PEOPLE VS. ESTEBIA
ANTONIO ROSQUETA
27 SCRA 106, February 27, 1969
FACTS:
 Attorneys; Counsel de officio; Lawyer is bound to exert effort
in behalf of indigent client, The Supreme Court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a
criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney.
 Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so
assigned “to render the required service”, A lawyer so
appointed “as counsel for an indigent prisoner”, our Canons of
Professional Ethics demand, “should always exert his best
efforts” in the indigent’s behalf.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not, the respondents be disbarred anddisallowed
from the practice of law
HELD:
 Same; Same; Lawyer must observe and maintain due
respect. An attorney’s duty of prime importance is “to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers”.
 The f irst Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer “to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance”. By his oath of
office, the lawyer undertook to “obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities”. [People vs.
Estebia, 27 SCRA 106(1969)]
PEOPLE v.
GR NO. L-36138, January 31, 1974
FACTS:
 Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such
cases of late, a member of the bar is proceeded against for
failure to live up to the responsibility owed to a client as well
as to this Court. This is another such instance.
 The respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel de parte for
appellants to show cause why disciplinary action should not
be taken against him for failure to file the brief for appellants
within the period which expired on March 30, 1973. He failed
to show cause as thus required, and on September 7, 1973,
the court issued a resolution suspending him from the practice
of law except for the purpose of filing the brief which should
be done within thirty days from receipt of notice.
 Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it appeared that he did seek to
explain his failure to file the brief on time, but he left it to be
mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father of
appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta, who,
however, was unable to do so as on the 10th of June, his
house caught fire.
 The Court required appellants to comment on a motion for
reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically their
alleged desire to withdraw appeal.
 Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of
respondent submitting two affidavits, one from Antonio
Rosqueta, Jr. and the aforesaid Citong Bringas and the other
from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein they indicated their consent
and approval to respondent's motion to withdraw appeal
ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondents shall be dismissed from the
practice of law
HELD:
 Respondent's liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be
absolved from the irresponsible conduct of which he is guilty.
Respondent should be aware that even in those cases where
counsel de parte is unable to secure from appellants or from
their near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the
appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection
with the case. It has been a commendable practice of some
members of the bar under such circumstances, to be
designated as counsel de oficio. That way the interest of
justice is best served. Appellants will then continue to receive
the benefits of advocacy from one who is familiar with the
facts of the case. What is more, there is no undue delay in
the administration of justice.
 Lawyers of such category are entitled to commendation. They
manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a profession and not
a mere trade with those engaged in it being motivated solely
by the desire to make money. Respondent's conduct yields a
different impression. What has earned a reproof however is
his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the pursuance
of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be
too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is
not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they
are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is
inexcusable.
 At any rate, the suspension meted on him under the
circumstances is more than justified. It seems, however, that
well-nigh five months had elapsed. That would suffice to
atone for his misdeed.
 WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is
lifted. The requirement to file the brief is dispensed with but
Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for negligence and
inattention to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by appellants
themselves, their appeal is dismissed.
REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
 Hayudini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R No. 108113, September
20, 1996]
 The Court ruled that the attorney-client privilege may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners’ client
if there’s a strong probability that revealing the name which is
as much as “communication” would implicate the client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice, despite
the general rule that client’s identity should not be shrouded in
mystery.
1ST DIGEST:
FACTS:
 The Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan
(SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro
Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG
Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of
the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
 During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a
"Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which
 excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the
complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder.
 In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG
has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused
to disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers
filed the petition for certiorari, invoking that the
Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:
 In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the
strict application of the law of agency
 In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr.
Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
 In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and
other information requested by PCGG.
 In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by
the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds
and with due consideration to equal protection of the law
ISSUE
 Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and
acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten
wealth is privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.
HELD:
 The court held that the client identity in this case is
privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity
should not be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions:
 Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice.
 Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
 Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime.
 The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers
in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under the first and third exception.
 The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the
Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client
confidence. Furthermore, this duty is explicitly mandated
in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.
The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby
annulled and set aside.
2ND DIGEST: (3) submit the deeds of assignments that petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their
PARTIES: respective shareholdings.

 The petitioners refused to give in to the conditions invoking

Teodoro R. Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara,
Jose C. Concepcion,
Petitioners
Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Victor P. Lazatin,
Eduardo U. Escueta
The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First
Division),
Respondents
Republic of the Philippines acting through
the PCGG, Raul Roco
SUMMARY:
 Petitioners are partners of the ACCRA Law Firm. One of their
clients (allegedly Eduardo Cojuangco) engaged them to
organize corporations and serve as nominees of the client.
