ISSN 0080-6757  Doi: 10.1111/1467-9477.

12140
© 2019 Nordic Political Science Association

When, How and Why Are Junior Coalition

Parties Able to Affect a Government’s
Foreign Policy? A Study of Swedish
Coalition Governments 2006–2014

Douglas Brommesson† and Ann-Marie Ekengren*

Junior partners in a coalition government are torn between an eagerness to profile them-
selves, and to show loyalty to the coalition. We investigate when, how and why junior coali-
tion parties affect foreign policy and profile themselves despite demands for national unity.
We study two Swedish centre-right governments in 2006–2010 and 2010–2014. The parties’
foreign policy positions in election manifestos are compared to the foreign policy positions
presented in the joint Alliance manifesto and yearly government declarations. An explora-
tive analysis of possible explanations for junior parties’ influence is based on elite interviews.
The results indicate that junior coalition parties might influence the foreign policy in sym-
bolic value related issues, but less so in issues with real policy implications. Our analysis
reveals the importance of the leading member of the coalition and how junior parties con-
verge over time towards the position of the senior coalition member.

Introduction
Foreign policy is associated with both the need to uphold national unity
and the possibility of expressing underlying beliefs on ideological issues.
This potential conflict between unity and ideological profiling is brought
to the fore in coalition governments where junior1  coalition parties are
torn between the demands of national and coalition unity (Oppermann &
Brummer 2014; McEnhill 2015), and the rare opportunity to profile them-
selves in issues with few budgetary consequences. Instead, foreign policy
is a matter of rhetoric where the spoken word reflects a party’s underly-
ing ideological beliefs (Brommesson & Ekengren 2013). We study junior

* Ann-Marie Ekengren, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 711,

405 30, Göteborg, Sweden. Email: Ann-Marie.Ekengren@pol.gu.se.
†
Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.

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coalition parties in a consensus context in order to explain when, how and

why a junior coalition party is able to affect a government’s foreign policy.
Coalition governments represent an extensive field of research in com-
parative politics where the main focus is on government formation and dis-
solution as an ultimate expression of power formation (Thies 2001; Bäck
2003). Negotiations already take place during the government formation
process when the portfolios are distributed among the coalition parties
(Bäck et al. 2009, 2011) or when coalition agreements are being decided
(Klüver & Bäck 2019). Recent studies on the allocation of highly attractive
foreign ministry portfolios (Oppermann & Brummer 2014, 567) in coalition
governments show causal complexity in these processes, but also point to
the fact that the relative size of junior partners and historical experiences
from holding the Foreign Ministry speak in favour of a junior partner during
the negotiations (Oppermann & Brummer 2018).
However, given the commonality of coalition governments there have
been raised repeated calls for more research on the foreign policy outputs
from coalition governments as well as on the process of coalition foreign
policy decision-making (Oppermann et al. 2017).2  In line with these calls for
more research, we investigate when, how and why a junior party in a coa-
lition is able to affect government foreign policy; when and in what issues
do different junior coalition parties influence government positions, in what
direction do they influence foreign policy and why are some junior parties
more successful than others?3  By using manifesto data and elite interviews
we provide new and fine-grained results on the variation of when, how and
why junior parties exert influence.
Junior partners in a coalition government are torn between an eagerness
to show their uniqueness in order to prove their value to their partisans
(cf. Fortunato & Adams 2015), and an eagerness to show their loyalty to the
coalition and keep a united front (McEnhill 2015, 101). Here we describe
and compare coalition partner’s foreign policy positions with government
policy in order to decide on when junior partners have had influence over
foreign policy and in what direction (how) they have influenced foreign pol-
icy. Thereafter, we explore possible explanations for their influence (or lack
thereof), the why-question. The cases in focus are Sweden’s two coalition
governments between 2006–2010 and 2010–2014. These cases involve junior
partners’ with highly profiled foreign policy agendas. At the same time these
coalition governments departed from an exceptionally strong desire to keep
the coalitions together. We elaborate on our case selection below.

Do the Actions of a Junior Partner Matter?

