
and known. The closest approximation in our experience to pure consciousness occurs in deep sleep, which
according to Advaita is a state of consciousnes without any objects. Potter, "Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara* and
His Pupils," Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, vol. 3, edited by Karl H. Potter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1982), p. 76.
20. yadi va* yac ca duhkham* mama pratikulam* anistam* yatha* tatha* sarvapraninam* duhkham* anistam*
pratikulam ity evam atmaupamyena* sukhaduhkhe* anukulapratikule* tulyataya* sarvabhutesu* samam* pasyati*
na kasyacit pratikulam acarati*, ahimsaka*
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ityarthah *. ya evam ahimsakah* samyagdarsananisthah* sa yogi* parama utkrsto* mato 'bhipretah*.
sarvayoginam* madhye.
21. idanim* yogasya yat phalam brahmaikatva-darsanam* sarva-samsara*-viccheda-karanam* tat pradarsyate*.
22. Eliot Deutsch, "A Metaphysical Grounding for Natural Reverence: East-West," in Nature in Asian Traditions
of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, edited by J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 259 265.
23. Ibid., p. 265.
24. Ibid., p. 264.
26. Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, p. 111.
27. Quoted from ibid., p. 113.
28. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 195.
29. J.A. B. van Buitenen, Ramanuja* on the Bhagavadgita*: A Condensed Rendering of his Gitabhasya* with
Copious Notes and an Introduction, 2nd ed. (1968; repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), p. 95.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Arvind Sharma, The Hindu Gita*: Ancient and Classical Interpretations of the Bhagavadgita (London:
Duckworth 1986), p. 226
35. Abhinavagupta, Gitarthasangraha* translated by Arvind Sharma (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), p. 149.
36. Ibid.
37. See, for example, Klaus K. Klostermaier, "Bhakti, Ahimsa and Ecology," Journal of Dharma 16 (1991):
246 254. Klostermaier notes that there is one theological feature of Vaisnavism* "which is central to its entire
doctrinal tradition and which could well become the cornerstone of a contemporary 'Eco-Theology'. It is the
famous sarira-sariri* bhava* articulated by Ramanuja as an article of faith" (p. 251). This is the doctrine of the
word as God's body. But Klostermaier notes that "One has not particularly noticed Vaisnavas speaking up against
the progressive ecological degradation of India through industrial and other abuses of the country" (p. 253).
38. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism, p. 182.
39. P. M. Thomas, 20th Century Indian Interpretations of Bhagvadgita: Tilak, Gandhi and Aurobindo (Delhi:
I.S.P.C.K., 1987), p. 20.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
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42. Ibid., p. 32.
43. "The last eighteen verses of the Second Chapter of the Gita give in a nutshell the secret of the art of living. It is
given there in the form of a description of a Sthitaprajna or the man of steady wisdom i.e., a satyagrahi . . . . The
ideal of the Sthitaprajna (man whose understanding is secure) as described in the Second Chapter of the Gita is
always before me and I am ceaseless in my efforts to reach that ideal." M. K. Gandhi, The Teaching of the Gita,
edited by Anand T. Hingorani (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), p. 98.
44. J. T. F. Jordens, "Gandhi and the Bhagavadgita," in Modern Indian Interpreters of the Bhagavadgita, edited by
Robert N. Minor (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 100.
45. Ibid.
46. Thomas, 20th Century Indian Interpretations of Bhagavadgita, p. 32.
47. See Arne Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyagraha (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974),
pp. 34 37.
48. Mohandas K. Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth, translated by Mahadev
Desai (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 265.
49. Ibid., p. 45.
50. Gandhi, The Teaching of the Gita, p. 48.
51. Mahadev Desai, The Gospel of Selfless Action or The Gita According to Gandhi (Ahmedabad: Navajivan
Publishing House, 1946), pp. 234 235.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
56. Desai, The Gospel of Selfless Action, p. 235.
57 Naess, "Self Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World," p. 25, contrasts atman * with another
Sanskrit term, jiva* Naess understands jiva to be the "narrow" self of egocentric interest and narrow ego
gratification, and atman to be the universal Self: "Through the wider Self every living being is connected
intimately, and from this intimacy follows the capacity of identification and as its natural consequences, the
practice of non-violence" (ibid.). Jiva* in Advaita Vedanta* has a metaphysical meaning. It refers to the atman, the
self shared by all, when it is embodied. It refers to a self who has not realized its identity with brahman and is
metaphysically ignorant.
58. In classical Hinduism, the liberated person can be trusted as a guru (teacher) to give unselfish advice and
guidance for the liberation of others, but his activity is not aimed at world maintenance.
59. Gandhi, Autobiography, p. 265.
61. Naess, "Self Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World," p. 26.
62. Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, p. 54.
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63. See ibid., pp. 23 56.
64. The Bhagavadgita * translated by Radhakrishnan, p. 204.
66. Naess also quotes BhG 13.24: "By meditation some perceive the self in the self by the self; others by the
discipline of knowledge, and others by the discipline of action."
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 195.
70. Naess, "Ecosophy T," pp. 105 112.
71. Ibid.
72. In Ingemund Gulvåg and Jon Wetlesen, eds., Sceptical Wonder: Inquiries into the Philosophy of Arne Naess on
the Occasion of His 70th Birthday (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982), p. 284.
73. Ibid., p. 262.
74. Ibid.
75. Quoted in Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, p. 35.
76. Rothenberg, Is It Painful to Think? p. 151.
77. Ibid., p. 187.
79. I am here concerned only with the Hindu influences on deep ecology.
80. A comparison of the use of the concepts of non-injury (ahimsa*) unity (advaita) and self-realization (moksa*)
in Ecosophy T with environmental thought in contemporary India would perhaps show a similarity especially to the
Gandhian environmental movement. While deep ecology has been criticized by some Indians, some Gandhian
environmentalists share its views. For a critique, see Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism
and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique," Environmental Ethics 11 (Spring 1989): 71 83; and for a
critique of Guha, David M. Jones, "The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World: Some Preliminary
Comments," Environmental Ethics 12 (1990): 233 252; and Arne Naess, "The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep
Ecology," in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, edited by George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp.
397 407. The most celebrated Indian environmental movement, the Chipko movement, was shaped in part by two
of Gandhi's best-known Western disciples, Mirabehn (Madeline Slade) and Sarala Devi (Catherine Mary Heilman),
who both made great contributions to the creation of environmental awareness about the destruction of the hills of
the Indian Himalayas. See Thomas Weber, Hugging the Trees: The Story of the Chipko Movement (Delhi: Viking,
1988), pp. 24, 80. The leadership of Chipko came from Gandhian sarvodaya workers. That the Chipko's method
was an adaptation of Gandhi's satyagraha (nonviolent resistance) also shows the strong link with the Gandhian
tradition. One aim of the movement is harmony with the natural world, which they see as the Gandhian ideal and
which is comparable to the goal of deep ecology. When describing the nonviolent method of the
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Chipko, Weber summarizes the description by Naess in Gandhi and the Nuclear Age, pp. 60 62.
82. Naess writes: "To cherish some of the ecosophic attitudes convincingly demonstrated by people from the East
does not imply the doctrinal acceptance of any past definite philosophy or religion conventionally classified as
Eastern. Heavy influence does not imply conformity with any beliefs: the history of ideas and contemporary
philosophizing are different subjects. "The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology," p. 400.
83. The sixth and eighth points of the deep ecology platform say: "(6) Policies must therefore be changed. These
policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be
deeply different from the present. (8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or
indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes." Naess, "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some
Philosophical Aspects," p. 14.
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13
A State of Mind like Water:
Ecosophy T and the Buddhist Traditions
Deane Curtin
When the Buddha's followers pressed him for answers to abstract, theoretical questions, he refused to answer. To
speculate about mere theories when there is suffering in the world, he said, is like speculating about the origin of a
poison arrow while it is still lodged in one's flesh. First remove the arrow! Questions about origins can come later.
This story is typical of many in the early Buddhist writings that depict the Buddha's teachings as rigorously
phenomenological, constantly returning his students' attention to the concrete reality of suffering.
The Buddha was not concerned about "the environment" in the contemporary sense. Nevertheless, in the same
phenomenological vein, he once counseled his son,
On the earth men throw clean and unclean things, dung and urine, spittle, pus, and blood, and the earth is
not repelled or disgusted. . . . Similarly you should develop a state of mind like water, for men throw all
manner of clean and unclean things into water and it is not troubled or repelled or disgusted. 1
Abuse of the Earth reflects our own suffering; suffering issues from ignorance of our true nature. A Buddhist
ecophilosophy, then, must begin with a rigorous phenomenology of self.
Arne Naess has come under many influences. Somemost notably Gandhi and Spinozaare more pervasive in Naess's
work than the influence of Buddhism. Gandhi's commitment to ahimsa* for example, has influenced Naess's
political philosophy of non-violence. Yet the Gandhian influence does little to explain key deep ecological
concepts such as Self-realization. Gandhi's "Self," the Hindu Atman*, is explicitly rejected by Naess in favor of a
Buddhist conception of no-self.2 Similarly, while Spinoza's influence is profound, it is the Spinoza of Paul
Wienpahl's The Radical Spinoza, a Spinoza of Becoming rather than of Being.3 Wienpahl's Spinoza finds its true
nature in the Zen monastery.
The Buddhist influence, though less pervasive, provides the most direct account of key deep ecological concepts
such as Self-realization and intrinsic
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value. I read Ecosophy T as a rigorously phenomenological branch of deep ecology. Like early Buddhism, Naess is
constantly responding to the human suffering that causes environmental destruction by challenging us to return to
the reality of lived experience. This is a response not only to suffering but also, at a deeper level, to "the suspicion
of reason." Like certain strains of Mahayana * Buddhism, Naess believes that reason can become opaque to itself
and mischievously lead us away from direct experience of the real, relational processes he calls "gestalts." He
rejects "any kind of established system of thought" and counsels, ''in every moment you must choose your life,
again and again. 'To hell with everything'start anew, as if this moment were your first and last." When he explains
what goes wrong with the bureaucrat's (shallow) thinking about the environment, he says, "all his education is to
forget about spontaneous experience! . . . The language they use is what I don't like. It is a quantitative language,
which does not go into the particulars, such as the heart of the forest."4
This Buddhist reading clarifies, but it also complicates. It reaffirms Naess's essential vision, but it challenges him at
two points to push further. It challenges him to affirm that Self-realization is a process of corealization with all
beings, not just with sentient beings. Naess appears to stop short of this affirmation, and thus opens himself up to
the charge of dualism. Second, while this reading accepts that humans do not create the value of nature, it questions
whether nature's value is best expressed in terms of the "intrinsic value" of radical environmental ethicists. The
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value is, in Naess's terms, an entia rationis, a falsifying mental
construction that conceals the immediate value of all beings which is revealed in authentic experience.
My interpretation depends on drawing out connections between a 1985 unpublished manuscript, "Gestalt Thinking
and Buddhism," and Naess's published works. "Gestalt Thinking . . ." constitutes Naess's most sustained attempt to
articulate the connections between deep ecology and the Buddhist traditions, and it has significantly altered my
earlier understanding of his work as found in "Dogen*, Deep Ecology, and the Ecological Self."5 I focus very
selectively on three aspects of the Buddhist traditions that seem to influence him the most: the oldest Buddhist
texts, found in the Pali Canon; the great Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna* (ca. 150 250), and the SotoZen*
monk Dogen (1200 1253). Naess explicitly traces his understanding of Self-realization to Dogen, and Dogen, in
turn, traces his lineage to Nagarjuna and the Pali texts.
The Suspicion of Reason

"Gestalt Thinking . . ." begins, "In the oldest forms of Buddhism monks were reluctant to answer metaphysical
questions. And if answers were offered, they
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were expressed undogmatically. 'Take it or leave it.' Even if true, a philosophical opinion might be of meager help,
or even a hindrance on the eightfold path." 6 One reason for the meager help one might expect from philosophy in
the process of Self-realization has to do with the Buddhist account of suffering. We have already seen that ancient
Buddhist texts report that the Buddha himself refused to answer metaphysical questions, comparing such talk in the
face of suffering to the person who just talks after being struck by a poisoned arrow. Suffering calls for action, not
armchair philosophy. This attitude toward philosophical opinion gives an existential urgency to Naess's thought,
and pushes him toward the need for deeper ecological thinking.
Still, we must ask, What is deeper thinking in Ecosophy T? Beyond the well-known, very general platforms that
distinguish the shallow from the deep, Naess's personal branch of ecosophy is distinguished by its "suspicion of
reason." Reason, precision, have their place in Naess's thinking, as in Buddhism, yet reason can obscure and distort
the reality of immediate experience. This is delusion, not clarity; it produces the suffering that degrades our
relations with human beings and the environment.
Since his early experience with the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle, Naess has been concerned with
precision in thinking. This concern still exists in his work, but it stands alongside the suspicion of reason. He says,
"there may be important things that are very difficult to make more precise. . . . If you leave out nonprecise things,
you are lost in accuracy. One must go back and forth, from precision to ambiguity."7 To say "Nature is one," for
example, is not precise. It is an entia rationis. But it is a highly useful distortion if it points people to the
spontaneous gestalt experience of connection in nature. Even "Self-realization" is dangerous if it becomes an
abstraction that does not constantly return us to the "concrete contents" of experience.
In "Gestalt Thinking . . . ," Naess draws on a connection between what he calls "gestalt ontology" and a Buddhist
account of experience. "Reason," he says, "works out abstract constructions" to facilitate its work: When
permanence, eternal being, are asserted of substance, as in Descartes and Spinoza, these entities are considered to
be entia rationis by gestalt ontology.8 They are, at most, helpful fictions. Helpful, but dangerous: If we forget they
are fictions, we become deluded about ourselves and our place in the world.
In contrast to these fictions of reason, Naess speaks of "concrete reality" as having a "gestalt character, that is to
say, no part and no wholes but subordinate and superordinate gestalts."9 Gestalts are concrete, relational processes.
Naess insists that he is speaking of ontology here, the way the world is, not simply of psychology. When we
rigorously examine the gestalt we commonly call "self," we find not the substance of Descartes and Spinoza but
"no (permanent)
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Self." "Selves are frequently recurring items, or knots, in the structure of contents." 10
Reason is inevitable, perhaps, but we go wrong when we fail to note that its entities are merely constructions
invented to do a particular job. We can be seduced by reason, never directly experiencing the world as it really is,
the world in its concreteness. Reason, when we do not suspect its efficacy, obscures reality. The realized Self that
exists in concrete, relational processes is transformed and distorted by reason into the permanent, nonrelational self
of Western philosophy and the Christian religion.
When asked why this form of self-delusion is so common, Naess resorts to talk about spontaneity. Shallow
ecological thinkers, he says, "forget about spontaneous experience!"11 Their education actually trains them to be
so caught up in entia rationisnumbers, charts, development plansthat they treat those as reality and fail to
experience their true selves spontaneously. Naess finds a similar striving for, and suspicion of, clarity in certain
Zen Buddhist traditions. Granted, one often fails to find this emphasis on clarity in many writings on Zen that are
popular in the West. D. T. Suzuki, for example, characterized Zen as a form of anti-intellectualism so totally
grounded in Japanese culture that it is incomprehensible outside that narrow context.12 Suzuki wrote almost
exclusively about Rinzai Zen, however, neglecting the Soto* Zen of Dogen. It is this strain of Zen that has been the
greatest influence on Naess. Dogen*, in turn, looked to the Indian philosopher Nagarjuna* for arguments against
the ability of discursive reason to express the process of self-realization. Naess's account of reason going "back and
forth, from precision to ambiguity" bears a strong resemblance to Nagarjuna's* thought.
While the Buddha himself espoused a rigorously practical and empirical account of experience, following his death
a variety of metaphysical schools arose that debated precisely the metaphysical questions the Buddha had refused
to answer. Against these competing schools, Nagarjuna intervened to develop his Logic of the Middle, based on the
idea of emptiness, or thusness, to show that these debates were vacuous.
Nagarjuna found a way to dispense with competing metaphysical arguments by showing that both sides reduce to
absurdity. Where the competing schools try to show that their conception of time or causality is absolute, for
example, Nagarjuna showed that, far from dispensing with the competing school, each uses terms that presuppose
the other's. In the words of T. R. V. Murti, "Relation has to perform two mutually opposed functions: as connecting
the two terms, in making them relevant to each other, it has to identify them: but as connecting the two, it has to
differentiate them. Otherwise expressed, relation
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cannot obtain between entities that are identical with or different from each other." 13 So reason goes wrong, for
example, in asserting either that the effect is contained in the cause, or that it is not contained in the cause. Put
concretely, any distinction highlights only one aspect of a situation and shrouds the other, incompatible, aspect.
Nagarjuna's* conclusion is that we may use reason, but we must suspect its ultimate efficacy.14
The effect of Nagarjuna's arguments, like those of the historical Buddha, is to drive us back to experience and away
from what Naess terms entia rationis. What we find here, again in Naess's terms, is the process of Self-realization
among gestalts; in Buddhist terms we find "emptiness" or "thusness."
Naess has struggled to express the sense of self-in-relation that is both deeply connected to other beings and yet
distinct. Time and again he rejects a substantial self in favor of the Buddhist "no-self," but he then warns, "Such a
formula must not be taken in the counter-intuitive sense that, for instance, I cannot be cold and hungry and
somebody else warm and satisfied."15 Neither the formula that there is self, nor the formula that there is no self is
precise. Like Nagarjuna*, Naess proposes to find a path through this intellectual thicket, not by further argument
and clarification but by driving us back to immediate, spontaneous experience. Following from Murti's
characterization of Nagarjuna's position, we can see that the ambiguity we sometimes find in Naess's writings is not
something which can be overcome with greater analytic precision. Whether we stress, in some contexts, the
connectedness of beings or, in other contexts, the distinctness of beings, we need to cultivate the suspicion of
reason which reminds us that both depictions are merely tools to "facilitate [reason's] work."
Like the Buddhist phenomenological tradition that runs from the earliest Buddhist writings, through Nagarjuna, to
Dogen*, I suggest that Naess's invitation to develop an ecosophy of our own can be seen as a recognition of the
ultimate futility of stating any deep position in absolute terms. Some truths are available only through direct
experience. The distinction Naess makes between his own version of deep ecological philosophy, Ecosophy T, and
the other branches of deep ecology he invites others to develop, is not simply an astute political move designed to
make a political movement inclusive. We must all develop our own ecosophical visions because there is no choice.
The suspicion of reason means we cannot do each other's work.
Directions for the Heart of the Forest

