6th Mahamana Malviya National Moot Court Competition

In the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavart

At New Delhi

Writ Petition (Civil) No. ______/2018

(Filed under Article 147,32,131A of the Constitution of Aryavart

,1950)

Devendra Singh Petitioner,

Versus

Union of India & others Respondent,

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondent,

MMC-24,

Counsel for the Respondent.

1
 Table of Content

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………...………….3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………...……………4-6

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...……………………..…………….7

STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………….8-9

ISSUES PRESENTED……………………………………...…………..10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT……………………………...………….11

ARGUMENT ADVANCED……………………………………………13

I) Whether the petition is maintainable?................................................................13-20

II) Whether the merger of the tribunals lie in money bill and the bill passed was a
money bill contrary to the petitioner claim that it was a CAB?..............................20-21

III) Whether the petitioners claim of malafide can be entertained and was there any
breach of duty / procedure or violation of constitution as alleged by the
petitioner……………………………………………………….……………........21-28

PRAYER……………………………………………………………..…29

2
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC. According

AERAT Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Appellate Tribunal

AMD Amendment

ART. Article

CAT Cyber Appellate Tribunal

CAB Constitutional Amendment Bill

Const. Constitutional

DEF. Definition

EPFAT Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal

GOVT. Government

IT Industrial Tribunal

NCLAT National Company Law Appellate Tribunal

TDSAT Telecom Disputes Settlement & Appellate Tribunal

PEPSU Patiala & East Punjab State Union

SCC Supreme Court Cases

CJI Chief Justice Of India

ICR Industrial Cases Report

SLR Stanford Law Review

i.e. That is

PIL Public Interest Litigation

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

List of Statues

1. Indian Finance Act…………………………...…………………….21,23,24,26

2. The Constitution of India ……………………………….……………….......13

Books Referred

1. V.N.Shukla, Constitution of India (35th edition 2017)…………...……19,21,23

2. Justice B.S Chauhan,Misc. Law Refrencer(2nd edition
2011)………………………………………………….……..13-16,18,22,23-27
3. S.K. Deoy Roy, Bias & Malafide Administrative Action, ( the law first edition
2004)………………………………………………….…………………...12,26

Cases

1. House Of Lords in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880)5 AC 214…....12.

2. Shiv Silk Mills, Bombay v. Mills Mazdoor Sabha 1961 ECR 192(
IC)…………………...…………………………………………...……….12,26.
3. B.D Gupta V. State of U.P 1995 SLR 304……………………………….13,26
4. Narendra Chaddha and others v. Union of India and others AIR1986 SC
638…………………………………………………….………………..…....13.
5. Montrial Street railway company normandin A I R 1917 PC
142……….……………………………………………………………… 13,26.
6. Ramdas Athawale S v. Union of India for SCC 1………….…………….13,22.
7. Amannaah v. K Veera Reddy AIR 1981 SC 116…………………..………..14.
8. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jithendra Kumar Mishra and others 19987 SCC
273………………………………………………………………..………….14.
9. K N Lakshminarasimaiah v. Secretary Mysore STAT(1966) 2 Mys L.J.
19………………………………………………….………………….……...14.
10. R.e.Sidebotham (1880) 14 CHD 458………………………………………..14.
11. Dr. Mrs. Mera Massey v. Dr SR Malhotra and others AIR 1998 SC
1153………………………………………………………………………….15.

