AMITY LAW

SCHOOL NOIDA

Debts: Doctrine of Pious Obligation

NAME: Sanskriti Rastogi SUBMITTED TO: Ms.Sheetal

NAME: Sanskriti Rastogi SUBMITTED TO: Dr. Neetu
Singh
ENROLLMENT NO. A3211118231
ENROLLMENT NO. A3211118231
SECTION: C
SECTION: C
COURSE: BA.LLB (H)
COURSE: BA.LLB (H)
SEMESTER: 4
SEMESTER: 3
 Sub-Heading Page no.
1. Introduction 3

2. Avyavaharik debts 4-5

3. Burden of proof of the debt 5-7

4. Debts outside the scope of the 7-8

doctrine
5. Pious obligation after the amendment 8
of 2005
6. Socio-legal impact of doctrine of 8
pious obligation

INDEX
 I. INTRODUCTION

Under the Hindu Law, a son is under a pious obligation to discharge his father’s debts out of his
ancestral property regardless of the possibility that he had not been profited by the debts, gave the
debts are not avyavaharika. The sons get absolved from their obligation to discharge the debt of their
father from the family assets just if the debt was one spoiled with immorality or illegality.

The obligation that is cast upon the son being religious and moral, the liability of the son for the
debt must be inspected with reference to its character when the debt was first acquired. In the event
that at the source there was nothing illegal or offensive to great morals, the subsequent dishonesty of
the father is in not discharging his obligation won’t absolve the son from liability for the debt.

In Hindu law there are two commonly destructive principles,

 the standard of autonomous coparcenary rights in the sons which is an episode of birth,
providing for the sons vested ideal in the coparcenary property.
 other the pious obligation of the sons to discharge their father’s debts not spoiled with
immorality or illegality, which lays open the entire estate to be seized for the installment of such
debts.
As indicated by the Hindu lawgivers his pious obligation to pay off the ancestors’ debts and to
mitigate him of the demise torments consequent on non-installment was irrespective of their
acquiring any property, however, the courts dismiss this liability arising irrespective of acquiring any
property and provided for this religious obligation a legal character.

Pious’ means ‘genuine, religious, dedicated, respectful. ‘Pious obligation’ means an obligation of
a Hindu because of profound dedication to religion. Hindu law states that ‘He who having gotten a
sum loaned or the like does not reimburse it to the proprietor will be conceived henceforth in his
creditors house a slave, a servant or a lady or a quadruped ‘. According to Hindu scriptures, it is the
blessed obligation of a son to pay off or discharge his father’s debts. The religious obligation is
joined to the son as well as a grandson and to the considerable grandson also, on the ground that all
the three are coparceners with others by their introduction to the world.
 II. AVYAVAHARIK DEBTS

Avyavaharik debts a liability brought about for a cause hostile to great morals. On the off chance
that it is unrighteous or completely ill-advised they can’t be called vyavaharika or legal debts. It
might be that the debts acquired by the father for safeguarding himself against criminal activity
against others or shielding himself in an action brought by others are legal in several circumstances.
In the event that a debt was acquired to shield the rights of the family and to safeguard its interests, it
is absolutely legal in nature. In the event that a debt is not spoiled with illegality at its origin, it might
tie on the son. The son will most likely be unable to claim resistance from the debts in such cases. In
any case, where the father’s lead which provoked the acquiring of the debt, is completely disgusting
to great morals or is grossly unjust or outrageously dishonest, then positively the son can guarantee
resistance from its liability. It is additionally stated that the essential decide is that the sons are not at
risk for the debts acquired by father which are Avyavaharika.

In a decision of a Full Bench of Bombay High Court, it was held that Avyavaharika debt
means illegal, dishonest or immoral one. It is not essential for the son to demonstrate criminal
liability of the father to claim the exception. So, where a person in possession of property, to which
he is not entitled, disposes of that property and deprives the legitimate proprietor of that property, his
direction is dishonest and the son is not obligated for the debts arising out of such lead.

Lord Dunedin of the Privy Council characterized the predecessor debts as precursor in reality as
well as in time i.e., not a piece of transaction reprimanded. Thus two conditions are necessary:

 The debts must be earlier in time and

 The debts must be earlier truth be told.