The formation of coalition governments, as well as their policy posi-
tions, involves extensive negotiations between coalition partners. Failed

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negotiations mean governments are at stake, coalition governments there-

fore tend to prioritize consensual issues (Martin 2004). A complicating fac-
tor in the negotiations, leading to increasing competition, is that it might
be important for junior partners to show to their partisans that they have
made a difference and fulfilled some of their political visions. In the words
of Jean Blondel and Müller-Rommel “[t]he coalition partners are likely to
differ on many policy points, even if one can expect them to have at least
some common orientations./…/ Furthermore, the parties run for elections
against one another and they have to emphasize their differences at the
polls” (Blondel & Müller-Rommel 1993). Still, the members of the coalition
depend on each other to remain in power. Therefore, they are likely to set-
tle unless one partner feels unable to fulfil at least some office-seeking or
policy-seeking motivations (Hermann & Hermann 1989, 368; Strøm et al.
2008; Oppermann & Brummer 2014, 557).
Earlier research shows that junior coalition partners have exerted a sig-
nificant influence over the formulation of states’ foreign policies, an influ-
ence not entirely motivated by their relative size (Kaarbo & Lantis 2003; cf.
Greene 2019). Still, junior coalition parties are found to exert influence in
some cases but not in others, leading to questions of why they are successful
to such a varying degree (Kaarbo 1996, 507).
In the foreign policy cases investigated in earlier research junior parties
have to a great extent held the position as foreign minister, making it diffi-
cult to know if the influence would be lower if that had not been the case
(Kaarbo 1996, 505, see also McEnhill 2015). Formal authority over policy
areas gives the parties an extensive advantage over the policy formulation
(Kaarbo 1996, 508–10; Laver & Shepsle 1996; Bäck et al 2011; Oppermann
et al. 2017). Our focus on the two Swedish coalition governments between
2006 and 2014 gives us the opportunity to study the influence of junior par-
ties who have no formal authority over foreign policy portfolios; in those
cases “junior party influence rests on the ability to constrain the ways in
which the senior partner employs its departmental authority” (Oppermann
& Brummer 2014, 558; Oppermann et al. 2017). Another argument for this
novel contribution is the interest of the Swedish case, given the strong for-
eign policy profile of the junior partners, which had not been expected by
the ideal typical arrangements according to earlier research (cf. Oppermann
& Brummer 2014, 560). We argue that by studying the Swedish coalition
governments 2006–2014, we add important knowledge on junior coalition
partners influence in cases where they do not hold a foreign policy depart-
ment, but still want to profile themselves with the help of foreign policy.
In her seminal book Coalition politics and Cabinet Decision Making,
Juliet Kaarbo (2012) outlines two possible foreign policy effects from junior
partners’ involvement in coalition governments. This has been further
elaborated in other studies as well; first, according to the dominant view

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in previous research, coalition governments could be expected to “produce

particularly peaceful governments”. Such peaceful policies “stem from the
constraints inherent in coalition politics”, pushing the coalition partners
towards a consensus rather than adventurous policies (Kaarbo 2012, 17;
Oppermann & Brummer 2014). Since the coalition parties would probably
like to stay in power, they have incentives to accept less radical policies, e.g.,
avoiding armed conflicts. Instead, they promote policies that are likely to be
accepted by the majority of the government.
The second possible effect a coalition government can have on for-
eign policy is not that of constraint but rather the opposite; a less con-
straining and more aggressive effect in terms of war ambitions.4  Kaarbo
identifies three possible explanations for this; “unaccountability, political
weakness, and hijacking by extreme junior partners” (Kaarbo 2012, 19).
Since there is no single party to be held accountable for certain foreign
policy decisions the different coalition partners can try a more aggressive
foreign policy path and blame their partners if something goes wrong.
When it comes to political weakness rather unstable coalitions can be
expected to “act on major foreign policy issues to demonstrate its abil-
ity to cope with policy crisis and thereby achieve some legitimacy at
home (Hagan 1993, 30–1; see also Kaarbo 2012, 20). Finally, according
to the risk of hijacking, junior and more extreme coalition parties can
be in a position where they blackmail the coalition leader and push the
coalition into a more aggressive foreign policy. (See also Greene 2019,
who argues that junior coalition partners have the ability to make rogue
autonomous decisions. Such decisions may run the risk of undermining
senior coalition partners foreign policy options.) According to earlier
research, coalition governments’ foreign policy could potentially range
from more conflictual/aggressive to more peaceful/cooperative. Coalition
government’s foreign policy could also potentially be more extreme and
committed (in terms of allocated resources). It is important to remember
that these two dimensions mean different things in different contexts, and
that one has to take the overall foreign policy profile of the country into
account (Oktay & Beasly 2017, 479). In our two Swedish cases, we could
expect more extreme and committed foreign policy, but not necessarily
more aggressive foreign policy.
The lesson learned from Kaarbo and others is that it is rather an
open question in which issues and in what direction junior partners are
believed to influence foreign policy, since different results point in dif-
ferent directions. But we can expect junior partners to have influence
over different types of questions, sometimes even in questions of war
and peace.

