Philosophy Finals Topics 2

Philosophy Finals Topics 2
Estrada vs. Escritor
Facts:
Escritor, widow, is a court interpreter. Her husband died back in 1998. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as
well.
She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more
than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also
admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness."
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting
union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is
allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the
declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital
relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing
may execute the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter
of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are
investigated before the declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were executed in
the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the
congregation where the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
Complaint was initiated on 2000.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if
the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s

Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between
public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus
the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her
right to freedom of religion.
J. Vitug’s Separate Opinion.
According to JYS, the issue in Estrada v. Escritor is identifying the meaning or standard of
“disgraceful and immoral conduct in the context of the Civil Service (CS) Law”. He also asks,
“when does private morality involving a court employee become a matter of public concern?” He
said that the Supreme Court (SC) laid down strict rules when the respondent is a Judge or a
court employee and has insisted that no untoward conduct involving public officers should be
left without proper commensurate sanction. Never the court justified o blesses the continuation
of an adulterous relationship such as this one.
To JYS, “moral” pertains to excellence of character or disposition; the distinction between right
and wrong; virtue and vice; ethical praise or blame. Moral law refers to the body of requirements
in conformity to which virtuous action consists. Applied to persons, it is conformity to the rules of
morality, being virtuous with regard to moral conduct. Immoral is the state of not being virtuous
with regard to sexual conduct. Anything contrary to the standards of moral conduct is immoral.
When a case involving the concept of immorality comes to court, the applicable provisions of
law and jurisprudence take center stage.
The inescapable fact in this case is that acts defined as criminal under penal law have been
committed. That Escritor, a married woman committed adultery by having sexual intercourse
with a man not her husband. She is also a co-principal in the crime of concubinage. The
decision in this case is not a pro hac vice ruling. It applies to court employees all over the
country and to everybody in the CS.
JYS mentions that illicit sex is now looked upon more kindly, but a relationship of adultery or
concubinage involving a court employee and not order it to be terminated should not be
disregarded. The concern should not be with the dogmas or rules of any church but with the
legal effects under the CS Law of an illicit or adulterous relationship. Escritor’s relationship with
Mr. Quilapio is illicit and immoral, both under the Revised Administrative Code and the Revised
Penal Code. The argument that a marital relationship is the concern of religious authorities and
not the State has no basis.
In Reynolds v. United States, the U.S. SC stated:
Any attempt to inject freedom of religion in an effort to exempt oneself from the CS rules relating
to the sanctity of the marriage tie must fail. The U.S. SC declared that while it protected religious
belief and opinion, it did not deprive Congress of the power to reach actions violative of social
duties or subversive of good order.
Exemptions granted under the Muslim Laws to legitimate followers of Islam do not apply to
them. The SC has no legislative power to place Jehovah’s Witness in the same legal category
as Muslims. The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court judges and court
employees are required to maintain the people’s faith in the courts as dispensers of justice, and
whose image is mirrored by their actuations. Considering that Escritor’s misconduct is in the
nature of a continuing offense, it must be treated as a first offense, and her continued
cohabitation with Quilapio as a second offense, which will warrant the penalty of dismissal.
JYS vote that Escritor is guilty of immorality and disgraceful conduct and should be suspended
for a period of six months and one day without pay, with a warning that the continuance of her
illicit cohabitation with Quilapio shall be deemed a second offense which shall warrant the
penalty of disimissal.
J. Carpio’s Dissenting Opinion
The majority opinion (MO) relies on Sherbert v. Verner in upholding Escritor’s claim. The
compelling interest espoused in this case has been abandoned by the U.S. SC in the
Employment Division v. Smith cases. In the Smith cases, the U.S. SC set aside the balancing
test for religious minorities laid down in Sherbert and ruled that the guarantee of religious liberty
as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause (FEC) does not require the grant of exemptions from
generally applicable laws to individuals whose religious practice conflict with those laws. The
MO used the obsolete compelling state interest in Sherbert to brush aside the illegality of
Escritor’s conduct. The MO also mentions two “opposing strains of jurisprudence on the
religious clauses” in U.S. history, separation or strict neutrality (SN) and accommodation or
benevolent neutrality (BN). It asserts that the framers of the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions
intended to adopt a BN approach, i.e. the Establishment and FEC. Even as the MO
acknowledges that the U.S. SC in the Smith cases has abandoned the compelling state interest
test espoused in Sherbert, the MO dismisses this abandonment in its analysis of Escritor’s free
exercise exemption claim by labeling the Smith cases as exemplifying the SN approach.
The U.S. SC opinions present three principal theories: a) strict separation or no aid theory; b)
governmental neutrality theory (GN); and 3) accommodation or benevolent neutrality theory. SN
holds that the establishment clause in conjunction with the FEC requires a strict separation of
church and state and that government can do nothing which involves governmental support of
religion. GN holds that the establishment clause requires government to be neutral on religious
matters–laws and governmental programs must be directed to secular ends and must have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. BN holds that any limitation derived
from the establishment clause cannot be rigidly applied so as to preclude all aid to religion and
that in some situations government must accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance
of religious freedom.
The MO fails to mention the distinction between Mandatory Accommodation and Permissive
Accommodation. The former is exemplified by the key idea in Sherbert that exemptions from
generally applicable laws are required by force of the FEC, which the MO adheres to in granting
Escritor’s claim of the free exercise exemption, while the latter refers to exercises of political
discretion that benefit religion, and that Constitution neither requires nor forbids.
The SC has recognized in countless cases that marriage and the family are basic social
institutions in which the State is interested as the public policy underlying Arts. 334 and 339 of
the Revised Penal Code, and yet the MO easily places them in jeopardy in upholding Escritor’s
claim. The BN promotes its own form of inequality when exemptions are granted only to
religious claimants like Escritor, whose illegal conjugal arrangement acquires a “special judicial
reinforcement”. This case is about a religious cover for an obviously criminal act. The MO will
make every religion a separate republic, making it a haven for criminal conduct that otherwise
would be punishable. Today concubinage, tomorrow bigamy, will enjoy protection from criminal
sanction under the new doctrine foisted by the MO.
JC vote to suspend Escritor for six months and one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. The suspension shall be lifted immediately upon Escritor’s
manifestation to the SC that she has ceased cohabiting with Quilapio, and is warned that her
continued cohabitation with him during or after her suspension and while Quilapio’s marriage
