1|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Sanado vs CA
Facts: Philippine Fisheries Commission issued to
petitioner Calixto Sanado an ordinary Fishpond permit
which petitioner leased to private respondent
Nepumuceno, but such lease contract does not include
the 10 hectares area already cultivated and fully
developed by petitioner. After how many years the
director of fisheries and aquatic resources
recommended to the ministry of natural resources the
conversion of the permit to a 25 years fishpond loan
agreement which respondent opposed. Sanado then
filed with RTC recovery of possession while the case is
pending the minister of agriculture and food ordered
the cancellation of the lease agreement. Petitioner
appealed to the office of the president because private
respondent was given a priority to apply for the said
area but such petition was dismissed. Prior to the
dismissal of Sanados appeal RTC ruled in favor of
petitioner which decision is affirmed by CA. Now
petitioner avers that the decision of the president is a
new matters which should not have been treated by the
appellate court with legal force and effect because it
was merely incidental to the propriety and impropriety
of the issuance of the writ of execution granted by the
trial court in favor of Sanado.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the president is
in quasi-judicial nature to justify the cognizance made
by the appellate court in its decision.
Ruling: YES, the action of an administrative agency in
granting or denying or in suspending or revoking a
license, permit, franchise or certificate of public
convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-
judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon
ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency,
upon which a decision is to be made and rights and
liabilities determined.
Findings of administrative agencies which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matter are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality.
25 digest pool
Carino vs CHR
December 2,1991
Facts: Respondent teachers went to Commission on
Human Rights(CHR) to complain Ramon Magsaysay
high school that while they were participating in a
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
Despite the orders of SC upholding Secretary Carinos
act of issuing the return to work order, which the
teachers disobeyed, CHR continued hearing the case of
the teacher and even ruled that they were denied of
due process.
Issue: Whether or not CHR have jurisdiction to try and
hear the present controversy.
Ruling: NONE, The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have
The court declares the CHR to have no such
power and that it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate or much less take over the
functions of the latter.
2|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Lastimosa vs Vasquez
April 6, 1995
Facts: Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of
Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated
rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts,
abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the
Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The
cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-
93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.
The ombudsman had ordered the assistant prosecutor
of Cebu to file a case against mayor Ilustrisimo,
however the assistant prosecutor refused to follow the
order of the ombudsman, instead of filling a case of
rape, the assistant prosecutor only filed act of
lasciviousness.
Issue: Whether or not the ombudsman have the power
of supervision and control over the assistant prosecutor?
Ruling: Yes, the ombudsman power to investigate and
prosecute includes the investigation and prosecution of
any crime committed by a public official regardless of
whether the acts or omission complained of are related
to or connected with or arise from the performance of his
official duty. In the same case , it was explained that the
ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutor for
assistance. When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes
under the “supervision and control” of the ombudsman
which means he is subject to the power of the
ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse, or
modify his (prosecutor’s) decision.
25 digest pool
Syquia vs Board of Power and Waterworks
November 29, 1976
Facts: Several tenants of a residential building filed a
complaint to respondent board of power and waterworks
against petitioner, the owner of the apartments they
were leasing. Respondents argued that petitioner are
billing them for electrical consumption in excess of the
authorized meralco rates. Petitioner argued that she was
charging them not only for the consumption in their
individual apartments but also for the fuel adjustments
and electricity used in common areas, the servant’s
quarters and elevator, which additional costs had been
distributed pro rata among all the tenants of the building.
Respondent board held that the additional charges were
unlawful since the tenants should be required to pay for
the electricity used only in their own respective units.
Petitioner appealed contesting that respondent board
has no jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not respondent board of power and
waterworks have jurisdiction over the complaints?
Ruling: None, Supreme Court held that tenants
complaint “give rise to a question that is purely civil in
character that is to be adjudged under the applicable
provisions of the civil code, not the public service act,
and not by the respondent regulatory board which has
no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general
circulation.”
Respondent board as a regulatory board
manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents
against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over
petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-
complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not
engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity
without permit or franchise.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints against
petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional
rising costs of electricity consumed for the common
areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of
P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its
orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside
as null and void.
3|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Globe vs Public Service Commission
January 21, 1987
Section 21 of Public Service Act, C.A No. 146
Facts: A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte
Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent
Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau
of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was
transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in
Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless
Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the
message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation
in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the
Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid.
The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in
its non-delivery to the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent
Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner
Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating
the incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case
No. 65-39-OC and petitioner was required to answer the
same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-
complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery
of the message to the addressee.
Issue: Whether or not Public Service Commission have
jurisdiction?
Ruling: None, had there been such a violation, the
commission would have been authorized to impose the
fine assailed in this case. It was shown, however, that
the petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so “
there were no terms or conditions of any certificate by
the commission to violate. Neither was there any order,
decision and regulation from the commission applicable
to petitioner that the latter allegedly violated, disobeyed
or disregarded”
Too basic in administrative law to need citation
of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent
Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation
creating such body; and any order without or beyond
such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under
consideration belonged to this category.
25 digest pool
RCPI v. NTC
Facts: Juan Alegre sent two (2) RUSH telegrams
through petitioner RCPI Taft Manila to his sister and
brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-
law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte informing them of the death
and interment of Manong Poling. Both telegrams did not
reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private
respondent filed a letter-complaint against the RCPI with
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for
poor service. NTC, acting under EO 564 which
purportedly broadened its supervisory power, assumed
jurisdiction over the controversy and imposed fines
against RCPI for failing to render adequate service to a
consumer.
RCPI contended that NTC has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case in point insofar as its predecessor
PSC (Public Service Commission) jurisdiction is limited
only to the fixing of rates.
Issue: Whether or not NTC has jurisdiction to
administratively impose fines on a telegraph company
for failing to render adequate service to a consumer.
Held: NONE. E. O. 546 is couched in general terms. The
NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of
Communications which exercised powers pursuant to
the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines
should therefore be read in the light of the Francisco
Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not
grant additional powers to the Board of Communications.
The Board in other words, did not possess the power to
impose administrative fines on public services rendering
deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot
arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of
legislation.
The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to
impose administrative fines on public service utilities,
including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to
render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it
expanded the coverage of the supervisory and
regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no
alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of
jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission,
are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating
such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
4|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Boiser vs. CA
122 SCRA 945
Facts: PLDT entered into a contract denominated as
“Interconnecting Agreement” whereby PLDT bound itself
to provide premiere with long distance and overseas
facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in
Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. On Feb. 27, 1979,
without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent
PLDT issued a “Circuit Authorization Order” to its co-
respondent, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and
Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT’s
relay station with the facilities of the petitioner’s
telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner
avers that this was in gross violation of the aforesaid
“Interconnecting Agreement”.
On March 2, 1979, CFI of Cebu issued a TRO
against respondent PLDT and directed the preservation
of the status quo between the parties. The petitioner
filed with the CA had for its object the setting aside of the
CFI restraining order which enjoined PLDT and the other
respondents from disconnecting the Mnadaue-Tagbiliran
telephone connections.
Issue: W/N Administrative Department (NTC) has
jurisdiction over the issue and not the regular courts?
Held: No, jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the Law. There is nothing in the
commission’s powers which authorizes it to adjudicate
breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and
exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the
private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI
restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard
the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the later
“Interconnecting Agreement”. But even if they were, this
question is one which should be clarified in the Civil case
for breach of contract.
25 digest pool
National Federation of Labor and Zambowood
Monthly Employees Union v. Hon. Carlito A. Eisma
GR No L-61236; January 31, 1984
FACTS: The petitioner National Federation of Labor, on
March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City,
a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao,
Zamboanga City.
Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent
firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. Then came,
on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike
against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair
labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and
"employment of oppressive alien management personnel
without proper permit. It was followed by the union
submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike,
"including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for
yes and three voted for no."
On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a
complaint with respondent Judge against the officers
and members of petitioners union, for "damages for
obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order." It was alleged that
defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading
to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers
and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such
premises. Six days later, there was a motion for the
dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order
and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the
acts complained of were incidents of picketing by
defendants then on strike against private respondent,
and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to
the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227,
not to a court of first instance. There was, as noted
earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is a labor arbiter that can pass
on a suit for damages filed by the employer.
HELD: YES, the said jurisdiction over the said question
is vested in the labor arbiter. On the precise question at
5|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has Association of the Philippine-American Management &
spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost Financing Co., Inc. as "the rather thorny question as to
fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn"
arbiter, not a court that possesses original and exclusive between the power lodged in an administrative body and
jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the
picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been
Martinez, the issue was set forth in the opening committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly
paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises administrative agency]." Certainly, the present Labor
anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Code is even more committed to the view that on policy
Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater
filed by an employee against his employer for recovery promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is
of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages — spared the often onerous task of determining what
the court of general jurisdiction or the labor Arbiter of the essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that
National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" It was may be incurred by either labor or management as a
categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-
exclusive jurisdiction over the case." Then came this employee relations.
portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject
matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is (Nota Bene: The second paragraph is the very essence
given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must of the ruling of the case. I posted the first paragraph for
be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. reference purposes in case Ma’am Jacob inquires the
Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is basis of the decision)
derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the
issue before Us should be resolved on the basis of the
law or statute now in force. We find that law in
Presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1,
1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: . . . Article
217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
— (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases involving all workers whether agricultural or non-
agricultural: . . . 3. All money claims of workers, including
those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages,
overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement,
except claims for employees' compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases
involving household services; and 5. All other claims
arising from employer-employee relations, unless
expressly excluded by this Code." That same month, two
other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman
and Aguda v. Vallejos.