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Explaining Junior Parties’ Influence on Foreign

Policy in Coalition Governments: Expectations for
the Empirical Investigation
Earlier research provides us with some explanations for when junior part-
ners are successful in their attempts to influence foreign policy. A neces-
sary condition for influence is that the junior partners try to get influence,
and not being passive awaiting the dominant partners move in foreign pol-
icy issues. One possible explanation for when junior parties try to be influ-
ential is based on policy saliency theory (Bäck et al. 2011; Oppermann &
Brummer 2014, 559). According to this theory the more important a party
considers a particular policy to be, the more likely the junior partners are
trying to maximize their influence over this particular part of foreign pol-
icy. If a junior party does not find the policy to be of great importance, they
are more likely to stay loyal to the government.
Also of great relevance is how the junior party evaluates its strategic and
ideological preconditions for focusing on foreign policy issues. Successful
efforts to gain influence are probably accompanied by a strategic or ideolog-
ical judgment by the junior party that the government/own party can gain
support among the voters, satisfy certain internal party groups or develop
their ideological positioning, if they pursue a more extreme/committed for-
eign policy (Oppermann & Brummer 2014, 559).
Another reason could be simply ‘government survival’. The other par-
ties can feel compelled to agree to a foreign policy change, since the junior
partner who is eager to influence the foreign policy in a certain direction is
doing that by threatening to defect from government cooperation. This is
probably not a very successful strategy to use too often, but in some extreme
cases it can explain the success of junior parties. Perhaps more likely are sit-
uations where the junior party communicates to the other parties that they
need to show their members a clear reason for their continued existence.
Earlier research provides us with some expectations for the empirical
investigation; junior partners will probably try to influence foreign policy in
issues they deem important (salience); issues for which they have extensive
support among the voters or party members, issues in line with party ideol-
ogy, or if they have asked for a vote of confidence. All three reasons seem
to be reasonable explanations and our study will investigate whether these
expectations receive empirical support.

Swedish Coalition Governments 2006–2014

We study two cases, the Swedish centre-right governments in 2006–2010
and 2010–2014, consisting of the coalition leader the Moderate party

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and three junior parties; the Liberals, the Centre party and the Christian
Democrats. 5  Coalition governments have been rare in Swedish political
history. The Social democrats have for a long time been able to form single
minority governments with support from the Left Party, the Green Party
or the Centre Party. The Moderates, the Liberals and the Centre Party
terminated the social democratic hegemony with different coalition gov-
ernments during the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, disagreements
among the coalition parties led to four different government constellations
during the period 1976–1982. For a long time, disagreements among the
centre-right parties were seen as an obstacle to a trustworthy government
alternative. The formation of the ‘Alliance’ between the Moderates, the
Centre party, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats in 2004 was some-
thing entirely new in Swedish political culture. The earlier disagreements
among the centre-right parties made it important to show that the parties
were able to cope with policy differences. Hence, there was a strong push
for unity among the four center-right parties when they formed a coali-
tion government in 2006 (see Bäck & Bergman 2016; Bäck & Erlingsson
2016). The coalition government in 2006–2010 was a majority government,
while the coalition government in 2010–2014 was a minority government.
Overall, it was easier for the coalition government 2006–2010 to pursue its
own goals, while the minority government 2010–2014 needed support from
other parties. This might have led to a more constrained, less committed,
behavior in 2010–2014 from the junior partners; maybe they only launched
foreign policy ideas they knew would reach support from other parties.
At the same time, two of the junior coalition parties had a strong profile in
terms of foreign policy. Both the Liberal party and the Christian Democrats
entered government with a tradition of defending human rights, generous
foreign aid and the promotion of democracy and rule of law in other coun-
tries. The Liberal party was also the only party in Sweden at that time taking
a clear stand in favour of Sweden joining NATO. The Swedish case could,
in other words, be said to present us with two competing expectations. As
discussed above, Kaarbo (2012) and others highlighted two general and
competing effects from coalition governments on foreign policy. The strong
demand for unity among the coalition parties goes hand in hand with the
expectation of a constrained foreign policy, while a strong foreign profile
among two of the junior parties goes hand in hand with the expectation of a
more committed foreign policy.
The two Swedish coalition governments between 2006 and 2014 pro-
vide us with an interesting micro cosmos for studying the relationships
between junior and senior coalition parties, while at the same time pro-
viding us with the opportunity to make an empirical contribution to the
research on Swedish politics. Sweden is characterized by a consensus culture
in foreign policy and given its problems historically to form stable coalition

