Legal and Judicial Ethics Cases

Legal and Judicial Ethics Cases
Apiag v. Judge Cantero
Facts:
In a letter-complaint[2] dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A.
Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly
having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.
According to the complainants:
"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant)
Maria Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together as husband
and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June 19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita
A. Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born. Thereafter, defendant left the
conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two
children with her meager income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs
suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant
was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for
support, however, they were ignored by defendant.
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent
The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that
respondent Judge had another family.
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:
"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said complaint, but vehemently deny the
validity of its due execution, for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter,
without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to our
town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City,
without patently knowing I was made to appear
(in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly
prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second
year high school days."
Issues:
That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
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The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the
offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary
The charges have no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of the foregoing
recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and
retirement of the respondent.
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following: abandonment
of his first wife and children, failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of public documents.
Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his
character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate
the character of man from the character of an officer. x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of official duties x x x .' More specifically, in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an
administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines
misconduct as referring 'to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' That is to abide by the
authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice
Malcolm, which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be shown, there must be 'reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate
the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no
direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his
official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct
in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant disciplinary action, the
act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to
separate the character of the man from the character of the officer.
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria
Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage was void and that
there was no need to have the same judicially declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing.
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a judicial declaration of such
fact"[20] before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void."[21] This was expressly provided under Article 40[22] of the Family Code. However, the marriage
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of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs.
Amante applies in favor of respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of
guilt in the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand,
so too must the accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith
that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public documents, a valid
defense in a charge of falsification of public document,[23] which must be appreciated in his favor.
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from
finding him administratively liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action
from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he
personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be above
reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles and
sense of propriety without which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so
indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge
and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as the price he has to
pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice."[24] It is against this
standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the record
reveals he had two families. The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs, support and
education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the
late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this case, we found no
trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the
filing of this administrative case, and has to all appearances lived up to the stringent standards
embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 years in
government service,[26] this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.
But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.
Principles:
Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his
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character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate
the character of man from the character of an officer
It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer,
must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro
Benacillo v. Amila
Initiated by: Lydia A. Benancillo, filed by complainant charging respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila with
Grave Abuse of Discretion.
Facts:
The complainant, the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, avers that Branch 1 of RTC Tagbilaran City,
acting as then Family Court in Tagbilaran City, issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
live-in partner, Paul John Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal
effects, including properties in their diving business called the Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc.
(Underworld). Belot sought the reconsideration of the issuance of the TPO.
Meanwhile, their business partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion for
intervention with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant filed an opposition to the
motion for intervention with prayer for preliminary injunction.
The complainant alleges that when Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran City, presided by the respondent judge,
was designated as the new Family Court in Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil Case No. 7268 was transferred to the
said court. Acting on the pending incidents, the respondent judge denied both Belot’s motion for
reconsideration and the intervenors’ motion for intervention in an Order dated July 16, 2007. The
respondent judge incorporated in the resolution a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the intervenors
from taking possession of the properties of Underworld.
Defense:
The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her "insatiable greed to have
exclusive control and possession pending trial of the case [of] all the properties of the Underworld
Divers Panglao, Inc. of respondent Paul John Belot." x x x [H]e added that the "complainant . . . is only a
live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was branded repeatedly by Belot as a
‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’."
According to the respondent judge, he rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007 because the complainant
had no right to her alleged shares in the corporation being merely a dummy owner of Belot’s shares. He
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was "fearful of the consequence in the event that complainant would stealthily dispose of or abscond
[with] the properties. . . because of the illegitimate status of their relationship, more so, with their
present feud caused by the arrival of Belot’s son and the alleged coming of the legitimate wife."
The respondent judge averred that the complainant "masterminded all [the] legal manipulations [and]
moved heaven and earth x x x to get possession of all the properties of Belot to the extent of filing the
instant administrative charge and a petition for certiorari lately with the Court of Appeals, dated
December 21, 2007 using the same offensive and disrespectful language in her arguments.
The respondent asserted he had the authority to motu proprio rectify an error to restore things to their
status quo during the pendency of the case in order to avoid damage or loss. x x x [T]he complainant
refused to attend the meeting he called with the intervenor in chambers to explain the Order.1avvphi1
Respondent Judge Amila incorporated in his submission his comment to a similar administrative
complaint filed earlier by the complainant. x x x [H]e alleged that he set aside his Order of October 2,
2007 because the Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot before the Court of Appeals had placed the
jurisdiction of the court under question.
Issue: Is the respondent Judge guilty of conduct unbecoming?
Held:
Yes.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxxx
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts
which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se
improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as such. "Be it stressed that judges are
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held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested]
with public trust."
In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors
to a meeting inside his chambers. His explanation that he called the said meeting to advice the parties
that he will rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. Why would a judge give the parties
advance notice that he is going to issue an Order, more so rescind his previous Order? Worse, why
would he call on the intervenors whom he had earlier ruled as not having any legal personality in this
case? This act of respondent judge would logically create an impression to complainant that the meeting
of the judge with the intervenors had turned his views around towards issuing a revocation of the
October 2, 2007 Order.
In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to complainant.
The former in effect maliciously besmirched the character of complainant by calling her as "only a live-in
partner of Belot" and presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate relationship. The
judge also called her a prostitute. The judge’s accusations that complainant was motivated by insatiable
greed and would abscond with the contested property are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of
complainant is also inconsistent with the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) he issued in her favor as a
victim of domestic violence. Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his
language.
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience,
prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his
words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for
his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10,10 Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court.
Laurel v. Misa
Allegiance to a nation is not suspended by an encroachment of enemy nations.
Type: petition for habeas corpus
Accusation: Anastacio Laurel is accused of Treason.
Facts:
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Anastacio Laurel helped the Japanese during world war 2.
Defense: a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended;
and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic.
Issue:
Does a change of allegiance would justify the treason by Laurel?
Held:
No, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no
such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only
passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the
occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for
the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign;
and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military
occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor.
Philosophy:
Temporary control of a country by an enemy nation during an invasion, does not negate the loyalty of a
citizen to the original country.
J. Perfecto’s Dissenting Opinion
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Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is
peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may
actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-
preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency
arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its
enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they
should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to the
enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be enforced
under the theory of suspension.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even
since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our
laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of
December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by
Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941.
When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during
the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in
force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and
also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we
provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled
as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then
convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy
invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for
treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed
without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal
technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the
innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having
betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due
process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such
during the critical period of test.
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Joaquin v. Javellana
Delay for cause, like health reasons, without asking for extensions result in a fine, but not dismissal.
Initiated by: Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin, charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana with grave misconduct in the
performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law.
ELIEZER A. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA,
Facts:
The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa. "People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Tan y Salazar,"
filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San
Carlos City RTC.
Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in the aforenumbered
criminal case, the decision, dated 16 July 1999, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been
rendered only on the tenth month after the case was submitted for decision. Complainant further
claimed that neither respondent judge nor his clerk of court was present during the promulgation of the
decision in contravention of Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge was also cited
for impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the
accused, whose vehicle respondent judge would even use at times.
Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge admitted that the decision in Criminal Case
No. RTC-1150 was rendered beyond the ninety-day reglementary period but attributed the delay to his
voluminous workload. Respondent was handling two salas, his original station, RTC Branch 59,
designated as being a special court for heinous crimes, and RTC Branch 57. He explained that he was
suffering from hypertension which resulted in his frequent requests for leave.
In due time, Justice Abesamis submitted his report, dated 25 May 2001, finding respondent judge to
have indeed failed to decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the ninety-day reglementary period. The
Investigating Justice found no irregularity, however, in the promulgation of the decision. He also found
no gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent.
In order to impose disciplinary action on judges, Justice Abesamis concluded, it should be shown that
the error or mistake invoked was gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith, and that a mere
error of judgment would not be a ground for disciplinary action. Finally, the Investigating Justice held
respondent judge accountable for impropriety for his close association with Atty. Agravante.
Issue: Was there undue delay in the promulgation of judgement?
Held:
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Section 15, Article XVIII, of the Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which
to decide cases or matters pending before them from the date of submission of such cases or matters
