Industry Releasable Threat Assessment

Current as of 1st December 2019

This Threat Assessment has been released to the maritime Community in confidence. It
should not be further disseminated without permission.

Information Cut Off Date (ICOD): 15 NOV 19

POC: EU NAVFOR CJ2 OPS

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Reference:
A. IRTA released 01 Sep 19, ICOD 15 Aug 19.

Introduction

1. The European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR)
and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) have written this Industry Releasable Threat
Assessment (IRTA). The intent of this IRTA is to inform risk management and decision
making for merchant and large commercial fishing shipping operators that are transiting
through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Western Indian Ocean.

2. This IRTA presents a common understanding of the current threat actors and offers
the combined military perspective on assessed future maritime trends and threats. It
updates and complements the previous IRTA released on 01 Sep 19 (Reference A)

Situation in Somalia

3. On 15 Nov 19 the former pirate kingpin Isse Yulux from the Puntland Piracy Network,
currently assessed to be deeply involved in transnational maritime crime in Puntland,
orchestrated an armed attack on Puntland forces near to Bossaso. The attack against the
Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) and other Puntland government forces involved
over 20 vehicles and 150 militia. It is highly likely that the attack was linked to the loss of a
contract related to the supply of logistics for the PMPF, but this demonstrates the impunity
with which the Pirate Network is able to operate. This development is assessed as
potentially significant and EU NAVFOR will continue to monitor and report on any
consequences for maritime security off the north coast of Puntland.

4. The continuing tensions between Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMS) and the
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) remain a concern. The presidential elections in
Jubbaland on 22 Aug 19 resulted in the re-election of the current president Ahmed
Mohamed Islam Madobe. However, the FGS is yet to recognize the results of the election.

5. After the reconciliation conference in Dhusamareb in the beginning of Sep 19,

relations between FGS and Galmudug authorities seem to be improving. In the following
months, SNA, in conjunction with AMISOM have launched a land operation intended to
clear the coastal areas from AS presence all the way down to Mogadishu. This development
will LIKELY disrupt AS’s control over in this region and also effect the Hobyo-Haradheere
Pirate Network (HHN) still believed to be present in this region. This pirate network is
assessed as still active and capable of launching attacks should the possibility arise. The
same pirate network is suspected of being behind the botched pirate attack, which occurred
on 21 Apr this year.

6. The ineffectiveness of state security forces continues to affect the security situation
on Somali coast. Whilst the effectiveness of such forces varies across the coastline, the
effectiveness of security forces in the Galmadug regions is particularly poor. However, the
Puntland authorities have made a significant improvements to maritime security in their
region thanks to the coordination between the activities of the Puntland Maritime Police
Force (PMPF) with that of international partners.

7. Somaliland and Puntland authorities continue to attract foreign investments in their

infrastructure. Planned capital investments in new ports in Eyl, Garacad and Hobyo and
ongoing construction works may succeed in boosting the Somali economy. Those activities

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will LIKELY make this part of Somali coast much safer in the mid and long term. However,
corruption is likely to remain a problem which impacts maritime security.

8. Maritime crime in the Horn of Africa (HoA) remains a concern for the international
community. Although there were no piracy incidents in the reporting period, it is HIGHLY
LIKELY that pirates have are engaged in other forms of illicit activity. Nevertheless, it is
HIGHLY LIKELY that former pirates still retain capability and intent to conduct acts of piracy,
but currently lack the opportunity due to the influence of local elders, foreign naval presence
in the area, implemented BMP5 measures and PAST on board.

9. Al-Shabaab (AS) continues to issue fishing licenses for foreign vessels in exchange
for food, money and fuel. Whilst this leads to illegal fishing, which is one of the drivers of
piracy, it is assessed that AS does not currently have the capability, intent or opportunity to
conduct piracy. However, AS does engage in other illicit activities (charcoal, weapons,
narcotics, khat, sugar trade, illegal movement of people), which are a significant sources of
income.