A son could guarantee resistance just where the debt in its starting point was immoral because of
the cash having been gotten by the commission of an offense; yet not where the father stopped by the
cash lawfully however subsequently misappropriated it. It is just in the previous case that the debt
answers the description of an Avyavaharika debt. In the event that initially the taking was not
immoral, i.e., in the event that it did not have a degenerate start or established upon extortion, it
couldn’t be portrayed as an Avyavaharika debt and the son couldn’t be exempted from satisfying that
debt. The supervening occasion, to be specific, the misappropriation, later on, would not change the
way of the debt. The vices should be innate in the debt itself.
 Immoral debts are those, which are taken in assistance of an immoral purpose such as for
prostitution or for the keeping of courtesan. Thus, the expenses of the marriage of courtesan’s
granddaughter or to influence to Hindu ladies so that she may take one of his sons in selection or
purpose of betting will be for illegal purpose .the debts resulting from the highly tortuous act which at
their beginning is polluted with a malicious purpose are avyavaharika.

The father himself can estrange the joint family property for the discharge of his personal debt
and son can provoke it just if the debts are polluted. This means the father can do it be implication
also.The pious obligation of the son to pay off the father debt exists whether the father is alive or
dead. It is interested in father amid his lifetime, to pass on the joint family property including the
interest of the son to pay off predecessor debts not brought about for family necessity or advantage
gave the debts are not spoiled with immorality. The father cannot do as such subsequent to
documenting of the suit for the parcel.

III. BURDEN OF PROOF OF THE DEBT

The obligation on son to pay off their father’s personal debts is a religious obligation and on the
off chance that they need to wriggle out of it? They can do as such just if the debts are polluted the
son also need to show that loan boss had the notice or information that the debts was corrupted.

The Apex Court in Luhar Marit Lal Nagji v. Doshi Jayantilal Jethalal, depending upon the
judgments of the Privy Council alluded to (supra), articulated the principles: “the sons who challenge
the alienations made by the father need to demonstrate that the precursor debts were immoral as well
as that the purchasers had seen that they were so corrupted.” That under the law as it now stands, the
obligation of the sons is not a personal obligation existing irrespective of the receipt of any assets,
and that it is a liability limited to the assets got by him in his share of the joint family property or to
his interest in the same. The obligation exists whether the sons are major or minor or whether the
father is alive or dead. In the event that the debts have been shrunk by the father and they are not
immoral or irreligious, the interest of the sons in the coparceners property can always be made
subject to such debts.

The proposition set down in Brij Narain’s case is established upon the pious obligation is that a
Hindu son constrained to his interest in the joint family property to pay the debt shrunk by the father
for his own advantage and not for any immoral or illegal purpose. By acquiring the debt, the father
enables the leader to sell the property in execution of a pronouncement against him for an installment
of the debt. The son is under a pious obligation to pay all debts of the father, regardless of whether
secured or unsecured.

In Venkatesh Dhonddev Deshpande v. Sou. Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni, the observations of

the Supreme Court are as follows:

Regardless of whether the father is the Karta of a Joint Hindu family and the debts are shrunk by
the father in his ability as director and leader of the family for family purposes, the sons as members
of the joint family will undoubtedly pay the debts to the degree of their interest in the coparcenary
property. Promote, where the sons are joint with their father and the debts have been shrunk by the
father for his very own advantage, the sons are at risk to pay the debts gave they are not caused to
illegal or immoral purposes.

In Hemraj v. Khem Chand, the Court alluded to the Judicial Committee’s view which held that
the translation of the expression “avyavaharika” as given by Mr. Colebrooke makes the nearest way
to deal with the genuine origination the term as used in the Smriti content, and that the term does not
concede to a more precise definition. The term regularly used in decisions and reading material to
describe those debts the father for which the son is not at risk is ‘illegal or immoral’. The expression
was doubtless initially intended to render “avyavaharika” however it has come to be used as a
compendious term to cover every one of the cases counted in the smiritis. It is, hence, convenient to
use the term ‘illegal or immoral’ purposes then “avyavaharika” which as discussed by me supra
eludes any precise definition.

No pious obligation is included in the said debt inasmuch as it is not the personal debt neither the
father nor the debts contracted for the advantage of the family. As understood the legal position is so
certain that so long as the purpose is not corrupted with the component of illegality or immorality the
sons are subject under the doctrine of pious obligation.