for decision or resolution. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct holds similarly by mandating that the
disposition of cases must be done promptly and seasonably. Admittedly, respondent judge has taken ten
months to finally decide
Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 from its submission for decision, a period clearly beyond the ninety-day
reglementary period.
He could have asked for an extension of time to decide the case and explain why, but he did not. Any
undue delay in the resolution of cases often amounts to a denial of justice and can easily undermine the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Aware of the heavy caseload of judges, the Court has
continued to act with great understanding on requests for extension of time to decide cases.
"Giving respondent judge the benefit of the doubt, and presume that his close associations with lawyers
practicing within the territorial jurisdiction of his court are all normal and do not in any way unduly
influence him in the discharge of his sworn duties, the Court cannot just leave respondent judge's acts
and consider them proper.
"It is expressly provided under the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT that:
"CANON 2. - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. - A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Rule 2.09. - A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others to convey the impressions that they are in special position to influence the judge.'
"It is obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in
such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.
WHEREFORE, (a) the complaint against respondent Judge Roberto S. Javellana for ignorance of the law is
DISMISSED for being without basis; (b) said respondent is found administratively liable for failing to
render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed therefor and is hereby
imposed a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS, with warning that a repetition of same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely than herein imposed; (c) the respondent, finally, is ADMONISHED to constantly
be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending cases before him.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
10
Initiated by: Respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government, filed a "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" That private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
Facts:
Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings. Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for
which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal
defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in
PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v. Cojuangco, et al."
2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm).
3. ACCRA Law Firm – acquired info on assets of clients, personal and business circumstances; assisted in
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil Case
0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders etc; delivered documents
which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., (1) stock certificates endorsed in blank representing
the shares registered in the client's name, and (2) a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said
shares; acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings
(as office practice)
4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG’s "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33
because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for Created by: Ma. Angela
Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 24 of 147 whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants conspired in helping set up, through the use of the
coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares
6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the holder of approximately 15 million shares (roughly
3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100 biggest
stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); a wholly-owned investment arm
7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB
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8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of
shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of
stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate
business purposes and already transferred shares
9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in the alleged illgotten wealth
10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving
that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as
accorded Roco.
11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely (PCGG’s Comment): (a) the disclosure
of the identity of its clients; (b) documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) deeds of
assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares
12. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the
counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation; (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the
Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting the Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C.
Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 25 of 147 reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of
PCGG against Roco
13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor
undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated Resolution herein questioned, denying
the exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence
that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial
distinction for equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG; unreasonable or unjust
ISSUE:
Privileged Information Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in
refusing to disclose the identity of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case
HELD:
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and
subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
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The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Sandiganbayan
resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint.
1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.
Reasons:
a. Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
b. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The attorney-
client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
c. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
d. Due process considerations Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 26
of 147 require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences
a. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception for freedom of consultation)
b. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at bar)
C. Government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD EXCEPTION)
D. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at
bar)
F. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential
3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is
Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients)
4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and
services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.
13
5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed.
Their services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency)
wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that
he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C.
Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 27 of 147 6.
OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to
reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment." b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.
— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
“An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of…” c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states,
Sec. 20: “duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval.” d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.” e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability,"
7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application
of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of
legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subverts the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
Zaguirre v. Ca
FACTS:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita
Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and
before the release of its results. Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter. The
14
latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her
support which did not materialize after the birth of the child. The Court found him guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.
The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her. In his
defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his
good moral character. His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband
and father despite the affair. More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court,
Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-
dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of
Php2,000.00 each.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be punished with
the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.
HELD:
No, not indefinite, but instead a suspension of 2 years.
The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and
reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of
two years. Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child
should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.
Gonzales v. Chavez
Initiated by: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the petition as a class suit, tax
payer suit against the actions of the Solicitor General. Petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the Solicitor General.
Facts:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the petition as a class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of common and general
interest to all Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to the enforcement of a public duty and the
prevention of unlawful expenditure of public funds.
According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-
three (33) cases before this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in
the National Labor Relations Commission and another case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one
15
hundred forty-four (144) cases. In December 1990, the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said
cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."
As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of
whom are trial lawyers. They would receive a monthly compensation of at least P10,000.00 plus
appearance fee of P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or P500.00 if trial is postponed.
Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance was made without
any reason, it implied that it was "within the absolute discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily
require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG in court.
Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no discretion to reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.
Petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as
substitutes for the Solicitor General.
Petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the Commission on Audit considering that any payment for
the services of the PCGG-hired lawyers would result in an unlawful expenditure of public funds.
Stressing the need to preserve the status quo until the determination of his rights as a citizen and
taxpayer, petitioner prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order.
Defense:
the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it has not allowed the disbursement of funds to pay for the
services of PCGG-hired private lawyers.
The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all
cases investigated by it" includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in determining
the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases including the matter of who, in particular, will control and
supervise the prosecution of said cases." The phrase "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor
General and other government agencies" simply means that the Solicitor General is called upon to
render assistance to the PCGG and whether or not such discretion is required by the Commission is a
matter of discretion on its part. Such provision does not preclude the PCGG from engaging the services
of private lawyers in the same way that it is "clearly authorized to hire accountants, appraisers,
researchers and other professionals as it performs its functions." Since, upon the dictates of legal and
practical necessity, it has hired lawyers in the United States and in Switzerland, "it may similarly hire
Filipino lawyers in prosecuting its Philippine cases."
Issue:
Can the PCGG hire private lawyers to for its purposes?
Held:
16
No, it’s the primary purpose of the Sandigan Bayan to represent the state, at the very least there must
be cooperation between the PCGG and the Sandigan Bayan
Section 41 further provides:
There shall be an officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of all his
duties, called the Solicitor-General who shall be appointed by the Commission . . . In case of a vacancy in
the office of Attorney-General, or of his absence or disability, the Solicitor-General shall have power to
exercise the duties of that office. Under the supervision of the Attorney-General, it shall be the especial
duty of the Solicitor-General to conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court, in which the
Philippine Government is interested, and the Attorney-General may, whenever he deems it for the
interest of the Philippine Government, either in person conduct and argue any case in any court of the
Philippine Islands in which the Philippine Government is interested or may direct the Solicitor General to
do so.
The reason advanced by the Solicitor General for his motion to withdraw his appearance as lawyer for
the PCGG is that he has been, more than once embarrassed in court and thereby made "a laughing stock
in its (his) professionalism." Examples are when the OSG lawyers betrayed ignorance in open court of
certain moves taken by the PCGG, such as the lifting of a sequestration of an asset or when it was under
the impression that an asset had mysteriously disappeared only to be informed that "a PCGG
Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the disposition of said asset."
The reason advanced by the Solicitor General for his motion to withdraw his appearance as lawyer for
the PCGG is that he has been, more than once embarrassed in court and thereby made "a laughing stock
in its (his) professionalism." Examples are when the OSG lawyers betrayed ignorance in open court of
certain moves taken by the PCGG, such as the lifting of a sequestration of an asset or when it was under
the impression that an asset had mysteriously disappeared only to be informed that "a PCGG
Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the disposition of said asset."
The Solicitor General's withdrawal of his appearance on behalf of the PCGG was beyond the scope of
his authority in the management of a case. As a public official, it is his sworn duty to provide legal
services to the Government, particularly to represent it in litigations. And such duty may be enjoined
upon him by the writ of mandamus. And such duty may be enjoined upon him by the writ
of mandamus. Such order, however, should not be construed to mean that his discretion in the handling
of his cases may be interfered with. The Court is not compelling him to act in a particular way.
Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent a failure of justice resulting from his abandonment in
midstream of the cause of the PCGG and the Republic and ultimately, of the Filipino people.
In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that the petitioner has a personal interest in
the case, as his petition is anchored on the right of the people, through the PCGG and the Republic, to
be represented in court by the public officer duly authorized by law. The requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and hence, part of the public which
possesses the right.
17
The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and granted in this petition. The said writ,
being intended to prevent the doing of some act that is about to be done, it may not provide a remedy
for acts which are already fait accompli. Having been placed in a situation where it was constrained to
hire private lawyers if the Republic's campaign to legally recover the wealth amassed by the
Marcoses, their friends and relatives was to prosper, the PCGG's action is justified. However, it was
not entirely blameless. Its failure to coordinate closely with the Solicitor General has spawned the
incidents which culminated in the withdrawal of the latter from appearing as counsel in its cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED
to immediately re-enter his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion to withdraw
appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the services of the lawyers it had employed but not before
paying them the reasonable fees due them in accordance with rules and regulations of the Commission
on Audit.
Orbos v. CSC
SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,

petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and NERIO MADARANG, respondents.
Initiated by: Nerio Madarang questioned the appointments of Agon and Magnayon
Facts:
In the course of the reorganization of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
Guido C. Agon and Alfonso Magnayon were appointed to the positions of Head Telecommunications
Engineer, range 74.
Nerio Madarang who was also appointed to the position of Supervising Telecommunications Engineer,
range 12, questioned the appointments of Agon and Magnayon by filing an appeal with the
Reorganization Appeals Board of the DOTC composed of Moises S. Tolentino, Jr. of the Office of the
Secretary, as Chairman and Assistant Secretary Rosauro V. Sibal and Graciano L. Sitchon of the Office of
the Secretary, as members. In a resolution dated January 9, 1989 the said Reorganization Appeals Board
dismissed Madarang's appeal for lack of merit. Hence, he appealed to the public respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC)
In its resolution dated August 29, 1989, respondent CSC revoked the appointments of Agon and
Magnayon for the contested positions and directed the appointment of Madarang to the said position of
Heads Telecommunications Engineer. DOTC Assistant Secretary Sibal sought a reconsideration of the
said resolution of the CSC but this was denied in a resolution dated November 2, 1989.
On November 21, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal filed a manifestation with the CSC stating:
18
The Telecommunications Office through the undersigned, hereby manifests that we received the CSC
resolution in CSC Case No. 393 on November 12, 1989 and in compliance thereto, we will convene our
Selection and Promotion Board to deliberate on the position of Head Telecommunications Engineer
(reclassified to Engineer IV pursuant to National Compensation Circular No. 58 effective July 1, 1989)
with qualified candidates including appellant Nerio Madarang.
Respondent Madarang requested the CSC to take appropriate action by implementing its resolutions
dated August 29, 1989 and November 2, 1989.
In an order dated December 19, 1989, the CSC directed the immediate implementation of its
aforementioned resolution insofar as it concerned the appointment of Madarang.
While petitioner does not question the aforestated resolutions of the CSC insofar as it disapproved the
appointments of Agon and Magnayon to the positions of Head Telecommunications Engineer, petitioner
maintains that as the appointing authority, he has the right of choice and discretion to appoint the
persons whom he deems fit to the position to be filled.
Petitioner emphasizes that when the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
November 2, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal informed the CSC through a manifestation that the DOTC
Selection and Promotions Board will be convened to deliberate on the position of Head
Telecommunications Engineer, taking into consideration qualified candidates including Nerio Madarang.
Nevertheless, the CSC stood pat on its resolution directing the appointment of Nerio Madarang to the
contested position.
On the other hand, the CSC contends that it was properly exercising a constitutional and legal duty to
enforce the merit and fitness principle in the appointment of civil servants and to uphold their equally
guaranteed right to be appointed to similar or comparable positions in the reorganized agency
consistent with applicable law and issuances of competent authorities.
Invoking the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 3 (Article IX [B]). — The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the writ
and reward system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President
and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.' (Emphasis supplied.);
Section 19, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987) which provides:
Section 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees — (l) Opportunity for government employment shall
be open to all qualified citizens, and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter
the service. Employees shall be selected on the basis of the fitness to perform the duties and assume the
responsibilities of the position.; and Section 12 of the same Executive Order:
19
Sec. 12. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions: (a) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provision of the said merit
systems... (Emphasis supplied.)
respondent CSC argues that the primary objective of the CSC system is to promote and establish
professionalism by ensuring a high level of morale among the employees and officers in the career civil
service. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the CSC contends it should see to it that the merit
system is applied, enforced and implemented in personnel actions involving appointments affecting all
levels and ranks in the civil service at all times.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position.
Held:
Yes, the revoked the appointments of Agon and Magnayon for the contested positions and directed the
appointment of Madarang, is negated.
Section 9. Powers and Function of the Commission. —The Commission shall administer the Civil Service
and shall have the following powers and functions:
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except
those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces,
firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the
appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is
disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the
appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That
the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All
appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by
the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes
ineffective thirty days thereafter.
From the foregoing provision it is clear that the CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an
appointment and not the power to make the appointment itself or to direct that such appointment be
made by the appointing authority. The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill
a vacant position and it finds the person qualified it must so attest. The duty of the CSC is to attest
appointments. That function being discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases.
By the same token, should the CSC find that the appointee is not qualified for the position, it has the
duty to disapprove the appointment. Thereafter, the responsibility of appointing the qualified person in
20
lieu of the disqualified appointee rests upon the discretion of the appointing authority. The CSC cannot
encroach upon such discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
This Court has pronounced in no uncertain terms that the CSC has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. The Court
likewise held that the CSC does not have the authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice.
Petitioner demonstrated his deference to the resolutions of the CSC disapproving the appointments of
Agon and Magnayon. However, in the implementation of said resolutions he decided to convene the
DOTC Selection and Promotions Board to deliberate on the person who should be appointed as Head
Telecommunications Engineer among qualified candidates including respondent Nerio Madarang.
Instead of acknowledging the authority of petitioner to exercise its discretion in the appointment of a
replacement, the CSC, in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, directed the appointment of Madarang as the substitute of its choice. This act of the CSC
must be struck down.
Private respondent Madarang, besides his comment, filed a motion to disqualify the Office of the
Solicitor General from appearing for petitioner and to cite petitioner in contempt of court for the filing
of the petition.
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials
or agents including petitioner and public respondent. This is so provided under Presidential Decree No.
478:
SECTION 1. Functions and Organization. — (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government
is upheld within the limits set by law. When confronted with a situation where one government office
takes an adverse position against another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General
should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him
to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a client's position. 11 In such an instance the government office adversely
affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may
appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.
In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the issues he found merit in the
cause of the petitioner based on the applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to represent
the petitioner as he did by filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the
