Systems Theory, The Key to Holism
and Reductionism
The position of biology among the
other natural sciences and the inter-
action of science and society present
questions which are engaging our minds
more than ever before. The changing of
the place of science in the community
may be considered a cultural evolution.
Without dwelling on the controversies
(cf. Waddington 1960, for example), it
may safely be assumed that there is a
certain analogy between biological and
cultural evolution, to cite the significant
summary of Osche (1972). The scien-
tific information collected in the course
of history and preserved in the culture is
passed from one generation to the other
by means of family and education in the
schools. This continuous flow of cul-
tural information is constantly subject
to change and renewal. Certain attri-
butes become disused because they are
replaced by new discoveries and inven-
tions, the selective value of which has
been tested in the human day-to-day
experience, or quite often at present, in
specialized scientific and technological
research. In this complicated process,
the interweaving of "theory and prac-
tice" plays a central role (van Melsen
1961, 1970). Dijksterhuis (1950) has
called the course of development of
natural science, from ancient con-
ceptions to the analytical abstraction
and mathematization of present-day
physics and chemistry, the mechaniza-
tion of the world picture.
The mechanization of the biological
picture of the world is also in full swing.
This is accompanied by a blurring, and
even vanishing, of the boundaries be-
tween the inorganic and the biological
sciences. This change in the identity of
biology is not only of theoretical signifi-
cance, it is of much greater practical
importance, because the mechanized
picture of "life" impinges on society
where it is a noticeable force in science
policy.
The author is with the Department of Zool-
ogy, Katholieke Universiteit, Nijmegen, The
Netherlands.
October 1974
G. Becht
THE INTERWEAVING OF THEORY
AND PRACTICE AND
ITS DIFFICULTIES
Biology is an empirical science, based
as it is on experience and experiment.
According to de Groot (1969, p. vi),
"science is conceived not so much as a
system of concepts, nor as a system of
statements, but rather as a process, or a
system of activities."
The scientific worker tries to com-
press factual experiences into orderly
arrangements, laws, and theories-in
other words, an understanding of
nature-to provide a basis for man to
behave rationally and purposively in his
environment.
The fundamental standard of experi-
ence is called the empirical cycle (Fig.
1). The empirical cycle can be con-
sidered as an information processing
system of the following activi ties:
observing, guessing, predicting, and
checking.
Even conscious reflective thought,
analyzed by verbatim records of the
thinking aloud of chess masters, can be
traced back to the diagram of the series
of empirical cycles (de Groot 1969, p.
7, 29, et seq.).
The purpose of the following line of
argument is to demonstrate, by means
of the structure of the empirical cycles,
not only the formation of logical
theories but also how the practice of
actual experimental methods impress
their stamps on biological knowledge.
According to Popper (1959, 1962),
the result ,of thinking, i.e., the logical
statement of an empirical science, must
be observable. A verifiable hypothesis
can then be developed from the series:
guessing-predicting-checking (de
Groot 1969, Ch. 3 and 4). The truth
content thereof must be put to a prac-
tical test and corroborated (Popper) or
confirmed (de Groot). In principle this
might require an infinite number of
tests. A simpler method is to falsify the
hypothesis by an experiment, i.e., to
render it untrue, for which, in principle,
merely one test may suffice. This asym-
metry of many theories with respect to
falsification and verification can be
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cancelled largely by statistical methods.
Whichever method is adopted, untrue
hypotheses are eliminated and true
theories remain to contribute to the
growth of communicable (scientific)
knowledge. What is "true" or "false" is
in the first place that which corresponds
to or differs from the individual ob-
servation; in the final analysis, to quote
Polanyi (1962), "The validity of scien-
tific knowledge is established and main-
tained through critical judgement in the
republic of science," known also as the
"forum."
The logical aspects of empirical
knowledge cannot actually be divorced
from the methodological aspect. Logic
and language tie us to the model con-
structed by science with respect to
reality (Nauta 1970, p. 267), and this in
turn is based on observation with our
senses.
All processes of learning are based on
a physiological anatomical correlation,
on the relations between receptor and
effector or between stimulation and
behavioral response (Fig. 1). In terms
of systems theory, the empirical cycle
has all the characteristics of a circuit
controlled by feedback. The control
proper is based on decisions concerning
adaptive criteria (Fig. 1, B), so that
imperfect hypotheses can evolve into
more accurate, more elegant, or more
successful theories (Buckley 1972).
In terms of the psychological tradi-
tion, the empirical cycle can be seen
also as the complex of relations with
which the subjective world of personal
consciousness-the consciously thinking
I-is related to the objective outer
world, the material reality of nature, the
Other. This point of view is illustrated
in Figure I by the zones 1 and 2.
The central area (3), the boundary
between the subjective inner world and
the objective outer world, is of special
569
importance. This is the region in which
human culture, including science, mani-
fests itself.
"Anthropogenesis, the emergence of
man, is characterized by abstract think-
ing by means of concepts, by speech,
and by the use of self-made tools. The
tool in the human hand performs the
same function as the bodily organ of the
animal. The hand was a necessary con-
dition for directing tools" (Pannekoek
1945). The complicated human larynx
and buccal cavity were equally neces-
sary conditions for the development anel
use of articulated speech and, therefore,
language (C, F).
There are two quite distinct kinds of
tools in a more restricted sense. One
kind (E) serves in handicrafts in the
forming of or action on objects. The
frrst tools were presumably things such
as the knife, hammer, etc.-also drawing
and writing tools.
The other (G) comprises extension
pieces and auxiliaries for sensory per-
ception, for testing by means of things
such as a stick for feeling, the magnify-
ing glass, the clock, etc.
But the third and most important
invention in the history of mankind is a
tool in a broader sense, namely the
symbol (F). The symbol is a representa-
tion of the object depicted with or in
something other than the original mate-
rial, according to the definition of
Biihler (1937).
"Die Eigenthiimlichkeit und ganz
ungeheure Wichtigkeit des Werkzeugs
liegt darin, dass es zugleich Theil des
Subjects und dennoch Objekt ist" (the
peculiarity and tremendous importance
of the tool is due to the fact that it is
both part of the subject, and yet, at the
same time, it is the object) in the words
of Noire (1880, quoted by Pannekoek
1945).
This characteristic feature of the tool
applies in even greater degree to the