The PCGG filed a case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth
against Cojuangco. The PCGG allege that the numerous
corporations (including the ones organized by the petitioners
for their unnamed client) were organized to serve as conduit
for ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and President Marcos. The
PCGG impleaded the petitioners as defendants in the case
against Cojuangco. They will only be dropped as defendants if
they
(1) disclose the identity of their clients;
(2) submit documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
attorney-client privilege. The SC agreed with the petitioners
and held that the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in
the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. There
are three principal exceptions to the general rule:
(1) where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice,
(2) where disclosure would open the client to civil liability,
and
(3) where the government’s lawyers have no case against
an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s
name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.
 The first and third exception applies in this case.
DOCTRINES:
 Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege
when the client’s name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is
so intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as
much “communication” as information revealed directly about
 the transaction in question itself, a communication which is
clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
communication without exposing himself to charges of
violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire
attorney-client relationship.
FACTS:
 The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of
the Complaint on before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as
one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corporations in PCGG Case No. 33.
 Among the defendants named in the case are herein
petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who
all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law
Firm).
 ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with
the correlative and incidental services where its members
acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents
which substantiate the client’s equity holdings, i.e., stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client’s name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares.
 In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members
of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of
clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
 As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil
Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

Respondent Presidential PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint” and “Third Amended Complaint” which
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint
in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant.
 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent
Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal
the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominees/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG
Case No. 33.

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
Opposition with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG
similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded
private respondent Roco.
 Respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for
the exclusion of petitioners, (a) the disclosure of the identity of
its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds
of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
 Respondent Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA
lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their
principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify
 their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to
be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves
from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence
and identity of the client.
 ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above
resolution but the same was denied by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not, under the peculiar facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
clients? (YES)
RATIO:
 The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract
of lease of services) and mandato (contract of agency). In
modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an
attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on
him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the
judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from
and superior to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an
attorney also occupies what may be considered as a “quasi-
judicial office” since he is in fact an officer of the Court and
exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be
taken favorable to his client.Thus, in the creation of lawyer-
client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties
that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his
client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good
faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public
interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking
legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.
LEGAL BASES OF THE PRIVILEGE
1) Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the
attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides: Rule
130, Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.—The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: x x x An
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney’s secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
2) Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Section 20 states: It is
the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client’s business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval.
3) This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that: A lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
4) Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands
a lawyer’s fidelity to client.
5) In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of
the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right
 to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information
would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory.
GENERAL RULE: A LAWYER MAY NOT INVOKE THE
PRIVILEGE AND REFUSE TO DIVULGE THE NAME OR
IDENTITY OF HIS CLIENT
 As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in
our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general
rule are well established.
 First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
 Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
 Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
 Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown
forces.
FIRST EXCEPTION: WHERE A STRONG PROBABILITY EXISTS
THAT REVEALING THE CLIENT’S NAME WOULD IMPLICATE
THAT CLIENT IN THE VERY ACTIVITY FOR WHICH HE SOUGHT
THE LAWYER’S ADVICE.
 In Ex-Parte Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official,
informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a
bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe
to that end. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal
to reveal his client’s identity before a grand jury. Reversing the
lower court’s contempt orders, the state supreme court held
that under the circumstances of the case, and under the
exceptions described above, even the name of the client was
privileged.
 U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig involved federal grand jury
proceedings inquiring into the activities of the “Sandino Gang,”
a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United
States. The respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe
Sandino. In connection with a tax investigation, the IRS issued
summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce
documents and information regarding payment received by
Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The
lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure
under the facts and circumstances of the case. In order to
promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal
advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the client’s consent.
SECOND EXCEPTION: WHERE DISCLOSURE WOULD OPEN
THE CLIENT TO CIVIL LIABILITY.
 In Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, Neugass, the
plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding,
owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second
taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action
both against defendant corporation and the owner of the
second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It
 turned out that when the attorney of defendant
corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact
was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the
name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of
the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action,
came to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the
man was the owner of the second cab. The New York
Supreme Court allowed the lawyer’s claim to the effect that he
could not reveal the name of his client because this would
expose the latter to civil litigation.