The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the

enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that
the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would
once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed
that even if they were not that explicit, history has
vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was
referred to by Philippine American Management &
Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors
6|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Angara v. Electoral Commission
63 PHIL 139
Facts: In the election of September 17, 1935, petitioner
Angara and the respondents Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the district of Tayabas. On
October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests. On December 8,
1935, Ynsua filed before Electoral Commission a
“motion of protest” against Angara and praying among
other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
member of the National Assembly or that the election of
said position be nullified. On December 9, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution stating that the last
day for filing protest is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that
the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the SC
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Issue: W/N the rules of proceedings adopted by the
Electoral Commission in election contest of which it was
the “sole judge” is validly prescribed by such
commission?
Held: Yes, it is a settled rule of construction that where
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred. The
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power must be
deemed by necessary application to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission.
25 digest pool
Phil Lawyers Assoc v. Celedino Agrava
GR No L-12426; February 16, 1959
FACTS: On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a
circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who
are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover
patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of
the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to
take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act
of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of
his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a lawyer can be a Patent
Attorney even without taking the said examination
(2) Whether or not the respondent Director acted
in excess jurisdiction is issuing the said circular
HELD: (1) YES, a lawyer can become such
without taking the said examination. The Director of
Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the
bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should
be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without
further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or
necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical
men and scientists in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description
of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the
7|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

same way that a lawyer filing an application for the the interpretation and determination of the scope and
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable,
required to submit a plan and technical description of as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor. involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
(2) YES, he acted in excess of his jurisdiction. from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code to the Supreme Court.
authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with (Nota Bene: The second ruling is the one related to
law, to secure the harmonious and efficient Admin Law. I included the first just in case Ma’am Jacob
administration of his branch of the service and to carry inquires such. After all, that is the main issue to be
into full effect the laws relating to matters within the answered and was answered by the Supreme Court.)
jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs
shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head,
make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the
effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been
promulgated not only for the Bureaus of Customs and
Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in
and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an

express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be
no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in
the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as
regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of
Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising
before them or otherwise transacting business with them
on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law,