4
12. Kabushiki Kaisha Tosiba v. Tosiba Appliances company and others 2008 10
SCC
766………..………………………………………………………………….15.
13. Tamil Nadu education department ministerial and general Subordinate
Services Association v. state of Tamil Nadu and others AIR 1980 SC
379…………….……………………………………………………………..16.
14. RK Garg v. Union of India and others AIR 1981 SC 2138….………….…..16.
15. V.k Nashwa v. Union of India 2012 to SCC 542……………………...…….21.
16. Saurabh Chaudry v. Union of India 2003 11 SCC 146………………….…..21.
17. Dwarkadas Marjatia and sons v. Board of trustees of Port Bombay AIR 1989 3
SCC 293………………………………………………………….………….21.
18. Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others AIR 1987 SC
877…………………………………………...………………………………22.
19. State of Haryana and others v. Ch bhajan Lal and others AIR 1992 SC 604
para
14…………………………………………………………………………….22.
20. Srinivasa general traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1983 for SCC 308/309
and 1990 4 CC 207…………………………………………………..………22.
21. Zee Telefilms Limited v. Union of India 2005 4 SCC 649…….……………22.
22. Desh Bandhu Gupta and company and others v. Delhi stock exchange
Association Limited, AIR 1979 SC 1049…………………………………....23.
23. BalasinorNagrik Co-operative bank limited v. Bahubhai Shankarlal Pandey
and others AIR 1987 SC 849…………………………………..…………….23.
24. Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Keshab Chandra Mandal AIR
1950 SC 265…………………………………………………………………24.
25. D D Joshi v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 420……………………………...24.
26. Bengal immunity community v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC
661……………………………………….………………………….……11,24.
27. Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woolen, cotton and Silk Mills
Limited and others AIR 1963 SC 1128…………………….…………….14,25.
28. Martin Burn Limited v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1966 SC
529…………………………………………………………………………...25.
29. The Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal I Calcutta v. M / S vegetables
products Limited AIR 1973 SC 927……………………………………..…..25.
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30. Shri Ram Narayan v. state of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459……….……….…25.
31. Ibodom V. Union Of India AIR 1975 , SC…………………………………27.
32. M / S Atul castings Limited v. Baba V Guruvachan AIR 2001 SC
1684………………………....……………………………………………….27.

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavart under
Art. 32, 131A, 147 of the Constitution of Aryavart, 1950.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Aryavart is a sovereign republic. All laws of Aryavart are pari materia

to the laws of India, hence the procedure and functions of executive,
legislative ,judiciary are same as that of India,
2. Aryavart has a multi party system .Elections were held in 2014 and AJP
emerged victorious, it had a majority in the lower house but the upper house
had a majority of members from regional parties.
3. The Hon’ble speaker of parliament of Aryavart, exercising his discretionary
powers certified a finance bill as a money bill, a money bill in which
amendments to various acts which included merger of various tribunals’ acts
like CAT & AERAT with TDSAT, CAT with NCLAT, and EPFAT with IT.
4. When the bill was labeled for approval, at that time many members of AJP
were absent. When it was put to vote (Bill) it came to a tie. Many members
requested the speaker to adjourn the proceedings and hold a re-vote but the
speaker declined that request and decided to use his casting vote in the favour
of passing the bill. The bill received the assent of the president and was
consequently notified in the official gazette.
Procedural Background
5. The provision of the finance act (AMD) 2017 was challenged before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavart by one Mr. Devendra Singh, a member of
upper house of the parliament representing one of the regional parties. He
contended that this was a colorable exercise of legislation since legislation was
done on matters not enumerated under Art110 (1) in guise of money bill and
that the speaker acted arbitrarily and in a malafide fashion which could be
seen as violation of spirit of constitution.
6. Mrs. Shweta Chandra a lawyer also filed a PIL before the Hon’ble SC of
argument of setting aside the impugned provision of the finance act. She
contended that the said AMD would compromise the independent nature of
(judiciary) tribunals due to more executive control and involvement in

7. Prescribing qualification, appointment and removal of the chairperson and

members of merged tribunal.

8
8. She also contended that the act is against the fundamental idea of expedition
disposal cases for which the tribunals were constituted. She also brought forth
a question as how can an act which was at all earlier instance amended by a
way of ordinary bill be now amended as a money bill in complete disregard of
legislative precedent .
9. Both the cases were clubbed together and listed for hearing before a division
bench. During the initial hearing, it was brought to the knowledge of the court
that a division bench had already decided on a similar matter in which the
court expressed its inability to interfere with the discretion of speaker of
legislative assembly. However, the existing bench was of the opinion that the
issues raised by the petitioner in this case were not adequately addressed by
the earlier division bench judgment and hence required reconsideration by a
larger bench.
10. Acting upon the request of the Hon’ble division bench, the CJI has formed a
constitutional bench and the case is now listed for hearing.

9
 ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable or not?

2. Whether the merger of tribunal lie in money bill and the bill passed was a money
bill contrary to the petitioners claim that it was a constitutional amendment bill?

3. Whether the speaker decision was constitutional or not?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Whether the writ is maintainable or not?

