CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

GERARDO D. ABE-ABE 
v.
JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin
and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO

(G.R. No. L-4827 May 31, 1979)

FACTS:

On August 20, 1976, the one hundred thirty-seven petitioners (farmers and owners of ricelands) filed an injunction
suit in the Camiguin court against Pedro P. Romualdo (a lawyer and delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention).

The purpose of the suit was to secure a judicial declaration as to the petitioners' prior vested rights under article 504
of the Civil Code to use the water of the Anibungan Inobo Ablay and Tajong Crocks to irrigate their ricelands
located upstream in Barrios Lumad and Baylao Mambajao, Camiguin The petitioners sought to enjoin Romualdo
from using the water of the creeks at night to irrigate his two hectare Riceland located downstream. That nocturnal
use was allegedly prejudicial to the petitioners.

Their version is that their use of the water of the creeks started in 1938; that in 1952 or after the volcanic eruption,
the waters of the creeks were made to converge in a single channel and two diversion dams were constructed with
the help of the municipal government and the Presidential Arm on Community Development PACD. The National
Irrigation Administration allegedly contributed money for the improvement of the dams. The petitioners wanted to
convey the impression that the communal irrigation system was established primarily for the benefit of the
ricelands located upstream.

In July, 1976, respondent or defendant Romualdo started using the water of the creeks by opening the diversion
dams at night. That act provoked the filing of the injunction suit already mentioned.

Romualdo's version in his answer is that at a conference among the petitioners (with their counsel), the provincial
commander, the district engineer, the mayor, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan and Romualdo, it was agreed
upon that the water of the creeks would be used on a rotation basis: the petitioners would use it in the daytime and
Romualdo and the other landowners downstream would use the water at night. The opening and closing of the dam
would be under the control of the provincial commander.

Romualdo alleged that he filed a water permit application with the district engineer's office as required in
Presidential Decree No. 424 so that he could use legitimately the water to irrigate his riceland
located downstream near the seashore in Sitio Boloc-Boloc. The regional director of the Bureau of Public Works
issued to Romualdo on October 5, 1976 a temporary authority to use the water of the creeks. In contrast, the
petitioners did not file any water permit applications although required to do so by the district engineer's office.

Romualdo interposed the defense that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. He
contended that the petitioners' remedy was to file their complaint with the district engineer's office pursuant to
Department Order No. 245 dated September 29, 1958 of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications
regarding the determination of water rights controversies.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of First Instance of Camiguin has jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute over water rights for
irrigation purposes even if the controversy has not yet been passed upon by the National Water Resources Council
the agency vested with original and exclusive competence to resolve conflicting c on the appropriation of water
resources.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

RULING:

We hold that the petition is devoid of merit. It is incontestable that the petitioners' immediate recourse is to
ventilate their grievance with the National Water Resources Council which, as already noted, is the administrative
agency exclusively vested with original jurisdiction to settle water rights disputes-under the Water Code and under
Presidential Decree No. 424.

That jurisdiction of the Council under section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 424 is reaffirmed in section 88 of the
Water Code and in section 3(d) thereof which provides that the utilization, exploitation, development, conservation
and protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the government through" the
Council.

It should be noted that article 100 of the Water Code repealed the provisions of the Civil Code and the Spanish Law
of Waters of August 3, 1866 "on ownership of waters, easements relating to waters, use of public waters and
acquisitive prescription on the use of waters, which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Water Code. Article
100 also repealed the Irrigation Law, Act No. 2152.

It is also noteworthy that section 3(e) of the Water Code recognizes that "preference in the use and development of
waters shall consider current usages and be responsive to the changing needs of the country".

Article 95 of the Water Code recognizes vested rights but requires that such rights should be registered on or before
December 31, 1978.

The Code in its article 20 acknowledges that "the measure and t of appropriation of water shall be beneficial use", a
rule found in the Philippine Bill of 1902 (See Sideco vs Sarenas 41 Phil. 80, 82-83).

The Code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to entrust to an administrative agency the settlement of
water rights disputes rather than require the claimants to go directly to the court where the proceedings are subject
to unavoidable delays which are detrimental to the parties.

It is patent that the petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedy. Their complaint should have been
lodged with the National Water Resources Council whose decision is reviewable by the Court of First Instance as
indicated in the aforequoted sections 88 and 89 of the Water Code.