with his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty of dismissal from the service.
J. Ynares-Santiago’s Dissenting Opinion.
Escritor's conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct.
The meaning or standard of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" to be applied by the Supreme Court in
disciplinary cases involving court personnel.
The degree of morality required of every employee or official in the public service has been consistently
high. The rules are particularly strict when the respondent is a Judge or a court employee.
The ascertainment of what is moral or immoral calls for the discovery of contemporary community
standards. For those in the service of the Government, provisions of law and court precedents also have
to be considered. The task is elusive.
That which is not consistent with or not conforming to moral law, opposed to or violating morality, and
now, more often, morally evil or impure, is immoral. Immoral is the state of not being virtuous with
regard to sexual conduct.
The term begs the definition. Hence, anything contrary to the standards of moral conduct is immoral. A
grossly immoral act must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.
The issue in this case is legal and not philosophical. It is a limited one. Is respondent Soledad S. Escritor
guilty of "disgraceful and immoral" conduct in the context of the Civil Service Law.
In the case of public servants who are in the judiciary, their conduct and behavior, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all else,
must be above suspicion.
Times are changing. Illicit sex is now looked upon more kindly. However, we should not completely
disregard or overlook a relationship of adultery or concubinage involving a court employee and not
order it to be terminated. It should not ignore what people will say about our moral standards and how
a permissive approach will be used by other court employees to freely engage in similarly illicit
relationship with no fear of disciplinary punishment.
Respondent is charged not as a Jehovah's Witness but in her capacity as a court employee. It is
contended that respected elders of the Jehovah's Witnesses sanction "an informal conjugal relationship"
between respondent and her marital partner for more than two decades, provided it is characterized by
faithfulness and devotion to one another. However, the "informal conjugal relationship" is not between
two single and otherwise eligible persons where all that is missing is a valid wedding ceremony. The two
persons who started to live together in an ostensible marital relationship are married to other persons.
We must be concerned not with the dogmas or rules of any church or religious sect but with the legal
effects under the Civil Service Law of an illicit or adulterous relationship characterized by the facts of this
case.
There is no conflict in this case between the dogmas or doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and
those of the Jehovah's Witnesses or any other church or denomination. The perceived conflict is non-
existing and irrelevant.
The issue is legal and not religious. The terms "disgraceful" and "immoral" may be religious concepts,
but we are concerned with conduct which under the law and jurisprudence is proscribed and, if
perpetrated, how it should be punished.
The argument that a marital relationship is the concern of religious authorities and not the State has no
basis.
The high degree of moral uprightness that is demanded of employees of the government entails many
sacrifices that are peculiar to the civil service. By aspiring to these positions, government employees are
deemed to have submitted themselves to greater scrutiny of their conduct, all in the pursuit of a
professional civil service. The Court has repeatedly applied these principles in analogous cases.
Immorality is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one day to one (1) year for the first offense
and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that respondent's misconduct is in the nature of a
continuing offense, it must be treated as a first offense, and her continued cohabitation with Luciano E.
Quilapio, Jr. must be deemed a second offense, which will warrant the penalty of dismissal.
Correlation to Law and Morality
Morality is relative, the standard is based on the court and not the religion of the accused.
Concerned employee vs. Mayor
A child out of wedlock is not in itself immoral, if the couple was not married to another party at the
time, but if any of the parties involved are married, then such act is considered disgraceful and immoral.
Facts:
Mayor was given a temporary appointment as Court Stenographer. It was found out that she had a
promiscuous background. Mayor had a child out of wedlock. And then an administrative case was filed
on her.
Held:
Mayor is administratively liable; her actions are disgraceful having sexual congress with a married man.
Under these tests, we can draw two conclusions arising from the fact that a single woman gives birth out
of wedlock.
If the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct. The situation may not be desirable, and may cause complications in
the life of both mother and child, but it does not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law
penalizing such an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct, or for
that matter, proscribing the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons. Neither does
the sexual behavior among single persons contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the
Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.
On the other hand, if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other
than the mother, then there could be cause for administrative sanction against either the father or
mother. In this case, the "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extra-marital relations
with a married person. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law,
the sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized28 and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a
special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, the Court has had little qualms with penalizing
judicial employees for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity.
Had respondent indeed not known that Leaño was married when they commenced their relationship,
such lack of awareness may constitute a valid defense for her actions. It is not beyond belief that she
would not have known of Leaño's existing marriage.
The evidence on record also reveals that even after respondent learned of Leaño's marital state, she
still, at least on one occasion, had a sexual encounter with him.
Significantly, this admitted encounter in May of 1998 occurred about one year after respondent's child
was born on 14 May 1997. Thus, while respondent may have been truthful in asserting that she had not
known Leaño was married when they commenced their affair, or when Leaño had impregnated her, the
fact remains that even long after respondent knew Leaño was married, she still consented to indulge in
sexual congress with him.
Had respondent desisted from continuing her affair with Leaño after learning he was married, this would
have exhibited not only prudence on her part, but also a willingness to respect a legal institution
safeguarded by our laws and the Constitution. Yet her persistence in maintaining sexual relations with
Leaño after that revelation instead manifests a willful subversion of the legal order, a disposition we are
unwilling to condone, even if avowed in the name of love. The Court, like all well-meaning persons, has
no desire to dash romantic fancies, yet in the exercise of its duty, is all too willing when necessary to
raise the wall that tears Pyramus and Thisbe asunder.
The conclusion of the OCA that respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct is correct, albeit
for the reasons we do not share.
In determining whether the acts complained of constitute "disgraceful and immoral behavior" under the
Civil Service Laws, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality, on the other should be kept in mind.
A child out of wedlock is not in itself immoral, if the couple was not married to another party at the
time, but if any of the parties involved are married, then such act is considered disgraceful and immoral.
Chu-qua vs. Clave
In a claim of immorality against a teacher, it necessitates evidence to show such.
Facts:
Chu-qua, is employed as a school teacher. She married a minor, student of hers, Bobby Qua.
And administrative case was filed on her, based on immorality.
Held:
Since the claimant produced no evidence that she had any immorality. Chu-Qua had no serious
misconduct or immorality.
We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion.