The council on behalf of the respondents most humbly submits to this Hon’ble Court
that the writ and PIL filed by Mr. Devendra Singh and Ms. Shweta Chandra is not
maintainable because the proceedings of the house of the Parliament cannot be
challenged in courts because of article 122 and 105 which gives immunity to the
members of the Parliament and because the courts in similar cases mentioned in
arguments advanced observed that every action cannot be eligible for Judicial review
and the courts observed its inability to interfere in the policy decisions through
Judicial review. When it is possible to attribute to an action, a just cause, that action
may not be said to be malafide and speaker acted as per article 100(1) and 110 (3)
which proves that he had a just cause behind his actions.

Whether the Bill passed in the session was a money bill, finance bill or ordinary
bill?

The council on behalf of the respondents most humbly submits to the Hon’ble court
that the bill passed in the session was a money bill because the provisions mentioned
in the amendments to the Finance Act 2017 falls within the definition of money bills
as per article 110 (1) . The bill is not a Constitutional Amendment Bill and the merger
is not related to constitution but the functioning and procedures of the tribunals and
the appropriation of money related to the consolidated fund of India which is is
needful for the upkeep/maintenance of the tribunals hence it falls within the ambit of
money bills.

Whether the speaker decision was constitutional or not?

The council on behalf of the respondents, most humbly submits to this Hon’ble court
that decision of the speaker was not malafide or unconstitutional because he was
acting as per the mandate of the constitution article 110(1) hence when it is possible
to attribute to an action a just cause, the said action and things following from such
action cannot be said to be malafide. The proceedings of Parliament cannot be

11
challenged in courts because of article 105 and 122. The bill was not a Constitutional
Amendment Bill because it was a finance bill which was tabled in the Lok Sabha was
later certified as a money bill by the speaker as per article 110 clause (3). So no
question of Constitution Amendment Bill or unconstitutionality arises.

12
 ARGUMENT ADVANCED

1. The petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable?

That the Council presenting the case on behalf of respondents most humbly submits
before this Hon’ble court that the writ filed by the petitioners is not maintainable
because of the following reasons:

A. The respondents contend that the allegations by Mr. Devendra Singh is

unfounded and baseless because legislation was done under articles 100(1),
110(3) ,117(1) and 119 1because as per article 100 speaker was bound to vote
i.e. use his casting vote in case of a tie and the word shall is used there .
B. The Council for the respondents submits to the court that in the case of house
of Lords in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214 , it was
observed that, “there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered
to be done something in the conditions under which it is to be done something
in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be
exercised which may couple the power with a duty and make it the duty of the
person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when call upon
to do so. The apex court further observed that the power coupled with duty
cannot be shirked or shelved nor it can be evaded, performance of it can be
compelled.”2
C. The council submits that, in the light of the above cited case it may be crystal
clear to the court that it was power coupled with duty which required the
exercise of that power and in our case 110 (3) and duty being 100(1) and when
it is possible to attribute reason to an action the said act cannot be said to be
malafide. This was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Silk Mill,
Bombay versus Mills Mazdoor Sabha3

1
Indian Constitution of India 1950.
2
Dr. Justice B.S . Chauhan, Misc.. Law Reference, Hind Publishing House (2d ed. 2011)
3
1961 ICR 192 (IC)

13
 D. The council further submits that in similar case of captain BD Gupta v. state of UP
1995 SLR 304 supreme court the court said” it is well settled that no legislation
can be challenged on Grounds of malafide”4
E. The counsel submit wherein the apex court placed relevance upon the ts that in
the case of Narendra Chadda and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1986 SC 638
judgment of privy council in Montrial Street Railway company normandin A I R 1 917
PC 142 “wherein the privy Council held that a person cannot be held
responsible for the thing which was beyond is control”. 5in the light of this
case the court may observe that the speaker could not have possibly foreseen
the tie which made him exercise his power of casting vote under article 100 on
the question of why did the speaker certify the bill to be a money bill it is a
well settled fact that the speaker has always voted with the government in the
past instances and it is naturally obvious that speaker being the member of the
party will have some sort of conformity with the ideology of the party from
which he is
F. The council submit that the case cannot be tried in courts because article 122 ,
105 (2)6gives immunity to the parliament members from court proceedings
hence this case cannot be tried in courts. In Ramdas Athwale S v. Union of
India 4 SCC 1 the court held that “each house of parliament is sole judge of
lawfulness of its own proceedings . 7Article 119 8also gives power to the
Parliament that if so far any provision of any law made by the parliament so
made is inconsistent with any rule made by house of the Parliament under
clause one of article 118 or with any other rule or other standing having effect
in relation to Parliament under clause 2 of the article such provision shall
prevail i.e. the parliament may override its rules. Article 323 A and B 9also
provides that the Parliament may set up criminals as needed has the mother of
the said tribunals is valid and hence Bonafide .