Downloaded from http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/ at Penn State University (Paterno Lib) on September 17, 2016
1 3 2

SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF COLLECTIVE WORLD OF OBJECTIVE WORLD OF

PERSONAL THOUGHT IN MAN MADE THINGS NATURE
HUMAN LIFE inventions, creations, books etc.
preserved in individual memories preserved in human culture

© ®
TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS
for grading, boosting or
attenuating of the action
(pen, pin, knife, hammer, fire etc.)

® SYMBOLS AND STATIC OR @

r+predicting. DYNAMIC MODELS
OJ OJ
.~ MENTAL .5 replacing the ideas, concepts etc. NONLIVING
~ EMPIRICAL is and the natural objects including empirical AND
S, CYCLE (I) 1 illustration, language, mathema- LIVING THINGS
LobservingJ tics, analog or digital machines,
automata etc.

i @ cy'cle (m)
~----~~----~~----~~
AIDS
for improving, grading or ampli-
fying the observation (meters,
lenses, oscilloscopes etc.)

Figo 1. The routes of practical and theoretical experience. Empirical knowledge begins as the result of the laborious direct
practical or experimental feedback interaction between man (1) and his natural environment (2). This interaction is here shown
as the big practical empirical cycle III (A,B,C,D). Hypothetical imagination (guessing), an important source of renewal,
adaptation, etc., is confined only to the small mental empirical cycle I, which operates in the conscious thought of single
individuals. During the evolution of mankind, the natural environment is being replaced more and more by a manmade (pseudo)
reality of symbols and models (F) and all manner of technical aids (E and G). They are the essential elements of the collective
world of culture which forms the indispensable substitute of and connection (E,F,G) between object (D) and subject (A,B,C).
The cultured condition allows for the rapid and unimpeded functioning of the theoretical empirical cycle II (A,B,C,E,F,G)
which is the prerequisite of all science.
This indirect stepwise (cycle I, II, and III) method of gaining experience by feedback interactions between thinking and doing
or between "theory" and "practice" has given man the enormous evolutionary advantage of access to nearly unlimited sources
of experience. Human society is made up of complicated chains and networks of innumerable, interrelated theoretical and
practical empirical and working cycles. Excessive (scientific) division of labor and traditional monodisciplinary specialization
may lead to reduced symbols and models, with consequences unfavorable to the control of life and society.