So far, Naess's thought coincides perfectly with Nagarjuna and the Soto Zen tradition. When we push further with
Dogen, however, this coincidence is not
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so clear. The challenge Dogen * issued to his own Buddhist tradition to move toward a more radical non-dualism
may also be seen as a challenge to Naess.
Self-realization, we have seen, is a process that can only be hinted at in various ways. Yet this does not prevent
some hints from being more revealing of experiential truths than others. Dogen's writings are pervaded with
elliptical references to the reality and phenomenological clarity of direct experience. Perhaps the most important
source for these references is one of the fascicles of his masterpiece, the Shobogenzo* titled Bussho* (Buddha-
nature). Dogen's* strategy here is to begin with classical formulations of Buddha-nature that were well known to
his audience,16 then to twist and transform meanings to suit his own unique purposes. As Norman Waddell and
Abe Masao note, Dogen often sacrifices grammatical correctness in his translations from Chinese to Japanese for
the illumination of an original philosophical point.17
He begins by quoting from the Nirvana Sutra, the principal Mahayana* sutra on Buddha-nature. The passage, in a
traditional translation, reads, "All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha-nature." By quoting the sutra,
he acknowledges tradition. However, he also knew that this formulation is open to the charge of dualism. Saying
that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature distinguishes Buddha-nature from the beings that have it, treating it as a
potential quality of sentient beings.
To remove these hints of dualism, Dogen twists the expression "All sentient beings without exception have the
Buddha-nature" to read "All sentient beings without exception are Buddha-nature."18 Buddha-nature, for Dogen, is
not a quality that sentient beings can have (or lack); rather, all sentient beings are Buddha-nature. Buddha-nature is
fundamental reality.
Dogen's single-minded commitment to non-dualism caused him to severely criticize its misuse in other Buddhist
writings. Buddhist tradition, for example, often restricted Buddha-nature to those beings that have the potential for
enlightenment, either in this life (humans) or in a future life (other sentient beings that can be reborn as human
beings). Nonsentient entitiesrivers and mountainsare excluded.19 But Dogen refused to accept the
sentient/nonsentient distinction as fundamental. He says emphatically:
Impermanence is in itself Buddha-nature. . . . Therefore, the very impermanency of grass and tree, thicket
and forest, is the Buddha-nature. Nations and lands, mountains and rivers, are impermanent because they
are Buddha-nature. Supreme and complete enlightenment, because it is the Buddha-nature, is impermanent.
Great Nirvana, because it is impermanent, is the Buddha-nature.20
Dogen was both radical and traditional in his treatment of Buddha-nature. To be nondualist, he believed, Buddhist
philosophy must commit to the funda-
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mental reality of all beings as Buddha-nature, not just sentient beings. This is explained, however, by reference to
the most traditional of Buddhist commitments: impermanence.
In "Gestalt Thinking . . ." Naess depends heavily on Dogen's * allusive writing to indicate what he means by
"transcending the subject/object dualism" in the process of Self-realization. Naess's thought mostly coincides with
Dogen's, but in one respect Dogen* appears to go beyond Naess. The question is: Should we challenge Naess to
take Dogen's final step?
Naess begins with a version of the passage just quoted from Dogen: "Grass, tree, nations and lands, all without
exception attain Buddhahood." All nature is concrete, relational processes, or gestalts, for Naess.21 In turn, the
recognition of Buddha-nature in all beings allows us to experience compassion for (identify with) these beings.
So far, Naess agrees with Dogen. But he goes on to raise doubts about how far the idea of Buddha-nature can
extend: "There is a question of how wide a range of beings may be said meaningfully to realize themselves.
Animals: Yes. Plants: Yes. But a wider range dilutes further the very concept of realization and Self. There is a
limit here."22 Naess seems to believe there is no problem in saying that Self-realization is a process of
corealization with all living beings. But he appears to question whether nonliving beings corealize. The dilemma is
clear: To extend corealization beyond living beings is to risk nonsense; not to do so introduces dualism, the
distinction between beings we can identify with and have compassion for, and those that are beyond the "limit."
Dogen challenges us to take this final step toward non-dualism. For Dogen, the self goes out to realize with what
he calls "the myriad things." But the myriad things also come forth to realize us. Dogen points toward
corealization with all things. This is what Abe Masao has called Dogen's "dehomocentric reversal": We are
realized by the mountain's "walking." The relations through which realization occurs move both ways, not only, as
Naess often describes it, in circles of expanding identification starting with the self and moving out to other
sentient beings.
This is Abe's brilliant point, and the core of Dogen's significance for environmental philosophy: We will never be
released from our suffering as long as we search within the circle of human suffering alone; we must be released
into the dimension of the "coming and going" of all living beings. Yet suffering does not end in identification with
all living beings. We must be released, finally, into the dimension of "appearance-disappearance, common to all
things." Abe says,
When Dogen emphasizes "all beings" in connection with the Buddha-nature, he definitely implies that
man's samsara, i.e., recurring cycle of birth and death, can be properly
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and completely emancipated not in the "living" dimension, but in the "being" dimension. In other words, it
is not by overcoming generation-extinction common to all living beings, but only by doing away with
appearance-disappearance, common to all things, that man's birth-death problem can be completely solved.
Dogen finds the basis for man's liberation in a thoroughly cosmological dimension. Here Dogen reveals a
most radical Buddhist dehomocentrism. 23
We fail to understand life and death, the fundamental human problem, if we deal with it only in human terms. The
life-and-death of human beings is subsumed by the generation-and-extinction (impermanence) of all sentient
beings. We fail again if we attempt to eradicate suffering at the level of all sentient beings. The generation-and-
extinction of all sentient beings is subsumed, in turn, by what Abe calls the "appearance-and-disappearance" of all
beings. There will be no release from human suffering, that is, until human beings experience themselves in the
"cosmological dimension" of all beings, until they understand that "mountain's walking is just like human
walking." As Dogen* says in his great work, "Mountains and Waters Sutra," ''If you doubt the mountains' walking,
you do not know your own walking; it is not that you do not walk, but that you do not know or understand your
own walking. "24
Abe contends, and I agree, that to say "there is a limit here" beyond which corealization cannot go, is to stop at the
level of the generation-extinction of all living beings.25 In failing to push further to the "appearance-
disappearance" of all things, Naess is committing to the kind of dualism that Dogen challenged in the Buddhist
tradition. It is to remain in the "living" dimension without hope of release from suffering rather than to push forth
to the cosmological dimension. Put in contemporary terms, this position remains close to the sphere of an animal
rights position, like Peter Singer's, according to which only sentient beings have moral standing, refusing to push
toward a radical environmental ontology that goes all the way down to the ontological "roots" in the appearance
and disappearance of all beings.26
As Abe points out, the third level of corealization is a "thoroughly cosmological dimension." This overcomes the
charge that Self-realization is merely a psychological, anthropocentric process, and accords perfectly with Naess's
point that in speaking of gestalts as concrete, relational states, he is making an ontological, rather than a
psychological, point about Self-realization. Naess's hesitation is probably the source of the charge against him that
his account of Self-realization remains anthropocentric.27 Naess often describes Self-realization as a process that
pushes out from the human to embrace greater and greater realms of being, but has "limits" at the level of plants.
Dogen provides an answer to this charge in a way that is consistent with deep ecological thinking. I use the term
"corealization" to mark this ontological dimension, in con-
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trast to "Self-realization," which might be understood as a psychological process.
Another great "thinker to the roots," Gary Snyder, elegantly expresses the truth of appearance-disappearance
common to all things when he says: "All beings are 'said' by the mountains and waterseven the clanking tread of a
Caterpillar tractor, the gleam of the keys of a clarinet." 28 There are no limits.
When Dogen* deflates our anthropocentrism, saying, "If you doubt the mountains' walking, you do not know your
own walking," when we are enjoined to "think like a mountain," this is not mystical drivel. These expressions point
toward a deep, coherent understanding of time, change, and causality. Yet these truths appear spontaneously, in the
moment before they are clouded by reason.
Ethics Without (Intrinsic) Good and Evil