In Keshav Nandan Sahay Vs. The Bank of Bihar it was said that sons are subject under the
hypothesis of pious obligation for the arrangement debts brought about by the father. The tenet of
pious obligation can’t matter to the spouse and she, in this way, can’t be at risk to the creditors on the
principles relevant to the sons. On a segment between a coparcener and his sons, a share is dispensed
to the spouse in her own privilege and she can’t be dealt with as minor representative of the husband.
The rule is based upon ancient Hindu texts which don’t say the spouse in the class of the sons and
there is no statutory order extending that convention so as to incorporate her.

Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar ((1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 222)

Indeed, even where the home loan is not for legal necessity or for an installment of precursor
debt, the lender can, in the execution of a home loan declare for the acknowledgment of a debt which
the father is personally subject to reimburse, sell the estate without getting a personal pronouncement
against him. After the sale has occurred, the son is bound by the sale, unless he shows that the debt
was non-existent or was corrupted with immorality or illegality.

Apentala Raghavaiah Vs. Boggawarapu Peda Ammayya

In this case, the offended party’s father Yellamanda did Tobacco business with the respondent
and subsequently ended up plainly indebted to him and because of which the father sold the property
to a litigant for paying off the debts. The respondent contested the request of by documenting his
counter fighting that the Tobacco business was finished by the father the applicant for the advantage
the joint family and the debt shrunk by him is not ‘Avyavaharika debt’ that the candidate is obligated
to discharge such debt brought about by his father regarding such business.

In the decision of the Supreme Court revealed in Manibhai v. Hemraj, it was observed
subsequent to alluding to various prior decisions of the Supreme Court as well as some other High
Courts, as follows: “Regardless of the possibility that “any credit is taken by the father for his
personal advantage which is found as vyavaharik debt and not avyavaharik, the sons are subject to
discharge their father’s debt under the teaching of pious obligation and in this view the matter if any
distance the joint family property is subsequently made to discharge such forerunner debt or advance
of the father, such estrangement would tie on the sons.”

IV. DEBTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE

1. Commercial Debts:
Commercial Debts was outside the regulation, as indicated by Old law. To the present law, it is
the doctrine.(i.e. the son is subject to pay the commercial debts)
 2. Suretyship Debts:
Liability arising out of suretyship by the father is not official on his son. Hence, it does not go
inside the convention.
3. Gaming Debts:
Gaming Debts are outside the regulation according to the Old and New Laws. Eg: Debts caused
by drinks, liquors and so forth.
4. Avyavaharika Debts:
As indicated by the Mitakshara, it is outside the doctrine. Cole rivulet translated it as “a debt for
a cause disgusting to great morals.” In other words, it is a debt for an illegal or immoral purpose.

V. PIOUS OBLIGATION AFTER THE AMENDMENT OF 2005

After the initiation of the Hindu Succession (Amendment ideal to continue against a son,
grandson or incredible grandson for the recuperation of any debt due from his father, grandfather or
awesome grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son,
grandson or extraordinary grandson to discharge any such debt. Bias of Pious Obligation Doctrine
:What is left of the pious obligation convention after the amendments in Hindu law is the injustice of
the principle of pious obligation of the son to pay his father’s debt, namely, even now the father amid
his lifetime can estrange the joint family property of himself and of his son for the installment of his
personal debts brought about by him which was neither necessary nor valuable for the family. This is
the residue, which is neither justifiable nor reasonable. However, it is the legitimate and fair
consequence of the inheritance of the son in the joint estate.

VI. SOCIO-LEGAL IMPACT OF DOCTRINE OF PIOUS OBLIGATION

The socio-legal impact of the pious obligation teaching is not consistent with the present day
jurisprudential trends in the field of exclusive jurisprudence. The Hindu law as stands changed by the
various Acts favors the absolute right of ownership with regards to Hindu females; it can’t stand to
rationale and reason the at where the woman’s restricted estate has been abolished the son’s idea in
the joint family property should be permitted to be taken away from the teaching of pious obligation.
What is imperative in this respect is to change the pious obligation regulation into the absolute
obligation and get it similarity with the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law because that has as of now
been the impact of Chandersen’s decision of the Supreme Court.