Risk assessment of a Vinyl Chloride

Monomer Distillation Column

Mandy Sidelinger

*Note: Although this can be a real process; many factors

were not included for best theoretical accuracy. Therefore
there was not diagram suitable for this process. One can be
provided if necessary.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/PROCESS DESCRIPTION

This problem illustrates the hazards and consequent effects associated with a

distillation system using a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FEMA). This distillation system is

used to separate vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), the main precursor to polyvinyl chloride

(PVC), from hydrogen chloride (HCl), which is a byproduct of the VCM formation reaction

(Figure 1)(Dow 2005).

ClCH2CH2Cl → CH2=CHCl + HCl

1,2-dichloroethane vinyl chloride hydrogen chloride

Figure 1: VCM formation reaction

HCl can be a valuable by-product, but any presence of HCl in a VCM stream will inhibit the

polymerization of VCM to PVC. It is important to note that VCM is not ever used as a final

product, it is solely a chemical intermediate (Siemens 2007). This is considering the extreme

effects that VCM can have on human health. VCM is listed as a Class IA Flammable Liquid

because of its low boiling point and affinity to form a vapor cloud when exposed to atmosphere

pressure. This vapor cloud has extreme potential to cause explosions and fires. Finally, it has

been noted that employees exposed to VCM can experience carcinogenic effects, such as “job-

related” cancer. PVC, on the other hand, is significantly less hazardous and is has much more

stability for safe storage.

The distillation of VCM from HCl requires a detailed hazard analysis, due to the

complexity of the operation because of the sensitivity of VCM to temperature and pressure

changes.
 First, a system description must be made to indentify all components in the distillation

system that could have potential hazards associated with them. This includes such items (modes)

as the VCM distillation column, condenser, reboiler, turbines, control/relief valves, and the

sealing units. These items were then research for material types, such as steel, pipe diameters,

and temperature/pressure data. This was followed by the recommendations for prevention of the

hazards by countermeasures or safeguards.

The FEMA showed the basic hazard of the VCM vapor ignition and all

safeguards/actions that could be used to prevent this issue in any way possible. These safeguards

are best described that, if used efficiently, could completely lessen the hazards. Finally, the

reason the safeguards/actions are in place are to protect: employees, equipment, facilities, the

environment, and production capabilities/quality. All of these are extremely important to a

company, and if these are not protected, employees could be injured, equipment could be

damaged, the community could be affected, and production could be slowed or stopped which

could make the company lose money.

A risk matrix was also created to analyze the hazard scenarios given in this exercise.

Basically, I analyzed the severity and likelihood of the scenarios, and evaluated ways that these

hazards could be eliminated and prevented in the future. I also determined how detrimental these

were and if action needed to be taken in all cases. These hazards all revolved around the central

idea that a VCM vapor cloud is ignitable, and the danger to human lives.

The main “extreme or high risk” hazards deal with any seal breaks or ruptures because of

the release of large amounts of VCM gas into the environment. A vapor cloud can be formed and

is highly flammable, so any ignition sources could cause a major hazard. All other hazards can
 be identified as “medium or low risks”, which means countermeasures and safeguards should

ensure these hazards do not cause fatalities or equipment failure.

My analysis determined that all equipment needs to be thoroughly inspected due to the

likelihood of seal leaks and flow backups. Secondly, all employees truly need to be educated on

the potential hazards and trained for all emergency situations. Also, every time a distillation

batch is started, maintenance must be performed, and all equipment must be checked for proper

valve opening/closing. For example, lines should be tested for any built-up pressure or heat.

The overall problem discussed in all the hazard scenarios of this FMEA of the distillation

column is if VCM come in contact with any sparks/flames it is highly likely an explosion will

occur. Also an overall safety issue is any usage of hot work equipment around VCM which can

become very dangerous and every precaution needs to be taken.