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governments, the centre-right parties have experienced a strong push to stay

united in order to demonstrate their capacity to govern. Hence, Sweden is
a case where junior parties are likely to stay loyal to the government and
the nation. At the same time the two Swedish centre-right coalition gov-
ernments, 2006–2014, include two parties with rather strong foreign policy
priorities. These parties can thus be said to be torn between two competing
loyalties: to the government and to their ideological beliefs. Hence, they are
facing the dilemma every junior coalition party with foreign policy ambi-
tions faces in a coalition government. Theoretically, it therefore seems a
rather open question when, how and why junior partners have had influence
over coalition policy formation. And maybe the minority coalition govern-
ment 2010–2014 led to even fewer possibilities for ideological profiling,
because of the need to receive support from other parties.

Manifesto Data and Elite Interviews

Given the quantitative approach offered by earlier research several schol-
ars have called for more “multi-method analyses” (Oppermann et al. 2017,
459). Well aware that a large N-study could offer superficial opportunities
for generalizations, we believe that our case study approach offers interest-
ing possibilities for exploring causal mechanisms and for actually linking
foreign policy analysis with domestic politics (Oktay & Beasly 2017, 476).
The first part of the article offers a descriptive analysis of when junior par-
ties in the Swedish governments 2006–2014 have had a deviant position in
foreign policy issues, and when their position has become that of the gov-
ernment. Here we also study in what direction the junior coalition partners
have pushed the coalition’s overall foreign policy, i.e., how they affect the
coalition government’s foreign policy. The second part offers an explana-
tory approach where we discuss the relevance of different explanations to
why junior partners have had (or lacked) influence.
The descriptive part compares the foreign policy positions maintained by
the coalition government with the foreign policy positions held by different
parties in the coalition. The parties’ foreign policy positions in election man-
ifestos or official foreign policy programs will be compared to the foreign
policy position presented by the coalition government in their common alli-
ance party manifesto and their yearly government declaration.
The second part discusses the relevance of different explanatory factors
for those cases where the junior parties have actually influenced the posi-
tion of the coalition government. This explorative analysis of junior parties’
influence is based on elite interviews with three government officials (State
Secretaries) from the Coordination office within Statsrådsberedningen (the
Prime Minister’s Office) who were responsible for coordination among the
coalition parties. These interviews, representing three of the four coalition

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parties, can be regarded as interviews with our key informants.6  In addition

we interviewed seven members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Parliament representing the coalition parties.

Describing Positions in the Foreign Policy of Swedish Coalition

Governments
In the empirical analysis we first describe the general foreign policy goals
expressed by the junior coalition parties in the foreign policy sections of
their election manifesto.7  We have coded all foreign policy goals men-
tioned in the different election manifestos and compared them to the alli-
ance manifesto (see Appendices S1 and S2). The Moderates declared that
the Alliance manifestos were identical to their own, which means that the
Moderates also accepted all foreign policy goals declared by the Alliance
in 2006 as well as in 2010.
In 2006 the Christian Democrats mentioned four foreign policy goals in
their election manifesto, and one of these was also included in the Alliance
manifesto. In 2010 the numbers raised to seven foreign policy goals in total
and four of these were included in the Alliance manifesto. This pattern is
similar to the other two junior partners in the coalition. The Liberals men-
tioned nine foreign policy goals in 2006, and three of them were included
in the Alliance manifesto. In 2010 the party mentioned 10 goals, and seven
of them were part of the Alliance manifesto. The Centre party mentioned
eight goals in 2006, and two of them were included in the Alliance mani-
festo. In 2010 these numbers raised to nine goals in total, of which four were
included in the Alliance manifesto. Hence, this pattern is consistent for all
three junior partners; an increasing number of foreign policy goals were
included in the Alliance manifesto during the latter period of the coalition
government. This can be interpreted as if it was increasingly important for
the junior partners to show to their voters that they actually received some-
thing in return from the coalition and that their policy was taken into con-
sideration after negotiating the Alliance manifesto.
Looking at the categories of foreign policy goals in which the parties
were able to affect the Alliance manifesto, it becomes evident that the three
junior partners were able to get their human rights goals into the Alliance
manifesto (2/2 both in 2006 and 2010), as well as most of their ideological
goals (3/5 in 2006 and 5/8 in 2010). The junior parties were less successful in
their economic goals (0/1 in 2006 and 1/2 in 2010), their security goals (1/6 in
2006 and 3/6 in 2010) or their foreign aid goals (0/7 in 2006 and 3/9 in 2010)
accepted into the election manifestos. This pattern might be interpreted as
if it is easier for a junior partner to influence the foreign policy goals of a
coalition government in issues that are more value related. It is often less