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to
show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he
concluded that “it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what
transpired during those times.” In reversing his decision, the NLRC observed that the assertions of
immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim.
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private
respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If
the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends
substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But,
definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality.
The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted
and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the
parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated
December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby
ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.
Situations of moral ascendency can have one party take advantage of another but does not immediately
make such immediately immoral.
Assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is a need for direct evidence to
support such claim.
Figueroa vs. Barranco
A child out of wed lock and a broken promise to marry does not count as gross immorality.
Facts:
Simeon Barranco Jr. promised to marry Patricia Figueroa, when Barranco passes the bar exam, after they
had a child together. But Barranco married another woman.
Figueroa then files a complaint that Barranco be denied admission to the legal profession, due to gross
immorality.
Held:
Yes. Simeon Barranco is allowed to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. The facts
presented do not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."
It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were consensual. The Court did
not find complainant’s assertions that she was forced into sexual intercourse to be credible. She
continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and
until 1971.
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship. The Court
viewed the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the
end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are
ignoble, the twenty- six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor.
Gross immorality – Sexual congress with a married woman, really bad.
But not premarital sexual relations and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his
part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of
the community.
Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
White light vs. Manila
Mayor Lim made and ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments,
within the Ermita-Malate area.
White Light was affected by the ordinance.
The rational for the ordinance is to limit the use of motels as places of immorality.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their
patrons’ equal protection rights.
2. Whether or not the Ordinance is valid and Constitutional.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court recognized that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of
their clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
Applying the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine. It is clear
that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the
patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have relationship with their patrons for the former to assert
rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to
government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute
needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the
Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. Based on the allegations
in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
2. No.The Court declared Ordinance No. 7774 as Unconstitutional.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. For an ordinance to be valid it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or ay statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admission and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power
as conferred on local government unit by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.
In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of
third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth
doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.
In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty
of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement
of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.
The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.
The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of
morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is
conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so
long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different
interests.
American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since
as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate
morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.
Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely
accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Civil Law
Jimenez vs. Canizares
Impotency or the capacity not to consummate a marriage has to be proven, and that a one sided claim
of one of the parties, does not justify an annulment.
Facts:
Jimenez and Canizares got married. Jimenez wanted to annul their marriage since he was allegedly
hurting his wife with his penis, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to
allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation.
The only the man Jimenez submitted themselves for medical examination.
Issue:
whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
Held:
No, since the grounds for annulment claimed by Jimenez is not provided for in the law.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately
lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties.
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence,
to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the
sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet
from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She
is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."2 The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to
tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Correlation to Civil law:
Exclusive list of annulment of marriage, a claim outside the exclusive list can’t be used as a grounds for
annulment.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
Facts:
Man and woman got married, but man does not have sexual congress with the woman. Eventually
woman files for annulment of marriage.
Held:
Such act of man not having sexual congress with the woman counts as psychological incapacity.
The marriage can be annulled based on non-consummation, fits as a ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked
her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse
with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's
claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not
having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact
that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband
is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly,
and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno
120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest
act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation.
It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in
its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
Non-consummation of marriage fits as a ground of psychological incapacity.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable.
Baccay vs. Baccay
The plaintiff has the burden of proof to show psychological incapacity in a petition for annulment based
on it.
Noel and Maribel got married, due to Maribel getting pregnant. But there was a miscarriage, and then it
was unsure that Maribel really was pregnant. Maribel just became unbearable, so Noel filed for
annulment based on psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Can the Marriage be nullified?
Held:
No, The psychological in capacity presented by Noel is insufficient to count as the one in Article 36.
The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual
intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted
her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly
observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how
the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the
marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a
marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent
suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."25 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or
a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5) Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Santos vs. Ca
Leouel and Julia got married. A year after the marriage, the couple when quarreling over a number of
things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs.
Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of
five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family.
Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Held:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support.
The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable.
Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
Art. 36.
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
Two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had
known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
The phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Republic vs. Molina
Mere irresponsibility and dissatisfaction is not psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo got married, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in
1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological
incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological
incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
-The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
-Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
-Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

-Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
-Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage
-Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
-Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
-Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
Antonio vs. Reyes
Being a pathological liar counts as psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes got married. Achild was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.
They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null
and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and
void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed
to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is
abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity.
Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her
to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological
incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts.
The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
It is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
The Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that
seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component.
In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
Te v. Te
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder doesn’t count as psychological incapacity.
Dependent Personality count as psychological incapacity.
The psychological disorder must render the spouse, unable to assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable
to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.
Facts:
Edward Te married Rowena Te, but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out
of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward
escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their
house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that
it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on
the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes, Dependent Personality count as psychological incapacity.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial perso Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live).
As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him.
He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak
of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he
is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally

examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The psychological disorder must render the spouse, unable to assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable
to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
being abandoned.
Halili v. Halili
An unspecified condition, but one that render the spouse, unable to assume the essential marital
obligations , is enough to count as psychological incapacity which can be the grounds for annulling a
marriage.
The psychological incapacity render the spouse, unable to assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
being abandoned.
Facts:
Lester and Chona got married. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a
joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they started
fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started
dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not
"fake."
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held:
Yes, there is psychological incapacity.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts
should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of
church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities;
they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to
do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
An unspecified condition, but one that render the spouse, unable to assume the essential marital
obligations, is enough to count as psychological incapacity which can be the grounds for annulling a
marriage.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is
indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the marriage null and void.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes
Inadequate Personality disorder in itself does not count as psychological incapacity.
What is important is the incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Facts:
Ramon Reyes took marijuana back in Dec 5 1976,Maria Socorro Camacho and Ramon Reyes got married.
They had a child which made their financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of Ramon were
unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite the fact
that Socorro would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he
accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend counseling sessions
but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-
marital affair.
Ramon Reyes is diagnosed as Inadequate Personality disorder.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held:
Yes, There is psychological incapacity. Though, Inadequate Personality disorder in itself does not count
as psychological incapacity. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage
In the case it was grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court."
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court."
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the
findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily
involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Dela Fuente v. Dela Fuente
Abusive behavior, and lack of a known illness not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no
indication of any organic or functional impairment, can count as psychological incapacity. As he is
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support.
Facts:
Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married.
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was
prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so
severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave
who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because
Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a
gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their
children by herself.
Issue: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held:
Yes, There is psychological incapacity. He is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving
love, respect, and support to the petitioner.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife
from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity,
and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty
for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted
efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was
anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform
his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental
illness is incurable.
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend
essential marital obligations.
Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application of the Molina guidelines "has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families,
our basic social institutions."
Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of
the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.
Republic vs. Cantor
Declaration of presumptive death, needs a well-founded belief that the spouse died, like a sinking ship,
or a calamity.
Merely walking out doesn’t count as “well-founded belief”
Facts:
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR and Jerry got married. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent
quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry
would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever
saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his
whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent
filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc.
Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She
alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as
her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a
point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
ISSUE: should the declaration of presumptive death be granted?
Held: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Declaration of presumptive death, needs a well-founded belief that the spouse died, like a sinking ship,
or a calamity.
-Justice Leonen’s Dissenting Opinion
It is clear that a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse is a summary
proceeding; more so, judgments of a trial court relating to such petitions shall be considered
immediately final and executory.
I disagree with the position that "well-founded belief" should be interpreted as an imposition of
stringent standards in evaluating the efforts and inquiries made by the present spouse in ascertaining
the absent spouse’s status and whereabouts. "Well-founded belief" should be based on the
circumstances of each case. It should not be based on a prior limited enumeration of what acts indicate
a "well-founded belief."
In cases for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, we cannot ask the
impossible from a spouse who was abandoned. In interpreting this provision, we must keep in mind that
both spouses are under many obligations in the Family Code, all of which require their presence.
From the text of Article 41, there are two substantive requirements and two procedural requirements
for a spouse to be declared presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage.
The two substantive requirements are the following: first, the absent spouse has been missing for four
(4) consecutive years or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred under circumstances
where there is danger of death per Article 391 of the Civil Code; second, the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is dead.
The two procedural requirements are the following: first, the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; second, there is the
underlying intent of the present spouse to remarry.
"Well-founded belief" should be based on the circumstances of each case. It should not be based on a
prior limited enumeration of what acts indicate a "well-founded belief."
"well-founded belief."- Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance
relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or
characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or
is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.
Intestate estate of Manolita Carungcong v. People
Relationships by affinity linger on after the death of the spouse.
Facts:
William was married to Zenaida. They have two daughters, Karen and Wendy. Zenaida died ahead of
her mother Manolita, William's mother-in-law.
In 1992, William made Manolita sign special powers of attorney appointing Wendy, then only 20 years
old, as Manolita’s attorney-in-fact to sell and dispose four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City.
William told Manolita (who was already completely blind) that the documents she was signing was
merely for paying taxes. Believing William's misrepresentation, Manolita signed the documents. The
parcels of land were sold and William misappropriated the proceeds thereof amounting to P22,034,000.
After the death of Manolita, Mediatrix, one of the surviving daughters, filed a petition for the settlement
of Manolita’s intestate estate before the RTC praying the she be appointed administratrix thereof. After
her appointment as such, Mediatrix learned from her niece Wendy about the fraudulent sale of the
parcels of land and the misappropriation committed by William.
Thus, as the duly appointed administrator of the estate of her deceased mother, she filed a case for
estafa against her brother-in-law, William.
William moved to quash the Information claiming that under Article 332 (1) of the RPC, his relationship
to Manolita, his mother-in-law exempts him from criminal liability.
Issue:
1. Did the death of Zenaida dissolve the relationship by affinity of her surviving spouse William and her
mother Manolita?
2. Should William be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to Manolita?
Held:
1. No, it did not, Relationships by affinity linger on after the death of the spouse.
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the
same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the
kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of
whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures
even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties
to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-
relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be
regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second
view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing
affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the same line is couched in
general language. It made no distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving
spouse of ones deceased child.
Third, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. That relationship by
affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord
with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in
favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of
either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20
also of the same Code.)
2. No. Due to the complexed nature of falsicifaction with the estafa, and that Art 332 Only exempts
Estafa, in its ordinary form, the case is not exempted and thus remanded to the RTC level.
The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It
does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime,
such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
The Information against William charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. What controls
is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that William is being charged not with simple
estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. He resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a
necessary means to commit the estafa. Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not
simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, he cannot avail
himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. Thus, the action provided
under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is
limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension
and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively,
when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as
a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of
the absolutory cause under Article 332
The continuing affinity view: maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless
of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures
even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties
to the said marriage.
Due to the complexed nature of falsicifaction with the estafa, and that Art 332 Only exempts Estafa, in
its ordinary form, the case is not exempted and thus remanded to the RTC level.
Criminal Law
People v. Tibon
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence
Accusation: Honorio Tibon, Parricide for killing his illegitimate children Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel
Albert (Reguel).
Facts:
Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law wife Gina Sumingot (Gina) lived together as
husband and wife. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert (Reguel). They lived
together with Tibon’s parents and siblings on the third floor of a rented house. Gina went to Hongkong
to work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s custody. After some time, Tibon heard
from her sister who was also working abroad that Gina was having an affair with another man. After the
revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two children.
On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother and his siblings
(Zernan and Leilani), went to Tibon’s room. They saw him with the two children who appeared to be
lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies. When Tibon realized that his mother and siblings had seen the
children lying on the floor he stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen knife and jumped out of the
window of their house. At the hospital, accused-appellant survived and was treated however, the
children could no longer be revived.
When Gina heard about the incident, she went home immediately and confronted Tibon at the hospital
where he was confined. He confessed to stabbing their children and begged her for forgiveness.
In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he could not
recall what happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could not remember
being taken to the hospital. He said that he was only informed by his siblings that he had killed his two
children, causing him to jump off the window of their house.
Issue:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity applies to the accused-appellant’s case?
Ruling:
No. Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval” is exempted from criminal liability. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Testimony or proof of
insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense.
The medical records of Tibon with the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) is inapplicable for such
refers to his condition to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately before or during the
commission of the crimes.
Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy because of the revelation that his wife was having an affair
overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity.
The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this case. Under Article 264 Parricide is
committed when: (i) a person is killed; (ii) the deceased is killed by the accused; (iii) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon was found guilty by this Court with the
punishment of reclusion perpetua.
Correlation to Criminal law:
Insanity as a defense: Need to present any competent witness who could explain his mental condition.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that
he or she is not guilty because of insanity.
The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.
An inability of the accused to recall events before and after the stabbing incident, as in the instant case,
does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate
himself.
People v. Takbobo
Death under exceptional circumstance, shifts the burden of proof to the accused to prove that: he killed
his wife and/ or the paramour, while his wife was in sexual congress with another person, either while
his wife was in sexual congress with another person, either while they were in flagrante delicto or
immediately thereafter.
Accusation: Ruben Takbobo is accused of parricide for killing his wife Lucia P. Takbobo
Facts:
Ruben Takbobo and Lucia P. Takbobo were married in 1969.
On the night of March 25, 1991, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, young Madilyn one of their kids
was awakened by noise caused by a quarrel between her parents. She claimed that she thereafter
witnessed the entire incident that transpired.
Ruben was quarreling with Lucia, and it escalated to Ruben hacking Lucia to death.
Ruben: that he killed his wife because he caught her sleeping with another man.
And he wanted to use Article 247 death under exceptional circumstance.
Issue:
1. Is the accused exempted due to death under exceptional circumstance?