THE DEFINITION OF FEMA

In a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) failures are ranked according to the

severity of consequences, the frequency of occurrence, and the ease of detection of the hazards. The

approach taken in a FMEA is to identify all potential failures in a step-by-step fashion in the

process or design, making it one of the important preliminary hazard analyses (PHA).

Single-point failures and their hazards are easily identified using a FMEA by singling out

each component, one at a time. As with any PHA, FMEA is usually implemented when a failure

can be a serious hazard, meaning to cause serious injury to operators and harm to equipment.

FMEAs are also flexible enough to be used during initial design stages, when modifying existing
equipment, or when new procedural measures are initiated. Since each component is separately

examined, it is important to include detailed “tags” to differentiate between items.

Historically, the FMEA system was started by the US military, and evolved through the

late 1960s-1980s by NASA and the aerospace industry. Manufacturing industries then took interest

in this process, and it is now common practice to use FMEAs in the automotive industry.

GOALS OF THE FMEA

1. To initiate safety practice and proper training in the use of this system through training

sessions and reading material for all operators that come in contact with this equipment.

2. To introduce this use of this safeguarded system into the market by enabling worldwide

access and displaying research to all markets.

3. To analyze the criticalities to introduce countermeasures to improve the future design of this

system.
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

System: Distillation of VCM Key: S=Severity of hazard Prepared by: Mandy Sidelinger
L=Likelihood of occurrence
R=Risk (S x L) measurement

Item Component Failure Cause Effect Safeguards S L R Recommendations

Number Mode
1 Temperature Fails open Circuit Increased Multiple 3 3 9 Add a high
control valve problems heating of temperature pressure alarm
or the VCM indicators on
defective distillation column Develop an
control column emergency plan for
switch High temperature operators to follow
Potential alarm and interlock on high
column system on column temperature
overpressure problems
and release Excess capacity in
of VCM the overhead
condenser

2 Thermostat; False low Calibration Increased Multiple 3 4 12 Add a high

temperature temperatur error heating of temperature pressure alarm
controller e reading the VCM indicators along the
column column Develop an
No signal emergency plan for
change Potential Spare condenser high temperatures
column capacity
overpressure Utilize high/low
and release temperature alarms
of VCM on more than one
thermostat
3 Heat Rupture Wear, Uncontrolled Emergency relief 4 3 12 Alarm or shutdown
exchanger mechanical input of device system for steam
failure steam build up
High notifications
Vessel temperature/pressur
overpressure e alarm with Safety plan for
with interlock emergencies with
flammable pressure build up
vapor cloud Design of system to
release accommodate Use of steel to
maximum pressures accommodate
maximum
Limiting ignition pressures
sources around
distillation column
4 Column/pipes Sealant Wear and Leakage of Buried tank 5 4 20 Preventative
sealer break tear VCM in the maintenance and
form of a Fireproof insulation routine inspections
flammable
vapor cloud Slope away spill Fire prevention
pools plans

Column distance
away from ignition
sources
5 Column Vacuum Faulty Loss of Column design to 5 5 25 Low pressure
collapse indicator containment; withstand minimum alarms
from VCM leaked amounts of pressure
pressure to Numerous pressure
drop environment Insulation gauges

Column Open ventilation

destroyed
 Vacuum relief valve
6 Pump Liquid Circuit Overpressure Alarm for pump 3 3 9 Interlock system to
blockage failure of the tube malfunction stop VCM if the
connected to pump stops
the column;
leading to Overhead space for
possible backed up VCM
shrapnel
generation

Release of
VCM vapor
cloud
5 Valve Fails closed Circuit No flow to Flow indicators 4 4 16 Alarm and shut
failure column, flow down interlock for
backs up and Gas detectors low flow
releases to
external Routine checks of
environment flow line
RISK MATRIX

Likelihood Severity
of Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Severe
Occurrence
Certain
Near Certain
Very likely
Frequent
Seldom

Extreme risk
(avoided)
High risk
(accepted by
waiver)
Medium risk
(accepted by
waiver)
Low risk
(accepted)