petitioner even if in so doing his representation runs against the interests of the CSC.
21
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the parties. He should be given
full support and cooperation by any agency or official involved in litigation. He should be enabled to
faithfully discharge his duties and responsibilities as the government advocate. And he should do no less
for his clients. His burden of assisting in the fair and just administration of justice is clear.
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his duty. As a matter of
fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and his
continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from appearing before this Court
even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the Government or any of its agents he is
expected to represent. The Court must be advised of his position just as well.
Private respondent Madarang also seeks to hold petitioner in contempt of court on the ground that the
petition was filed in order to circumvent or obviate the dismissal of a similar petition in this Court filed
by Guido Agon and Alfonso Magnayon. The legal personality of the petitioner to file the petition is also
questioned on the ground it was Assistant Secretary Sibal and not the petitioner who issued the
contested appointments.
On March 29, 1990 this Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by the said
petitioners there being no compelling reason to warrant the reversal of the questioned resolution.
Apparently, the disapproval of the appointments of Agon and Magnayon was the issue in said petition.
In the present petition as aforestated, petitioner yields to the disapproval of the appointment of the
two, but questions the authority of the CSC to direct the appointment of Madarang to the contested
position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of the respondent CSC dated
August 29, 1989, November 2, 1989 and January 19, 1990 are hereby annulled insofar as they direct the
appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position. The petitioner is hereby authorized to
convene the DOTC Selection and Promotion Board to determine who shall replace Guido Agon and
Alfonso Magnayon to the contested position by considering all qualified candidates including Nerio
Madarang. The restraining order dated March 29, 1990 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Republic v. Andaya G.R. No. 187257
Initiated by: Petition for Mandamus filed by the president of the National Power Corporation Employees
Consolidated Union (NECU) and the president of the National Power Corporation Employees and
Workers Union (NEWU),
22
That National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) should release and pay the Cost of Living Allowance
(COLA) and Amelioration Allowance (AA) to all NAPOCOR employees.
RTC: petitioners and intervenors NECU & NEWU, Judgement: NAPOCOR was to release the money.
Facts:
The implementation of Republic Act No. 6758 resulted in the integration of all allowances previously
received, including Cost of Living Allowance and Amelioration Allowance, into the basic standardized
salary. When a government entity ceases to be covered by Republic Act No. 6758, the new position
classification and compensation plan must also include all allowances previously received in the basic
salary, in line with the principle of non-diminution of pay.
In 1976, a salary standardization and compensation plan for public employees, including that of
government-owned and controlled corporations, was enacted through Presidential Decree No. 985. 6 The
Decree likewise provided that notwithstanding the standardization and compensation plan, additional
incentives may be established by government-owned and controlled corporations from their corporate
funds. Pursuant to the Decree, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation No.
97, granting additional financial incentives to employees of government-owned and controlled
corporation performing critical functions, among which was NAPOCOR. 9 The additional incentives
included COLA and AA.
Issue:
a. Whether NAPOCOR employees are entitled to the payment of their COLA and AA from the period of
July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999.
b. Whether the COLA and AA were already deemed factually integrated into the standardized salaries
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.
c. Whether the COLA and AA were already integrated into the standardized salaries pursuant to the New
Compensation Plan for NAPOCOR employees in Republic Act No. 7648 and Memorandum No. 198, series
of 1994.
d. Whether the trial court violated the Constitution when it ordered NAPOCOR to back pay COLA and AA
from its corporate funds.
Held:
a. Whether NAPOCOR employees are entitled to the payment of their COLA and AA from the period of
July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999.
23
COLA and AA are already deemed integrated into the standardized salaries of the NAPOCOR employees
from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
it would be incongruous to grant any alleged back pay of COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to December
31, 1993, when the NAPOCOR officers and employees have already received such allowances for this
period. The grant would be tantamount to additional compensation, which is proscribed by Section 8,
Article IX (B) of the Constitution:
SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Mandamus cannot lie to compel the performance of an unconstitutional act. 177 The Regional Trial Court
clearly acted in grave abuse of discretion in ordering the back payment, to the affected NAPOCOR
officers and employees, the COLA and AA for the period of July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
The question remains, however, as to the entitlement of NECU and NEWU to the back pay of COLA and
AA from January 1, 1994 to March 16, 1999.
b. Whether the COLA and AA were already deemed factually integrated into the standardized salaries
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.
The enactment of Republic Act No. 7648, or the Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993 authorized the
President of the Philippines to reorganize NAPOCOR and to upgrade its compensation plan. From this
period, NAPOCOR ceased to be covered by the standardized salary rates of Republic Act No. 6758.
c. Whether the COLA and AA were already integrated into the standardized salaries pursuant to the New
Compensation Plan for NAPOCOR employees in Republic Act No. 7648 and Memorandum No. 198, series
of 1994.
As previously discussed, COLA and AA were already deemed integrated into the basic standardized
salary from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993. These allowances need not be separately granted. All
basic salaries by December 31, 1993 already included the COLA and AA.
Thus, in order to conclude that the NAPOCOR employees were not able to receive their COLA and AA
upon the implementation of the New Compensation Plan, it must first be determined whether its
implementation resulted in the diminution of their salaries and benefits.
24
Evidence on record, however, shows that the affected employees suffered no diminution in their
compensation upon the implementation of the New Compensation Plan on January 1, 1994.
The pay slips184 of an employee, Melinda A. Bancolita, from December 1993 to January 1994 are
instructive. For the period of December 1 to 7, 1993, she had the position of "SR IRD/IRM OFFICER", and
was receiving a total compensation of ₱8,017.40. 185 From January 1 to 7, 1994, she held the same
position and was still receiving a total compensation of ₱8,017.40. 186 The pay slips187 of another
employee, Corazon C. San Andres, from this period are similarly instructive. For the period of December
1 to 7, 1993, she held the position of "SECRETARY A," and was receiving a total compensation of
₱3,917.00.188 From January 1 to 7, 1993, she held the same position and was receiving the same amount
of compensation.189
Considering there was no diminution in the salaries and benefits of the NAPOCOR employees upon the
implementation of the New Compensation Plan, there was no basis for the Regional Trial Court to grant
NECU and NEWU's money claims. To repeat, the indiscriminate grant of additional allowances would be
tantamount to additional compensation, which is proscribed by Section 8, 190 Article IX (B) of the
Constitution.
d. Whether the trial court violated the Constitution when it ordered NAPOCOR to back pay COLA and AA
from its corporate funds.
The Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate execution of its
November 28, 2008 Decision even before the lapse of the period for appeal.
Money claims and judgments against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit.
Trial courts have already been strongly cautioned against the issuance of writs of execution in cases
involving the disbursement of public funds in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos.