570 BioScience Vol. 24 No. 10

 symbol which, on the one hand, is used
as a reference to abstract ideas, con-
cepts, or feelings in the subjective world
of consciousness. On the other hand,
the symbol may be the alternative repre-
sentation of real things in the objective
external world.
Primitive symbols and models
evolved towards language, writing,
mathematics, and finally to all the
modern contraptions which still give rise
to ever more complex, but yet symbolic
and model, representations.
Symbols and models have two cul-
tural functions: First, they serve for the
collection and storage of personal
knowledge as an aid to the limited
memory of the individual owner.
Second, symbols, in particular the
spoken and written language, are the
foremost means of communication.
Without these means, the social enter-
prise known as science, would be
impossible.
During anthropogenesis, man has
thus "enveloped" himself with and tied
himself to three categories of self-made
things which are functional components
of the empirical cycle: first, symbols
and models; second, tools and imple-
ments; and third, aids in observation.
This self-made collective cultural world
includes all the information collected by
individual experience and vital for sur-
vival, which is why the identity of a
science should mean: first, the collec-
tion of theoretical conceptions and
representations, as well as the language
required for their expression; second,
the collection of specific practical meth-
ods of scientific study; and third, the
collection of chosen objects of study.
The ability to learn is interpreted as a
general feature of the empirical cycle.
The minimum biological condition is
the presence of a simple reflex circuit
with a small central nervous component
(Horridge 1962, 1968; Hoyle 1965).
This indicates possession of a primitive
empirical cycle (Fig. 1, type III,
A,B,C,D), i.e., without reflection and,
of course, without tools.
In higher animals, manipulation of
objects (dolphins, dogs) or use of tools
(apes) are clearly established. Because
often conscious foresight and under-
standing seem to be present, there is a
tendency to assume also simple mental
cycles of type I (ie., reflection).
Typical of man-in contrast to ani-
mals-is the self-made pseudoreality of
symbols and models, with which the
original reality is imitated and simu-
lated. This has created almost boundless
October 1974
possibilities of the functioning of the
theoretical empirical cycle (type II, A,
B, C, E, F, G), not just as often and
quickly as desired (creating statistical
possibilities), but also, above all, with-
out the dangers and drawbacks of the
material and experimental experience,
otherwise so difficult to obtain, of cycle
III. Without the help of the cycle ot
type II, the cycle of type I could never
have developed to the abstract, logical
reasoning apparatus of modern cultured
man.
For quite some time, the life scien-
tists have been dazzled by the ad-
vantages of the successes, obtained in
this way, of modern engineering and
experimental natural science; the dis-
advantages and shortcomings are only
now beginning to be felt more clearly,
so that a few years ago a number of
experienced biologists, such as von
Bertalanffy, Paul A. Weiss, Hyden,
Waddington, and others voiced their
disquietude under the title of "Beyond
Reductionism" (Koestler and Smythies
1969). With respect to this "reduc-
tionism," the fundamental question
raised is whether the present methods of
research, with their emphasis on analyt-
ical chemistry and physics, do not lead
to the reduction (Le., loss) of essential
biological information.
Reduction of a theory, T 1, to a
theory, T2, corresponding to phe-
nomena in another "level of organiza-
tion," is briefly defined by Beckner
(1959, p. 45), following the leadership
of Tarski and Woodger, as follows: "Let
T 1 be a theory that employs some
theoretical terms that T 2 does not, ...
then T 1 is reducible to T2 if every
phenomenon truly described in T 1 is
subject to an explanation in terms of
phenomena described by T2 ."
Reduction of theories is a normal
and important process which aims at the
simplification of statements concerning
the environment and at widening of
their scope of application.
"About the very notion of reduction
itself [there is] a wide divergence of
opinion" (Goodfield 1972). "Is reduc-
tionism essentially a problem of differ-
ing world views (Popper), a research
stratagem (Medawar), a problem of jus-
tification of the actual methods, prob-
lems, and procedures of the man in the
lab, rather than discovery (Edelman), an
attitude which served to focus on cer-
tain problems as being genuinely bio-
logical (Goodfield), a problem of all
human existence (Skolimowski), a prob-
lem of how the true proposition of one
science can be logically deduced from
another (Shapere and most philoso-
phers)?" According to Goodfield,
" ... one point wltich repeatedly comes
up whenever the word reduction is
mentioned ... is usually expressed by
the aphorism that 'the whole is more
than the sum of its parts.' "
The above reveals reductionism as an
area of Complicated problems in which
logical and methodological components
often receive separate treatment. Above
all, the logical aspects of the reduction
of theories have. been discussed in much
detail in the literature. Let us, therefore,
consider special cases of reduction as
the inevitable consequence of the
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specialized methods of practical bio-
logical research.
(a) The relative imperishableness of
raw materials for tools, models, etc. is
indispensable to specialization but leads
also to petrification of the specialist
(Fig. 1, E, F, G).
(b) The specialized experimenter can
be characterized by the kind of objects
and instruments with which he person-
ally prefers to surround himself. He
wears, as it were, "instrumental spec-
tacles" which allow him to observe only
a limited part of living nature, so that he
can, of course, construct only a reduced
picture. The disciplines of morphology,
anatomy, and physiology are classical
examples of this; they reduce time (or
spatialobservables 1) to zero.
These are two prototypes of reduc-
tionism in biological research which
have created the preconditions for more
extended analysis.
(c) As a result of the rapid advances
of technology, there arose a firm apri-
oris tic conviction concerning the power
of chemistry and physics. Because of
the requirements imposed by their in-
strumental techniques of analysis, a
great part of the chemical or physical
observables in biology could be isolated
only after essential organizations and
complicated structures of the living
organism (in D) had been broken and
modified by killing, cutting, fine grind-
ing, etc. A (possible) loss (=reduction)
of important information resulting from
the breaking of the complexity and
hierarchy of structures important for
the living organism did not bother many
scientific investigators.
To summarize, the practice of sci-
ence can be represented as the making,
collecting, identifying, and classifying of
lObseIVable: a (variable) quantity that is
obseIVable and measurable.
571
representations, mappings, and descrip-
tions of real objects (Fig. I, D) with
which we are familiar (B), by means of
symbols and models (F). The internal