members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the
reason that much of the business in said office involves
8|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA
117 SCRA 369
Facts: Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc.
organized by Guiang, Liceralde and six (6) others, which
was then issued a consolidated timber license. Guiang
and Liceralde, due to some differences with the majority
group in the corporation, requested the Secretary of
Agriculture and National Resources that they be allowed
to withdraw their respective forest areas under their
original timber licenses from the consolidated timber
license of Agusmin and consolidated them with he
timber license of Pedreo B. De Jesus and Sulpicio
Lagnoda. The request was referred to the Director of
Forestry who declared that the request is beyond his
jurisdiction. Guiang, Liceralde and De Jesus formed a
corporation known as the P.B. De Jesus & Co., Inc.
Agusmin interposed and appealed from the decision of
the Secretary stating that it was appealing said decision
to the Office of the President.
Issue: W/N the right for procedural due process has
been violated by the Executive Secretary?
Held: No, in deciding administrative questions,
technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and
due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not
indispensable, little, if any, useful purpose could be
gained in further discussing these issues because Letter
of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancelation of
the timber issued to Agusmin, in effect, reversed and set
aside the said decision of the Executive Secretary before
the same become final and enforceable. In the words of
the CA, the said decisions did not acquire and finality.
Administrative rules of procedure would be
construed liberally in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses. There is no denial of due process if the
decision was rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
25 digest pool
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S.
SAMANIEGO
FACTS: Respondent Joel S. Samaniego, the City
Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay, was charged with two
administrative complaints for dishonesty and grave
misconduct. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found respondent liable for grave misconduct. Via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in the CA, Samaniego assailed the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable. The
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
was granted. The Office of the Ombudsman filed a
motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion
to recall the writ of preliminary injunction. The motions
however were denied. The Office of the Ombudsman
then claims that the CA erred in denying its right to
intervene, considering that its joint decision was the
subject of the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of
preliminary injunction should be recalled.
The Court decided, in the interest of justice and
practicality, that the issuance of the injunctive writ was a
superfluity. It anchored its decision on the case of Office
of the Ombudsman v. Laja where it pronounced the
scope of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman, as amended. The provisions state that
“where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.” Only
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of
not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary shall be final and unappealable hence,
immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases
where the penalty imposed is other than penalties
mentioned, the law gives the respondent the right to
appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision
becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the
period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the
denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or
decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce
issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman
Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions
should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. The penalty meted out to respondent
was suspension for one year without pay. Hence, the
filing of the appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ
prevents the penalty from being executory.
9|P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
(NOTE: This is now the case assigned)
This is a resolution of the second motion for partial
reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman to our decision dated September 11, 2008,
particularly our pronouncement with respect to the stay
of the decision of the Ombudsman during the pendency
of an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal to the Court of
Appeals stops the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman from being executor
HELD: No. An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall
be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that
the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the
penalty of suspension for one year is immediately
executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the
mere filing of an appeal to the CA.
The Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of
the Ombudsman suppletorily only when the procedural
matter is not governed by any specific provision in the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.7
Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical,
an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution
authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate
its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections
18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide
that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions and
duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of
justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary
injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to
encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution as the injunctive writ
will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
25 digest pool
In Re Contempt Proceedings against Armando
Ramos, Jesus L. Carmelo v. Armando Ramos.
G.R. No. L-17778. November 30, 1962.
Facts: On Feb. 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila created a
Probe Committee to investigate license inspectors and
personnel of License Inspection Division of the Office of
the City Treasurer. The committee issued several
subpoenas to Casa de Alba bookkeeper Armando
Ramos in connection with an admin. case against
Crisanta Estanislao. Ramos failed to appear always
(dates June 3, 8, 9, 15, and 16, and Aug. 4 and 11,
1960).
Petitioner Carmelo filed a petition for contempt against
Ramos alleging that his refusal tended to impede and
obstruct administrative proceedings. CFI dismissed it.
Issue: Whether the Committee has the power to
subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for
punishment in case of refusal.
Held: NO.Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to
inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend
contempt committed against administrative officials or
bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is
clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of
court, as is done in Sec. 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. One who invokes Sec. 580 must
first show he has authority to take testimony or evidence.
There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor
creating the committee about such a grant of power.
Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to
require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule
is that the Mayor cannot delegate this power.
10 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Examiners
G.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969
Facts: In the initial hearing of the Board of Medical
Examiners on the charge against Arsenio Pascual, Jr.,
counsel for complainants announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. The Board took note,
but stated that he will still testify as such witness in the
next hearing.
Pascual filed an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board with the CFI of
Manila. The complainants in the administrative case,
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, filed a
motion for intervention. Lower court ruled in favor of
Pascual.
Issue: Whether in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board
can compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent.
Held: NO. 1. The lower court's decision follows the
principle in Cabal v. Kapunan, about an adminstrative
case, that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not
only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take
the witness stand. While the matter there referred to an
administrative case, there is clearly the imposition of a
penalty. The present case is not dissimilar. The self-
incrimination clause is applicable to a proceeding that
could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to
practice the medical profession.
2. The Board is mistaken that the clause is limited to
allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to
which could lead to a penal liability. That is just one
aspect of the right. The constitutional guarantee protects
as well the right to silence. In Chavex v. CA, defendant
has a right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless
he chooses to take the witness stand.
Quotables:
Chief Justice Warren: "the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Justice Douglas: "...Self-Incrimination clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force to surrender..."
25 digest pool
Masangkay v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-13827 . Sept.28, 1962
Facts: Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan
designated by the COMELEC in its resolution to among
others, take charge of the receipt and custody of the
official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of
their distribution, among the different municipalities of
the province. He and several others were charged
before the COMELEC with contempt for having opened
three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of the province of Aklan without the
presence of the division superintendent of schools of
Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal
Party and the Citizens' Party, in violation of the
instructions of said Commission and which are
punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election
Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
He was subsequently convicted by the COMELEC as
guilty and sentenced to suffer three months
imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be
served in the provincial jail of Aklan. Masangkay
contended that, even if he can be held guilty of the act of
contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack
of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose
such disciplinary penalty under the principle of
separation of powers.
Issue: W/N COMELEC can exercise the power to
punish contempt
Held:NO. The COMELEC, although it cannot be
classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision law come under its jurisdiction. However, when
the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot
exercise the power to punish contempt because such
power is inherently judicial in nature.
In the instant case, the resolutions which the
Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the
charge for contempt was filed against petitioner
Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution
of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the
different municipalities. Thus, the COMELEC cannot
exercise its power to punish contempt.
11 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
ARCADIO R. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON.
AMADO INCIONG, as Chairman of the National Labor
Relations Commission and DOMINGO CINCO,
respondents.
[G.R. No. L-36385. July 25, 1979.]
FACTS: This litigation started with private respondent
Domingo Cinco filing a verified complaint on December
12, 1972 with the then National Labor Relations
Commission, charging petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino
with violating the constitution of the Batangas Labor
Union by refusing, as its president, to call for the election
of officers in the month of November, 1972, and praying
that such election be conducted immediately. Upon
receipt of such verified complaint on January 9, 1973,
petitioner on the same date sent an urgent telegram to
the respondent National Labor Relations Commission for
the cancellation of the hearing of such complaint set for
January 12, 1973 as he had to appear on that very day
before the then Court of Industrial Relations, a formal
motion to such effect being filed on January 11, 1973.
But the respondent Chairman paid no heed to the letter
and instead allowed the respondent Cinco to proceed
with their election, by notifying them on January 30,
1973.
Subsequently, on February 26, 1973, the Batangas
Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch No. VII, Balayan,
Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 942 for prohibition
with a writ of preliminary injunction, against the
respondent Domingo Cinco and the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor,
seeking to annul the order of January 30, 1973 and to
prohibit the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission and the Secretary of Labor from enforcing
it. The court of first instance then presided by Judge
Jaime delos Angeles, now retired, did not grant the writ
of preliminary injunction ex parte as prayed for in the
petition but instead set the application thereof for hearing
on March 1, 1973 with due notice to all the parties, with
neither the Commission nor the then Secretary of Labor
appearing through counsel, although petitioner did. After
such hearing, Judge Jaime delos Angeles reserved his
resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate
legal questions raised therein.
Then and there, the petitioner and Judge delos Angeles
were summoned by the respondent Chairman, in order
for them to explain why they should be not cited in
contempt due to their “refusal to comply”.
25 digest pool
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Inciong has the
power "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to
comply", in order to attain the objectives of Presidential
Decree 21.
HELD: NO, he has not been granted with such power.
We start with a fundamental postulate. As set forth in
Villegas v. Subido: "Nothing is better settled in the law
than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The
government itself is merely an agency through which the
will of the State is expressed and enforced. Its officers
therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the
responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there
is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There
must be a delegation of such authority, either express or
implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid
of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That
principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. . . . Neither the
high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the
motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the
rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we
must take all pains to avoid." The undeniable concern of
respondent Inciong that the objectives of Presidential
Decree No. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for
exercising a power not conferred by such decree. He
ought to have known that the competence, "to hold any
person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly
cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance.
Correctly construed, it cannot cover the case likewise of
a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to
avail himself of a judicial remedy. It must ever be borne
in mind by an administrative official that courts exist
precisely to assure that there be compliance with the
law. That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the
rule of law requires. It is true that courts, like any other
governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its
jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is admitted that the
then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the
arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution
in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised.
The proper step for an administrative official then is to
seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely
on the ground that the matter did not fall within the
domain of the powers conferred on it. Instead,
respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him
for contempt. That was an affront to reason as well as a
disregard of well-settled rules. Neither was there any
contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking
judicial remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal
system if an individual is denied access to the courts
under these circumstances. The resort of respondent
12 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as
epithetical jurisprudence, seeking shelter in the
opprobrious term "old society tactics," is an implied
admission of his actuation being devoid of support in
law. As was so well stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "It
must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be
permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute."
(Nota Bene: Presidential Decree 21, though not
mentioned in express in the case, has something to do
with labor law.)
25 digest pool
Ang Tibay v. CIR
G.R. No. L-46496 . Feb. 27, 1940
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and
the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged
that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU,
from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by
the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs
and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That
National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal
one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the
Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by
the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing
the said motion.
Issue: W/N the motion for new trial is meritorious to be
granted.
Held: YES. The Court of Industrial Relations is a
special court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal
of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial
functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1).
There is in reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedure
requirements, but not free to ignore or disregard
fundamental and essential requirements of due process
involving proceedings of administrative character. Their
13 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is
not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR,
with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth.
25 digest pool
Clarita Carbonel v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 187689 ; September 7, 2010
FACTS:Clarita Carbonel, the petitioner, an employee of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology in Makati
City, went to CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of
the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service
Professional Examination because she lost her copy.
However, the Examination Placement and Service
Division noticed that the petitioner’s physical appearance
and signature were different from those affixed on her
form. Because of these discrepancies, CSCRO IV
conducted an investigation, where the petitioner, without
a counsel, confessed that she accepted the proposal of
a certain Bettina J. Navarro for the latter to obtain for
petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by
merely accomplishing an application form and paying the
amount of P10, 000.00. Hence, the formal charge
against petitioner. After the formal investigation, the
CSCRO IV rendered its decision finding the petitioner
guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification
of official documents. The petitioner, after three years,
filed an appeal to the Civil Service Commission;
however, such was dismissed for failure to file within the
reglementary period. The petitioner elevated the case to
CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the CSCRO IV.
The petitioner filed a petition with the SC contending that
CSC’s findings were based solely on her uncounselled
admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO
IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated
because she was not afforded the right to counsel when
her statement was taken.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC violated the due
process because she was not afforded the right to
counsel when her statement was taken
HELD: NO. It must be remembered that the right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus,
the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative
body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being
14 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not
always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit the
imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.
As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the
investigation may be used as evidence to justify her
dismissal.
25 digest pool
Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al
GR No 117565; November 18, 1997
Due Process – Assistance by Counsel
Facts: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-
CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional
Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas
expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was
falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he
had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.
Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed
by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two
complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted
on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted
by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for
its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ
the services of counsel. The committee granted the
motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared
on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution. The
Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of
Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing
Lumiqued.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the
right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be
waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. It is not an
absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners
invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to
have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any
crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he
could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.
“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a
party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that, without such
15 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