10. AS terrorists still pose a significant threat in the rural areas in central and south
Somalia. Despite the ongoing operations by Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops, AS have been able to remain a threat by changing
their tactics, techniques and procedures and their targeting priorities. Whilst operations
against AS in south and central Somalia deprived the group of longstanding strongholds and
resources, AS personnel have been able to move from one area to another, blend into local
population and find alternative routes. The main threat posed by the group remains that of
IEDs, which are sometimes augmented by indirect fires and other forms of attack. Recent
floods in Hirshabelle, Jubbaland and Southwest State at the end of Oct and beginning of
Nov 19 provided an opportunity for AS to gain the support of the local populace by providing
them with humanitarian assistance. These floods affected 547 000 people, with 370 000
displaced and at least 17 dead.

11. Despite the tightening of security in Mogadishu in Mar 19, AS was able to continue to
plant IEDs and conduct IDF attacks on critical infrastructure, including the Mogadishu
International Airport (MIA) and Villa Somalia. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that AS remains able to
infiltrate Mogadishu and attack security forces with small-scale IEDs and IDF. The
International Community at the MIA is considering revising the 2016 Mogadishu Security
Plan to prevent further attacks. Security in Mogadishu is the primary focus since the town is
the center of all Somali and international institutions and organizations.

Situation in Yemen

12. The war in Yemen has been ongoing since 2015 and although some progress has
been made to reduce conflict in specific areas such as the City and Governate of Hodeida
there is still widespread fighting and the situation across the country remains volatile.

13. The Government of Yemen (GoY) and the Houthi militia accepted a detailed plan for
the two-phase redeployment of their respective forces from the vital port city of Hodeida.
The Redeployment Plan and subsequent Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC)
agreed on 17 Feb 19 is a critical part of the original ceasefire agreed in Stockholm, Sweden
during Dec 2018 that called on the government and Houthis to move forces away from the
key ports of Hodeida, Saleef and Ras Isa and key infrastructure including the Red Sea Mills.

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14. On 16 Jan 19 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2452,
establishing the UN Mission to support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) for an initial
period of six months. The mandate of this mission, comprising up to 75 monitors, is to lead
and support the functioning of the RCC, to monitor the parties’ compliance with the ceasefire
in Hodeida Governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces.

15. The ceasefire in Hodeida Governorate is tentatively holding, despite numerous

reported violations by both sides. On 11 May 19 the Houthis indicated that they had started
their withdrawal from Hodeida and Saleef and on 15 May the UN stated that the withdrawal
was complete, with the ports handed over to the Yemeni Coast Guard; the GoY has
disputed the validity of the UN assessment. On 15 Jul 19 a further meeting took place
between the GoY and Houthis to discuss the situation in Hodeida. Both parties reaffirmed
their support to the ceasefire and the UN announced it would extend its monitoring period
for a further 6 months.

16. Over 8-10 Aug 19, Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC) managed to take
control of the city of Aden. The STC, although part of the internationally recognized GoY, is
ultimately striving for independence in the southern part of the country. There has been
limited violence between the STC and GoY since the resurgence of the STC. On 5 Nov 19,
the GoY and STC signed a power sharing agreement which involved the requirement for a
new Cabinet to be formed with a 50 percent split between GoY and STC ministers. The
effect of the reunification is yet to be seen. To date, there has been no evidence that the
Houthis gained any advantage from the fracture in the GoY or any disadvantage from the
reunification.

Activity since 15 AUG 19

17. Piracy There have been no incidents of piracy reported during the reporting period.

Conflict Related

18. There have been no reported conflict related incidents during the reporting period.
The last conflict related incident occurred on 26 Jan 19 as reported by WFP VOS APOLLO
near the Hodeida anchorages.

Non-Maritime Security Events

19. 23 Aug 19. MV MIMOSA reported being approached by two skiffs in IRTC. But the
embarked PAST did not assess that the skiffs were manoeuvring suspiciously. No piracy
tripwires were present. Ship and crew were reported safe.

20. 3 Sep 19. MV NAVIGATOR GEMINI reported being approached by one skiff in IRTC.
PAST on board showed weapons and skiff retreated. No piracy tripwires were present.

21. 16 Sep 19. Yacht SILVER MOON reported that she was hijacked by unknown group
of six armed people in Eritrean territorial waters. UKMTO has since stated that the yacht is
safe and on route to her destination. No more information has been provided about the
attack. No piracy tripwires were present.

22. 18 Sep 19. FV GALERNA III reported that a dhow carrying four skiffs approached
while in North-east Arabian Sea. She moved away from dhow and skiffs. The master of

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vessel stated he was unable to identify any tripwires because the dhow and skiffs did not
come close enough.