Naess has often characterized his writing as fundamentally ontological, making the surprising claim that he is not
really interested in "ethics." Despite this, one of the basic commitments of deep ecology, after Self-realization, is
to the intrinsic value of nature.29 "Gestalt Thinking . . ." gives insight not available in Naess's other writings into
why he thinks of ethics as primarily an ontological enterprise.
The final section of "Gestalt Thinking . . ." connects the ontology of spontaneous experience with an ontology of
value. Naess discusses an unpublished paper by Yasuaki Nara, "The Practical Value of Dogen's* view of Nature,"
and Nara's use of two Japanese terms, inochi and kuyo. Inochi means, roughly, life, or the value of life. Nara notes
that the Buddhist precept of non-harming is merged with Japanese culture through inochi. As Nara explains,
however, this involves much more than a commitment to the non-harming of sentient beings. Inochi means the
non-harming of "all beings."
We come to appreciate the scope of inochi when we understand how it functions within the Japanese custom of
kuyo, memorial services to atone for harm done to all beings. Nara cites the example of the yearly service for eels,
performed by restaurant owners and customers for taking the inochi of the eels. Note that one does not swear off
eating eels or become a vegetarian. The kuyo requires one to grant, however, that the eater exists in relation to the
eel. To take the eel's inochi is an act of moral gravity.30
Nara goes on to point out that services for the taking of inochi are not limited to living things: "In the Edo period,
the housewife and daughters of each home were supposed to do kuyo for the used or broken needles with a sense
of
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regret for their lost inochi, thanks, and also with prayers for the enhancement of their sewing talents." Kuyo is also
done for "old clocks, dolls, chopsticks, spectacles, tea-whisk, etc." Nara concludes, "To sum up, the traditional
views of nature in Japan first of all do not make clear distinction between man, animals, and things. Though the
individuality of each exists, all are felt to be part of the one world of the Buddha, each revealing its value." 31
All beings havebetter, are theirinochi. When one is spontaneously present to "concrete contents," as Naess calls
them, in that moment before the clouding of reason, one cannot fail to be present to value(d) being. Gary Snyder,
writing of Dogen's* "Mountains and Waters Sutra," elegantly returns us to this original place:
Dogen is not concerned with "sacred mountains"or pilgrimages, or spirit allies, or wilderness as some
special quality. His mountains and streams are the processes of this earth, all of existence, process, essence,
action, absence; they roll being and nonbeing together. They are what we are, we are what they are. For
those who would see directly into essential nature, the idea of the sacred is a delusion and an obstruction; it
diverts us from seeing what is before our eyes; plain thusness. Roots, stems, and branches are all equally
scratchy. No hierarchy, no equality. . . . This, thusness, is the nature of the nature of nature. The wild in the
wild.32
For Snyder, like Dogen*, we see "directly into essential nature" when we are present to needles and dolls;
chopsticks and tea whisks; Caterpillar tractors and clarinet keys; mountains and waters. There is no hierarchy, no
equality, at all.
Naess himself grants that "cruel parasites, inflicting slow painful death on their victims" are "'things' and therefore
seem to be eligible for kuyo." Significantly, he describes this "horizontality and anti-hierarchical way of feeling
things" as "nearest to the truth and the [philosophy] which I feel at home with.''33
I contend, however, that this way of feeling makes sense only if Naess agrees with the fundamental point of the
previous section: There can be no limit to corealization. To attain a truly horizontal feeling, we must affirm
corealization, not just Self-realization. Corealization occurs among all beings, not just living beings. Naess's
account of value is clearly within the ontological dimension, but his account of Self-realization remains
psychological.
If Naess's account becomes ontological through and through, several important points become expressible. Notice
that inochi is a relationalthough not a relativesense of value. We always stand in relation to the concrete contents of
experience. When this becomes transparent to us, kuyo becomes necessary. One must atone for what one does
because the context is relational: it includes the eel and the eater. But in becoming directly present to the eel, one
does not create value, or "extend" moral standing from the human to the nonhuman.
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Rather, the choice is between acknowledging our responsibilityand eating gratefullyor failing to be directly present
to the eel, and to oneselfthereby eating with ingratitude.
This corelational account of value is not a form of relativism. The distinction between psychological Self-
realization and ontological corealization is critical here. If the Self simply extends itself to new realms of
identification, values appear to be created relative to the state of the Self. But when we and the "myriad things" go
forth to corealize, this is a way of being in the world, not a mental construction.
We can now see why Dogen * would have rejected the distinction between (intrinsic) good and evil for reasons
deriving from Nagarjuna*: Neither is absolute; to treat them as such is to invent an entia rationis. When we see
directly into nature, we are always directly present to Buddha-nature, to value(d) being. There is no distinction at
this level between good and evil, between the good parasite and the bad parasite. Such distinctions come later.
Intrinsic good and evil are, at most, "useful tools" required by reason to facilitate its work, and they are dangerous
if we forget the suspicion of reason.
Instead of speaking of good and evil as intellectual categories, Dogen speaks of the practice in which we are
directly present to things as they are (genjo*-koan*), the dimension of "appearance and disappearance." Here "the
resolve to do no evil continues as the act of not producing evil. When it comes to be that evils are no longer
produced, the efficacy of one's cultivation is immediately presencing."34 "Do no evil" becomes "the nonproduction
of evil''; "Do good" becomes "the performance of good." Good and evil as intellectual categories drop away.
Practice remains in the presence of things as they are: pure thusness, without hierarchy.
There is an illuminating connection between Dogen's* nondualistic practice and Naess's idea of beautiful
actions.35 Naess has distinguished what we conventionally mean by ethics, duty-bound actions following from
moral laws, from beautiful actions performed spontaneously and joyfully as an expression of Self. This reading of
Naess's beautiful actions as joyful acts done in the presence of the inochi of all beings, not just motivated by the
intrinsic value of some beings, appears sympathetic to his conclusion in "Gestalt Thinking . . . . "He notes, for
example, that it is hard to know what to say about the "problem of evil," given the "conception of intrinsic value of
all things." Surely, though, if we no longer know what to say of evil, we should also suspect its contrasting term,
the (intrinsic) good. Naess notes, "There is a need for clarification of the meaning of the intrinsic value conception,
but I cannot go into the matter here."36
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I suggest that Naess simply give up the distinction between intrinsic good and evil, at least when he is talking to
philosophers, since everything he wants to say about the value of nature can be captured through corealization.
Intrinsic value is merely an entia rationis that is sometimes useful for expressing the ontological point that humans
do not create the value of nature. Neither does nature create the value of human beings.
I also see a strong connection at this point between Dogen's * non-production of evil, Naess's beautiful actions, and
Spinoza's ethics. In the preface to the "Fourth Part of the Ethics: On Human Bondage, or the Powers of the
Affects," Spinoza talks freely about the way the mind constructs concepts, concepts that may be useful but also can
be dangerous if we do not recall the specific way Spinoza uses them. He reminds us that "Perfection and
imperfection, therefore, are only modes of thinking, i.e., notions we are accustomed to feign because we compare
individuals of the same species or genus to one another. This is why I said . . . that by reality and perfection I
understand the same thing." There is here a nonhierarchical acceptance of the reality of all beings. Of good and evil
he says, "As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in
themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to
one another."37 The great paradox of Spinoza's Ethics is that it is an ethic without good or evil.
If these suggestive readings make sense, it follows that it is a drastic misreading of Naess to depict him as an
environmental philosopher whose moral obligations toward nature are derived from a basic commitment to intrinsic
value. While he may use the language of intrinsic value as a helpful mental construction expressing his view that
nature cannot be abused for shallow human purposes, his deeper view is that "All things have value."38 We may
ask, then, in what way is Naess's "ethic" an environmental ethic? It does not privilege spotted owls over killer
parasites, or wild rivers over Caterpillar tractors.
Naess, I believe, is not an environmental ethicist. When he uses imprecise language like "Nature has intrinsic
value," he is open to the response "Nature as opposed to what?" Naess is not saying anything that distinguishes
"nature" from any other gestalt. But this is no criticism whatsoever. For Naess himself has said time and again that
he is not interested in ethics; he is, rather, proposing a "new way of seeing the world." He is proposing a "pre-
ethics'' that springs spontaneously from the respect/compassion for the thusness of all beings.
Ecosophy T respects all beings. It just so happens that Naess lives at a time when human suffering is causing the
eclipse of wild things. Unlike the environmental ethicist who intends to say something special about nature when
using the phrase "Nature has intrinsic value," Naess cannot be understood as saying
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something like "The value of nature trumps human concerns." This is where Naess's Buddhist compassion
translates into a Gandhian nonviolent political agenda that includes both wild nature and human beings. It thus
appears that Naess is not guilty of the charge that his use of the concept of intrinsic value pits humans against wild
nature, though this is certainly true of the way other radical environmental philosophers have used the concept. 39
Still, one can imagine the charge that direct presence to Buddha-nature makes for bad political movements. Deep
ecology began out of the urgent need to stop environmental destruction. Yet we all must do our own work at the
roots of suffering, even if we can later reach consensus at a more abstract, imprecise level. This does not make for
quick political action.
Naess does not say that we must complete our own work before reaching consensus. He says that we must
constantly work back and forth between "the heart of the forest" and the imprecise, but important, level of political
consensus where we may use the language of intrinsic value to effect change. This is what Buddhists call "skillful
means." The Buddhist realizes that we cannot say the truth to someone who has not yet had his or her experience in
the heart of the forest. One can, however, use skillful means to direct someone to that experience. While such
means cannot be entirely ''truthful"they are not "precise"they are motivated by compassion and the hope of relief
from suffering. The environmental ethicist uses language to lay out clear and precise ethical first principles from
which all duties follow. The environmental ontologist skillfully guides people toward the forest.
In this sense, Naess's environmental ontology leads him to a certain kind of value pluralism. He specifically
discourages the attempt to erase cultural differences, saying, "there is ample reason for supporters of the Deep
Ecology movement to refrain from questioning each other's ultimate beliefs. Deep cultural differences are more or
less cognitively unbridgeable and will remain so, I hope."40 Intrinsic value does not, and cannot, function for
Naess as the precise formulation of an ultimate ethical truth. Naess is calling for a network of solidarity among
plural human cultures, not the reduction of all beliefs to a precise ethical formula. Despite his pluralism, however,
Naess is not a relativist. He never doubts that those who directly experience things-as-they-are will work to prevent
destruction of the forest.
Notes
1. William Theodore de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan (New York: Vintage Books,
1972), p. 27, from Majjhima Nikaya.
2. Arne Naess, "Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism," unpub. ms, p. 4.
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3. See Paul Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza (New York: New York University Press, 1979).
Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 55 56, 161, 162 163.
5. My appreciation to Professor Naess for providing me with this paper in response to my earlier article, "Dogen *,
Deep Ecology and the Ecological Self," Environmental Ethics 16:2 (1994): 195 213. Thanks also to David
Rothenberg and Andrew Light for their thoughtful responses to the ideas expressed there.
6. Naess, "Gestalt Thinking," p. 2.
9. Rothenberg Is It Painful to Think? p. 155.
12. Daisetz T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).
13. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study on the M dhyamika System (London: Allan and
Unwin, 1960), p. 13 (italics in original).
14. For more detailed accounts of Nagarjuna's* thought, see T. P. Kasulis, Zen Action Zen Person (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1981); and Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (New York:
Abingdon Press, 1967).
16. Readers interested in the ways Dogen connects with and departs from Buddhist tradition should consult
Heinrich Dumoulin's Zen Buddhism: A History, vol. 2, Japan (New York: Macmillan, 1990).
17. Norman Waddell and Masao Abe, "Shobogenzo* Buddha Nature (Part I)," The Eastern Buddhist 8:2 (1975):
94.
18. The translation Waddell and Abe give for the second sentence is "All sentient beingswhole being is the
Buddha-nature." Ibid., p. 95. I have kept the translations parallel here. On the radicalization of Buddha-nature, see
Dumoulin, Japan.
19. This idea, however, was not original with Dogen. For some fascinating background on this issue, see William
LaFleur, "Sattva: Enlightenment for Plants and Trees in Buddhism," CoEvolution Quarterly 19 (1978): 47 52.
20. Norman Waddell and Masao Abe, "Shobogenzo Buddha Nature," (Part II), The Eastern Buddhist 9:1 (1976):
91, 93.
21. Given the previous section, perhaps one reminder is in order: Apparently categorical statements such as this
should be read as clues toward direct experience.
23. Masao Abe, "Dogen on Buddha Nature," Eastern Buddhist 4 (1971): 39.
24. Dogen, "Mountains and Waters Sutra," in Moon in a Dewdrop, edited by Kazuaki Tanahashi (Berkeley, CA:
North Point Press, 1985), p. 98.
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25. Naess does say, "There is a limit here. Not a definite [limit], and the options where to trace it are many"
(Naess, "Gestalt Thinking," p. 3). He does not explicitly address these options, but it does seem clear that he
questions whether we can go beyond plants.
26. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review, 1990).
27. See Val Plumwood, "Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of
Rationalism," Hypatia 6:1 (1991): 3 27.
28. Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990), p. 115.
29. This has led David Rothenberg, for example, to question whether Ecosophy T includes an ethical position. See
Rothenberg, Is It Painful to Think?
30. I develop a corelational account of eating along these lines in "Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care," Hypatia
6:1 (1991): 60 74, repr. in Deane Curtin and Lisa Heldke, eds., Cooking, Eating, Thinking: Transformative
Philosophies of Food (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
31. Naess, "Gestalt Thinking," pp. 8 9.
32. Snyder, Practice of the Wild, p. 103.
34. See Kasulis, Zen Action, pp. 94 95.
35. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, translated and edited by Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge
37. Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 2, edited by Edwin Curley, (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 545.
38. Naess, "Gestalt Thinking," p. 7. My emphasis.
39. See Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World
Critique," Environmental Ethics 11:1 (Spring 1989): 71 83, for this charge; and Arne Naess, "The Third World,
Wilderness, and Deep Ecology," in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, edited by George Sessions (Boston:
Shambhala, 1995), pp. 397 407, for Naess's response. I take J. Baird Callicott's early work to be a classic case of
the objectionable use of intrinsic value when he says, "The extent of misanthropy in modern environmentalism
thus may be taken as a measure of the degree to which it is biocentric." See Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic
(Albany: State University of New York 1989). His more recent attempt to provide an evolutionary account of
ethics in which human and environmental concerns coincide does nothing to provide a decision procedure for such
cases. Where Naess is an environmental ontologist, Callicott is an environmental ethicist.
40. Naess, "The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology," p. 400.
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14
Deep Ecology and Its Social Philosophy:
A Critique
Bron Taylor
Deep ecology philosophy is both more and less plural than is usually recognized. To assess such philosophy fully,
we must apprehend both its diversity and that which makes it possible to speak of deep ecology as an emerging
philosophy and movement.
For nearly a decade I have been conducting ethnographic and archival research exploring this movement,
especially in North America. In this essay I (1) describe the forms deep ecology assumes as it trickles down from
philosophers and shapes much of the grassroots environmental movement in the United States; (2) argue that the
Green ideology known as bioregionalism has almost universally been grafted onto deep ecology, becoming its de
facto social philosophy; and (3) evaluate the central conceptual claims and bioregional social philosophy that are
typically found in grassroots deep ecology.
Deep Ecology on the Ground

Deep ecology on the ground is simpler than in the philosophical literature. This is partly because few activists have
read or taken time to read such material widely. One consequence of this is that environmental activists who
embrace deep ecology tend to adopt simpler understandings of it than do writers of deep ecology philosophy. 1
Deep ecology on the ground is, conversely, more complicated than most versions found in the philosophical
literature. This is partly because its rank-and-file practitioners are less interested than are its philosophical
advocates in resolving inconsistencies or in defending a particular version of deep ecology.
Consequently, grassroots deep ecology has become a bricolage of countercultural ideas fused to a kind of generic
(common-denominator) understanding of deep ecology. This generic deep ecology can be expressed simply, in a
way that
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echoes the "eightfold platform" articulated by Arne Naess and George Sessions: All life has value, apart from its
usefulness to human beings, and thus, all life ought to be allowed to continue its evolutionary unfolding. 2 This
simple proposition, often reduced to the term "biocentrism" or "ecocentrism," captures well the central moral claim
of deep ecology.3
If this is correct, then deep ecology's grassroots evolution has little to do with Naess's apron diagram, whether
specific "ecosophies" ("T" or others) are compelling, or whether there is a better term than "deep ecology" to
express its key presuppositions.4 Many activists who identify with the deep ecology movement, of course, have
read and resonate with the eightfold platform. They agree that all life matters, and that if people are to respect
living systems, they must dramatically change their lifestyles and political arrangements in ways that reduce human
population, consumption, and ecologically unsustainable technologies.
The Wider Complex of Deep Ecology Ideas and Ideals

Thus, deep ecology on the ground seems, at first glance, to be content with a simple formula and general call to
action. But there are perspectives underlying and deduced from what I am calling the "generic" form of deep
ecology which are so widely shared that they may be considered, for practical and analytical purposes, important if
not essential parts of it.
Western Desacralization and Anthropocentrism as Root Cause;

Earthen Spirituality and Bioregional Ideology as Antidote
Many Greens, perhaps especially those identifying with deep ecology, believe that monotheistic religions foster
environmentally destructive behavior. Those religions shape consciousness such that humans believe that (1) they
are the only species which deserves moral consideration and (2) the holy is above or beyond the world, and thus
Earth's living systems are of penultimate moral concern. Additionally, such religion is criticized as intolerant of
and repressive toward peoples whose ideas and cultures are more ecologically sustainable. Put simply, Western
religions are anthropocentric and "desacralize" nature; consequently they precipitate a war on nature and nature-
beneficent cultures, and are the central engines of environmental calamity.5
The flip side of this coin is that Western religious idea-complexes must be overturned in order for humans to
harmonize their lives with nature. This helps to explain why deep ecology philosophers think it is important to
reject monotheism (considered the antinature, "dominant paradigm" of Western reli-
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gion and philosophy) while resurrecting and defending the lifeways and religions of the world's esoteric religious
traditions and remnant foraging societies.
George Sessions, for example, suggested that Western people could grope their way back to a proper
understanding of the "God/Nature/Man relationship" via the pantheism of the seventeenth-century philosopher
Baruch Spinoza. 6 He borrowed from Aldous Huxley (who borrowed in turn from Leibniz) a belief in "perennial
philosophy,"7 a variety of alternative, nature-beneficent ideals scattered globally and found especially in world's
surviving indigenous peoples, religions originating in the Far East, and among Jewish, Christian, and Muslim
contemplative mystics.8
The ubiquitous critique of Western spirituality also helps to explain why so many deep ecology activists have been
involved in Earth-oriented ritualizing. Indeed, in 1982, Bill Devall criticized environmentalists for failing to
"reconstruct [and] rediscover the earth bonding processeswhich worked so well for primal peoples" while praising
those engaged in countercultural spirituality for leading the way.9 In the years since he wrote those words, radical
environmentalists have designed many rites to evoke and deepen feelings of connection to a sacred Earth and its
many manifestations.10
Gary Snyder and Paul Shepard (more than Sessions, Devall, or even Arne Naess) developed many of the ideas that
would become central to the form deep ecology would take at the grass roots. In "Four Changes" (written before
Naess coined the term "deep ecology" and published in a Pulitzer Prize-winning book titled Turtle Island) Snyder
expressed virtually all the ideas that would later be sketched into the deep ecology platform.11 He penned
additional ideas that today are truisms, or nearly so, within the deep ecology movement. "Western Culture," he
asserted, is the "root of the environmental crisis'' because it severs culture from the "very ground of its own
being . . . from wilderness."12
Far preferable, Snyder claimed, are the beliefs of "Gnostics, hip Marxists, Teilhard de Chardin Catholics, Druids,
Taoists, Biologists, Witches, Yogins, Bhikkus, Quakers, Sufis, Tibetans, Zens, Shamans, Bushmen, American
Indians, Polynesians, Anarchists, [and] Alchemists."13 He also endorsed pantheistic beliefs in "nature herself . . the
great goddess, the Magna Mater" who, he added, "I regard . . . as a very real entity."14 Snyder further argued that
the animistic perceptions found in "all primitive cultures" demonstrate that people can learn to understand and
speak for the nonhuman world.15 Thus, Snyder's essay is noteworthy, and not only as an early expression of the
desire to supplant Western monotheism with spiritualities considered more nature-beneficent.
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Meanwhile, Paul Shepard was doing more than any other deep ecology architect to advance the central radical
environmental cosmogony, its story about how today's world came to be. In several remarkable books, Shepard
blamed the rise of pastoral and agricultural lifeways, both of which tamed animals (including humans), for
destroying environmental and human emotional health. 16 Both pastoral and agricultural societies required political
centralization and a warrior class for their expansion and perpetuation. They violently suppressed foraging peoples,
supplanting their cultures with cultures in which people had little contact with nature and less "attentiveness" to it,
turning the world into a "thing" instead of a "presence," widely destroying animistic spirituality and ethical
sensitivity toward nature.17 Pastoralism especially promoted these trends, producing hierarchical sky-God
cosmologies and violent centralized human cultures that severed the gods and the sacred from Earth, unleashing a
war against it. Such cosmologies were often, according to Shepard, fused to the agriculture with which they
became enmeshed and mutually dependent.18
In Coming Home to the Pleistocene, completed just before his death in 1996, Shepard summarized his lifework: "If
there is a single complex of events responsible for the deterioration of human health and ecology, agricultural
civilization is it."19 Despite the relentless, ten thousand-year drive toward an impoverishing domestication, humans
can rediscover appropriate lifeways, ones in which a life in wild nature is seen as "a basic optimum human
environment".20 "A new paradigm of primordial recovery" is possible, Shepard argued, one that ''models optimum
qualities of human life not only in terms of philosophy and culture but also in food, exercise, and society, as these
existed among late Pleistocene humanity and still exist in relic hunter/gatherer peoples. "21 The potential resides in
the human genome itself, Shepard believed, in our genetic inheritance from millennia as evolving Homo sapiens.
In the human genome, wildness and wisdom remainand they can teach us how to live.
Such "Back to the Pleistocene" sentiment was proclaimed early on by Gary Snyder in Turtle Island, but his
thinking later moderated. No less a critic of modern agriculture, Snyder now urges that we learn from, if not return
to, Neolithic or "upper-Paleolithic" lifeways that include small-scale, "traditional" (or "indigenous") agriculture and
horticulture.22
In response, Shepard gently criticized Snyder, as well as influential farmer-writers (and bioregionalists) Wes
Jackson and Wendell Berry, for failing to push "the thesis of an undiluted model of primal life to its conclusion."
He acknowledged, however, the apparent impracticality of this ideal, stating that he would certainly prefer that
their Neolithic consciousness would "prosper-and prevail" over current lifeways.23
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These figures, whose ideas have influenced grassroots deep ecology, believe that the domestication of plant and
animal life and agriculture itself inexorably reduce biological diversity. Indeed, despite disagreements about which
food production technology we should use, Snyder, Shepard, and early environmentalists such as John Muir and
Henry David Thoreau, who are considered to be elders by contemporary deep ecologists, 24 all trace the primordial
fall from a foraging paradise to agriculture.25 Such a cosmogony fuels the turn toward the local and a desire for a
bioregional polityan important if not universal aspect of grassroots deep ecology.
Summarized simply, bioregionalists envision decentralized governance ("community self-rule" and "participatory
democracy," in movement parlance) within political boundaries redrawn to reflect the natural contours of differing
ecosystem types.26 Such polity is needed because within a given ecological region people canby virtue of "being
there" and "learning the land,'' its climate patterns, native flora and fauna, water systems, soils, and so onbetter
care for and build ecologically sustainable lifeways than can people and institutions placed farther away. The
region itself, moreover, can become a part of human identity. To take care of one's place, therefore, is to take care
of oneself. It does not require altruism or sacrifice. As with deep ecology, such a shift in human identity, a sense of
loyalty to place, requires a fundamental spiritual reorientation toward a holistic, ecocentric worldview.
It was in Turtle Island that Snyder articulated the ideas which would provide the bedrock of bioregionalism, more
than five years before the term was coined.27 By the 1990s bioregionalism was firmly grafted to the grassroots
deep ecology movement in North America.28 To a significant extent, bioregionalism would put flesh on the
skeleton of a deep ecology platform that was strikingly bereft of political conviction. Indeed, bioregionalism
provided the deep ecology movement with the social philosophy that any comprehensive philosophy must develop.
Summary:
The Wider Complex
Snyder, Shepard, and others have promoted a complex of ideas that are now intimately associated with deep
ecology: We suffered a primordial fall from a foraging paradise in which domestication and agriculture
accompanied the destruction of nature-sympathetic (especially animistic and pantheistic) religious perceptions,
rituals, and lifeways. We should defend, learn from, and help revitalize the world's remnant foraging societies or
small-scale agricultures, and strive toward bioregional modes of identity and political governance. These are
among the transformations needed if we are to construct lifeways that ensure biological and cultural diversity.
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A recovery of ecological sustainability requires a rejection of modern, Western, anthropocentric, and monotheistic
modes of consciousness, bioregional deep ecology proclaims. This simultaneously will involve a return to or
invention of ritual forms that promote what could be called "primal" consciousness or spirituality. 29 It will
produce emotionally healthy animals, including humans. A transformed consciousness and proper spiritual
perception will yield a love for the land and all life, promote local acts of compassion, and ignite resistance to
environmental destruction. Such consciousness change will eventuate in bioregional activism and political
organization.30
Despite such broad agreement, Snyder and Shepard disagreed about the ability of the world's great, cosmopolitan
religions to foster the needed perceptual changes. In his final book, Shepard first quoted Snyder, agreeing with him
that "otherworldly philosophies end up doing more damage to the planet (and human psyches) than the existential
conditions they seek to transcend." He protested, however, Snyder's use of Jainism and Buddhism as models:
"Surely these are two of those great, placeless, portable, world religions whose ultimate concerns are not just
universal but otherworldly." Although Shepard clearly preferred that religion remain located bioregionally, he
could discern no contradiction in Snyder's personal life between his bioregional commitments and his approval of
some type of cosmopolitan religion. Shepard concluded, "I suspect that Snyder, like [Wendell] Berry and [Wes]
Jackson, is not so much following tradition as doing what Joseph Campbell called "creative mythology."31
This is a good point to conclude this brief overview of deep ecology as it grows on the ground, for whether in the
work of theorists like Snyder and Shepard, or in the ritualizing found among deep ecology groups, mythmaking
(and ritualizing) is important and ongoing. Cosmogonic myths diagnose our current predicament: Agricultures (and
later, large, centralized nation-states) have supplanted foraging lifeways and produced ecological and spiritual
dysfunction. From such myths is deduced a decentralist preference that shapes deep ecology's bioregional social
philosophy. They shape its evangelical strategy: To heal the Earth and all its creatures, we must find ways to
recover or invent a regionally placed, postanthropocentric consciousness and spirituality. To whatever extent
possible, we must return to the primal lifeways of foraging people or of small-scale, premonotheistic agricultures,
which have traditionally generated place-based identities and evoked kinship feelings for nonhuman nature.
Consciousness transformation, it is believed, is the first step toward the needed behavioral changes.
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A Critique of Deep Ecology