representation, he shall not be bound by such WHO ARE PROTECTED

proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable,
is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without
the participation of its members, the safeguard is
deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not
that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only
with a lawyer at his side.”
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s
appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for
reconsideration.
Equal protection is available to all persons, natural as
well as juridical. Artificial persons, however, are entitled
to the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.
By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable
only by citizens, such as the rights to vote, hold public
office, exploit natural resources, and operate public
utilities, although aliens are comprehended in the
guaranty. Even ordinary statutes can validly distinguish
between citizens and aliens or, for that matter, even
between or among citizens only.

NOTES:

EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or

things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.

Substantive equality is NOT enough, it is also required

that the law be enforced and applied equally. Even if the
law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate
equal protection if it is administered “with an evil eye and
uneven hand,’ so as to unjustly benefit some and
prejudice others.

The right to equal protection, basic as it is, sheltered by

the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand
departments of the government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many
constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue

favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications.
16 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
OLONGAPO JEEPNEY OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and Diosdado
Bartolo
February 26, 1965. G.R. No. L-20699
FACTS: In connection with the application of Diosdado
Bartolo, for a certificate of public covenience to operate
a (transportation) public utility service on the route —
Sta. Rita (Olongapo) to Magsaysay Drive (Naval Base
gate) in Olongapo, Zambales — the Public Service
Commission issued an order setting said application for
hearing. The order also contained the usual requirement
of publication and notice (of said order) to all operators
affected, as appearing in the attached list thereto, "at
least ten (10) days before the date of hearing, and that
applicant, during the hearing, shall submit among others,
as proof of compliance therewith, the affidavit of the
person who mailed said notices, to the effect that the
same was made within the required period.
The records show, however, that while the notice was
duly published in 2 newspapers of general circulation on
July 5, 1962, the individual notices sent by registered
mail to the affected operators were posted in Manila only
on July 25, 1962. Consequently, the addressees
received the same on the first week of August or after
the scheduled date of hearing as appearing in said
notice.
The records do not reveal what took place on July 30. It
appears, however, that Atty. Jesus K. Calderon, who
was designated to receive applicant's evidence, did so
on August 20, 1962, and as none of the affected
operators was present, an order of default was entered
against them at the instance of the applicant. On
November 16, 1962, a decision was rendered granting
applicant Bartolo a certificate to operate 2 jeepneys on
the route covered by his application. Presumably on
account of the general order of default, the affected
operators were not also notified of this decision. It was
only in December, 1962, upon inquiry made in the Motor
Vehicles Office, that they learned of said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdictional requirement of
notice to affected parties was not complied with.
HELD: Yes. Although the order of June 28, 1962
specifically required that the notices should be sent to
the persons named in the list at least 10 days before the
hearing which was scheduled for July 30, 1962, the
registry receipts, which were submitted to the
commissioner as part of applicant's evidence, show that
25 digest pool
the mail was actually posted in Manila only on July 25,
1962. Considering that these were sent by registered
mail and the addressees were in Zambales, it was
almost a certainty that the latter would not, as they did
not, receive the same before July 30. Furthermore, it
may be pointed out that although the same order of the
Commission required the submission of the affidavit of
the person who posted the notices, attesting to the fact
that the mailing was made at least 10 days before the
date of hearing, no such affidavit was presented.
Notwithstanding the foregoing deficiencies, the
application was, nevertheless, approved and the
disputed decision was rendered.
In this instance, respondent applicant contends that the
publication of the notice of hearing in 2 newspapers of
general circulation in the province of Zambales is
notification not only to the interested parties, but to the
whole world in general. This is inaccurate. The order
required, in addition to publication, individual notice to
the operators affected by the application and whose
names appeared in the list attached to the order. The
requirement, therefore, is not in the alternative, but
conjunctive. It cannot be disputed that this requirement
of the Public Service Commission itself in connection
with an application for a certificate of public
convenience, is within the power of the Commission to
impose. The inadequate notification to the interested
parties in this case, which resulted in the oppositors'
failure to be present during the hearing, deprived them of
their day in court. The decision rendered in disregard of
said right, consequently, is null and void.
17 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

PEFIANCO vs. MORAL
G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000
FACTS: Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed
a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral,
then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National
Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of
some historical documents from the vaults of the
Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National
Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several
hearings on the complaint. Secretary Gloria issued a
resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative
offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the
commission of pilferage of historical documents of the
national library, to the prejudice of the national library in
particular, and the country in general." She was ordered
dismissed from the government service.
when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed,
it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably
failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to
the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is
the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to
furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not
entitled to the writ prayed for.

Respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the

DECS Investigation Committee Report purportedly to
"guide [her] on whatever action would be most
appropriate to take under the circumstances.”
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary
Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the
case for Secretary Gloria.
ISSUE: Whether or not Moral is entitled to be informed
of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges
filed against her.
HELD: No. She is not entitled to the writ she is praying
for. There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty
on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally
held in Ruiz v. Drilon, that a respondent in an
administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against
him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against her during the hearings of
the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had
been accorded these rights.

The nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the

subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled that
mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
18 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al. vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, et al.
FACTS: Petitioners, being parties in several opposition,
interference and cancellation proceedings in said Office,
challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules
of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director
of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office
to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise
provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the
case shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to
the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or
trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of determining the question of priority of
adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-
mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of
Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to
hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez,
Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the
other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the
hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under
the law the Director must personally hear and decide
inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the
Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for
mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to
personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the
hearing officers.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent has the power to
delegate the hearing of inter partes cases to his
subordinates.
HELD: Yes. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of
Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of
technical, scientific or other qualified officers or
employees of other departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including corporations owned, controlled or operated by
the Government, when deemed necessary in the
consideration of any matter submitted to the Office
relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act.
Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director,
subject to the approval of the Department Head," to
"promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in
the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority
25 digest pool
undoubtedly also applies to the administration and
enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No.
166).It has been held that power-conferred upon an
administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders
as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry
out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate
source of authority to delegate a particular function,
unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication
it has been withheld. There is no provision either in
Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of
such authority, so far as the designation of hearing
examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such
authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and
consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.
It is well-settled that while the power to decide resides
solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this
does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be
made.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of
which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those
of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due
process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing
require that the actual taking of testimony be before the
same officer who will make the decision in the case. As
long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and
the decision is supported by the evidence in the record,
there is no question that the requirements of due
process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no
abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer
concerned as the actual decision remains with and is
made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give
the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of
making determinations upon evidence the officer who
makes the determinations must consider and appraise
the evidence which justifies them."
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make
preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at
the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the
merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to
the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that
the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional,
petitioners have not shown in what manner they have
been prejudiced by the proceedings.
19 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR
FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more
popular support but the latter had the advantage of being
the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power.
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed,
allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these
murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the
province and sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against
supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting
the candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and
the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the
private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of
the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the
decision now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique. This decision
was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and
Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M.
Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the
ground that he was a former law partner of private
respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused.
Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the
private respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa. The petitioner then came to this
Court, asking us to annul the said decision. The case
was still being considered by this Court when on
February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was granted due process
before the Comelec, an administrative body.
HELD: No.Given the general attitude of the Commission
on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and
the particular relationship between Commissioner
Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least
apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body
would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was.
Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his
objection to the transfer of the case to another division
25 digest pool
cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His
conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations
of innocence and proved the motives of the Second
Division when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that.
They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at
all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party
and with a judgment already made and waiting only to
be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-
judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which
the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach
the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach
his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all
the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established
facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may
color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a
just decision. Where this is probable or even only
posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit
himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like
Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion.
Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have
recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule
of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the
Second Division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision, assuming it could act, and
rendered the proceeding null and void.
20 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979
CASE: This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed
from the second decision of the Court of Appeals,
reversing its first decision and holding that it was
improper from Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own
decision as Director of Mines.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's
judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be
set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources
should review anew the decision of the Director of Mines
"and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the
trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows:
Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of
Gonzalo P. Nava referred as Petitioners Groups of
Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabilona, referred as
private respondents-appellees
FACTS: (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227,
Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960
wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or
protestants, wherein petitioners sought to be declared as
the rightful and prior locators and possessors of nine
mining claims located in Zambales. However Director
Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any
mineral nor staked and located mining claims in
accordance with law the basis for which he dismissed
the case.
In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining
claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo
Pabilona, now the private respondents-appellees, were
duly located and registered.
(2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While
the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead
of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case
No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as it he was adjudicating
the case for the first time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon
exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he
had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing
authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use
another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate
judge in the same case.
He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the
disputed mining claims, while, on the other hand, the
Martinez and Pabilona groups had validly located the
25 digest pool
said claims. Hence, he dismissed the appeal from his
own decision.
(3) On September 20, 1963, the petitioner filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that
they be declared the prior locators and possessors of the
sixty-nine mineral claims in question. Impleaded as
defendants in the case were the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the Director of Mines and the
members of the Martinez and Pabilona groups.
After hearing, the lower court sustained Secretary
Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. It held that the
disqualification petition of a judge to review his own
decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court)
does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no
provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an
appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of
Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the petitioners did not seasonably
seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon from deciding their
appeal, and that there was no evidence that the
Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice,
animosity or hostility to the petitioners.
(4) The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Sixth Division of that Court (Pascual, Agcaoili and
Climaco, JJ.) in its first decision reversed the judgment
of the trial court and declared that the petitioners were
the rightful locators and possessors of the said sixty-nine
mining claims and held as invalid the mining claims
overlapping the same. However, after a motion filed by
private respondent-appellees the Court of Appeals in its
second decision remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources for another review of Director
Gozon's decision. This was the prayer of the petitioners
in their brief but in their opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, they prayed that the first decision of the
Court of Appeals in their favor be maintained.
ISSUE: WON Sec. Gozon as the Secretary of
Agriculture acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reviewing his own order issued as the Director of Mines.
HELD: Yes.We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with
grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as
Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a
mockery of administrative justice.
21 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
The provision of section 61, The Mining Law,
Commonwealth Act No. 13-I, that the decision of the
Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the
Secretary should be a person different from the Director
of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
in his first view of the case.
A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of
things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from
reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He
should have asked his undersecretary to undertake the
review.
Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process,
meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon
reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.
25 digest pool
Corona vs. CA
214 SCRA 378
Facts: Secretary Reyes Filed a complaint with the
Administrative Action Board (AAB) a complaint against
Dinopol, then manager of the Port of Davao. For
dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and for violation of the Anti-
Graft Law. Dinopol actively participated at the hearings
although he asserted that the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) not the AAB, had jurisdiction over the case. AAB
found Dinopol guilty as charged. Dinopol filed with the
RTC of Pasig a petition challenging the jurisdiction of the
AAB. The court ruled in favor of Dinopol.
Issue: W/N the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB
have jurisdiction to initiate and hear administrative cases
against PPA personnel whose rank are below that of an
assistant general manager?
Held: No, what is prescribed by law and the Beja case
is that all complaints against a PPA official or employee
below the rank of Assistant Manager by the proper
officials, such as the PPA Police or any aggrieve party.
The aggrieved party should not, however, be one and
the same official upon whose lap the complaint he has
filed may eventually fall on appeal. Nemo potest esse
simul actor et judex. No man can be at once a litigant
and judge. Unless, of course, in a exceptional case,
such official inhibits himself or expresses his willingness
at the outset to waive his right to review the case on
appeal.
22 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
PERLA C. BAUTISTA, GREATER MANILA
FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS &
DRIVERS ASSOCIATION vs. BOE, MANILA
ELECTRIC CO
G.R. No. 75016 January 13, 1989
FACTS: On May 30, 1986, MERALCO filed with BOE a
verified application for an upward revision of its rates.
The application alleged among others, that MERALCO
suffered net losses of P231.2 million in 1984 and P70.4
million in 1985 due to the devaluation of the peso, the
drop in kilowatt sales, limited access to credit, high
financing cost and charges of operations and
maintenance and the deterioration of system loss. The
application averred that the proposed rate schedule is an
increase of 9.5 centavos per kilowatt hour in
MERALCO's basic distribution charge which is 5.25% of
the March 1986 average billing rate. However,
consumptions up to 130 kilowatt hours per month of
residential customers, and up to 70 kilowatt hours of
small commercial customers, and consumptions of
government-owned hospitals and public street lighting
services are not affected by the increase.
In the same petition, MERALCO prayed for an ex parte
provisional approval of the proposed rates anchored on
the reasons that under its existing rate schedules, it
expects to incur a total cash deficit from its 1986
operations in the amount of P918,317,000.00; that its
operating income is not enough to cover the payment of
the interests and amortization of its foreign loan, and that
it is unable to maintain its distribution system to provide
safe and efficient service. Attached to the petition are the
affidavits of its key officers with supporting duly certified
schedules, computations, documents and papers.
On June 9, 1986, herein petitioners Perla C. Bautista
and Greater Manila Federation of Jeepney Operators
and Drivers Association, filed an "Opposition to the
Application for the Increase in Rates" and prayed that no
provisional approval should be granted by the BOE.
They alleged that they, together with others similarly
situated, are adversely affected by the increase in rates
of MERALCO and that the increase in rates is exorbitant
and unreasonable as the prices of petroleum products
had already gone down.
In an Order dated June 11, 1986, the BOE provisionally
approved MERALCO's revised rate schedules without
hearing.
25 digest pool
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid
order stating that they were not afforded the opportunity
to be heard. Without setting for hearing, the BOE denied
the motion for reconsideration.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the Board of Energy acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it provisionally approved ex-parte the application
for increase in rates of MERALCO.
HELD: The records show that the issue has become
moot and academic as MERALCO decreased its rate by
12.6 centavos per kilowatt hour in its electric, bills for
August 1986, apart from a 4.2 centavo cut per kilowatt-
hour for September 1986. In fact a similar petition (G.R.
75045, Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Board
of Energy et al.) raising a like issue and with the same
factual backdrop was dismissed by this Court in the
resolution of October 3, 1986 for having become moot
and academic.
Assuming that this case has not yet become moot, it is
beyond dispute that when BOE provisionally authorized
private respondent's application without hearing, it
merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has upheld the
authority of regulatory boards like the Energy Regulatory
Board (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, et al., G.R. No. 78888-90,
June 23, 1988), to grant provisional relief upon the filing
of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage
thereafter, and without the need of prior hearing, but it
shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter
for the determination of its final decision. The order
granting Such provisional relief, however, must be based
upon substantial evidence — supporting papers duly
verified or authenticated, and is without prejudice to
rendition of a final decision after hearing. This Court
ruled in the case of the Board of Transportation that the
provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the
primary application is given a full hearing, are the
safeguards against its abuses (Matienso v. Abellera,
G.R. No. L-45839, June 1988).
In the case at bar, petitioners were given the opportunity
to air their side and put to test the reasonableness of the
revised rate schedules applied for during the hearings
for the determination of the principal relief sought. The
allegations, therefore, that due process had been denied
23 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