23. 25 Sep 19. FV ALBATUN II reported that skiff approached in northeast Arabian Sea.
PAST delivered warning shots and the skiff stopped closing. No piracy tripwires were
present.

24. 2 Oct 19. FV ALBATUN II reported again that skiffs approached her in northeast
Arabian Sea. PAST delivered warning shots and the skiffs stopped closing. No piracy
tripwires were present.

25. 13 Oct 19. Unknown FV reported that skiff approached in northeast Arabian Sea.
PAST fired warning shots and the skiff stopped approaching. No piracy tripwires were
present.

26. 30 Oct 19. Two FVs reported a suspicious boarding by unidentified armed personnel
near to Eritrea. The Chinese Naval Expeditionary Task Force subsequently informed CMF
that the armed personnel have disembarked and FVs are sailing safely.

Figure 2: Geographic Location of Non-Maritime Security Events

Outlook

Piracy

27. During the reporting period, there has been no confirmed piracy attacks. The last
piracy attack occurred on the Republic of Korea flagged FV ADRIA and the Spanish flagged
FV TXORI ARGI on 21 Apr 19 transiting through the Somali Basin. Both of these attacks
were unsuccessful due to the use of the embarked PAST.

28. The lack of piracy attacks can be attributed to various factors, mainly, the adverse
weather conditions effecting the region due to the SW monsoon, the presence of

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international warships in the region , the adherence by the maritime industry to BMP5
measures and the employment of PAST on board commercial vessels.

29. Current weather conditions in the area are now characterized by the inter-monsoon
period. Sea conditions are improving and the effects of the SW monsoon have reduced
drastically. It is forecasted that weather conditions will continue to improve which will lead to
an increase in maritime activity in the region, both legal and illegal.

30. The improvement in weather conditions will generate a window of opportunity for
pirate action groups (PAGs) to launch attacks. The Hobyo-Haradhere pirate network is
assessed as being dormant but able to conduct pirate attacks should favorable conditions
present themselves. However, it is likely that there will be few if any incidents of piracy in
the region. Lower risk illegal activities such as the smuggling of people, narcotics, weapons,
tobacco and charcoal have LIKELY reduced the appetite and desire for local actors to
conduct piracy. Despite being highly profitable, piracy is considered as a high-risk operation
by pirates themselves. However, the piracy attack conducted in April is a stark reminder that
the threat from piracy is only being suppressed, not eliminated. The possibilities of an
increase in activity by PAGs is considered HIGHLY LIKELY should there be a decrease in
military presence at sea and a waning in adherence by the maritime industry to the BMP5
measures.

31. In Oct, severe flooding hit several parts of Somalia with Galmudug and Southwest
state being the worst affected states. It is estimated that more than 350,000 civilians were
displaced by this calamity. It is LIKELY that this flooding and subsequent displacement of a
large number of an already impoverished civilian population results in an increase in illegal
activities as a means of earning money. This may also contribute to an increase in activities
related to piracy.

Attacks linked to the Yemen Conflict

32. The Houthis continue to launch attacks against land-based and coastal Saudi led
Coalition (SLC) targets. On 14 Sep, the Houthis claimed an attack on the Aramco oil facility
in Saudi Arabia which almost certainly was one of the most significant regional events of the
year. However, despite laying claim to the attack, it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that the Houthis
had the capability to conduct the attack. It remains a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that other
regional state actors will use the Houthis as a proxy to perform attacks on their adversaries.

33. The latest incident reported in the Red Sea was on 11 Oct 19 when the National
Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) informed that the Iranian flagged crude oil tanker SABITI
had been hit by two separate explosions. The incident took place some 60 miles from
Jeddah. The explosions reportedly hit the vessel’s hull, causing damage to the vessel’s two
main tanks, and resulted in an oil spill in the Red Sea. To date the cause and vector of the
damage caused on MV SABITI has not been identified. Imagery available indicates that the
damage on the SABITI hull is not compatible to a missile strike, but appears to be similar to
the damage sustained by the MV KOKUKA COURAGEOUS and MV FRONT ALTAIR last
June, when subject to limpet mines attacks.