187257 and 187776 are GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008, Joint Order dated March 20,
2009, and Writ of Execution dated March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84
in Civil Case No. Q-07-61728 are VACATED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated April
15, 2009 is made PERMANENT.
Corpus Jr. v. Pamular
Proper appeal to a criminal charge by an accused is to file for reconsideration and not for certiorari.
Amendments of form to a complaint after arraignment can only be question by those who were already
entered a plea
25
SC is not a trier of facts
Accusation: CARLITO SAMONTE charged with homicide for killing Angelita Espinosa.
Facts:
SAMONTE shot and killed Espinosa using an unlicensed firearm colt 45. Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense.
Based on the affidavit executed by Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one
who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito.
In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelita's
murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before the Regional Trial Court.
Amendment: The there is a conspiracy between Samonte and Corpus to kill Angelita Espinosa.
Defense: a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with a
prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte on
March 3, 2009. This Petition seeks to enjoin Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order
and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from conducting further proceedings in the
murder case.
Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended information, Samonte will have an
additional burden of setting up a new defense particularly on any acts of his co-accused since "the act of
one is the act of all."
Petitioners assert that Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended:
Section 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60)
days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Prosecution:
26
Filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1 there should be "no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" available. Considering that there is still a remedy
available for the accused apart from filing a petition, the petition shall fail. She claims that petitioners
should have first filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before resorting to a
petition for certiorari before this Court.
Issue:
1. Should the petitioners have first filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before resorting to this Petition of certiorari?
2. Was there already probable cause when the warrant was issued to corpus?
3. Should respondent judge have deferred from conducting further proceedings on the amended
information and on the issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice?
4. Can Corpus be held liable for the conspiracy despite it being an amendment?
5. Can the court rule on the a change of the facts of conspiracy, due to the amendment?
Held:
Procedural Issues:
1. Should the petitioners have first filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before resorting to this Petition of certiorari?
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
Yes. Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional
Trial Court. Apart from bare conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court.
It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a
mere procedural technicality.
These are "jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with."
27
Therefore, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before
filing this Petition is fatal.
2. Was there already probable cause when the warrant was issued to corpus?
Yes, due to the multiple types of probable cause, one by the prosecutor-executive, one for the Judge-
judicial.
When a Regional Trial Court has already determined that probable cause exists for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, like in this case, jurisdiction is already with the Regional Trial Court.134 Therefore, it
can proceed in conducting further proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance of a
warrant despite the pendency of a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
3. Should respondent judge have deferred from conducting further proceedings on the amended
information and on the issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice?
He could have continued, Plus 60 days from the day of Petition for Review was filed by the petitioners.
RULE 116 Arraignment and Plea
Section 11. Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty
(60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court,
informing it about their pending Petition for Review of the Prosecutor's January 26, 2009 Resolution
before the Department of Justice.
This Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a
petition with the reviewing office.
Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment."
Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9,
2009. Thus, the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can
now continue with the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.
Feb 9, 2009 Plus 60 days= April 10, 2009.
28
4. Can Corpus be held liable for the conspiracy despite it being an amendment?
Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase "conspiring and
confederating together" in the amended information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial
to the rights of the accused after his or her arraignment.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can
be made provided it is with leave of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if it is beneficial to the accused.
Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot
invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.
Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section 14 prohibits any substantial amendment
especially those that may prejudice his or her rights. One of these rights includes the constitutional right
of the accused to be infonned of the nature and cause of the accusations against him or her, which is
given life during arraignment.
5. Can the court rule on the a change of the facts of conspiracy, due to the amendment?
No, Priscilla filed a Manifestation, which provides that on October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an
affidavit stating that Corpus ordered him to kill Angelito.
Settled is the rule that this Court, The Supreme Court, is not a trier of facts. These matters are left to
the lower courts, which have "more opportunity and facilities to examine these matters." This Court is
not a trier of facts and cannot receive new evidence that would aid in the speedy resolution of this
case.241 It is not this Court's function to "analyze and weigh the evidence all over again." 242
Therefore, based on the foregoing, this Court remands this case to the Regional Trial Court for it to pass
upon this factual issue raised by petitioner Samonte based on his October 30, 2013 affidavit.
Thus the case is Remanded to the lower court.
Philosophy:
29
The rule provides that only formal amendments not prejudicial to the rights of the accused are allowed
after plea.
The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether a defense