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expensive to declare your support for human rights than to increase military
spending, just to give one example.
As a next step we turn to the foreign policy ideologies in the manifestos,
as well as in the government declarations presented to parliament at the
start of each parliamentary year. In this way we also focus on how the junior
partners have affected government foreign policy. This complements the
first step of the empirical analysis, in that it covers not only what is promised
but also what becomes part of government policy. Here it is important to
remember that a declared (outspoken) foreign policy objective is an import-
ant policy outcome in itself. The data presented here is restricted to the for-
eign policy goals in the manifestos/declarations referring to two dimensions:
cooperative – non-cooperative goals and military – peaceful goals. Each cat-
egory is based on a number of goals.8  These categories have been selected
on the basis of ideological dominance, i.e., these categories form dimensions
where there is heated debate and where the parties diverge and express
their foreign policy visions. Here the data include goals not only from the
foreign policy sections of the election manifest, but also from other parts of
the manifestos that refer to international issues. Hence, the total number of
foreign policy goals exceeds the number of goals in the initial analysis.
The results in Figure 1 (see also Appendix S3) show how the junior
coalition parties scores higher on the cooperative end of the cooperative/
non-cooperative dimension (especially the Christian Democrats and the
Liberals) and higher on the peaceful end of the militant/peaceful dimension
(especially the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party), than the alliance
government. In both cases these tendencies are strengthened before the sec-
ond election in 2010 where the smaller parties in general move toward a
more cooperative and peaceful foreign policy. It is especially interesting to
notice how the two junior parties with strong interests in foreign policy – the
Liberals and the Christian Democrats – find common ground in 2010 with
a more peaceful and cooperative foreign policy compared to their coali-
tion partners. It is also interesting to note how the Liberals move to a more
radical outlier position in 2010, from a position in 2006 much closer to the
position of the joint Alliance manifesto. The Christian Democrats maintain
such an outlier position in both 2006 and 2010. Compared to the Liberals
and the Christian Democrats the joint Alliance manifestos move in a some-
what different direction. First and foremost, the change from 2006 to 2010
is modest and stability is the dominant trait. Second, the change goes in the
opposite direction from the change in the manifestos of the smaller parties.
The Alliance manifesto in 2010 is less peaceful and less cooperative com-
pared to 2006, but the change is, as already said, modest.
If we compare these positions of the different parties and the Alliance
with the policy expressed by the government, we can conclude that after the
initial years (2006–2008) the government positions become highly stable

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Figure 1. Foreign Policy Goals According to Two Dimensions 2006–2013. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

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Comment: The data points refer to the balance between, on one hand, military oriented goals and peaceful
oriented goals and, on the other hand, cooperative goals and non-cooperative goals. The positions for the
parties and the Alliance (All.) reflect the manifestos from 2006 and 2010. The position of the government
reflects the government declarations from all eight years (2006–2013) of the two coalition governments of
the Alliance. The arrows illustrate the direction in which the different parties have moved from 2006 to 2010.
The arrows accordingly point in the direction of the 2010 position.

across the cooperative – non-cooperative dimension. The positions from

2009 and onward actually resemble the position of the Alliance manifesto
from 2010 to a very high degree. Accordingly, the government position
moves from a position that favours multilateralism and internationalism to
a position that is at least somewhat stronger in favour of national indepen-
dence and sovereignty (although still maintaining a positive value on the
cooperative/non-cooperative dimension). The second dimension reflects
a rather surprising result, at least if international events of a more hostile
security environment are taken into account. During the war in Georgia in
2008 and with a more assertive Russian security policy the Swedish foreign
policy moves in a more peaceful direction, with less emphasize on military
defence. Hence, the government declarations express more and more peace-
ful positions over time. One exception to this rule is in 2010 when the gov-
ernment expresses rather strong support for the military. But this is done
with regard to an increasingly stronger criticism in the public debate of the
government policies and of what is perceived to be weak national defence.
The government then defends its policies and claims to have a strong

