Cases for Search and Seizure

1. People vs. Pastrana, February 21, 2018 - Purpose

FACTS:
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Amador
Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI
Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that respondents were engaged in a
scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees would call prospective clients abroad
whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks.
Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No
shares of stock, however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as
follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana’s personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-
clients, who threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing.
Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of
the RPC, but also a violation of RA No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed
H. Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of respondents’ former
employees who actually called clients abroad; the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations
used by respondents in their scheme; and the sketch of the place sought to be searched.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant is null and void.

HELD:
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal liberty
and security of hoes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of the constitutional provision against
unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
 2. Dela Cruz vs. People, January 11, 2016 - Scope
GR No. 200748 July 23, 2014

FACTS:
The petitioner here was Jaime De La Cruz, a police officer, who was charged of violation of Sec
15, Art 2 of RA 9165 or “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. According to the prosecution, the
NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito that Ariel, who was the live-in partner of Corazon and
the son of Charito was picked up by unknown persons whom were believed to be police officers for
allegedly selling drugs. After that, an errand boy came and gave a phone number to the complainants.
During the call, complainants were instructed to go to Gorordo Police Office wherein they met James who
demanded them money worth P100,000 which was lowered to P40,000 in exchange of the release of
Ariel. After the meeting, they went to the NBI to file a complaint. Thus, the NBI conducted an entrapment
operation. During the course of entrapment, the officers were able to nab Jaime Dela Cruz by using a pre-
marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder which was made part of the amount demanded by James
and handed by Corazon. After that, petitioner Jaime was required to submit his urine for drug testing
which produces a positive result for having presence of dangerous drug. However, petitioner denied the
charge against him.
RTC and CA found the accused guilty.

Issue: WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal

Held:
No. Drug test can be made upon persons who were apprehended or arrested under the situations
listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. It must be noted that the accused was here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion. Extortion is not listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. Thus, drug test in Sec 15 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime, but only for unlawful acts listed under Art 2 of RA 9165.

3. Pollo vs. Chairperson Constantino-David, October 18, 2011- Scope

FACTS:
On January 3, 2007 an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent alleged that the chief
of the “Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na” division of the CSC has been lawyering for accused gov’t
employees having a pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and to back up all the files in the computers found in the “Mamamayan Muna” and Legal
divisions. The team backed up all the files from the computers of said divisions, which included the
computer of Pollo, who was the OIC of the “Mamamayan muna” program of the CSC.
The team obtained from petitioner’s personal files around 40-42 drafts of legal pleadings or
documents which were for and on behalf of parties facing charges as respondents in administrative cases
pending before the CSC or other tribunals giving rise to the inference that petitioner was aiding and
advancing interests adverse to the interest of the CSC as agency of the government tasked to discipline
misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. And since these these draft pleadings were
obtained from the computer assigned to and under the direct control and disposition of Pollo, it invariably
raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation.
The CSC charged petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The CSC subsequently issued a resolution finding petitioner guilty of the charges against him
and dismissed him from the service. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondents and denied his motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation of his constitutional right to
privacy.

RULING:
The SC held that the search on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files
were both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.
In resolving the case, the SC relied on the following US court rulings:

In Katz v. US, the court noted the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). .

O’Connor vs. Ortega teaches that in the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court
needs to balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the
government’s interests. A public employer’s intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: (1) whether the action was
justified at its inception and (2) whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.

Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
nature of the misconduct.

In US v. Simons, the defendant, an employee of the CIA, was convicted of receiving and
possessing materials containing child pornography. The agency had a policy that employees were to use
the Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. It also stated that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s Internet
access as deemed appropriate. The US Supreme Court held that the search of his computer files remains
valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was
discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. And although Simons had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with
regard to the files in his computer in light of the policy of the agency.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, the
SC ruled on the following questions: 
(1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?
- NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.  

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files.  Petitioner did not allege that he
had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked
and not open to other employees or visitors.  Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.  On the contrary, he submits
that he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom
he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.  
Furthermore, as in the Simons case, the office had a policy regulating the use of office computers
which explicitly provides that employees have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated or human means.  This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done
to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. 