 In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, the lawyer
involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether he
represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The
purpose of the court’s request was to determine whether the
unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with
the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer
refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court.
Upholding the lawyer’s refusal to divulge the names of his
clients the court held:
 If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order
appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the
purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in
establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation.
THIRD EXCEPTION: THE NAME WOULD FURNISH THE ONLY
LINK THAT WOULD FORM THE CHAIN OF TESTIMONY
NECESSARY TO CONVICT AN INDIVIDUAL OF A CRIME, THE
CLIENT’S NAME IS PRIVILEGED.
 In Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers
regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed
taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). No investigation was then being undertaken by
the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the
taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which
had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee for the advice given.
Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in
Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but
without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird
identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Baird could not
be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him.
The court emphasized the exception that a client’s name is
privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the
legal services of the client’s identity exposes him to possible
investigation and sanction by government agencies. The
Court held:
 The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than
the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
non-payment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime.
FIRST AND THIRD EXCEPTIONS ARE APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE
 The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case
falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
 First, disclosure of the alleged client’s name would lead to
establish said client’s connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
 DISPOSITIVE:
 The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:
1) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
2) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
3) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
FACTS:
 From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in
their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations
in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice
in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their clients’ shareholdings.
 There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners’ legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of
their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
 Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the
client’s name would obviously provide the necessary link for
the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
It is the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a
crime.
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners as
parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 33.
ACA v. SALVADO
A.C. No. 10952, January 26, 2016
 Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for
disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
 Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010,
he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty.
Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced
himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several
businesses including but not limited to the lending business;
that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the
complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he
would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;
and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by
Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and investors.
 As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued
several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus
interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank.
 Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to
learn that the aforementioned checks were dishonored as
these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.
 Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon
Atty. Salvado. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began
to avoid complainant’s calls and text messages. This
prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty.
Divina, for appropriate legal action.
 Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty.
Salvado, directing him to settle his total obligation in the
amount of P747,000.00. Atty. Salvado refused to receive the
said notice.
 Complainant went to Atty. Salvado’s house to personally
serve the demand letter. A certain “Mark” who opened the
gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer
residing there and had been staying in the province already.
 As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing
Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted from his vehicle
and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate of the
house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had
not forgotten his debt. During this conversation, Atty. Salvado
assured complainant that he was working on “something” to
pay his obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at
the least, read the demand letter.
 Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his
obligations.
 Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant that he had
previously entered into various government contracts and that
he was previously engaged in some other businesses prior to
engaging in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty.
Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest
in his business, but it was Atty. Divina’s earnings of good
interest that attracted him into making an investment.
 The checks he issued were merely intended as security or
evidence of investment.
 Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were
instances when he would request complainant not to deposit a
check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds.
This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the
checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located
in Marikina City as collateral.
 Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado
be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
 IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with
modification – increased the period of suspension from six (6)
months to two (2) years.
ISSUE:
 WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended for he violated
CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD:
 YES.
RATIO:
1. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made
by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader
of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. A man,
learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make
truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or
 otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed,
complainant’s being beguiled to part with his money and
believe Atty. .Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was
typical human behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it
hard to believe that a person like the complainant would not
find the profession of the person on whose businesses he
would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty.
Salvado’s stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or
another, influenced complainant’s decision to invest.
2. The excuse of “gullibility and inadvertence” deserves scant
consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the
primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless
checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the
public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience
that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal
whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the
issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct,
and put the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt,
though it was not related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado’s
business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the
subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the
court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the
CPR.
3. The Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado’s deceiving attempts
to evade payment of his obligations.
JIMENEZ VS. FRANCISCO
A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
 Mario Crespo (aka Mark Jimenez) filed a complaint for estafa
against Caroline Castaneda Jimenez (complainant in the
disbarment case) and several others with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez claimed to be the true and
beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion) which was incorporated
for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in
Forbes Park. The Forbes house was purchased for
P117,000,000 but it was undervalued to make it appear that it
was sold for only P78,000,000. Later on, Jimenez was
informed by his lawyer, Atty. Edgar Francisco, that Caroline
fraudulently sold the Forbes property to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise for P118 million. This sale was again undervalued
at P78 million. Thereafter, Jimenez, with the assistance of
Atty. Francisco, sued them for estafa.
 Caroline was shocked and felt betrayed especially by Atty.