consistency of the descriptions seems to
be warranted by the use of logic. Simi-
larly, rules of correspondence
(Margenau 1950) seem to guarantee
unambiguous relations between repre-
sentation and reality. This now appears
questionable. Rather, it seems that by
bypassing the rules of correspondence
and perhaps even because of bypassing
logic, all kinds of reduction of knowl-
edge may occur in consequence of
intentional or unintentional, accidental
or necessary, losses of information in
BIOLOGICAL CONTROL CIRCUIT
extensor
(muscle)
CONTROL CIRCUIT IN ENGINEERING
(speed governors)
centrifugal force
governs supply
of steam
Fig. 2. The combining of biology and technology: the principles of automatic control gave rise to systems theory.
572
the various elements of the empirical
cycle.
Finally, the purpose of the above has
been to show how science, as a part of
human culture which is part of human
existence, must quite inevitably give an
incomplete and distorted picture of
reality and its complications. Reduc-
tional gaps have opened up between the
life sciences and the inorganic and tech-
nical sciences. But it is slowly being
realized that such incorrect information
about reality may mean in the end a
danger to human existence; hence, the
growing interest in finding ways to
overcome the deadlock in which we
now find ourselves as a result of our
SYMBOLS FROM SYSTEMS THEORY
valve
m_"'I-__
the energy
of the spring is
released in stages
1 tick =
REGULATOR
FOR CLOCK
MECHANISM
pendulum (T= constant)
regulates speed of escape-
ment
flywheel
dependence on classical science and
engineering. This will be discussed fur-
ther in the next section.
ABOUT THE OBJECTS AND
THE THEORY OF SYSTEMS
In the world of human culture, the
steadily-increasing collection of tools,
symbols, aids, etc. has grown by chance
or design into ever more complicated
imitations and simulations of living ob-
jects. To mention just two of the most
spectacular examples: Our knowledge of
the flight of birds and insects has
achieved rna terial form in airplanes;
Downloaded from http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/ at Penn State University (Paterno Lib) on September 17, 2016
disturbance
~ process 1 - - - -_ _ out
control circuit
Rl-4----.....J
controller
RELATIONS DIAGRAM OR
SIGNAL FLOW DIAGRAM
structural or functional
D 0 = elements
= transport of
mass, of energy,or of
information
BioScience Vol. 24 No. 10
 our knowledge of mathematics, neuro-
physiology, and psychophysics has be-
co me embodied in electronic
computers.
Fascinating articles by Verveen
(1968-69, 1971) have been devoted to
the still largely unwritten history of
systems theory. In engineering achieve-
ments, a certain principle has played an
utterly unique and indispensable role,
namely, automatic regulation and con-
trol (Fig. 2). Before the practice of
technology was able to develop to the
present state of flowering, a general
understanding of the theory had to be
attained.
Ideas about biological control mech-
anisms were enunciated from the 17th
to the 19th centuries (Verveen 1968-69,
1971). The foundations of these ideas
gradually were sublimated to an im-
portant stream of thought early in the
20th century, namely holism, which
owed its name to Smuts (1926 [cf.
Meyer 1940]). Von Bertalanffy (1940)
made important contributions with
numerous publications between 1930
and 1970 to the preparation and dis-
semination of an independent systems
theory. The need for a theory of
"holistic simplification" (Meyer 1940)
formed a clear guiding policy.
Finally, this mixture of biology and
engineering cUlminated in Norbert
Wiener's book "On Control and Com-
munication in the Animal and the Ma-
chine," published in 1948. This marked
the birth of cybernetics, i.e., the doc-
trine of steering and control. Presum-
ably of equal importance was the
publication by Shannon and Weaver
(1949) of "The Mathematical Theory of
Communication." This led to informa-
tion theory, the doctrine of communica-
tion by means of signals, signs, and
symbols. From these two roots, a doc-
trine-systems theory-is at present
developing.
Before going further, a few defini-
tions will be necessary:
"A system is an arrangement of
physical components, or a set or collec-
tion of things, connected or related in
such a manner as to form and/or act as
an entire unit, an entirety or whole"
(Distefano et al. 1967). This is just one
of 24 (!) definitions of the concept of
"system," compiled from the literature
by Klir (1969), which extend from
mathematical via biological to engineer-
ing. "Connected or related" means that
the set of parts is kept intact by
connecting forces; in a dynamic system,
it means that transports of mass, energy,
October 1974
and information can occur between the
parts.
It is quite generally accepted that all
systems, and in particular the palpably
living systems, are constructed
hierarchically from subsystems (e.g.,
organs) and the subsystems, in tum,
from sub-subsystems (e.g., cells), etc.
The above definition, however, always
remains applicable (von Bertalanffy
1952, Koestler 1969 a,b, Mesarovic et
al. 1970).
The word "system" is also used in
systems theory in the following mean-
ings (Nauta 1970):
(a) The concrete or real system,
organization, or object, e.g., a
crystal, organism, or factory
(Fig. 1, D).
(b) Conceptual or model systems,
e.g., a diagram, atomic model
(Fig. 1, F).
(c) Formal systems or language
systems, e.g., logical calculus,
axiomatic theory (Fig. 1, B).
We can recognize that in the entire
world of symbols, techniques, products,
economies, etc., made and cultivated by
human society, mechanisms are operat-
ing such as control, exchange, evolution,
etc., which occurred on a smaller scale
in ordinary living nature from its very
inception and which form the con-
ditions of continuing life. To use this
idea I have introduced the following
classification of life sciences illustrated
in Figure 3.
Van der Klaauw (1949) enumerated a
number of biological generalizations,
such as "the organism as a whole, as a
totality," "environment and Umwelt,"
evolution, finalism, and purpose, etc.
The science covering this collection of
concepts, which may be applied beyond
the bounds of biology in the true
meaning of the word-e.g., in psychol-
ogy, sociology, philosophy, and even in
a religious and political sense-was
defined by him as metabiology 2.
A.M. Weinberg (1972) wrote: In the
case of "interaction between science
and society," there are "clearly separa-
ble elements, one scientific, the other
political. Many of the issues which arise
in the course of the interaction between
science or technology and society-e.g.,
the deleterious side effects of tech-
nology ... -hang on the answers to
questions which can be asked of science
2V. Westhoff of Nijmegen drew my attention
to this. The term "metabiology" was orig-
inally used by me in a somewhat different
sense.
and yet which cannot be answered by
science. I propose the term trans-
scientific for these questions since,
though they are, epistemologically
speaking, questions of fact and can be
stated in the language of science, they
are unanswerable by science: they
transcend science."
Even though the boundary is not
sharp, Van der Klaauw is clearly more
interested in theoretical biological
generalization, while Weinberg is con-
cerned more with the practical applica-