34. Historically, Houthi militants have demonstrated the capability to engage surface
vessels within the southern part of Red Sea. Apart from the Oct 11 incident on tanker
SABITI, no attacks had been conducted against shipping in this area since 24 Jul 18 (KSA
flagged tanker MV ARSAN). The threat related to these types of attack is LIKELY to remain
LOW as long as the Stockholm Agreement holds as an attack would ALMOST CERTAINLY

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create a negative perception of the Houthis and their cause. However, due to the fragility of
the ceasefire in Hodeida and the ongoing conflict in other parts of Yemen, there is a
REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that the threat to SLC warships and SLC flagged MVs from
rocket/missile and Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED) could resurge in the
SRS without notice. It is UNLIKELY that the Houthis would deliberately target neutral
shipping, not directly linked to the SLC; however, the risk of unintended damage to neutral
shipping would exist, due to misidentification, as seen with MV INCE INEBOLU in May 18.

35. There remain no reported incidents of naval mines in the shipping lanes of the SRS
or BAM. Although the Houthi’s have ALMOST CERTAINLY deployed naval mines in Yemeni
coastal waters, analysis of the mines indicates that they are LIKELY of low quality and are
HIGHLY UNLIKELY to drift into international shipping lanes. Subsequently, the mine threat
within the established Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) continues to be LOW.

36. The continuing conflict and hostilities in Yemen offer considerable freedom of
movement to International Terrorist Organizations (ITOs) and other non-state actors, such
as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Daesh. The last attack by these groups
in the maritime environment was in May 17 (MV MUSKIE); the threat from ITOs is LOW.

Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) Analysis

37. An initial study on the impact of the reduction in HRA boundaries, according to the
agreement of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) on the behaviour of vessels transiting
the VRA, is now complete. However, EU NAVFOR MSCHOA as part of its continuing
analysis of merchant traffic behaviour and BMP compliance, will report periodical updates as
required. The study was centred on registration and the use of PAST after the 1May 19,
assuming all registrations, which amount to average 68% of total traffic within VRA, as the
the scope for the study.

Figure 3: Average use of PAST within VRA from November 2018 to October 2019.

% PAST

31.95% 30.52% 30.97% 31.62% 32.46% 30.98%

28.59% 30.99% 31.12% 28.57% 28.83% 29.26%

2018-11 2018-12 2019-01 2019-02 2019-03 2019-04 2019-05 2019-06 2019-07 2019-08 2019-09 2019-10
PAST

38. With regard to the use of PAST in the whole VRA a slight decrease on the average
has been observed after the 1 May 19 (See Figure 3), when the reduction of HRA was
implemented.

39. While Fig. 3 reveals a slight decrease in the use of PAST in the VRA as a whole,
considering a split of the studied area into two different sub-areas, inside HRA and outside
HRA, a more pronunced decline has been observed in the latter (See Figure 4).

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 PAST/NO PAST in Registered traffic
80%
66% 65% 67% 69%
70%
60%
50%
40% 34% 35% 33% 31%
30%
20%
10%
0%
PAST NO PAST PAST NO PAST
INSIDE HRA OUTSIDE HRA

PRE REDUC POST REDUC

Figure 4: PAST/NO PAST inside and outside new HRA.

40. As it can be seen in Figure 5, after breaking down initial area into smaller sub-areas,
data reveals that the use of PAST is roughly the same inside the new HRA. The Red Sea
and the GOA keep almost the same percentage. Low density in traffic in Somali Coast could
explain one point in decline in this sub-area. In sub-areas outside the new HRA, as
expected, decline is more pronounced, being the observed steepest decrease in Indian
Ocean. Probably due to being the farthest sub-area from HRA, record percentage in the use
of PAST in Indian Coast has traditionally remained at low level.

Figure 5: Average use of PAST in sub-areas inside and outside new HRA for last year.

41. Finally, with regard to the number of registered vessels with MSCHOA, data shows a
decrease in sub-areas outside new HRA (Figure 6), while levels inside the new HRA has
remained high.

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 REGISTRATION
90% 85% 85% 83% 80%
80% 79%
80% 75% 74%
70% 65% 66%
62% 61%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Red Sea GOA Somali Coast Arabian Sea Indian Ocean Indian Coast
BEFORE 1 MAY 2019 AFTER 1 MAY 2019

Figure 6: Average registration comparison 6 month before and after the new HRA
implementation.