If a litigant goes to court without first pursuing his administrative remedies, his action is premature or he has no
cause of action to ventilate in court. His case is not ripe for judicial determination (Aboitiz & Co., Inc. vs. Collector
of Customs, L-29466, May 18, 1978, 83 SCRA 265, 271).

"When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a
litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere This traditional attitude
of the courts is based not only on conveyance but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect
for a co-equal office in the government If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to (the) courts." (Cruz vs. Del Rosario, 119 Phil. 63, 66.)

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies before resorting to the court means that there should be an
"orderly procedure which favors a pre administrative sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly
within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of in. interference with functions of the
administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process has run its course, and
prevention of attempts 'to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first instance'" (2 Am Jur 2nd 428; Antonio
vs. Tanco, Jr., L-38135, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 448, 454).
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

LOVINO v. MORENO

(G.R. NO. L-17821, NOV. 29, 1963)

FACTS: 

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila enjoining the Secretary of  Public Works
and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in a fishpond abandoned by Primitivo
and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province of Pampanga. The cause started by a petition of
numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications complaining
that appellees had blocked the “Sapang Bulati”, a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampang and asking that the
obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to
the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision dated August 11, 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove (5) closures of Sapang
Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary should order their removal at the expense of the respondents.

After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the
Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is
not the subject of the present appeal.  The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below
was that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether
a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive
as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

ISSUE:

Whether the objections to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, tenable

RULING:

No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions

or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because
the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession. It is
true that the exercise of the Secretary’s power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some
questions of fact such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character, but these functions,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear
navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly
conferrable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value cannot be done except
through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous hearing, and are
inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice
to the complainants and the appellees who appeared therein. It is noteworthy that Republic Act No. 2056 authorizes
removal of the unauthorized dikes either as & public nuisances or as prohibited constructions& on public navigable
streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within
their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave
abuse of discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court
below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

TANJAY WATER DISTRICT v. GABATON

(GR NO. 63742, April 17, 1989)
FACTS:
On March 3, 1983, petitioner Tanjay Water District, represented by its manager, Joel B. Borromeo,
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, an action for injunction with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, against respondent Municipality of Pamplona and its
officials to prevent them from interfering in the management of the Tanjay Waterworks System.
Respondent Judge set the hearing of the application for injunction on March 16, 1983.  The Municipality and
its officials answered the complaint.  Esperidion Moso filed a separate answer.
When the case was called for hearing on March 16, 1983, respondent Judge gave the parties five (5) days to
submit their respective position papers on the issue of the court's jurisdiction (or lack of it), over the
action.  The respondents' position paper questioned the court's jurisdiction over the case and asked for its
dismissal of the complaint (Annex F).  Instead of a position paper, the petitioner filed a reply with opposition
to the motion to dismiss (Annex G).
On March 25, 1983, respondent Judge issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter (water) and over the parties (both being government instrumentalities) by virtue of Art. 88
of PD No. 1067 and PD No. 242.  He declared that the petitioner's recourse to the court was premature
because the controversy should have been ventilated first before the National Water Resources Council
pursuant to Arts. 88 and 89 of PD No. 1067.  He further ruled that as the parties are government
instrumentalities, the dispute should be administratively settled in accordance with PD No. 242.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge is correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. The respondent Judge is correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Articles 88 and 89 of The Water Code (PD No. 1067, promulgated on January 25, 1977) provide as follows:
"ART. 88.  The [Water Resources] Council shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to
appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within
the meaning and context of the provisions of this Code.
"The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies shall be immediately executory and the
enforcement thereof may be suspended only when a bond, in an amount fixed by the Council to answer
for damages occasioned by the suspension or stay ofexecution, shall have been filed by the appealing party,
unless the suspension is by virtue of an order of a competent court.
"All disputes shall be decided within sixty (60) days after the parties submit the same for decision or
resolution.
"The Council shall have the power to issue writs of execution and enforce its decisions with the assistance of
local or national police agencies."
"ART. 89.  The decisions of  the Council on water rights controversies may  be  appealed to  the Court of  First
Instance of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from
the date the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any of the following grounds: (1)
grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law." (Emphasis supplied.)
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Inasmuch as this case involves the appropriation, utilization and control of water, We hold that the jurisdiction
to hear and decide the dispute in the first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as provided in PD
No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject.  The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has
only appellate jurisdiction over the case.

