Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
P i
Previous classes
l
1. Overview and roadmap
2
2. Can democratization be strengthened by
the international community?
Barbara Wejnert: international forces
outweigh domestic factors
What strategies are used? Menu of
alternative types of interventions.
Norris 3
P li cycle
Policy l
Policy
advocacy
Policy
Policy
implement
analysis
ation
Policy
options
Norris 4
Impact of
democratic
governance
‘Yes’ ‘Yes’
‘Yes’ Norris
Rodrik et al Siegle et al
‘No’
‘No’
No Mansfield
Przeworski et ‘No’ Ross
& Snyder
al
Norris 5
R di
Readings
Dani Rodrik Institutions Rule?
Adam Przeworski Institutions Matter?
Michael Ross Democracy good for the
poor?
Haerpfer Ch 8 Democracy and capitalism
Norris 6
St t
Structure: advocacy
d debate
d b t
I. Context: does democratic ggovernance matter
instrumentally for development?
II
II. Does democratic governance lead to
economic growth?
III
III. Does democratic governance lead to social
welfare?
IV. Discussion exercise
V. [[Next class]] Does democracyy lead to peace?
p
Norris 7
I Context: Does
I.
democratic governance
matter instrumentally for
development?
Norris 8
A
Agreed
d UN GA S
Septt 2000
2000. Target
T t deadline:
d dli 2015
Norris 9
2.5
hRate
Annual AverageReal GDPper CapitaGrowth
2
(percent)
1.5
0.5
0
1820-70 1870-1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-2001 2001-2005
Note: % Pop living on less than $1/day, 1990-2001. High income nations are excluded.
Source: Millennium Development Goals Report 2005
Norris 11
G
Growth
th off USAID spending
di
Norris 12
D b t about
Debate b t th
the iimpactt
Impact of
democratic
governance
Economic Peace
Social welfare
growth (next class)
‘Yes’ ‘Yes’
‘Yes’ Norris
R d ik ett all
Rodrik Si l ett all
Siegle
‘No’
No
‘N ’ M
‘No’ fi ld
Mansfield
Przeworski et ‘No’ Ross
& Snyder
al
Norris 14
Trade
(markets)
Geography
(Climate, Institutions
resources,
(property rights,
transport, health,
rule of law)
communications,
i ti
agriculture)
Economic
growth
R d ik model
Rodrik d l
Income level
(GDP per capita
Integration Institutions.
(ratio trade/GDP)
Geography
(distance from
equator)
Norris 16
Norris 17
I tit ti
Institutional
l variables
i bl
Institutions= property rights and rule of law
Measured by Kaufmann-Kray/World
Kaufmann Kray/World Bank
Settler mortality rates (Acemoglu 2001)
Instruments
I t t are measured d by
b settler
ttl
mortality rates (79 nations) and by %
speaking
ki W Westt E
European llanguages (137
nations)
Norris 18
Norris 19
Norris 20
R d ik Conclusions
Rodrik C l i
“The qquality
y of institutions trumps
p everything
y g
else. Once institutions are controlled for,
integration has no direct effect on incomes, while
geography has at best weak direct effects.”
ff
p135.
Alt
Alternative
ti measures, robust b t results
lt
Instrument not an explanation: colonial history?
Policy implications? ‘Not much at all’ (!) eg
varied property rights in China and Russia
St
Strengths
th and d limits
li it off this
thi account? t?
Norris 21
D b t about
Debate b t th
the iimpactt
Impact of
democratic
governance
Economic Peace
Social welfare
growth (next class)
‘Yes’ ‘Yes’
‘Yes’ Norris
R d ik ett all
Rodrik Si l ett all
Siegle
‘No’
No
‘N ’ M
‘No’ fi ld
Mansfield
Przeworski et ‘No’ Ross
& Snyder
al
Norris 22
P
Przeworski
ki ett al.
l ‘No’
‘N ’
Adam Przeworksi, Michael Alvarez, Jose
Cheibub and Fernando Limogi. 2000.
Democracy and Development. (CUP) Ch3
Does democracy undermine growth?
Growth rates of productive inputs
Investment share in GDP
Probit model controlling for income, Britcol, religion
P
Przeworski
ki ett al.
l
Conclusions: “There is no trade-off between democracy
and development, not even in poor countries.” p178.
In poor countries (with incomes below $3
$3,000),
000) the two
regimes are almost identical in their:
Investment shares
Growth of capital stock
Growth of labor force
Output per worker
P d t wages
Product
Democracy need not be sacrificed to economic
development
Norris 24
P
Przeworski
ki ett al.
l
Yet important distinction between rich and poor nations
Poor nations invest little, get little value from total factor
productivity
p y and p
payy low wages
g
Most poor nations remain poor
Regimes make no difference for growth
Democracy is fragile in poor nations so most have dictatorships
More affluent nations ($2500-3000+)
Total growth rates similar for dictatorships and democracies
Yet reasons for growth differ…
Wealthy dictatorship grow by using a lot of labor and paying low
wages (repressing unions) – labor-intensive productivity, higher
birth rates/fertility but shorter longevity (esp. for women)
Wealthy democracies grow by using labor more effectively: slower
population
l ti and d llabor
b growth th rates
t bbutt hi
higher
h wages, bbenefit
fit more
from technical progress
Norris 25
P
Przeworski
ki ett al.
l conclusions
l i
The kind of regime does not affect the rate of
investment, the growth of capital stock (p153), or
the growth of total income (p156)
“There is no trade-off between democracy and
d
development,
l t nott even in
i poor countries.”
ti ”P P.178
178
“Much ado about nothing.”