Francisco as he was the one who assisted her with the
transactions. Atty. Francisco also happened to be the legal
counsel of Clarion. Hence, she filed a complaint against him
with the IBP-CBD, seeking his disbarment, on the basis of the
affidavit executed by Atty. Francisco in the estafa case.
 On his part, Atty. Francisco argued that he did not violate the
rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the
ground that he was the personal counsel of Jimenez and not
of Caroline.
 The IBP-CBD found that Atty. Francisco violated the rules on
privileged communication and conflict of interest, and that he
participated in unlawful transactions. It was recommended
that he be suspended for one year from the practice of law.
The IBP-BOG affirmed.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rules on privileged
communication and conflict of interest.
HELD:
 No. Those rules presuppose a lawyer-client relationship. Also,
the rule on lawyer-client privilege requires the following
factors:
1) Attorney-client relationship;
2) The client made the communication in confidence; and
3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.
 In this case, Caroline failed to establish the professional
relationship between her and Atty. Francisco.
 Nevertheless, Atty. Francisco was suspended from the
practice for six months for having participated in the unlawful
transactions concerning the purchase of the Forbes property
in violation of Canons 1 and 10 and Rule 1.0 of the CPR.
FOSTER VS AGTANG
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
o MANILA – Erlinda Foster had a legal problem concerning a
deed of absolute sale, which Atty. Jaime Agtang notarized,
she entered into with Tierra Realty. Foster then agreed to
engage Atty. Agtang’s legal service for the filing of the
appropriate case in court. Atty. Agtang received P20,000 as
acceptance fee and P5,000 for incidental expenses. In the
course of the attorney-client relationship, Atty. Agtang
committed the following acts:
1) He asked a loan from Foster in the amount of P100,000 for
the repair of his car;
2) Asking for an unnecessarily high filing fee of P150,000. He
justified the amount, citing the high value of the land involved
and the sheriff’s travel expenses and accommodations in
Manila.
3) He again asked for P70,000 or P50,000 for a supposed
emergency but received only P22,000;
4) He asked P50,000 to bribe a judge in connection with the
reformation case;
5) Failing to notify Foster that the case was already dismissed;
and (6) He did not disclose to Foster that he was acquainted
with Tierra Realty.
 With respect to the loan, Atty. Agtang claimed that it was
Foster’s husband who insisted on the loan to reward his
patience of visiting their home. He denied the other
accusations.
 The IBP recommended Atty. Agtang’s suspension for one
year, which was shortened to three months.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Atty. Agtang violated the CPR.
HELD:
 Yes. He violated the following provisions of the CPR:
o Rule 1.0
For overpricing the amount of the filing fee. He asked for
P150,000 when it should have only been P22,410.
o Rule 16.04
 For borrowing considerable amounts of money from Foster.
o Rule 15.03
For representing conflicting interest. He failed to disclose to
Foster that he represented Tiera Realty in the past.
o For these, Atty. Agtang was disbarred.
NATIVIDAD VS. SOLIDUM
A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014
FACTS:
 Atty. Ivan Solidum was retained as Hilda Presbitero’s counsel
for the purpose of following up the release of the payment for
the latter’s 2.7-hectare property in Bacolod which was the
subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). DAR was supposed to pay
P700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Hilda to
PNB for P1,200,000. Hilda claimed that PNB’s claim had
already prescribed, so she engaged the services of Atty.
Solidum to represent her in this matter. He proposed the filing
of a case for quieting of title against PNB. He received
P50,000 from Hilda for the expenses of the case, but nothing
came out of it.
 Hilda’s daughter, Ma. Theresa Yulo, also engaged Atty.
Solidum’s services to handle the registration of her 18.85
hectare lot in Negros. Theresa convinced her sister, Natividad
Navarro, to finance the expenses. Atty. Solidum thus received
P200,000 from Natividad. Natividad later on that the property
was already in the name of Teodoro Yulo and said that she
would not have spent so much if Atty. Solidum only apprised
her of the real situation of the property.
 To finance his sugar trading business, Atty. Solidum obtained
two loans from Natividad, both in the amount of P1 million. He
promised a 10% monthly interest.
 He also obtained a loan from Hilda in the amount of P1 million
covered by a real estate mortgage over a 263-square-meter
property in Bacolod. Atty. Solidum sent Hilda postdated
checks drawn against an account in Metrobank. Hilda was
dissatisfied with the mortgaged land, so Solidum promised a
bigger land, but did not deliver on such promise.