5
Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan, Miscl. Law Refrencer ,2 nd edit.,(600)
6
Constitution of India 1950
7
Ibid. 6 (67)
8
Ibid. 6 (66)
9
Ibid. 6(180-182)

14
 G. The council submits that in the case of Mr. Devendra Singh who is a member
of a regional party of Rajya Sabha seems to harbor prejudice and his actions
seem to be politically motivated. Writs are maintainable by aggrieved persons
i.e. person aggrieved but he fails to establish how his legal right is violated or
harmed. The council most humbly submits that this view is supported by the
following cases
 In Thammanna v. k.veerareddy ,AIR 1981 SC 116 , the
supreme court held that although the meaning of expression
person aggrieved may vary according to the context of the
state youth and facts of the case nevertheless normally a
person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal
grievance a man against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has wrongly deprived him off something
or wrongfully refused something or wrongfully affected his
title to someone. However in Duryodhan Sahu and others
versus jitendra kuma rmishra and others (1998) 7 SCC 273
the supreme court has rejected the claim of a stranger to
maintain a writ petition even in Public Interest10
 In K.N lakshmiinarasimaiah v. secretary, Mysore
STAT,(1966)2Mys.L.J.199. The court said “The person
aggrieved means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his
entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does
not include any kind of disappointment or personal
inconvenience. Person aggrieved means a person who is
injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense”.11
 In Re Sidebotham, (1880) 14 ChD 458 . It was observed that
“ the words person aggrieved do not really mean a person
who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have
received if some other order has been made a person
aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance
against whom a decision has been pronounced which has
wrongfully deprived him off something or wrongfully refused

10
Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan, Miscl. Law Refrencer ,2 nd edit.,(597)
11
Ibid 10 ,(597)

15
 him something or wrongfully affected his title to
something”.12
 In Dr .Mrs Meera Massey v. Dr S.R Melhotra and others ,
AIR1998 SC 1153 the court observed that it should i.e the
case should not be for personal gain and he must have
Bonafide feelings his actions should not be politically
motivated not for publicity .13 And here it may be adduced on
the basis of facts that both msshewta and mrdevendra seem
publicity hungry and politically motivated.
 In Kabushikikaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances company
and others 2008 10 SCC 766 . The apex court held that an
applicant in order to show that he is a person aggrieved must
show that in some possible way he may be damaged or
injured is a Trademark is allowed to stand and by possible
that mean possible in a practical sence and not nearly in a
fantastic view. Does it is evident from the aforesaid that
person aggrieved is to be considered in context of the act in
world and is to be restricted to the person who has
wrongfully been deprived of something or wrong full he
refused something or his interest slash title is adversely
affected, but the same does not require a very liberal and
wide interpretation. A person having am a chance to officiate
would have no locus standi in such a matter the party has to
satisfy the court as to what is the legal injury caused by that
violation of law for the redressal of which the party has
approached the court evolution of law or making out a legal
issue is not enough to maintain the writ petition.14

2. The council on behalf of respondents submits that the PIL filed by Ms

Shewta Chandra is not maintainable as judiciary has observed that it cannot

12
Id 10, (598)
13
Ibid. 13 (599)
14
Ibid. 13(600)

16
 interfere in financial matters of the state through judicial review. It is settled
legal proposition that the policy decision taken by the state or its authority’s /
instrumentalities is beyond the purview of Judicial review unless the same is
found to be arbitrary unreasonable or in contravention to the statutory
provisions or violates the rights of individuals guaranteed under the statute the
policy decision cannot be in contravention of the statutory provisions for the
reason that if legislature in its wisdom provides for a particular right /
guarantee / benefit etc at the authority taking a policy decision cannot verify
the same15 . The council most humbly submits that this claim is supported by
the following cases:

B. In Tamil Nadu education department, ministerial and general

Subordinate Services Association v. state of Tamil Nadu and others
AIR 1980 SC 379 the supreme court while examining the scope of
interference by the courts in public policy held that the court cannot
strike down a circular / Government order or a policy merely because
there is a variation or contradiction . Life is sometimes full of
contradictions and even inconsistency is not always a virtue. What is
important to know whether Malafide vitiates or irrationality and
extraneous factors foul? The court has held as under “once the
principal is found to be rational the fact that a few freak instances of
hardship may arise on either side cannot be a ground to invalidate the
order or the policy. Every cause claims a martyr and however unhappy
we may be to see the seniors of yesterdays becoming the juniors of
today ,this is an area where absent arbitrariness and irrationality, the
court has to adopt hands free policy16
C. In RK Garg vs Union of India and others AIR 1981 SC 2138 the
supreme court considered the validity of the provisions of the special
bearer bonds (immunities and exceptions) Ordinance, 1981 and
special bearer bonds (immunities and exemptions) act 1981 which
provided for exemption and immunity from criminal liability of the
persons who invest money in purchasing the special bearer bonds from

15
Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan, Misc. Law Refrencer ,2nd edit.,(428)
16
Ibid. 15(428)

17
the income never disclosed earlier. The court made the following
observations. “ it is clear that Article 14 does not forbid reasonable
classification of persons objects and transactions by the legislature for
the purpose of attaining specific ends .what is necessary in order to
pass the test of permissible classification under article 14 is that the
classification must not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive but must be
based on some real and substantial distinction bearing just and
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
Legislature... another rule of equal importance is that laws related to
economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws
touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etcetera it has
been said by no less a person than homes J that the legislature should
be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with Complex
problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or a
straight jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of
legislation dealing with Economic matters, where, having regard to the
nature of the problems required to be dealt with greater play in the
joints has to be allowed to the Legislature. The court should feel more
inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of
economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human
rights are involved. ......... the court must always remember that
legislation is directed to practical problems that the economic
mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are
singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do
not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract
symmetry that exact wisdom and nice adoption of remedy are not
always possible and that the judgment is largely a Prophecy based on
meager and uninterrupted experience . Every legislation particularly
in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on
experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and
therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all
possible abuse there may be crudities and iniquities in complicated
experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot
be struck down as invalid......... there may even be possibilities of abuse
18
 but that too cannot itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation,
because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some
divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may
be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such
distortions and abuses. Indeed howsoever great maybe the care
bestowed on its framing it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which
is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The
court must therefore adjudicate the constitutionality of such legislation
by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities
or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities,
inequities or all possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can
always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the
essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the
Legislature in dealing with complex economic issues. (Emphasis
added).17
The council further submits in the light of the above cited cases that in
the aforementioned cases the court has observed that policy decisions
do not come under the purview of Judicial review and that judicial
review should be used carefully. The courts have also observed that
sometimes unique situations arise before the legislature and the
legislature has to direct its actions under these situations accordingly as
the situation demands. In these cases the court has also expressed its
inability to interfere in matters relating to finance. The judges have
also observed that nearly procedural inconsistencies do not make an
order / action malafide.

D. In the case , MS Swetha Chandra seems to Harbor some prejudice

against the executive because she alleges that the amendment would
pave way for greater executive involvement in appointment of
chairperson and members of the tribunals but according to articles 309,
310 ,311 ,312 ,309, 111 ,274 etc18 in these cases Parliament /
legislature appoints members with the consent of president and the

17
Id 15 (428- 429)
18
Ibid 6

19
 president is head of the executive hence the question of greater or
lesser executive involvement is baseless because executive already
have a say in these matters according to the mentioned articles. The
President is the head of the executive and every order or acts or bills
are passed after his signature hence it is futile to contend that the
actions can be free from executive involvement. Her allegations lack
fundamental locus stand. This is supported by the cases mentioned in
the points of point (H) above cited.
Bhagwati J says about PIL that when the court entertains a PIL it does
not do so in caviling spirit or in a confrontational mood or with a view
to tilting at executive authority or seeking to usurp it .19 In the light of
above cited statement we may adduce from the facts that this PIL is an
attempt to usurp executive’s authority hence is not maintainable.

II) The merger of tribunals lie in money bill and the bill passed was a money bill
contrary to the petitioner’s claim that it is a Constitution Amendment Bill?