to the petitioners are without basis, they themselves PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. vs. CIVIL
having participated at the hearing for the final AERONAUTICS BOARD
determination of the application of MERALCO by the
BOE. G.R. No. L-24219 June 13, 1968

FACTS: On September 16, 1964, Fairways filed with

CAB the corresponding application for a "certificate of
public convenience and necessity", was objected to by
herein petitioner, Philippine Air Lines, Inc. After several
hearings before the CAB officer, on December 14, 1964,
Fairways filed an "urgent petition for provisional authority
to operate" under a detailed "program of implementation"
attached to said petition, and for the approval of its bond
therefor, as well as the provisional approval of its "tariff
regulations and the conditions of carriage to be printed
at the back of the passenger tickets." PAL opposed but
CAB gave a resolution issued on January 5, 1965,
granting the petition of Fairways provisional authority to
operate scheduled and non-scheduled domestic air
services with the use of DC-3 aircrafts", subject to
specified conditions which through evidence showing
prima facie its fitness, willingness and ability to operate
the services applied for and the public need for more air
transportation service, and to encourage and develop
commercial air transportation. Pursuant to Republic Act
No. 4147, granting thereto "a franchise to establish,
operate and maintain transport services for the carriage
of passengers, mail, industrial flights and cargo by air in
and between any and all points and places throughout
the Philippines and other countries". A reconsideration of
the resolution was denied, PAL filed the present civil
action alleging that, in issuing said resolution, CAB had
acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not (1) CAB is not empowered to

grant any provisional authority to operate, prior to the
submission for decision of the main application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity;
(2) CAB had no evidence before it that could have
justified the granting of the provisional authority
complained of;
(3) PAL was denied due process when CAB granted
said authority before the presentation of its evidence on
Fairway's main application; and
(4) In granting said provisional authority, the CAB had
prejudged the merits of said application.

HELD: 1.) NO. Because under Section 10-C(1) of

Republic Act No. 776: (C) The Board shall have the
following specific powers and duties:(1) In accordance
with the provisions of Chapter IV of this Act, to issue,
deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel suspend or
24 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

revoke, in whole or in part, upon petitioner complaint, or previous notice and hearing, consistently with due
upon its own initiative, any temporary operating permit or process. Again, the constitutional provision to the effect
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; that "no decision shall be rendered by any court of
Provided, however, That in the case of foreign air record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
carriers, the permit shall be issued with the approval of the facts and the law on which it is based", applies, not
the President of the Republic of the Philippines explicitly to such interlocutory orders, but to the determination of
authorizes CAB to issue a "temporary operating permit," the case on the merits.
and nothing contained, either in said section, or in
Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 776, negates the power 4.) No. Because the provisional nature of the permit
to issue said "permit", before the completion of the granted to Fairways refutes the assertion that it
applicant's evidence and that of the oppositor thereto on prejudges the merits of Fairways' application and PAL's
the main petition. opposition thereto. As stated in the questioned order,
CAB's findings therein made reflect its view merely on
The CAB's authority to grant a temporary permit "upon the prima facie effect of the evidence so far introduced
its own initiative," strongly suggests the power to and do not connote a pronouncement or an advanced
exercise said authority, even before the presentation of expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
said evidence has begun. In connection with the
commercial air transport service, from the policy of our
public service law, which sanctions the issuance of
temporary or provisional permits or certificates of public
convenience and necessity, before the submission of a
case for decision on the merits. The overriding
considerations in both instances are the same, namely,
that the service be required by public convenience and
necessity, and, that the applicant is fit, as well as willing
and able to render such service properly, in conformity
with law and the pertinent rules, regulations and
requirements.

