TAN VS.
COURT OF APPEALS should therefore be applied retroactively to pending
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe
rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds
can properly administer justice. They include rules of
pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to
criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by
which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural
laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal
sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect of transactions or considerations already past.
Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes." The
general rule against giving statutes retroactive
operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent
the application of statutes to proceedings pending at
the time of their enactment where they neither create
new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which
deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable
to all actions - those which have accrued or are
pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that "a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure."
Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39
thereof prescribing that "no record on appeal shall be
required to take an appeal" is procedural in nature and
actions. Hence, the question as to whether an appeal
from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for
failure of appellant to file a record on appeal within
thirty days as required under the old rules, which
question is pending resolution at the time Batas Bilang
129 took effect, became academic upon the effectivity
of said law because the law no longer requires the filing
of a record on appeal and its retroactive application
removed the legal obstacle to giving due course to the
appeal. A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try
certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is
a remedial statute that is applicable to claims that
accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed
after it took effect, for it does not create new nor take
away vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over
a claim at the time it accrued cannot validly try the
claim where at the time the claim is formulated and
filed the jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by
law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, for even actions
pending in one court may be validly taken away and
transferred to another and no litigant can acquire a
vested right to be heard by one particular court.
Exceptions to the rule. The rule that procedural laws
are applicable to pending actions or proceedings
admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply
where the statute itself expressly or by necessary
implication provides that pending actions are excepted
from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under
appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event
that to do so would not be feasible or would work
injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied
retroactively to pending actions if to do so would
involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR: We hold that
section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this
case as it would result in great injustice to the
petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to
redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive
right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing
the reckoning date of the period of redemption when
he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised
Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would
result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot.
It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of
this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner
cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on
the period of redemption when he made the
redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square
meters but as petitioner claims, "it is the only property
left behind by their father, a private law practitioner
who was felled by an assassin's bullet."14
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose
it because of a change of procedure on the date of
reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous.
The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed
and the change applied retroactively if to do so will
defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which
is already vested.
Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Company
It is a far better and more prudent course of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends
of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases
while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice. Thus, substantial justice would
be better served by giving due course to petitioner's
notice of appeal.
The emerging trend of jurisprudence is more inclined
to the liberal and flexible application of the Rules of
Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding
the bench and the bar that zealous compliance with
the rules is still the general course of action. Rules of
procedure are in place to ensure the orderly, just, and
speedy dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility
or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or
suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a
case from their operation is warranted only by
compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice
requires it.
There have been some instances wherein this Court
allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but
this flexibility was 'never intended to forge a bastion
for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.'
A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances. (Fortich vs
Corona)
Also we straightened out the misconception that the
enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it would prejudice the substantive rights
of litigants: Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on technicalities. This does not
mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the
effective enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory
to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement
of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of
the litigants.
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed
except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. x x x.
Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of
the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or suspension
should only be for persuasive reasons and only in
meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.cralaw25 Further, a bare invocation of 'the
interest of substantial justice' will not suffice to
override a stringent implementation of the rules.
The Court is bound to deny a liberal application of the
rules on substitution of counsel and resolve definitively
that GOODLAND's notice of appeal merits a denial, for
the failure of Atty. Mondragon to effect a valid
substitution of the counsel on record. Substantial
justice would be better served if the notice of appeal is
disallowed. In the same way that the appellant
in Pioneer was not permitted to profit from its own
manipulation of the rules on substitution of counsel, so
too can GOODLAND be not tolerated to foster
vexatious delay by allowing its notice of appeal to carry
on.
Sebastian vs. Morales
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,16 liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on technicalities. This does not
mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the
effective enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory
to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement
of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of
the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure so that issues may be properly presented
and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a
liberal application of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
explain his failure to abide by the rules.
In the instant case, petitioners failed to show any
compelling reason for not resorting to the proper
remedy. Instead, we find from our perusal of their
pleadings before the appellate court that they stoutly
and persistently insisted that the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari was their correct remedy.
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the
merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the
appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the
issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by
the judge, guided by all the attendant
circumstances.52 Thus, there should be an effort, on the part
of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with
the rules.
In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been
advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice and
fair play are better served if the case is decided on its
merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay
the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for
review. To us, Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause.

Sablas vs. Sablas

The policy of the law is to have every litigant's case tried

on the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by
default are frowned upon.21 A case is best decided when all
contending parties are able to ventilate their respective
claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in
support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be
heard fully and the demands of due process are subserved.
Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that
accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can
be reached by the courts.

SLU vs. Cobarrubias

Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the

litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide
order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial
system.50 While procedural rules are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless
delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business.51

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled

or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules,
they are required to be followed. However, there are
recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of
the defaulting party by immediately paying within a