2. If not exempted, can he at least avail mitigation based on, passion and obfuscation, voluntary
surrender any voluntary plea of guilty?
Held:
The exceptional circumstance contemplated in Article 247, just like any circumstance which may either
absolve or exempt an accused from liability or modify his penalty, must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Having admitted the killing of his wife, the onus probandi has shifted to appellant
to establish that he did so while his wife was in sexual congress with another person, either while his
wife was in sexual congress with another person, either while they were in flagrante delicto or
Ruben: That "(his) purpose was to kill the man but she pushed the man and my wife was killed. But, the
physical evidence, as represented by the pictures taken of the deceased victim, disclose that she was
killed with the multiple stab wounds. The manner of infliction and the number of physical injuries
negate the claim of appellant that he did not intend to kill his wife.
Appellant adamantly insisted in his testimony before the lower court, and also in his brief, that his wife
had no panties on the night he allegedly saw her with another man. However, on a closer examination
of the pictures marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" for the prosecution, we can not entirely believe the claim
of the defense, since two of the exhibits 19 contradict such contention. The records do not show nor has
appellant essayed any explanation why in those two exhibits the deceased was apparently wearing her
panties.
2. With respect to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, however, it should be noted
that the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity. appellant was not able to prove by convincing evidence that he saw his
wife sleeping with another man. Hence, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, that allegation of
appellant "is a afterthought to lessen his liability," and that what appears is that appellant killed his wife
because "he was not in his right mind." Appellant cannot, therefore, be credited with this mitigating
circumstance.
The two other mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and a plea of guilty allows the crime of
parricide with a penalty of reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal, minus 1 degree.
“He was not in his right mind” is not mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
People v.Oyanib
The accused has to prove all the requirements of death in exceptional circumstance, to be exempted.
Accusation: Manolito Oyanib, is accused of parricide and homicide of killing his wife and her paramour,
Jesus Esquierdo.
The case was translated to Visayan dialect so Oyanib can better defend himself in court.
Facts:
Due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation.
However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her
relationship with other men. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very
intimate situation.
One evening Manolito received a letter from the school of their son. The letter mentioned that his son
Julius failed in two subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work all
day the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse.
Manolito stabbed Jesus and stabbed Tita in the left breast, and three more times in different parts of her
body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo appeared from
the ground floor and inquired about what had happened.
Manolito left the house of Edgardo. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her
paramour.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he
brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour,
Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.
Manolito was convicted for Homicide and Parricide.
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstances
provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manolito Oyanib killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the
satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
(3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be
untenable. The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife
must concur with her flagrant adultery.
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused
must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find
accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of
his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and
outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife
when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well
several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to
surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to
avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code.
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse
as a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught
in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
People v.Genosa
"battered woman syndrome" (BWS)- allows to circumvent the normal self defense requirements.
Accusation: Marivic Genosa, accused of parricide for killing her husband Ben Genosa.
Facts:
After a cycle of abuse from her husband, wife executes him by shooting him at the eye, after he was
stunned.
Issue: Is the appellant guilty of parricide?
Held:
Yes, as BWS in this case cannot be used as self defense. The defense was only able to establish the
occurrence of one occasion of the "tension-building phase" of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus,
Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness
that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission
of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to
14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
-Justice Ynares-Santiago’s Dissenting Opinion
The defense was able to establish the occurrence on more than one occasion of the "tension-building
phase" of the cycle. The various testimonies of appellant's witnesses clearly reveal that she knew exactly
when she would once again be subjected to acute battery. Her cousin, Ecel Arano, testified that she
often asked the latter to sleep in her house as she was afraid every time her husband came home drunk.
Clearly, whenever appellant requested for Arano's company, she was experiencing a tension-building
phase. The barangay captain, Panfilo Tero, also testified that appellant sought his help two months
before she killed her husband, again demonstrating that she was in the tension-building phase and was
attempting to prevent another incident of acute battery. Appellant presented evidence to prove that the
tension-building phase would occur whenever her husband would go out looking for other women,
would lose at cockfights or would come home drunk. She often tried to ignore her husband's attitude or,
as testified to by some witnesses for the prosecution, even shouted back, fought off or even injured her
husband during the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute battery.
The "acute battering incident stage" was well demonstrated by the severe beatings suffered by Marivic
in the hands of the deceased as well as the threats to kill her using a bolo or a cutter. The physical
abuses occurred at least 3 times a week in the 11 miserable years of their marriage, six incidents of
which were documented by the 1990-1995 medical records of Marivic. They included, among others,
hematoma, contusion, and pain on the breasts; multiple contusions and trauma on the different parts of
her body even during her pregnancy in 1995. The tranquil period underwent by Marivic was shown by
the repeated "kiss and make-up" episodes of their relationship. On more than 5 occasions, Marivic ran
to her parents' house after violent fights with the deceased only to forgive the latter every time he
would fetch her and promise to change.
All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance and forgiveness developed a trauma in the
mind of Marivic making her believe that a forthcoming attack from the deceased would cause her death.
This state of mind of Marivic was revealed in her testimony given way back in 1998, before she was
examined by experts on BWS. Unaware of the significance of her declarations, she candidly narrated
how she felt immediately before she killed the deceased.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once.
If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the deceased, which culminated in the physical
assaults and an attempt to shoot Marivic when she was 8 months pregnant, took the place of unlawful
aggression, thus entitling her to a complete self defense even if there was no actual employment of
violence by the deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic had every reason to believe that the
deceased would kill her that night not only because the latter was verbally threatening to kill her while
attempting to get a gun from the drawer, but more importantly because the deceased wounded her on
the wrist with a bolo, and because of the deceased's previous conduct of threatening to cut her throat
with a cutter which he kept in his wallet.
There are many things which cannot be proved by direct evidence. One of this is state of mind. In the
case at bar, there is more than sufficient physical evidence presented by the appellant from which her
mental state can be inferred. The prosecution did not object to the presentation of these physical and
testimonial pieces of evidence, namely, the medical records of 23 instances of domestic violence-related
injuries and the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the barangay captain. Indeed, no person
would endure 23 reported instances of beatings if she were planning to kill her spouse in the first place.
The majority need not worry that women around the country will mastermind the killings of their
husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their attempts to employ the BWS defense.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be allowed the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a finding that the acts of violence and battery
committed by the deceased were illegal and unlawful and were committed immediately before
appellant could recover her natural equanimity. But what is the natural equanimity of a battered
woman? Appellant was not a normal married woman. She can never be in a state of natural equanimity
as she was in a constant state of alertness and hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute battery. The
esteemed ponente also correctly found that the appellant acted with diminished will-power. However,
he failed to go further. In the case of People v. Javier,17 it was held:
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the
claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the
accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was
presented regarding his mental condition at the time of the killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare
allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing
evidence was shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of
will-power at the time of the killing.
In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact present clear and convincing evidence that she
was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered from the "Battered Woman Syndrome".
Expert testimony was presented and admitted to this effect, such that the ponente ably discussed the
causes and effects of the syndrome. To ignore the testimony and the evidence thus presented is to make
impossible the proof of mental state. Evidence as to the mental state need not be also "beyond
reasonable doubt."
Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in previous violent episodes
was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction with BWS justified
the killing of the deceased. The danger posed or created in her mind by the latter's threats using bladed
weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the circumstances, the natural response of the battered
woman would be to defend herself even at the cost of taking the life of the batterer.
The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid form of self-defense, is a

noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered women who are trapped in a culture of
silence, shame, and fear. This would however be an empty victory if we deliberately close our eyes to
the antecedents of this case. The facts are simple. Marivic was suffering from the "Battered Woman
Syndrome" and was defending herself when she killed her husband. Her acquittal of the charge of
parricide is therefore in order.
Sec 26, RA 9262

SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to
be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman
syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised
Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points.
People v. Brusola
If the penalty is 2 indivisible penalties, 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance would apply the lower
indivisible penalty.
Accusation: ABENIR BRUSOLA is accused of parricide for killing his wife Delia Brusola. Death by ball
hammer on her head
Facts:
Man kills wife, with baller hammer, due to an argument. He did a voluntary surrender.
Issue: Can Brusola apply at least 1 mitigating circumstance?
Held:
Yes, the penalty is 2 indivisible penalties, 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance would apply the lower
The trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, 2 indivisible penalties
Since BRUSOLA voluntarily surrendered, he has 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one
mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition
of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.
Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties-reclusion perpetua to
death-Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly
imposed.
The effect of 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance is apply the minimum penalty.
The effect of 2 ordinary mitigating circumstance is reduce the penalty by 1 degree.
But if the penalty is indivisible, and only 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance is available, it would have no
effect.
If the penalty is 2 indivisible penalties, 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance would apply the lower
The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one's spouse. If anything, it is an
obligation to love and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven to anger, rage, or murder
due to jealousy is not a manifestation of this sacred understanding. One who professes love should act
better than this. The accused-appellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill his spouse, no matter
the reasons. He committed a crime. He must suffer its consequences.
People v. Jumawan
Marital Rape is possible.
Accusation: EDGAR JUMAWAN for raping his wife, KKK.
Facts:
Man savagely has sexual intercourse with wife against her will, even beating her to do it.
Issue:
Is EDGAR JUMAWAN guilty of raping his wife?
Held:
Yes, rape is possible for a husband to a wife, legal positivisim.