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commitment to national defence, also arguing that the Swedish defence is

strong enough. The government support of militant goals is therefore not
so much a support for a change in policy, but rather a support of status quo.
To sum up, our results support important theoretical assumptions of this
study. First, two junior coalition parties with strong foreign policy priorities
appear to adopt more radical and committed foreign policy positions. It is
possible from this to draw the preliminary conclusion that these junior parties
have used foreign policy to send ideological signals and position themselves in
the public debate. This pattern is especially visible in relation to human rights
and ideological issues. Second, however, it is hard to see any clear signs of evi-
dence supporting the conclusion that such positioning efforts have resulted in
increased influence within the government. Instead we see how the distance
increases over time between Liberals and the Christian Democrats on the
one hand and the Alliance manifesto on the other, and to large extent also
the government declarations, This might be a result of the fact that the coali-
tion government turns into a minority government during the second term,
and the government therefore pursues a mainstream foreign policy.

Explaining the Lack of Influence of Junior Coalition

Partners
So far we have covered the first part of our study – when and how a junior
coalition party is able to affect the foreign policy of a coalition government.
Moving on to possible explanations for junior partners’ influence, we turn
to the elite interviews with State Secretaries responsible for coordination
between the coalition parties and with the members of the foreign affairs
committee. According to our review of earlier research above we could
expect 1) issue salience, 2) ideology or strategic consideration over voter
turnout or internal party cohesion and 3) government survival, to be
important factors for explaining the influence of junior coalition parties.
The two State Secretaries of the Liberals and the Christian Democrats,
Helena Dyrssen and Jakob Forssmed, both raise foreign aid as the prime
example of where they were successful in influencing the foreign policy of
the government (see also interview with MP Pethrus (CD)). Sweden had a
tradition of using 1 per cent of the GDI for foreign aid and this “1 per cent-
goal” was highly salient and almost sacred to the Liberals and Christian
Democrats. It thus became a subject of tough negotiations among the coa-
lition parties. Both Dyrssen and Forssmed point to the fact that the unity of
the two parties, together with passive support from the Centre party, made
their position much stronger (Interviews with Dyrssen and Forssmed).
Foreign aid involves large resources, making it unlikely as a profiled issue
for junior influence.

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Forssmed also mentioned support for human rights as a case where the
Christian Democrats tried to influence the government policies (Interview
with Forssmed). This is more in line with a traditional value-related for-
eign policy issue. The major coalition party, the Moderates, according to
both Forssmed and Dyrssen, was more focused on the need of Swedish
businesses, for example the weapon industry, while the Liberals and the
Christian Democrats paid more attention to respect for human rights and
therefore demanded stricter rules for the export of weapons. In one case
concerning a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on trade relations,
including defence-related products, with an unnamed authoritarian regime,
both the Liberals and the Christian Democrats refused to support the deci-
sion and could therefore stop the decision (Interviews with Forssmed and
Dyrssen). However, both Forssmed and Dyrssen returned to the “1%-goal”
as the best example of their influence on the foreign policy of the coalition
governments 2006–2014.
When trying to explain why the Liberals and the Christian Democrats
were successful in this case and not so much in others, both Dyrssen and
Forssmed, as well as several members from their parties in the Foreign
Affairs committee in the Parliament, are united in their analysis of why it
was hard to influence the foreign policy of the coalition. They all point to
the fact that the Ministry of foreign affairs was controlled by the major coa-
lition party, the Moderates, and in particular by the Foreign Minister Carl
Bildt. Bildt had a strong record in foreign policy, a wide global network and
very clear objectives that were hard to influence. Mikael Sandström, the
state secretary of the Moderates in the Coordination Office confirms this by
acknowledging Bildt´s views as the views of the Moderate party (Interviews
with Sandstr’m, Dyrssen and Forssmed; this is also supported in interviews
with MPs Enochsson (CD), Johansson (M), Lundgren (C), Malm (Lib) and
Pethrus (CD)). The Ministry itself is also mentioned as a reason why the
junior parties were not successful in other cases, Forssmed mentions the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a particular strong Ministry with diplomats
used to run the show independently from the political leadership (Interview
with Forssmed; MP Johansson (M), MP Malm (Lib) and MP Pethrus (CD)
confirms this view).
When trying to explain the one case where the junior coalition parties
actually had a decisive influence, the case of foreign aid, Helena Dyrssen
gives one very blunt explanation: Carl Bildt did not care enough about
the “1% goal” (Interview with Dyrssen). In other words, he allowed the
junior parties to have their way since it was an unimportant issue to him,
and he realized it was a salient issue for the junior parties. It is thus possi-
ble to explain both success and failure to influence the government policies
with the same variable: the role of the Foreign Minister. In issues where
the Foreign Minister had strong opinions, he stayed in strict control; and in