Strengths and limits of this account?
Why the contrasts with Rodrik’s account?
Norris 26
D b t about
Debate b t th
the iimpactt
Impact of
democratic
governance
Economic Peace
Social welfare
growth (next class)
‘Yes’ ‘Yes’
‘Yes’ Norris
R d ik ett all
Rodrik Si l ett all
Siegle
‘No’
No
‘N ’ M
‘No’ fi ld
Mansfield
Przeworski et ‘No’ Ross
& Snyder
al
Norris 28
R
Ross ‘N
‘No’’
AJPS 2006
Is democracy good for the poor?
Democracy is linked to higher spending on
health, education, and social security
Yet “Democracy
Democracy has little or no effect on infant
and child mortality.”
Previous
e ous stud
studies
es fail
a to co
control
t o for
o cou
country-
ty
specific effects and for global health trends, and
they have sample bias (autocratic states often
have missing data)
Norris 29
R
Ross’s
’ model
d l
168 states 1970-2000 p pop
p over 200,000
,
5 year panels
Dep var=logged infant and child mortality
Independent var=Polity IV democracy-autocracy scale
Control for income, pop density, econ growth, HIV-Aids
Missing data imputed (Amelia)
( )
OLS panel-corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) and
lagged dependent var
A fixed effects model (controls for country-specific
effects but underestimates sig of slow/stable vars)
Norris 30
Ross
No relationship between type of regime
and infant/child mortality
y rates
Why? “We know little…”
Incomplete information by voters?
Weak channels of accountability?
Strengths and weaknesses of this study?
Norris 31
D b t about
Debate b t th
the iimpactt
Impact of
democratic
governance
Economic Peace
Social welfare
growth (next class)
‘Yes’ ‘Yes’
‘Yes’ Norris
R d ik ett all
Rodrik Si l ett all
Siegle
‘No’
No
‘N ’ M
‘No’ fi ld
Mansfield
Przeworski et ‘No’ Ross
& Snyder
al
Norris 32
Si l ett all ‘Y
Siegle ‘Yes’’
From Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegle and Michael Weinstein. 2005.
The Democracy Advantage NY: Routledge
Democracies consistently out-perform autocracies in the developing
world
Classify regimes by Polity IV index
Compare low-income nations (GDP under $2000 constant 1995
dollar terms)
World Bank data 1960-2001
No difference found in levels of economic growth
Better measures of well-being
Life expectancy,
Lif t access to
t clean
l water,
t literacy,
lit health
h lth services,
i infaqnt
i f t
mortality
Avoid humanitarian crisis and severe economic contractions
Norris 33
U P
Use Polity
lit IV iindex
d
Rates 161 states every year since 1800
0-10 scale
Constraints on the chief executive (1-4)
(Independence of the chief executive)
The
e co
competitiveness
pet t e ess oof popu
popular
a pa
participation
t c pat o ((1-3)
3)
(Extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression)
Democracies: score 8 to 10
Intermediary states: 3 to 7
Autocracies: score 0 to 2
Norris 36
Norris 37
Halperin,
p , Siegle
g and Weinstein
Economic indicators
35
3.5 3 26
3.26 3.16
3
2.66
25
2.5
2
Autocracy
15
1.5 Mixed
1
1 Democracy
0.74
0.5
0
PerCap GDP Growth
-0.15 1975-2002 GNP Annual Growth 1975-95
-0.5
Note: Poor nations only (GDP/cap under $2000)
Polity DEMOC: 35 Autocracies, 25 Mixed, 16 Democracies
Norris 39
Halperin,
p , Siegle
g and Weinstein
Social Indicators
140
80 75 74 Autocracy
67
60 Mixed
60 54 55 Democracy
43
40
29
20
0
Aids/100000 InfantMortality ChildMortality LifeExp
Halperin,
p , Siegle
g and Weinstein
Social Indicators
140
80 75 74 Autocracy
67
60 Mixed
60 54 55 Democracy
43
40
29
20
0
Aids/100000 InfantMortality ChildMortality LifeExp
Halperin,
p , Siegle
g and Weinstein
Government expenditure
30
24.5
25 22.9
9
20.2
20
Autocracy
15 Mixed
10.5 Democracy
9.7
10
5 4 2 3.5 4.1
4.2 41
2.7 2 3.2
1.6
0
Central Govnt Educ Military Aid rec
rec'd
d
Wh ? Pl
Why? Plausible
ibl reasons?
?
Democratic leaders incentives to respond to
social needs
Ch k and
Checks dbbalances
l
Open flow of information
L
Less corruption
ti
Adaptability and smooth succession
Commitment to rule of law
Feedback learning, trial-and-error
Norris 45
Ad
Advocacy d
debate:
b t
You are asked to break up into discussion pairs.
You have 15 minutes allocated for the paired discussions.
You are asked to draw upon the readings for this class and your
own arguments and experience.
For policy advocacy, you should either argue for or against the
proposition that democratic governance reduces poverty and
improves welfare.
Give a series of reasons, ranked in importance using the template
overleaf, supported by evidence or case illustrations wherever
possible.
After 15 minutes, we will compare the reasons for or against the
proposition in plenary, to see if a consensus emerges.
Norris 48
T
Template
l t
PRO: Reasons whyy democratic ggovernance reduces p
povertyy and Evidence,, examples,
p , support
pp for this claim
strengthens social welfare.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CON: Reasons why democratic governance fails to reduce poverty Evidence, examples, support for this claim
and strengthen social welfare.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Norris 49
Next class
Does democracy lead
to a p
peace dividend?
Class Materials: www.pippanorris.com