2. & 3.) No. Apart from PAL's assertion being

contradicted by the tenor of said order, there is the legal
presumption that official duty has been duly performed.
The CAB is vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial
in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws
affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation
and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special
training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the
overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the
nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying
our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should
respect the findings of fact of said administrative
agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in
support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly
and patently insubstantial. Petitioner has not
satisfactorily shown that the aforementioned findings of
the CAB are lacking in the necessary evidentiary
support.

In the case at bar, we are concerned with an

interlocutory order prior to the rendition of said decision.
In fact, interlocutory orders may sometimes be issued ex
parte, particularly, in administrative proceedings, without
25 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
Judge Abelita III v. Doria
G.R. no. 170672
FACTS: Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages
under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against
P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez alleging that on
24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were
on their way to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate
when Doria and Ramirez , accompanied by 10
unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to
the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano,
Masbate. Abelita was suspicious of the request and told
respondents that he would proceed to the PNP
Headquarters after he had brought his wife home.
Abelita alleged that when he parked his car in front of
their house, Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key
to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and
conducted a search without a warrant. The search
resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Abelita
presented the shotgun’s license to respondents.
Thereafter, Ramirez continued his search and then
produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found
inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and
detained him, without any appropriate charge, at the
PNP special detention cell. Doria alleged that his office
received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. SPO3
Ramirez later reported that a certain Sia was wounded
while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and
his wife just left the place of the incident. Doria looked
for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of
the incident report. Doria requested petitioner to go with
him to the police headquarters as he was reported to be
involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly
sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence.
Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon
reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with
petitioner as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the
vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the
door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s
seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested petitioner. Doria alleged that his men also
arrested other persons who were identified to be with
petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and
frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed
against petitioner before this Court. The trial court ruled
in favor of Doria which resulted to a motion for
reconsideration by Abelita but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
25 digest pool
ISSUE: 1. Whether the warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure were illegal under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure;
2.Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages
under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code; and
3.Whether the findings in the administrative case against
petitioner are conclusive in this case.
HELD: 1.) NO. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule
to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender
has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Personal knowledge of facts must be
based on probable cause, which means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes. Ramirez investigated the
report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to
shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then
sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to
give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away,
coupled with the incident report which they investigated,
is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of
the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause.
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain
view doctrine which states that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The police authorities were in
the area because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside
the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a
shooting incident just took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to
the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
26 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
2.) NO. It was established that petitioner was lawfully
arrested without a warrant and that firearms were validly
seized from his possession. The trial court found that
petitioner was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and frustrated murder, and that respondents
were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be
held civilly liable for their actions.
3.) NO. For res judicata to apply, the following requisites
must be present:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must
be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are
substantially between the same parties
The present case and the administrative case are based
on the same essential facts and circumstances, the
doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative
case deals with the administrative liability which may be
incurred by the respondent for the commission of the
acts complained of. The deals with the civil liability for
damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of
causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes
of action is not required in the application of res judicata
in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is
required that there must always be identity of parties in
the first and second cases. There is no identity of parties
between the present case and the administrative case.
The administrative case was filed by Sia Lao against
petitioner. Sia Lao is not a party to this case.
Respondents in the present case were not parties to the
administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner.
Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to petitioner’s
complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless
cannot be held liable for damages.
25 digest pool
Governor San Luis, et al. v. CA & Berroya, Jr.
GR No. L-80160, 26 June 1989
Facts: Berroya had been the quarry superintendent in
Laguna. He denounced graft & corrupt practices by
employees of the provincial gov’t. Gov. San Luis issued
an office order transferring Berroya to the ofc of the
Provincial Engineer. Berroya challenged the transfer &
the Civil Service ruled the same violative of RA 2260 &
ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position
of quarry superintendent. Instead of complying w/ the
CSC directive, San Luis suspended Berroya. The CSC
reiterated its directive & ruled the 1-yr suspension illegal.
San Luis appealed the said directive to the Office of the
President. Said ofc issued a decision reversing the CSC
rulings but later reversed its decision on motion for
reconsideration.
San Luis dismissed Berroya for alleged neglect of duty
but the CSC declared the dismissal unjustified & directed
Berroya’s reinstatement. The CSC Merit System Board
denied San Luis’ Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution. Berroya’s formal demand for reinstatement
having been disdained he sought a mandamus to
compel his reversion to the position of quarry
superintendent.
The trial court upheld the validity of Berroya’s dismissal
but the CA reversed said ruling on appeal.
Issue: Whether decisions of the CSC & the OP, w/c
had become final & executory, can be reviewed by the
courts
Held: No. Whenever any board, tribunal or person is
by law vested w/ authority to judicially determine a
question, like the Merit Systems Board of the CSC & the
OP, such determination, when it has become final, is as
conclusive between the same parties litigating for the
same cause as though the adjudication had been made
by a court of general jurisdiction.
Decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed
by the courts, except when the former have acted w/o or
in excess of their jurisdiction, or w/ grave abuse of
discretion. Findings of administrative officials &
agencies who have acquired expertise bec their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
27 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
The decisions rendered by the OP & the Merit Systems
Board had attained finality w/o petitioners having taken
any timely legal recourse to have the said decisions
reviewed by the courts. The appropriate administrative
agencies having determined w/ finality that Berroya’s
suspension & dismissal were w/o just cause, his
reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the
Provincial Governor, a duty whose performance may be
controlled & enjoined by mandamus.
25 digest pool
Nasipit Lumber, Co. vs. NLRC
177 SCRA 93
Facts: Acting Secretary of labor issued an order
affirming the order and granting petitioner’s application
for clearance to dismiss Collado, employe by the latter
as security guard for alleged theft of four crates of
lawanit boards containing 1,000 panels. Collado filed a
complaint before the Butuan District Labor Office. The
labor arbiter conceded that NALCO acted in good faith in
terminating Collado’s employment to protect its business
interests. However, he was constrained to arrive at said
conclusion ordering the reinstatement of Collado
because of the order of the Nasipit Municipal Judge
finding that there was nothing in the testimony of the
prosecution witness to establish the probable guilt of
Collado. NALCO filed an appeal with the NLRC.
However, NLRC favored collado.
Issue: W/N the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion?
Held: Yes, in this case, petitioner supported its
application for clearance to terminate Collado’s
employment with sworn statements implicating him in
the theft. Such sworn statements are sufficient to
warrant dismissal. On the other hand, the dropping of
the qualified theft charges against Collado is not binding
upon a labor tribunal. The doctrine of res judicata does
not apply to or may not be invoked in labor relation
proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book
V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code provides that such proceedings are non-litigious
and summary in nature without regard to the legal
technicalities obtain in courts of law.
28 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Hon.
Bienvenido E. Laguesma & Pepsi-Cola Products,
Phil., Inc.
GR No. 122226, 25 Mar 1998
Facts: Petitioner union filed a petition for certification
election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Phil., Inc. However, its petition was denied by
the med-arbiter &, on appeal, by the Sec. of Labor &
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees &, therefore, ineligible for union
membership under the Labor Code.
Petitioner brought a suit challenging the validity of the
order of the med-arbiter, as reiterated in the order of the
Sec. of Labor & Employment. Said petition was
dismissed by the 3rd Division for lack of showing that
Laguesma committed grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration
presenting the question as to whether route managers
are managerial employees. This question was the
subject of 2 previous determinations by the Sec. of
Labor & Employment, in accordance with w/c the case
was decided by the med-arbiter.
Citing the ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. NLRC,
petitioner argues that these previous administrative
determinations do not have the effect of res judicata in
this case, bec labor relations proceedings are non-
litigious & summary in nature w/o regard to legal
technicalities.
Issue: Whether res judicata applies in this case
Held: Yes. Res judicata did not apply in Nasipit Lumber
because it involved labor relations proceedings of a non-
adversary character. But the doctrine of res judicata
certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings. It applies to judicial or quasi judicial
proceedings & not to the exercise or administrative
powers. Proceedings for certification election, such as
those involved in the case, are quasi judicial in nature &,
therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can
attain finality.
25 digest pool
DEMETRIO R. TECSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 123045 November 16, 1999
Facts: Upon the offer of Tecson, who was then the
mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur, he and Mrs.
Luzana agreed to engage in an investment business
which is to sell tickets at PhP 100 each which after 30
days would earn PhP 200 or more. She would buy
appliances and cosmetics at a discount, with the use of
the proceeds of the sales of tickets, and resell them.
Tecson does not appear to have given any financial
contribution.
After having already sold 40 tickets in the
amount of P4,000.00, bringing with him a Mayor's Permit
in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their business called "LD
Assurance Privileges," he asked for a cash advance of
P4,000.00 which he would use during the fiesta on
September 29, 1989, and he would not release the
Mayor's Permit unless the cash advance was given him.
Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not
the due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances
on his share. Tecson signed for the cash advance.
On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a
Business Permit in accordance with the instructions of
Tecson. The permit was in her name but the same was
for the operation of "Prosperidad Investment and Sub-
Dealership," the new name of the business. In the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur on October 17, 1989 presided over by
Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the
business permit at the instance of the Provincial Director
of the Department of Trade and Industry.
Suzana now filed an administrative case against
petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019
and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 with the DILG. She
also filed a also filed a civil case against petitioner for
damages with the Regional Trial Court. Lastly, another
complaint was filed with the Ombudsman for violation of
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act:.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del
Sur dismissed the administrative case. As to the civil
case, a compromise agreement was reached between
the litigants. The trial court approved the same on
December 6, 1991.
29 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