 Solidum was able to pay Nati and Hilda a total of P900,000.
Later on, Nati and Hilda could no longer encash the checks
Solidum was giving, because the accounts were already
closed. When the two tried to foreclose the mortgages,
Solidum countered that the 10% monthly interests were
illegal.
 Nati and Hilda filed a complaint against Solidum with the IBP-
CBD which found Solidum guilty of violation of several
provisions of the CPR and recommended his disbarment. But
the IBP-BOG reduced the penalty to a two-year suspension.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Atty. Solidum violated the provisions of the
CPR.
HELD:
 Yes. He violated the following provisions:
 Rule 1.01
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that
respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he
obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could
no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
 drafted on the ground that the interest rate was
unconscionable. It was also established that respondent
mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000,
showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale
was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he
did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his
client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan
Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only
claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open
a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his
wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined
to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made
complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In
fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first
batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the
second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants
believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s
name.
 Rule 16.01
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare
lot, claimed that respondent received P265,000 from her.
Respondent countered that P105,000 was paid for real estate
taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid P70,000 to the
surveyor but the receipt was only forP15,000. Respondent
claimed that he paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee,
and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his
claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the
funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s
property.
 Rule 16.04
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a
MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned
out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property
he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn
from his account but from that of his son. Respondent
eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself
prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his
loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the
accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings
with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client.
 Atty. Solidum was disbarred.
HECK VS. SANTOS
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004
FACTS:
 Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation
of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial
sloth.
 Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before
the Regional Trial presided by Judge Anthony E. Santos.
Heck and his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the
order to schedule the
  trial on June 10 and 11, 1996. Consequently, they and
their counsel failed to appear therein. Since only the
plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared in that
hearing, Judge Santos considered the non-attendance of
Heck and his co-defendant as waiver of their right to present
evidence. Judge Santos thereafter ordered that the case to
be submitted for decision. He therefore authorized Atty.
Singson to prepare the draft of the decision.
 The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim
from the draft which Atty. Singson prepared. Hence, Heck
filed an administrative complaint charging Judge Santos with
violation of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge
Santos guilty for adopting Singson’s work as his own.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
 Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
HELD:
 The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order
for the counsel of one of the parties to draft the decision and
his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The pertinent canons of which read: Canon
2, a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge should perform
official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence adjudicative responsibilities.
 By such order, Judge Santos abdicated
a function exclusively granted to him by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. It is axiomatic that decision-
making, among other duties, is the primordial and most
important duty of a member of the bench. He must use his
own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the
evidence presented before him and his own discernment
when determining the proper action, resolution or decision.
Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation
of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial
sloth.
 Lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. It
bears emphasis that a judge must not only render a just,
correct and impartial decision. He should do so in such a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness,
impartiality and integrity.
TABANG VS. GACOTT
A.C. No. 6490, September 29, 2004
 Lilia Tabang sought legal advice from a judge named
Estaquio Gacott (father of respondent herein) regarding her
desire to buy a 30-hectare agricultural land in Palawan. The
judge told her that she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks
of land, because she already owns other parcels of land, so
he advised her to put the title of the lands in the names of
fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for easy
disposition. Lilia eventually succeeded in acquiring the lands.
But, later on she had to sell the same. She then asked the
assistance of Atty. Glenn Gacott (respondent). On the pretext
that he is going to help them sell the subject property to
prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the seven land titles
from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year
from the time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to
negotiate the sale of the property. He informed herein
complainants that he lost all the seven land titles and advised
them to file a petition for the reissuance of title. However, in
the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed
 that the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven
individual Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Lilia
Tabang appear to have been signed by the same person
because of the similarities in their strokes. The public
prosecutor informed the trial court of this fact prompting the
latter to summon the alleged principals. To avoid
embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court
because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia
withdrew the case without prejudice to the re-filing of the
same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for re-
issuance of title, changing the signatures of the fictitious
owners. Upon knowledge that a new set of cases was filed,
respondent executed or caused to be executed several
documents, among which were Revocation of Special Power
of Attorney and Affidavits of Recovery purportedly signed by
the principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused the
annotation of these documents in the land titles covering the
subject properties. Thereafter, respondent caused the
publication of a notice representing himself as the owner of
the subject parcels of land and indicating therein his desire to
sell the said properties. Eventually, respondent was able to
sell the seven parcels of land to seven individuals. However,
only three of these buyers were legitimate, while the
remaining four are dummies of respondent. As a result of
selling the three parcels of land, respondent was able to
receive P3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was
remitted to complainants.