tion at the higher (social) levels of
science.
In the above we have seen that the
amalgamation of these two sciences
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leads to a generalization. This may be
expressed formally as follows: The
interface of the two collections of
biology and technology is a collection
of generalizations. For this collection, in
view of the biological background, the
name "metabiology,,3 (Fig. 3) seems
appropriate.
Biology is then, above all, the
doctrine of "real" intra-individual living
systems. Transbiology, therefore, be-
comes the doctrine of extra-and inter-
individual living systems.
Given the technological and formal
mathematical backgrounds-i.e., the
mechanization of the world picture-the
generalizations can also be called general
systems theory.
Next I should like to utilize this
classification in order to compare a few
systems with each other and arrive at a
generalization. A question that seems
somewhat superfluous is: What is
operated or controlled in a biological or
technological system? This question
should be clearly distinguished from
how something is controlled.
We have become familiar with the
how in the methods of control engineer-
ing. For the control of complicated
technical organizations, such as tor-
pedoes, rockets, ocean liners, inter-
continental aircraft-in short, projectiles
of all kinds-use is made of stabilizers,
automatic pilots, homing devices, etc.
Names reflect what is operated, e.g.,
"lunar rocket," "American Line." We
indicate the purpose as an integral part
of the organization, according to the
principles of jinalism or teleology.
3Whether the prefIX "meta" is suitable in this
connection is difficult to say because it has
many different meanings, as in the words
metaphYsics, metalinguistics, and metamodel.
The proper designation and the full taxonomy
of sciences is here of secondary interest.
573
 This conclusion that purpose is a
feature of the system or organization,
although discredited in biology, I shall
now translate from technology into a
biological analogy, the control of a
single extremity. We know that the
various "building materials," such as
skeleton, tendons, muscles, sensory
organs, peripheral and central nervous
systems, and the skin which covers
everything, perform different kinds of
work. Yet the extremity in its total
organization produces only one or a few
highly specific and complicated forms
of work which we call locomotion, the
power to move from place to place. A
simple zoological experiment suffices to
demonstrate this. By the invisible or
almost invisible disruption of just one
important relation-namely, by anaes-
thesia or by killing of ganglion cells-the
production of this specific form of
work, locomotion, can be stopped
temporarily or forever. The systems
analyst calls this, significantly, the
"cracking" of the system. Although
with proper care it is possible to
continue studying by experiments the
various vital properties of cracked
"building materials," such as sensory
organs, nerves, and muscles, for some
time, the permanent interference with
the ganglion means destruction of the
essential c1umu:teristic and purpose of
the organization of the locomotory
extremity, the locomotion. How easily
and imperceptibly the reduction takes
place! And vice versa. A constructional
kit for a small model airplane will do.
With just a few manipulations, we have
the very specific manner of locomotion
known as flying. The same organization
can be built up from various materials,
such as the canvas of an old Fokker or
the metal of a modern Boeing. Now
take the components apart, and the
specific property of flying is lost.
The result of comparing biology with
technology is this: Whether the design
arises from technology or whether it is
brought -about in: the living organism is
irrelevant. Biology and technology can
be "mixed." The generalized property
of "flying" can be built up from fairly
arbitrary, living or nonliving material, as
a specific, indivisible property belonging
to a certain form or organization or
structure of a system. This statement
belongs to the overlapping part of
Figure 3, which means that it is an
"element" of the interface of biology
and te.chnology. This can, therefore, be
formulated in the following general
statements of systems theory:
574
theory of
living
organisations
Fig. 3. After fruitful combination of biology and technology, the systems theory
separates off. Venn diagram: the circles enclose sets or collections of disciplines
having the general systems theory in the common set or interface. (If A and B are
sets, the interface of A and B, AnB = {a: aeA, aeB} is a set of generalizations.)
1. To each existing system (organiza-
tion), there are specific properties or
characteristics which, on division (analy-
sis), are lost (reduction).
Inversely, the following is equally
true:
2. In the designing of a model system
or. in the building up (synthesis) of a
real organization, specific new proper-
ties or characteristics are created (epi-
genesis, emergence).
The properties indicated as being
specific comprise as a rule the essential
reason for the existence or the purpose
of the organization. This is the systems
theoretical formulation of the old
adage: The whole is more than the sum
of its parts.
The hitherto almost insuperable ob-
stacle to exact formulation of the above
statements was the lack of understand-
ing that:
1. A concept such as an atom,
quantum, individual, population,
Ganzheit, whole, etc. 4 was merely a
symbol of one or a few indivisible
properties of the system;
2. Their indivisibility is seemingly in
contradiction to the evident experi-
mental divisibility of the concrete,
material atom or individual. What in
fact is lacking after division (for ex-
4Atomos < Gk indivisible (particle); in-
dividuum < L in = not; dividere = divide;
holos < Gk whole.
TRANSBIOLOGY
theories of nonliving
(and mixed)
organisations
TECHNOLOGIE
ECOLOGY
ECONOMY
SOCIOLOGY
ETC.
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ample, for the purpose of chemical or
physical analysis) is just the real and
often highly prized property belonging
to the particular hierarchical level of
organization. This kind of flaw in our
logic, our methods, and/or techniques
has ted to tire misconception known as
"reductionism. "
Conclusion: We have seen that there
is a (seeming) discrepancy between the
thesis of holism and the antithesis of
reductionism which inspired this en-
deavor of synthesis known as systems
theory
THE STRUCTURE OF A
WATTLED (MULTIDISCIPLINARY)
METABIOLOGICAL SYSTEM
The development of science can be
considered as made up of continually
advancing "shifts from end to means"
(Brouwer 1907; de Groot 1969 p. 6-12).
In the above, the historical run leading
to the jump to one of the ends has been
sketched: a theory of systems able to
describe the fundamental structure of
living organisms and the organizations
created by them. Thereafter, some
systems theories have already clearly
evolved into more specialized means
with which we (can) organize, cultivate,
etc. the world around us. Several au-
thors have presented their ideas in
"Trends in General Systems Theory,"
witli: its excellent introduction by the
BioScience Vol. 24 No. 10
 editor, Klir (1972). The essence is
formed by two "big metabiological
theories" which clearly bear the signa-