The Sandiganbayan, however, issued an order
for petitioner's arrest. The First Division rendered the
assailed decision convicting appellant of violating R.A.
No. 3019.
On his appeal, the Tecson argued that the
dismissal of the administrative case before the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur is
conclusive and binding upon the parties by virtue of the
doctrine of res judicata. Also, that having been tried
before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional
protection against double jeopardy since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had
already cleared him of all charges.
dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
2. No. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a
valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. 10 None of
the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the
administrative case. It must be stressed that the said
proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in
nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the decision of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused
serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the
Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not there was a violation of the

Constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy.

Held: 1. No. First, it must be pointed out that res

judicata is a doctrine of civil law. 7 It thus has no bearing
in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public
officers that a public official or employee is under a
three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a
wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a
public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for a wrongful doing.

Finally, such violation may also lead to

suspension, removal from office, or other administrative
sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and
distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily
bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative
complaint.

As to the amicable settlement, it is settled that a

complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance
against a public officer or employee cannot just be
withdrawn at any time by the complainant. This is
because there is a need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government and its
agencies and instrumentalities. 9 The inescapable
conclusion, therefore, is that the order of the trial court
30 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e
EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR v. LUIS BUNDALIAN,
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND GREGORIO R.
VIGILAR, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
G.R. No. 149335; July 1, 2003
Facts: An unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15,
1995, addressed by private respondent Luis Bundalian
against Montemayor was sent to the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
for accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 301. Petitioner was then
OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH. That in
1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot
at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles,
California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00.
Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing
wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
c administrative case before the PCAGC moot and
Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted
his counter-affidavit before the Philippine Commission
Against Graft and Corruption alleging that the said house
is owned by her sister-in-law. He also pointed out that
the charge against him was the subject of similar cases
filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his counter-
affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Reportof the
Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency
of evidence.
While petitioner participated in the proceedings
and submitted various pleadings and documents through
his counsel, Bundalian could not be located as his
Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the
course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly
required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns
(ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored
these directives and submitted only his Service Record.
After the investigation, the PCAGC concluded
that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to
buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in
1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise
found petitioner’s explanation as unusual, largely
unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. The
PCAGC concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition of the
subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his
salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service
pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
25 digest pool
August 24, 1998, the Office of the President
issued Administrative Order No. 12,[4] ordering
petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
government benefits.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,
Montemayor alleged that he was denied due process in
the investigation before the PCAGC and that his guilt
was proved by substantial evidence. Lastly, that the
earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman
rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC
moot and academic.
Issues: 1. Whether or not whether he was denied due
process in the investigation before the PCAGC.
2. Whether or not the earlier dismissal of similar
cases before the Ombudsman rendered the
academic.
Held: 1. No. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain
one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given
the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
Petitioner's active participation in every step of
the investigation effectively removed any badge of
procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the
due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to
challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.
Neither can we sustain petitioner’s contention
that the charge against him was unsupported by
substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified
complaint. Despite petitioner's denial of the ownership
of the house, he failed to explained why the house was
named after him and the sister-in-law did not even
submitted any support that she indeed was the owner
therof.
2. No. The decision of the Ombudsman does not
operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of
this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise
of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by
the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the
31 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a ti v e 25 digest pool

acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised
Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct,
petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated
by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and
control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature,
the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the
case at bar

Note: Basic principles in administrative investigations.

First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise.

Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of

the executive branch of the government, the findings of
facts made therein are to be respected so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence.

Third, administrative decisions in matters within

the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof
of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
These principles negate the power of the reviewing court
to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an
administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and
do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence
that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned.