UNITED

NATIONS

International Tribunal for the Case No. IT-94-1-T

Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Date: 7 May 1997
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Original: English

IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Presiding

Judge Ninian Stephen
Judge Lal Chand Vohrah

Registrar: Mrs. Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh

Opinion and Judgment of: 7 May 1997

PROSECUTOR

v.

DU[KO TADI] a/k/a/ “DULE”

___________________________________________________________

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

___________________________________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Grant Niemann Ms. Brenda Hollis Mr. Alan Tieger

Mr. William Fenrick Mr. Michael Keegan

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr. Michaïl Wladimiroff Mr. Steven Kay Mr. Milan Vujin

Mr. Alphons Orie Ms. Sylvia de Bertodano Mr. Nikola Kosti}

Case No. IT-94-1-T 7 May 1997

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encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or systematic

violations aimed at the civilian population”, although it also stated that “[t]he hallmarks of
such crimes lie in their large-scale and systematic nature”, and that the “particular forms of
unlawful acts (murder, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, imprisonment etc.) are less
crucial to the definition [sic] the factors of scale and deliberate policy.”146 Despite this
seeming inconsistency the prevailing opinion was for alternative requirements, as is evident
from the article addressing crimes against humanity in the 1991 Report of the International
Law Commission which was entitled “Systematic or mass violations of human rights”147.

648. It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the notion of crimes
against humanity that led to the inclusion of the requirement that the acts must be directed
against a civilian “population”, and either a finding of widespreadness, which refers to the
number of victims, or systematicity, indicating that a pattern or methodical plan is evident,
fulfils this requirement. As explained by the commentary to the I.L.C. Draft Code:
(3) The opening clause of this definition establishes the two general
conditions which must be met for one of the prohibited acts to qualify as a
crime against humanity covered by the present Code. The first condition
requires that the act was “committed in a systematic manner or on a large
scale”. This first condition consists of two alternative requirements. . .
Consequently, an act could constitute a crime against humanity if either of
these conditions is met.

The commentary to the I.L.C. Draft Code further explains these requirements and
their origins. It states:
The first alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed in a
systematic manner meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The
implementation of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or
continuous commission of inhumane acts. The thrust of this requirement is to
exclude a random act that was not committed as part of a broader plan or
policy. The Nürnberg Charter did not include such a requirement. None the
less the Nürnberg Tribunal emphasized that the inhumane acts were
committed as part of the policy of terror and were “in many cases . . .
organized and systematic” in considering whether such acts constituted
crimes against humanity.
(4) The second alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed
on a large scale meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of
victims. This requirement excludes an isolated inhumane act committed by a
perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a single victim.

146
Report of the I.L.C. on the work of its Forty-ninth Session, (1994) G.A.O.R., 49th sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10, p. 76, emphasis added.
147
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-third Session, (1991) G.A.O.R., 46th
sess. Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (“I.L.C. 1991 Report”), at 265.

Case No. IT-94-1-T 7 May 1997