ture of their purpose: the mastery of
two fundamental principles of life, viz.,
hierarchy (Mesarovic) and evolution
(Klir, here described by Orchard), with
the addition of a third, wattled theory.
The theory of Mesarovic is strongly
deductive, axiomatic in design, and at-
tempts to make do with a minimum of
mathematical structure, i.e., it operates
with a greatly generalized formalism. Its
emphasis is on the study of hierarchical,
multilevel, decision-making, large-scale
systems which include especially in-
dustrial, economic, and administrative
systems (Mesarovic et al. 1970). The
solution· of the overall goal of a large-
scale system is replaced by the solution
of the family of subgoals of the sub-
systems. The time sequence plays a role
only in the form of time delays. Al-
though the authors presume the possi-
bility, the theory seems suitable only to
a very moderate degree for the descrip-
tion of processes of evolution. An in-
teresting point is that it is still difficult
to define the interaction between hier-
archical levels or strata in other ways
than as relations between "supremal and
infimal units."
It is supposed that principles and
laws on anyone stratum cannot gener-
ally be derived from those used on other
strata of the hierarchical structure. This
is clearly a holistic point of view in
which finally the human participant
remains as the irreducible decision-
making or goal-seeking element.
Klir's theory might be called induc-
tive because he identifies system traits
before he defines a system as such. A
given phenomenon (object) is specified
at a chosen space-time resolution level.
The variation in time of all quantities is
called the activity of the system. The
time-invariant relations among the
quantities are defined as behavior. The
organization is defined as the collection
of all properties producing the behavior
of the system. The structure is that part
of the organization which remains per-
manent, fixed, or constant. The so-
called UC(Universe of Cou-
plings)-structure is the set of all
elements and their couplings. The
ST(State Transition)-structure is the set
of all states and all transitions between
states. On the basis of a logical dis-
junction of these five fundamental
traits, Orchard (1972) introduces a new
definition to define a sequence of sys-
tems. This sixth definition generates a
October 1974
procedure which describes the manner
in which the fundamental traits vary in
time. This is recognized as a property
basic to all systems. It leads to a
so-called K-system of trajectories in a
time-space. Among the fundamental
problems of systems theory, Klir (1969,
p. 74) includes the above methods of
analysis and synthesis and the investiga-
tion of the system regarded as a "black
box," but nevertheless, holistic or hier-
archic principles play practically no role
in his theory. This theory seems less
applicable to problems of decision-
making, oriented particularly to the
study of evolutionary processes. The
theories of Mesarovic and Klir, thus, turn
out to be reduced theories which to some
extent might supplement each other.
General systems theory promotes
multidisciplinary integration. A very
promising attempt to achieve such in-
tegration is Wymore's (1972) "wattled
theory of systems." It comprises many
intertwined branches of mathematics,
science, and systems engineering. "The
theory has been developed to subsume
both the theory of discrete automata
and the theory of continuous systems
defined by differential equations." A
system is defined as a black box pro-
cessing transitions of state. The basic
framework of this wattle is oriented
toward the development of a methodol-
ogy for systems engineering. It seems to
me that this theory deserves special
attention because it is a heterogeneous
wattle, the multidisciplinary and in-
tegrated character of which has the edge
on homogeneous, logically or method-
ologically consistent theories.
In almost all of Klir's "Trends,"
there is a clear endeavor to base the
axiomatizing and formalizing on various
methodological research thrusts, such as
algebra, particularly set theory, topol-
ogy (Cornacchio 1972, Hammer 1972),
probability and information theory
(Ashby 1972), computer implementa-
tion (G.M. Weinberg 1972), theory of
automata (Lofgren 1972), etc. This
general trend to formalize, to diminish
conceptual confusion, narrows the orig-
inal semantic meaning of the entities
concerned. It has the grave disadvan-
tages of "poverty of fully formalized
concepts" (Kindler, quoted by Klir
1972, p. 3). Furthermore, I consider it a
disadvantage that one of the most es-
sential holistic points of departure,
namely the individuality of organisms, is
given scant attention.
To overcome these weaknesses of
formal systems with respect to the
practice of biology, use might be made
of a conceptual model of a kind pre-
viously suggested by me (Becht 1969).
Only a few lines can be presented here.
This is also a kind of wattled theory,
but, as will be evident, its wattle is quite
different from that of Wymore (1972),
because it makes less use of mathe-
matical and more use of biological
concepts, ideas, and theories.
Its center is the holistic idea that
each organization, whether the living
unicellular or multicellular organism, is,
as it were, the "carrier" of a number (n)
of indivisible (biological) properties.
These biological properties or character-
istics are defined by means of measur-
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able quantities. Their measuring requires
defined system units, countable, non-
reducible biological quanta. The most
important natural biological unit is the
individual form of organization known
as the Operational Biological Unit
(OBU, Fig. 4), because it is symbolized
by an "indivisible" unit volume or
operand in the biological phase space
(OBU = system cell = "black box" or
"white box" [Quastler 1965] = holon
[Koestler 1969 a, b) = "bion" [Isaacs
and Lamb 1969]). The fundamental
characteristic of a living organism is the
conservation of the living organizational
units, ie., organelle, organ, individual,
or population (species) (Miller 1971).
To describe the characteristics of an
OBU, a reference frame-a "biological
space"-has to be constructed. For that
purpose we can fall back on the greatest
unifying theory of biology, the theory
of evolution. To represent evolution,
use is made of pedigrees, dendrograms
or "phylogenetic symbols" (Lam 1936).
Just as a river depicted on a map is an
abstract projection of the actual stream
of water in space, so is a phylogenetic
symbol the abstraction of the living
stream of organisms in time, depicted in
an evolutionary space.
The principal dimensions of the bio-
logical or evolutionary space are diver-
sity and time. These dimensions are
used in Figure 4. The "qualitative"
diversity measures structures, along the
x-axis, in the form of information (H =~
Pi log Pi, where Pi is the part of the ith
species in the collection of all species of
structures). The "quantitative" diversity
(y-axis) is a measure of the spatial
distribution or of the physical reality of
space, i.e., mass and/or energy. The
z-axis is the dimension of the time. The
place in the biological space defines the
complexity of a biological system as the
resultant of its history of development.
575
 DIAGRAM OF OPERATIONAL
BIOLOGICAL UNIT (OBU)