42. In conclusion, data reveals a slight reduction in the use of PAST and registration after
the reduction of new HRA on VRA as a whole, the decline being steeper in sub-areas
outside the new HRA. This observed decline in the use of PAST and registration could be
correlated, and probably suggests a decrease in company security officers’ perception of
threat after the reduction of the HRA.

43. It is strongly reminded that the implemented change in HRA boundaries does not
imply any reduction in the Vessel Registration Area (VRA) which remains unchanged.
Analysis of the data reveals that registration has suffered a decrease within all the areas
afected by the HRA reduction, specially vessels transiting through the Indian Coast Area.
EU NAVFOR encourages the shipping community to continue registration in the whole VRA,
and to bear in mind that pirates retain the intent and capability to conduct attacks and that
the threat has not been eradicated.

Summary of CMF Activity

44. CMF, through Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, has continued to conduct counter
piracy operations involving naval forces, maritime air assets and maritime agencies. These
have presented a credible deterrent to potential Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) and reinforced
confidence within the maritime community through increased naval presence. CMF and EU
NAVFOR Somalia will continue to coordinate operations to maximize the naval presence
within the region and facilitate information sharing throughout the maritime community.
During the reporting period CTF 151 conducted one Surge Operation (SO), Blue Crab II
over 10-11 Aug 19, and one Focused Operation (FO), King Crab over 23-26 Sep 19, both in
the vicinity of the GOA and HOA.

45. Since 2 Oct 2019, EU NAVFOR has taken over the Counter Piracy Chairmanship
from CMF. The strategic counter piracy strategy agreed by CMF and EU NAVFOR is:

a. Continue naval presence operations by CMF and EU NAVFOR assets to deter and
deny PAG’s operations against the shipping community;

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b. Increase intelligence gathering and sharing of information on PAG camps;

c. Expand Key Leadership Engagements (KLEs) with regional and other international
navies, coastguards and maritime agencies to garner support for counter piracy efforts;

d. Continue to engage the international shipping community and provide timely piracy
updates;

e. Increase awareness on social media of the counter piracy efforts made by CMF and
EU NAVFOR.

46. While CTF 151 has achieved success in countering piracy efforts in the GOA and
HOA, the other CMF CTFs have also had notable accomplishments in the Indian Ocean
(CTF 150) and the Arabian Gulf (CTF 152):

a. Since the start of 2019, CTF 150 had seized had seized 48 442.4 kilograms of
hashish, 2040.97 kilograms of heroin and 131.38 kilograms of meth, with a combined street
value of USD 46,327,960.201. In addition, CTF 150 continues to engage with regional
partners and international agencies to address other illicit activity such as charcoal
smuggling.

b. CTF 152, under the command of the Royal Jordanian Navy, has significantly
enhanced regional cooperation for maritime security in the Arabian Gulf (in particular
participation by regional Coastguards) and has instigated a number of cooperative and
capacity building training courses and joint patrols to encourage the sharing of best
practices amongst regional partners and agencies.

47. These operational successes across all the CTFs directly contributed to the
deterrence of illicit activities in the maritime throughout the Area of Operations (AOO).

48. Additionally, the Commanders of the CTFs have continued to build relations and
develop capability by engaging with numerous countries in the region. This has led to
increased information sharing, closer alliances, and further improved our ability to suppress
piracy and combat illegal activity, whilst enabling the legitimate use of the seas in the region.

Summary of EU NAVFOR Activity

49. In order to fulfil one of its primary tasks, protect World Food Program (WFP) vessels
and other vulnerable shipping, EU NAVFOR deployed an Autonomous Vessel Protection
Detachment (AVPD). Until 24 August, an AVPD from Montenegro was stationed aboard MV
JUIST and on 24th August an AVPD from Lithuania took over. During the entire period, these
AVPDs provided protection for eight voyages delivering food and non-food support to
Somalia.

50. With the sixth revision of the OPLAN for Operation ATALANTA, EU NAVFOR is
executing its Concept for Cooperation (COCOA). This concept allows nations to contribute
to the Operation for a short time or for a specific activity, instead of allocating a ship for a full
rotation. In September, October and November, there were several interactions with assets
from CTF 150, CTF 151 and ALINDIEN. Six of them were PASSEXs with Korean Navy,
French Navy, Seychelles Air Force and Coastguard, one was a RAS with USNS Cesar
Chavez and the last one was an exercise between our Special Operation Maritime Task Unit
1 Information accurate as of 3 Nov 2019.

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(SOMTU) and the French Special Forces. These interactions gave the opportunity to share
best practices and are a practical example of COCOA.

51. In November, EU NAVFOR participated in Cutlass Express exercise 19.2 sponsored

by AFRICOM. Special emphasis of this exercise is placed on joint interagency and
transnational operations in accordance with existing regional frameworks to enhance
interoperability and foster relationships with partner nations. The exercise has been divided
into two different phases, the first in the area of Djibouti, the second in the southwest part of
the Indian Ocean, in particular IVO Seychelles, Mombasa (Kenya), Mauritius and different
areas in Madagascar. EU NAVFOR Somalia assets have been involved in training Somalian
and Kenyan Boarding Teams IVO Djibouti, and Seychelles and Tanzanian boarding teams
IVO Seychelles.

Conclusion

52. The last piracy incident on 21 Apr 19 emphasized the fact that piracy is not
eradicated but just suppressed. It underlined the importance of implementation of BMP 5.
Since the end of the southwest monsoon at the end of Sep 19, more the more permissive
conditions for small boat operations have resulted in slight increase in maritime activity in
the region. The continued presence of international naval forces, such as EU NAVFOR
Somalia, CMF and recently formed International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC),
combined with BMP 5 measures continue to serve as the most effective way of countering
piracy in the area.

53. The ongoing conflict in Yemen still has impact on the shipping in the BAM and SRS
area. Peace agreement between International Recognized Government (IRG) and the
Southern Transitional Council (STC) signed on 05 Nov 19 ended the conflict inside the
Saudi-led coalition that particularly affected Aden port. On the other hand, the fight between
Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels is far from be over. If the Stockholm agreement
between Houthis and Saudi-led coalition collapses, the attacks on Saudi-led coalition (SLC)
warships and flagged MVs in the BAM and SRS are LIKELY to appear again. In that case,
there is a residual risk of miscalculation or misidentification that can result in collateral
damage to the neutral ships.

54. The 45th Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) conference, hosted by
CMF, took place on 19 and 20 Nov 19 in Manama, Bahrain, at the British Club. This
conference allows Industry Representatives along with Independent Deployers (India, China
and Russia), CMF and EU NAVFOR, to discuss the threats to the free flow of commerce in
an open forum, and to promote the exchange of information on maritime security in the
region.

Annex:
A. Glossary of Terms.

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 Annex to

IRTA dated 01 December 2019

Glossary of terms

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AOO Area of Operation

AQAP Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula

AS Al Shabaab: Terrorist group operating in Somalia

AVPD Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (military detachment)

BAM Bab-al-Mandeb strait

BMP5 Best Management Practice (Version 5)

IMO and industry sponsored suggested planning and operational

practices for ship operators and Masters of ships transiting the Indian
Ocean

CMF Combined Maritime Force: 33 nation multi-national maritime force

operating in Indian Ocean and Red Sea

CP Counter Piracy

COCOA Concept for Cooperation ATALANTA

CTF Combined Task Force

EU NAVFOR European Union Naval Forces Counter Piracy Mission, Op ATALANTA

GOA Gulf of Aden

GOO Gulf of Oman

HRA High Risk Area

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 Industry defined area where it is considered there is a higher risk of
piracy and within which self-protective measures are most likely to be
required

GOA Gulf of Aden

IMSC International Maritime Security Construct

IRTA Industry Releasable Threat Assessment

IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin

IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor

IRG Internationally Recognized Government

MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)

The maritime industry control centre for the EU's Op ATALANTA.

MSTC Maritime Security Transit Corridor

PAG Piracy Action Groups

Individual group of pirates formed to capture a vessel at sea

PAST Private Armed Security Team

POB Persons on board

SHADE Shared Awareness and De-confliction

SLC Saudi Led Coalition

SOH Strait of Hormuz

SRS Southern Red Sea

STC Southern Transitional Council, UAE-backed faction in Yemen

TTP,s Tactics, Technics and Procedures

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UKMTO United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, based in Dubai

VRA Vessel registration Area

WBIED Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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