(2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, involving the copying of the contents of the hard drive
on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?
- YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the contents of
the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David
regarding anomalies in the CSC.  
The nature of the imputation in the complaint was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If a
CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending
cases before the Commission a cast clouds of doubt would be cast upon the institutional integrity of the
Commission as a quasi-judicial agency.
That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Considering the temporary nature of
computer files, that they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, drastic and immediate action was
necessary and thus the need for the warrantless search.

4. People vs. Marti, January 18, 1991 - To whom directed

Facts:
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of
the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended
to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the
date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland.” Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured
the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in
Zurich. In view of Marti’s representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box,
with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before
delivery of Marti’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and
husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection,
where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti’s packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or
cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate
Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter’s stated address was the Manila Central Post Office.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights,
be invoked against the State.

Held:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing the accused’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court
sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

5. Miguel vs. People, July 31, 2017 - To whom directed

Facts:

 An information was filed before the RTC charging Jeffrey Miguel (petitioner) of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, penalized under 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002”
 Prosecution alleged that (prosecution version of facts):
o Around 12:45 am of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of Brgy. San Antonio
Village, Makati, named Reynaldo Bahoyo was doing his rounds when he received a
report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street!
o Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Velasquez then went to said street and
saw a visible intoxicated person, which they later identified as petitioner, urinating and
displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot
o When they asked petitioner where he lived, the latter answered “Kaong Street”
o Bahoyo then said he lived on the same street but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so
he asked for an ID, but petitioner failed to produce one
o Velasquez repeated the for an ID, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a
pack of cigarettes containing one stick and two pieces of rolled paper containing dried
marijuana leaves
o This prompted the Bantay Bayans to seize the items, take petitioner to the police station,
and turn him, as well as the items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo
o SPO3 Castillo then inventoried the items, and prepared a request for qualitative
examination of the rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing
o Tests confirmed it was marijuana and that petitioner was positive for the presence of
Methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites
 Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and presented a different version of facts (petitioner version of
facts):
o He was just urinating in from of his workplace when 2 Bantay Bayan operatives
approached him and asked him where he lived
o Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, they frisked him, took away his
belongings, and thereafter handcuffed and brought him to the Brgy. Hall
o He was detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to
another office where a bald officer questioned him
o He was then taken back to the Brgy. Hall where they showed him 2 sticks of marijuana
joints allegedly recovered from him
 RTC Ruling
o RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime charged
o They ruled that the Bahoyo and Velasques conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as
petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest
o Thus, the incidental search which yielded the seized marijuana was also lawful
 Petitioner appealed to the CA
 CA Ruling
o CA affirmed conviction
o It held that search made on petitioner was valid as it was done incidental to his arrest for
exhibiting his private parts on public
o As such, said marijuana is admissible in evidence and sufficient to convict him for the
crime charged
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the petition to the SC
  Petitioner argues that the search and arrest was illegal and, thus, the marijuana purportedly
seized from him is inadmissible in evidence

Issue:

Whether or not the there was a valid search incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest

Ruling:

 NO
 (First, the Court established that the Bill of Rights apply to Bantay Bayan operatives)
 The Bantay Bayan operatives are not government agents like the PNP or the NBI in charge of law
enforcement, but are civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the law
enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security. The Bill of Rights generally cannot be
invoked against the acts of private individuals, however, they may be applicable if such
individuals act under the color of a state-related function
 In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, the Bill of Rights may be
applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who arrested and subsequently searched petitioner.