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears,
however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a
husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal
separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse.
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th
Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on
tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus
of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape.
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by
KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably
corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and
short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-
appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can
happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her
time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her
refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the
atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband
does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the
human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or
withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage
in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor
before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that
achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that
safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital
rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable
under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby
a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman
and married her.8
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to
punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage or to protect a man's valuable
interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his
wife, he was merely using his property.
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under
three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until
she marries to become the property of her husband. If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to
pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied
her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order
within the family.
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the
woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal
property or write a will.
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable
implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated
that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which
she cannot retract.
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and
England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be
rape if committed against a woman not his wife. In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as
"the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would
always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar
rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.The privilege was personal and pertained to
him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her.
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for
being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule
in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in
its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York
declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta for lack of rational basis in distinguishing
between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The
various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic
notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand
even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute
to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been
cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed
consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent.
Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently
causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is
irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as
giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband
feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts
governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a
woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been
rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated
with recognition as a whole human being x x x." (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia,
outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a
husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious,
asleep, or legally unable to consent.
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section
266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape
Law.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband
does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the
human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or
withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage
in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor
before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that
achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
People v. Cruz
"Sweetheart defense”- that is, that he and AAA were lovers and that AAA consented to the sexual
relations, as a defense to negate the rape. If proven that the sexual act was non- consensual the defense
is ineffective.
Accusation: Marvin Cruz, 2 Counts of Rape, AAA a minor 17 years old.
Facts:
Man has sex with girlfriend against her will, through the use of threats and violence.
Issue:
Is Cruz guilty of rape?
Held:
The Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA positively identifying Cruz as the one who sexually
abused her is worthy of belief. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly
established how Cruz sexually molested her on November 6, 2007 with the use of force, threat and
intimidation. Indeed, "a rape victim is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so
humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few
inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.
n this case, the prosecution was able to show how Cruz was able to manipulate AAA into having sex with
him against her will on two (2) separate instances on November 6, 2007, to wit:
(1) Cruz threatened AAA that he will circulate a copy of their sex video to her family and schoolmates if
she refused to go to his house and meet him in order to assure sexual congress. Alarmed by the
consequence of his threat, AAA had no choice but to go to his place as he wanted, in the hope that he
would keep his word that he will give her the disk containing their sex video;
(2) When Cruz and his friends were having a drinking spree in his house, he threatened AAA that he will
ask them to rape her if she puts her clothes back on. Again, AAA had no choice but to do what he
demanded, and thereafter repeatedly sexually molested her; and
(3) Cruz held a lighted cigarette near her chest and warned her that he will burn her skin if she continues
to resist his sexual advances. Helpless, AAA had no choice but to succumb to his demand.
"sweetheart defense", it is said that love is not a license for lust. "A love affair does not justify rape for a
man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will. In
this case, Cruz’s argument that they are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him
and AAA on November 6, 2007 have not been proven to be consensual.
"sweetheart defense", it is said that love is not a license for lust. "A love affair does not justify rape for a
man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.
People v. Andayang
‘Sweetheart’ defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim
were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important
as the first, because this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust."
Covering the face of a woman with drug-laced handkerchief with the intent to have sexual intercourse
with her once unconscious, is synonymous with force.
Facts:
Man uses a drug laced hankie to roofie rape the victim.
Issue: Did REYNALDO OLESCO rape the victim?
Held:
Yes, he had no evidence to support the sweet hearts doctrine, and the fact that he basically roofie raped
a girl.
It has been duly established that when "AAA" passed by the bakery, Olesco immediately pulled her and
covered her mouth with a handkerchief. She smelled something like a "snow bear" and lost
consciousness. Thereafter, Olesco raped her.
In other words, "AAA" became unconscious after accused employed force on her; that is, pulling her and
covering her mouth with a "snow bear" smelling hanky. The act of pulling her and covering her face with
a drug-laced hanky is the immediate cause why "AAA" fell unconscious which facilitated accused’s
bestial desire against "AAA." There is, therefore, no truth to the claim of Olesco that no force was
employed upon "AAA" to satisfy his bestial desire. It is a well-established doctrine that for the crime of
rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed accomplishing it be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view x x x. Thus, the use of force and intimidation
as alleged in the information has been sufficiently established.
‘Sweetheart’ defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim
were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important
as the first, because this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust."
People v. Felan
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Facts:
Man rapes his own daughter, and his only defense is saying that his minor daughter can’t be trusted on
her testimony.
Issue: Is Felan Guilty of rape?
Held:
Yes, even a lone victim testify can be enough to get a conviction of rape.
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The State competently and sufficiently established these elements beyond reasonable doubt. AAA
rendered a complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the accused, whom she
positively identified. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things, as in this case.
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
People v. Bartolome
Even if there was absence of force, the apparent submission of herein victim does not indicate consent.
Facts:
Man rapes his own daughter, and the daughter is a minor and pregnant with the child of the boyfriend,
and his only defense is saying that the sex was consensual.
Issue: Is Alex Bartolome guilty of rape?
Held:
Yes in summary of the events, all his actions indicate that it was non consensual.
Appellant's arguments are not at all persuasive and, much less, credible. Contrary to his claim, the
prosecution sufficiently and convincingly established that appellant did have carnal knowledge of the
victim through force and intimidation.
Furthermore, even if there was absence of force, the apparent submission of herein victim does not
indicate consent. She had been repeatedly abused by her father for more than a hundred times. On the
occasion of all those rapes, appellant inflicted upon her bodily injuries and continously threatened to kill
her. Considering the strength and the moral ascendancy of her father, the victim obviously knew that
any opposition or resistance on her part would be futile. It must be emphasized that in this type of
incestuous rape, the degree of force or intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape
where the parties involved have no relationship at all with each other, because the father exercises
strong moral and physical control over his daughter.
It is hard to believe that a daughter would simply give in to her father's lascivious designs had not her
resistance been overpowered. No daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her
own father unless there was force or intimidation, as a sexual act between a father and a daughter is
extremely revolting.
Even if there was absence of force, the apparent submission of herein victim does not indicate consent.
In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence
over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation.
Force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings
about the desired results, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point. So must it likewise be for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is
therefore subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at
the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.
Reyes v. People
A common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure, is not oral defamation.
Facts:
Man disgruntled with his work gets 20 to 30 coworkers and proceeded to make placards which man and
the others gave threats to the employer.
Issue:
Is Reyes guilty of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation?
Held:
No.
Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely:
(1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that
such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition.
The threat was made not subject to a condition.
It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger,
motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This
is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats
voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of
Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to
threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so
they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the
libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion
in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense
committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole
letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the
statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for
which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part
of the more important offense of threats.
Putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. It is not oral defamation.
Villalon v. People
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed.
If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the
right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
What is important for the violation of Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children is that the
spouse or child was subjected to a form of violence.
Facts:
Villalon had episodes of repeatedly shouting/uttering contemptuous and insulting words to her
like: "Gago, Maarte, Tanga, Bobo, Hindi Marunong Umintindi, Mukhang Pera, Mandarambong ang
Pamilya, Putang-Ina, Walang Laman ang Utak" and other words of similar import and by his public
display of relationship with one CCC., thereby causing AAA mental and emotional anguish.
Petitioner insists that his self-incriminatory testimony should have been stricken off the record at the
trial court level since his constitutional right against self-incrimination was timely raised by his former
counsel. Too, the Facebook pictures were not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rule on
Electronic Evidence.
Also he converted to Islam.
His mother-in-law and his filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant.
Issue: is ALLAN SAN JUAN VILLALON guilty of Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children?
Held:
Yes.
Right against self-incrimination is not an absolute right, nor does it operate as a bar to any self-
incriminating testimony.
right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. In this
particular case, petitioner had the option NOT to answer the questions propounded, but chose to
answer them anyway, in spite of claiming that his right against self-incrimination was raised at the time
the questions were asked. This operates as a waiver of his right, and his answers must stand.
As to his supposed conversion to Islam, the same is neither established nor relevant. It is noteworthy
that it is only in the present petition that petitioner raises his supposed conversion to Islam in 2009 as an
issue. It was not raised at the trial court, nor was it brought up at the CA. Further, there is only the
attached annex in the present petition to show his supposed conversion, nothing more. If petitioner had
truly converted to Islam in 2009, and believed that the same is a defense in his case, nothing prevented
him from presenting it as an issue at the trial court, considering that the charge against him was filed in
2011.
Moreover, even if We accept for the sake of argument his supposed conversion to Islam, the same does
not relieve him of liability for his acts. Even if under P.D. No. 1083, he can possibly have more than one
wife, said law is not a license for him to commit acts of violence or abuse against the complainant. There
is a glaring lapse in logic for him to use religion as a defense for his actions.
Anent the third issue, his former counsel's supposed gross negligence in failing to present the court
actions between his mother and his mother-in-law and his filing a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to complainant, the same are irrelevant as the elements for the violation of Section 5(i)
of RA No. 9262 have been duly established.
That said elements have been duly established also disposes of the last issue raised, that the
emotional/mental anguish suffered by the complainant was not proven.
right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. In this
particular case, petitioner had the option NOT to answer the questions propounded, but chose to
answer them anyway, in spite of claiming that his right against self-incrimination was raised at the time
the questions were asked. This operates as a waiver of his right, and his answers must stand.
Conversion to a different religion is not an excuse to do any form of violence to a spouse.