1. That the council on behalf of the respondents most humbly submit to this
Hon’ble court that the amendments to the finance bill 2017 which were
initiated after the speaker certified a finance bill tabled in Lok Sabha as a
money bill .The bill is a money bill. The petitioners contend that a bill is a
money bill if it only falls under the provisions mentioned in article 11020
clause one but it is also clearly written in the clause 3 of the same article that
the decision to decide whether a bill is a finance bill or ordinary bill lies solely
up to speaker’s decision and it shall be final. only a part of article 110 i.e (1)
cannot be used and that and the whole article 110 is to be read to interpret the
actual essence of the statute

2. The Council further submits that article 11921 Lays down provisions that the
Parliamentary by law establish or provide for procedure of the conduct of
business in financial matters and even though they may be inconsistent with

19
V.N. Shukla, Constitutional Law of India,11th Edition (33).
20
Ibid. 6
21
Ibid. 6

20
 22
any provisions of article 118 clause 1 and 2, they may still prevail hence in
the light of the above article of the Constitution of Aryavart the court may
conclude that this power has to be given to the legislature because protects it
from outside influence to uphold the doctrine of separation of powers
enshrined in the directive principles of state policy of the constitution of
Aryavart for the welfare state.

3. The Council for the respondents further submits to this Hon’ble court that the
amendments to the finance act 2017 is rightly certified as a money bill and it is
not a Constitutional Amendment Bill. The bill is not a Constitutional
Amendment Bill because the money of upkeep of these tribunals and the
compensation that these tribunals give , comes from the consolidated fund of
India and in the definition of money bill in article 110 (1), (c),(d),(e),(f),(g) it
is given that money bill is related to consolidated fund of India and hence it
comes under definition of money bill and article 110(1)(3)23 that the decision
of the speaker is final.
4. The Council for the respondents further submit to this Hon’ble Court that the
claim of petitioners that the merger of tribunals lie in the article 323A &B 24 is
wrong because the word merge is not used and it only says that the Parliament
may set up tribunals hence it may not be right to drag the issue into the topic
of amendment of constitution as such cases hinder the free will of the
Parliament which is needful in forming good policies

III) Whether the speaker decision was constitutional or not?

That the council on behalf of the respondents most humbly submits to the Hon’ble
Court that

1. The petitioners are trying to misguide the court as they have said that they are
challenging the decision and not the member and article 10525 protect the
members not the decisions they also say that it’s nowhere written that decision

22
Ibid. 6
23
Ibid. 6
24
Ibid. 6
25
Ibid. 6

21
 of the speaker can be challenged or the decision of any Member of Parliament
but it is not so article 122 (1)(2) says that the validity of any proceedings in
Parliament shall not be called in question in court on the ground of any
alleged irregularity of procedure . Article 12226Prove the claim of petitioners
futile and protect the proceedings of the house of parliament hence the
amendments to the finance act 2017 cannot be challenged.
2. The petitioners by claiming that in some instances the decision of the speaker
has been challenged is trying to wrongly portray the facts as they were not
matters relating to the said problem and cannot be possibly connected with the
case . The Judiciary cannot interfere in parliaments business and this view is
supported by the following cases
A. The council submits that in case of V.k Naswa v. Union of India 2012
2 SCC 542 the court observed that “the court can neither legislate nor
issue a direction to the legislature to enact the law in a particular
manner. The court has a very limited role and in exercise of that it is
not open to have judicial legislation.... “27
B. The council submits that in the case of Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of
India 2003 11 SCC 146 the court observed that, “mandamus normally
is not issued to government for making law”.28
C. The council further submit that contrary to what the petitioners claim
that they can challenge the decision of the Hon’able Supreme Court in
Dwarkadas Marjatia and sons v. Board of trustees of the port of
Bombay 1989 3 SCC 293 the court held that Judicial review is not
concerned with the decision but the decision making process 29, in the
light of this case mentioned it may be clear to the court that the
30
speakers decision was as per article 100 (1 )and 110 (3) hence valid
and this case is not maintainable.
The council further submit that In a similar case of Sheo Nandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar and others AIR 1987 SC 877 and State of
Haryana and others v. Ch Bhajan Lal and others AIR 1992 SC 604