 (Next, the court determined that the arrest and search was NOT validly made)
 The Bill of Rights provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest first before a search can be
made – this process cannot be reversed.
 A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, provided the parameters defined in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
 In Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements must concur, namely:
a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
 Section 5(b), requires that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it
 In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is essential
 On the basis of the testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that petitioner went out to the
street to urinate (note that there was no CR in his workplace) when the Bantay Bayan operatives
chanced upon him. That latter then approached and questioned petitioner, and thereafter went on
to search his person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana.
 Verily, the prosecution’s claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts was belied by the
testimonies (important note: the Bantay Bayans testified in the cross examination that petitioner
was showing off his private parts while urinating and turning his back from them. How the hell can
you show off your private parts when you are turning your back and urinating? lol)
 Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest,
considering that there was NO overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
  Neither do these circumstances necessitate a “hot pursuit” warrantless arrest as the arresting
operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an
offense
 Moreover, if the arrest was made because of the alleged display of private parts, then the proper
charge should have been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any showing that such
charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
This strengthens the view that no prior lawful arrest was made which led to a valid search
incidental thereto.
 There must be a lawful arrest FIRST, before a search can be made, the process cannot be
reversed.

6. Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People, July 13, 2014 - Nature of a search warrant; general
warrants
Facts:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations
Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants[3] before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of... petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC)[4] located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis,
Quezon City,... applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations,
which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401... the trial court conducted a
hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera)
and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as
witnesses

Issues: PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to
question the quashal of the search warrants;

Ruling:
at the conformity of the... public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party
moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants
When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing
left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

Principles:
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in
a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.[40]
Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident)... has already been filed
before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant
or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in
Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to
be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the... accused therein."
 7. People vs. Dichoso, June 4, 1993 - General search warrant
Facts:
Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag , the accused, appealed from June 11, 1991 of the RTC of San
Pablo City where he has been convicted of the crime violating Sec. 15, Art. II and Sec. 4, Art. II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to pay fine of P20, 000 and the cost of suit. Likewise, Jaime Pagtakhan, was
also charged with illegal possession of regulated drug violating Sec.16 , Art. III of the Dangerous Drug
Act . However, Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because as for the words of the trial
court “she cannot be located”. The three cases were consolidated for a joint trial. In Branch 30 of the
RTC San Pablo City.
According to the accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso, the said accusation of illegal possession of
dangerous has been framed up or planted evidence. Aside from that, he contends that the search
warrant is a general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated, and the
search conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible.

Issues:
Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible?
Whether or not the search warrant against them is valid?
Whether or not the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act?

Rulings:
In the first issue, no, because the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it
particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies the offense involved.
Items seized are admissible. For the second one, the search warrant has been examined and found
out that it was valid. Lastly, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City is
hereby modified that Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sec. 16, Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight
years as minimum to twelve years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.

8. Chua vs. People, July 01, 2003 - Conditions of a valid warrant

FACTS:

Chua and private complainant Philip See were long-time friends and neighbors. On different dates from
1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PS Bank checks of varying amounts to See. However,
See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or
closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed a Complaint
for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 (BP 22).

The prosecution filed a Motion to Re-open Presentation of Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion to Allow
Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003, intending to introduce
the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as a newly discovered evidence, stating that “despite diligent
efforts to locate the demand letter x x x, the same was not located until sometime in February 2002, when
I was having our old house/office cleaned and ready to be rented out;”

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 qualifies as a newly discovered evidence.

RULING:
NO. The demand letter dated November 30, 1993 deserves no weight and credence not only because it
does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the purview of law but also because of its doubtful
character.

The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was
the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to
the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular
piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is
not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came
to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed
to secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due
diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed
that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In
other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The
movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion;
he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts
reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
facts known to him.

"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of
such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment."

In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a newly
discovered evidence within the purview of the law. Per See's statements in his affidavit, the said evidence
was already known to him at the time he filed his complaint against Chua. It was also apparently available
considering that it was just kept in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable diligence, he
could have promptly located the said demand letter and presented it during trial. However, the
circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at the
time he filed the complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated December
10, 1993 was referred to in the complaint, which per See's own allegations, was also not actually received
by Chua. In addition, the prosecution failed to present the original copy of the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on the basis of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993
alone, the prosecution cannot possibly establish the existence of the second element of the offense.
Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 make it susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction was a mere afterthought - a belated
attempt to fill in a missing component necessary for the existence of the second element of BP 22.