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Estrada vs. Escritor

Complaint was initiated on 2000.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

J. Vitug’s Separate Opinion.

J. Carpio’s Dissenting Opinion

J. Ynares-Santiago’s Dissenting Opinion.

Correlation to Law and Morality

Concerned employee vs. Mayor

Correlation to Law and Morality

Chu-qua vs. Clave

In a claim of immorality against a teacher, it necessitates evidence to show such.

And administrative case was filed on her, based on immorality.

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Correlation to Law and Morality

Figueroa vs. Barranco

Correlation to Law and Morality

Gross immorality – Sexual congress with a married woman, really bad.

White light vs. Manila

White Light was affected by the ordinance.

2. No.The Court declared Ordinance No. 7774 as Unconstitutional.

Correlation to Law and Morality

Jimenez vs. Canizares

Correlation to Civil law:

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

Correlation to Civil law:

Non-consummation of marriage fits as a ground of psychological incapacity.

Baccay vs. Baccay

Can the Marriage be nullified?

Correlation to Civil law:

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Correlation to Civil law:

Republic vs. Molina

Mere irresponsibility and dissatisfaction is not psychological incapacity.

Is the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity?

Correlation to Civil law:

-Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

-Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

-Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

Antonio vs. Reyes

Being a pathological liar counts as psychological incapacity.

Correlation to Civil law:

Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder doesn’t count as psychological incapacity.

Dependent Personality count as psychological incapacity.

Yes, Dependent Personality count as psychological incapacity.

Correlation to Civil law:

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally

Yes, there is psychological incapacity.

they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments.

Correlation to Civil law:

Inadequate Personality disorder in itself does not count as psychological incapacity.

Ramon Reyes is diagnosed as Inadequate Personality disorder.

Correlation to Civil law:

Dela Fuente v. Dela Fuente

Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married.

Correlation to Civil law:

Republic vs. Cantor

Merely walking out doesn’t count as “well-founded belief”

ISSUE: should the declaration of presumptive death be granted?

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;