26
I’d 6
27
Id 19 (35)
28
Id 19 (35)
29
Id 19 (30)
30
I’d 6.

22
 para 14 the court observed that “ it is settled legal proposition that a
party cannot succeed merely on the allegation of malafide, for the
reason that it is settled legal proposition that the allegation of malafide
or bias become totally irrelevant if the charge on which the enquiry is
conducted found to be proved it is a settled legal proposition that if the
charges are otherwise justifiable and stand proved on the basis of
adequate evidence the order does not stand vitiated on account of
malafide or political vendetta by the statutory authority or any other
person, even if the malice proved.31 Hence in the light of this case the
finance act 2017 cannot be touched.
D. The council submits that in Ramdas Athawale (5)v. Union of India
2010 4 SCC 1 t he court observed that “each house of parliament is
sole judge of lawfulness of its own proceedings”.32 In the light of this
case the claim of the respondents that Parliament members cannot be
tried in courts with respect to the proceedings of the house, is further
solidified.
E. The counsel submits that the petitioners cannot compel Supreme Court
to act out of some prior decided cases because the circumstances and
Facts may or may not be applicable. In Srinivasa general traders v.
State of Andhra Pradesh 1983 4 SCC 353 ,379 see also 1990 4 SCC
207 the court in this case observed that, “ a case is an authority only for
what it actually decides and not for what may logically follow from it .
Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts
proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions
which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the
whole law but governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case
in which such expressions are to be found .Observations in the
judgment which were really not necessary for the purpose of decision
and go beyond the occasion have no binding authority and nearly have
persuasive value”.33

31
Id 19 (512)
32
Id 19(6)7
33
Id 19(77)

23
 The same view was observed in Zee Tele films Limited
versus Union of India 2005 4 SCC 649.34
F. The council further submits that In Deshbandhu Gupta and company
and others v. Delhi stock exchange Association Limited AIR 1979 SC
1049 , the apex court observed that “the principle of contemporenea
exposition , i.e. interpreting a document by reference to the exposition
it has received from competent authority can be invoked do the same
will not always be decision of the question of construction the
administrative construction that is the contemporaneous construction
placed by administrative or executive officers responsible for
execution of the act / rules etc. generally should be clearly wrong
before it is overturned ; such a construction commonly referred to as
practical construction although not controlling is nevertheless entitled
to considerable weight and is highly persuasive”.35
In the light of this case we conclude that the court use the decision of
the authority deciding the matter in interpreting the statute hence in
this case it also decision of the speaker should be upheld as exemplary
and hence followed.
G. The council for the respondents submits that in BalasinorNagrik Co-
operative bank limited v. Babubhai Shankarlal Pandey and others
AIR 1987 SC 849 the court observed that, “the court has to be alive of
the fact that while integrating the provisions of a statute it can neither
add nor subtract a word. legal Maxim ‘A verbis legis non
estrecedendum’ means that from the words of law there must be no
departure holding that a section is to be interpreted by reading all its
path all together and it is not permissible to omit any part thereof.36
In the light of the mentioned case the court may conclude that article
110 clause one need not be read alone but the whole article 110 which
also also give speaker that discretionary power to decide whether the
bill is a money bill or not should be read and also article 323 A and B,
do not impair the parliament from setting up any tribunals.

34
Id33 (77)
35
Supra note 6 (390)
36
Supra note 5 (395)

24
 H. The Council for the respondents submit that the said amendments to
the finance act 2017 i.e. the merger of tribunals will stand even though
initially it may cause some hardship to the litigants who have cases
pending before the tribunals . This is supported by the following cases
1. The council submits that In the case of Commissioner of
Agricultural Income Tax v. Keshab Chandra Mandal AIR 1950
SC 265 the court held that there may be a statutory provision which
may cause great hardship or inconvenience to the party concerned
or an individual, but the court has to enforce it in full rigor. It is a
well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or
inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed
by the legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute.
37

2. The council submit that incase of DD Joshi v. Union of India AIR

1983 SC 420 the court observed that if the language is plain and
admits of only one meaning, it has to be given effect to even if it
leads to hardship or possible injustice38
3. The council submits that in the case of Bengal immunity
community v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661 it was observed by
the constitution bench of the supreme court that if there is any
hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law, but the court
cannot be called upon to discard the Cardinal rule of Interpretation
for mitigating a hardship if the language of an act is sufficiently
clear, the court has to give effect to it, however, in equitable or
answers the result may be as it is said, ‘ Dura lexsedlex’ which
means the law is hard but it is the law . Even if the statutory
provision causes hardship to some people, it is not for the courts to
amend the law as a legal enactment must be interpreted in its plane
and literal sense as that is the first principle of interpretation.39
4. The council submits that in the case of Mysore State Electricity
Board v. Bangalore woollen, cotton and Silk Mills Limited and