9. Allado vs. Diokno, May 5, 1994 - Requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
Facts:
The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission], is heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national, who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice. Other incidental crimes charged were
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, and usurpation of authority. The whole
investigation was triggered by an extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a
discharge of the Philippine Constabulary. Based on the confession of Umbal, Judge Barrios of RTC Br 11
issued a search warrant against petitioners. For the institution of criminal proceedings the DOJ took over
the case, after a new panel of prosecutors were recommended [cz petitioners claim the first set of
prosecutors were affiliated w/ Lacson head of PACC and could not be impartial] and after preliminary
investigation found probable cause that accused commited the crime and submitted the case for trial
which was assigned to Judge Diokno of Br 62. Judge Diokno after finding probable cause issued warrant
of arrest.

Issue: WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant?

Ruling:
Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for in
order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief
by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twest’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not
been established, nor have his remains been recovered.
We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this
Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one
witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we
emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause
is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and
the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind
the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have
to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor’s certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the
judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the
judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is a function of the prosecutor

10. Columbia Pictures vs. Flores, June 29, 1993 - Requisites in the issuance of search
warrants
THE FACTS

As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. , NBI
agents conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them respondent FGT
Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted
film," a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to have
copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments”
(owned by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI applied for and was able to obtain
from the respondent judge the subject Search Warrant No. 45 which reads:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

 GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI Senior Agent
Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that
there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.
No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been
committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network,
Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko
are responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner
Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of MPAA member
Company Titles) the following properties to wit:

(a)   Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;
(b)   Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being
reproduced or retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and
books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per
attached list), or otherwise used in the reproduction/retaping business of the
defendants;
(c)  Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials
used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or
possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping
and concealing in the premises above-described, which should be seized and
brought to the Undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00
A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the undersigned
immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs.

In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents
found and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively distributed by
petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials,
accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers,
production orders, and posters.

FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the
subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had the right possess the seized
reproduction equipment, which are not illegal  per se, but are rather exclusively used and intended to be
used for reproduction and not in the “sale, lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.”

Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and
under special instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its right to
possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in serious doubt, the lower court ordered the
return of the “television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT.

II.    THE ISSUE

Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?

III.   THE RULING

[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the respondent Judge
Flores.]

NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search
warrant.

Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the Court has
previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In 20th Century Fox
vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under
circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A striking similarity between this case
and 20th Century Fox  is the fact that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof
describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the warrant issued in
the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:

(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful
reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is
keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.

On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in 20th  Century
Fox:

Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which
can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out
betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to
a legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they
were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general
which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to
include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature
of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.

 The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
the immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own erroneous
conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be gleaned from his statement that “. . . the
machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of tapes
of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the machines or
equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted
motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a registered and
duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of
videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction
equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).”

11. Prof. David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, May 03, 2006 - Steps in the conduct of search and seizure
THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of

the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-
over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way
to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo,
was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in
the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
II.    THE ISSUE

1.    Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?

2.    Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant

to PP 1017 valid?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1.    NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly

issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)   When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b)   When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition  and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-
shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the
leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he
was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2.    NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the  Daily Tribune’s  offices  conducted
pursuant to  PP 1017 was NOT valid.
 [T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that  a
search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in
the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And
Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served
at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

12. Mendoza vs. People, April 21, 2014 - Two kinds of determination of probable cause
Facts:

Juno Cars hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its
Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5)
cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission. Juno
Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City,
Alfredo pilfered a total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage. On March 4, 2008,
Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the
filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa. He then filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice. While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the
Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City.

On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order
dismissing the complaint, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals and was granted. Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45
before this court. He argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as
shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader
than [the] executive determination of probable cause" and that "it is not correct to say that the
determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor.

Issue: When warrant of arrest may issue

Ruling:

The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge
has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase “upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce” allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.

Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Alfredo. A judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to
lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or
she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she
can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to
proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.

13. People vs. Choi, August 03, 2006 - Requisites for determination of the existence of probable
cause
Facts:

 Mario Nieto, an intelligence operative of the Department of Finance, applied for a search warrant
against Choi for violation of the Intellectual Property Code. (fake Marlboro red cigarettes and
cardboard cases)
 After examination of the applicant and the witnesses, the judge issued the search warrant.
Search was conducted the same day.
 Choi questioned the validity of the search warrant before the RTC and the CA, arguing that
probable cause was not sufficiently established because the examination conducted was not
probing and exhaustive. Moreover, the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be
searched.
 CA ruled that the judge committed GADLEJ in relying upon the conclusion of the witness that the
cigarettes he received from Choi were fake, without requiring the presentation of the alleged fake
cigarettes and genuine ones for comparison.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant

Ruling:

 No. A search warrant can be issued upon a finding of probable cause.

 Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally
o The examination must be under oath
 The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers
Although there is no hard and fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it
is necessary that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory, or pro forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
 The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Probable cause is concerned
with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after full-blown trial.
 The questions of the judge during the examination in this case were sufficiently probing, and not
at all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent with each other, and the
narration of facts was credible. The testimonies and other evidence on record constituted
adequate bases to establish probable cause that the alleged offense has been committed.
  Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge, the findings
of the judge deserve great weight, and may only be overturned when there is clear disregard of
the facts before him and dictates of reason, which is not present in this case.

14. Homar vs. People, September 02, 2015 , Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (in
flagrante delicto arrest)

15. Warrantless arrest and search and seizure ( in flagrante delicto arrest and seizure of
evidence in "plain view")

16. Veridiano vs. People, June 07, 2017 - Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest)
Facts:

1.) At about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio
operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later identified
as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3 Alvin Vergara who were both
on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at
Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They chanced upon Veridiano at around
10PM inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and
asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to
check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.” PO1
Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his
constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his
initials. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the
seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The contents of the tea bag tested
positive for marijuana.

2.) RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.

3.) Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." The CA
rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.

4.) The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his
possession.

5.) Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.

6.) Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petition was granted.

Issue: Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner

Ruling:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed."78For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test 79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.
In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused
did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. 92 The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." 93 That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. 94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of
arrest.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or
is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence.134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except
for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either
arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-
SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.

17. People vs. Cogaed, July 30, 2014, warrantless searches and seizures (stop- and-frisk search)
FACTS:
Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint,
the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana
inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the
contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that he was just
transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the
bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is
admissible as evidence.

HELD:
NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible
as evidence.

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only
be determined by a judge.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with
all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present
in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It
has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.

The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There
were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession
of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise
known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance
of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through
unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental
rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.

18. Sanchez vs. People - November 19, 2014, Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (stop-
and-frisk search and search incidental to a lawful arrest)
FACTS:
 Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang,"
was selling drugs to tricycle drivers, a group of police officers was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B,
Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta.
After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group
chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed
Rizaldy holding a match box.
An officer asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While
examining it, the officer found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline
substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the
tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a Certification
that the white crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet was shabu; and on April 21, 2005,
the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused Sanchez which was affirmed by the CA.
Sanchez insisting on his acquittal, filed a petition arguing that the warrantless arrest and search
on him were invalid due to the absence of probable cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in
flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He also
contends that the failure of the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his
guilt.

ISSUE: Is the warrantless arrest and search on the accused valid?

RULING: No.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
In the case, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct
of the search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person
into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the
same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting
the search on him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only after the discovery of the shabu inside the
match box. Evidently, what happened in this case was that a search was first undertaken and then later
an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the search.
Also, the evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives leaving
the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of
Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared
suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113. Therefore, the warrantless arrest
and search was invalid.
19. People vs. Cuizon, April 18, 1996 - Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (search
incidental to a lawful arrest)

20. Caballes vs. CA, January 15, 2002 - Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (search of
moving vehicle, plain view doctrine and consented search)