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issues where he had less strong opinions, he could allow the coalition part-
ners to influence the policies if there were issues of great importance to the
coalition partners.
Still, the more ideological statements were of importance to both the
Liberals and the Christian Democrats. Both State Secretaries admit to
have tried, and sometimes succeeded, in influencing the wording of differ-
ent statements. The exact wording was of less importance to the Moderates
and the Foreign Minister and the junior parties were therefore given the
opportunity to influence the wording in order to send ideological signals to
their core constituency (Interview MP Malm). This indicates that strategic
considerations were not absent from the list of possible explanations; par-
ties want to please strong internal opinions if possible. Both Dyrssen and
Forssmed recognize such signals as important to their party members and
the more convinced voters; they wanted to stay loyal to their ideological
core principles as well as satisfy very convinced party members (Interviews
with Dyrssen and Forssmed). Sandström also recognizes these tendencies
but according to him, this was a careless way of acting, putting Swedish
interests and citizens at risk (Interview with Sandström). No matter how
we value these ideological signals, two junior coalition parties still used the
foreign policy as a symbolic tool, albeit with limited obligations attached.

Junior Coalition Parties: Small Dogs Barking Like

Big Ones
In this article we have elaborated on when, how and why junior coalition
partners have influence over foreign policymaking, especially so in cases
where they do not have any foreign policy portfolios. Our study of two
Swedish coalition governments, 2006–2014, has provided us with a mi-
cro-cosmos where we have been able to study junior coalition partners and
their influence over the foreign policy of the coalition governments.
Our study on Sweden and the two centre-right coalition governments,
2006–2014, gives support to the conclusion that junior coalition parties
might influence the future foreign policy of the coalition in value related
issues.9  In general, the two junior coalition parties with the strongest for-
eign policy profiles, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, have both
maintained more radical positions than both the joint election manifesto of
the so-called Alliance and the government declarations. At the same time,
they have had some, but limited, influence over actual foreign policy. Our
comparison of the election manifestos shows how the junior parties were
successful in influencing the wording on value-oriented statements in the
joint election manifesto. The interviews with the two State Secretaries of the
Liberals and the Christian Democrats support this conclusion and reveals

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© 2019 Nordic Political Science Association

how this was a deliberate strategy of the two parties, partly to satisfy their
ideological core principles as well as dedicated party members. The inter-
views also show how the two parties were successful in influencing the for-
eign aid policy and the decision to maintain the 1 per cent-goal (1% of the
GDI to foreign aid). Our empirical study underlines the importance of the
unity of the two junior parties, and to some extent also of the third junior
party, the Centre party, in order to reach this influence. We can conclude
that the smaller parties with a strong profile actually did use foreign policy
in order to position themselves in ideological terms and that they therefore
pushed for more radical and committed foreign policy, in accordance with
Kaarbo’s and others second expectation.
However, our analysis has also revealed the importance of the role of the
leading member of the coalition, the Moderates. The more junior parties
were influential when they perceived an issue to be highly salient and when
the Moderates at the same time, and more specifically the Foreign Minister,
did not perceive an issue as equally salient (i.e., foreign aid). In general,
the smaller parties were not successful in influencing foreign policy related
to real politik but in more symbolic issues (or at least issues perceived by
the Moderates as symbolic). Instead, the Moderates could push the foreign
policy towards the mainstream and establish a foreign policy characterized
by more and more stability during the eight years in office. It is possible that
the formation of a minority coalition government, 2010–2014, reinforced
that trend and made it less strategic for all parties in the coalition to allow
more extreme policy positions. The role of the Moderates also underlines
one of the possible explanations for the influence of junior parties, namely
how the leading party reacts to these efforts. It was only when the leading
party allowed them to have influence that they actually had any significant
influence. Salience among the junior coalition partners was a necessary, but
not a deciding factor. More important was the reaction from the leading
party and its Foreign Minister.
Our case study indicates that junior partners can influence the foreign
policymaking of a coalition government, but only to a limited extent, mainly
decided by the leading partner in the coalition. Given the fact that our study
only covers two cases we would like to encourage further research on the
topic. In line with the research tradition that has evolved over the past years,
we see the need for both large-n analysis of the entire post-war period (for
a single country or region) as well as more case studies. When it comes to
further case studies we think one should especially focus on pair-wise com-
parison of cases where we can investigate the impact of factors such as dif-
ferences in political culture (consensus or conflict culture in foreign policy),
differences if a junior partner holds the foreign policy portfolio or not (c.f
Oppermann et al. 2017, 460), differences among ministers’ individual ideo-
logical positions in relation to the PM (Bäck et al. 2016) and different types

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of strategies employed by the senior party holding the PM post. Given the
fact that the Foreign Minister played such a crucial role here, one might also
focus more on the personality and experience of the Foreign Minister, espe-
cially in relation to the foreign policy spokespersons for other parties. This
would also bring more foreign policy analysis and activity into the research
agenda.