MARILAO WATER CONSUMERS ASSOC.

vs. IAC
G.R. No. 72807 September 9, 1991
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of P.D. 168 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973), Marilao Water
District (MWD) was formed by Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Marilao dated September 18, 1982, which resolution was thereafter forwarded to the LWUA and
"duly filed" by it on October 4, 1982 after ascertaining that it conformed to the requirements of the
law.

Marilao Waters Consumers Association, Inc. (MWCA), a non-stock, non-profit corporation, filed
a petition before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan claiming that the creation of the water district is
defective and illegal. Impleaded as respondents were the Marilao Water District, as well as the
Municipality of Marilao, Bulacan; its Sangguniang Bayan; and Mayor Nicanor V. GUILLERMO.
The petition prayed for the dissolution of the water district.

MWD filed its Answer with an affirmative defences that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter since the water district’s dissolution fell under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
SEC.

MWCA countered thatsince the Marilao Water District had not been organized under the
Corporation Code, the SEC had no jurisdiction over a proceeding for its dissolution and that under
Section 45 of PD 198, the proceeding to determine if the dissolution of the water district is for the
best interest of the people, is within the competence of a regular court of justice.

RTC dismissed the MWCA’s suit ruling that it is the SEC which has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
Which triburial has jurisdiction over the dissolution of a water district organized and operating as a
quasi-public corporation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended: the
Regional Trial Court, or the Securities & Exchange Commission.

RULING:
The present case does not fall within the limited jurisdiction of the SEC, but within the general
jurisdiction of RTCs.

PD 198 authorizes the formation, lays down the powers and functions, and governs the operation of
water districts throughout the country; it is "the source of authorization and power to form and
maintain a (water) district." Once formed, it says, a district is subject to its provisions and is not
under the jurisdiction of any political subdivision.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

The juridical entities thus created and organized under PD 198 are considered quasi-public
corporations, performing public services and supplying public wants.

The juridical entities known as water districts created by PD 198, although considered as quasi-
public corporations and authorized to exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private
corporations under existing laws are entirely distinct from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code, PD 902-A, as amended.

The Corporation Code has nothing whatever to do with their formation and organization, all the
terms and conditions for their organization and operation being particularly spelled out in PD 198.

The resolutions creating them, their charters, in other words, are filed not with the Securities and
Exchange Commission but with the LWUA. It is these resolutions qua charters, and not articles of
incorporation drawn up under the Corporation Code, which set forth the name of the water districts,
the number of their directors, the manner of their selection and replacement, their powers, etc.

The SEC which is charged with enforcement of the Corporation Code as regards corporations,
partnerships and associations formed or operating under its provisions, has no power of supervision
or control over the activities of water districts.

The "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973" has a specific provision governing dissolution of water
districts created thereunder This is Section 45 of PD 198. Under this provision, it is the LWUA
which is the administrative body involved in the voluntary dissolution of a water district; it is with it
that the resolution of dissolution is filed, not the Securities and Exchange Commission. And this
provision is evidently quite distinct and different from those on dissolution of corporations "formed
or organized under the provisions of the Corporation Code under which dissolution may be voluntary
(by vote of the stockholders or members), generally effected by the filing of the corresponding
resolution with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or involuntary, commenced by the filing of
a verified complaint also with the SEC.

Although described as quasi-public corporations, and granted the same powers as private
corporations, water districts are not really corporations. They have no incorporators,
stockholders or members, who have the right to vote for directors, or amend the articles of
incorporation or by-laws, or pass resolutions, or otherwise perform such other acts as are authorized
to stockholders or members of corporations by the Corporation Code. In a word, there can be no
such thing as a relation of corporation and stockholders or members in a water district for the
simple reason that in the latter there are no stockholders or members. Between the water district and
those who are recipients of its water services there exists not the relationship of corporation-and-
stockholder, but that of a service agency and users or customers.

There can therefore be no such thing in a water district as "intra-corporate or partnership

relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates (or) between any or all of them
and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively," within the contemplation of Section 5 of the Corporation Code so as to
bring controversies involving them within the competence and cognizance of the SEC.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Metro Iloilo Water vs CA

(GR NO. 72807, SEPT. 9, 1991)

DOCTRINE: The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws
and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s
rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to
invoke the special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial
intervention

FACTS: Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198.
It was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration Conditional Certificate of Conformance
No. 71. Its service areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City etc.

Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yet identical petitions
for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and / or temporary restraining order against
herein private respondents the pertinent portions of which read:

4. –That pursuant to the provisions of section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, as amended, the petitioner as a
Water District was authorized to adopt laws and regulations governing the drilling, maintenance and
operation of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single family domestic use on
overlying land, with then provision that any well operated in violation of such regulations shall be
deemed an interference with the waters of the district;

Private respondents invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contending that the cases were
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water
Council) under Presidential Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines
(Water Code). In addition, private respondents Emma Nava and Rebecca Berlin denied having
extracted or withdrawn water from the ground, much less sold the same

Additionally, he alleged the petitioner’s rules and regulations were not published in the Official
Gazette and hence petitioner had no cause of action. Meanwhile, private respondent Gerry Luzuriaga
claimed that he was not the real party in interest, but Shoemart, Inc. which has the control and
possession of the property where the alleged withdrawal of ground water was taking place.

The trial court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was within the original jurisdiction
of the Water Council, involving, as itdid, the appropriation, exploitation, and utilization of water, and
factual issues which were within the Water Council’s competence. Inaddition, the trial court held that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine of “primary administrative
jurisdiction.” MR denied shortly thereafter.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may entertain the positions

HELD: Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 32. Protection of waters and Facilities of District. – A district shall have the right to:

(a) Commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise actions or proceedings to prevent
interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of any surface, stream or
ground water supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of the district or be a common
benefit to the lands or its inhabitants. The ground water within a district is necessary to the
performance of the district’s powers and such districts hereby authorized to adopt rules and
regulations subject to the approval of the National Water Resources Council governing the drilling,
maintenance and operation of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than a singled family
domestic use on overlying land. Any well operated on violation of such regulations shall be deemed
in interference with the waters of the district.…

(c) Prohibit any person, firm or corporation from vending, selling, or otherwise disposing of water
for public purposes within the service area of the district where district facilities are available to
provide such service, or fix terms and conditions by permit for such sale or disposition of water.

By virtue of the above provisions, petitioner states that as a water district, it has the right to prevent
interference with the water of the district; and to enforce such right, it is given remedies of
commencing, maintaining, or intervening in, defending or entering into appropriate actions or
proceedings. In asserting the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and the propriety of
its filing of the petitions before the trial court, petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court in Amistoso
v. Ong, as reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals, that where the issue involved is not the settlement
of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already
granted, the regular court has jurisdiction and not the Water Council.

A judicial question is raised when the determination of the questions involves the exercise of a
judicial function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. As opposed to a moot question or
one properly decided by the executive or legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed
to the courts.

The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and
jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s rights as
a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the
special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While
initially it may appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the
Water Council, i.e., the appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as “the acquisition of
rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner
and for any purpose allowed by law,” in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main
thrust of the petitions.

The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, on the basis of which the petitions were dismissed by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, does not even come to play. The petition is remanded to the trial court.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Collado vs CA
(G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002)

FACTS:
Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an
application for registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”), situated in Antipolo Rizal.
Attached to the application was a technical description, stating “this survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” The Solicitor General filed oppositions to
the application. Petitioners (Edna Collado and her co-applicants) allege that they
have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open,
public, notorious and in the concept of owners. They paid all real estate taxes
and submitted evidence to prove that there have been 9 transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest. RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners for having presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title
over the property.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. NO.

RULING:
NO. There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity)
dated July 26, 1904 10 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR"
for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners’ claim
over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights." They
point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are
"subject to existing private rights, if any there be." Petitioners contend that
their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known
predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the
Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed
and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore
alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on
Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all
lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution
belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource.
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged
lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit
of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes."26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court had occasion to
discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt
from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for
brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed
by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also
recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product
of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of
watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground
water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and
Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the
owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration
of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection,
management or administration of such waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of
the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the
DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such as
watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and industrialization have
taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat,
natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue,
private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a
watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp vs. Court of