, \
\
\
\

,
\
I

,,
I

I
I
I
I
I

Downloaded from http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/ at Penn State University (Paterno Lib) on September 17, 2016
/
/
/
/
/

//
I ;/
/ /

environmental rhythms favour strong / /

/ //

interaction with biological phases;

;/
-::/
parameters e.g. light and/or tempera -
ture in daytime or at night. concentrati-
on during ebb or flow etc

Fig. 4. The organization of the living individual is abstracted in the form of a systems theoretical symbol: the Operational
Biological Unit (OBU). This is represented in the biological space, of which the measuring directions (x, y, z) indicate three
groups of fundamental magnitudes, viz. information, mass and energy, and time.

Some parts of the aspects of the history
of development are mentioned below.
Growth (in the y-direction) is the
augmentation of specific magnitudes of
the living organism. This takes place on
the basis of the open, steady state
energy and material metabolism
(=Fliessgleichgewicht, von Bertalanffy;
h 0 meorhesis, Waddington). Blackith
(1965) considers the specific size as the
resultant of a large number of param-
eters, such as weight, volume, length,
surface area, etc. Many different kinds
of work and energy are produced and
perhaps conserved (Morowitz 1968).
The living individual spans the time
between birth and death (the z-direc-
tion). The duration of various events
covers (and, therefore, is preferably
expressed as "= measured by") specific
periods (T) or (working) cycles (e.g.,
muscular contraction) and by the quan-
tities derived therefrom, such as phases
of activity and quiescence, refractory
periods, and other magnitudes of wave
theory. Hence, purely formally, these
aspects together are designated "waves"
instead of the term "biological
clocks" associated with so much use-
lessness. Seen from this point of view,
the system can be represented as a
"multi oscillator" (Pittendrigh 1960) or
a "wave packet" with a group period
lying within the specific volume of
the OBU. The principal limiting unit
is the lifetime.
There is a very striking but neglected
aspect of the appearance of a general
wave property: The minimum and maxi-
mum amplitudes of OBU's are often
associated with a certain form of en-
ergy. Reserve materials can be con-
sidered as potential chemical energy
while their conversion in chains of
metabolic processes represents the
kinetic energy.
In the case of many biological
rhythms, it is not clear whether they are
described best on the basis of the
mathematical model of a harmonic or a
relaxation oscillator (Wever 1965). A
systems theoretical problem is to unify
this form with fluctuations about the
set point of a homeostatic control cir-
cuit (Machin 1964, cf. also Milsum
1972, p. 165-173).
Steady states, homeorhesis, homeo-
stasis, biological rhythms, and cycles are
reflections of general laws of conserva-
tion in the subdiscipline of physiology.
The collection of a\l y-z planes forms
a subspace in which the physiological
functions of the system are described.
Development has also structural
aspects. The abundance of forms of
living nature is classified hierarchically
by the biosystematist. The often tree-
like system of classification symbolizes
the increasing complexity of living or-
ganizations (just one division of a
branch is shown in Fig. 4). Determina-
tion of a taxonomic group is essentially
a determination of the place in the
roster of biological characteristics. Each
of the biological characteristics (phenes)
represents an indivisibly organized prop-
erty. In this simple model they are
arranged in accordance with hierarchical
information in the x-direction.
Such arranging is the task of taxon-
omy. Its cornerstone is the method of

