Navarro vs.

Escobido, GR 153788, November 27, 2009

Posted by Pius Morados on August 21, 2012
(Provisional Remedies: Replevin: Prior demand is not a condition precedent)
Facts: Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because
no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before
the complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue: WON prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for  a writ of replevin.
Held: No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows
the facts:
(a)      That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b)      That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c)      That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the
adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum
as he may recover from the applicant in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to
make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

G.R. No. 177429 November 24, 2009

ANICIA VALDEZ-TALLORIN, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUANITO TARONA, Represented by CARLOS TARONA, ROGELIO TARONA and
LOURDES TARONA, Respondents.
FACTS: On February 9, 1998 respondents Carlos, Rogelio, and Lourdes Tarona (the Taronas) filed
an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan, against petitioner Anicia
Valdez-Tallorin (Tallorin) for the cancellation of her and two other women’s tax declaration over a
parcel of land.
The Taronas alleged in their complaint that, unknown to them, in 1981, the Assessor’s
Office of Morong in Bataan cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father, Juanito
Tarona (Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land in Morong, Bataan. The cancellation was
said to be based on an unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly executed in
favor of petitioner Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and
Dolores Valdez, who were not impleaded in the action. In place of the cancelled one, the
Assessor’s Office issued Tax Declaration 6164 in the names of the latter three persons. The old
man Tarona’s affidavit had been missing and no copy could be found among the records of the
Assessor’s Office.
The Taronas further alleged that, without their father’s affidavit on file, it followed that
his tax declaration had been illegally cancelled and a new one illegally issued in favor of Tallorin
and the others with her. The unexplained disappearance of the affidavit from official files, the
Taronas concluded, covered-up the falsification or forgery that caused the substitution. The
Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and issue a
new one in the name of Juanito’s heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Taronas’ complaint should be dismissed for not impleading Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose names, like their co-owner Tallorin, the
annulled tax declaration had been issued.

RULING: The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.

Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Joining
indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. Without
their presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.

Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not only
as to the absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the responsibility for
impleading all indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in the names of defendant
Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and, in its
place, the reinstatement of the previous declaration in their father Juanito’s name. Further, the
Taronas sought to strike down as void the affidavit in which Juanito renounced his tenancy right
in favor of the same three persons. It is inevitable that any decision granting what the Taronas
wanted would necessarily affect the rights of such persons to the property covered by the tax
declaration.

The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations to the persons in whose names they
are issued. Their cancellation adversely affects the rights and interests of such persons over the
properties that the documents cover. The reason is simple: a tax declaration is a primary
evidence, if not the source, of the right to claim title of ownership over real property, a right
enforceable against another person. The Court held in Uriarte v. People that, although not
conclusive, a tax declaration is a telling evidence of the declarant’s possession which could ripen
into ownership.

CaseDig: Heirs of Hinog vs. Melicor

G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005
By: Unknown Contributor

FACTS:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog.
Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale. However, on June 24, 1998, while trial was still pending, Bertuldo died without
completing his evidence.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services was
terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new
counsel for Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount
of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that non-payment of the correct
docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged from the
records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court reinstated the case after private
respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee.
On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for certiorari and
prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency docket fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
is proper.

HELD:   

No, it is not proper. 

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared
with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for extraordinary writs. 

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the
Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve issues
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct
resort to certiorari unless redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Algura vs. LGU of Naga City
GR No. 150135