NOTES
1. Junior partners refer to smaller parties in a coalition Government. In our study we
define junior partners as parties significantly inferior to the ‘senior’ party in the coa-
lition, holding the Prime Minister post. The junior partners control much fewer seats
in the Parliament (cf. Kaarbo 1996, 504). See also an interrelated use of the concept
where junior refers to junior ministers without cabinet rank (Lipsmeyer & Pierce
2011).
2 . Other studies have investigated the policy-making process in coalition governments
in other areas than foreign policy. Our argument is that foreign policy-making is
somewhat different in that it relates to a state’s relations with other countries and not
only to its citizens, and therefore merits a study of its own. The push for national unity
is stronger in foreign policy-making. But see also Greene (2019).
3. In line with the quest for broadening the scope of investigation we study states overall
foreign policy, not only questions of war and peace (cf. Oktay & Beasly 2017, 478–9).
4. Since Kaarbo studies a number of cases where armed conflicts have been on the
agenda it is understandable that she operates a less constrained and aggressive effect
in terms of war ambitions. However, we argue that such an effect could also take
other directions. The common denominator of less constrained and aggressive effects
should instead be understood as a more extreme and profiled foreign policy, com-
pared to the mainstream foreign policy views in the particular state. For example, in
countries like Sweden we would not expect war ambitions, but rather a more profiled
foreign policy that can be seen as extreme in relation to other Swedish parties.
5. The Moderates were in charge of both the Foreign Ministry and the subordinate port-
folio of foreign aid. Carl Bildt was Foreign Minister during the whole period, and
Gunilla Carlsson (2006–2013) and Hillevi Engström (2013–2014) were Ministers of
Foreign Aid.
6. The three key informants are from the Moderate party, the Liberal Party and the
Christian Democrats. Given the focus here on junior parties having a more distinctive
foreign policy agenda, the absence from the Center Party is less troubling.
7. We study foreign policy goals, since rhetoric is very important in foreign policy.
Foreign policy goals are at the center of a state’s foreign policy.
8 . The goals are grouped within four categories, forming the end points of two central
foreign policy dimensions. In order to strengthen the validity these categories are
based on the same kind of foreign policy goals coded in the international Manifesto
Project. We have however, with the important help of our Research Assistant XX,
coded the Swedish manifestos independently since all manifestos were not included in
the Manifesto Project Database at the time of the coding. More importantly, however,
is that our measurement is different compared to the Manifesto Project Database
(MPD) since MPD measures the percentage of a manifesto that was devoted to a
certain category, while we measure the balance between two opposing values that
together form one dimension (e.g., militant – peaceful).
• The Cooperative category is based on foreign policy goals expressing support for the
internationalism and multilateralism, including support for European integration.
• The Non-cooperative category is based on goals expressing criticism of international-
ism and European integration and instead supporting national independence, sover-
eignty and unilateralism.

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© 2019 Nordic Political Science Association

• The Militant category is based on goals expressing a view of the world as dangerous
where states faces a security dilemma, hence making it important to increase military
spending.
• The Peaceful category includes goals such as decreasing military spending, ending
conscription, disarmament, and the use of negotiations to settle disputes.
For descriptions of each foreign policy goal see: https​://manif​estop​roject.wzb.eu/cod-
ing_schem​es/mp_v5
For coding instructions see: https​://manif​estop​roject.wzb.eu/down/paper​s/handb​
ook_2014_versi​on_5.pdf
9. Wagner et al. (2018) show that parties even tend to politicize security related issues.
Our results show that this conclusion might have its limitations in a consensus ori-
ented political culture, where value-oriented issues might be easier to politicize.

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Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of
this article at the publisher’s web site:

Appendix S1. Foreign policy goals in manifestos from 2006.

Appendix S2. Foreign policy goals in manifestos from 2010.
Appendix S3. Positions of the parties and governments according to two
dimensions.
Appendix S4. Interview guide with State Secretaries.
Appendix S5. Interview guide with parliamentarians having a seat in the
Foreign Affairs Committee

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