Appeals
(GR NO. 112526, OCT.12, 2001)
FACT:
The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) order
of compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Sta. Rosa was the registered owner of two parcels of land in Cabuyao Laguna. According to
them, these lands are watersheds which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the Canlubang
community and that 90 light industries are located in that area. They were alleging respondents usurped
its rights over their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land provides water to the
residents, respondents sought an easement of a right of a way to and from Barangay Castile, to which, by
counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against respondents. Respondents went to the DAR and filed a
case for compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to acquire private rights in land without
the willing consent of its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society. The said land was inspected
by the Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities concerned, they
decided that the said land must be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioners filed an objection on
the ground that: The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with
slopes 18% and above. (Which falls under the exception in compulsory acquisition of CARP) The
occupants of the land were illegal settlers or (squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as
beneficiaries. Another issue raised by the petitioners was that the DAR failed to follow the due process
because instead of paying just compensation, a trust account was made in favour of the petitioners.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the property was a watershed, not covered by CARP.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

RULING:
YES. The property in dispute is a watershed and not covered by CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water
may be declared by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may
be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants
thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration
of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary
or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce
of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time
of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the property as
watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance
adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution 26 voiding
the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now
classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its
police power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs." 27
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform28 we held that lands classified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to
farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and
survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area. 29
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a "watershed or part of the protected area
for watershed purposes." Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be
interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In
the case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the
land was allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that
may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore
the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river
watersheds, they concluded that:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds.
Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which
are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this
would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below.
On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of
the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of
the Matang Tubig structures they couldn't care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given
precious resource – water. x x x x x

Tan vs. Director of Forestry

G.R. no. L-24548
Facts:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice, advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before
May 22, 1961. This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States
Government to the Philippine Government.

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after
paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers
before the deadline.

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same
to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive
to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:

It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve
for watershed purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation
establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also
desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license
in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the
area may be reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.)
CARLOS P.
GARCIA
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings
and recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public
interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions.

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award,
bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

Issue:

Whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction,
and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause,

RULING:

No. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources did not act without or in excess of their jurisdiction.

What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare
of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and
immediately imperilled by forest denudation.

The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed
(p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and
guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly
mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the country's watershed.
Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various unscientific and
destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber
cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules
and regulations included in the ordinary timber license it is stated:

The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director
of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public
interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the
fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as
the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President
Diosdado Macapagal.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

HONORIO BULAO, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE FRANCISCO VILLARTA and
SANTIAGO BELLEZA, respondents.

(G.R. No. 101983 February 1, 1993)

FACTS:

On April 25, 1983, respondent Santiago Belleza filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tayum, Peñarrubia, Abra, a complaint against petitioner Honorio Bulao. The petitioner moved to dismiss the
same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He argued that the said case was cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court, the real issue being one of ownership, possession of the land where the ditches are located, and real
rights involving the use of ditches. The court denied the motion and required him to answer the complaint.

The Petitioner failed to do so and was declared in default. He then moved for reconsideration and the lifting of
the order of default. This time he claimed that it was the National Water Resources Council that had
jurisdiction over the case because it involved rights on the utilization of water. The motion was also denied,
and the court proceeded to receive the evidence of the private respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is correct in claiming that NWRB shall have the proper jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner invokes in this connection the cases of Abe-abe vs. Manta  and Tanjay Water District
vs. Gabaton.
CASE DIGESTS (WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

In the first case, the petitioners sought a judicial confirmation of their prior vested right under Article 504 of
the Civil Code to use the water of Anibungan Albay and Tajong Creeks to irrigate their ricelands upstrean.
They also wanted to enjoin the private respondent from using the water of the creeks at night to irrigate his
riceland located downstream.

In the second case, the court was asked to prevent the Municipality of Pamplona from interfering with the
management of the Tanjay Waterworks System.

It was held in both cases that jurisdiction pertained to the National Water Resources Council as the issues
involved were the appropriation, utilization and control of water.

But these cases have no application to the instant controversy.  It is clear from a reading of the private
respondent's complaint in Civil Case 70 that it is an action for damages predicated on a quasi-delict.

A quasi-delict has the following elements: a) the damage suffered by the plaintiff; b) the act or omission of
the defendant supposedly constituting fault or negligence; and c) the causal connection between the act and
the damage sustained by the plaintiff.