under the original information will still be available even after the amendment is made and if any
evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable even in the amended information.
An allegation of conspiracy that was not previously included in the original information constitutes a
substantial amendment.
De lima v. Reyes
The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Facts:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several
radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead.
Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting
that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and
Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel
T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091[8] creating a
special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel was
composed of Senior Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S.
Cacha, and Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D. Medina.[9]
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, filed
a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her
husband's murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former
Marinduque Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon
Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo O. Edrad, and
several John and Jane Does were also implicated.[10]
On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution
dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which,
among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes
and Edrad.[12] On July 7, 2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega
30
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both
Motions were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution[13] dated September 2, 2011.[14]
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel
of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel was
composed of Assistant State Prosecutor Stewart Allan M. Mariano, Assistant State Prosecutor Vimar M.
Barcellano, and Assistant State Prosecutor Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due
process"[15] to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel in its Resolution dated
September 2, 2011. The Department Order also. revoked Department Order No. 091.[16]
Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring former Governor
Reyes to appear before them on October 6 and 13, 2011 and to submit his counter-affidavit and
supporting evidence.[17]
On September 29, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review
(Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's Resolution dated September 2, 2011.
On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
assailing the creation of the Second Panel. In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely
abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He also argued that the parties were already
afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new nor
material to the case.
On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending
the filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes.[20] Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest on March 27, 2012. However, the
warrants against former Governor Reyes and his brother were ineffective since the two allegedly left the
country days before the warrants could be served.[22]
On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad
Cautelam[23] assailing the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012. .
On April 2, 2012, he also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
impleading Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.[24]
In his Supplemental Petition, former Governor Reyes argued that the Regional Trial Court could not
enforce the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and proceed with the prosecution of his
case since this Resolution was void.[25]
31
On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five, rendered the Decision[26]
declaring Department Order No. 710 null and void and reinstating the First Panel's Resolutions dated
June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when
she issued Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel. The Court of Appeals found that
she should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule
on Appeal[27] instead of issuing Department Order No. 710 and creating the Second Panel. It found that
because of her failure to follow the procedure in the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, two Petitions for Review
Ad Cautelam filed by the opposing parties were pending before her.[28]
The Court of Appeals also found that the Secretary of Justice's admission that the issuance of
Department Order No. 710 did not set aside the First Panel's Resolution dated June 8, 2011 and
September 2, 2011 "[compounded] the already anomalous situation."[29] It also stated that Department
Order No. 710 did not give the Second Panel the power to reverse, affirm, or modify the Resolutions of
the First Panel; therefore, the Second Panel did not have the authority to assess the admissibility and
weight of any existing or additional evidence.[30]
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision dated March 19, 2013. The Motion, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
Resolution[31] dated September 27, 2013.
In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the alleged
miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second Panel since both parties
were given full opportunity to present their evidence before the First
Panel. It also ruled that the evidence examined by the Second Panel was not additional evidence but
"forgotten evidence"[32] that was already available before the First Panel during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation.[33]
Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari[34] assailing the Decision dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution dated September 27, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals. Respondent Mario Joel T. Reyes filed his Comment[35] to the Petition in
compliance with this court's Resolution dated February 17, 2014.[36] Petitioners' Reply[37] to the
Comment was filed on October 14, 2014 in compliance with this court's
Resolution dated June 23, 2014.
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710, and with regard to this:
Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition; and
32
Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another panel of prosecutors in
order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
Lastly, whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul.
ven when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function,
the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion.[65] In Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn:[66]
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the
writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the
Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount
to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted
without authority.[67]
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of
prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul
Ruling:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega) with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order impleading Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.
the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling circumstances for her to be able to
designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.
33
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul even when an administrative agency does not
perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of
judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In Auto Prominence
Corporation v. Winterkorn:[66]
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the
writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over
the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of
prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710
because she had reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may
cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to overturn
the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including
the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of
Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and despoticmanner,'by reason of passion or personal hostility."
The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor's determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are given
a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an information should be filed in court or whether
the complaint should be dismissed.
A preliminary investigation is "merely inquisitorial,"[86] and is only conducted to aid the prosecutor in
preparing the information.[87] It serves a two-fold purpose: first, to protect the innocent against
wrongful prosecutions; and second, to spare the state from using its funds and resources in useless
prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz-Paño:[88]
34
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
trials.
Garrido v. Garrido and Valencia
Membership at the bar is a privileged.
Marriage cannot be assumed to be void, but require to be declared void, to avoid bigamy.
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA,
Respondents.
Initiated by: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel E. Garrido
(Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality.
Facts:
Maelotisea alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children. Sometime in 1987,
one of their children confided that an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child
of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her daughter, May Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at
a mall together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively.
In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since he left
the conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the needed financial support to
the prejudice of their children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already
married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married
Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to
financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he
confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with
his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from
college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar
on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26,
1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
35
On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that
Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from
the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia.
In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea filed a motion for
the dismissal of her complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido,
who is the father of her six (6) children.
ISSUES:
1. Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the alleged immoral acts
were committed before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar?
2. Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of the case.
3. Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct.
4. Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense that the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea is
void tenable.
RULING:
A. Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s

qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice of law is a component
of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.
The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material
in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law,
and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not
important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice
of law. The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he
became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.
B. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of
discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after
she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
36
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but
solely because of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
C. The undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established
a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the
marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court
that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married
to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited
relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of
his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a
crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were
in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the
two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not “valid.”
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
37
community’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment
arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws
of the land.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct”; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.”
D. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the
fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency
would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-
married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from
the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this,
because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six
children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the
prism of law.
Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior
demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not
only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up
to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he
or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in
which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. The requirement of good moral
character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image
of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each
purpose is as important as the other.
The Fallo:
38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gro ss immorality, violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Philosophy:
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the
lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment
arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Mane v. Medel
Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning, humilating, and berating‖ him
during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for
the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the latter’s law school. When Mane
answered that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: ―Then you’re not
from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all
law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal
despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.‖
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s person, seemingly disregarding the case
at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks were
unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.
ISSUE:
39
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct
unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
HELD:
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By
hurdling the Bar Examinations which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of
the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as,
inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater is clearly an engagement in
an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt that
his integrity and dignity were being ―assaulted,‖ he acted properly when he directed complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged
on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they
deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by
any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
Initiated by: PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al.
with Sandiganbayan.
Facts:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK
had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank.
Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.
A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision
of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino
40
established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and
cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former Pres. Marcos.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan.
It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which
subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It
failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD
No it doesn’t apply.
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning
of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter.
41
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar
is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall
within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.
He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable
meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the
power to influence the subject proceedings.
The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act
which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the
intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors.
In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest
of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Dissenting Opinions of J. Callejo Sr. and Carpio-Morales
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
42
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a
public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the service.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio-Morales:
Doctrines of law of the case and conclusiveness of judgment do not pose a barrier to the determination
of petitioners' right to maintain the suit:
Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of 'law of the
case. We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to
G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a
second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of these case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be facts of the
case before the court.
It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral
estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved.
A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court sustain B's defense of
sovereign immunity and dismisses the action. Several years later A brings the second action against B
for an unrelated tortious injury occurring after the dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not
conclusive on the question whether the defense immunity is available to B.
The key issues, in query form, are:
(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper?
(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than resolving it as
part of the judgment?
(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search and seizure
order issued against ALLIED correct?
(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to
bring an action in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed period?
43
I also believe that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the
question of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a legal
question. Moreover, Civil Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially
unrelated claims.
Justices Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez further opine that the order of the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case No. 0005 denying PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is not an interlocutory order but a
final order, and that as a result, the principle of res judicata applies.
With all due respect, I believe that we cannot characterize the denial of PCGG's motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza as a final order. Black's Law Dictionary defines interlocutory in the following manner:
Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the commencement and the
end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An
interlocutory order or decree is one which does not finally determine a cause of action but only
decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which requires further steps to be taken
in order to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the merits.
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final or executory as of right
(final and executory), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the
merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses
an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
final, or to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.
An interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider.
Under the foregoing, the perpetual application of Rule 6.03 is clearly a valid and proper regulation.
In his ponencia, Justice Reynato S. Puno labels as insignificant the role of then Solicitor General in the
liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), saying that 'it is indubitable from the facts
that Atty. Mendoza had no iota of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK
and that his only involvement was 'advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of. Justice Puno observes that 'the
procedure of liquidation is simple and is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29.
44
Atty. Mendoza's lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is to me
not material. What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal
expertise. In advising the Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of
Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza
synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law with a view to successfully
liquidate the bank.
Ultimately, Justice Puno advocates for a liberal interpretation of Rule 6.03 since a strict interpretation
would cause 'a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent.
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to this position which is grounded on the premise that this is
'the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers. Effectively, this is likely to result in the
compromising of ethical standards which this Court must never allow. While it is desirable to recruit
competent lawyers into government service, this does not justify the disturbance of our mores.
The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed. Admittedly
the salary for serving in government often pales in comparison to that of the private sector. I submit,
however, that while financial considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting
recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think that serving in government is its
own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to know that money is not
everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of financial
success that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road less traveled and
serve in government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference.
There is more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth. As Winston Churchill puts it: 'What
is the use of living if it be not to strive for noble causes and make this muddled world a better place for
those who will live in it after we are gone?
Henry Ong Lay Hin v. CA.
Accusation: Henry Ong Lay Hin (Ong) and Leo Obsioma, Jr. (Obsioma, Jr.) charged with estafa punished
under Article 315.
Facts:
Ong and Obsioma, Jr. failed to pay Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company a total of ?344,752.20, in
violation of their trust receipt agreement with the bank.
Ong filed the Urgent Motion for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction or, Alternatively, for Bail.
Ong alleges that his counsel never received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution denying his
Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals never became final and
executory, and the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment.
45
Judge Gabriel T. Ingles likewise gravely abused his discretion in issuing a warrant for his arrest and
ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail.
Assuming that his former counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution, Ong argues that
his counsel was grossly negligent in failing to appeal the Court of Appeals’ Resolution. This gross
negligence allegedly deprived him of due process and, therefore, should not bind him.
Considering the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, Ong prays
that this court issue a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction for him to be “liberated from his . . .
illegal imprisonment.”40 In the alternative, he prays that this court allow him to post bail for his
provisional liberty while this court decides his Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the entry of judgment;
(2) Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest and
commitment order against petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin; and
(3) Whether petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin’s former counsel was grossly negligent.
Held:
1. There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case