Likelihood of Occurrence Key

Level Likelihood of Occurrence DEFINITION

5 Certain Likely to occur continually
4 Near Certain Likely to occur repeatedly
3 Very Likely Likely to occur sometime
throughout equipment life
2 Frequent Possibility of occurring
1 Seldom Not likely to occur; but not
impossible

SEVERITY (key) (Based off Clemens & Simmons 1998)

 Severity of Hazard
Levely/Descriptive Personnel Equipment Down Product Environment
word illness/injur loss(S)** time loss effect
y
5 Fatal >1M Up to a >1M Long-term(5yrs
Severe injury/death year or or greater)
longer environmental
damage or
requiring >$1M
to correct and/or
in penalties
4 Permanent 500K to 3 500K to Medium-term (3-
Major disabling 1M months 1M 5yrs)
injury or job- or environmental
related longer damage or
disease requiring $500K-
$1M to correct
and /or in
penalties
3 Disabling 250K to 2 weeks 250K to Medium-term(1-
Moderate injury 500K to 3 500K 3yrs)
months environmental
damage or
requiring $250K-
$500K to correct
and/or in penalties
2 Injury 1K to 250K 1 day to 1K to Short-term (>1
Minor causing time 2 weeks 250K year)
off work environmental
damage or
requiring $1K-
$250K to correct
and/or in penalties
1 First aid/no <1K <1 day <1K minor
Insignificant human injury environmental
damage readily
repaired and/or
requiring <$1k to
correct and/or in
penalties

RECOMMENDATIONS
The above process could use the necessary safeguard and these following main recommendations

to reduce the risks associated with the hazards presented. The FMEA analysis concluded the

following as important recommendations in a VCM/HCl distillation process:

1. Consideration of installing a high pressure alarm on the column

2. Developing a checklist of emergency actions to follow in the event of a high column

temperature or pressure

3. Installing a separate flow transmitter and low flow alarm on the reflux line

4. Installing an auto-start circuit for the excess capacity in the VCM condenser

5. Consider using different temperature transmitter on the column to alarm and interlock

high and low column temperature

6. Clearly label overhead condensers and valves

7. Require operators to monitor column pressure hourly

8. Redundant temperature and pressure gauges

9. Gas detection and alarm systems

10. Training and equipment research for proper VCM handling

11. Remote-controlled feed

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the best way to prevent these hazards is proper permits and operations and

equipment training. Employees must be cautioned that this is not an area to be careless. There

may eventually be a time when VCM comes in contact with atmospheric pressure and potentially

ignite, but with proper protection, equipment, and evacuation processes, this matter could

become less dangerous and occurring less often.

REFERENCES
Clemens, P. & Simmons, R. (1998). System Safety and Risk Management –
A Guide for Engineering Educators.

Hydrocarbon Asia, Initials. (2009, October). Optimization of distillation

column and energy reduction. Retrieved from
http://hcasia.safan.com/mag/hcaoctdec09/t32.pdf

Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Initials. (1994). Use of pha to control

chemical process hazards [pp. 1-5]. (DOE Scientific Database),
Retrieved from http://multisearch.libraries.psu.edu/

Roughton, J., & Crutchfield, N. (2008). Job hazard analysis [pp. 3-56].
(Science Direct Database), Retrieved from
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/science/book/9
780750683463

Siemens, Initials. (2007, December). Process analytics in VCM plants.

Retrieved from http://www.sea.siemens.com/us/internet-
dms/ia/AppliedAutomation/AppliedAutomation/docs/CS_Process_Analyt
ics_in_VCM_Plants.pdf

The Dow Chemical Company, Initials. (2005). Product safety assessment:

vinyl chloride monomer. Retrieved from
http://www.dow.com/productsafety/finder/vcm.htm

United States, . (1993). Example pha of a department of energy water

chlorination process (Science Direct Database), Retrieved from
http://multisearch.libraries.psu.edu/