 The complainants thus filed a complaint against respondent
with the IBP, claiming that in executing the various Revocation
of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit of Recovery,
affixing thereon the signatures of the fictitious registered
owners of the disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the
ownership over the said lands upon himself, respondent
committed gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit.
 Respondent denied that complainant Lilia Tabang is the real
owner and that she merely acted as a broker who was trying
to promote the sale of the properties; that when she came to
know that the properties were sold by their registered owners,
she called up the law office of respondent and demanded that
she be given her share or balato in the sale of the properties
equivalent to 20% of the gross sales because of her alleged
efforts exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of
land; that when respondent turned her down, Lilia threatened
to put him in bad light and seek his disbarment. Respondent
further denies complainants allegation that he sold real
properties of some of his clients to third persons claiming that
in all these cases his role was merely to notarize the
documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the
buyers of their properties.
 The Investigating Commissioner conducted a mandatory
conference and thereafter required the parties to submit
position papers. And then she recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The
IBP-BOG modified the penalty to disbarment.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Atty. Gacott should be disbarred.
HELD:
 No. The case should be remanded for further proceedings,
because the procedure observed was not proper. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution. In complaints
for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory
requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid
and compelling reasons. Sec. 8 of Rule 139-B provides:
“Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to
answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed
with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to
 issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall
be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to
appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The
Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3)
months from the date of its commencement, unless extended
for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application. Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any
other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with
as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge
shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of
Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of
Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for
hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as
practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall
within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action
and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.”
 In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated
the formal investigation by conducting a mandatory
conference between the complainants and the respondent
after both parties have filed their complaint and answer,
respectively. The mandatory conference was supposedly held
for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the parties
to stipulate facts. However, no definitive result was reached
during the conference as respondent continued to deny all the
allegations of the complainants. After the mandatory
conference was held, no further hearings were conducted.
Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely required the
parties to submit their respective position papers, including all
the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of
witnesses, if any. On the sole basis of the pleadings filed by
both parties and of the documents attached thereto, the
Investigating Commissioner submitted her Report and
Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
DE JESUS VS. SANCHEZ-MALIT
A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
FACTS:
 Mercedita De Jesus filed a disbarment case against lawyer
and notary public Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (respondent)
for allegedly committing the following acts:
1) Drafting and notarizing a real estate mortgage over a
public market stall which falsely named Mercedita as its
absolute and registered owner for which Mercedita was
sued for perjury;
2) Notarizing a lease agreement without the signature of
the lessees;
3) Notarizing a sale agreement over a property covered
by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
without advising Mercedita that the property was still
covered by the period within which it could not be
alienated; and
4) Notarizing SPAs without the signature of the principals.
 With regard to the mortgage, respondent claimed that the
deed was prepared in haste, hence she failed to delete the
phrase “absolute and registered owner.” With regard to the
lease, respondent countered that respondent countered that
the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually
new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to
 complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra
copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one,
relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would
sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy
for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by
a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an
experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice
on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the
purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not
present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the
property was the subject of a case pending before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB);
complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject
property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs
submitted by complainant as additional evidence wereproperly
notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that
the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence,the notarization was limited to the former’s participation
in the execution ofthe document. Moreover, the
acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be
notarized in the principal’s place of residence.
 An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted
her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent
Ex-ParteMotion for Submission of Additional Evidence.
Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by
respondent, including the following:
(1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the
SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact;
(2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact;
(3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the
parties thereto;
(4) an unsigned Sworn Statement;
(5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor;
(6) five unsigned Affidavits;
(7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration
by the Heirs);
(8) an unsigned Invitation Letter toa potential investor in
Japan;
(9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and
(10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
 The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that she
be disqualified as notary public for two years and suspension
from the practice of law for six months. This was affirmed by
the IBP-BOG.
 In her motion for reconsideration, respondent argued that the
additional evidence should have been expunged for being
inadmissible, because the procedural requisites under the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice was not observed.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent should be penalized.
HELD:
 Yes. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision
declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation
 thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the
other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.

 The important role a notary public performs cannot be

overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but
one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.

 Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of

a false statement or information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew
that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market
stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the
real estate mortgage contractdoes not make respondent any
less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

 The Supreme Court did not believe respondent’s explanation

for her lapses.