Grave abuse of discretion is the “arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
In the present case, petitioner failed to prove the Court of Appeals’ and trial court’s grave abuse of
discretion.
The registry return card is the “official . . . record evidencing service by mail.”50 It “carries the
presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed
[and, therefore,] it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise.
Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption.
The affidavits of petitioner’s wife and mother-in-law, Mary Ann Ong and Nila Mapilit, stating that
petitioner’s former counsel told them that the law office never received a copy of the Resolution, 52 are
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. 53 Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s false claim, his former
counsel had notice that the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration as early as April 21,
2004 when his counsel received a copy of the trial court’s Order directing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against petitioner.
2. Issuing the warrant of arrest and commitment order against petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin is valid.
46
it likewise did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the arrest warrant against petitioner and
ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail. Since the Court of Appeals had already issued the Entry
of Judgment and had remanded to the trial court the original records of the case, it became the trial
court’s duty to execute the judgment.
3. The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel bound him

The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the application of
procedural rules.56 The exception to the rule is “when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel
deprives the client of due process of law.”
The agency created between a counsel and a client is a highly fiduciary relationship. A counsel becomes
the eyes and ears in the prosecution or defense of his or her client’s case. This is inevitable because a
competent counsel is expected to understand the law that frames the strategies he or she employs in a
chosen legal remedy. Counsel carefully lays down the procedure that will effectively and efficiently
achieve his or her client’s interests. Counsel should also have a grasp of the facts, and among the
plethora of details, he or she chooses which are relevant for the legal cause of action or defense being
pursued.
In the present case, petitioner took almost seven (7) years, or almost 84 months, from the Court of
Appeals’ issuance of the Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file a Petition before this
court. As this court ruled in Bejarasco, Jr., petitioner ought to have been sooner alerted of the
“unreasonably long time”66 the Court of Appeals was taking in resolving his appeal. Worse, he was
arrested in Pasay City, not in Cebu where he resides. His failure to know or to find out the real status of
his appeal “rendered [petitioner] undeserving of any sympathy from the Court vis-a-vis the negligence of
his former counsel.”67cralawred
We fail to see how petitioner could not have known of the issuance of the Resolution. We cannot
accept a standard of negligence on the part of a client to fail to follow through or address counsel to get
updates on his case. Either this or the alternative that counsel’s alleged actions are merely subterfuge
to avail a penalty well deserved.
Philosophy:
Hiring legal counsel does not relieve litigants of their duty to “monitor the status of [their] case[s],”1
especially if their cases are taking an “unreasonably long time”2 to be resolved.
47
48

Legal and Judicial Ethics Cases

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Cases

Apiag v. Judge Cantero

According to the complainants:

The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:

The charges have no basis in fact and in law.

A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted

Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro

Issue: Is the respondent Judge guilty of conduct unbecoming?

Allegiance to a nation is not suspended by an encroachment of enemy nations.

Type: petition for habeas corpus

Accusation: Anastacio Laurel is accused of Treason.

Anastacio Laurel helped the Japanese during world war 2.

Does a change of allegiance would justify the treason by Laurel?

No, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

J. Perfecto’s Dissenting Opinion

ELIEZER A. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA,

Issue: Was there undue delay in the promulgation of judgement?

"It is expressly provided under the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT that:

7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB

c. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

b. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at bar)

No, not indefinite, but instead a suspension of 2 years.

Can the PCGG hire private lawyers to for its purposes?

Section 41 further provides:

SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,

Invoking the following provisions of the Constitution:

Republic v. Andaya G.R. No. 187257

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos.

Corpus Jr. v. Pamular

SC is not a trier of facts

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

RULE 116 Arraignment and Plea

Feb 9, 2009 Plus 60 days= April 10, 2009.

Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

Thus the case is Remanded to the lower court.

The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether a defense

Resolution dated June 23, 2014.

Garrido v. Garrido and Valencia

Membership at the bar is a privileged.

2. Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of the case.

3. Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct.

A. Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

Dissenting Opinions of J. Callejo Sr. and Carpio-Morales

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio-Morales:

The key issues, in query form, are:

Henry Ong Lay Hin v. CA.

1. There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case

Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption.

3. The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel bound him

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