37
Supra note 5 (394),(395)
38
Id 5 (395).
39
Id 5 (395)

25
 others AIR 1963 SC 1128 a constitution bench of the apex court
held that inconvenience is not a decisive factor in interpreting a
statute.40
5. The counsel submits that in the case of Martin burn Limited v.
The corporation of Calcutta AIR 1966 SC 529 the supreme court
while dealing with the same issue observed as under that a result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil Court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation attitude must be of course be given
effect to whether a court likes the result or not.41
The council further submit that in the case of the Commissioner of
Income-Tax, West Bengal I, Calcutta versus m / S vegetables
products Limited AIR 1973 SC 927 the court observed that
therefore, it is evident that hardship to an individual cannot be a
ground of not giving the effective and grammatical meaning to
every word of the provision if the language is unequivocal.42
6. The counsel submits that in the case of Sri Ram Ram Narayan v.
State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459 the constitution bench of the
supreme court held that if the language of the enactment is clear
and unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the courts to add
any words thereto and evolve there from some sense which may be
said to carry out the supposed intention of the Legislature. The
intention of the Legislature is to be gathered only from the words
used by it and no such liberties can be taken by the court for
effectuating a supposed intention of the Legislature.43

3. The council submits that the action or the bill was not malafide and it was not
a Constitutional Amendment Bill as it is clearly given in the fact that it was
tabled in the Lok Sabah as a finance bill and the speaker used his authority to
certify the finance bill is a money bill hence there is no question of malafide or

40
Id 5 (395)
41
Id 5 (395)
42
Supra note 5 (395)
43
Id 5 (396)

26
 Constitutional Amendment Bill. The speaker acted in a Bonafide manner and
under the limits of the powers bestowed upon him by the constitution. The
following cases support the claim.
A. The council submits that in the case of Shiv Silk Mills , Bombay vs
Mills Mazdoor Sabha 1961 ICR 192 (IC) the court observed that
when it is possible to attribute to and action, a proper motive, it is
wrong to conclude that it was inspired by any ulterior or improper
motives or malafide.44

In the light of the mentioned case the court may conclude that the speaker
acted well under the powers vested upon him by the constitution under
article 110 clause 3 and hence when he has a proper motive his action
cannot be treated as malafide.

B. The council further submit that in the case of captain BD Gupta vs

State of UP 19905 SLR 304 SC the court held that admittedly the rules
are made under article 309 of the Constitution of India and are
therefore a piece of legislation it is well settled that no legislation can
be challenged on ground of malafide.45
C. The council for the submit that the speaker could not have possibly
foreseen the tie in the house on the day on which the bill was put to
vote and in the case of NarenderChadda and others vs Union of India
and others AIR 1986 SC 638 wherein the apex court placed reliance
upon the judgments of privy council in Montreal Street Railway
company Normandin, AIR1917 PC 142, wherein the private Council
held that a person cannot be held responsible for a thing which was
beyond is control”.46
D. The council further submits that in the case of Ibodom vs Union of
India AIR 1975 SC the court observed that if the order is passed out of
malice or grudge or ill will it will be overruled, but mere allegation is
not enough.47 And in this case which concerns the amendments to the
finance act 2017 seems to lack any concrete Grounds of allegations

44
Supra note 3 (309)
45
net
46
Id-5 (600)
47
net

27
 whatsoever which may support the claim of malafide on part of
speaker of parliament or the act.

The council submits that in light of the cases aforementioned and in the case of M / S
Atul castings Limited versus Bawa v Gurvachan, AIR 2001 SC 1684 in which the
court observed that the findings in the absence of necessary pleadings and supporting
evidence cannot be sustained in law” . 48
The case which challenges the amendments
to the finance act 2017 may be dismissed as the petitioners have no supporting
evidence to support their allegation that the speaker acted in a malafide manner or the
act is unconstitutional because everything was done as per the mandates of the
constitution.

48
Id-d (600)

28
 PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the issue raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare
that;

1. Dismiss the writ petition filed by Mr. Devendra Singh and the P.I.L filed by
Ms Shweta Chandra and deem the amendments to the Finance Act 2017 as
fully constitutional hence valid

2. Punish the petitioners for abusing the process of law for personal gains i.e.
publicity and political vendetta so that it sets an exemplary example to stop
these unnecessary cases which consume precious court time and protect the
parliament.

3. Pass any other order , decree or judgments that it deems fit in the light of
justice equity and good conscience

And pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity, and good
conscience.

All of which is humbly prayed,

MMC-24,

Counsel for the petitioner.

29