The following critique of bioregional deep ecology depends on the general accuracy of the preceding portrait. I
have identified, based on fieldwork and text-based research, central beliefs found among deep ecology proponents
and movements. I do not claim, by focusing on the mainstreams and central tendencies of deep ecological thought,
that everyone associated with the deep ecology movement uncritically endorses these tendencies. Quite the
contrary: Within most social movements there is pluralism as well as some ideaglue that binds together the group,
however tenuously. Because of space limitations, however, I must focus my critique on the main conceptual
tendencies found in North America's deep ecology movements.
A General Critique of Deep Ecology's Social Philosophy

Bioregional deep ecology generally asserts the binary associations found in table 14.1. My central argument is that
such ideology would be more compelling if its advocates would eschew simplistic binary oppositions and
monocausal explanations in their efforts to explain the causes of and solutions to environmental degradation.
Sometimes, of course, such dichotomies insightfully illuminate how certain social variables, cultural differences,
and historical developments shape human lifeways and impact nature. A problem arises, however, when such
dichotomies are viewed, as they often are, as distinct and rigid oppositions, or as variables whose influence runs in
a single direction. When examined in historical and cross-cultural perspective, it becomes clear that such
oversimplifications are grounded in a misleading failure to appreciate the diversity and complexity of human
cultures and political economies.
The failure of many deep ecology advocates to appreciate such complexity signals either social-scientific naïveté
or interpretive hubris. The latter is highly ironic, for in other important ways, bioregional deep ecologists express an
unusual and laudable humility. Even though it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape anthropocentrism, 32 the
effort to do so, and the claim that all life has value apart from its usefulness to human beings, is a salutary act of
moral imagination, perhaps even a spiritual insight. Such humility is morally praiseworthy: Willingness to consider
equally the interests of others (sometimes even above one's own) is widely and properly recognized as virtuous.
Individuals involved in deep ecology movements do, generally speaking, make significant sacrifices (at least as
conventionally understood) in their efforts to promote sustainability
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Table 14.1
Binary associations in bioregional deep ecology
Good Bad
Pastoral and agricultural societies
Foraging (or small-scale organic
horticultural) societies
Animistic, pantheistic, Monotheistic, sky-God,
goddess-matriarchal, or Eastern religions patriarchal, Western religions
Biocentrism/Ecocentrism Anthropocentrism
(promotes conservation) (promotes destruction)
Intuition Reason (especially instrumental)
Holistic worldviews Mechanistic and dualistic worldviews
Decentralism Centralization
Primitive technology Modern technology
Regional self-sufficiency Globalization and international trade
Anarchism/participatory democracy Statism, corruption, authoritarianism
Radicalism Pragmatism
through lifestyle simplification and political action. They express a commendable humility when they insist that
ecosystems are more complex than we can know, deducing from this a powerful rationale for precautionary
principles that demand the protection of all ecosystem types as wilderness or biosphere reserves.
Yet such humility often evaporates when deep ecology advocates turn their attention to political and economic
systems. This is ironic, partly because dualistic distinctions, such as summarized in table 14.1, seem incongruent
with the holistic, antidualistic metaphysics endorsed by most deep ecologists. Given such holism, it is surprising
how often deep ecology advocates articulate or otherwise express dualistic beliefs to the effect that some such
systems are "unnatural." 33 Equally ironic is that many such holistic thinkers fail to apprehend that, because
political and economic systems are embedded in ecosystems, they are also highly complex.
Complexity suggests more than a suspicion of monocausal explanations for social reality. It underscores the
difficulty of identifying the relative importance of the multiple variables contributing to social realities and social
transformations. An understanding of socioeconomic systems as aspects of even more complex living systems
clarifies why it is often difficult for scholars or activists to discern which strategies might best effect the desired
transformations. An understanding of political complexity would lead to greater humility when making tactical and
strategic recommendations, and less antipathy toward
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those with similar goals but differing political judgments about how best to pursue them. This is not an abstract
point. Those well acquainted with internal politics among environmentalists know how common it is for strategic
disagreements to devolve into counterproductive brawls.
This general critique, and the negative effects of simplistic historical and social scientific analysis, can be used to
evaluate, through cross-cultural and historical examples, several specific claims that are endemic within the
bioregional deep ecology movement.
To summarize: Deep ecology advocates argue that
1. Anthropocentric attitudes, emerging with agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, and subsequently grounded in
Western philosophies and religions, are causing the current extinction episode.
2. Hope requires widespread resistance to environmental degradation and the evolution of bioregional governance
and bioregionally sustainable lifeways.
3. This requires that we replace anthropocentric with ecocentric attitudes.
4. Such replacement in turn requires that we "resacralize" our perceptions of nature and, thus, a religious revival of
indigenous and Eastern religions, or holistic metaphysics (such as Spinozan philosophy or "scientific" pantheism).
In short, deep ecology posits that a transformation of human consciousness must take place if humans are to
reestablish harmony with nonhuman nature.
A Critique of Specific Claims and Assumptions

On Consciousness and Environmental Behavior
We do not have convincing empirical (quantitative) research correlating environmental attitudes and behavior.
Nevertheless, my fieldwork in North America suggests that in the affluent, industrialized West, people espousing
ecocentric values do promote environmentally aware lifestyles and passionate political action more consistently and
passionately than those who express anthropocentric attitudes and presuppositions. 34 There is ample evidence,
however, that the dichotomies and correlations surmised by many deep ecology advocates (e.g., in table 14.1) are
not as strong as they presume. Indeed, the increasing number and diversity of ecological resistance movements
around the world suggest that some deep ecology premises are, if anything, decreasingly apt generalizations about
social reality.
This was an important finding of my on-the-ground research that explored diverse and widely dispersed examples
of movements promoting environmental protection which have been variously been characterized as "militant" or
"radical."35 This cross-cultural research challenged the prevalent deep ecological conviction that consciousness
change toward an ecocentric, deep ecological spirituality is a precondition of "radical" environmental action.
Although we
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found examples where deep ecology-like values and spiritualities animated environmental actors and groups, we
also found many cases where such motivations were missing or not widely shared. Indeed, contrary to deep
ecological expectations, in the global context the most prevalent factor precipitating and justifying aggressive
environmental resistance appears to be a recognition that intensifying environmental degradation directly threatens
traditional livelihoods, human health, and the life prospects of children. 36
Indeed, it is social analysis purporting to explain the causes of current environmental threats that most decisively
fosters environmental activism. Social analysis helps inspire the creation of new environmental movements and
ecologizes the agendas of many social movements that originally had no environmental objectives. In the global
context, it is not an analysis of the environmentally destructive consequences accompanying the advent of pastoral
or agricultural lifeways, or of the changes in religious perceptions that accompanied such developments, which
most decisively fuels resistance, even in cases where such views are present.
The most common social analysis animating grassroots environmentalism outside of the industrial West can be
summarized in this way: The land has been stolen and abused by outsiderseither by multinational commercial
interests, or more commonly, by national and local commercial eliteswho are interested in quick profits rather than
in ecologically sustainable land use.37 Grassroots activists often trace the beginning of this process to the arrival
of colonial armies, the theft of their mineral resources, and fast-following commercial enterprises, including cash-
crop monocultures.38 It is not agriculture or technology per se that is blamed for immiseration, therefore, but
international agribusiness which overturns putatively sustainable agricultures, centralizing production and
exporting food, displacing and impoverishing the original inhabitants. Such analysis is often and increasingly tied
to a clear understanding of how the enclosure of commons lands and the displacement of peoples living there play
a key role in the destruction of human lives, cultures, and the environments upon which human lives depend.39
These types of analyses represent a novel fusion of left-wing criticism and a growing ecological and historical
understanding of the processes by which traditional livelihoods have been lost and of the ways in which modern
agriculture impoverishes people and ecosystems. In less-affluent countries we increasingly find, consequently, that
notions such as "sustainable development" and "environmental justice" provide valuable conceptual resources both
for environmental resistance and for endeavors to restore traditional and less-damaging agricultures and
livelihoods.40 Nevertheless, some prominent deep ecology ad-
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vocates dismiss such notions as an impediment to environmental sustainability, considering them to be
anthropocentric and thus, not sufficiently ecological or ecocentric. 41
When informed by an ecological understanding of resource-based limits and widespread environmental damage
resulting from industrial growth, even those with anthropocentric value systems will realize that such growth
cannot benefit most people. Participants in popular movements, consequently, decreasingly view industrial growth
as the "development" goal or the means to "social justice."42 Arriving at such ecology-informed conclusions
certainly involves a transformation of consciousness, particularly when we consider the success capitalist societies
have had in making economic growth the axial social organizing principle of most countries on the planet. But
such consciousness change can occur without a concomitant shift toward a deep ecological, or even an ecocentric,
perspective.
Indeed, the obvious negative consequences of unrestrained "development" reinforce perceptions that the land has
been expropriated by outsiders who are using it up for their exclusive benefit, and the conclusion that any further
extension of international commerce betrays local needs and interests.43 In the final analysis, it is often a
realization of the connections between commercial development, ecological deterioration, and declining life
prospects that produces what can be called the "ecologization" of many popular social movements.44 Increasingly,
social movements are becoming ecologized, recognizing that growth and industrialization are illusions of
prosperity offered by elites to keep ordinary people from defending and promoting appropriate and sustainable
alternatives.
On Spirituality and "Ecological Consciousness"
What about the claim that we must resacralize our perceptions of nature? What of the ubiquitous assumption within
deep ecology movements that resacralization requires a rejection of Western monotheistic (and patriarchal)
religions? What of the belief that the worldviews and religious practices of Eastern religions and indigenous
peoples, or pantheistic metaphysics, provides superior ground for environmentalism than Western religions or
philosophies?45
My brief response involves four assertions. First, current scholarship shows that the ecological practices of
indigenous peoples are diverse and efforts to portray such peoples as ecological saints or sinners are simplistic,
failing to recognize religious and cultural pluralism among and within such groups.46 Second, the debate over the
impact of Eastern religious ideals on environmental behavior is anything but resolved, and the tendency to make
broad generaliza-
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tions has proven problematic, just as it did with indigenous societies. 47 Third, those who have asserted that
Christianity is the decisive variable precipitating environmental degradation have advanced a conclusion which
exceeds their evidence.48 To summarize these three points: The putative ecological superiority of indigenous and
Eastern religions over monotheistic worldviews is a difficult empirical question. The likelihood is that broad
generalizations about the ecological superiority of one or another culture or religious tradition will continue to
prove wanting. Understanding the ecological impacts of societies and religions will require careful attention not
only to the tendencies that inhere in different groups, but also to their internal pluralism and changing forms.
My fourth assertion, then, in response to the typical assumptions about religion found in deep ecology subcultures,
is that a greater appreciation of the malleability of religion is needed than is usually found within them.49 A proper
appreciation of religious change can be grounded in the history of religion. Fieldwork exploring the ways in which
religious, philosophical, and ecological ideas cross-fertilize and transmogrify group thinking and practices can also
foster an appreciation of religion's malleability.50
Whatever tendencies there have been or may be in various cultural and religious traditions with regard to
environment-related behaviorwhen the ecological facts become clear, when people recognize that their well-being
is threatened by environmental degradation, when they decide to do something about ittheir followers usually turn
first to their own traditions. There they seek the conceptual and material resources they will need to respond. When
these resources prove inadequate, people often will transform their traditions, sometimes rapidly, into forms better
suited to the challenge. Sometimes this occurs as a result of cross-fertilization and mutual influence among groups
that are usually isolated from each other and thus have little opportunity to exercise mutual influence. When
environmental circumstances become dire, however, people often become more receptive to participating in
coalitions, encountering new people, and considering new ideas. When such social dynamics are unleashed, few
remain unchanged in the process.
These findings square with those of scholars who have studied grassroots environmentalism in less-affluent
countries.51 They also cohere with recent scholarship examining the "greening" of monotheistic religions in the
West.52 A good example of such change can be found in the "Earth Charter," an endeavor led by an ecumenical
coalition of religious leaders to construct, with participation from "civil society" around the world, principles for
revering the Earth. The hope is to have the Charter ratified by the United Nations, and that this would inspire
greater international cooperation toward solving environmental
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problems. Interestingly, the second draft retains language of the sacred and intrinsic value to describe human
responsibilities to the nonhuman nature:
Planet Earth, our home, is alive with a unique community of life. With reverence for the sources of our
being, we give thanks for the gift of life. We affirm that Earth's life support systems and resources are the
common heritage of all and a sacred trust. Ensuring a healthy and beautiful Earth with clean air, pure
waters, fertile lands, expansive forests, and plentiful oceans is a basic common interest of humanity. . . .
General Principles: Respect Earth and all life . . . [and] the interdependence and intrinsic value of all beings.
53
This document is based on long-term discussions among people of many different civil and religious groups, and
illustrates how people with very different worldviews are developing new perspectives in response to the
environmental crisis.
To summarize, participants in deep ecology groups generally believe that a shift toward primal, pagan, or Eastern
religious spiritualities is a crucial prerequisite to reharmonizing human and nonhuman relations. Such beliefs need
heavy qualification. The history of religion demonstrates the malleability of religion, and contemporary research
shows dramatic changes unfolding in many religious groups and most religious traditions. Meanwhile, the
emergence of increasingly plural grassroots environmental movements demonstrates that deep ecological
consciousness change is no more likely to spur ecological resistance than ecological education combined with
appeals to self-interest and concern for children, families, and communities. Indeed, many of the deep ecology
dichotomies listed in table 14.1 are incomprehensible and have little explanatory power in non-Western contexts.54
On Bioregional Ideology, Decentralization, and the Question of Power
We have already reviewed the extent to which deep ecology has fused with bioregionalism. Much bioregional
theorizing has focused on the difficulties involved in demarcating bioregions. We can see that such difficulties are
not insuperable, however, when we recognize that bioregional provinces are necessarily also cultural zones; they
are social constructions, not just ecological realities. If they are to become governance units, they must be
contested and negotiated.55
Another problem identified by political scientists is that "States in a world organized along bioregional lines would
be more prone to conflicts rooted in differences in identity and traditions."56 The explosion of violence that
attended the bioregional breakup of the Soviet Union certainly intensified this critique. It is worth noting,
moreover, that "The designers of the American Constitution were keenly aware of the [dangers of the bioregional]
European
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pattern and . . . were determined to avoid and counteract [regional conflicts by relying on] unnatural borders." 57
It is not clear, however, that in the long run and on every continent and during every era, violence and conflict
would be greater under bioregional forms of political organization than under political units drawn according to
bioregional differences. Fear of balkanization raises important concerns, but a universal condemnation of
bioregional polity does not logically follow. Gary Snyder, for example, would likely point to anthropologist A. L.
Kroeber's work which shows that Native Americans have usually lived peacefully, largely in differing bioregional
provinces.58
A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who influenced their most influential
theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by life in unnatural, hierarchical,
centralized, industrial societies) to cooperative behavior.59 This debatable assumption appears to depend more on
radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or anthropology.
Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species
survival; so also, at times, does aggressive competitiveness.60 Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for
human altruism, it is doubtful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of
power by selfish and well-entrenched elites.
It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments will not voluntarily cede authority.61 Any
political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely require "widespread violence and dislocation."62 Few
bioregionalists seem to recognize this likelihood, or how devastating to nature such a transitional struggle would
probably be. Moreover, making an important but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist
Daniel Deudney warns: The sizes of the bioregionally based states would vary greatly because bioregions vary
greatly. This would mean that some states would be much more powerful than others [and] it is not inevitable that
balances of power would emerge to constrain the possible imperial pretensions of the larger and stronger states.63
Andrew Bard Schmookler, in his critique of utopian anarchism, has raised a kindred concern. In The Parable of the
Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution, he criticized anarchists (and their relatively moderate
bioregional progeny) for ignoring a specific problem of power.64 He asked: How can good people prevent being
dominated by a ruthless few, and what will prevent hierarchies from emerging if decentralized political self-rule is
ever achieved? One does not have to believe all people are bad to recognize that not all people will be good, he
argued; and unless bad people all become good, there is no solution
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to violence other than some kind of government to restrain the evil few. Schmookler elsewhere noted that those
who exploit nature gather more power to themselves. How, then, can we restrain such power? There must be a
government able to control the free exercise of power, Schmookler concluded.
Once when debating Green anarchists and bioregionalists in a radical environmental journal, Schmookler agreed
that political decentralization is a good idea. But if we move in this direction, he warned, ''There should be at the
same time a world order sufficient [to thwart] would-be conquerors." Moreover, "Since the biosphere is a globally
interdependent web, that world order should be able to constrain any of the actors from fouling the earth. This
requires laws and means of enforcement." Schmookler concluded, "Government is a paradox, but there is no
escaping it. This is because power is a paradox: our emergence out of the natural order makes power an inevitable
problem for human affairs, and only power can control power." 65
Bioregionalism generally fails to grapple adequately with the problem of power. Consequently, it has little "answer
to specifically global environmental problems," such as atmospheric depletion and the disruption of ocean
ecosystems by pollution and overfishing. Political scientist Paul Wapner argues that this is because bioregionalism
assumes "that all global threats stem from local instances of environmental abuse and that by confronting them at
the local level they will disappear."66
Nor does bioregionalism have much of a response to the "globalization" of corporate capitalism and consumerist
market society, apart from advocating local resistance or long-odds campaigns to revoke the corporate charters of
the worst environmental offenders. These efforts do little to hinder the inertia of this process.67 And little is ever
said about how to restrain the voracious appetite of a global-corporate-consumer culture for the resources in every
corner of the planet. Even for the devout, promoting deep ecological spirituality and ecocentric values seems
pitifully inadequate in the face of such forces. Perhaps it is because they have little if any theory of social change,
and thus cannot really envision a path toward a sustainable society, that many bioregional deep ecologists revert to
apocalyptic scenarios. Many of them see the collapse of ecosystems and industrial civilization as the only possible
means toward the envisioned changes. Others decide that political activism is hopeless, and prioritize instead
spiritual strategies for evoking deep ecological spirituality, hoping, self-consciously, for a miracle.
Certainly the resistance of civil society to globalization and its destructive inertia is honorable and important, even
a part of a wider sustainability strategy. But there will be no victories over globalization and corporate capitalism,
and
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no significant progress toward sustainability, without new forms of international, enforceable, global environmental
governance. 68 Indeed, without new restraints on power, both within nations and internationally, the most beautiful
bioregional experiments and models will be overwhelmed and futile.
Even bioregional deep ecologists deeply committed to this new Green ideology sometimes realize that lasting
victories must be gained through legislation or secured in the courts. The history of environmental politics in the
United States certainly demonstrates that, contrary to bioregional ideology, it is often people far away who care
more for specific places than those near them. This dynamic is apparent in federal legislation and judicial rulings;
they have repeatedly provided wildlands greater protection from local extractive interests than would have been the
case were such places left exclusively under local jurisdiction.69 It is curious to me that so few bioregional deep
ecologists notice the irony when their adversaries in the "wise use" movement parrot their primary political
objective, decentralization and local control.70 Such realities provide ample reason for skepticism that
decentralization along bioregional lines will bring the desired transformations, at least in the foreseeable future.
My quarrel here is with the idea that "bioregionalization" is a panacea for environmental protection and positive
social change, with related binary oppositions such as "big political systems bad/small political systems good."
This criticism notwithstanding, there is a core of common sense to the idea that people living in a region are better
placed than people far away to learn about their region and how to live there sustainably. There are also many
encouraging examples of environmental activism and practice that have been inspired by bioregional ideas.
The recent "bioregionalization" of California provides an important example. In 1991, eighteen federal and state
resource agencies signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" titled "California's Coordinated Regional Strategy to
Conserve Biological Diversity.'' The agreement subdivided California into ten large ecoregions and charged
officials within them to cooperate on all issues related to environmental protection and resource management.71
These new management units ignored the preexisting county structures and were based largely on judgments about
the boundaries of different ecosystem types.
This dramatic initiative would not have happened in the absence of decades of grassroots activism and severe
environment-related conflicts. The "bioregional" or "biodiversity" project, as this governmental initiative is
sometimes called, is not only a new way governments are hoping to manage ecosystems. It is also a way
government officials hope to reduce and manage political conflicts about how to manage them.
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The most thoughtful pioneers of bioregional deep ecology, it must be stressed, are not ideologues. In an essay
reflecting on the bioregionalization of California, for example, Gary Snyder wrote, "I am not arguing that we
should instantly redraw the boundaries of the social construction called California, although that could happen
some far day." Instead, Snyder advanced a longer-term view, concluding that bioregional thinking "leads toward
the next step in the evolution of human citizenship." 72 And Raymond Dasmann, who coauthored perhaps the most
important early bioregional manifesto,73 while asserting two decades later that there are "obvious advantages to
bringing a unified political control over the management of a single ecosystem,'' also recognized the formidable
"political difficulties involved in redefining longstanding county or state boundaries." Dasmann concluded
pragmatically, "It appears more feasible to seek close cooperation among the agencies involved in the management
of a bioregion than to attempt the redrawing of political maps."74 As we have seen, this process is under way in
California, and despite many problems, such developments show that bioregional ideas can foster many positive
changes, even without redrawing all political boundaries and immediately realizing a bioregional utopia.
It is this kind of pragmatic bioregional deep ecology that is most promising. It promotes concrete engagements
within bioregions and pushes governments toward more rational, environment-related policies that consider the
well-being of ecosystems and watersheds that cross existing political boundaries.
Toward a Bioregional and Terrapolitan, Deep and Social Environmentalism

I have elucidated the core ideas of deep ecology and the bioregional social philosophy that has been grafted upon it
within the grassroots deep ecology movement. I then criticized the penchant in these movements to oversimplify
the causes of and potential solutions to the environmental crisis. My hope is that critique can foster changes which
can make bioregional deep ecology more politically effective and intellectually compelling. By returning to a
previous criticism, I suggest an example of how this might work.
Despite his previous, power-related criticisms, Dan Deudney applauds bioregionalism and deep ecology for
promoting "earth-centered identity and community claims." These can, he believes, erode the nationalistic
identities that so often precipitate environmentally destructive conflict. Nevertheless, he criticizes "localist
bioregional ideologies and political practices" for failing to apprehend "the unmistakable message of ecological
science . . .that the earth is the only integral bioregion, and that the 'homeland' of all humans is the whole
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planet rather than some piece of it." 75 This critique illustrates the peril of basing environmental politics primarily
on decentralist principles. Arguing for a better approach, Deudney coined the term "terrapolitanism" to capture the
need for new forms of political association based on loyalty to Earth itself.76
If such philosophy were to spread widely, it would provide a social-philosophical ground for what Deudney thinks
we shall need if we are to arrest the destruction of the biosphere: legitimate international governance grounded in a
federal-republican Earth constitution.77 Deudney and those pursuing international environmental governance offer
an important corrective to decentralist absolutism, for surely we must develop cooperative global responses to
protect the planetary commons.
Interestingly, in a way reminiscent of bioregional spirituality, Deudney thinks that the development of a "planetary
civic earth religion" could contribute to the conceptual and affective basis for new forms of international
governance.78 Indeed, he strikes a deep ecological note, asserting that environmentalist and deep ecological
worldviews express a more credible cosmology than traditional religions. "Environmentalism is the first worldview
of the modern era that can present a credible cosmology," he claims, adding, "A striking feature of 'deep ecology'
as a spiritual and moral system is that it can make at least a prima facie claim to being compatible with an
important science-ecology."79
I am sympathetic with such assertions. A planetary civil Earth religion could emerge, playing a positive role in
replacing nationalistic identities with more life-affirming bioregional and terrapolitan identities. Deudney himself
thinks that the idea of the Earth as alive, as Gaia, could provide the common denominator for a planetary civil
religion. He argues that Gaia is the "most salient metaphorical structure spanning the divide between ecological
science and Earth identity narratives,"80 and concludes that "Gaian Earth religiosity seems well suited to serve as
the 'civic religion' for a federal-republican Earth constitution."81 There are alternatives. The Earth Charter, for
example, could be considered another, more inclusive manifesto for a planetary civil religion.
I am concerned that Deudney may, like other deep ecology sympathizers, underestimate the ability of the traditional
religions to reconfigure themselves, and overestimate the likelihood that large numbers of people will jettison their
birth religions for Gaian Earth religiosity. Of course, many traditional religions already view the Earth's living
systems as sacred or otherwise as deserving reverence and due care, and some are now evolving such theologies.
Some are incorporating, and others will incorporate, Gaian Earth spirituality into their worldviews. For others,
however, this would be impossible without a more comprehensive conversion. In any case, traditional religions
must be full part-
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ners in the sustainability discussions, even if they do not fully adopt cosmologies and mythic metaphors that
scientists and intellectuals find compelling. The Earth Charter, emerging from a long process of consultation
involving the participation of diverse sectors of civil society, seems less prone to exclusionary assumptions.
I conclude recapitulating my general argument. Bioregional deep ecology will be more compelling if its advocates
eschew reductionistic explanations for, and simplistic solutions to, our environmental predicaments. To their credit,
many deep ecologists recognize that in addition to a proper spiritual perception and biocentric morality, a social
critique and a social philosophy are needed. They have set off in a promising direction, appropriating bioregional
thought and mapping out positive campaigns resisting environmental degradation and restoring ecosystems. But
they should take more seriously the biospheric dimensions of the environmental crisis and consider new strategies
to address them. Deep ecology movements must open themselves to greater cross-fertilization with other
perspectives, including international relations theory and social ecology. If we are to grapple our way toward a
greener tomorrow, openness to and experimentation with new ideas is essential. There are too many variables for
us to identify with certainty the most decisive cause of environmental decline or the best solution to it. There are,
however, many contributing causes that can be identified and attacked, and many worthy experiments in
sustainability are under way or envisioned, and worth supporting. 82
At their best, bioregional deep ecology movements represent a morally laudatory humility and compassion. Their
activists are among the most passionate defenders of life on Earth. Stripped of overbroad critiques and simplistic
prescriptions, their insights can be bedrock for the construction of Green social philosophy. They should be
welcomed into the sustainability debate, along with the raucous chorus of new and old environmental philosophies,
traditional religions, diverse political theories, and nature religions. Perhaps in this stew of rapidly mutating and
cross-fertilizing political life and thought, we can find hope and take heart.
Notes
1. What seems essential in the deep ecology literature (see the essay by Eric Katz, chapter 2 in this volume) is not
in the deep ecology movement.
2. See the introduction to this volume.
3. This formulation has been synthesized from dozens of similar articulations found within deep ecology groups
and the corresponding literature. Some deep ecologists prefer
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the term "ecocentrism" to "biocentrism," asserting they are concerned with ecosystems as wholes, not only with
life-forms. The terms are often used interchangeably.
4. As Warwick Fox argues in Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston: Shambhala, 1990).
5. Only two years after Naess began speaking of "deep ecology," George Sessions blamed Judeo-Christianity for
sponsoring anti-Nature behaviors and ignoring the anti-anthropocentric insights of postsixteenth-century natural
science; see George Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis," Humboldt Journal of Social
Relations 2 (1974): 1 12. He wrote, "Western ethical systems which portray humans as being of ultimate value in
the universe are only a manifestation of the anthropocentric cosmologies within which they have developed. The
entire humanistic approach to Nature displays a profound ignorance and insensitivity to contemporary
cosmological and ecological conceptions of man's place in nature" (p. 10).
In "Earth bonding," Earth First! 3 (1982): 13, 21, Bill Devall argued similarly, criticizing Christianity for its
war against paganism and environmentalists for undue preoccupation with Western rationality.
6. Sessions first asserted that Spinoza's pantheism better fits contemporary scientific understandings and properly
overturns Western anthropocentrism in "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis" (p. 9). Soon afterward he
expanded this argument in "Spinoza and Jeffers on Man in Nature," Inquiry 20 (1977): 481 528, specifically
criticizing the "Judeo-Christian tradition" for ''the demise of pantheism and the desacralization of Nature" (p. 482)
while discussing similar tendencies in Western philosophy.
7. Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1944). "Philosophia Perennisthe phrase
was coined by Leibniz; but the thingthe metaphysic that recognizes a divine Reality substantial to the world of
things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, or even identical with,
divine Reality; the ethic that places man's final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent Ground of
all beingthe thing is immemorial and universal. Rudiments of the Perennial Philosophy may be found among the
traditional lore of primitive peoples in every region of the world, and in its fully developed forms it has a place in
every one of the higher religions" (p. vii).
8. The initial passage of Sessions's "Spinoza and Jeffers on Man in Nature" provides an excellent early example of
the type of argument widely held by deep ecologists: "Modern Western society has experienced a profound failure
of religious, philosophical, and moral leadership. A more-or-less continuous minority tradition in the West, more
in keeping with the great religions of the East . . . might have provided leadership . . . but it has not done so. This is
a tradition, both its Eastern and Western versions, which Aldous Huxley [and] Leibniz before him called the
'perennial philosophy'. Most of the hunting and gathering societies . . . have been guided by religions which were
part of this tradition. And in the civilized West, a tenuous thread [of Perennial philosophy] can be drawn" (p. 481).
Sessions then mentions several pre-Enlightenment philosophers and theologians, including St. Francis, and
more recent thinkers, such as "Spinoza, Thoreau, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Lauren Eisley, Gary Snyder, Paul
Shepard, [and] Arne Naess." Despite differences, Sessions continues, "This minority tradition could have
provided the West
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with a healthy basis for realistic portrayal of the balance and interconnectedness of three artificially separate
components (God/Nature/Man) of an ultimately seamless and inseparable Whole. It is this basis that we need
now. It means rejecting the dominant Western paradigm of the God/Nature/Man relationship and the individual,
and societal divisions, programs, values, and actions which are a result of this paradigm; all of which are
leading human societies and the biosphere, as we know it, to destruction" (pp. 481 482).
9. Devall, "Earth bonding." Specifically, he praised Native American, New Age, and ecopsychology subcultures
for fostering Earth-beneficent consciousness change, mentioning Gary Snyder, Dolores LaChapelle, Paul Shepard,
Sun Bear, and ecopsychology pioneer Robert Greenway. Oddly, Devall later asserted, in a review of my Ecological
Resistance Movements, that deep ecology should not be considered a form of nature mysticism. See Devall's "How
Radical and Deep the Resistance?," The Trumpeter 12 (Fall 1995): 201 203; and my rejoinder, "Ecological
Resistance Movements; Not Always Deep but if Deep, Religious," The Trumpeter 13 (Spring 1996): 98 103.
10. See Bron Taylor, "Evoking the Ecological Self: Art as Resistance to the War on Nature," Peace Review: The
International Quarterly of World Peace 5 (1993): 225 230.
11. Gary Snyder, "Four Changes," in his Turtle Island (New York: New Directions, 1969), pp. 91 114. Here
Snyder asserted the intrinsic value of all species and stressed the importance of evolution and "biological
diversity," in the earliest use of this phrase that I have found anywhere (p. 108). He also urged a dramatic
reduction in human numbers and consumption, likening the growth of industrial society to a "cancer" on the
planet. This may be the first such use of this now common metaphor.
12. Ibid., p. 106.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 107.
15. Ibid., p. 110.
16. Shepard's most important early books are The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game (New York: Scribner's,
1973) and Nature and Madness (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1982). See especially Nature and Madness, where he
asserts that the process of domestication makes animals and humans alike "infantile" while fostering social
hierarchy and eroding the human perception of a sacred world (pp. 35 39, 113 114, 171 n. 2). In Coming Home to
the Pleistocene (San Francisco: Island Press, 1998), p. 132, he seems to soften his position, asserting that
genetically we remain wild, even when we become conditioned to comfortable and domesticated landscapes.
When I first interviewed him, Earth First! cofounder and deep ecology advocate Dave Foreman singled out
Shepard's work as very influential. (Many Earth First!ers share John Muir's contempt for sheep, sometimes
quoting his description of them as "hooved locusts.")
In The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1991), pp. 110 11, 267, 439 nn. 84, 86, Max Oelschlaeger asserts that this type of view was articulated initially
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 1778), who in turn directly influenced Gary Snyder. See Gary Snyder, Earth
House
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Hold: Technical Notes and Queries to Fellow Dharma Revolutionaries (New York: New Directions, 1977), pp.
118 122.
Shepard was influenced especially by Nigel Calder, Eden Was No Garden: An Inquiry into the Environment of
Man (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967); Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago:
Aldine, 1968); Peter Ucko and G. W. Dimbleby, eds., The Domestication and Exploitation of Plants and
Animals (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); and Morris Berman, The Reenachantment of the World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1981).
Gary Snyder made comments akin to Shepard's pioneering "ecopsychology" and suggested that human
emotional health depends on finding an ecological identity through "psychological techniques for creating an
awareness of 'self' which includes the social and natural environment" (Turtle Island, p. 101).
17. Shepard, Nature and Madness, pp. 37, 22 23; Coming Home, pp. 81 103.
18. See Shepard, Coming Home, pp. 109 129, for example. "Pastoralism was one of the two great paths leading
into the civilized world, and without its myths, traditions, and economy the modern world would be
incomprehensible. The slow fusion of the earliest sedentary agriculture and the emergent ideology of the
pastoralists between about six thousand and two thousand years ago gave us the first modern states. The long
shadow thrown over the earth's ecology is that of a man on a horse, the domestic animal which, more than any
other consolidated centralized power, energized the worldwide debacle of the skinning of the earth, the creation of
modern war, and the ideological disassociation from the earthbound realm" (p. 109).
19. See Shepard, Coming Home, p. 103. The subjunctive tense here contradicts the unambiguous conviction of the
rest of his work that promotes this monocasual explanation.
20. Here, quoting Hugh Iltis, in Coming Home, p. 136.
21. Ibid.
22. My interview with Gary Snyder at Davis, CA, June 7, 1993.
23. See Shepard, Coming Home, p. 107.
24. For how earlier environmentalists, including John Muir and Henry David Thoreau, expressed similar ideas, see
Bron Taylor, "Resacralizing Earth: Pagan Environmentalism and the Restoration of Turtle Island," in American
Sacred Space, edited by David Chidester and Edward T. Linenthal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995),
pp. 97 151.
25. For a representative recent example of such a perspective, see "Agriculture and Biodiversity Rewilding," a
special issue of Wild Earth 8 (1988): 29 77, especially Catherine Badgley, "Can Agriculture and Biodiversity
Coexist?" (pp. 39 47). She draws on the latest scientific evidence to advance the radical Green critique of
agriculture.
26. Scholarly introductions to bioregionalism can be found in Bron Taylor, "Bioregionalism: An Ethics of Loyalty
to Place," Landscape Journal forthcoming, 2000, and Michael V. McGinnis, Bioregionalism (New York and
London: Routledge, 1999).
27. See Allan Van Newkirk's term-coining article, "Bioregions: Towards Bioregional Strategy for Human
Cultures," Environmental Conservation 2 (1975): 108 119. Van Newkirk subsequently had little to do with the
movement he named.
28. In addition to Gary Snyder, among the most influential early bioregionalists were
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Raymond Dasmann, Freeman House, and Peter Berg. See Peter Berg and Raymond Dasmann, "Reinhabiting
California," The Ecologist 7 (1977): 399 401; Van Andruss et al., eds. Home!: A Bioregional Reader
(Philadelphia: New Society, 1990); Christopher Plant and Judith Plant, eds., Turtle Talk: Voices for a
Sustainable Future (Philadelphia: New Society, 1990); and Peter Berg, ed., Reinhabiting a Separate Country
(San Francisco: Planet Drum, 1978). Other primary sources include Kirkpatrick Sale, Dwellers in the Land: The
Bioregional Vision (Philadelphia: New Society, 1991); and Freeman House, Totem Salmon (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1999).
29. See Bron Taylor, "Earth First!: From Primal Spirituality to Ecological Resistance," in This Sacred Earth,
edited by Roger Gottlieb (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 545 557. See also Max Oelschlaeger,
The Idea of Wilderness, for an excellent example of the kind of argument inspired and influenced by theorists
critical of agriculture and monotheism, such as Shepard and Snyder. Oelschlaeger urges a return to a
Paleolithic consciousness that sees humans as one with nature, fusing this perception onto contemporary
cosmological understandings.
30. Many deep ecologists are influenced by the school of thought known as "eco-or trans-personal psychology,"
which Shepard's Nature and Madness helped inspire. For the best introduction to this literature, see Theodore
Roszak, Mary Gomes, and Allen Kranner, eds., Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind (San
Francisco: Sierra Club, 1995).
31. See Shepard, Coming Home, pp. 107 108.
32. As Eric Katz well argues in chapter 2 of this volume.
33. For an excellent introduction to the problem of identifying the natural, see William Cronon, Uncommon
Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York: Norton, 1995).
34. For an excellent recent study on environmental attitudes in America, see Willet Kempton, James Boster, and
Jennifer Hartley, Environmental Values in American Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); and on the role of
passion and religion, see Bron Taylor, "Beliefs in Practice" in The Ecologist, 27:1 (1997): 38 39.
35. Bron Taylor, ed., Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular
Environmentalism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). Many observers note, moreover, that because women usually
have greater roles in subsistence production and religious nurturing than men do (often in part because men are
forced to leave their birthplaces to seek wage income elsewhere), they tend to be more aware of the direct threats
posed by ecological deterioration. Consequently, more women than men tend to participate in environmental action
and work to defend and restore ecologically sustainable, agrarian livelihoods. See the contributions in Ecological
Resistance Movements by Lois Lorentzen, Vikram Akula, Ben Wisner, and Bob Edwards, for example, as well as
Tariq Banuri and Frédéerique Apffel Marglin, Who Will Save the Forests?: Knowledge, Power, and Environmental
Destruction (London: Zed, 1993); Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed,
1988); Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Yash Tandon, "Village Contradictions in Africa," in Global
Ecology: A New Arena of
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Political Conflict, edited by Wolfgang Sachs (London: Zed; Halifax, NS: Fernwood, 1993), pp. 208 223.
36. In addition to the researchers cited in the previous note, others have come to similar conclusions, such as John
Friedman and Haripriya Rangan, eds., In Defense of Livelihood: Comparative Studies in Environmental Action
(West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1993); Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, Plundering Paradise (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993); Hilary Tovey, "Environmentalism in Ireland," International Sociology 8
(1993): 413 430; Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental
Movement (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993); and, more recently, Barbara Rose Johnston, ed., Life and Death
Matters: Human Rights and the Environment at the End of the Millennium (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira, 1997).
37. See the articles by Bob Edwards, Larry Lohmann, Vikram Akula, Heidi Hadsell, and Al Gedicks in Bron
Taylor, ed., Ecological Resistance Movements.
38. See the articles by Ben Wisner and Yash Tandon in ibid.
39. A "commons" is land to which a community has access; it may be community-owned or controlled. The best
introduction I have found dealing with commons issues was written by the editors of The Ecologist and
republished as Whose Common Future? Reclaiming the Commons (Philadelphia: New Society, 1994).
40. This is especially true since ecological understandings of how resource scarcity exacerbates all the destructive
dynamics that accompany the global extension of market capitalism penetrate such movements. David Carruthers,
<davidc@mail.sdsu.edu>, a political scientist at California State University, San Diego, argues that although the
"environmental justice" rubric originated in the North, like the term "sustainability," it is increasingly and
effectively appropriated by Southern environmental movements. See David Carruthers, "The Globalization of
Environmental Justice: Changing the Face of Third World Environmental Resistance," presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Los Angeles, March 19 21, 1998; and ''Environmental
Justice on the Borderline: Defending Workers and Community in Mexico's Maquiladoras," presented at the
Conference on Environmental Justice: Global Ethics for the 21st Century, University of Melbourne, Australia,
October 1 3, 1997.
For an excellent article explaining how "sustainability" serves increasingly as an "ideological resource" for
popular environmental movements, see Heidi Hadsell, "Profits, Parrots, Peons: Ethical Perplexities in the
Amazon," in B. Taylor, Ecological Resistance Movements, pp. 70 86.
41. George Sessions, for example, fervently believes that environmentalism must be grounded in ecocentric values
because with anthropocentrism (including when it is found in "Green" social justice movements), human concerns
ultimately trump concern for environmental sustainability. See Sessions's "Radical Environmentalism in the 90s,"
Wild Earth 2:3 (1992): 64 70; and "The Sierra Club, Immigration & the Future of California," Wild Duck Review
4:1 (1998): 24 25. Although Sessions can provide examples as evidence, he overreaches in making into a kind of
social law what might be a demonstrable tendency. Yet it seems to many, and to me, that a fully informed
anthropocentric environmentalist would adopt, for prudential and human-concerned reasons, a comprehensive
precautionary principle in defense of biodiversity. And Sessions's argu-
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ment seems unable to account for dramatic environmental protection movements outside of North America that,
although not ecocentric as he understands the term, are every bit as engaged in environmental protection as are
Northern deep ecologists.
It is also good to remember that environmental resistance in Western industrial countries has also been strongly
influenced by progressive social criticism. Its participants are often ecologized members of the left's peace and
social justice movements. See the articles by Wolfgang Rüdig and Bob Edwards in my Ecological Resistance
Movements; Robert Gottlieb's Forcing the Spring; and Mark Dowie's Losing Ground (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1995).
Sessions complains that Gottlieb and Dowie inappropriately pressure Green environmentalists to adopt an
urban, "environmental justice" agenda that banishes ecology to the margins. It is true that environmental
movements need not always march under an environmental justice banner and that it is sometimes
counterproductive to do so. But environmental justice, and even the more problematic term "sustainable
development," which can be an oxymoron, may instead refer to a vision of people living and making a living
in a place without degrading its ecological diversity and vitality. This would in most cases, of course, require a
reconstruction of livelihoods along greener lines and a reduction of acquisitive goals and human numbers. But
understood in this way, we can conclude that there will be no environmental sustainability without
environmental justice. This should be painfully obvious when ranchers kill wolves reintroduced into the
American Southwest, fearing their livelihoods are threatened. Put differently, there seems to be a dualistic
distinction between livelihoods and ecosystem viability underlying Sessions's critique of the environmental
justice and sustainability rubrics.
42. Like Gandhi, social activists increasingly recognize that only grief will follow if all marginalized people seek
to follow the West's path of natural resource imperialism to development. For representative quotes expressing
Gandhi's views that industrial societies are unsustainable and depend on imperialism, see Ramachandra Guha, "The
Malign Encounter: The Chipko Movement and Competing Visions of Nature," in Banuri and Marglin, Who Will
Save the Forests?, p. 98. It is obvious to most within popular movements that large-scale hydroelectric dams
benefit elites while exacerbating inequalities; that they destroy communities and livelihoods; and that commercial
forestry is likewise a disaster, uprooting people, eroding soil, polluting water, and destroying fisheries. See ibid.,
pp. 82, 98; and Broad and Cavanagh, Plundering Paradise, pp. 56 63.
Dieter Rücht, meanwhile, has found that anti-industrial attitudes are increasingly widespread among
environmentalists from many cultures, dividing them into radical and reformist camps; see his "Environmental
Movement Organizations in West Germany and France: Structure and Interorganizational Relations,"
International Social Movement Research 2 (1989): 61 94.
43. For a good example of such analysis, see Haripriya Rangan's analysis of how such a view animated some of
the earliest Chipko actions, "Romancing the Environment: Popular Environmental Action in the Garhwal
Himalayas" in Friedmann and Rangan, In Defense of Livelihood, pp. 155 181.
44. And except for the few (usually indigenous) groups still engaged in foraging life-ways, the survival strategy
considered to cohere with growing environmental awareness
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often involves efforts to return to preindustrial agricultural and pastoral lifeways, not a rejection of them.
45. As discussed previously in notes 6 8 and the corresponding text, the best-known architects and popularizers of
deep ecology speak of a "perennial philosophy," a nature mysticism promoting reverence for life. They assert that
such philosophy is a universal perception not only in Eastern and indigenous religions, but also among many of the
dissident mystical branches of the Western religious and philosophical tradition. From this they can argue that
there are many paths to deep ecological consciousness.
As documented earlier, however, deep ecology writers generally express strong antipathy toward Christianity
and Western philosophy. Such antipathy is equally strong throughout most of the grassroots deep ecology
movement. And the leading American deep ecology advocates have done little, to my knowledge, to moderate
such attitudes within the deep ecology movement or to encourage participation in it by monotheists. Indeed,
arguments like those documented in the previous notes, and Lynn White's now famous argument blaming
Christianity (and other monotheistic religions) for fostering nature-destructive attitudes, although viewed as
seriously flawed and overly simplistic by cultural historians, are widely believed within the deep ecology
movement. Moreover, White's call for a revival of Franciscan-style Christianity is rarely mentioned by deep
ecologists. See Lynn White, Jr., "The Historic Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," Science 155 (1967): 1203 1207.
A notable exception to this general pattern may be found in the work of Max Oelschlaeger. After writing The
Idea of Wilderness and promoting a deep ecological appreciation for the sacredness of wild nature in it, he
reached out to Christians in Caring for Creation: An Ecumenical Approach to the Environmental Crisis (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
46. For example, the extent of the long-term indigenous management of the Americas "has been routinely
underestimated," according to Gary Paul Nabhan, in an excellent and well-nuanced introduction to the discussion
of Native American impacts on the environment. See his "Cultural Parallax in Viewing North American Habitats,"
in Reinventing Nature?: Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction, edited by Michael Soulé and Gary Lease
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1995) pp. 87 101.
For additional articles exploring the impacts on nature of indigenous peoples and their cultures, see K. Butzer,
"The Americas Before and After 1492: Current Geographical Research," Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 82 (1992): 345 368; William Denevan, "The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in
1492," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82 (1992): 369 385; Calvin Martin, "The American
Indian as Miscast Ecologist," in Ecological Consciousness: Essays from the Earthday X Colloquium, edited by
Robert C. Schultz and Donald Worster (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981); Calvin Martin,
Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978); Paul Martin and R. G. Klein, eds., Quaternary Extinctions: A Prehistoric Revolution (Tuscon:
University of Arizona Press, 1984); Thomas Overholt, ''American Indians as 'Natural Ecologists,"' American
Indian Journal 5 (1979): 9 16; Kent Redford, "The Ecologically Noble Savage," Cultural Survival Quarterly
15:1 (1991): 46 48; David Suzuki and Peter Knudtson, Wisdom of the Elders: Honoring Sacred Native Visions
of Nature (New York: Bantam, 1992).
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47. Based on empirical studies, Steven Kellert argued, for example, that conceptions of nature originating in the
Far East are "highly abstract and idealized" and "rarely provide . . .support for nature conservation." "Moreover
traditional Eastern attitudes toward nature often encourage passivity, even fatalism, toward the natural world
depicted as all-powerful and beyond human capacity to control or grasp, let alone conserve or regulate'' (pp.
116 117). Kellert concluded that "Neither Eastern nor Western societies are intrinsically inferior or superior in their
perspectives of nature" (p. 118), and that idea differences between East and West do not play the decisive role
often attributed to them. See Stephen Kellert, "Concepts of Nature East and West," in Soulé and Lease,
Reinventing Nature?, pp. 103 121.
Yi Fu Tuan similarly resists those who view Far Eastern cultures as inherently Green; see "Discrepancies
Between Environmental Attitude and Behaviour: Examples from Europe and China," The Canadian
Geographer 12 (1968): 176 191. J. Baird Callicott and Roger Ames criticize Tuan's argument, insisting that
Asian thought expresses a more nature-beneficent worldview than do Western religion and philosophy. See
their "Epilogue: On the Relation of Idea and Action," in Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, edited by
Callicott and Ames (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 279 289.
48. About five years after Lynn White's article was published, Arnold Toynbee agreed with him that monotheism is
responsible for the environmental crisis. Unlike White, however, Toynbee promoted pantheism and the religions of
the Far East as the remedy. See his "The Religious Background of the Present Environmental Crisis," International
Journal of Environmental Studies 3 (1972): 141 146.
49. Of course, if religion is malleable, it may evolve in directions we deplore, including environmentally
destructive ones. A number of writers, for example, point to links between nature-oriented religion and Nazi
ideology, expressing fear of the reactionary potential of Green religion. See Michael Zimmerman, "Possible
Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity," chapter 9 in this volume and his Contesting Earth's Future:
Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) and "Ecofascism: A Threat to
American Environmentalism?," in The Ecological Community, edited by Roger Gottlieb (New York and London:
Routledge 1996), pp. 229 254.
See also Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, translated by Carol Volk (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995); and John Clark's "The French Take on Environmentalism," Terra Nova 1:1 (1996): 112 119, in
which he argues that Ferry provides "absolutely no support to his thesis that authoritarianism is implicit in the
ecology movement." Clark argues that Ferry failed to note that the Nazi view of nature was thoroughly
anthropocentric and instrumental. Jeffery Kaplan provides a significant counterpoint, demonstrating in "Savitri
Devi and the National Socialist Religion of Nature," The Pomengranate 7 (1999): 4 12, that some Nazis
promoted species egalitarianism. Kaplan concludes that in Savitri Devi's Green religion, "Nature serves not
only as plea for humanity to move beyond the conception of dominion over nature, but as a bridge between the
worlds of deep ecology and animal liberation and the adherents of racialist neo-Nazi beliefs." These sources
demonstrate that Green religions, including deep ecology, are capable of evolving in reactionary ways.
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My fieldwork-based view is that deep ecology subcultures are unlikely to provide fertile ground for reactionary
politics; see my "Diggers, Wolves, Ents, Elves and Expanding Universes: Global Bricolage and the Question of
Violence Within the Subcultures of Radical Environmentalism," in Cult, Anti-Cult and the Cultic Milieu: A Re-
Examination, 2 vol., edited by Jeffery Kaplan and Hélène Lööw (Stockholm: Stockholm University Press,
2000), and "Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber to the
Earth Liberation Front," Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence 10:4 (1998): 1 42.
50. One example of such malleability can be found at Genesis Farm in New Jersey, an increasingly influential
Catholic community and ecological learning center, led by Dominican Sister Miriam Therese MacGillis. The
worldview and ritualizing that are evolving at the Farm fuse in a novel way monotheistic religion (Roman
Catholicism), ritualizing celebrating the sacredness of the Earth and designed to deepen people's felt connections to
it, and newly consecrated scientific cosmogonies about how the world came to be the way it is today. Some of this
religious worldview resembles that of deep ecology and the bioregional movement, borrowed indirectly through
Thomas Berry, the priest most responsible for the Creation Spirituality movement. Interestingly, especially for the
current argument, some in this new religious movement express a panentheistic theology: the idea that God (or the
Holy Spirit) is present in all creation (not that nature is God or divine, as in pantheism, which Catholicism
considers a heresy). For a fascinating study, see Sarah McFarland Taylor, "The Greening of Catholicism:
Negotiating Religion and Culture at Genesis Farm" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara,
1999).
51. A range of research illustrates such assertions, including Bron Taylor, Ecological Resistance Movements;
Friedman and Rangan, In Defense of Livelihood; and Broad and Cavanagh, Plundering Paradise.
52. See the articles and many references in these introductory books: Roger Gottlieb, ed., This Sacred Earth (New
York and London: Routledge, 1996); David Kinsley, Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-
Cultural Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995); Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, eds.,
Worldviews and Ecology: Religion, Philosophy, and the Environment (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994); and Sean
McDonagh, The Greening of the Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990).
53. This quote is from the second working draft, January 1999. For the earlier "Benchmark Draft," see "The Earth
Charter," Earth Ethics 8:2 3 (1997): 1,3. It contained some language that seemed to endorse Gaian pantheism:
"Earth is our home and home to all living beings. Earth itself is alive. We are part of an evolving universe. Human
beings are members of an interdependent community of life with a magnificent diversity of life forms and cultures.
We are humbled before the beauty of the Earth and share a reverence for life and the sources of our being. We
give thanks for the heritage that we have received from past generations and embrace our responsibilities to present
and future generations . . . . We the peoples of the world commit ourselves to action guided by the following
interrelated principles: 1. Respect Earth and all life. Earth, each life form, and all living beings possess intrinsic
value and warrant respect independently of their utilitarian value to humanity" (p. 1). In the next draft the intrinsic
value claim was retained but the controversial pantheistic language was expunged.
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54. See especially the articles by Larry Lohmann and Ben Wisner in Bron Taylor, Ecological Resistance
Movements. It is not surprising that bioregional deep ecologists from the industrialized West would tend to extend
dichotomies they find in their own cultures more widely. Sometimes such dichotomies can have interpretive value.
They can, however, fail to grasp the complexity of the variety of cultural variables that shape human ideals and
behavior. Dichotomies that may be quite illuminating in Western, affluent countries might be misleading in other
regions and offensive to those in the regions to which they are applied.
Lohmann shows that in rural Thailand, for example, villagers take a decidedly pragmatic approach to the land
and forests, in ways that would make many deep ecologists cringe. They would probably be viewed as
"regrettably 'anthropocentric,"' Lohmann thinks, "and their preoccupation with agriculture and ambivalence
toward 'wild nature' [would] suggest a lack of appreciation of the intrinsic value of plants and animals . . .. [and
a lack of] sufficient reverence for untouched nature" (p. 124). But this pragmatism does not mean, Lohmann
concludes, that the villagers "treat their forests, streams, animals, or rice as instruments [or] place humans at the
center of the universe . . .. Rather, forests, streams, animals, and rice are valued for themselves, treated as
things which have intrinsic value and in some sense even as persons who can benefit humans but who if abused
will also punish them" (p. 125). Lohmann urges us to leave behind "the Western obsession with dividing
attitudes into anthropocentric and ecocentric,'' and concludes that this is essential if we are to build cross-
cultural coalitions and solidarity among people hoping to preserve commons regimes and promote ecologically
appropriate and just lifeways.
55. For detailed argument along these lines and further citations, see Bron Taylor, "Bioregionalism."
56. Dan Deudney, "In Search of Gaian Politics" in Bron Taylor, ed., Ecological Resistance Movements, p. 294
57. Ibid., p. 293.
58. A. L. Kroeber, Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1947). My impression here is based on a June 7, 1993, interview with Snyder in Davis, CA, when he mentioned
how profoundly Krober's work had influenced him.
59. Bioregionalists often draw on the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin for this assumption; for a criticism of such
thinking, see Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1996), p. 38.
60. Biologist Michael Soulé puts it harshly: "Most interactions between individuals and species are selfish not
symbiotic." See his "The Social Siege of Nature," in Soulé and Lease, eds., Reinventing Nature?, p. 143.
61. Wapner, Environmental Activism, p. 38.
62. Deudney, "In Search of Gaian Politics," p. 293.
63. Ibid., pp. 293 294.
64. Andrew B. Schmookler, The Parable of the Tribes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; repr.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).
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65. This argument is from Andrew B. Schmookler, "Schmookler on Anarchy," Earth First! 6:5 (1986): 22. It led to
a long debate in this radical environmental journal. Few of the anarchistic bioregionalists would cede ground on
the necessity of government. Interestingly, in his editor's note in response to this article, Earth First! cofounder
Dave Foreman agreed: "True: our fall was our 'emergence out of the natural order.' It is fortunate for us that the
framers of the US Constitution understood this paradoxical problem: that is why we in this society, for all its
glaring imperfections, can freely discuss the evils that the play of power produces around us, and freely search for
solutions." Before long, Foreman was arrested and convicted in an ecotage (ecosabotage) case. He later left the
movement he cofounded, partly due to his disgust with the rigid anarchists increasingly drawn to it.
66. This incorrectly assumes, he continues, that "the problems . . . are not acute, . . . that humanity has decades or
[even] centuries to split itself up into small communities and to begin to tackle the causes of environmental decay."
See Wapner, Environmental Activism, p. 37.
67. On a positive note, the San Francisco-based Foundation for Deep Ecology has created a Forum on
Globalization that is providing a venue for activists and intellectuals to strategize how to educate and resist such
destructive trends.
68. For discussions of trends and possibilities along these lines, see Karen Litfin, ed., The Greening of Sovereignty
in World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); Ronnie Lipschutz, ed., Global Civil Society and Global
Environmental Governance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Ronnie Lipschutz and Ken
Conca, eds., The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993); Sheldon Kamieniecki, ed., Environmental Politics in the International Arena (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1993).
69. This is nowhere more clear than in the case of federally owned land in the West that would have suffered
worse environmental degradation had not the American people, through their federal government, established and
retained title to many lands. For example from Australia, where federal power saved huge tracts of Tasmanian
forest despite the prevailing sentiment among Tasmanians, see P. R. Hay, "Vandals at the Gate: The Tasmanian
Greens and the Perils of Sharing Power," in Green Politics Two, edited by Wolfgang Rüdig (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
70. There are relevant differences, of course. Bioregional localism and ecosystem integrity, not country-or state-
oriented localism, guides bioregional decentralist advocacy.
71. As Ronnie Lipschutz correctly observes, "State sponsorship [is] an attempt to catch up with global civil society
in California, whose members have undertaken hundreds of small-scale environmental protection and restoration
projects." See Ronnie Lipschutz, "Guardians of the Forest: Renegotiating Resource Regimes in Northern
California," in Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance, edited by Ronnie Lipschutz, pp.
81 125, quote on p. 83. See also Gary Snyder, "Coming in to the Watershed," Wild Earth (spec. iss. on the
Wildlands Project, 1992): 65 70; and Bron Taylor, "Bioregionalism.''
72. Snyder, "Coming in to the Watershed," p. 67.
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73. Peter Berg and Raymond Dasmann, "Reinhabiting California."
74. Raymond Dasmann, "Bioregion," in Conservation and Environmentalism: An Encyclopedia, edited by Robert
Paelhke (New York and London: Garland, 1995) pp. 83 85.
75. Deudney, "In Search of Gaian Politics," pp. 289 290.
76. Dan Deudney, "Global Village Sovereignty: Intergenerational Sovereign Publics, Federal-Republican Earth
Constitutions, and Planetary Identities," in The Greening of Sovereignty, edited by Karen Litfin, pp. 299 323.
77. Ibid.
78. Deudney, "In Search of Gaian Politics."
79. Dan Deudney, "Global Environmental Rescue and the Emergence of World Domestic Politics," in Lipschutz
and Conca, The State and Social Power, pp. 288 305, quote at 294.
80. Deudney approvingly cites James Lovelock's rejection of a sacred/secular dualism, and says Lovelock
"articulates the central claim of the Earth science-religion fusion: 'Thinking of the Earth as alive makes it seem, on
happy days, in the right places, as if the whole planet were celebrating a sacred ceremony."' See Deudney, "Global
Village Sovereignty," p. 317.
81. Ibid., p. 318.
82. For an important argument along these lines, see Anthony Weston, "Before Environmental Ethics,"
Environmental Ethics 14:4 (Winter 1992): 321 328.
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Page 321
INDEX
A
Abe, Masao, 258 259
Abram, David, xiv, 157
Activism, 66, 86 88, 269 270
Advertising, 218, 226, 230n29
Africa, 73, 141 142
Agriculture, critique of, 272 273, 277, 290n18, 291n29
Ammons, A. R., 156
Animism, 169, 271
Anthropocentrism, 17 18, 39, 44, 92, 125, 142, 297n54.
See also Nonanthropocentrism
as dominant world view, 169, 270
as implied in deep ecology, xvi, 33 38
as opposed to deep ecology, xiii, 21, 53, 260, 270 274, 277
as principle of action, 278 279
Anti-modernism, 202 205, 212
Anti-Semitism, 172, 190
Apron diagram, 10, 19, 270
Asceticism, 232
Asian philosophy, 197
Atman *, 75, 235, 243, 250n57, 253
Australia, 43, 66, 119
B
Bahro, Rudolf, 101, 113
Bakhtin, M. M., 207
Barrès, Maurice, xvii, 85, 92 99
Bauman, Zygmunt, 73
Beautiful actions, 33, 38, 40n36, 99, 109 110, 263 264
page_321
Belonging, 89
Bergson, Henri, 199
Berry, Wendell, 171, 272
Bhagavadgita*, xxi, 231 252
Biocentrism, 29, 270, 287n3.
See also Anthropocentrism; Ecocentrism
as opposed to deep ecology, 19 20.
as part of deep ecology, 270, 277
Biodiversity, 284
Bioregionalism, xxi, 90, 109, 273, 281 285, 290nn26 28, 297nn54, 59
Biospherical egalitarianism, 21, 49, 197, 242
Birches, laughing, 31, 151, 155
Body, 95, 109, 180
Bookchin, Murray, 8, 14n9, 151
Brahman, 235 237
Brennan, Andrew, 23 24, 95, 126, 129, 131, 133
Brower, David, 151
Buber, Martin, 61
Buddha, 253 256
Buddha nature, 258 259
Buddhism, xxi, 136, 142, 253 267
C
California, 284
Callicott, J. Baird, xviii, 23 24, 125 134, 137, 139 143, 144nn l, 9, 145nn20, 23, 146n31, 147n40, 148n51, 267n39
Calvin, John, 169
Calvino, Italo, 157 160
Campbell, Joseph, 274
Capitalism, 79, 283
Carnap, Rudolf, 60
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Carr, David, 206
Causality, 116
Cheney, Jim, 215 216
Childhood, 163
Christianity, 142, 169 172, 196, 208 209, 256, 294n45
Clarinet, 261
Clark, John, xv, 3 15
Class, 108
Collective action, 225
Colonialism, 66 67, 278
Communism, 170, 172
Community, 45, 54, 128, 132, 136
Complexity, 20, 45, 276
Concrete contents, xix, 31, 151 168, 255, 261. See also Deep ecology; Ontology of gestalts; Gestalt thinking
Consciousness, 49, 95, 186, 223, 274, 277, 279
Conservation vs. preservation, 44
Consumption, xx, 215 230, 283
Convergence thesis, 12, 131
Copernicus, 169, 183
Corealization, 260, 262. See also Self-realization
Covens, 187
Coyotes, 165
Cultural degeneration, 175
Curtin, Deane, xxi, 253 267
Cyborgism, 204
D
Darwin, Charles, 23, 169, 175, 196
Dasein, 175
Dasmann, Raymond, 285
de Benoist, Alain, 170
page_322
Decentralization, 281 285

Deconstruction, 199 200
Deep ecology.
See also Ecosophy T; Identification; Naess, Arne; Platform of deep ecology; Reform environmentalism;
Self-realization and apron diagram of principles, 10, 19, 247n2, 270
and bioregionalism, xxi, 89 92, 109, 273 274, 281 287
and biospherical egalitarianism, 21, 49, 197
and Buddhism, xxi, 253 267
contrast to shallow ecology, ix, xii, 5, 53, 216, 255 256
definition of, ix, 18 21
and direct experience, 91, 152 156, 160 163, 223, 229n22, 257, 261
and ecology, 29 30
and Hinduism, xxi, 231 252
and holism, 20, 24 26, 28 31, 36 37
and integral nationalism, 88, 92 99
and methodological vagueness, 5 6
and music, 163 164
as movement, ix, xxi, 4, 151, 167n2, 269 299
murkiness of, 50
and narratives, 205 212
as ontological system, xiii xiv, 28, 98, 151
and ontology of gestalts, 30 31, 109, 117, 151 156
and peace and justice movements, 12
as philosophy, x, xiii, 19 21, 24, 151
and pluralism, xviii, xx, 126, 134 140, 244
and political analysis, xvii, xxi, xxiin2, 59, 70 81
and postmodernism, xix xx, 195 197, 201 205
and radical environmental philosophies, xv, 3, 7, 195
and rejection of affluence, 20, 216 219, 222 223
and social philosophy, 4, 272 279
and spirituality, xxi, 169 170, 179 194, 271 272, 279 281, 285 287
and total views, xi xii, 24
page_322
Western bias of, 9, 67, 118, 140, 267n39

Deep green theory, xvi, 43 58
Deep positions in general, 50 52, 255
Deep questioning, 5
Deleuze, Gilles, 198 201, 212
Deloria, Vine, 78
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Page 323
Derrida, Jacques, 178, 198 100
Desai, Mahadev, 241
Descartes, 255
Desire, 220, 222 227
Deudney, Daniel, 282, 285
Deutsch, Eliot, 236, 243
Devall, Bill, xiv, 49, 87, 90, 109, 170, 216, 271
Development, xxii, 279
Developmental psychology, 91
Dietz, Mary, 116
Divine potential, 190
diZirega, Gus, 74, 76, 187 188, 191
Dogen, 136, 253, 258 263
Doty, C. Stuart, 97
Drengson, Alan, xiv, 11, 90
Dryghton, 187 188
Dryzek, John 65
Dualism, 119, 276
E
Earth Charter, 280, 286
Earth First!, 86, 289n16, 298n65
Eckersley, Robyn, 90, 98
Eco-impartiality, 36, 52
Ecocentrism, xiii, xxi, 4, 270, 287n3, 292n41.
See also Biocentrism
as different from deep ecology, 22 23
as principle of action, 277
as synonym for deep ecology, 21, 270
Ecodefense, 109
Ecofascism, 171 172. See also Fascism
page_323
Ecofeminism, 3, 7, 107, 109, 115 124, 221, 228n18.

See also Feminism
and critique of liberalism, 110 113
and spirituality, 173, 184
Ecological holism, 22 23, 125
Ecological scholarship, 8
Ecological self, 98
Ecologism, 29, 279
Ecology, 29 30, 227n9
Economics, 9, 118, 217, 228n9
Ecophilosophy, xi, 108
Ecosophies, xii, 270
Ecosophy T, xx, 12, 24 25, 60, 135, 216 227, 242 246, 253 267. See also Deep ecology
Ecosystem, 80, 132
Eden, 180
Eel, 261
Eight points. See Platform of deep ecology
Einstein, Albert, 25
Elephants, 22, 68
Embodied materialism, xviii, 107 109, 114 124
Enlightenment, 35, 112, 221
Epics, 208
Eurocentrism, 118
Evolution, 186, 196
Expression, 155
F
Fascism, 71 73, 171, 189 190, 202
Feld, Steven, 163
Feminism, xvi, xviii, 74, 108, 115 121, 173, 184
Ferry, Luc, 72, 295n49
Flatland ontology, 174
Foreman, Dave, 53, 289n16, 298n65
page_323
Forests, 31, 47, 129, 265

Foucault, Michel, 198
Fox, Warwick, xiv, 96, 98, 135, 202, 216
France, 101
Freeden, Michael, 87
Freud, Sigmund, 175, 229n27
G
Gaia hypothesis, 170, 286
Galapagos Islands, 159
Galileo, 152
Gandhi, Mohandas, 3, 38, 231, 239 245, 251n80, 253, 265, 293n42
Gare, Arran, xix, 195 214
Geden, Oliver, 172
Gender, 108, 291n35
Genesis, 136
Gestalt thinking, 31, 88, 253. See also Concrete contents; Deep ecology, ontology of gestalts
Gilligan, Carol, 120
Glasser, Harold, 5
Globalization, 283
God, 174, 185, 215, 240, 271
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Page 324
Goddess, 184, 271
Good and evil, 261
Gore, Al, 151
Great Chain of Being, 51
Great Smoky Mountains, 77
Great World System, 184, 209
Greater value assumption, 51, 53
Greece, 176, 206
Green ethics, 46
Green political parties, 171, 201
Grey, William, xvi, 37, 43 58
Guattari, Félix, 198 201, 212
Guha, Ramachandra, 9, 140
H
Habermans, Jurgen, 203, 215
Haraway, Donna, 204
Hargrove, Eugene, 126
Hart, Mickey, 163
Hartsock, Nancy, 116
Hayek, F, 187
heaven, 184
Hegel, G. W. F, 44, 177
Heidegger, Martin, xix, 151, 154, 160, 169 197, 200
Heraclitus, 29
Herder, Johann, 196 197, 203
Herf, Jeffrey, 176
Hinduism, 231 252
Holderlin, H., 177
Holding, 115 117
Holism, 20, 28, 36, 125
page_324
Home, 91, 285

Hoyle, Fred, 54
Human survival, 53
Hume, David, 23, 54
Humphrey, Mathew, xvii, 85 124
Hunger, 184
Husserl, Edmund, 154
Huxley, Aldous, 271
I
I-Thou relationship, 61
Idealism, 110 115
Identification, 7, 26 27, 61 63, 66, 104n27.
See also Deep ecology; Self-realization
and activism, 66
and alienation, 203
as anthropocentric, 33 36, 69
as basic principle of deep ecology, xiii, 24 26
compared to Buddhist philosophy, 257 263
compared to Hindu philosophy, 234 246
compared to solidarity, 66 70
and difference, 61 65
and dualism, 119
feminist analysis of, 117 121
and ontology, xvii, 28
and place, 90
and traitorous identity, 69 70
Ideology, 87
Impermanence, 258
Indigenous peoples, xxi, 114, 141, 186, 279
Individualism, 125
Industrialization, 90
Instrumental rationality, xiii
page_324
Interspecies communication, 162 165

Intrinsic value, 11, 19, 54, 222, 263 264, 267n39
Intuition, 91, 112, 157, 199
Ireland, 163
Irwin, Robert, 162
J
Jackson, Wes, 272
Jacobsen, Knut, xxi, 231 252
Jefferson, Thomas, 76
Jeffersonianism, green, 74, 76, 78
Joy, 216
Judaism, 169
Judgment, 207
Junk in space, 54
K
Kaluli people, 163
Kant, Immanuel, xx, 27, 33, 132, 157, 177, 215, 220 221, 225
Karma, 238, 246
Katz, Eric, ix xxiv, 17 42
Kheel, Marti, 121
Kittelsen, Theodor, 161
Kovel, Joel, 159
Kroeber, A. L., 282
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Page 325
Labyrinth, 166
LaChappelle, Dolores, xiv
Lakes, 165
Land, 80, 95, 278
Land ethic, 22, 45, 141
Larson, Gary, 68
Lasch, Christopher, 189
Left-wing criticism, 278
Leopold, Aldo, 22, 24, 27, 45, 141, 146n31, 177, 210
Levinas, Emmanuel, 162 163
Liberalism, xvii xviii, 77 78, 99 100, 107 124, 170, 187
Libidinal understanding, 118
Lift-up-over-sounding, 163
Light, Andrew, ix xxiv, xxiin2, 125 148
Lizards, 159
Locke, John, 78
Lockean theory of property, 68, 78 81
Lohmann, Larry, 113, 121
Lorraine, 93
Lucretius, 199
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 198, 205
M
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 207
Madhva, 238
Marcuse, Herbert, 175
Martin, Peter, 189
Marx, Karl, xviii, 108, 121
Marxism, xx, 108, 172, 208 209, 215, 219
Maskit, Jonathan, xx, 215 230
Mateship, 119
page_325
Mathews, Freya, xiv, 25, 32 34, 91, 96

McLaughlin, Andrew, xiv, 19, 21, 90, 98, 109
Meditation, 232 233
Megamachine, 101, 106n64, 113
Meinong, Alexius, 46
Meta-industrial nurture, 113
Metaphysics, 28, 36, 215, 221
Mill, John Stuart, xvii, 85, 99
Mining, 86, 117
Modernity, 179 181, 184 187, 195 198, 205 206, 208, 212
Monism-pluralism debate, 125 148
Monologic, 208, 211
Monotheism, 169, 270, 295n48
Moore, G.E., 165
Moral obligation, 22
Moralizing, 99
More-than-human world, 157
Mothers, 108, 116
Mountains walking, 259
Mountains, 155, 161
Muir, John, 273
Murti, T. R. V., 256
Music, 31, 163
Myth, 89, 226, 274
N
Naess, Arne, ix, xiv, xviii, 18, 24, 37 38, 48, 59, 87, 90, 109, 126, 154, 197, 215, 271.
See also Deep ecology; Ecosophy T
as activist, 39nl, 59
as denying importance of ethics, 27 28, 33, 38, 98 99, 261
differences with George Sessions, 7 10
differences with Peter Reed, 61 65
and gestalts and Buddhism, 254 257, 259 263
page_325
as influenced by Buddhism, 62, 136, 253 256

as influenced by Ghandi, 3, 231, 239 246, 253
as influenced by Hinduism, xxi, 231 246, 247n4
as influenced by Spinoza, 136, 197, 253, 264, 288n6
and logical positivism, 60, 255
and phenomenology of gestalts, xix, 30 31, 88 89, 109, 117, 151 156
and pluralism, 126, 134 140, 146n30, 147n40, 197, 265
and poetry, 156 163
Nagarjuna, 254, 256, 263
Naivete, 269 299
Nara, Yasuaki, 261
Narrative, 205 212
Nationalism, 88, 93
Nature as agent, 46, 84n51
page_326

Page 326
Nazism, 12, 71 74, 83n38, 171 173, 175 178, 181 182, 190, 192n5, 202 203, 295n49
Neopaganism, 169 194
Neoplatonism, 188, 204 205
New World, 79
New age, 172, 189
Newton, Isaac, 88
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 172, 183, 196, 200, 220
No-self, 257
Nonanthropocentrism, xii, xiii, 19, 21, 45, 53 54, 125. See also Anthropocentrism; Biocentrism; Ecocentrism
Nondualism, 258
Nonviolence, 3, 7, 244, 265
Norton, Bryan, 29, 131, 134 140
O
Okin, Susan Moller, 74
Oneness, 245
Ontology, xiii, xvii, 28, 32, 85 106, 181, 260
Oppression, 65 70, 82n21, 108
Otherness, 61 70, 82n27, 174
P
Paganism, 169 170, 188 191, 281
Panentheism, 173
Panspermia, 54
Pantheism 173, 296n53
Passmore, John, 44
Pateman, Carole, 74, 113
Perennial philosophy, 62, 179, 288n7, 294 n. 45
Phenomenology, xix, 151 168, 229n22, 253
Platform of deep ecology, x xi, xiii, 6, 10 11, 19, 136 137, 146n30, 167n2, 216 217, 222 223, 246nl, 252n83, 255,
270 271
Plato, 156, 219 221
page_326
Plotinus, 188
Plumwood, Val, xvi, xvii, 59 84
Pluralism, xviii, 12, 46, 125 148, 244, 269 299
as compatibilism, 130, 137
communitarian, 128
cultural, 140 143
interpersonal, 130, 139
intrapersonal, 128
and Naess, Arne, 134 140
and relativism, 127
redefined, 131 134
of values, 265
Poetry, 156 168
Polyphony, 208 212
Population, 11
Positivism, 111, 255
Postmodernism, xix, 126, 195 214, 228n15
Poverty, 185
Pragmatism, xxii, 134
Pre/trans fallacy, 180
Progress, 80, 196, 219
Property, 70 81
Protagoras, 17, 31, 36, 153
Psychic life, 219
Q
Quality of life, 6, 217, 222
R
Race, 108, 178
Radhakrishnan, 239 244
Ramanuja, 238 239, 243
Raven, Peter, 9
Raz, Joseph, xvii, 99 101
page_326
Reed, Peter, xvii, 61 64

Reflexive logic, 117
Reform environmentalism, xii, 139
Reformation, 196
Relational thinking, 20, 28, 30, 120, 256
Relativism, 47, 127, 263
Religion, 178 183, 269 299
Religiosity, xix, 169 194
Reproductive labors, 116
Responsibility, 3, 139
Retribalization, 86, 271 273
Rhizome, 200 201
Ricoeur, Paul, 206
Ritual, 271
Rivers, 54
Rocks, 54
Rodman, John, 35
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Page 327
Rolston, Holmes, 22, 24, 126
Romanticism, 72, 155
Rootedness, 87, 96
Rothenberg, David, ix xxiv, 20 21, 25, 37, 91, 151 168
Ruddick, Sara, 114
Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 173
S
Sachs, Wolfgang, 121
Sale, Kirkpatrick, 87, 90, 109
Salleh, Ariel, xvii xviii, 107 124
Sankara *, 234 237
Sayles, John, 163
Scale, 45, 48
Schelling, Friedrich, 177
Schmookler, Andrew Bard, 282
Seed, John, xiv
Seeds, 115
Self-control, 240
Self-creation, 212
Self-defense, 95 96, 115n42
Self-realization, 12 13, 27 28, 38, 63, 197.
See also Deep ecology; Identification; Naess, Arne
as anthropocentric, 33 36, 49 50
as basic principle of deep ecology, xiii, xvi, 24 26, 85 86, 203
compared to Buddhist philosophy, xxi, 63, 253 254, 257 263
compared to Hindu philosophy, 234 246, 250 n. 57, 251n80
compared to Kant, 225
compared to moral extensionism, 27 28
criticism of, xvii, 33 36, 49 50
and denial of ethics, 85 86, 98
page_327
and desire, xx, 219 227

and identification, 27, 34, 63, 160
as ontology, 32, 85 106
and self-defense, 95 96
Sentimentalism, 153
Sessions, George, x, xx, 7 8, 19, 21, 49, 87, 91, 202, 216 217, 270 271, 292n41
Sextus Empiricus, 153, 202
Shallow ecology. See Reform environmentalism
Shepard, Paul, 271 273
Shiva, Vandana, 140
Silkies, 163
Siskiyou-Klamath region, 90, 95
Slaves, 76, 108, 111
Smallpox, 52
Snyder, Gary, 261 262, 271 273, 282, 285
Social ecology, 3 15
Social justice, 9, 204, 278
Socialism, 59 84
Sole value assumption, 51
Solidarity with nature, xvii, 59, 65 70, 243
Solipsistic omnipotence, 63
Soviet Union, 281
Speedboats, 165
Spinoza, Baruch, 25, 136, 197, 253, 264, 271, 288nn6, 8
Spirituality. See Religion
Spretnak, Charlene, 184
Sprigge, T. L. S., 165
Starhawk, 169, 184
Stoicism, 216
Stone, Christopher, 125, 128, 134
Streams, singing, 31
Subjectivity, 223
page_327
Sublime, 157
Sustainability, 9, 274 275, 278, 284
Suzuki, D. T., 256
Sylvan, Richard, xiv, xvi, 17, 35 39, 43 58
and deep ecology, 48 50
and deep green alternative, 50 55
and value theory, 46 48
T
Taylor, Bron, xxi, 169, 269 299
Taylor, Paul, 29
Thomas, Ned, 94
Thoreau, Henry David, 273
Tilak, B. G., 240
Tolerance, 60, 138
Total views, xi, xiii, 24
Transcendentalism, 199
Transnational corporations, 201
Transpersonal ecology, 28, 98
Transpersonal philosophy, 173, 178 191
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Page 328
Transpersonal Self, 85
Tranströmer, Thomas, 166
Treeline, 36
Trickster, 205
Trolls, 161
Turner, Jack, xiv
U
United Nations, 280
Unity-in-nature, 65 70
V
Value, 46, 262
van der Steen, Wim, 147n40
Varner, Gary, 126
Vermin, 63
Vienna Circle, 60, 255
Violence, 185
Vision-logic, 179
Vital needs, 5
Volosinov, V. N., 207
W
Waddell, Norman, 258
Wales, 86, 94
Web of life, 186, 191
Wenz, Peter, 126
Wergeland, Henrik, 155
Weston, Anthony, 126 127, 131, 137
Whale songs, 165
Whitehead, Alfred North, 136
Wicca, 184
Wickramasinghe, Chandra, 54
page_328
Wienpahl, Paul, 253

Wilber, Ken, xix, 10, 173, 178 191, 204 205
Williams, William Carlos, 156
Wise use movement, 172
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 160 161
Wives, 74, 108, 111
Wombats, 63
Women and nature, 114 124, 291n35
World spirit, 111
Worldviews, xii xiv
Z
Zapata, Daniel, 87, 94
Zapatistas, 81
Zen, 253, 256
Zimmerman, Michael E., xix, 10, 72 76, 163, 169 194, 202 205
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edited by Eric Katz,

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About the Contributors vii

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

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Toward Ecophilosophical Unity-in-Diversity

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Deep Ecology and Social Change

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