Facts:
Souses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint for damages
against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of
their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by
their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which
petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip) was appended, showing a gross monthly income of Ten
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four Pesos (PhP 10,474.00) and a net pay of Three Thousand Six
Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Ninety Nine Centavos (PhP 3,616.99) for [the month of] July
1999. Also attached as Annex "B" to the motion was a July 1999 Certification issued by the
Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared
in their name for taxation purposes.
Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge
Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order, granted petitioners' plea
for exemption from filing fees.
Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Government's demolition of a portion of
petitioners' house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their
boarders' rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Algura's sari-
sari store and Antonio Algura's small take home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the
Algura spouses and their six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and
schooling, among others.
On October 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10,
1999, arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the
spouses' boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.
Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed, petitioners then filed
their Reply with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting before the Naga City RTC on October
19, 1999. On February 3, 2000, a pre-trial was held wherein respondents asked for five (5) days
within which to file a Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants.
On March 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of
Filing Fees dated March 10, 2000. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00
net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse
Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence
along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners' second floor
was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP
3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from
their computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them.
Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.
On March 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the Motion to
respondents' motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing fees.
On April 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants
on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal
fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court
—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.
On April 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2000 Order. On May
2000, respondents then filed their Comment/Objections to petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
On May 2000, the trial court issued an Order giving petitioners the opportunity to comply with
the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants.
On May 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance 15 attaching the affidavits of petitioner
Lorencita Algura16 and Erlinda Bangate,17 to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141,
Section 18 of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants.
In her May 2000 Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of their small
dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their
six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on her husband's salary as a policeman which provided
them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real property as
certified by the assessor's office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income
from her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband,
were not enough to pay the family's basic necessities.
To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit
of Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that she personally knew spouses Antonio Algura
and Lorencita Algura, who were her neighbors; that they derived substantial income from their
boarders; that they lost said income from their boarders' rentals when the Local Government
Unit of the City of Naga, through its officers, demolished part of their house because from that
time, only a few boarders could be accommodated; that the income from the small store, the
boarders, and the meager salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their basic necessities
like food and clothing, considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew
that petitioners did not own any real property.
Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. issued his July 17,
200018 Order denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners Algura should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for
exemption from paying filing fees.

Held:
Yes. Applying Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, The petitioner Algura
should be declared and considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying
filing fees. The court rule that if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the
other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application
should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section
21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
In the Case at bar,the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the
Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy
the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141.
Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a
hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show
that they didn't have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic
necessities for them and their family. In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right
to also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of
the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have
to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as
indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.

PBCOM VS. LIM AND CALDERON

GR. No. 158138
April 12, 2005
FACTS: PBCom filed a complaint against respondents in the RTC of Manila for the collection of a
deficiency. Petitioner alleged therein that respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a
continuing surety agreement in favor of petitioner for all loans, credits, etc that were extended
or may be extended in the future to respondents. Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon
respondent’s request. It was expressly stipulated threrein that the venue for any legal action
that may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City, “to the exclusion of all
other courts…” Respondents allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity. Thus, petitioner
foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by respondents, leaving a deficiency balance.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, invoking the
stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the promissory note with respect to the
restrictive/exclusive venue.
The trial court denied said motion asseverating that petitioner had separatecauses of action
arising from the promissory note and the continuing surety agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4,
Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, x x x venue was properly laid in
Manila.  An MR of said order was likewise denied.
On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged debt was based on the Promissory Note, which
had provided an exclusionary stipulation on venue “to the exclusion of all other courts.” The
parties’ Surety Agreement, though silent as to venue, was an accessory contract that should have
been interpreted in consonance with the Promissory Note. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE: WON the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on venue stipulated in
the PN
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
YES; Since the cases pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the
proper venue, petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
**
Section 2 of Rule 4 of the ROC provides that personal actions must be commenced and tried
(1) in the place where the plaintiff resides, or
(2) where the defendant resides, or
(3) in case of non-resident defendants, where they may be found, at the choice of the plaintiff.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law specifically provides otherwise, or when — before
the filing of the action — the contracting parties agree in writing on the exclusive venue
thereof. Venue is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the parties. A stipulation as to venue
does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless qualifying or restrictive words
are used in the agreement.
**
In enforcing a surety contract, the “complementary-contracts-construed-together” doctrine
finds application. According to this principle, an accessory contract must be read in its entirety
and together with the principal agreement [  This principle is used in construing contractual
stipulations in order to arrive at their true meaning; certain stipulations cannot be segregated
and then made to control. This no-segregation principle is based on Article 1374 of the Civil Code,
which we quote:
“Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to
the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.”
The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case. Incapable of standing by itself,
the SA can be enforced only in conjunction with the PN.  The latter documents the debt that is
sought to be collected in the action against the sureties. The circumstances that related to the
issuance of the PN and the SA are so intertwined that neither one could be separated from the
other.  It makes no sense to argue that the parties to the SA were not bound by the stipulations
in the PN.
NOTES:
A cause of action is a party’s act or omission that violates the rights of the other. Only one suit
may be commenced for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, only one case should remain and the others must be dismissed.
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