576 BioScience Vol. 24 No. 10

comparison, used in all manner of sub-
disciplines, as a result of which relative
hierarchical values are ascribed to the
characteristics. These values are (arbi-
trarily) arranged to form taxonomic
collections of characteristics which are
called species, for example. The collec-
tions of species are used to indicate the
diversity of these species within a hier-
archically higher collection. The n-
dimensional relations are caculated as
"generalized distances." This method is
known as numerical taxonomy. The
cluster of related characteristics, the
taxon, thus calculated has been called
by Sokal and Sneath (1963) an Opera-
tional Taxonomic Unit (OTU). Accord-
ing to Cornacchio (1972), the basic
structuring in such studies is accom-
plished via topological spaces. The col-
lection of all x-y planes forms a taxo-
nomic subspace.
The indivisibility of certain biological
properties or characteristics (phenes) is
demonstrated clearly in another way,
namely, by how they behave as genetic
factors. "Mendelian" genes are in es-
sence holistic arithmetical units.
The ontogenetic development of an
indivisible (genetic) property covers the
stages from the state of minimum dif-
ferentiation, the gene (or complex of
genes) in the zygote, to the state of
maximum differentiation, the phene (or
complex of phenes) in the adult individ-
ual. In principle, an indivisible property
is symbolized by one place on the
x-axis. The question of the relationship
between the phenetic information men-
tioned above, and the genetic informa-
tion will be discussed later.
The phylogenetic construction of bio-
logical systems in evolution is repre-
sented conventionally by a direction join-
ing different states of organization in the
biological space. Orthogenesis, biological
"inertia" (Abel 1928, Fig. 4) or homeo-
stasis of a population (Darlington and
Mather 1949), is, therefore, an invariable
direction symbolizing the conservation
of organizational states in time.
The processes of life are irreversible in
time. If a unit volume of organization
(OBU) has grown from minimum to
maximum mass, energy, and informa-
tion, i.e., when it is "fully" grown, there
is no return. Then, the law of conserva-
tion operates, and the individual must
reproduce itself in some way, vegeta-
tively or generatively; in other words, it
must create a new organization in a new
volume of the biological space. The orga-
nizing of new volumes is subject to rules
of symmetry, and they in turn form the
October 1974
source of all manner of regular patterns
so abundant in living organisms.
The above system has been con-
structed from dynamic properties of
"biological building materials," i.e.,
morphological anatomical elements
(points in the x-y subspace) and physio-
logical elements of working cycles (in
the y-z subspace). By definition, the
organization of the total biological
system comprises relations between the
morphological, anatomical, and physio-
logical elements. They include the "in-
tegrating" relations, highly esteemed in
the hierarchy of the living individual, of
the circulatory, neural, and endocrine
organs, for instance. These relations are
symbolized in this model (Fig. 4) by the
transverse arrows, which represent trans-
ports of mass, energy, and information
(stimuli) and which are combined into
homeostatic control circuits. Their
symbolic task in this model is to main-
tain the specific volume of the organiza-
tion within the OBU; the real purpose is
the conservation of the living organiza-
tion, in particular of an individual or of
a species.
CONCLUSION
The application of holistic quantities
to systems theory, and specially to the
(meta) biological doctrine of evolution,
is based on the use of biological "quanta"
and biological "waves" in a space of
mass/energy, time, and information.
Outlook. The model suggests the
possibility of describing the strategy of
life within the restrictions of the laws of
conservation as a competitive process
(f(z», between available mass and ener-
gy (f(y» and the available (= achievable)
structure (information, negentropy f
(x». In that sense, evolution might be
considered as the development of an
"epigenetic landscape" (Waddington
1957, 1968, 1969, 1970) which is gov-
erned by a "striving to chaos" (the 2nd
law of thermodynamics) and a law of
living systems, a "striving to order and
organization" (in Fig. 4, displacements
to bottom left and top right respec-
tively).
The endeavors of Thom (1970,
1972) to describe epigenesis and mor-
phogenesis respectively by topological
means deserve special attention.
SUMMARY
Anthropogenesis, the evolution of
mankind, is accompanied by and de-
pendent on the creation of a collective
transbiological cultural world composed
of technology, economics, ecology, soci-
ology, etc. Because of numerous mono-
disciplinary specializations, above all in
technology and economics, it was neces-
sary to utilize excessively reduced
symbols, models, and theories of reality.
Because of the inadequacy, in actual
practice, of these mono disciplinary re-
ductions, individual man became alien-
ated from his fellow men and all nature
around him, meaning that man had
reduced or starved all sorts of "unim-
portant" relations of systems. Accord-
ingly, man lost control over the develop-
ment and (r)evolution of the great
Downloaded from http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/ at Penn State University (Paterno Lib) on September 17, 2016
transbiological systems, for the con-
servation of which he ought ethically to
consider himself responsible. .
The blending of biological and tech-
nological knowledge of regulation and
control formed the impetus for synthe-
sizing the thesis of holism and the
antithesis of reductionism to the meta-
biological systems theory. In principle,
the possibilities have thereby been
created to bring many transbiological
systems under control again.
These principles have been sketched
in a metabiological model of evolution
in which endeavors were made to de-
scribe the law of conservation of living
systems by means of holistic quantities,
particularly biological "quanta" and
biological "waves" in a space having the
coordinates mass/energy, time, and in-
formation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is grateful to V. Westhoff
of Nijmegen, P. Dullemeijer and A.A.
Verveen, both of Leiden, for their in-
terest and critical comments, to H.G.E.
Wallace for preparing the manuscript for
publication, and to J.J.A. Slippens for
preparing the illustrations. Last, but not
least, my thanks are due to the head of
my department, J.M. Denuce, who gave
me the opportunity to work on this
theme.
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